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However, a key condition for this positive outcome is that rms actually behave in the manner predicted by the

latter set of theories, and use this improved measurability to increase the eciency of advertising allocation by seeking out sets of target consumers for whom there is less of a price premium.

Empirical Analysis of Advertising Outcomes in the Presence of Attribution Technologies

This paper uses two dierent datasets to explore the predictions of the theoretical literature. The rst is data on advertising allocation decisions within a single media platform after the introduction of a technology which improved the measurability of advertising. The advantage of focusing initially on the eects of a single-channel attribution technology is that the eects are relatively clear-cut and easy to understand. However, of course, cross-channel attribution technologies probably have the most potential for transformative eects of online advertising markets. Therefore, I also use a second dataset that traces out the advertising allocation decisions of advertisers after adopting a media attribution system that allowed them to compare the performance of search advertising and display. In all cases, the data analysis is relatively simple and descriptive. I do not have access in this data to a counter-factual - that is, what would have happened if the advertiser had not adopted the technology, so I do not make strong causality claims. However, the simple comparative statistics do allow me to study whether the changes I observe in advertiser behavior are in line with what is described in the theoretical literature in Section 3. 4.1 Analysis of a single-channel attribution technology

This dataset stems from advertising allocations decisions made by a single rm on an individual media platform. Ads could be targeted on the basis of the keywords which were based on users characteristics that they had shared on the platform. Display advertising on this platform was priced by a second-priced position auction. This auction mechanism is 19

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