CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

OVERVIEW
Impartiality is a fundamental value in judicial ethics. It is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. The administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle.

 Impartiality applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity

SECTION 1

Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

Impartiality denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge.

Supreme Court in several cases held:

The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert to when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The complainant carries the burden of proof.

SECTION 2
Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

This provision is designed to maintain and improve public confidence in the entire judiciary as an impartial dispenser of justice.

SECTION 3
Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

Judges may, in their exercise of sound discretion, restrict themselves voluntarily from sitting in a case, but such a decision should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons.

DUTY TO SIT DOCTRINE

It is a judges duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.

RULE OF NECESSITY
The majority view is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to demands of necessity. It means that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case.

SECTION 4
Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

This Section warns judges against making any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of the proceedings before them or "impair the manifest fairness of the process.

SECTION 5
Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances where:

SECTION 5
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

 the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge that the judge is a next-door neighbor of the complainant in a case Mere divergence of opinion between a judge and a party's counsel as to applicable law and jurisprudence reasons of strained personal relationship, animosity and hostility between a judge and party or counsel

NOT GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

SECTION 5
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

Any justice or judge shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has, been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with a party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.

SOME DISQUALIFICATIONS
if the judge was formerly associated with one of the parties or their counsel notarizing the affidavit of a person to be presented as a witness in a case before him. if a judge previously represented a party if a judge is a material witness in a case, the judge may not hear the case

SECTION 5

(c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;

ECONOMIC INTEREST
"Economic interest," as set forth in the Terminology section of Rule of Conduct of US, means ownership of more than a de minimis legal or equitable interest.

DE MINIMIS INTEREST
"De minimis" denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable questions as to a judge's impartiality.

Except for situations in which a judge participates in the management of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not include:

(1) an interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common investment fund; (2) an interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant;

(3) a deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or (4) an interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.

MEMBER OF JUDGES FAMILY

Member of the judge's family means a spouse, domestic partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.

SECTION 5
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

SECTION 5

(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review.

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree;

FOURTH DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP

The following persons are relatives within the fourth degree of relationship: greatgrandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, first cousin, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew or niece.

SIXTH DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP

The sixth degree of relationship includes second cousins.

 The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts' justice

SECTION 5
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

This rule is intended to ensure judges impartiality by preventing situations in which a judge must consider familial interests in the conflicts before him or her.

SECTION 6
A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial,

SECTION 6
the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

Notably, the decision to continue hearing the case, despite the existence of reasons for disqualification should be: (1) coupled with a bona fide disclosure to the parties-in-litigation; and (2) subject to express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material or substantial.

CASE
Dr. Isagani Cruz v. Judge Philbert Inturralde RTC Antipolo City

Section 1

 April 18, 2001 Dr. Isagani Cruz filed a complaint against his wife Yolanda a Complaint for Injunction at RTC Antipolo, Branch 72 family court. The hearings were conducted by Exec. Judge Mauricio Rivera since Branch 72 has no presiding judge Parties filed joint motion to suspend with prayer of hold departure order on Mrs. Cruz. Judge Rivera granted the Motion for suspension but denied the issuance of hold departure order 9/21/2001 Mrs. Cruz filed a motion to allow her and her 2 children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to compel Dr. Cruz to return her travel documents.

Facts

FACTS
10/19/2001 Judge Iturralde assumed as the new presiding judge of Branch 72 Dr. Cruz filed his Opposition to the Motion at a hearing but during the same, Judge expressed his predisposition to grant Yolandes Motion. This supposedly constituted partiality which showed that he had already prejudged the incidents of the case. Dr. Cruz filed a Motion to Inhibit which was denied by Judge.

Respondents Comments
He merely upheld Judge Riveras earlier decision. On the Motion to Inhibit, he first met the parties and their counsels only during that hearing. He even advised the parties to appeal his Orders by way of petition for certiorari if they found it erroneous. .

ISSUE

Whether or not Judge Iturralde should be inhibited from hearing the case?

Ruling
No. As to allegation of bias and partiality, SC Circular provides that hold-departure orders may be issued only in criminal cases. the subject case is not criminal in nature, had the respondent ruled otherwise, he would have been guilty of gross ignorance of the law and/or willful violation of the Circular

 The issue of partiality has not been reasonably established, respondent cannot be faulted for denying the Motion for Inhibition. A ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot be overturned in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. It is settled that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis.

Let it be known that this Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary. However, when an administrative charge against a court personnel holds no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court employee against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes.

Case 2
LEON UMALE VS HONORABLE ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HONORABLE BENJAMIN AQUINO, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO FELICIANO, ANTONIO DAVID, CECILIO CHICO, BENJAMIN ESCANDOR, ROLANDO SAMSON AND ALFONSO CO MAY 25, 1973 Section 5 par. a

 Petitioner Leon Umale impugn the validity of the order of respondent Judge Villaluz disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against 16 accused including the 6 herein private respondents where the petitioner Is the complainant. The case was presided by the respondent from January to April 12, 1971. On April 15, respondent voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground that before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same and directed the immediate forwarding of the case to Exec. Judge of CFI of Pasig The case was then presided by Judge Benjamin Aquino

FACTS

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE VILLALUZ COMMITTED ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF, WITHOUT ANY MOTION THEREOF BY THE PARTIES, ON THE GROUND OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CASE EVEN BEFORE THE SAME WAS FILED?

 Section 1 of Rule 137 of Revised les of Court : No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

RULING
Yes. Paragraph 2 of Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.

A judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that the opinion he express in a letter addressed by him as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in the case at bar and express his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment.

 Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant, because such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the accused or in any manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.

It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to crossexamination.

CASE 3
Vernette Umali-Paco, Bernardino D. Ng, Orlando H. Habitan and Josephine F. Andrada v. Reinato G. Quilala, sued in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 57 Makati City, Aida C. Lomugdang, officer in charge and Lilia Batu, court stenographer of the same branch

FACTS
Complainants were officers of the Philippine Retirement Authority, PRA, defendant in an action for specific performance entitled Phil. Retirement Authority Members Association Foundation Inc. PRAMA vs PRA. They charged respondent Judge with bias and partiality on various occasions. Among which was when during the hearing on plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminary injunction, lead and coached a witness for PRAMA and instructed their counsel on what questions to ask

 Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion of PRAMA to set the case for hearing without giving the counsel for PRA an opportunity to oppose it. That he could very well issue the writ ex parte, on prayer of PRAMA, impressing upon the plaintiff that he was in a position to resolve the application without having to hear the evidence for defendant PRA. That he unceremoniously interrupted Atty. Paco as she was explaining a matter propounded by the court That he delegated to his acting clerk of court, Aida Lomugdang, not a member of bar, the task of receiving evidence, as well as ruling on any objections Stenographer made it appear that the session was presided by Judge when in fact he did not.

 As to respondents comments, the allegations of bias and partiality were made with little substance, that it had been usual practice to ask questions from witnesses. On issue of without giving PRA the opportunity to oppose, he explained that cases involving a prayer for injunctive relied necessitated expeditious and judicious resolution and despite of that, he did not immediately issue the writ and his willingness to hear argument of both parties negate the accusation of bias and partiality. On issue of delegating the reception of evidence, it is with the knowledge of the parties and the counsel and purely ministerial matter and with voluntarily submission, they should be deemed to be in estoppel.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Judge exhibited partiality and bias?

RULING
NO. Judge Quilala deviated somewhat from usual practice when he ignored the objection of counsel and asked the question himself. But bias and partiality could not necessarily be inferred therefrom. Considering that the witness is a Spanish national, with difficulty in understanding the questions, he must have thought it best to take a hand in the examination. The judge may aptly need to intervene in the presentation of evidence in order to expedite the resolution of a case and prevent unnecessary time.

RULING
On granting the motion of the plaintiff to set the case for an earlier hearing without giving the counsel for defendant an opportunity to oppose it, also no patent irregularity could be deduced. Prayers for injunctive reliefs are given priority in the attention of the court. Indeed under the rules, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ex parte could be issued without it being necessarily conditioned on prior notice and hearing.

Yes. On his unnecessary bickering with Atty. Paco, his utterances could easily and very well be mistaken for, if not reflective of, a mark of arrogance.

[The] statement of respondent Judge appears to be a reckless one, uncalled for x x x. Trial judges should be circumspect, carefully judicious and foremost, legally correct in their pronouncements or utterances, especially in open court, to avoid any showing of ignorance, arrogance or bias or partiality to a party. x x x Parenthetically, subject statement of respondent Judge could have been worded in a more judicially suitable manner, short of showing his irritation towards respondent PRAs counsel, which may only tend to suggest his bias against defendant PRAs counsel or partiality to the other party. Trial judges should be circumspect and act with proper judicial decorum in their pronouncements or utterances, especially in open court.

 On issue of delegating the task, Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Sec. 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. --- The judge of the court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of the evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.

Respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu, likewise, was also remiss, albeit without any apparent ill-motive, in her duty to accurately record the proceedings before the court. The afternoon session was clearly separate from the morning hearing. A transcript of stenographic notes should be a faithful and exact recording of all matters that transpire during a court proceeding.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Court finds (a) respondent Judge Reinato G. Quilala guilty for conduct unbecoming a judge and of violating Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of Court, and he is hereby penalized with a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos; (b) respondent acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang guilty of having acted in contravention with the rules on the reception by her, albeit upon the directive of respondent judge, of evidence without herself being a member of the bar, and she is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED; and (c) respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu to have been remiss in her duty to accurately reflect the circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the afternoon hearing of 19 February 2001, and she is ADMONISHED to henceforth be circumspect in her duties. Respondents are each warned against committing any further infraction on their part.

CASE 4

Rosario Castillo & Sonia Villasanta Vs. Judge Celestino Juan

FACTS
The petitioners are the offended parties in two rape cases, on two separate occasions, in the secrecy of Judge Juans chambers, the latter informed them of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused indemnify them. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of them not having testified as yet.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE JUAN SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM HEARING THE CASES?

RULING
Yes. Trial Judge is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.

 outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for disqualification.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and respondent Judge is ordered to desist from further conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape.

CASE 5

Sps.Teodorico Marfil and Teodora Espanola Vs. Judge Orlando Cuachon

FACTS
March 1980 complainants charged Judge Cuachon with gross Ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming a Judge. 1979 Maria Soto Vda de Gonzales, aunt of the wife of Judge Cuachon, filed a criminal complaint against complainant for violation of Anti-Squatting Law, before the sala of respondent Judge. Respondent took cognizance of the case and issued a warrant for the arrest of Teodorico, apprehended and detained. Complainants counsel prayed for his release.

 For failure of respondent to order the release, an urgent motion to quash the criminal action was filed by the Teodoricos counsel which not favorably acted by Judge. Complainants prayed that Judge be removed from his office. Respondents averred that he followed the usual process when the complaint is filed. He announced during the hearing that the case was called for a possible amicable settlement and when there was no possibility, he inhibited himself, thus he could no longer act on motion to quash and order of release.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE?

 Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rule of Court clearly provides: No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is peculiarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of an parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

RULING

 It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in Criminal Case No. 449 is the aunt of respondent's wife. However, notwithstanding such relationship and the above-quoted prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case. These actuations of respondent Judge opened to question his ability to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge. The fact that he subsequently inhibited himself after it became evident that no possible amicable settlement could be reached does not extenuate his culpability. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely

CASE 6
Juan C. Sandoval, now deceased, represented by his surviving spouse, Adelaida Sandoval vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Lorenzo Tan Jr.

FACTS
The property subject is a parcel of land on which an apartment building stands covered by TCT in the name of Lorenzo L. Tan Jr married to Carolina Mangampo. 1984 Lorenzo discovered that the adverse claim of one Godofredo Valmeo has been annotated on his title. An impostor had mortgaged the property. 1985 real Lorenzo met Juan Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner. Lorenzo filed a case for recovery of his property which the trial court ruled in his favor, presided partly, heard part of plantiffs evidence and ruled on motions

 By Justice Victor but the decision was penned by Lucas Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when Judge Victor was promoted. Upon elevation to Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE VICTOR SHOULD INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM DECIDING THE CASE?

 SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

RULING

: Rule 3.12 of The Code of Judicial Conduct A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where: Xx (c)the judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; xx From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case.

 The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court is the subject of review or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.