243-244 That though All the Actions of God, are entirely Free; and consequently the Exercise of his

Moral Attributes cannot be said to be Necessary, in the same Sense of Necessity as his Existence and Eternity are Necessary; yet these Moral Attributes are really and truly Necessary, by such a Necessity, as, though it be not at all inconsistent with Liberty, yet is equally Certain, Infallible, and to be Depended upon, as even the Existence it self, or the Eternity of God.

For though nothing is more Certain (as has been already Proved in the Ninth Proposition of this Discourse) than that God Acts, not necessarily, but voluntarily, with particular intention and design, knowing that he does Good, and intending to do so, freely and out of choice, and when he has no other constraint upon him but this, that his Goodness inclines his Will to communicate himself and to do Good; so that the Divine Nature is under no Necessity, but such as is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Freest Choice: (which is the Ground of all our Prayers and Thanksgivings:) yet it is nevertheless as truly and absolutely impossible for God not to do (or to do anything contrary to,) what his Moral Attributes require him to do; as if he was really, not a Free, but a Necessary Agent.

The Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, is not a necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice. The contrary to this Proposition, is the Foundation and the Sum of what Spinoza and his Followers have asserted, concerning the Nature of God. What Reasons or Arguments they have offered for their Opinion, I shall have occasion to consider briefly in my Proof of the Proposition it self. The Truth of whic, appears.