Since elsewhere you have asked me what can be called being itself, life itself and

wisdom itself; and what you yourself find doubtful, in what way at times I call God
life itself, but at times substantial life itself. I am necessarily settled that the
sanctified man of God will be absolved of this doubt. First, indeed, so many words
and now I take that it is not contrary of life or virtue itself to say they are God, and
of life or peace or power substantially. For this is said of existence, and maximally
from the first existence as the cause of all existence; but that above all, and indeed
because they are first, exist above super-substantially but you say: what do we call
being itself or life itself or whatever is absolutely and principally, or from
Since elsewhere you have asked me what can be called being itself, life itself and
wisdom itself, I amAfter Dionysius determined the peace which is constituted by
things according to divine gifts, this determines the divine perfections themselves
as they are considered in the abstract, about which he does three things. First,
remove doubts; second, solve them accordingly: And first indeed said in many
ways and now I assume that it is not contradictory to say of God that he is power
itself or life itself, as well as life itself or substantial life, peace or power. Third, their
solution confirms thereupon: And to say what belongs to these things?
It is therefore with regards to the first principle that Timothy asks about two of them
in that letter to Dionysius. First, what is life itself and wisdom itself. For this is used
frequently and uniquely by Dionysius, as is evident in the preceding. Second,
Timothy said in his letter said he is doubtful about the way in which Dionysius says
that God is to be life itself, and also when God is to be the cause of life itself; and
further, Dionysius says that he can liberate Timothy from this doubt insofar as it
was.
Thus he says: And first indeed said in many ways and now I assume that it is not
contradictory to say of God that he is power itself or life itself, as well as life itself or
substantial life, peace or power, solving the doubts raised, and first: accordingly, it
is shown in what way God is life itself, and the cause of life itself; second, solving
the first, it is shown what it is to be life itself, thus: ? He says therefore that he
does not want to assume things as though they were said simply; and further,
because life itself is not said simply, but in many ways, it is not contradictory that
we call God life itself or power itself; and again that we call him substantially, that
is the creator, life itself, or peace itself, or power itself. But it is contradictory if
this is not said in multiple ways. For when we declare God to be substantially life
itself and similar things, we praise him as the cause of all existence, from that
existent since he is maximally and exists first. For it is manifest that life itself is
prior to living, and likewise with the others. Therefore it God is the cause of the first
of these, he is the cause of all. When we truly declare God to be power itself or life
itself, God is praised as existing above all, and above them which are first among all
others, are called life itself according to some sort of excess.
Therefore when he says But you say: what we say totally to be life itself or
whatever to be absolutely and principally, and we , solving the first doubt, namely,
what is life itself; and first, repeating the question; second, excluding false intellect,
as But this that we say is not oblique, but correct; third, determining the truth, as
But to be being itself and life itself we call divine.

Therefore first he proposes from the person of Timothy what is meant when
existence itself or life itself is said, and whatever similar others; and he says
specifically absolutely, that which is abstractly, and principally. As it is the
principal of others, for life itself signifies the principle of life.
Thus when he says: But this that we say is not oblique, but correct, he excludes
errors of the intellect. To which is evidently known as the Platonic position that ideas
are separate things, since they are all said in the abstract, they are set to subsist in
the abstract as causes according to certain order, namely that first principle of
things said to be goodness itself and unity itself; and this first principle, which is
good and one essentially, is said to be the highest God. But existence is placed
under good, as is said above, and life under existence, and the others accordingly.
And similarly they were said to be under the high God to be a sort of divine
substance which is named being itself, and below these others is what is named life
itself. Therefore this to exclude straining (?) he says that which is above what can be
said, which existence itself and life itself subsist first from God, it is not something
erroneous, but it is correct and has a plain manifestation. For we do not name
something divine or angelic per se to some degree, because it is the cause of all
existence. But he adds the angels, which were called secondary gods by the
Platonists, we name angels. For only the divine existence itself supersubstantially is
the principle and substance and cause of all that exists; as he says which is referred
to the order of nature, according that the divine existence precedes all beings; the
substance belongs truly to the exemplary ratio; for it is that whose substance is its
existence which is the exemplar of all existence. But that which is called the cause
belongs to that which gives existence to existents. But similarly when we say life
itself, we do not understand this certain godly power by which life is caused, since it
is other than the preceding life of the highest God, who is the cause of all that lives,
and even life itself. And, as we collect the highest and all, we do not declare them to
be some sort of separate essences and hypostases, because they are the principles
of things and their creators, by which the Platonists said to be gods, as though selfoperating for the production of things. Yet similarly the gods, if we wish to speak
truly and properly, we would say that they do not exist in things; neither those who
posit such gods according to some certainty of science arrive upon this, or
themselves or their fathers, since neither the first Platonists nor the later ones could
accept this matter in a certain or firm science, but according to a certain deceptive
human rationale.
Therefore when he says: But being itself and life itself, we call divine, error
excluded, solves according to the truth, and he says that being itself and life itself
and similar things, are said in two ways. One way they are said is as according to
God, who is the one subersubstantial principle of all and the cause. And life itself or
being itself is said of God, since it does not live by participation in some other life,
neither is he by some other being, but is himself is own to live participated in by
creatures, and existing as the principle of living and existing of creatures. But
another way being itself and life itself are said to be powers or perfections according
to their providence in the one imparticipatable God, the creature given to
participation. For it is evident that God, who is the principle of this power, remains in
himself imparticipatable, and consequently unparticipated, however the gifts

themselves are divided in creatures, and partially received: hence participation is

said of creatures; and according to that which is participated according to propriety
of each and every participant, according to these participants and they are called
existents from nature, insofar as they participate in esse; and living insofar as they
participate in life; and divine insofar as they participate in godliness, and the others
are similarly. And since the principle, and thus God is the cause and participation
and substantificator of the participants. Yet participations themselves can be
considered in three ways. One way according to itself, as abstract and by
universality and from particularity as is signified when life itself is said. Another way
to be considered in universal, as life is called total and universal. A third way in
particular, according to that life which is called the same or of that thing. Similarly
participants can be considered in two ways. One way as a universal, as when it is
called living universally or totally. Another way in particular, as when it is said of this
or that living. And God is the cause of all of these. And he says that this is good, it
is God, first certain as their substantificator, namely, life itself and being itself and
similar things, as considered absolutely totorum ipsorum, thus to be universal and
the like; after particularities themselves