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- Petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. - The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time Disposition Petition Dismissed. William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. appear at the district attorney's office. When Camara failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an inspection under the Housing Code which states that authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. - Camara still refused to allow entry. A complaint was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. He was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. - Camara argues that A503 is contrary to the 4th and 15th Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under A507 for refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by A503. - CA held that 503 does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions. ISSUE 1. WON administrative searches can be considered as intrusion to privacy 2. WON warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being enforced 3. WON Camaras acts should be sustained HELD 1. YES Ratio One governing principle has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. Reasoning

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- The 4th Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The basic purpose of this Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. - Frank vs. Maryland would not squarely fall into place in this case. In the Frank case, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. Municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion," because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. - The Court may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason, Frank differed from the great bulk of 4th Amendment cases which have been considered by the Court. But the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases cannot be regarded as merely "peripheral." - Under the present system (in 1967), when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. 2. NO Ratio Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an inference of `probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken. Reasoning - Probable cause is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To

CAMARA V MUNICIPAL COURT 387 US 523 WHITE; June 5, 1967

FACTS - November 6, 1963 - An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's Housing Code. - The building's manager informed the inspector that Camara, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted Camara and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant. - November 8, 1963 The inspector returned again but still without a warrant so Camara still refused to let him in. - A citation was then mailed ordering Camara to

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apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. - The area inspection is a "reasonable" search of private property within the meaning of the 4th Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. 3. YES Reasoning - There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. - Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. Disposition Judgment reversed -See was convicted. He claimed that 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize this warrantless inspection of his warehouse, would violate his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ISSUE/S WON the Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection in commercial premises HELD YES -the basic component of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment - that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure is applicable to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant's locked warehouse. -Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. -In Camara v Municipal Court, we held that the Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless codeenforcement inspection of his personal residence. In Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. -(Court applied analogous case of administrative subpoena) It is these rather minimal limitations on administrative action which we think are constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial
liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards."

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establishments. The agency's particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field. Disposition Reversed CLARK, (HARLAN and STEWART join), DISSENT -Frankfurter wrote in Frank v. Maryland: "Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling places is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few." -As I read it, the Fourth Amendment guarantee of individual privacy is, by its language, specifically qualified. It prohibits only those searches that are "unreasonable." I submit that under the carefully circumscribed requirements of health and safety codes, as well as the facts and circumstances of these particular inspections, there is nothing unreasonable about the ones undertaken here. These inspections meet the Fourth Amendment's test of reasonableness and are entirely consistent with the Amendment's commands and our cases. -There is nothing here that suggests that the inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper purpose, or designed as a basis for a criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of any discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action affecting the appellant in either case. See was operating a locked warehouse - a business establishment subject to inspection. - The Court says the question is not whether the "inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a warrant." With due respect, inspections of this type have been made for over a century and a half without warrants and it is a little late to impose a death sentence on such procedures now. In most instances the officer could not secure a warrant - such as in See's case thereby insulating large and important segments

SEE V SEATTLE 387 U.S. 541 WHITE; June 5, 1967

NATURE Appeal from the decision of Supreme Court of Washington FACTS -An inspection was conducted by a representative of Seattle Fire Dept as part of a periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle's Fire Code. City of Seattle Ordinance No. 87870. - See did not permit him to enter and inspect his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed. See was arrested charged with violating 8.01.050 of the Fire Code1
1 "INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions

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of our cities from inspection for health and safety conditions. (Human nature being what it is, we must face up to the fact that thousands of inspections are going to be denied. The economics of the situation alone will force this result. Homeowners generally try to minimize maintenance costs and some landlords make needed repairs only when required to do so. Immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct possible defects are going to keep many a door closed to the inspector) -The Court then addresses itself to the propriety of warrantless area inspections. The basis of "probable cause" for area inspection warrants, the Court says, begins with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement; in determining whether an inspection is reasonable "the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement." It adds that there are "a number of persuasive factors" supporting "the reasonableness of area codeenforcement inspections. They are: long acceptance historically; the great public interest in health and safety; and the impersonal nature of the inspections - not for evidence of crime - but for the public welfare. Upon this reasoning, the Court concludes that probable cause exists "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." These standards will vary, it says, according to the code program and the condition of the area with reference thereto rather than the condition of a particular dwelling. The majority seem to hold that warrants may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry; I can find no such constitutional distinction or command. These boxcar warrants will be identical as to every dwelling in the area, save the street number itself. I ask: Why go through such an exercise, such a pretense? As the same essentials are being followed under the present procedures. In my view this will not only destroy its integrity but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS: - The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. - After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent. - After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal. - The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. ISSUE: WON there RA 2056 is unconstitutional because it constitutes unlawful delegation of judicial power HELD: NO Reasoning - The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that R.A. 2056 merely empowers

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the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession

It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2. - It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that principle is recognized by the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process of law. - The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws.

(PAST DIGESTS)

LOVINA V. MORENO 9 SCRA 557 REYES, J.B.L: November 29, 1963

CHINA BANKING CORP & CBC PROPERTIES AND COMPUTER CENTER INC. v MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND

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307 SCRA 443 GONZAGA-REYES; MAY 19, 1999
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from RTC order FACTS - Petitioners China Banking Corp. (CBC) and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc. (CBC-PCCI) are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) waiver certificates for having a Superior Retirement Plan pursuant to Sec. 19 of PD 1752 (Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980) which provides: employers who have their own existing provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund. - In June 1994, RA 7742 amending PD 1752 was approved. In Sept. 1995, respondent HDMF Board issued an amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742 (The Amendment), and pursuant to said amendment, the Board issued a circular entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752 (Guidelines). Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a provident/retirement AND housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage. - CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the applications were disapproved after a finding that their retirement plan is not superior to PagIBIG Fund. The other reason is that under the amended IRR of RA 7742, to qualify for waiver, a company must have retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG funds. - Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claimed that the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF.

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- Respondent Board filed motion to dismiss which was granted by the RTC. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by the RTC on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the CA. RTC stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. - Petitioners filed a MFR which was denied. They then filed this appeal contending that it does not question the power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations to implement PD 1752 and Sec.5 of RA 7742; however, the Amendment and Guidelines issued by it should be set aside and declared null and void for being inconsistent with the enabling law, PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption for coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. - Respondents contend that there is no question of law involved. The interpretation of the phrase "and/or" is not purely a legal question and it is susceptible of administrative determination. In denying petitioners application for waiver of coverage, respondent Board was exercising its quasi-judicial function and its findings are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Moreover, the Amendment and the Guidelines are consistent with the enabling law, which is a piece of social legislation intended to provide both a savings generation and a house building program. ISSUE WON respondent Board acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment and Guidelines insofar as they impose as a requirement for exemption from coverage or participation in the HMDF Fund the existence of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan. HELD YES. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer from a legal infirmity and should be set aside. Ratio The rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative agency. - Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. - The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Reasoning Sec. 19 of PD 1752 provides: An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes. - On June 17, 1994, RA 7742, amending certain sections of PD 1752 was approved. Sec. 5 of the said statute provides that within sixty (60) days from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual Fund shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of (this) Act. - Pursuant to the above authority the Home Development Mutual Fund Board of Trustees promulgated The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7742 amending PD 1752, Rule VII Sec.1 thereof reads: SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension-Existing Provident or Retirement Plan. An employer and/or employee group who has an existing provident or retirement plan as of the effectivity of RA 7742, qualified under RA 4917 and actuarially determined to be sound and reasonable by an independent actuary duly accredited by the Insurance Commission, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. - Subsequently, the HDMF Board adopted in a Special Board Meeting, Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742. As

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amended, Rule VII on "Waiver or Suspension" now reads: RULE VII. WAIVER OF SUSPENSION SEC1 Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing Provident/Retirement and Housing Plan. Any employer with a plan providing both for a provident/retirement and housing benefits for all his employees and existing as of Dec. 14, 1980, the effectivity date of Presidential Decree No. 1752, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. - On Oct.23, 1995, HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, was promulgated. The Circular pertinently provides: I. GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION OF FUND COVERAGE: A. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN AND HOUSING PLAN ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund coverage, provided: - In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably. - It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Sec.19 of PD 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. Disposition petition is given due course and the assailed Orders of the court a quo are SET ASIDE. The Amendment and the Guideline, insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to the retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund coverage, are hereby declared null and void.

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- It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President, cancelled such meeting. - There was thereafter a general membership resolution reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success. After setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to inspection by the members - On December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court, sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union - Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v AIRSPAN CORP (Sarah) CATURA V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 37 SCRA 303 FERNANDO: January 30. 1971
NATURE: Petition for review FACTS: - On December 27, 1966, a complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered was filed by the prosecution division of the respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. - In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply.

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related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967. labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof." - The complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. - The power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made.

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customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The findings of the court showed that the money was paid to the collector under protest, and involuntarily. It was established that the company was coerced by the certainty that, if it did not pay, the collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships plying between New York City and foreign ports at periodical and definite sailings.

There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. - The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with a preliminary injunction ISSUE: WON respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order. HELD: YES Reasoning - The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization." ... "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member." ... "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate

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c. Imposition of Fines and Penalties OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v STRANAHAN 214 US 320 White; June 1, 1909
FACTS:

Both the Secretary and collector were expressly authorized by law, entitled An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, enacted on March 3, 1903. Section 9 of said Act, under which the Secretary and collector acted, provides: That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company other than railway lines entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or the owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease; and if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Treasury [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] that any alien so brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time, such person or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) for each and every violation of the provisions of this section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be remitted. - Oceanic Steam argues that:

1.

Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of

However complete may be the power of Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion of aliens, and to entrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to administrative officers, nevertheless the particular legislation here in question is repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a purely

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administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment malady, as disclosed by the examination, establishes that the alien was suffering with the disease at the time of embarkation, and that such fact would have been then discovered had the medical examination been then made by the vessel or its owners, as the stature requires.

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and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress. 2. The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief. - The legislation of Congress from the beginning has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.

2.

Even though it be conceded that Congress may, in some cases, impose penalties for the violation of a statutory duty, and provide for their enforcement by civil suit instead of by criminal prosecution, nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion that a penalty may be authorized, and its collection committed to an administrative officer without the necessity of resorting to the judicial power. In all cases of penalty or punishment, enforcement must depend upon the exertion of judicial power, either by civil or criminal process, since the distinction between judicial and administrative functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an administrative power to enforce a penalty without resort to judicial authority. The fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the 5th Amendment, because amounting to a taking of property without due process of law, since, as asserted, the fines were imposed, in some cases, without any previous notice, and in all cases without any adequate notice or opportunity to defend.

3.

Issue: WON the power conferred upon the named officials is consistent with the Constitution Held: YES

The power thus lodged in the officers was intended to be exclusive and that its exertion was authorized as the result of the probative force attributed to the official medical examination for which the statute provides, and that the power to refuse clearance to vessels was lodged for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction and its collection to be acts of administrative competency, not requiring a resort to judicial power for their enforcement. - The report of the Senate committee on immigration is considered: Section 10 [which became Section 9] therefore imposes a penalty of $100, to be imposed by the [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] for each case brought to an American port, provided, in his judgment, the disease might have been detected by means of medical examination at the port of embarkation. This sufficiently guards the transportation lines from an unjust and hasty imposition of the penalty, insures a careful observance of the law, and leaves in their own hands the power to escape even a risk of the fine being imposed, since they can refuse to take on board even the most doubtful case until certified by competent medical authority to be entirely cured. - Courts discussion on Oceanic Steams arguments:

3.

Court did not think it necessary to entertain the controversy, as it is evident that the statute unambiguously excludes the conception that the steamship company was entitled to be heard, in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as the plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that subject to the medical officers for which the statute provided.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v PHIL. AIRLINES INC. 63 SCRA 524 ESGUERRA; APRIL 30, 1975
NATURE Appeal from 2 resolutions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) FACTS - On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio to Manila who could not be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. - Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA 776, the CAB, through the first questioned resolution, imposed a fine of P5000 upon PAL.

The exaction which the section authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose, when considered in the light afforded by the context of the statute, is clearly but a power given as a sanction to the duty which the statute places on the owners of all vessels, to subject all alien emigrants, prior to bringing them to the United States, to medical examination at the point of embarkation, so as to exclude those afflicted with the prohibited diseases. In other words, the power to impose the exaction which the statute confers on the Secretary is lodged in that officer only when it results from the official medical examination at the point of arrival not only that an alien is afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases, but that the stage of the

1.

The various sections of the Act accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the Act should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of penalty, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. The sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty required by the statute,

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Upon PALs MFR, the CAB, through the second questioned resolution, reduced the fine to P2500. It also stated that Public Act 4271, as amended, requires the grantee (of a legislative franchise for air service), PAL Inc. to comply with the provisions of RA 776, and regulations promulgated thereunder from time to time. - PAL claims that there is nothing in RA 776 which expressly empowers the CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case. The power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the CAB by mere implication or interpretation. ISSUE WON the CAB has authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to impose penalties HELD YES. Ratio The CAB is empowered to impose administrative penalties or those violations punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations but no power to impose fines in the nature of a criminal penalty. Reasoning RA 776 created the CAB and the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) so that in the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity certain declared policies which include: the regulation of air transportation in such manner as 'to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; to promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines; (Sec. 4, RA 776) the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act (Sec. 10 RA 776) power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own initiative, any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (Sec. 10(c) (1) RA 776) power to investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued. (Section 10(D) RA 776) power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder. It has the power also either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be. (Sec. 10(F) (G) RA 776) power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec. 32(17) RA 776) - The fine imposed on PAL by CAB is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the provisions of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of a criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC, because the fine in this case was imposed by CAB because of PALs violation of CAB rules on flagstops without previous authority. The CAB explained in its resolution that the imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. - There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (RA 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the CAB of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise fines and civil penalties, a power which is expressly given to the CAA whose orders or decision may be

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reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the CAB would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. - However, PAL committed the violation of the CAB regulation against flagstops without malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same. For this reason, the penalty imposed by the CAB may be mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum. Disposition Resolution appealed from is modified by reducing the administrative fine imposed on the appellant PAL to P100.

SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER 99 Phil 762 BAUTISTA ANGELO; August 25, 1956
NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Dept Store - This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law. - The employers denied the charge. They claim that the complainant was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co-

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employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in court. - the court found the following facts: Nena Micaller was earning P4.80 a day. After every New Year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus whereas the other employees were only given P60. For three consecutive years, she was given a first prize for being the best seller, the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organized a union among the employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the National Labor Union. Later, the National Labor Union sent a petition to the store containing ten demands and Nena was called by the management for questioning and, in the manager's office, she was asked who the members of the union were, but she pretended not to know them. - Richard Yang and Yu Si Kiao, together with a brother-in law, went to Nenas house and questioned her regarding her union membership. - Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, and there she was again questioned regarding her union activities and was even made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union. - the manager of the Store, Yu Ki Lam asked each the every employee whether they were members of the union. - the union gave notice to strike to the management. Upon receipt of the notice, the management hired temporary employees equal in number to the old. The new employees were affiliated with another labor union. - an information for threats was filed against Nena Micaller before the municipal court. This was dismissed. Another information was filed against Nena Micaller for slander. A third information for slander was filed against her before the same court. And on November 30, she was dismissed for "insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls inside the store during business hours." And on the strength of these facts the court found respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to pay a fine of P100. - Petitioners contend that section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 being penal in character should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in that sense their guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences as was done by the industrial court. In other words, it is contended that the evidence as regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above-named petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon them is unjustified. ISSUE WON petitioners can be legally punished by a fine of P100. HELD NO. Ratio The power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified. Reasoning SEC. 25. Penalties.- Any person who violates the provisions of section three this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, or both by such free and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court. Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense. - The above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the penalties therein provided. It merely states that they may be imposed "in the discretion of the court." - The word court cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution. We refer to those which postulate that "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that "In all criminal prosecution the accused . . . shall enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf". - The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations in dealing with the unfair labor practice cases negates those

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constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in court for the courts of law or equity cannot be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this act that the Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and its Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objective and without regards to technicalities of law of procedure. - legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation show that the real intent of congress was to place that court on the same footing as the Public Service Commission and the Court of Industrial relations by confining their jurisdiction exclusively to civil matters. - on the issue of WON there was unfair labor practice, the court did not rule on this as it involves questions of fact. The industrial court has made a careful analysis of the evidence and has found the petitioners have really subjected complaint and her co-employees to a series of questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting unfair labor practice. This finding is binding upon this Court following well-known precedents. Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of P100 imposed upon petitioners.

U.S. VS BARRIAS 11 Phil 327 Tracey; Sept 24 1908

FACTS - The defendant was charged in CFI Manila with violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. After a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being

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towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. - Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. - By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows: SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both. - Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. ISSUE WON Act No. 1136 is valid (as far as Sections 5 and 8 are concerned) HELD YES - The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. - This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) - This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of

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canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. - In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying: Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature. Disposition judgment of the CFI as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is revoked, and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of $25

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), v BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS G.R. No. L-43653 MARTIN; Nov 29, 1977
NATURE Petition for review by certiorari FACTS - This involves 2 cases consolidated by the Court for decision. - In the first case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela,

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informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, Isabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. - In the second case, Pacifico Innocencio claims that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the nonreceipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lources Innocencio) has not been notified about its non-delivery. As a consequence Pacifico Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada, Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. - After hearing, the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Hence, this appeal ISSUE WON the Board can impose a disciplinary fine on RCPI HELD NO. RATIO The Board exceeded its authority when it imposed a fine on RCPI since its enabling law does not authorize it to do so. Its power is limited only to management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by radio companies. REASONING The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. - In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: "There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the impress of validity. - In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Board lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion. Disposition both decisions of Board of Communications reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction

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adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4 - On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33, which provides among others (pls see original for list of offenses and penalties)
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR) A. LPG Refiller/Marketer 1st Offense Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder 2nd Offense Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder 3rd Offense Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

- It is alleged that Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the assailed Circular) listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33 enumerated and specifically defined the prohibited/punishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not included in the law. Issue WON the circular is valid Held Yes - For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. 1.The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on

PEREZ V LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC 492 SCRA 638 QUISUMBING; Aug 28, 2007
Facts - Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of

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cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. 2.As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. - Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law. of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. Administration Code authorizes the establishment of settlement area for nonChristians. A Resolution was passed by the Provincial Board of Mindoro providing a selected public Land in Tigbao as site for permanent sewttlement of the Mangyans. -The resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior and it was ordered that Mangyans who refuses to comply shall be imprisoned. Rubi and other Mangyans were arrested; thus, they applied for Habeas Corpus. Issue WON there was invalid delegation of legislative power HELD NO - There is distinction between delegation of power to make law which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Government with approval of the Provincial Board the power to execute the law. The Provincial Government and the Provincial Board are best fitted to select the most favorable site for improving the lives of the Mangyans. The Government must guarantee peace and order to encourage immigrants to invest in Mindoro and to protect crops and persons of settlers of Mindoro from predatory men. Disposition: Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.

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LAUREL; June 12, 1939
NATURE Appeal from judgment of the CFI FACTS - Rosenthal and Osmea (appellants) were charged and found guilty of violating Act 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law, in the CFI. They both appealed to the IAC, but since the appeal also questions the constitutionality of Act 2581, the case was referred to the SC - the law essentially requires corporations who want to offer securities (shares of stocks) to obtain a certificate or license from the Insular Treasurer. The Treasurer is to issue the same if, upon his examination of documents, he deems it advisable and satisfactory that the stocks be sold in the Philippines. The Act also gives the Treasurer the authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel the permit. The decision of the Treasurer was appealable to the Sec. of Finance - the acts complained of consisted in buying and selling of the stocks at high and speculative prices (they bought at P5/share and sold at P100P300/share). Also, they allegedly were not licensed to sell stocks. - on appeal, the appellants contend that the law was unconstitutional on 3 grounds: undue delegation of legislative power (for although it empowers the treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits, no standard or rule was fixed which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Treasurer); does not afford equal protection before the law; and that it is vague and ambiguous ISSUE WON the law is unconstitutional on any of the three grounds

C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS 1. Interest of Law and Order

OF

RUBI, ET AL. v THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO 39 PHIL 661 MALCOLM, J.:March 7, 1919
Nature: An application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. Facts: - It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials

2. Public Interest PEOPLE V ROSENTHAL AND OSMEA 68 Phil 328

HELD NO Ratio Act 2581 is not unconstitutional for not setting a standard for the exercise of discretion, violating equal protection of laws, nor for being vague and ambiguous.

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Reasoning On fixing no standard to guide issuance/ cancellation of permits: - The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. - Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence. - The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the rule of law was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. - the maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non potest delegare has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved. - Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business. On denial of equal protection of the law: - Another contention is that the Act denies equal protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions. - Hall v Geiger-Jones: If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law. On vagueness and uncertainty of the law: People v Fernandez and Trinidad: An Act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. - An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith. Disposition Decision affirmed with modifications (lower penalty).

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INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO v PANGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR 70 PHIL 602 LAUREL; November 25, 1940
NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari to review the resolution of CIR FACTS - June 2, 1939 > the Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial Relations that an industrial dispute existed between the HARDWOOD and its employees who are members of PANGIL and that the controversy [which involved 2) setting the minimum daily wages of common laborers at P1 because before P0.70 a day was paid regardless whether employed in a town or mountain camp; 3) devising a proper schedule of rate of wages for all laborers; and 4) rate of wages for the mountain camps should be higher by 20% over those given in the town] was a proper one to be dealt with CIR in the public interest under Sec 4 of CA 103. - September 19, 1939 > DECISION ADICIONAL of Leopoldo Rovira of the CIR "The agreement, the Court said in part justified claims under 2 and 4 that affect the type of day laborers, and in consequence ordered the company to appeal to pay wages to their workers as a fair and reasonable amount not lower P1 daily for work in the mountains, and for those who conduct their work in the plains an amount not get off of P0.90 per day, based on eight (8) hours per day, excluding "overtime" no less than twenty-five (25) percent on the day laborers as shall be fixed... " - October 17, 1939 > MFR filed with CIR of the DECISION ADICIONAL - November 28, 1939 > while MFR pending, HARDWOOD filed a motion praying that CIR has no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to demands 2 and 4, alleging (1) that the CIR has no authority to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with a particular and specific industrial dispute under Sec 4 of CA 103; (2) that such authority would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the CIR and would deny HARDWOOD the equal protection of the laws, thus rendering said section unconstitutional and void.

3. Justice, equity and substantial merits of the case

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- December 23, 1939 > CIR by resolution in banc, denied the MFR as well as the motion of November 28 ISSUES 1. WON the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of under Sec 4 of CA 103 2. If it has, WON such grant of power is unconstitutional and void HELD 1. YES Reasoning - Sec 4 CA103 is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order to prevent nonpacific methods in the determination of industrial and agricultural disputes. "This bill," thus begins the explanatory statement of Bill No. 700, "creating a Board of Industrial Relations... Provides compulsory arbitration... In accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the Constitution, which provides that' The state may establish binding arbitration." Incorporating the conclusion reached by a committee appointed a year or so before, it was observed that "under the current legislation" evidently referring to Act no. 4055 "there is no suitable instrument to avoid strikes. The Department of Labor merely occupies the role of peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its decisions are not binding for either employers or workers. The people have reached a level of industrial development, which makes it imperative that the government's intervention in these conflicts to be more effective. . . " (Ang Tibay v CIR) And in order that this declaration of policy may not just be an empty gesture, CA 103, in various sections thereof, has provided the means towards its realization. Thus in Sec 4, the CIR is empowered to "take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regard wages, shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers." - The petitioner suggests that if an industrial dispute between an employer and its employees causes a strike or lockout arising from differences as regards a minimum wage, CIR would be without authority to take cognizance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless the President, under Sec 5 of CA103, directs it to investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry. To adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to "settle all question, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees" and to frustrate the very objective of the law, namely, to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the Government could be made effective in order to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. It is fundamental that the intention and policy of the National Assembly, as expressed in the enactment, should be effectuated, and the Act should receive a construction that will lead to this result. 2. NO Reasoning - The contention that Sec 4 CA 103 is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the court and depriving HARDWOOD equal protection of the laws because the provision "does not indicate in what manner, by what standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum wages under said section" is without merit. - Sec 20 CA103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal

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protection clause of the Constitution. (Antamok Gold Fields Mining Company v CIR, June 28, 1940.) Disposition Petition for certiorari is denied

4. What is moral, educational or amusing MUTUAL FILMS v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 236 U.S. 230 McKenna, J.; February 23, 1915
NATURE Appeal from an order FACTS - Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing, selling, and leasing films, the films being produced in other states than Ohio, and in European and other foreign countries. Complainant has on hand at its Detroit exchange at least 2,500 reels of films which it intends to and will exhibit in Ohio, and which it will be impossible to exhibit unless the same shall have been approved by the board of censors. The board has demanded of complainant that it submit its films to censorship, and threatens, unless complainant complies with the demand, to arrest any and all persons who seek to place on exhibition any film not so censored or approved by the censor congress on and after November 4, 1913, the date to which the act was extended. It is physically impossible to comply with such demand and physically impossible for the board to censor the films with such rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed with its business, and the delay consequent upon such examination would cause great and irreparable injury to such business, and would involve a multiplicity of suits. ISSUE/S 1. WON the statute violates the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution 2. WON the statute is a permitted delegation of legislative power HELD 1. NO. It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the

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cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the police power of the State. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. It was this capability and power, and it may be in experience of them, that induced the state of Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions, as it does in its Criminal Code, to require censorship before exhibition, as it does by the act under review. We cannot regard this as beyond the power of government. 2. YES. The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power, and void for that if not for the other reasons charged against it, which we have discussed. While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,' while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies. - The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power, and void for that if not for the other reasons charged against it, which we have discussed. While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,' while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies. Disposition Petition is denied.

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FACTS - A statute makes it unlawful "to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel, unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department . . . ." The statute further provides: "The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto." - Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. It owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the United States a film produced in Italy entitled "The Miracle." - After having examined the picture, the motion picture division of the New York education department, acting under the statute, issued to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The Miracle," with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy called "Ways of Love. - For a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways of Love" was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price. - The New York State Board of Regents, which by statute is made the head of the education department, received "hundreds of letters, telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other communications" both protesting against and defending the public exhibition of "The Miracle." - The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested three members of the Board to view the picture and to make a report to the entire Board. After viewing the film, the committee reported that in its

5. What is sacrilegious JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. v WILSON 343 U.S. 495 CLARK; May 26, 1952
NATURE Appeal from decision of CA of New York

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opinion there was basis for the claim that the picture was "sacrilegious." - Appellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the Regents. Among the claims advanced by appellant were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the guaranty of separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion; and, (3) that the term "sacrilegious" is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. - The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant's contentions and upheld the Regents' determination. The New York Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. ISSUE WON a New York statute which permits the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are "sacrilegious" is constitutional. HELD NO. - To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule. - The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. - New York's highest court says there is "nothing mysterious" about the statutory provision applied in this case: "It is simply this: that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule . . . ." This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. - In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. - Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures. - Since the term "sacrilegious" is the sole standard under attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different question from the one now before us.

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7. Reasonableness as an implied standard WISCONSIN INSPECTION BUREAU v WHITMAN 196 Wis 427 (Giulia) 8. To promote simplicity, economy or efficiency CERVANTES vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL 91 SCRA 359 REYES; May 26, 1952
NATURE Petition to review a decision of the Auditor General. FACTS - Cervantes is the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors, grant to him of quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month was approved. Submitted to the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was disapproved by the said Committee on the strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at a sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance. - NAFCO is a government controlled corporation, therefore subject to the provisions of RA 51 and EO 93. RA 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government-owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. Pursuant to this authority, the President, promulgated EO 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council. The council was to advise the President in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations

6. Adequate instruction

and

efficient

PACU v SECRETARY 97 Phil 806 (Ajang)

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and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. - The petitioner filed this petition for review after his motion for reconsideration was denied for the same reasons. ISSUES 1. WON EO 93 is null and void because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive 2. WON quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per annum. HELD 1. NO. Ratio So long as the Legislature lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute there is no undue delegation. Reasoning Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in governmentcontrolled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. 2. Ratio Regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of the powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. DISPOSITION Petition dismissed.

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PEOPLE v JOLIFFE (Kiyo)

Dean Carlota
WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR HELD NO. The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been

IV. PROCEDURE

ADMINISTRATIVE

A. BOOK VII, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 (Please see separate copy) B. IN RULE-MAKING, PRICE, WAGE OR RATE FIXING C. IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES 1. Rules of Procedure 2. Due Process a. Cardinal Primary Rights ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69 Phil 635 LAUREL; February 27, 1940
FACTS - The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents. ISSUE

9. Maintain monetary stability, promote rising level of production and real income

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especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. - In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. - This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.

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survey Hernandez lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay of the proceedings. -Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered. -Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the orders revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below -CFI: dismiss with costs ISSUES 1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the hearing 2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it 3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings valid (other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included) HELD 1. NO Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the

ASPREC V ITCHON 15 SCRA 921 SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966

NATURE Petition for review FACTS -Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would

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law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 2. YES Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. 3. YES Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

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the cause of his dismissal. - POEA considered the case submitted for resolution by mutual agreement of the parties after submission of their respective position papers and supporting documents. POEA Administrator Achacoso ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. - On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. ISSUE/S 1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative proceedings 2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed HELD 1. NO Ratio Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. DUE PROCESS- Cardinal Primary Rights - In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. - These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Adjudication Office. Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of due process. Reasoning Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and supporting documents had become parts of the records and were considered by the POEA and by the NLRC. 2. YES Ratio Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. - Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires NOTICE and HEARING. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the

VINTA MARITIME V NLRC (Basconcillo) 284 SCRA 656 PANGANIBAN; January 3, 1998
NATURE Special civil action of certiorari FACTS - Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. - The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay. They claim that he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed. - The employee denied the allegations against him; contrary to his employers claim, he was actually surprised when he was told of his dismissal. This occurred after he had a verbal altercation with a British national, regarding the lack of discipline of the Filipino crew under the engineers supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding

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particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. -The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages -Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari ISSUE WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob HELD NO Ratio The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Reasoning -CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. -In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. -The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not

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render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such crossexamination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. -Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order. Disposition Petition is dismissed.

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION) 86 SCRA 27 MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS -In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". -In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. -While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the company. -The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob -During the hearing of Bachrachs petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, was presented as the lone witness -After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. -The employee's association filed a motion praying that: (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records

UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA (AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE) G.R. No. 134625. MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
NATURE Petition for review FACTS -Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitors visa. she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. -After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." -Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense.

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-After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo JoaquinPaz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyes article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal. -Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. -The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. -The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondents name. -Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. -Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. -Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. -Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn. -In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. -The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993. -Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. -During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter. -Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard. -BOR withdrew degree -TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA reversed ordering BOR to restore her doctoral degree. ISSUE WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process HELD NO. Reasoning In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all

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resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents. Disposition Petition for mandamus DISMISSED

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. V. CA (SEC. OF AGRI AND NATURAL RESOURCES) G.R. No. L-49711. AQUINO; November 7, 1979
NATURE Petition for review FACTS -This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper for Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines. -The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment, confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the Minister of Natural Resources should review anew

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the decision of the Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows: (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixtynine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloa, now the private respondentsappellees, were duly located and registered (pp. 224-231, Record on Appeal). (2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. ISSUE WON Gozun correctly reviewed his own decision HELD NO. Reasoning Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides: "SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: "Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date of its receipt. "In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned." (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June 18, 1952). Undoubtedly, the provision of section that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court; secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law). A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review.Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness. Disposition Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources SET ASIDE

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Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of Lao and Perez, petitioner was charged by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses: "(1) Dishonesty; "(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons; "(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws; "(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations; "(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service." - Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. - Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME Trading Corporation. - Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best

RIVERA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 240 SCRA 43 VITUG; JAN 4, 1995

NATURE

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interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held Rivera guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its resolution, the MSPB denied the motion. - Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. The CSC dismissed the appeal of Respondent George Rivera, finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 94-1276. - Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. The SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. ISSUE WON petitioner was denied due process when Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC HELD YES. - In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case." - Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990. cdrep Dispositive Resolution set aside, case remanded to CSC

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certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence. - Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS. - However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted - GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution. - More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. - GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by evidence. - Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and AIFC. - GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed to service GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment. - GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to the Office of the President. - At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it. - The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. - The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied. Issues: 1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. (PHILS.), INC. 187 SCRA 409 GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 23, 1991
Nature: Appeal Facts: - GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations by the GTEB and, as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for

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2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the final judgment in was a judgment on the merits. Held: 1. NO. In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didnt commit GAD as GTEB indeed violated the right to due process of Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun. The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the records. RATIO: Evidence on record must be fully disclosed to the parties. 2. NO. - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in midair cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res judicata. Reasoning: - For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: . . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action. - The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point." (Deang v. IAC). - The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents. - The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other subsequent cases. - The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence. - At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division, - Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however, is not without exceptions. - As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. - Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. - Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989]) - In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families . -Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the Malacaang decision. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from

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the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation. Dispositive: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED. Separate Opinion FELICIANO-concurring: I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that petitioner American Inter-fashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the President in rendering its decision in OP Case No. 3781 dated 7 September 1989.

PEFIANCO V. MORAL 322 SCRA 439 BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000

NATURE Petition for review of decision of CA FACTS - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision. - Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied. - Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus,

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he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. CA sustained TC. - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco. ISSUES 1. WON the order of the TC is proper 2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report HELD 1. NO. - Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied. - Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified. 2. NO. - Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. - In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. - Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. Disposition Petition is granted.

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the Ombudsman or pending resolution, except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of 7 treasury warrants. CICS Director Angel Quizon submitted to the Chief, PNP, a memorandum confirming respondents allegations. - By command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was suspended from the police service for 90 days. Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within 5 days from receipt of the complaint. - Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. - The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer. - The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondent's dismissal from the PNP service. The PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary Dismissal Officer. - The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll syndicate, unexplained assets or wealth, and falsification of public documents (falsified his transcript of records with PUP) - Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board, which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP. - Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975. - After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process requirement of the Constitution. ISSUE WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the National Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground that respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed against him HELD YES, the requirements of sufficiently complied with. due process were

NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE G.R. No. 129914 PARDO; May 12, 2000
NATURE Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - A newspaper published an article saying that Bernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen, firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated from the service. - President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. The Secretary referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges. - Respondent was informed of the article and S/Supt. Romeo Acop ordered him to explain through affidavit. - Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by

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Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trialtype proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Reasoning - Record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Disposition Petition GRANTED. an advantage if they had real property in the US. He claimed that Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of Montemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. He also attached a Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. While Montemayor participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents, Bundalian could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. PCAGC repeatedly required Montemayor to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (he did not file his SALN from 1992-1994), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. He ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. - The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, ordered Montemayors dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. His MFR was denied and his appeal to the CA was dismissed. ISSUES 1. WON Montemayor was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC HELD 1. NO. Ratio The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Reasoning The PCAGC exerted efforts to notify Bundalian of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. Be that as it may, Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. He voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counteraffidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a

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reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the CA. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. - The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant did not divest the PCAGC of its authority. Under Section 3 of EO 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. It is not uncommon that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service. - In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

MONTEMAYOR V BUNDALIAN GR No. 149335 PUNO; July 1, 2003

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - An unverified letter-complaint, was received from LUIS BUNDALIAN by the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. It accused EDILLO MONTEMAYOR, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth. Montemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot in California, making a down payment of US$100,000. His in-laws in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property. It accused Montemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects. - Montemayor submitted his counter-affidavit before the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. They were advised by an immigration lawyer (they wanted to emigrate) that it would be

SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC 419 SCRA 354 (Sarah)

AUTENCIO V MANARA 449 SCRA 46 PANGANIBAN; January 19, 2005

NATURE

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Petition for Review under Rule 45 FACTS - Manara lodged a complaint against Autencio for dishonesty and misconduct in office. - after hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the City of Cotobato declared Autencio guilty of misconudct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. - petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which modified the decision to grave misconduct, and imposed the penalty of dismissal for cause with all its accessories - petitioner, in her motion for reconsideration, alleged that she had waived her right to present her evidence at a formal hearing to submit the case for resolution, only because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence. - petitioner elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the CSC resolutions; CA denied reconsideration. ISSUE/S 1. WON petitioner was deprived of substantial due process because she was made to believe that she would be liable for the lesser offense of simple negligence. HELD 1. NO Reasoning On the formal charge against her, petitioner had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of personnel in the Assessors Office to support her claim of innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she -assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. A formal or trialtype hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured. Settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial evidence. Disposition Petition is denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution affirmed.

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her turn at the arrival immigration counter, her passport was examined by Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga. Noting that Ms. Weng, a Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport, Ms. Pajarillaga suspected that the formers passport was fake. Ms. Weng was taken out of the queue and brought to Respondent who was the duty intelligence officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak in Chinese, asked respondent by sign language that she wanted to meet a friend who was waiting at the NAIA arrival area. Respondent approved the request and accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival area. Thereafter, Respondent, with Ms. Weng and her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration area. While inside the office of Respondent, Ms. Weng asked that her passport be returned. Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of Respondent. The money was grabbed by Respondent. Shortly, her passport was returned ans [sic] she was allowed to leave. When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against Respondent." - Then BID Commissioner, Zafiro L. Respicio, issued Personnel Order No. 93-179-93 commencing an administrative case against petitioner Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. - During the pendency of the administrative case, petitioner was convicted of robbery before the Sandiganbayan regarding the same incident. - Petitioner filed motion to dismiss admin case. Denied. Indorsement mentioned (SEE NATURE) was issued. ISSUE/S 1. WON petitioner was denied due process HELD 1. NO. Ratio Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural

SAMALIO V CA (CSC, DOJ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION) 454 SCRA 462 CORONA; March 31, 2005
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 24, 1999 decision, as well as the September 1, 1999 resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 which in turn affirmed the November 26, 1997 resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The aforementioned CSC resolution upheld the August 30, 1996 1st Indorsement of then Justice Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona confirming the penalty of dismissal from service imposed by the Bureau of Immigration upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty, oppression, misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service in connection with his act of extorting money from Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a foreign national.

FACTS - Petitioner was formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. - In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutors office of Pasay City recommended that petitioner Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan under the following facts: "x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at the NAIA from Saipan. While waiting for

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requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Reasoning Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony. The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the Secretary of Justice confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the BID are supported by substantial evidence. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the case on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on the records of the proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against petitioner before the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, as well as a resolution of the same office recommending the prosecution of petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery and violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan Criminal Case and the fact of petitioners conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to support the decision of the CSC. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the country even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in the Sandiganbayan criminal case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 093-0224 of the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted. Disposition ]petition is DENIED.

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-The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to 10 days without a hearing pursuant to 3313.66, filed an action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 against the Columbus Board of Education and various administrators of the CPSS. The complaint sought a declaration that 3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind, in violation of the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to enjoin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to 3313.66 and to require them to remove references to the past suspensions from the records of the students in question. ISSUE WON the Ohio Law is unconstitutional HELD: YES. -It is true that 3313.66 of the Code permits school principals to suspend students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had their own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. -Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. . "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -Boards of Education not excepted." - Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Due Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only when the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is therefore of no relevance. -in determining WON due process is applicable, the weight of the deprivation is not the determinative factor but that of the nature of the interest at stake. A 10 day educational suspension bears a lot of consequences for students.

GOSS V LOPEZ 419 U.S. 565 WHITE; January 22, 1975

FACTS: -for various reasons, 9 high school students were suspended by their respective school administrators. They mostly participated in demonstrations in their schools. Due to this, school administrators suspended them for ten days. -Ohio law provides for free education to all children between the ages of six and 21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel him. In either case, he must notify the student's parents within 24 hours and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or his parents, may appeal the decision to the Board of Education and in connection therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. No such procedure is available for cases of suspension.

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-when it is determined that due process is applicable, what has to be known then is what process should be due. -in this case, to impose a standard process for suspension of 10 days might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. -The Court held that a standard should be available only in cases exceeding 10 days. Dissenting, Powell - The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of education. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify imposition of a constitutional rule... Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition. In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability. [n2] The state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months. Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of his disability. The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a right to an "evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural due process. ISSUE: WON the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.

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HELD: NO, the present procedure in claiming benefits under the Social Security is sufficient to meet the due process requirement Reasoning - The specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. - Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence: "The crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits."

MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE 424 U.S. 319 POWELL: 1976

FACTS: Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources, including physicians, from whom he had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After considering these reports and other information in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, and advised

Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members, workmen's compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other important programs, both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . . . ." As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process. The potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be

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"unable to activity." engage in substantial gainful Instance, which was granted. interposed present appeal. Respondent ISSUE WON the requirements of administrative due process have already been complied with HELD NO - Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. - True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case. Disposition The decision appealed from is affirmed.

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88 SCRA 121 MAKASIAR; January 31, 1979
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Workmens Compensation Commission FACTS - Petitioner Consolacion Bautista is the surviving spouse and the only heir of the late Andres Bautista, who died while his disability compensation claim was pending review by the respondent Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC). In his lifetime, Andres Bautista was employed a switchman by respondent Philippine National Railways (PNR) since 1945. In August 1973, he filed his application for retirement on the ground of disability, which was likewise pending action at the time of his death. - In August 1974, Andres Bautista filed a notice of injury or sickness and claim for compensation dated July 29, 1974 with the Department of Labor in Dagupan City all that he is sick of PTB and Rheumatism that the date of accident was August 10, 1973, that he stopped working on August 16, 1973 and that he orally named his employer of the fact of his sickness. He attached to the claim for compensation a physician's report dated July 28, 1974 with a diagnostic finding that claimant was suffering from PTB, far advanced; prognosis Poor, which required hospitalization. His employer filed its Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness. - Hearing officer dismissed the compensation claim of claimant for the reasons that: In view of the repeated non-appearance of the claimant and counsel during the scheduled hearings of this case despite due notice to the and it appearing that the evidence adduced was not enough to warrant an immediate award in favor of the claimant let this case be dismissed and respondent PNR is absolved from any liability - Counsel for claimant Bautista filed MFR saying that the hearing of the case was delayed by reason of the repeated non-appearance and motions for postponement on the part of counsels for employer PNR and the consequent withdrawal of the original counsel; that his failure to appear at the last 2 scheduled hearings was excusable for the reason that he received the notice of hearing 2 days after the scheduled date of hearing and he informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this fact; that the counsel of employer PNR was likewise not present at the last scheduled hearing.

b. Notice and Hearing 1. When required NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. V COLLECTOR G.R. No. L-19180 BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31, 1963
NATURE Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction FACTS - The Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. F. Sharp & Company informing it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. - C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who answered the notice stating, among other things, that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense." - The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha stating that the television set in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. - Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First

BAUTISTA V WORKMENS COMPENSATION

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Counsel also informed hearing officer of the fact that claimant is already dead without however stating the date and cause of death. - MFR was denied but hearing officer ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to the respondent Commission for review. Respondent Commission, on the basis of the evidence on record, affirmed the order of dismissal. Hence, this petition, which the Court subsequently treated as a special civil action ISSUE WON the late Andres Bautista, represented by his surviving spouse herein, was denied due process in his claim for compensation HELD YES (NOTE: On discussion on the merits, see Original case) - Respondent WCC gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and in not passing upon the issue of denial of due process squarely presented by claimant's counsel. - The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter, so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested party's right to a hearing. Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. - Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counsel's "repeated non-appearance" at the said hearings cannot stand. - The hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and to the prejudice of the laborer, the late claimant Andres Bautista, as demonstrated by his obdurate handling of claimant's excusable non-appearances at scheduled hearings, on one hand, and his mild treatment of respondent employer's repeated failure to appear at scheduled hearings and its motions for postponement, on the other. The records clearly show that while respondent had asked for and was granted at least 5 postponements; claimant, on the other hand, only moved for postponement once and that was even on a joint motion with respondent employer Disposition Petition is granted.

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all the members of the Board of Directors" from private respondent's complaint. -Labor-Arbited sided with Equitable, the involved lawyer was a "mere legal assistant" tasked with certain duties not all that related to the practice of law. The Labor Arbiter concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action because a lawyer-client relationship should instead be governed by Section 26, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. Also, there were valid grounds and he was not denied due process, holding that private respondent was "heard exhaustively on the matter of the charge lodged against him" and that, "for valid practical reasons," petitioners "were not in a position to accede" to the demand for a formal hearing. -NLRC concluded differently. The NLRC ruled that private respondent was denied the right to due process. -Equitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. Issues 1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship requiring the procedural requirements 2. WON the corporation is solely liable HELD 1.Yes, there was. "A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its inhouse counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and other professionals." The existence of an employer-employee relationship, between the bank and private respondent brings the case within the coverage of the Labor Code. Under the Code, an employee may be validly dismissed if these requisites are attendant: (1) the dismissal is grounded on any of the causes stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) the employee has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself as so required by Section 2 and

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. NLRC 273 SCRA 352 Vitug ; June 13, 1997
Nature Special civil action of certiorari Facts -Sadac was appointed VP for the Legal Department of Equitable. -Nine lawyers 3 of the bank's Legal Department under Equitable, addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, accusing Sadac of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement, ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Private respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter. -Morales, Chairman of the Board of Directors, called the contending lawyers to a conference in his office in an attempt to resolve their differences, it failed. Board of Directors, apprised of the situation, adopted a resolution directing one of its directors, Banico, to look further into the matter and to "determine a course of action for the best interest of the bank." Banico met with the complaining nine lawyers, he was warned that if private respondent were to be retained in his position, the lawyers would resign en masse. -Mr. Banico submitted a report to the Board of Directors and said that there was abusive conduct and mismanagement and was inefficient and ineffective.The Board asked Sadac to voluntarily resign. They emphasized that they are just saying that the Board has lost its confidence on him and they are waiting for his voluntary resignation. Sadac again made a request for a full hearing and cautioned that, under Section 31 of the Corporation Code, individual members of the Board could be held accountable for voting or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. -Sadac persisted in his request for a formal investigation. Unheeded he filed a complaint in the NLRC for illegal dismissal and damages. -Board of Directors terminated Sadac and reiterated that it was one between client and lawyer. He also is disentitled from his compensation. The Board instructed management to take the necessary steps to "defend itself and

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Section 5, Rule XIV, Book V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. Ordinary breach of trust will not suffice, it must be willful and without justifiable excuse. This ground must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest; otherwise, the dismissal will be rendered illegal. Petitioners' stated loss of trust and confidence on private respondent was spawned by the complaints leveled against him by the lawyers in his department. -The act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to continue working for the employer. Here, the grievances of the lawyers, in main, refer to what are perceived to be certain objectionable character traits of private respondent. Although petitioners have charged private respondent with allegedly mishandling two cases in his long service with the bank, it is quite apparent that private respondent would not have been asked to resign had it not been for the letter-complaint of his associates in the Legal Department. Confident that no employer-employee existed between the bank and private respondent, petitioners have put aside the procedural requirements for terminating one's employment, i.e., (a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) another notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with these requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any judgment reached by management without that compliance can be considered void and inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of notice and hearing. 2. Yes, a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise when a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out similar other unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law. The case of petitioner is way off these exceptional instances. It is not even shown that petitioner has had a direct hand in the dismissal of private respondent enough to attribute to him (petitioner) a patently unlawful act while acting for the corporation. Neither can Article 289 of the Labor Code be applied since this law specifically refers only to the imposition of penalties under the Code. ...

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- MSPB later issued an order directing the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits. - At first, the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. The matter was brought up to the CSC, wherein indirect contempt proceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply with the order of reinstatement. The provincial treasurer also partially released some of the backwages. - But the problems did not stop there. Later, the Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent Commission on Audit. It claims that COA is the proper authority to determine disbursement as regards the backwages. In its decision, COA ruled that the payment of backwages has become the personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith. - Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial treasurer stopped the payment of backwages. ISSUE/S 1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission HELD 1. NO. Reasoning - First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision. A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence, is personally liable for the payment of petitioners' back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural infirmities in its implementation - (important according to the syllabus) Second, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process were violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical

UY V COA G.R. No. 130685 PUNO; March 21, 2000

NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS - Petitioners were among the employees of the Provincial Engineering Office who were dismissed by Gov. Paredes, allegedly to scale down operations. - Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB found that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. It held that while reduction in force due to lack of funds is a valid ground for termination, employees to be terminated must be determined after being found to be the least qualified (in terms of relative fitness, efficiency and length of service)

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procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities - Third, the MSRB decision became final and executory. Final judgments may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government Disposition Decision of COA set aside to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the NBI and the DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The Court granted the motion. - Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not considered under the protection of the Philippines while abroad. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. The respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. - Petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." - Petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law. ISSUES 1. WON the order of the respondent Court is beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction 2. WON petitioner is entitled to hearing before his passport can be cancelled

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HELD 1. NO Ratio When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.) Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him. In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. 2. NO Ratio Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. Disposition Petition is denied

2. When not required SUNTAY v PEOPLE G.R. No. L-9430 PADILLA, J.; June 29, 1957
NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari FACTS - Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, as follows: The accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. - Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco where he is at present enrolled in school. The offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the CFI of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. The private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court

DE BISSCHOP V GALANG 8 SCRA 244 REYES; May 31, 1963

NATURE Appeal from an order of CFI. FACTS - American citizen George de Bisschop (petitionerappellee) was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3 years as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager.

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- He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. This was denied when Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa discovered that Bissmag Inc. was a gambling front, and that de Bisschop is suspect of evading payment of his income tax. In a letter dated September 5, 1959, the Board of Commissioners advised him to depart within 5 days. De Bisschop requested for a copy of the decision, but the legal officer of Bureau of Immigration replied that no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and expediency. - To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case. ISSUES 1. WON Commissioners of immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; 2. WON Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions. HELD 1. NO Ratio Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authority. Administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Reasoning - Courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. - This is not a violation of the due process clause; the letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality, and far from final, because the requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. - It is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. As per Judge Cooley: due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. Xxx In certain proceedings of administrative character, it may be stated without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. 2. NO Ratio Decision as employed in the law refers to the number of votes necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. Reasoning There is nothing in immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for extension of stay. Obiter Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. It will issue only if there is no other plain, speedy , and adequate remedy. The use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice. Habeas corpus affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances. The existence of habeas corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of prohibition. DISPOSITION The order appealed from is reversed. The petition for prohibition is dismissed.

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-A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 Sept 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989. Meantime, Solar filed MFR appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 Sept 1988. -Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days. -21 April 1989: Solar went to RTC QC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds: that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. -Solar went on appeal to the CA. CA reversed the Order of dismissal of TC and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA also declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that the decision was without prejudice to whatever action the Board may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of Solar's water treatment facilities. -CA, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of the Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. The Boards MFR was dismissed. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The Boards argues: -that its ex parte Order dated 22 Sept 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law (PD984, Sec7(a)) and were not violative of due process; and -that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari. Solar contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health; safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V CA (Solar Textile Finishing Corp) 195 SCRA 112 FELICIANO; March 11, 1991
NATURE Petition to review FACTS -22 Sept 1988: the Board issued an ex parte Order, signed by Board Chairman Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. -Said order, issued pursuant to Sec7 of P.D. 984 and Sec38 of its IRR, was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant: a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board; and b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR").

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ISSUE WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. HELD NO. -Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 9842 authorized the Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." -It is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." -Sec5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out the max permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations. Tullahan-Tinejeros River is classified as inland waters Class D (for agriculture, irrigation, live stock watering, industrial cooling and processing) -Note: the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 Dec 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is
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already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation, after informing the Commission of the plant acquisition, was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. -The inspection reports of November 1986 and September 1988 make clear that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the max allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. -The Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. The Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition. -In Technology Developers, Inc. v. CA, the SC upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollutioncausing establishment. In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. -Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

"P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides: (a) Public Hearing . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.".

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