POLLO VS.

CONSTANTINO-DAVID (2011)

Facts:

Ann anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chairperson
alleging that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them ―to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.‖

The team proceeded at once to the office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD
and the Legal Services Division. Within the same day, the investigating team finished the task. It was found
that most of the files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner were draft
pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson
David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit
within five days from notice.

Petitioner denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he
had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, and that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his relatives and associates, and that he is not authorize the
activities as they are in violation of his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination
and warrantless search and seizure. Also, the files/documents copied from his computer without his
consent are inadmissible as evidence, being ―fruits of a poisonous tree.‖

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). On 24 July 2007, the CSC issued a Resolution
finding petitioner GUILTY of the same merits and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE
with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.

By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner‘s petition for certiorari after finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the search conducted and the copying of petitioner‘s files without his knowledge and
consent lawful?

Held:

Yes. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of ―unreasonable‖
searches and seizures.
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O‘Connor and Simons for warrantless searches involving
public employees for work related reasons to the case at bar, we now address the following questions: (1)
Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files? (2) Was the search
authorized by the CSC Chair reasonable in its inception and scope?

The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for he failed to prove
that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. He did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. He did
not use passwords nor adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer files. The CSC also
implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted in connection
with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an employee‘s office is
justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo‘s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving
a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. The nature
of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be
furtively engaged in the practice of ―lawyering‖ for parties with pending cases before the Commission would
be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It is settled that a
court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise
the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it. Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or
fall-out.

Thus, petitioner‘s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into
the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find
no merit in his contention that O‘Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not
involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner‘s computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of
such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the
warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O‘Connor.

Del Castillo vs People, G.R. No. 185128

Facts: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival,
somebody shouted ―raid‖ which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and go directly to Del Castillo‘s house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing
incriminating in Del Castillo‘s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut
several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty.
The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.

Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated
in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillo‘s right against unreasonable searches and
seizure.

Ruling: Petition GRANTED. It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly
leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner
as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillo‘s constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered
them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the
assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted
as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority as ―any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as
a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A
person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.‖

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as
an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: ―For purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable
and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall
be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents
of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and
the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

FACTS:

 Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office of the PNP filed
applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide
Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No.
188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet
Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.
 The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which
amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other
Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT.
 The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicants Rivera
and Gali of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
Witness‘ testimonies
 According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local
exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international
gateway facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines.
 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine
cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the
destination country.
 The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to
complete the circuit. In contrast, WWC and Planet Internet were able to provide international long
distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT‘s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF.
 This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is
originated."
 On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was
used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can
be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."
 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given
access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and PIN provided under a
GlobalTalk prepaid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number, which included
the country code, phone number and a pound sign. The call was completed to a phone number in
Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local
number 6891135. This indicated that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT‘s
IGF.
 Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC. However, upon an
ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is
Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
  Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT‘s IGF, they
violated P.D. No. 401 as amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone connections.
 Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and
equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong
to PLDT.
 Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of R. A. No. 7925, because in bypassing the
IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while
"piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business
revenues from international long distance calls.
 Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment without first
securing type approval license from the latter.
 PLDT alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of
taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
 RTC :granted the application for search warrants.
 Three warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to
seize various items in the office premises of WWC and Planet Internet, which includes various
telecommunications equipment to support the illegal toll bypass operations.
 The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the NCR-PNP.
 Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.
 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not
devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President‘s Office and the Information
Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also
seized.
 Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the
same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute
theft;
(2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime;
(3) the search warrants were general warrants; and
(4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
 PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
 In the hearing of the motions to quash, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to
have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. and of Capital Wireless.
 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services,
which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines
for the first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire.
 Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its
IGF usage. None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
 RTC : granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the
nature of general warrants.
 Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
 PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground that it had failed to get
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 CA: reversed and set aside the RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and
effective. Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.
 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an
appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the
Motions for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing a motion for reconsideration to
question an order quashing search warrants
2) Whether or not an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal
action is deemed a final order that can be the subject of an appeal
3) Whether or not the assailed search warrants were general warrants

HELD:
1) No. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore, conformity of the
public prosecutor is not necessary to give PLDT personality to question the RTC.
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
 The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.
 However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the
filing of an application therefor.
 An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a criminal action. The
application for and the obtention of a search warrant cannot be equated with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court.
 The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different
from those for the institution of a criminal action. A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process.
 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a
special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity.
 A search warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to
its original jurisdiction.
 Therefore, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.

2) Yes.
 An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a
criminal action, is not merely an interlocutory order.
 It partakes of a final order and can be the proper subject of an appeal.
 Therefore, PLDT was correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a
petition for certiorari.
 An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main
criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.
 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before
the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of
a motion to quash a search warrant. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending
criminal case, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory.
 In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case
yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of
the grant) ends the judicial process.
 When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to
be done by the trial court.
 Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be
properly taken therefrom.

3. ) No.
  The assailed search warrants are not general warrants.
 The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items
described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
sought.
 A general warrant is defined as a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to
be arrested or the property to be seized.
 It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
 Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses.
 Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only
for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
 The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission.
 Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search
with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
 The particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is
required wherever and whenever it is feasible.
 A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized
when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which
the warrant is being issued.
 PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business.
 Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises
of petitioners and was able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

The petitions were DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision were AFFIRMED.

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18

FACTS: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD)
launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army
Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The
letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed
members.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the
Central Committee.

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members of
the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among
others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because they
were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served
a subpoena.

In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein

Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital
to the success of the prosecution.

The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by
Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with
no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution
of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP
custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis
and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting
forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this
case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection
with and in furtherance of rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.

Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the
records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.

Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail
respectively.The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court
granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject
to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the
peace negotiations

ISSUE: [1] Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest?

[2] Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the political offense doctrine?

HELD: "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support
of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a
chance to present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in
their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente
Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance
by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent
were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority
of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to
claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit.
The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of
several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994.Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath
or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the
determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing
the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if,
on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos
Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed
to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99
Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.Thus, when a killing
is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

***
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners are
able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.

PEOPLE v. VICENTE ROM, [ GR No. 198452, Feb 19, 2014 ]

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated 9 August 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579
affirming with modification the Decision[2] dated 24 June 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062, CBU-55063 and CBU-55067, finding herein appellant
Vicente Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15[3] (illegal sale of shabu),
15-A[4] (maintenance of a drug den) and 16[5] (illegal possession of shabu), Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[6] In
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063, for respectively violating Sections 15 and 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court imposed on the appellant the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period ranging between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months, as maximum. While in Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, that is
for violating Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court sentenced the
appellant to reclusion perpetua and he was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The Court of
Appeals, however, modified and reduced the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063 to
an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

In three separate Informations[7] all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with violation of
Sections 15, 15-A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The three Informations read:

Criminal Case No. CBU-55062

That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about 10:30 P.M. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [herein appellant], with
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there sell, deliver or
give away to a poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed plastic packet of white crystalline
substance weighing 0.03 gram locally known as "shabu", containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[8] (Emphasis and italics supplied).

Criminal Case No. CBU-55063

That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], with deliberate
intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in [his] possession
and control or use the following:

Four (4) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing
0.15 gram
 locally known as "shabu", containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.[9] (Emphasis and italics
supplied).

Criminal Case No. CBU-55067

That on the 31s[t] day of August, 2000, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [appellant], with deliberate intent, did then and there knowingly
maintain a den for regulated users along the interior portion of Barangay T. Padilla in violation to (sic) the
provision of Sec. 15-A of Art. III of RA 6425.[10] (Emphasis supplied).

On arraignment, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY[11] to all the
charges. A pre-trial conference was conducted on 2 April 2001, but no stipulation or agreement was arrived
at.[12] The pre-trial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 2 Marvin Martinez (PO2 Martinez), the
designated poseur-buyer; PO3 Franco Mateo Yanson (PO3 Yanson); and Police Senior Inspector Marvin
Sanchez (P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez), the team leader of the buy-bust operation against the appellant. They were
all assigned at the Vice Control Section of the Cebu City Police Office (VCS-CCPO). The testimony,
however, of P/Sr. Insp. Mutchit G. Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas), the forensic analyst, was dispensed[13] with
in view of the admission made by the defense as to the authenticity and due existence of Chemistry Report
No. D-1782-2000[14] dated 1 September 2000 and the expertise of the forensic analyst.

The prosecution's evidence established the following facts:

Two weeks prior to 31 August 2000, the VCS-CCPO received confidential information from their informant
that alias Dodong, who turned out later to be the appellant, whose real name is Vicente Rom, was engaged
in the illegal sale of shabu and also maintained a drug den at his residence in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu
City. Thus, the VCS-CCPO, particularly PO2 Martinez, conducted surveillance and monitoring operation.[15]

On 31 August 2000, at around 10:15 p.m., P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez, Chief of VCS-CCPO, formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. The buy-bust team was composed of PO2 Martinez
(poseur-buyer), Senior Police Officer 1 Jesus Elmer Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez), PO3 Yanson, PO3
Benicer Tamboboy (PO3 Tamboboy), PO3 Jaime Otadoy (PO3 Otadoy) and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez (team
leader). Being the designated poseur-buyer, PO2 Martinez was provided with a P100.00 peso bill and a
P10.00 peso bill buy-bust money bearing Serial Nos. AD336230 and AM740786, respectively, and both
were marked with the initials of PO2 Martinez, i.e. "MM." The former amount would be used to
buy shabu while the latter amount would serve as payment for the use of the drug den.[16]

After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and upon arrival there at around 10:20
p.m., PO2 Martinez proceeded directly to the appellant's house, which was earlier pointed to by their
informant, who was also with them during the buy-bust operation. The rest of the buy-bust team strategically
positioned themselves nearby. Once PO2 Martinez reached the appellant's house, he knocked on the door,
which the appellant opened. PO2 Martinez subsequently told the appellant that he wanted to
buy shabu worth P100.00. The appellant looked around to check if PO2 Martinez had a companion. Seeing
none, the appellant took out his wallet from his pocket and got one heat-sealed plastic packet containing
white crystalline substance, later confirmed to be shabu, and gave it to PO2 Martinez. The latter, in turn,
gave the P100.00 peso bill marked money to the appellant. While this sale transaction was going on, PO3
Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez were only five to eight meters away from PO2 Martinez and the appellant.
P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez clearly witnessed the sale transaction as it happened right outside the door of the
appellant's house.[17]

Afterwards, PO2 Martinez told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the shabu, so the latter required the
former to pay an additional amount of P10.00 as rental fee for the use of his place. After paying the said
amount, the appellant allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his house. Once inside the house, PO2 Martinez was
directed by the appellant to proceed to the room located at the right side of the sala. Upon entering the said
room, PO2 Martinez saw three persons, later identified to be Jose Delloso (Delloso), Danilo Empuerto
(Empuerto) and Arnie Ogong (Ogong), already sniffing shabu.[18]

Thereupon, PO2 Martinez made a missed call to P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez, which was their pre-arranged signal,
to signify that the whole transaction was consummated. After the lapsed of about 10 to 15 seconds, the rest
of the team, who were just few meters away from the appellant's house, barged in and identified themselves
as police officers. PO2 Martinez then told PO3 Yanson to hold the appellant. PO3 Yanson grabbed the
appellant and made a body search on the latter that led to the recovery of four heat-sealed transparent
plastic packets containing white crystalline substance, which were inside the appellant's brown wallet that
was tucked in his pocket; the buy-bust money consisting of P100.00 peso bill and P10.00 peso bill; and
P280.00 consisting of two P100.00 peso bills, one P50.00 peso bill and three P10.00 peso bills believed to
be the proceeds of the appellant's illegal activities. The one heat-sealed plastic packet of shabu bought by
PO2 Martinez from the appellant remained in the possession of the former.[19]

The appellant, Delloso, Empuerto and Ogong were informed of their constitutional rights and were later
brought by the buy-bust team to their office, together with the confiscated items, for documentation. At the
office of the buy-bust team, the confiscated items were given to their investigator, SPO1 Fernandez, who
marked the one heat-sealed plastic packet containing white crystalline substance, which was the subject of
the sale transaction, with VRR-8-31-2000-01 (buy-bust) while the other four heat-sealed plastic packets
containing white crystalline substance, which were recovered from the appellant, were similarly marked with
VRR-8-31-2000-02 to VRR-8-31-2000-05. The "VRR" in the markings are the initials of the appellant, i.e.,
Vicente Ramonida Rom.[20]

Thereafter, all the five heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance, together with the
Request for Laboratory Examination, were brought by PO3 Yanson to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which examination yielded positive results for the presence
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"[21] as evidenced by Chemistry Report No.
D-1782-2000.[22]

For its part, the defense presented the appellant and Teresita Bitos, whose testimonies consist of sheer
denials. Their version of the 31 August 2000 incident is as follows:

At around 10:15 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. of 31 August 2000, the appellant was at the house of his daughter,
Lorena Cochera (Lorena), in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as Lorena had asked her father to get the
monthly house rental fee from Teresita Bitos, whose nickname is "Nene." While the appellant and Nene
were talking, the police officers suddenly barged in. The appellant noticed that PO2 Martinez proceeded to
the inner portion of the house and opened the door of the rooms. Nene stopped them but the police officers
told her to just keep quiet. The police officers went on opening the door of the two rooms, where they saw
three male persons. The police officers frisked the appellant and the three other men. The police officers
likewise took appellant's wallet containing P360.00. The appellant then requested Nene to tell his daughter
that he was arrested. Thereafter, the police officers brought the appellant and the three other men to the
police station.[23]

The appellant denied that he sold shabu to PO2 Martinez. He also denied that he was maintaining a drug
den and that he allowed persons to sniff shabu inside the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, in
exchange for a sum of money. The appellant likewise denied that he knew the three other men who were
arrested inside the room in the said house. The appellant claimed instead that he knew PO2 Martinez prior
to 31 August 2000 because the latter usually stayed at the house to apprehend snatchers. Also, a week
before 31 August 2000, he and PO2 Martinez had a conversation and he was asked to pinpoint the "fat fish,"
which is the code for the big time pusher. When he said that he does not know of such pusher, PO2 Martinez
got angry. The appellant maintained that on 31 August 2000, he was no longer living in the house
in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as his daughter had already brought him to Minglanilla, Cebu, as early as
July 1999. On the said date, Nene was already occupying the house and had subleased one of its rooms as
his daughter Maya told him so. The appellant admitted that a year prior to 31 August 2000, and before he
transferred to Minglanilla, he was apprehended for illegal possession of shabu.[24]

The narration of the appellant was corroborated by Nene on all material points.

Testifying on rebuttal, PO2 Martinez denied that he knew the appellant prior to 31 August 2000. PO2
Martinez clarified that he came to know the appellant only on the night that they conducted the buy-bust
operation.[25]

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible, competent and convincing as they were
able to satisfactorily prove all the elements of the offenses charged against the appellant, the trial court, in its
Decision dated 24 June 2002, held the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 15,
15-A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The trial court disposed of the case as follows:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, the Court finds the [herein appellant] for

Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, for violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, GUILTY. There being no mitigating nor any aggravating circumstance proven,
1) the Court hereby imposes the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in the MEDIUM
PERIOD ranging between TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as
minimum[,] to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum;

Criminal Case No. CBU-55063, for violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, GUILTY. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
2) Court imposes the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in the MEDIUM PERIOD ranging
between TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum to FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum; and

Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, for violating Section 15-A, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, GUILTY. The court hereby imposes upon the [appellant] the penalty
3)
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
PESOS.

The five (5) heat-sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, are hereby CONFISCATED in favor of the government and shall be
destroyed in accordance with the law prohibiting said drug.[26] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied).

The appellant appealed the trial court's Decision to this Court via Notice of Appeal.[27] However, pursuant to
this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,[28] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review.

On 9 August 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Decision affirming with modification the
ruling of the trial court. Its decretal portion reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu City in
Criminal Cases No. CBU-55062, CBU-55063 and CBU-55067 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION concerning Criminal Cases No. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063, for which [the
 herein appellant] is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[29]

The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the appellant on all the charges against him as the
prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since all the essential elements of
illegal sale and possession of shabu were duly proven by the prosecution. As to the charge of maintaining a
drug den, the same was also established by the fact that PO2 Martinez himself paid P10.00 to sniff
the shabu in one of the rooms of the appellant's house. The appellant's denial, therefore, cannot prevail over
the evidence hurled against him.

The Court of Appeals, however, deemed it necessary to modify the penalty in Criminal Case Nos.
CBU-55062 and CBU-55063. It explained that the sale of less than 200 grams of shabu is punishable with a
penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on the quantity. In this case, the
quantity of shabu illegally sold to the poseur-buyer by the appellant was 0.03 gram. Pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20,[30] Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the proper penalty to be
imposed for the illegal sale of 0.03 gram of shabu would be prision correccional. Also, in this case, the
appellant had in his possession 0.15 gram of shabu, which is punishable also with imprisonment of prision
correccional. Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant must be sentenced to an
imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, as well as in Criminal Case No.
CBU-55063.[31]

Still unsatisfied, the appellant appealed the Court of Appeals' Decision to this Court via Notice of Appeal.[32]

Both the appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General manifested[33] that they would no longer file their
respective supplemental briefs as the issues have already been fully discussed in their respective appeal
briefs[34] with the Court of Appeals.

The appellant's assignment of errors as stated in his Appellant's Brief are as follows:

1. The Regional Trial Court erred in convicting the [herein appellant] notwithstanding the
inherent incredibility of evidence for the prosecution;

2. The Regional Trial Court gravely erred in allowing the evidence of the prosecution
despite the indubitable evidence that the [appellant] i[s] innocent of the crime[s]
charged; [and]

3. The Regional Trial Court erred in convicting the [appellant] in spite of the failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt.[35]

The appellant avers that the testimony of the poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to reason and
highly incredible for no person who is engaged in an illegal transaction would leave the door of the house
open after such transaction. Moreover, no person would sell shabu to a buyer when he knew all along that
the said buyer was a police officer as it was ridiculous to expose oneself to the danger of being caught and
arrested.

The appellant similarly holds that the entry in the house was illegal and there was certainly no transaction
that took place therein. The search and the seizure made in connection thereto were also invalid. Thus, the
pieces of evidence allegedly obtained by the police officers were inadmissible for being the "fruit of a
poisonous tree." The same cannot be used against him in violation of his rights.
The appellant believes that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as their
testimonies as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the case were contrary to human conduct,
especially with regard to the allegation that he knowingly maintained a drug den, since he was no longer the
owner of the house, which was the subject of the search, and he did not live there anymore.

The appellant's contentions are devoid of merit.

In essence, the issues in this case hinge on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension
of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses having
heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[36] The rule
finds an even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals.[37]

After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to overturn the
findings of both lower courts, which were adequately supported by the evidence on record.

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential elements
must be duly established: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[38] Succinctly, the delivery of the illicit drug to
the poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully consummates the
buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[39]

In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the above-enumerated elements beyond moral
certainty. The prosecution witnesses adequately proved that a buy-bust operation actually took place on
which occasion the appellant was caught red-handed giving one heat-sealed plastic packet containing white
crystalline substance to PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, in exchange for P100.00. PO2 Martinez, being
the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant in open court to be the same person who sold to him the
said one-heat sealed plastic packet of white crystalline substance for a consideration of P100.00,[40] which
when examined was confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu per Chemistry Report No.
D-1782-2000 issued by P/Sr. Insp. Salinas, Head, Chemistry Branch, PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 7. Upon presentation thereof in open court, PO2 Martinez duly identified it to be the same object sold
to him by the appellant as it had the marking "VRR-8-31-2000 (buy-bust)," which SPO1 Fernandez had
written thereon in their presence.[41] This testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez, who was just five to eight meters away from the former and the appellant during the sale
transaction.[42]

Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt for the offense of
illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

We already had occasion to show the unacceptability of the contention of the appellant that the testimony of
the poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to reason and highly incredible for no person who is
engaged in an illegal transaction would leave the door of the house open after such transaction. In case after
case, we observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a
stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, the drug pushers have
become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not
the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and the delivery of the prohibited drugs.[43]
With regard to the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.[44] All these elements have been established in this case.

On the occasion of the appellant's arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, PO3
Yanson conducted a body search on the former resulting to the recovery of four more heat-sealed plastic
packets containing white crystalline substance inside his wallet that was tucked in his pocket with an
aggregate weight of 0.15 gram, which were later confirmed to be methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Yanson identified in open the court the said four heat-sealed plastic packets
of shabu with markings "VRR-8-31-2000-02" to "VRR-8-31-2000-05" written thereon by SPO1 Fernandez to
be the same objects recovered from the appellant.[45] PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, corroborated this
testimony of PO3 Yanson.[46]

Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant has the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed
plastic packets of shabu. Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi,[47] which the appellant in this case miserably
failed to do.

There is also no truth on the appellant's claim that the entry in the house was illegal making the search and
the seizure in connection thereto invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence obtained by the police officers
inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree."

This Court in Dimacuha v. People[48] clearly states:

The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also
ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In People v. Chua Ho San [citation omitted] we pointed out that the interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1)
search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected
with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest
of escaped prisoners.

Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams
and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of information
received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest,
therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover
of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an
arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find
and seize things connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore,
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.[49] (Emphasis supplied).
To repeat, the appellant, in this case, was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully
arrested. Following Dimacuha, the subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu in the
appellant's wallet that was tucked in his pocket was justified and admissible in evidence for being the fruit of
the crime.

With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution had likewise proved beyond a shadow
of reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of the offense of illegal possession of shabu in violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, the prosecution had also established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its
existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and
circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among
police officers.[50] In this case, this fact was proven by none other than the testimony of PO2 Martinez,
the poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the same to
which the latter responded by requiring the former to pay a rental fee of P10.00. The appellant, thereafter,
allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his house and directed him to proceed to one of the rooms located at the right
side of the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three other persons already
sniffing shabu.[51] This testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp.
Sanchez.[52]

Moreover, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, several peso bills were found in the appellant's wallet,
including three P10.00 peso bills, which circumstances bolstered the prosecution's assertion that the
appellant has indeed allowed his house to be used as a drug den for a fee of P10.00 per person.[53]

In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer the owner of the
house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing therein. The defense also presented
Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the appellant.

The testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellant's testimony was not credible. She herself
admitted that the appellant requested her to testify in his favor.[54]

Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to present his
daughter, who is the alleged owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim.

Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon
with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a
defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial
assumes significance only when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters.[55] Moreover, there is a
presumption that public officers, including the arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties.[56] In
this case, the defense failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence.
Furthermore, this Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted
the buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got angry with him when he
failed to pinpoint the big time pusher cannot be considered as the ill motive in implicating the appellant on all
the three charges against him for this is self-serving and uncorroborated.

Given all the foregoing, this Court sustains the appellant's conviction on all the charges against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579
dated 9 August 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

PLDT vs Alvarez, G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014

FACTS:

Philippine Long Distance Company’s ACP Detection Division regularly visits foreign countries to
conduct market research on various prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow their users to make
overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate, so as to prevent or stop network
fraud. While in UK, they bought a prepaid card – The Number One prepaid card – to make test calls, and
discovered that During a test call placed at the PLDT–ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT
telephone number (2–8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was originating from a local
telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT‘s Integrated Customer Management (billing)
System, the ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail R. Razon
Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It
further learned that several lines are installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon. Local call
tests were conducted then in the country. Moreso, they test other call cards as well, Unity Card and IDT
Supercalling Card, which yield to the same results. All foreign calls are directed to same local PLDT number
belonging to Experto Enterprises, which when traced, the occupant is still Abigail n that same address in
Paranaque.

According to PLDT, the respondents are engaged in a form of network fraud known as International Simple
Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the RPC. ISR is a method of routing and completing international
long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae and/or wave frequencies which are connected directly to the
domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined (terminating country); and, in the
process, bypassing the IGF at the terminating country.

Several Search warrants were then filed for violating PD 401. Among the items seized were the following:
a.6 Quintum router;

b. 13 Com router;

c. 1 Cisco 800 router;

d. 1 Nokia Modem for PLDT DSL;

e. 1 Meridian Subscriber‘s Unit[;]

f. 5 Personal Computers[;]

g. 1 Computer Printer[; and]

h. 1 Flat–bed Scanner[.]

Respondent filed a motion to quash but was denied by the RTC. Respondent then filed a petition for Certiorari
and was granted. PLDT filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
WON respondent Alvarez is liable for theft.

RULING:
Partially granted. Deviating from its earlier rule that an ISR activities do not constitute a crime under Philippine
law; the court held that even prior to the passage of the RPC, jurisprudence is settled that ―any personal
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of
theft.‖ 40 This jurisprudence, in turn, applied the prevailing legal meaning of the term ―personal property‖
under the old Civil Code as ―anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter
(not real property).‖ 41 PLDT‘s telephone service or its business of providing this was appropriable personal
property and was, in fact, the subject of appropriation in an ISR operation, facilitated by means of the unlawful
use of PLDT‘s facilities.

. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of ―subtraction‖
penalized under said article.

However, on the Court ruled that Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW B–l and SW B–2 read as follows:
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any similar equipment or device used for copying and/or
printing data and/or information;

8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and

9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and
documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment[.] 74

The fact that the printers and scanners are or may be connected to the other illegal connections to the PLDT
telephone lines does not make them the subject of the offense or fruits of the offense, much less could they
become a means of committing an offense. What PD No. 401 punishes is the unauthorized installation of
telephone connection without the previous consent of PLDT. In the present case, PLDT has not shown that
connecting printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if connected to a PLDT telephone line,
would or should require its prior authorization.

LAUD v. PEOPLE GR No. 199032, November 19, 2014

FACTS:

PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto Fajardo, applied with the Manila-RTC for a warrant to
search three caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the
alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. In
support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was presented to the RTC and testified therein that he
personally witnessed the killing of six persons in December 2005. Judge William Simon Peralta, acting as
Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and
thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
presence of human remains.

Herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally
Seized Evidence premised on the ground that, among others, the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
Search Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City. Manila-RTC granted the motion. The People filed a
petition for certiorari which the CA granted. Laud moved for reconsideration, but was later denied. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE/S
1.Whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No.
09-14407— NO.

2.Whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the
compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court—YES.

3.Whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with and the
one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated—YES.

RATIO

1.NO. While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to divest
Judge Peralta‘s authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such
authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.

The treatment of a de facto officer‘s acts is premised on the reality that third persons cannot always
investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that
officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such. Public interest demands that acts of persons
holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the
public – as distinguished from the officer in question – is concerned. Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer
principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.

2.YES. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search
warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal cases
pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions,
as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code,
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws
that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court." Search warrant
applications for such cases may be filed by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of
such agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The
Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue
the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts."

As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and
was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor,
Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state,
may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special criminal case" excludes it from the
compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on search warrant
applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall
be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is
being applied for in connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be superfluous and therefore
should be dispensed with.

3.YES. In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is
evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed
the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.

Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of
probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time" attended the search warrant‘s
appliycation from the crime‘s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant‘s
claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted
for by a witness‘s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in
determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by
the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities
attending a criminal case. To the Court‘s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant‘s application does
not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been
sufficiently met.

The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a
particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." A description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads
the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently
complies with the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the
three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound.

Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those
which are issued for more than one specific offense. Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was
issued only for one specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October
17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Epie vs. Ulat-Marredo, GR 148117, March 22, 2007

Facts:

- In an information, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province Epie and Palasi was
charged violating Section 68 of PD 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines in that he
possessed and transport 870 bd ft., of Benguet Pine Lumber without any permit from the DENR.
- As per prosecution, September 6, 1998, 2:30 PM, SPO2 Ngina received information from a
confidential agent that a jeepney was loaded with the said trees in Atok. He then relayed information
to other police officers and swiftly established a checkpoint in Atok. At 4:00 PM, they spotted a
jeepney heading to La Trinidad, which they flagged down. It didn‘t stop so they chased. When it
halted at first they found it loaded with vegetables but upon close inspection, found pieces of lumber.
The driver and others admitted not having permits for it and were arrested and investigated but only
petitioners Epie and Palasi were charged.
- Epie et. al filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence Prosecution as lumber was illegally seized which was
denied. Reconsideration likewise denied. It was appealed to CA but was dismissed and
reconsideration as well.

Issue

- Whether or not the police officers have probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle was loaded
with illegal cargo and therefore can be stopped and searched without warrant.

Supreme Court Ruling

- SC denied petition
- In People vs. Sarap, we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without
warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of
probable cause.
- Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may
be conducted by peace officers.
- They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La
Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could
not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.
- They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La
Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could
not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.

People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783, September 03, 2007

Facts: On or about March 7, 1999, in Antipolo City, Bernardo Tuazon have in his possession seven (7)
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags of methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu for a total
weight of 250.74 grams. Upon arraignment, appellant, pleaded not guilty.

The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno. In the
Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they
discovered 2 big plastic bags and 5 medium size plastics and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing
serial number C-9890 with one loaded magazine with eleven ammunition.

The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict
and imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On
September 17, 2003, the Court resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant and required the
parties to file their respective briefs. In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary
pleading in which he questioned the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence presented
against him. He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within Marville
Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which could
have justified his apprehension. He goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the
validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the
unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police. Appellant claims that as the confidential
informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the authorities were
already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior
surveillance and then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from
him should be excluded from evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the
court a quo.

Issues: 1. Was the search of Tuazon‘s vehicle valid?

2. Are the shabu sachets found from Tuazon‘s car admissible in evidence?

Ruling: 1. Yes. The court held that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the
Gemini car driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to
deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville
Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as,
indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped
the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellant‘s waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his
possession of said firearm which all the more strengthened the police officers‘ suspicion. After he was told to
step out of the car, they found on the driver‘s seat plastic sachets containing white powdery
substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrantless search of the Gemini car.

2. Yes, our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution which states: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in
Section 3(2) of the same article (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and
seizures admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. Thus, the sachets of marijuana found on
Tuazon‘s car were obtained lawfully, making it admissible in evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS, GR NO. 188611, June 16 2010

FACTS:

October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was
about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent
described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned
himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other
passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He
caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but on the women got away.

DOCTRINES:

ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)

1.This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

2.This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

MALUM PROHIBITUM

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership
thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.

Appellant‘s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good
faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum
PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS

Facts: Respondent was found guilty of violation of the dangerous drugs act.

She was arrested after she was carrying a bag alleged to have prohibited drugs inside. The bag, before it
came to her possession was found inside a passenger jeepney with no owner so the policeman looked
inside it only to find packs of marijuana. The policeman was acting on a report made about the bag by an
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network.

Issue: WON the warrantless search conducted was valid.

Held:Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At
the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner.
He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could
be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle
has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc
could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were
loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the
motor vehicle had already left the locality. 13
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving
vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial
warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so
because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be
admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and so he
flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged
down the accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. The
accused violated a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving
said motor vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3
Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching something from his jacket. He was alerted
and told the accused to take out the contents of his jacket‘s pocket as the latter may have a weapon inside it.
The accused obliged, slowly put out the contents of his jacket‘s pocket which included two plastic sachets of
suspected shabu.

The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive of
methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because
there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he
was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there
was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.

Held:

Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. At the
time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
under arrest. rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.

MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G. R. NO. 191532 AUGUST 15, 2012

Doctrine:
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized
exception established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest. In this exception, the law
requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings.

Facts:
On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit
conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and
his wife Ina Aderp was engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City;
that buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao; that Sultan run away
from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in
the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, he police
operatives found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in particular, was caught
sniffing what was suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan
while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no
offense was being committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to
enter the dwelling of Sultan. That Ambre is inside the residential compound to buy a Malong. She argues that
the alleged ―hot pursuit‖ on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were
supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. That the police officer just barged in
and arrested her.
Rosete testified that after she left Ambre inside along with the vendors and buyers of malong. She
returned and found out that the policemen arrested the people inside the compound.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the
guilt of Ambre. CA affirmed the decision of RTC

Issues:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid?
2. Whether or not the items seized are inadmissible in evidence?
3. Whether or not chain of custody of evidence was broken?

Held:
1. Yes, the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid.
2. Yes, the items seized are admissible in evidence.
3. No, the chain of custody of evidence was not broken.

Ratio:
1. The Court held that the arrest and search done against the petitioner is valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing
or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Futhermore, Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising
them before entering her plea

2. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded. for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. But this
rule does not apply in an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception
established by jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and
seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. Thus, the evidence sized are admissible.
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
Ambre, together with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from
them were found positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report No.
DT-041-05 to DT-043-05.

3. The chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.
 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised. Hence, even though the
prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug
paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the items seized from
her inadmissible. Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the
following items were confiscated from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu;
one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of
aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow
disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned over the seized items to
PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former.
The testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the
commission of the crime charged in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. It
upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains
because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

People of the Philippines vs Belocura

G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012

Facts: Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation
of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through
the information: That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) plastic bag colored red and white, with label ―SHIN TON YON‖, containing the following: One (1)
newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams; One (1)
newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams. With a
total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution established the guilt of the accused using the evidence obtained.

Held: No. The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him.
Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor
was not overcome.

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This
may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being
the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.

The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized
by PO2 Santos from Belocura‘s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution
later presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the
specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana
allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana
to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti
– the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary
to constitute the crime must be established.

That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both
laws by virtue of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic
under the Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical
relation to, the facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other. The test of relevancy
is whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the
proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any
matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical
connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.

Martinez vs. People, 690 SCRA 656, February 13, 2013

Facts: At around 9:15PM of December 29, 2007, PO2 Soque, PO2 Cepe and PO3 Zeta, conducted a
routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting
"Putanginamo! Limangdaan na ba ito?" For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of
the City of Manila which punishes breaches of the peace, Ramon was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet
and brought Ramon to Police Station 9. Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165.

In defense, Ramon denied the charge and claimed that a man in civilian clothing which introduced himself as
a police officer asked his identity. Ramon was immediately handcuffed and brought to a precinct to be
detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque propositioned Ramon and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his
release. Sine his wife was unable to produce such, he was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest
proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Ramon could be convicted of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs provided
that there‘s warrantless search conducted.

Held: Ramon Martinez was acquitted since the subject shabu purportedly seized is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, such
exclusionary rule is not absolute. The following are the traditional exceptions: customs searches, searches
of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures and
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. As to the last exception, it requires that the apprehending officer must
have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. The term probable
cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance (Breaches of the Peace), however, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated
place, would constitute any of the acts punishable under such provision. The words he allegedly shouted are
not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot
considering that at the time of the incident. Thus, evidences negates the presence of probable cause when
the police officers conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
In this regard, considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicit of the crime charged,
Ramon's acquittal should therefore come as a matter of course.

[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful
arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest
as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS. COGAED, June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334

FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the
driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside
Cogaed‘s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his
bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor
of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He
was then arrested by the police officers.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible
as evidence.

HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as
evidence.

As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be
determined by a judge.

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

(2) Seizure of evidence in ―plain view,‖
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The search involved in this case was initially a ―stop and frisk‖ search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

―Stop and frisk‖ searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement.
That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However,
this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of ―suspiciousness‖ present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a ―genuine
reason to serve the purposes of the ―stop and frisk‖ exception.

The ―stop and frisk‖ search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting
dangerous weapons.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the
probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was
Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to
Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of
Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has
not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain
view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed
was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless
arrest.

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed‘s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when
the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant‘s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary
rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should
be excluded as evidence because it is ―the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures.‖ It ensures that the fundamental rights to one‘s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

Sanchez v. People GR No. 204589, November 19 , 2014

FACTS

1.Sanchez was charged for violation of Sec. 11 of Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of shabu. He
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Prosecution‘s Version of Facts

ted on the information

that Jacinta Marciano was selling drugs to tricycle drivers. They were dispatched to Brgy. Alapan 1-B, Imus,
Cavite, to conduct an operation.

nta. After a few

minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the
tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Sanchez to alight. It was then they noticed Rizaldy holding
a match box.

osta asked Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box which the latter agreed to.
While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that it was a regulated drug, the group accosted Sanchez and the tricycle
driver. They were brought to the police station.

Defense‘s Version of Facts

that he and Darwin Reyes were on their way

hope where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four armed men riding an
owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin. He protested and asked what
offense did they commit. The officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out
that he merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to
Imus Police Station.

-examination, the accused admitted tht it was the first time that he saw the police officers at the
time he was arrested.

2.The RTC ruled that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, in actual possession of shabu. It stated that
the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said
dangerous drug and suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to
contain shabu.

3.The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the
RTC and upheld the conviction of Sanchez. According to the CA, there was probable cause for the police
officers that he was seen leaving the residence of a notorious drug dealer, where, according to a tip they
received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It also conccluded that the confiscation by the police
operative of the subject narcotics from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search.

ISSUE/S

I. Whether or not the Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto hence a search warrant was no longer
necessary –NO

RATIO

It is observed that the Court of Appeals confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest with stop-and-frisk
principle.

A stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused with the search incidental to a
lawful arrest envisioned in Sec. 13 Rule 126.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. The law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made, the process cannot be reveresed.
The arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach
for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime.

As held in Terry v. Ohio, the Terry stop-and-frisk serach is a limited protective searcch of outer clothing for
weapons. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
apoliceman and makes reasonable inquiries, he is entitled for the protection of himself.
The two-fold interest of stop-and-frisk are:

1.The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause

2. The more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police office to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

IN THE CASE AT BENCH, neither the in flagrante delict arrest nor the stop-and-frisk principle was
applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure made by the police operatives. The search preceded
the arrest of Sanchez . There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 113,
arrest is the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. Sec. 2 of the same rules provides that an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

It appears that SPO1 Amposta after they caught up with the tricycle just noticed Sanchez holding a match
box and requested if he could see the contents. The arrest was made only after the discovery by SPO1
Amposta of the shabu inside the boxx. What happened in this case was a search first before arrest was
effected. This does not qualifiy under a valid warrantless arrest under Sec. 5 Rule 113*.

The evidence on record reveals that no physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committeed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. He was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler.
IT has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set in par. B of Sec 5 of Rule 113 have been
complied with. The police officers had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from
the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. The police
officers had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer.
Nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug
activities insidde the house. There was no over manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in, or was attemptin to engage in the criminal activity of ilegally
possessiong shabu.

There is no valid stop-and-frisk. This is an act of apolice officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him and pat him for weapon/s or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter‘s outer clothing for possible concealed weapons. The apprehending officer must have a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer‘s experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed.

The Court does not find the totality of the circumstance sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would
justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a
tricylce without more, were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind
of an experienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession.
Lastly, the OSG characterizes the seuzure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in
plain view. The SC disagrees.

Under the plaint view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

The following are the requisites:

1.the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area

2.the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent

3.it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure.

It is readily apaprent that the seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. There
was no valid intrusion. Sanchez was illegally arrested. The subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered
and it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was alledly inside amatch box being then
held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers.

RULING

Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized
shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of
custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion.
Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the petitioner,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or
reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.

Notes

* Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Villanueva v. People, GR No. 199042. 17 November 2014

Facts

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with a violation of Section 11, Article 2 of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for having in his possession 0.63 grams of shabu. The
prosecution states that 4 witnesses testified that a complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo for
allegedly shooting the former. Police officers then proceeded to the house of Villanueva and informed him
about the Complaint, thereafter inviting him to the police station. He was subjected to a body search and in
the process was found to have shabu in his left pocket. According to Danilo, meanwhile, he was at home
watching tv when the police officers invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had
been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, Danilo was then frisked and detained at the police station.
RTC: Danilo is guilty. CA: affirmed.

Issue

Whether Villanueva violated Sec. 11 of RA 9165 despite the illegality of the arrest and the lapses on the
part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated drug

Held

No. Petitioner acquitted, lower court decision set aside.

Ruling

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private
person. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. He pleadednot guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the
case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.

Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally
waived his right to contest the legality of the search.Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner was merely ordered to take out the
contents of his pocket.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the ―fruit of the poisonous tree.‖
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution: ―Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shallbe inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.‖ Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused- appellant cannot
be sustained.

People of the Philippines vs. Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
FACTS:

Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta was convicted guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 by the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 127 on July 23, 2009. On appeal is the decision dated January 17, 2012 of the court
of Appeals affirming in in toto the decision of the RTC.

On November 11, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two bricks of dried marijuana fruiting
tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.

PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez were on duty; a certain Edwin Lojera arrived at their
office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that
while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute
(gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8 th Avenue Street
corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused
Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.

PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue
corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two armed
men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez
chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiao‘s companion a .38 revolver.

The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Pablo Temena, police investigator
at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of marijuana
contained in a black bag with his initials, ―NM‖. Thereafter, said specimens were forwarded to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP. Jesse Dela
Rosa revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.

On Calantiao‘s defense the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with
another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a ―fuck you‖ sign against the persons on board of
that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson
Mariano; one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes
alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered some words, police officer poked his gun against
Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and
were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money
were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for
drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it would
be sufficient evidence against them.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not that the allegedly seized items are inadmissible evidence in accordance to plain view
doctrine.

2. Whether or not the arresting officers‘ patent non-compliance with the requirements for the proper
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs.

HELD:

1. In People v. Valeroso, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz: When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer‘s safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee‘s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
 apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also
in the permissible area within the latter‘s reached. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure
of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. The phrase ―within the area of his immediate control‖ means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested. In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence
searched and seized from him could not be used against him because they were discovered in a
room, different from where he was being detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area
searched could not be considered as one within his immediate control that he could take any weapon
or destroy any evidence against him. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in
Calantiao‘s possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon
from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the
marijuana was in Calantiao‘s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending
officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect‘s person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because ―objects in the ‗plain view‘ of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.‖ ―The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It serves to supplement the prior
justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest,
or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. ‖The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
Calantiao‘s situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao‘s possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao‘s lawful arrest.

2. SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The
apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have
not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the
foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and
that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge such
burden. It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself
admits this. 23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed
for having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.
However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit: The defenses of denial and
frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to
prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the
cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his
self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster his allegations.

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were
stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO v. PEOPLE [ GR No. 205015, Nov 19, 2014 ]

The Facts

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of
the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the Forest Protection Unit of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos
(Ramos) went to the petitioner's house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon
arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about
two meters away from the petitioner's house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the
neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the
DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner's house without a search warrant.[7]

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered.
When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner's claim of ownership, the latter
showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the
said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions
and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed
that the petitioner bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16
on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in the petitioner's house, on March 15, 1994, was 24
pieces of magsihagon lumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces 2x8x18; and 1 piece
2x10x12.[8]

Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber,
asked for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber
to the DENR office for safekeeping. Seizure Receipt No. 004157 and a Statement Showing the
Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated,[9] which showed the value of the lumber to be
P9,040.00, were issued to the petitioner. Forest Rangers Butal and Ramos corroborated Abaniel's
testimony.[10]

SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio
Crescencio went to the house of the petitioner where they saw some lumber which was later loaded on a
cargo truck. Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office in San Roque, Talibon,
Bohol.[11]

On the other hand, the lone witness of the defense, Lolita Crescencio, admitted that the seized lumber were
owned by the petitioner but claimed that the latter bought it from Pengavitor Enterprises of Trinidad, Bohol
and from Java Marketing in Ubay, Bohol.[12] However, the defense had only the Official Receipt No. 35053
issued by Pengavitor Enterprises which, however, did not tally with the forest products confiscated.
On May 17, 1994, the petitioner was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The Information[13] alleged:

That on or about the 15th day of March, 1994, in the municipality of Talibon, Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to possess and to gain for her own benefit, without any legal document as required
under existing jurisprudence, laws and regulations, and without any lawful authority under
existing rules and regulation of DENR Forest Management Sector, willfully, unlawfully and
illegally possess and have under her custody and control forest products consisting of
twenty-four (24) pieces of magsihagon lumber with a volume of 452 board feet and a total
value of Nine Thousand Forty (P9,040.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency; to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.[14]

During the arraignment on July 15, 1997, the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued.[15]

On August 12, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment[16] convicting the petitioner of the offense charged and
sentenced her to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eleven (11)
years and six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The RTC also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber owned by the petitioner.[17]

As expected, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. However, in its Resolution[18] dated April 15,
2011, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the petitioner failed to furnish the OSG a copy of the
Appellant's Brief in violation of the Rules of Court. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA, in its Resolution[19] dated November 19, 2012. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA's dismissal of the appeal due to the petitioner's failure
to serve a copy of the Appellant's Brief to the OSG is proper, in view of the attendant factual circumstances
and in the interest of substantial justice.

Ruling of the Court

In this case, the petitioner asks for a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure and submits that the
CA erred in dismissing her appeal purely on the basis of mere technicalities.

Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest
opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and of dispensing with technicalities whenever
compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.[20]

The Court has constantly pronounced that "[t]he rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure not override substantial justice. For this reason,
courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure
that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free
from the constraint of technicalities."[21]

It is clear that without at all touching on the substantive aspects of the petitioner's cause, the appellate court
opted not to decide the case on the merits. The subject of the appeal was the decision of the RTC convicting
the petitioner of violation of the Forestry Code and sentencing her to suffer an imprisonment of no less than
six (6) years to eleven (11) years.
In this case, there is nothing in the record that shows any deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to
subvert and delay the final disposition of the case. In fact, when the petitioner learned that her appeal was
dismissed by the CA for failure to serve a copy of her Appellant's Brief to the OSG, she immediately
confronted her previous counsel who denied having filed such brief. As the petitioner was very much worried
of being incarcerated, she asked her previous counsel to withdraw from the case. Thus, the petitioner
submits that the outright denial of her appeal is due to the incompetence and ignorance of her former
counsel who even lied about the fact that he has indeed filed an Appellant's Brief.

As a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for
the appellate court's indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty or property; or (c) where the interests of justice so require.[22]

Here, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy of the Appellant's Brief to
the OSG is a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure as the wanton
recklessness or gross negligence of her counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in
the outright deprivation of her liberty.

In this regard, the Court agrees that the CA should have taken a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the
merits of the appeal, especially when what is involved is no less than the petitioner's liberty.

Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner's culpability.

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show
that she bought the questioned lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been admitted in
evidence against her.

The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain
view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[24]

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the
house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner's house, the lumbers were lying
under the latter's house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is
clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the
petitioner's house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section
80[25] of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the
Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing
in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly,
in the course of such lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which
evidently incriminated the petitioner.

The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, as well as her subsequent
failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute
criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two
distinct and separate offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and (2) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[26]

In the second offense, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest
products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates
the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is
a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.[27]

In the present case, the magsihagon lumber were admittedly owned by the petitioner but unfortunately no
permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly
charged the petitioner with the second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that the
lumber was confiscated from the petitioner, namely: a Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume
of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15, 1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of the petitioner,
and a photograph of the confiscated lumber. Moreso, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR
personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the
petitioner's liability.

As to the imposable penalty on the petitioner, the RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor as maximum.

The Court does not agree. This Court notes that the estimated value of the confiscated pieces of lumber, as
appearing in the Statement Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated is
P9,040.00 which is alleged in the Information. However, except for the testimonies of Abaniel and Butal that
this amount is the estimate based on prevailing local price as stated in the apprehension receipt they issued,
the prosecution did not present any proof as to the value of the lumber.

Clearly, this evidence does not suffice. The Court had ruled that in order to prove the amount of the property
taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. In the
absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the minimum
penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.[28] Hence, the lower court erred in finding that the value of the confiscated lumber is P9,040.00 for no
evidence of such value was established during the trial.

Accordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)[29] of the RPC,
which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. However, considering that violation of Section
68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft under Article 310[30] in relation to Article 309 of the
RPC, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that is, to prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or within the range of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days, considering that there are no attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense.

In accordance with current jurisprudence[31] and taking into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court finds it proper to impose on the petitioner, in view of the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision on August 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, in
Criminal Case No. 96-27, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Ma. Mimie Crescencio is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith
& Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the
police station for furtherinvestigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to
do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further
alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only
after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and
hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

FACTS:
l Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.

l A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.

l Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that they saw two men "looking from side to side,"
one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them.

l The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found
with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.

l His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket.
The weapons were taken from them.

l Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.

l One other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject
weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987.
He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.

l He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the
revolver.

l Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.

l It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because
of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized
as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected
without a warrant.

l The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest was lawful

HELD:

NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be
arrested after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely ―looking from side to side‖ and ―holding his abdomen‖. There was apparently no
offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.

The Court takes note that there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused
was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting
suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later after Danganan had appeared at
the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein.

As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor
was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.

Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

Manalili v CA (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:

At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance
along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that
drug addicts were roaming around said area.

Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying
manner.

Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked
him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what
the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it.
Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.

The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:

Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible
as evidence.

Held:

The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in
violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding.

The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause.
Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the
place to be searched.

Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant.

In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when
he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent
court.
Esquillo vs people, G.R. No. 182010 aug 25 2010

Facts:

the (RTC) convicted Susan Esquillo (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Aguas conducted surveillance on
the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as Ryan. PO1 Cruzin
glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and was seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case a small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. PO1 Cruz
he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her.
He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet. Instead of
replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained.

Issue
Won the arrest without warrant is legal

Ruling
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps
to quash the Information on such ground. she raised the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence for the first time only on appeal. By such omissions, she is deemed to have
waived any objections on the legality of her arrest

the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case,
it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her.

In stop and frisk operations, The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters
outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason,
in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, (2) more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation. the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation.

G.R. No. L-95630 June 18, 1992

SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and MA. LUISA VEROY, petitioners, vs.THE HON. WILLIAM L. LAYAGUE,
Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Regional Trial Court at Davao City;

Facts: On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a
directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of herein petitioners in
Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They
were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was
not present and they did not have a search warrant. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet
conducted the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. They recovered a .45
cal. handgun with a magazine, a bag etc. The spouse Veroy were held liable for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion).

Issues: Assuming the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in admitting in evidence certain articles which were clearly inadmissible for being violative of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held: Yes. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution).
However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one.
Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving
vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991
[193 SCRA 122]). None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house
of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel
soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not
have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for
a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but
only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police
officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.

Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind
of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as
evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan
v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in
mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed.
Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal
possession of firearms is DISMISSED.

People v. Nuevas, GR No. 170233, 22 February 2007

Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in
Olongapo City, came across Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon inquiry, Nuevas
showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. He then
informed the officers of 2 other persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.

The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando
Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein. When the police officers introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag
over to them. After the items were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the police office.

Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during their
physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the Fiscal‘s office where they were informed of the charges
against them.

The 3 were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was automatically elevated to the CA for review.
However, Nuevas withdrew his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and terminated as to him.
The CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:

W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Held:

NO. The search conducted in Nuevas‘ case was made with his consent. However, in Din‘s case, there was
none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating
contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates,
offering himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find
excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the cost of others‘ lives. Thus, the Court would have
affirmed Nuevas‘ conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. The police
officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic
bag. Neither can Din‘s silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Thus, the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. On the other hand, Inocencio‘s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves
was sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The act
attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to
illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the
contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items.

Ratio:

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes ―unreasonable‖ and any evidence obtained therefrom is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exceptions are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) Search of evidence in ―plain view‖;
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Elements of search of evidence in plain view:

(a) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) Inadvertent discovery of the evidence by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) ―Plain view‖ justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search and seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The arrest, however, must precede
the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.

An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if
the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

It must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search—the consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by duress or coercion.

The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It
is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obstrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that:
(1) The right exists;
(2) The person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) The said person had an actual intention to relinquish such right.

Obiter:
To behold is not to hold.

PEOPLE VS DEQUINA

Facts: Accused Nelida Dequina was charged for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the
pertinent facts of the case are as follows: P03 Masange along with two other companions were given a tip
that a huge amount of marijuana will be delivered in the corner of Juan Luna and Rexabano Street in Tondo
Manila. Being given the description of the purported carriers, P03 Masange et al. proceeded to the area and,
a male and two females were seen getting off the taxi and carrying individual black bags. The officers went
to the individuals and the three began to panic. One of them is accused Nelida Dequina who dropped the
bag she was carrying, causing the zipper to open and revealed what seemed to be bricks of marijuana. The
bags of her two other companion contained the same. Dequina raised as a defense that she only did what
she did because she was under the gun, that her daughter was in the hands of the mastermind threatening
her that something bad is to happen to her daughter if she would not complete what she is asked to do.

The RTC convicted her party of the crime and was affirmed by the CA. Dequina and party assail their
conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal. They were not doing anything illegal that would have
justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons and belongings. A search
made without a warrant cannot be justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was lawful. The
People counters that accused-appellants‘ arrests were lawful as they were then actually committing a crime.
Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the resulting warrantless search of their persons and
belongings was also valid. In addition, accused-appellants did not refute that they were indeed transporting
prohibited drugs when they were arrested and, instead, alleged as defenses that Dequina acted under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo were merely accommodating a trusted childhood
friend.

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of Dequina is valid.

Held: Yes. The party of Dequina was in inflagrante delicto at the time of the arrest.

Ratio: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made
by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: 1. When the person to be arrested
is in inflagrante delicto. 2. When the arresting officer is in hot pursuit. 3. When the person to be arrested is an
escapee.

―Transport‖ as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean ―to carry or convey from one place to
another.‖ The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught
in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue need not
even open Dequina‘s traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police
officers‘ presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing
the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being
committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following
warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.

G.R. No. 178039 January 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

FACTS: On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were
abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque. Nimfa was able to recognized one of
the kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employer‘s office. 14 The kidnappers
called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson was
able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions. After, numerous
times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be
paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake
House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk
unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan
were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and video
coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and the latter as the one who
took the ransom. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then
apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon
Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the
gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the
suspect‘s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red
car and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. When said car slowed down, they blocked it
and immediately approached the vehicle.23 They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the
suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took
place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?

DOCTRINE: The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, which provides: ―A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.‖ A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states: ―A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.‖

RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates
two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it. Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The
police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively
consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers
stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be
based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule
113 does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
 eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long
enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to
personal knowledge based on probable cause.

Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such.
Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do
so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from are AFFIRMED.

BOC and EEIB vs. Ogario

G.R. No. 138081, March 30, 2000

o Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings.
FACTS:

On December 9, 1998, Felipe Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure
and Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of ―SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan.‖ According to the
EIIB, the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked ―SNOWMAN,
Milled in Palawan.‖ It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V ―Alberto.‖ Forfeiture
proceedings were commenced but respondents filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC of Cebu City,
impugning the issuance of the Warrant.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered the return of the goods. Meanwhile, in the forfeiture
proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu, a decision was rendered ordering the goods forfeited
in favor of the government.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings

HELD:

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere
with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

The rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no
unnecessary hindrance on the government‘s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties
due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, such act does not deprive the BOC of
jurisdiction thereon.

FELICISIMO RIETA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004

Facts: After a car chase, Col. Lacson and his men searched a vehicle and found several firearms. The
persons in the car belonged to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with
mission orders. During that same incident, when the cargo truck which was accompanied by the car during
the car chase was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside.

Rieta, one of the passengers of the seized cargo truck, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of
the blue-seal cigarettes. He alleged that the cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were the
contents thereof shown to them upon their apprehension. These allegations were corroborated by one of his
companions during the incident.

RTC and CA found Rieta guilty of smuggling.

Issue: Were the evidence obtained against the accused inadmissible in evidence because petitioner and his
co-accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order (ASSO) which was
subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable Supreme Court?

Held: The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance
of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act
was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was
issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner
-- is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.

The search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation of customs
laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional provision. Such provision
mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has
personally determined the existence of probable cause.

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a warrant for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant,
the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable goods (branded
watches, etc) after PAF officers were observing their conduct and found it to be suspicious during a special
mission given to them to make a routine surveillance to check on reports of alleged trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by PAL employees.

Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: WON the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Held:

Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was
to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL
personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and
his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and
seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.

In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any
article, cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have
been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a
warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the
case at bar.

In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by
importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Government‘s policy to combat the serious malady of
smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty
has not been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individual‘s private papers and
effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have continued to affirm.

PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

FACTS:

l Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d‘état on
December 1989 against the Government.

l Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC .

l Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being
occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post.

l Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo
when a group of five men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car.

l Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, the
five men drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver.

l Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the
crossfire.

l Thereafter, the search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition,
5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.
l Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping
through the door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano,

l No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there
was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed.

l Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion but was acquitted of
attempted homicide.

ISSUE/S:

WON appellant is guilty of illegal possession of firearms

WON there were a valid search and seizure in this case.

HELD:

1. YES. There is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally
possessed several firearms, explosives, and ammunition without the requisite license or authority therefor.

Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and
safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and explosives,
and which criminal acts have resulted in the loss of human lives, damage to property and destruction of
valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country during the first few
years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-growing
importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and preempt the
commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.

The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management.

Moreover, When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.

The Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the
Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the
room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. 13 At first, appellant
denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there
was no intent on his part to possess the same since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col.
Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire
credence.

2. YES. It is a valid search and seizure.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December
5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

PEOPLE V. ANDRE MARTI G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:

l The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend
Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland.

l The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the packages.

l Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes and
husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.

l When Job Reyes opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an
opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.

l Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.

l He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, (August 14, 1987).

l Job Reyes was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.

l Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and
three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila.

l Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

l The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
Tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigar.

l The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects.

l The NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail.

l The NBI agents asked for assistance to Manila Central Post Office‘s Chief Security, where the appellants
passport addressed was indicated.
l Appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.

l On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry
Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as
certified by the forensic chemist.

l An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

l Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and
Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

l Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is
violated when his parcels were opened without his permission.

ISSUE:

WON an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?

HELD:

1. NO. The court ruled in the negative.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by
the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities.

Therefore, In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of
a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.

In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Waterhouse Drug Corp. v NLRC

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10
bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico
overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a ―refund‖ for the
jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. NLRC: Dismissed the
Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one‘s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.

Held:

Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against
such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and
civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of
Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of Employment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y

LANDICHO, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]

FACTS:
 On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court
found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate
occurrence is the spouses‘ only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal
grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge
with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 636

That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without
justifiable motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38
caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal
gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.

Criminal Case No. 637

That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber
revolver, Colt with Serial No. 41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first
securing the necessary license or permit therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation on the constitutional right to privacy of the accused.

HELD:
Accused-appellant denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the
fatal weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had
been a dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever
she went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is believed by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor
of the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on
the night her mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his
father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Piñas police investigators to surrender the
gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting
incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum
receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon (p.
66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally procured in grave violation of
his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search
and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this
Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of one‘s person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant‘s
father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON G.R. No.
143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry
5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at
the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about
her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and
four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom
they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan.
The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent,
he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the
economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the
cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be ―shabu,‖ the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the
suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or ―shabu‖ was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection
or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel.
It was only after they found ―shabu‖ inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the
vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar
is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To overcome this
presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican ―Alex‖ Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no
evidence to support his claim. No witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing,
flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he
does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of
the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of
the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or
intent to possess the same.

SALES VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight.
As part of the routine security check at the predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru
Metal Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on
duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Aviation
Security Group (ASG)..

While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants.
When Soriano asked petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands.
Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter was nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from
his pocket. Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry Trota-Bartolome who was
nearby.

PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open his hands. Petitioner finally opened his
right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops.

Petitioner now assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1 Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him
stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous search was unnecessary
because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner walked past through the
metal detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. He likewise
mentioned the fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that time, which he said was not accounted for.

ISSUE: Whether or not the frisking done to petitioner was valid.

RULING: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation‘s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets
that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

The search of the contents of petitioner‘s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport
security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence.
Petitioner‘s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker‘s hand felt the rolled
papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that
he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities.

PEOPLE VS CADIDIA

FACTS: While performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal I
(domestic airport), Marilyn Trayvilla frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the departure area and she
noticed something unusual and thick in the area of Cadidia‘s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it
was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia‘s explanation,
Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the
domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered
that inside were two sachets of shabu.

ISSUE: Whether or not the frisking done on the accused was valid.

RULING: Airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure.1âwphi1 As held in similar cases of
People v Johnson73 and People v Canton,74 this Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes
Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body
illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport
frisking thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation‘s airports.
Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage
as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches arc reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity or the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed. travellers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that the are
subject to search and. if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would he subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

People v. Conde G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001

Fact: Apollo Romero, was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw four men block the
path of two decease Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. One of the men, later identified as Oscar
Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions approached and stabbed the Indians.
After the stabbing, the four men fled. Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away from the place where the
crime was committed. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, testified that he was assigned with the Intelligence and
Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, he was told to investigate the abovecited incident. The police
arrested the three accused. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare,
Conde‘s wife, went to the police station to talk to the accused. These weapons were discovered inside her
bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when
they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad‘s bag
and when they searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items.

Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused is valid even if their arrest was conducted in violation for their
right against warrantless arrest.

Held: Yes, the arrest was a clear violation of their constitutional right; unfortunately, appellants did not assert
their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before
his arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to
question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their
arrests should had been made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for appellants to raise the
question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear
waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from
error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading
to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the
guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 Right against Searches and/or
Seizures

FACTS:

As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried
of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order.

ISSUES:

What constitutes a reasonable search?

Whether checkpoints violate the right against searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.
RULING:

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte‘s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to
enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte‘s right against unlawful search and
seizure.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Valmonte vs. Gen. De Villa G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990

Facts: In the Court‘s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners‘ petition for prohibition seeking the
declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Before submission of the incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment,
to which petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless
search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether installment and operation of checkpoints is unconstitutional and constitutes warrantless
search.
Held: No, it is the basic right of the State to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its
program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government
has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving
them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the
pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the
reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it
has selected.

Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with
legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may
obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint
operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized
manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding
motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed
checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to
the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be
unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since
field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing
stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular
exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial
review.

People v. Rodelio C. Exala, et al., G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993

I. THE FACTS

A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City
for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of
the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They
answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He
then noticed a black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When he
asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from the 3 accused. Nobody answered. Instead, they
suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened, which was found out to contain
marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter prosecuted and convicted of illegal transportation of marijuana.
Accused Bocalan appealed and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence
against him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in evidence against the
accused?

III. THE RULING

 [The 1st Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the conviction of the accused. Justices Griño-Aquino and
Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillo‘s ponencia. Justice Cruz, by his lonesome, dissented from the
majority.]

The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the admission of the seized
marijuana because he neither raised this issue before the trial court nor objected to the admissibility of the
marijuana when it was offered in evidence.

And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalan‘s contention
deserves scant consideration because there are instances where search and seizure can be made without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the ―stop-and-search‖ without a warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this
Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa]. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after
a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is
because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense.

According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do away
with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. This
case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful ―stop-and-search‖ at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with ―Operational Bakal,‖ the main object
of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized
persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was
flagged down and the occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a
black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the
accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet
and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in
abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused,
which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the
opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.

[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his appeal to the
Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.]

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Justice Cruz maintained the proposition in his dissent in Valmonte vs. De Villa that checkpoints
and the searches and seizures incident thereto are unconstitutional. In People vs. Exala, he expounded on
this thesis:

I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality

in general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be
stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the chance that it may
be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill
of Rights.
 In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the
search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is
no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just
been committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being
searched or arrested is the culprit.

I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at

‗constructive borders‘ near the boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of
immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory, the requirements of a valid
search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible exemption is where a
crime like a bank robbery has just been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the
authorities have to seal off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I
submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.

xxx. [W]e cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that,
after all, the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would
rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights
being systematically ignored in the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution
is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)

GUAZON V. DE VILLA G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro
Manila.

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "areal target zoning" that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional.

The alleged acts committed during the raid are the following:

1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific target house to search and that there is no search warrant or
warrant of arrest served.

2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.

3. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses.

4. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows.

5. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.

6. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying
their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation.

7. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings, and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information.

l The respondents said that such accusations mentioned above were total lies.
l Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to the government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state.

l The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted.

l Respondents averred that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual
operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

ISSUE:

WON the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal

HELD:

YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a valid exercise of the military powers of the
President.

Abenes v. CA, GR No. 156320, 14 February 2007

Facts

Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered firearm and its
ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms and
its ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was
asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police saw the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked
him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one, the police confiscated the firearm. It
was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder.

The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges. Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that the
checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and that his constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue/s

W/N the checkpoint was legally set up.

W/N Abenes‘ constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had been violated.

Ruling

YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was
established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under which the
policemen found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant (plain view).

NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun
Ban and were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating Abenes where they
saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes
alighted from the vehicle.

However, there is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no license. Thus, for failure of
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior authority,
license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability under the illegal possession of firearms
law. However, Abenes is still convicted for violation of the Comelec Gun Ban.

Doctrine

Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual‘s right against unreasonable search.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;

(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;

(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

GANAAN V IAC

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant‘s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty
minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‗Yes‘. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant
for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant‘s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200,
which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for
certiorari.

Issue:

W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term ―device or arrangement‖ under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held:

No. The law refers to a ―tap‖ of a wire or cable or the use of a ―device or arrangement‖ for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as ―tapping‖ the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

According to the Supreme Court, everything stated before them consists only of allegations. According to
petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No
estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and
Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated
in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a
trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been
tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand
allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has
apparently complained.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, to order
police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat
areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or
rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.

The Constitution grants the Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would
bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the State.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

FACTS:

l Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed acts in
―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code.‖

l Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette
wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

l The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely:

(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and

(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

l Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the Rules of
court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
 (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.

l The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; The
defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible
regardless of the irregularity.

l The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a resolution, the
writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD:

NO the search warrant is invalid.

l The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

l The constitution protects the people‘s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at
bar, none of these are met.

l The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a ―violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.‖

l In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.

l As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
 whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.

l As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a ―violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,‖ — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.

l The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

l Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.

l However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against
their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.

l The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

PASTRANO vs. CA, G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997

FACTS

A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza, then intelligence operations officer of the Philippine
Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by
his father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed fear of the
petitioner who, according to them, had firearms. Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been
the victim of foul play. Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife also saw Capt. Mañoza, seeking
his assistance in connection with the death of their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and
his common-law wife were keeping unlicensed firearms in their house. They executed a joint affidavit which
they stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three
(3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of his house.

On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Mañoza applied for a search warrant on the
same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of
Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a search warrant which Capt. Mañoza and his men later served at the
residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City. Seized from petitioner's dwelling was a sack
containing the following:

One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in Germany ROHMGMBH
SONTHEM/BRENZ;

One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;

One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in U.S.A.;

Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.

On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y Capapas and his common-law wife,
Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as penalized
under P.D. No. 1866, §1.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution.

RULING

The Court held that petitioner waived any objection based on the illegality of the search.

Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge had examined the complainant
and his witnesses by means of searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, §4 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 126, §4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and his witnesses to be put in writing and
under oath. But although this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to
this end. He did not move to quash the information before the trial court. Nor did he object to the
presentation of the evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal search.

Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. As held in People v. Omaweng,
the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and
the waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the crime charged and that the Court
of Appeals and the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.

Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver ―to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila,‖

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that
all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.

ISSUE:

1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondeat
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

HELD:

1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners‘ right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely
the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine
of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and
servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of
the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is
the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‗directly‘ or ―indirectly‖
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added
meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the
factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government
was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect
of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.

W. CAMERON FORBES v. CHUOCO TIACO, G.R. No. L-6157, July 30, 1910

FACTS:

April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the plaintiffs alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the said W. Cameron
Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by
the aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the police and of the secret
service, respectively, of the city of Manila, and that having been able to return to these Islands he feared, as
it was threatened, that he should be again deported by the said defendants, concluding with a petition that a
preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the
defendant, Chuoco, and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.

Respondent argued that It is true that the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11 others or his
nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R.
Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, but the said expulsion was carried out in
the public interest of the Government and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese
Government in these Islands.

The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting the petition, issued
against the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting the defendant Chuoco Tiaco.

The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and presented a motion asking that the injunction be
dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that the facts set out in the complaint did not constitute a
motive of action, and that the latter was one in which the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction
against the plaintiffs for the reasons set out in the complaint; notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S.
Crossfield overruled the demurrer and disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction
standing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise of this inherent power in
the deportation of aliens, for the purpose of controlling this power vested in the political department of the
government.

HELD:
Under the system of government established in the Philippine Islands the Governor-General is "the chief
executive authority," one of the coordinate branches of the Government, each of which, within the sphere of
its governmental powers, is independent of the others. Within these limits the legislative branch cannot
control the judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch, nor either the executive department. In the exercise
of his political duties the Governor-General is, by the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, invested with
certain important governmental and political powers and duties belonging to the executive branch of the
Government, the due performance of which is entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and discretion. So
far as these governmental or political or discretionary powers and duties which adhere and belong to the
Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it is universally agreed that the courts possess no power to
supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their discharge or exercise.

PEOPLE vs. MARTINEZ (G.R. No. 1911366, 13-DEC-2010)

FACTS:

Upon the receipt of the report, police authorities and members of the SWAT team hied to Trinidad Subd.,
Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from the people in the area, the house of the accused was located. As the police
officers entered the gate of the house.

However, nothing from outside the house could be seen what is happening inside, such as the alleged
paraphernalia and plastic sachet of shabu on the table while they were outside the premises of the property
of accused.

Before entering, they only relied on the information that that there was an ongoing pot session inside the
house of accused. Thereafter, they immediately barged in and arrested accused.

ISSUE:

WON there was an express waiver on the part of the accused. NO.

WON the items were seized in plain view. NO.

HELD:

1. The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment. However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens
as well as into their houses, papers and effects. X x x the constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant.
Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant – (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in ―plain view‖; (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.

Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 s clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may
be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid.
Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man‘s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the
above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal.

First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants
had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a
penal establishment.

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrest without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is
based on actual facts, that is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

2. Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plain view are: (a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view"

justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and
address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest
and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus
inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012.

FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited the Luz to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station.
While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in
size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said
container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the container on
the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims
that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz
was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under the city ordinance, and
such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?

HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent
on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former
may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue)
a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was there a valid warrantless search and seizure that
can still produce conviction?

HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz was deemed arrested upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall
be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might
make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements
were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

[T] here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject
items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.

PEOPLE VS MARIANO

Facts:

Acting on an informant‘s tip, a buy-bust team was formed composed of SPO1 Goñez, the team leader, with PO1
Olleres as the poseur-buyer, and police back-ups, PO3 Razo, and a certain PO1 Pabrigas, and an unidentified member
of the PDEA. SPO1 Goñez produced the marked money consisting of one (1) One Thousand Peso bill and six (6) One
Hundred Peso bills. PO1 Olleres placed his initials on the marked bills. On 17 October 2004, the team conducted a
buy-bust operation in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia. PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the
target house and they witnessed an ongoing pot session. They looked for "Galog" and they were introduced to
Godofredo. They asked Godofredo if they can "score." Godofredo immediately left the house and went to a street at the
back of the house. He returned carrying two (2) sachets of shabu, which he handed to PO1 Ollares. In exchange, PO1
Olleres paid him the One Thousand Peso marked bill. Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The
latter asked for the Six Hundred Peso marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan as payment for the
shabu. After these exchanges, they requested appellants for an actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a
tooter and aluminum foil. While they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest.

An Affidavit of Arrest was prepared and signed by PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo.11 PO1 Olleres also prepared a receipt
of the property seized containing his and appellants‘ signatures. The buy-bust team marked the plastic sachets
containing shabu at the crime scene and PO1 Olleres brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also
took photographs of the items confiscated and of appellants.

Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, found that the specimen submitted to her was
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the convictions of the appellants. It justifies the legality of the warrantless
arrest of appellants as they were caught in flagrante delicto. Moreover, the OSG avers that appellants are estopped
from questioning the legality of their arrest having raised them only on appeal.

Held:

We deny the appeal.

Appellants were charged and convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs
are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Appellants were caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu
during a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Olleres, positively testified that
the sale took place and that appellants sold the shabu, thus:

A: At about 10:30 in the morning of that day our team leader instructed me to be with them in conducting a buy bust
operation.

Q: And who was with you at that time?

A: PO3 Razo and an asset.

Q: Where is the venue of the buy bust operation?

A: In the house of a certain Gerry Angustia (sic).

Q: At what time did you proceed to said place more or less?

A: About 10:00 o‘clock in the morning, Ma‘am, we proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic). As per information of
our asset, Galog was already on that house.

Q: Who is that Galog that you are referring to?

A: Godofredo Mariano.

Q: When you reached the place of Gerry Angustia (sic), what happened?

A: When we arrived at the scene there was an ongoing pot session but we did not disturb them because the subject of
our operation for the day is Godofredo Mariano and when we arrived we asked who is Galog and he was introduced to
us and so we asked him if we can buy some items from him.

Q: The place where you proceeded to, Mr. Witness, is it a house?

A: It is just a small house and to our knowledge it was being occupied by Gerry Angustia (sic).

Q: Mr. Witness, what happened when you were there and being introduced to Galog?

A: We talked with him and asked him if we can score and Godofredo Mariano left the house and went to a street at the
back of the house and when he came back he has already with him two (2) sachets of shabu.

Q: Now, what happened when he returned with two (2) sachets of shabu?

A: Upon arrival of Godofredo Mariano with those two (2) sachets of shabu, we paid him one thousand (Php1,000.00)
pesos and right then and there Allan Doringo approached us and offered to us to buy also two (2) sachets of shabu.
Q: Did you likewise buy the shabu offered by Allan Doringo?

A: Yes, Ma‘am, Police Officer Razo gave Allan Doringo six hundred (Php600.00) pesos.

Q: Afterwards, what happened?

A: And right after the exchanged of items we requested the two (2) of them to have the actual test of shabu and while
they were testing the shabu we declared arrest.

Q: What do you mean when you say they were actually testing the shabu?

A: They tested the shabu by providing us the totter and aluminum foil and while we were testing the said shabu we
declared arrest.

Q: Is accused Godofredo Mariano present today in court?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: Please identify him to us?

A: (Witness pointed to a man in a blue strife sweet shirt (sic) who identified himself as Godofredo Mariano.)

Q: What about accused Allan Doringo (sic), is he present today in court?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: If you are required to identify him, will you be able to do so?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: Please go down and identify him?

A: (Witness pointed to a man in black shirt and identified as Allan Doringo when asked.)22

Simply put, Godofredo produced two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave it to PO1 Olleres in exchange for
P1,000.00. Also, Allan had offered and given two (2) more sachets containing shabu to PO3 Razo, who in turn, handed
him P600.00. PO3 Razo corroborated the account of PO1 Olleres, to wit:

Q: Mr. Witness, on October 17, 2004 at more or less 10:45 in the morning do you still recall your whereabouts?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: Will you please tell us where?

A: On October 17, 2004 at 10:45 a.m. from the camp we proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic).

Q: And what was your purpose in going to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic)?

A: To conduct a buy bust operation.

Q: By the way, where is that house of Gerry Angustia (sic) located?

A: At pier Uno of Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon just in front of the Coast Guard.

Q: Okay, when you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) to conduct buy bust operation, who was with you at
that time?
A: PO3 David F. Olleres, Jr. and our asset.

Q: When you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) and when you arrived at the house of Gerry Angustia (sic)
what happened next?

A: While at the house of Gerry Angustia (sic), Godofredo Mariano offered to our asset to taste the shabu and he also
offered two (2) sachets of shabu worth Php1,000.00 to PO3 David Olleres, Jr. while this Allan Doringo persuaded us to
buy also two (2) sachets of shabu which was offered to PO3 Olleres who gave him also Php600.00 pesos.

Q: What did Olleres do when he was offered this shabu by Godofredo Mariano?

A: He received the two (2) sachets of shabu from Godofredo Mariano and gave Godofredo Mariano the Php1,000.00
bill then PO3 David Olleres identified himself to Godofredo Mariano.

Q: Now, before Olleres identified himself as a police officer, did you already buy the shabu from Allan Doringo?

A: Godofredo Mariano sold his shabu to PO3 David Olleres while this Allan Doringo insisted to me to buy his shabu for
Php600.00 pesos.

Q: And what did you do when Allan Doringo offered you this shabu in the amount of Php600.00.

A: I get Php600.00 from David Olleres and paid Allan Doringo the same amount after I received from him the shabu.

Q: Then what happened afterwards?

A: Then after that we introduced ourselves as police officers and we brought them to the camp for police investigation.

Q: Are accused Allan Doringo and Godofredo Mariano present today in court?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: If you are required to identify them, will you be able to do so?

A: Yes, Ma‘am.

Q: Please point at them?

A: (The witness pointed to a man in yellow shirt who identified himself as Allan Doringo when asked and also the
witness pointed to a man in black shirt and identified himself as Godofredo Mariano when asked.)23

The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white
crystalline substances inside the four (4) plastic sachets confiscated from appellants. The marked money was
presented in evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo and the receipt by appellants
of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.

Godofredo was further charged and convicted of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. The elements of illegal
possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article
II, Republic Act No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.24

The prosecution has convincingly established that Godofredo was in possession of drug paraphernalia such as
aluminum foil, aluminum tooter and lighter, all of which were offered in evidence.25 The corresponding receipt and
inventory of the seized shabu and other drug paraphernalia were likewise presented in evidence.26 Police
Superintendent Leonidas Diaz Castillo attested to the veracity of the contents of these documents.27

While both appellants admitted their presence in the scene of the crime, they both denied the existence of a buy-bust
operation.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted. Denial
in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies
acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellants cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellants.28

Appellants‘ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1
Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were in fact participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that
appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team.

Anent the absence of counsel during the execution of an inventory receipt, we agree with the conclusion of the
appellate court that notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the inventory receipt, the prosecution has sufficiently proven
the guilt of appellants, thus:

Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence
if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration
against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that appellants signed receipt
of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders inadmissible the receipt itself.1âwphi1

In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is irrelevant in light of the ample
evidence proving appellants‘ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust
operation was conducted to entrap appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established that the sale of
shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by
the other members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed in four (4) plastic
sachets seized from appellants.29

In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants sold shabu. Under Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. As to Godofredo who
was further convicted of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
imposes the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon any person, who unless authorized
by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia
fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

Based on the foregoing rules, we also affirm the imposition of penalties by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 November 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03343 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision dated 5 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Sorsogon
City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-706, 04-707, and 04-708, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Burgos vs Esperon GR No. 178497, February 04, 2014

Doctrine:

The Court emphasize that the Court‘s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

Facts:

Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the
forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon City.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced
Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had
transpired and that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have
been fully determined. The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt.
Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered
his arrest in connection with Jonas‘ disappearance.

Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The respondents have not appealed to the
court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent
Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner‘s motion should be granted.

Ruling:

No.

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the
developments of the case, including the Court of Appeal‘s decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, the Court resolve to deny the petitioner‘s Urgent Ex
Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
The Court note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of
the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the Court held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis the writ
merely embodies the Court‘s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to
address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on
the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo
proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms ―responsibility‖ and ―accountability‖ signify in an
Amparo case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court has
already found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in
connection with Jonas‘ disappearance.

The Court emphasize that the Court‘s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the
CA‘s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation
and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM,
Petitioner, vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C.
YANGCO, Respondents, G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latter‘s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children in Parañaque City.
 On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009,
Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as ―Legally
Available for Adoption.‖ On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was ―matched‖ with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian‘s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her
family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available
for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of
the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was
no enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes ―enforced disappearance,‖ the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting ―enforced disappearances‖ as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No.
9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization‘s refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian‘s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD‘s
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed
her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no ―enforced disappearance‖
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
 Christina‘s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify
the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 183345 Septembe 17, 2014

Facts : Manuel Dy Awiten (Dy), claimed that as a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank (where Ngo was the
manager) and because of their good business relationship, he took Ngo‘s advice to deposit his money in
an investment that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo introduced Dy to Gracia Hao (Hao) (petitioner),
who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources
Development Corporation where subsequently DY invested.

Dy‘s initial investment was P10M. He received the promised interest from is investment. Thus, convincing
him to invest more. He invested almost P100M. The additional investments were given through checks.
Gracio Hao also issued several checks representing Dy‘s earnings. These checks were subsequently
dishonored.

Dy seek Ngo‘s help to recover the amount. Ngo promised, however, Dy subsequently discovered that the
former already resigned from the bank. This time, Dy confronted Gracia. Dy learned that his money was
invested in the realty business of Gracia Hao‘s realty business.

Dy filed a complaint with the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor filed an information for
syndicated estafa.

Warrant of arrest were subsequently issued against the Hao‘s and other accused Hao filed a motion to defer
arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. They invoked lack of probable cause and the pendency of
their petition for review with the DOJ.

RTC denied the petitioner‘s twin motion.

CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision with regard to the twin motion. However, the CA opined that the information
shows only probable cause for simple estafa only.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment shall be deferred because of the pendency of the petition for review
with the DOJ

Held: NO. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is
a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the
President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003.
Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended
indefinitely.

We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In
Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, we explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration
of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.

As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners' petition
for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners' arraignment was already
beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.

As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the petitioners'
refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the Rules in their favor. As
there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now
ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties' evidence and
allegations may be weighed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the
February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289.
We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest
issued stand.

2. WON a valid warrant of arrest is issued

YES. To be valid, the warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that probable
cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine
the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need not conduct a hearing; he only
needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.

The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause
to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present any evidence to controvert
this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:

The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension of
arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joya‘s motions, which
may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Hao‘s own petition for review. This
is not to mention the delay in the resolution by the Department of Justice. On the other hand, co-accused
DeJoya‘s motion to determine probable cause and co-accused Spouses Hao‘s motion to lift warrant of arrest
have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after
his personal examination of the facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief
that they are guilty of the crime that in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]

Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal evaluation
of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to apprehend the
petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.

PEOPLE VS VILLAREAL

FACTS:

- PO3 Renato de Leon was riding on his motorcycle when he saw appellant Nazareno Villareal from
an 8 to 10 meter-distance
 - Villareal was then inspecting a plastic sachet containing shabu
- De Leon approached Villanueva whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested for
illegal drug possession but the latter tried to escape
- He was apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver and was brought to the police station
- In his defense, Villanueva was walking when a man who was riding a motorcycle called him from
behind
- He was approached, instructed not to run, then was frisked, and took his wallet
- Appellant was brought to the police station where he was detained and mauled
- He was also asked questions with a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer about a
stolen cellphone
- The trial court convicted appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and such was
established properly through an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest
- The appellate court sustained conviction finding a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest

ISSUE:

Whether or not the in flagrante warrantless arrest was valid

HELD:

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

In both instances, the officer‘s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows
for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a
motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet
allegedly held by appellant.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime
had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground
to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which
does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was
merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter‘s previous charge for the same offense.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the
exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest.
"Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To
interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person‘s reputation or past criminal citations would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person‘s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory
the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

People v. Collado

Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were engaged in
selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using their residence in 32 R.
Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their drug sessions. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter
formed. The asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the
money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought out a small
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they
found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered
with various drug paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of
white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking
marijuana was recovered from Ranada.
RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs. 5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache,
Sumulong, Madarang and Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165. CA affirmed the decision with
modification that Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and Madarang are accessories, not principals.

Issue:
Whether or not irregularities attended the arrest, detention, and the procedure in handling the specimen
seized from them

Held:
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to
PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.

As for the specimen, the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are
not fatal to the prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance
were preserved, as in this case.
In Rañada‘s case, he was actually caught having custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia
intended for smoking, injecting, etc. into one's body. It was also indubitably shown that he failed to present
authority to possess the prohibited articles, much less, an explanation of his possession thereof. However,
as regards the other accused who were seen in the company of Rañada, the evidence of conspiracy against
them was insufficient. They were in close proximity to Rañada at the time and place of the incident. But mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show specific overt
acts that would link these accused to Ranada's possession of the said contrabands. The CA erred in ruling
that they were accessories to the crime.

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No.
180661 December 11, 2013

Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men
rush out of a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached the
house. When they peeked through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot
session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and arrested Antiquera and Cruz.
While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The
court affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity
that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering
that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO y EBDANE, appellant [G.R.
No. 188133. July 7, 2014.]

Theme: Inadmissibility of evidence in arrest inflagrante delicto; Chain of custody requirement: Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165

FACTS:

The prosecution charged the appellant Edaño and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations.

The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits
followed.

Prosecution
Witnesses: Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin
Casignia and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer
Corbe
On the evening of August 6, 2002, members
of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement
Group, together with a female informant, went
to the parking area of McDonalds, West
Defense
Witnesses: Siochi and Ruben Forteza
At around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he
called Siochi on the phone, and informed him
that the motorbike starter the latter needed
was already available. On the same day,
Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation
against a certain alias "Nato."
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on
board a space wagon driven by Siochi. 5 The
informant approached the appellant and
talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards,
the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. 6 When
PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant,
the latter went out of the vehicle and ran
away.
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied"
transparent plastic bag from the appellant's
right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun
tucked in the appellant's waist. The other
members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant,
Siochi and the seized items to the police
station for investigation.
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical
Officer examined the seized items and found
them positive for the presence of shabu.
Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and
asked for the directions to McDonalds, West
Avenue. At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and
Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes
on board a space wagon. The appellant met
them at the subdivision gate, and showed the
starter to Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called
on the appellant's cellular phone. The
appellant then boarded the vehicle, and told
Siochi that he would just talk to a person at
McDonalds. Afterwards, Vanessa called him
from inside a parked car. The appellant
approached Vanessa who, for her part,
alighted from the car. Vanessa told the
appellant to get inside the car's rear. The
appellant did as instructed. Immediately after,
the male driver alighted from the vehicle and
entered the car's rear. The appellant went out
of the car, but the male driver followed him
and grabbed his hand. The appellant resisted,
and wrestled with the driver along West
Avenue. During this commotion, the appellant
heard a gunfire; four (4) persons approached
him, and then tied his hands with a masking
tape. The police placed him on board a
pick-up truck, and then brought him to
Bicutan. In Bicutan, the police brought him to
the interrogation room, where they punched
him and placed a plastic on his head.

RTC: found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It
also ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine. The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as long as the integrity of the seized item had been
ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed their
official duties. Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of
illegal possession of shabu.

The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated
December 23, 2008. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether or not the seized items were
admissible?
2. Whether or not the corpus delicti of the crime charged was adequately proven?

RULING:

1. No, the shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
 Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known as arrest in flagrante
delicto.

"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that
the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other;
there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the
informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that
the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no
personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he
approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:

Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's
consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for
even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of
retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.

In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, cannot be evidence of
guilt. Considering that the appellant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and
seizure.

2. No, the prosecution failed to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.

We stress that "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes." Thus, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the various lapses — enumerated and discussed below — committed by the
police in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated shabu.

1) We find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark the drugs
seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves.
 Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer
of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule
requires that the "marking" of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that
enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation."

Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the marking should be
done by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant's participation in the marking procedure
should only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.

2) The police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the place of confiscation or
at the police station. These omissions were admitted by the prosecution during pre-trial.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]

This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9165.

To be sure, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when
the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been
preserved. These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to
offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and safekeeping of the
seized items.

Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165
would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is gross disregard of
the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt
cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for
a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity
in the performance of official duties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008 decision and the
December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. Appellant Oliver
Renato Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v. REYMAN ENDAYA Y LAIG, [ GR No. 205741, Jul 23, 2014 ]

Antecedents

Appellant was charged under two separate informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa
City, Branch 12, with violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 0098-2003

That on or about the 20th day of November, 2002, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay 2-A, Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of
Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession, custody and control eight
(8) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", having a total
weight of 0.32 gram, a dangerous drug.[2]

Criminal Case No. 0099-2003

That on or about the 20th day of November, 2002, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay 2-A, Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell, deliver and give away one
(1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu", weighing 0.04 gram, a dangerous drug.[3]

Prosecution's Version of the Events

On 11 November 2002, police operatives of Mataasnakahoy Police Station, acting on a report from
a barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug activities, conducted surveillance operations on
appellant. A week of surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report;[4] hence, on 20 November 2002, a
team, composed of SPO4 Moriel Benedicto (SPO4 Benedicto), SPO3 Nestor Babadilla (SPO3 Babadilla)
and PO2 Edwin Chavez (PO2 Chavez), was formed to perform a buy-bust operation against appellant.[5] A
civilian asset, armed with five (5) pieces of P100.00 bills as marked money, acted as poseur-buyer.[6]

On board a car from Mataasnakahoy Police Station, the police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded
to the place of operation: the Golden Luck Beer Garden located at Barangay 2-A, Mataasnakahoy,
Batangas. At a distance of about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters from the beer house, the civilian asset
alighted from the vehicle and proceeded on foot to the establishment where appellant was a regular
customer. In the meantime, the buy-bust team positioned themselves at a place outside the restaurant not
far from where the civilian asset was. Appellant subsequently arrived and approached the civilian asset, who
was standing in front of the beer house. The two talked for a while,[7] after which, the police operatives saw
the civilian asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed something to the former which
later turned out to be a plastic sachet containing shabu.[8]

After receiving the plastic sachet from appellant, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal of touching
his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police officers then immediately
approached appellant, introduced themselves as police officers and informed him that he is under arrest for
selling shabu.[9] Appellant was informed of his constitutional rights in Tagalog[10] and then frisked by SPO3
Babadilla and PO2 Chavez for any deadly weapon. During this body search, SPO3 Babadilla recovered the
marked money from appellant.[11] Meanwhile, the shabu subject of the sale between appellant and the
civilian asset was handed by the latter to PO2 Chavez.[12]

Appellant was forthwith brought to the Mataasnakahoy Police Station where police officers again searched
his body to look for an identification card.[13] This body search yielded another eight (8) plastic sachets of
shabu, found in his wallet by PO2 Chavez, who then marked them by writing a figure "8" on each plastic
sachet.[14] The shabu subject of the buy-bust operation, on the other hand, was marked by PO2 Chavez by
writing the same figure "8" on the sachet but he added a distinctive mark by burning the edges of the plastic
sachet to distinguish it from the other eight sachets confiscated from appellant.[15]

The team thereafter conducted an inventory of the items seized from appellant in the presence of appellant,
Clerk of Court Rogelio Binay of the Mataasnakahoy Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Counselor Renato
Tiquiz, Barangay Captain Victorina Orosco, NGO representative Olivia Macariola, Sangguniang
Bayan members Romeo Laqui and Oseña and media representative Virgo Santiago, who all signed the
receipt of property seized.[16] A photograph of appellant and the seized items, together with the
aforementioned witnesses was taken at the police station.[17] Finally, a letter-request for laboratory
examination, together with the marked sachets, was transmitted to the Philippine National Police crime
laboratory.[18] The qualitative examination conducted on the specimens yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[19]

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that at around 7:00 in the evening of 20 November
2002, he was at home in Barangay Nangkaan, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas, watching TV with his family. At
around 9:00 in the evening, he left the house to go with a friend to the bus station in Lipa City to fetch his
friend's sister. From the bus station, they proceeded to the Golden Luck Beer Garden.[20] While drinking
beer inside the establishment, two police officers, one of whom was SPO4 Benedicto, approached appellant
and invited him to go out with them to the police car.[21] Appellant obliged, but as he was about to get into
the car, SPO4 Benedicto punched him in the stomach and pushed him inside the car. SPO3 Babadilla and
PO2 Chavez then joined them. It was then, according to appellant, when the police officers started their
threats to kill him unless he reveals to them the name of the drug pusher in the area. In reply to their threats,
appellant told them that he did not know anyone selling drugs.[22]

Appellant alleged that they drove around the municipality of Mataasnakahoy, circling it three times before
the police officers brought him to the police station. Before he was allowed to get off the car, SPO3 Babadilla
took his wallet and left it in the car. At the police station, he was immediately put in jail but he was unable to
ask the reason for his imprisonment because one of the police officers punched him again.[23] When he
was subsequently taken out of his cell, the police officers led him to a table where they showed him plastic
sachets containing shabu allegedly found in his wallet.[24] Thereafter, the police officers took photographs
of him and the items supposedly seized from him, although he refused to be photographed. He was also
made to sign a document, which later turned out to be the inventory of property seized, without allowing him
to read the contents thereof and without the assistance of a counsel. Neither did the police officers inform
him of his constitutional rights.[25]

Appellant claimed that he did not file a case against the police officers because he was already incarcerated
and, besides, he is ignorant of the procedure in the filing of cases.[26]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding that the prosecution was able to successfully prove the existence of the essential elements of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the trial court rendered a Decision[27] dated 22 October
2010, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused Reyman Endaya y Laig is convicted of

the offenses charged in these cases for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11
(paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer:

a) Section 11 Imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 and;

b.) Section 5 Life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.[28]

xxx

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court upon a finding that the prosecution was able to establish,
beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crimes with which appellant was charged, and
consequently, his guilt.

The CA brushed aside the attempt of appellant to assail the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution,
declaring that the inconsistencies in their respective testimonies, which appellant tried to amplify, are too
minor to adversely affect their credibility. More importantly, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was
properly preserved and established by the prosecution, thereby ascertaining the guilt of appellant. The CA,
thus, held:

The inconsistencies allegedly committed by [SPO4] Benedicto and [PO2] Chavez will not
save [appellant] from conviction. To secure a reversal of the lower court's findings, the
inconsistencies should have pertained to the actual buy-bust itself, that crucial moment when
[appellant] was caught selling or in possession of shabu, not to peripheral matters. x x x

xxxx

To be sure, the discrepant statements alluded to by [appellant] were too minor to adversely
affect the credibility of the witnesses. Those discrepancies did not detract from the
established fact of the crimes charged against him. As the High Court held, inconsistencies in
the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility.

In view of all the foregoing, this [c]ourt finds that [appellant] failed to overthrow the
presumption of regularity accorded the police officers in the performance of their official duty.
He utterly failed to prove that in testifying against him, these witnesses were motivated by
reasons other than the duty to curb the sale and possession of prohibited drugs and
possession of drug paraphernalia. There is no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the
part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a serious crime to [appellant]. Thus, the
[c]ourt will not allow the former's testimony to be overcome by self-serving defenses.

xxxx
 This Court likewise finds no merit in [appellant's] contention that the prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of the offense. Testimonies of prosecution witnesses convincingly
stated that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved
by them. [SPO4] Benedicto testified that he witnessed when their asset handed the shabu
(which he bought from appellant) to [PO2] Chavez. Thereafter, he saw [PO2] Chavez put
markings on them. [PO2] Chavez also attested that he marked the 1 sachet of shabu sold by
[appellant] to their asset as well as the 8 sachets of shabu confiscated from [appellant]. They
eventually prepared a request for laboratory examination. The Chemistry Report stated that
all the specimens submitted by the apprehending officers which bore the same markings
gave positive result to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.

It is thus evident that the identities of the corpus delicti were properly preserved and
established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill-will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with. [Appellant], in this case, has the burden to show that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits
by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.
Needless to say, [appellant] failed to muster out such burden.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed October 22, 2010 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lipa City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 0098-2003 and 0099-2003
convicting Reyman Endaya y Laig for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.[29]

In separate Manifestations dated 21 May 2013[30] and 13 June 2013,[31] respectively, appellant and
appellee manifested their intention not to file a supplemental brief before this Court and to adopt the
respective briefs they filed before the CA.

The Issues

Appellant raised the following errors in his brief:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 11 AND 5 OF R.A. NO. 9165 NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY
SEIZED WHICH THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS FORCED TO SIGN IN VIOLATION OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SACHETS OF SHABU AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit; hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction.

Appellant's guilt for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu was proven beyond reasonable
doubt

The illegal sale of dangerous drugs is punishable under the first paragraph of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 as
follows:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
(Emphasis supplied)

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration for the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material in the prosecution of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in
court as evidence.[32] The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of
the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller. As long as a police officer or civilian asset went through the operation as a buyer,
whose offer was accepted by the appellant, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs
to the former, the crime is already consummated. In the case at bar, the prosecution has
amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty.[33]

The records show that appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted
after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the buy-bust team positively
identified appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet of shabu to their civilian asset who,
in turn, handed the marked money to appellant. Both the sachet of shabu and the marked
money were presented as evidence in court. SPO4 Benedicto narrated in detail the
transaction during his testimony before the court.

On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 on illegal possession of
dangerous drugs state that:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:
 xxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:

xxxx

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.

For the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.[36]

The foregoing elements were likewise convincingly established herein. When the police operatives bodily
searched appellant for his wallet at the police station, they found eight (8) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance which, upon laboratory examination, turned out to be shabu.

Appellant argues that the arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 on the inventory of the items seized from him. According to him, the inventory of
the plastic sachet taken from him at the Golden Luck Beer Garden was not completed immediately after his
arrest and at the place where he was arrested; the same sachet of shabu subject of the illegal sale was not
marked at the time and place of his arrest, but only at the police station; and there was no representative
from the Department of Justice as the government official present during the inventory was the Clerk of
Court, who is a representative of the Supreme Court and not of the Department of Justice. He insists that no
less than strict compliance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 is mandated by the law.

To ascertain that the illegal drugs presented in court are the ones actually seized from the accused, the
prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165
has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link in the chain
of custody with respect to the confiscated items.[39]

Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 embodies the procedural safeguards intended to counter or prevent
possible police abuses in cases of buy-bust operations. The provision provides, in part:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;

Compliance with the foregoing provisions, "especially the required physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible government functionaries, would
be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation."[40]

The records of this case clearly show that the foregoing requirements were complied with.

As mandated by the above-quoted provision of law, the apprehending team conducted a physical inventory
of the drugs confiscated from appellant, as evidenced by the "Receipt for Property Seized"[41] which was
signed by representatives from the municipal trial court, a non-governmental organization, the media, and
three locally elected public officials, as proof that they were present when the inventory was carried out.
Likewise, a photograph[42] of the accused, together with the items seized from him, and with the
aforementioned representatives from the public and private sector as witnesses, was taken at the police
station. The physical inventory and taking of the photograph were done after the confiscated items were
marked by PO2 Chavez. Finally, within 24 hours from the time the plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance were taken from appellant, the same were forwarded to the regional crime laboratory
office for qualitative examination where the specimens tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[43]

In view of the foregoing, the allegation of appellant that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the
mandates of Section 21, particularly paragraph 1, of R.A. No. 9165 has no basis. In addition to this,
jurisprudence states that "the phrase 'marking upon immediate confiscation' contemplates even marking at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team."[44] Hence, the fact that the seized plastic
sachets were marked at the police station only does not deviate from the elements required in the
preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs.

In any case, contrary to appellant's claim, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not
necessary[45] "as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team." Elaborating on the provisions of R.A. No. 9165, Section 21 (a) of its IRR
states:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this Court has, in many cases held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, 'as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."[46]

In People v. Salonga,[47] we held that "it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity
must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt."[48] That the substances
which were sent to the crime laboratory and examined by the forensic chemical officer and found to be
shabu were the very same substances which the police officers seized from appellant is proven by the
following excerpts from the testimony of SPO4 Benedicto.

The foregoing narration was again supported by the statements of PO2 Chavez in his testimony dated 1
September 2004.

The foregoing testimonies categorically demonstrate that the evidence seized from appellant were the same
ones tested, introduced, and testified to in open court. Both SPO4 Benedicto and PO2 Chavez were able to
identify the drugs with certainty when these were presented in court. In short, there is no question as to the
integrity of the evidence.[51]

Finally, in order to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs confiscated from appellant,
the respective testimonies of SPO4 Benedicto and PO2 Chavez establish that the plastic sachet subject of
the illegal sale was handed over by the civilian asset acting as poseur buyer to PO2 Chavez while still at the
crime scene. PO2 Chavez continued to be in possession of the same until they reached the police station
where he accomplished the marking thereof. The eight sachets of shabu in the wallet of appellant, on the
other hand, which were found by PO2 Chavez after bodily searching the former at the police station, were
likewise marked by PO2 Chavez. Once marked, the items were turned over to the police investigator and
thereafter, a letter-request together with the marked sachets was forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination where the substances inside the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu. These sachets, with
their identifying marks still intact, were then presented in court.

Based on the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the chain of custody was unbroken, thereby ensuring the
integrity of the corpus delicti. Unless appellant can show that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering with
the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will be upheld. It is
incumbent upon appellant to show that the foregoing circumstances are attendant in this case to overcome
the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly
performed their duties.[52] As the CA correctly found, appellant failed to discharge this burden.

II

Signature of appellant on "Receipt for Property Seized" inadmissible in evidence

Appellant contends that he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the "Receipt for Property Seized;"
therefore, the document cannot be admitted in evidence against him as his act of signing the same is a form
of confession or admission.

We find merit in appellant's contention. There is no showing in the records of this case that appellant was
assisted by a counsel when he signed the "Receipt for Property Seized."
It is settled that the signature of an accused in the receipt of property seized is inadmissible in evidence if it
was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged;[53] hence, the constitutional
safeguard must be observed.

Nevertheless, as aptly found by the CA, while it is true that appellant signed the receipt of property seized
without the assistance of a counsel, the same only renders inadmissible the receipt itself.[54] Thus,
according to the CA:

x x x the evidentiary value of the "Receipt of Property Seized" in the present circumstances is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving [appellant's] guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As [w]e have earlier stated, the prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation
was conducted to entrap [appellant]. The testimonies of the arresting police officers clearly
established [the illegal possession] and that the sale of shabu by [appellant] was
consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, [were] presented in court and
confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team and they have acknowledged that they
were the same drugs subject of that particular buy-bust operation [and subsequent body
search on [appellant].[55]

III

Sachets of shabu not fruits of poisonous tree; hence, admissible in evidence against
appellant

Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without conceding that he had in fact sold
and possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence for being fruits of a
poisonous tree, having been obtained after an unlawful arrest and search.

Appellant's insistence on the illegality of his warrantless arrest lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected under paragraph (a) or what is termed "in flagrante
delicto."[56] For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of the
afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[57]

Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally witnessed the exchange between
appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money and the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance which subsequently tested positive for shabu. At the time he was arrested, therefore, appellant
was clearly committing a crime in full view of the buy-bust team. As held by the CA:

Because [appellant] had been caught in flagrante delicto by the apprehending police officers,
they, as the arresting officers were duty-bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to
search him for anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The
search, being an incident of a lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity.[58]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04872 dated 11 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

JOEY M. PESTILOS, et al v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On February 20, 2005, there was an altercation ensued between the petitioners and the defendant,
Atty. Generoso. The defendant then called the Central Police District to report the incident. The police then
acted on the report and dispatched officers to go to the scene of the crime and to provide assistance. Upon
arriving at the scene of the crime, they saw the defendant badly beaten.

The defendant pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers to ―invite‖
the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, it was found out that the
petitioners stabbed the defendant with a bladed weapon.

On February 22, 2005, the petitioners were then indicted for attempted murder. On March 07, 2005, the
petitioners filed for an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested since there was no valid warrantless arrest that took place because the police officers
did not personally know that they were the perpetrators of the crime.

The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners‘ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation and
likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then challenged the decision of the RTC
before the Court of Appeals but the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

2. WON the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the police precinct.
3. WON the order denying the motion for preliminary investigations is void for failure to state the facts
and the law upon which it was based.
RULINGS:

1. With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, it is deemed reasonable to conclude that the police officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners‘ warrantless arrests. Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The circumstances qualify as the police officers‘ personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

1. The term ―invited‖ is construed to mean as an authoritative command. Arrest is defined as the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An
arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. The application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
2. There is no taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the
motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters,
as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents
leading up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the
court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefore. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, the court upholds the
validity of the RTC‘s order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners‘ Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The Supreme Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ordered to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the
petitioners.

Villanueva v. People GR No. 199042. 17 November 2014

Facts

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with a violation of Section 11, Article 2 of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for having in his possession 0.63 grams of shabu. The
prosecution states that 4 witnesses testified that a complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo for
allegedly shooting the former. Police officers then proceeded to the house of Villanueva and informed him
about the Complaint, thereafter inviting him to the police station. He was subjected to a body search and in
the process was found to have shabu in his left pocket. According to Danilo, meanwhile, he was at home
watching tv when the police officers invited him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had
been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, Danilo was then frisked and detained at the police station.
RTC: Danilo is guilty. CA: affirmed.

Issue

Whether Villanueva violated Sec. 11 of RA 9165 despite the illegality of the arrest and the lapses on the
part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated drug

Held

No. Petitioner acquitted, lower court decision set aside.

Ruling

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private
person. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. He pleadednot guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the
case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.

Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant. While the
accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally
waived his right to contest the legality of the search.Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner was merely ordered to take out the
contents of his pocket.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence
against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the ―fruit of the poisonous tree.‖
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution: ―Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shallbe inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.‖ Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused- appellant cannot
be sustained.

PEOPLE vs. PENAFLORIDA

Facts: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation
Division of the PNP station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of
marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines
Sur. Major Domingo Agravante, chief of police in Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente
as team leader, SPO2 Callo, SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the
police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook appellant who
was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane
and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant‘s
possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then
brought to the headquarters where he was booked.

Major Lorlie Arroyo, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was presented
as an expert witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative
sample from the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana.
Appellant denied the accusations against him. That on his way home, they met Boyet Obias (Obias) who
requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales, he placed it in the
basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. On his way home, he was
flagged down by the police and was invited to go with them to the headquarters.

TC ruled that there was violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review.

In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had freely and consciously
possessed marijuana. One of the issues raised is that, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the
police officers should have first investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead
of arbitrarily arresting him.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?

Ruling: No. The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm that appellant was transporting marijuana to
Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and
already committing a crime. The arrest as effected after appellant as caught in flagrante delicto. He was
seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then
already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant
was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.

Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No 7659, states: Sec. 4. Sale, Administration,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. x x x.

Jurisprudence defines ―transport‖ as ―to carry or convey from one place to another.‖ In the instant case,
appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey
the package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales.

Appellant, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. But TC rejected
his contention, noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package
because ―marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma which would have alarmed him.‖

Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the
crime under RA No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
knowledge thereof is not necessary

Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of one million pesos by virtue of the amendment to Section 4, RA No. 6425 by RA No. 7659. TC‘s
decision is affirmed.

TOPIC: IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO (VALID ARREST)

People v Sembrano, G.R. No: 185848, August 16, 2010

Crimes: Illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu

RTC: Guilty
CA: Guilty
Supreme Court Decision: Denied.

Facts: Operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Novaliches Police Station arrested appellant in
broad daylight, in the course of a buy-bust operation and after a follow-up search on him.

Two days after the arrest, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City in the National Capital Region filed
two separate Informations against him: for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug.
Qualitative examination was conducted by the forensic chemical officer on specimens of the substance
retrieved from the buy-bust operations. The findings showed that the specimens were composed of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug

Sembrano was arraigned and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial
proceedings having been terminated, trial on the merits ensued

Issue: Whether or not the appellant was illegally arrested.

Ruling: Appeal is denied.

Appellant contends that the warrantless arrest against him was unlawful, and consequently, applying the
‗fruit of the poisonous tree‘ doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during such unlawful warrantless arrest
cannot be used as evidence. The defense proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly seized from appellant
during the buy-bust operation should have been declared inadmissible. Appellant adds that he was framed
up by the police officers.

The Solicitor General disagrees, saying that the sachets of shabu were seized from appellant during a
buy-bust operation. Thus, any opposition thereto with respect to its admissibility on the ground that said
sachets were seized during an illegal arrest is unfounded.

Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs if the following
elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The court
reiterated the meaning of the term corpus delicti, which is the actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering 0.12 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
to PO2 Manaol, the poseur-buyer, for a consideration of P200.00. Upon frisking after his arrest, another 0.27
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride was recovered from him.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and
effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets
of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were properly admitted in
evidence against him.

VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007 Warrantless Arrest,
Search and Seizure, Fruit of a poisonous tree

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation
of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
FACTS

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented three barangay tanods namely, Bautista, Aratas
and Ordoo, who arrested petitioner.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol
along the National Highway in the said barangay together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the
house of Barangay Captain Mercado, where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open
his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police
station for further investigation.

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. However, Aratas admitted that
he himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado.
Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of
his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado
to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents thereof.

The forensic chemist conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from petitioner. He
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken
from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify
whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.

Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They
took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied
ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give
the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner
declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.

The RTC rendered judgment against him.

The CA affirmed the challenged decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Whether or not the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the
fruit of a poisonous tree.

RULING:

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not
the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality,
as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful
as well.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person may
be arrested without a warrant, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances
was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an
offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod
did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.

Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to
his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached
him.

It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and
then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.

Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz that flight alone is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone,
and under the circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent
explanation as it does to a nefarious one.

Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, [t]he phrase in his presence therein, connot[es] penal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic
and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is
strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search
most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to
allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.

However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to
the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.

Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves
allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful.
As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or
consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for,
while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a
crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances.

Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant‘s belief that
no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when
petitioners bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of
the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given,
nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged ―consent.‖ Even granting that petitioner
admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As a result,
petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right
or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful
search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has
failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof
that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.

In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused. There can be no
crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated
was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug. As we discussed in People v.
Orteza, where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for
conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu.

First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in
the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control
of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that
official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the
apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings
on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take
custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and
where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created
reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the
prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of chain
of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law
enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized
drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and
must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in
his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the
evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon
by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet
often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused the
right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used
to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, where the circumstances are shown
to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does
not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence
which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond
reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.

Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant
for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national
highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and
when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station
as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants‘ pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The
team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked
in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated
sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered
a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the
Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have
been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not
have been confiscated.

Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellant‘s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive
on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20).
Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

PEOPLE vs. BIYOC 532 SCRA 201

Facts:

At 4pm of Dec 5, 2000, private complainant AAA was in a room on the 2 floor of the family house taking care
of here one year old sister. Her father, herein

appellant, entered the room and touched here genitals, after which he told her to lie down on the floor.

Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant at once pulled her short pants down and
touched her genitals again, after which he went on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
Appellant was not able to fully penetrate AAA‘s vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB went up the 2 nd
floor and saw appellant sitting in front of AAA who was lying down, face up. Appellant immediately warned
BBB not to tell their mother about what she saw. After

BBB left appellant inserted his penis inside AAA‘s vagina.

BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in partner of appellant, what she saw, CCC
thus immediately confronted AAA who did confirm that appellant had inserted his penis inside her vagina
that afternoon, and that appellant had been doing the same act to her since she was nine years old.
Incensed, CCC accompanied AAA the following day, December 6, 2000, DSWD to report the incident, and
also to the police officers.

PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the family home and on their way, they met
appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him of his rights, arrested him and brought him to the police station.
AAA‘s and CCC‘s statements were thereupon taken.

TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In his brief, appellant raised the issue that the trial court
failed to consider the fact that the accused‘s arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that his arrest was
illegal because a ―warrantless arrest was effected even before the statement of the private complainant was
taken.‖

Issue

WON the contention of the accused-appellant is correct?

Ruling

NO. Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment;
otherwise, they are considered waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be stopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court as what was done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter their pleas
during arraignment, but they also actively participated during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in their arrest.

In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest before entering his please, hence,
he is deemed to waive the same.

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180, November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165
(illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three
barangay tanods who made a search on him

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay
tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by
the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag
opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest
was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the
search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by
reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a
warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioner‘s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of the tanods)
is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.

However, the Court‘s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts
failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the
contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioner‘s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

People v. Santos

G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008

Limited Application of the RPC on R.A. 9165

Facts:

On March 8, 2003, at around 11 p.m. to 1 a.m., accused Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc were
arrested by police officers for allegedly selling and owning sachet of shabu. In a buy-bust operation, Jerry
Santos acted as the front in the crime as he received the mark money from the police officer, which the
former eventually ceded to Ramon Catoc, whom thereafter handed over the sachet of shabu to the police
officer.

Both Santos and Catoc were charged of violation of Sec. 5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 as they
unlawfully, willfully an feloniously sold illegal drugs in the form of shabu to the police agents. Both were
sentenced of life imprisonment and damages of 500,000php.
 In addition to that, Catoc was also charged with a violation of Sec. 11 of Article II of the Same law as
he feloniously, unlawfully and willfully possessed a sachet of shabu. He was sented with 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years imprisonment and damages of 300,000php.

They filed a motion attesting that no buy-bust operation actually happened on March 8, 2003.
However, the trial court denied the motion of the accused. The Court is more inclined to give credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses given the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty accorded to them by law and jurisprudence vis-à-vis the self-serving disclaimers of the herein accused
whose version of the incident as narrated above hardly inspires belief.

CA, in a review of the judgment, affirmed the decision of the trial court ruled that the buy-bust
operation conducted by the SDEU operatives was legitimate and regular. Furthermore, the
testimonies of the appellants and their witnesses were said to have contained irreconcilable
inconsistencies and that no ill motive for the alleged frame-up was put forth by the appellants.

Issue: W/n the penalties imposed upon the accused are proper and appropriate?

Held: Yes.

In accordance with Section 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165, the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code find limited applicability with respect to the provisions of the said Act. Section 98 reads:

Sec. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any
law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No.
3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor
offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Thus, in determining the imposable penalty, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be
applied. Under this article, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances.[77] Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word ―shall,‖ the non-applicability of the
Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject to exception only in case the offender is a minor. [78]

In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the circumstances attendant in
the commission of the offense, are given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and the
fine as provided for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, ―An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,‖ the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be meted out to appellant shall only be life
imprisonment and fine.[79] Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 were properly
imposed on appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc y Picayo in Criminal Case No. 12193-D for
illegal sale of shabu.