BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO V.

CONSTANTINO-DAVID, 2011

FACTS:
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly
taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the
team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were
turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs
(OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the
Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-
affidavit within five days from notice.

ISSUE:
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and
was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy.

HELD:
NO. The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3,
2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the
fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.The Court ruled that the petitioner did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.the case at bar involves the computer
from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

OPLE V. TORRES

FACTS:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is
that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. The
issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress.
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their
right to privacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:
YES. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution.The right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308
is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear
and present danger. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO V. DIRECTOR GENERAL NEDA

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450 which requires all government agencies and controlled
corporations to have a uniform identification card; the director-general of the national economic development
authority was tasked to implement this order. The information required to be in the said identification card would
be: name, home address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, names of parents,
height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb marks, any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others,
tax identification number (TIN). The petitioners argued that the said executive order usurped legislative functions
and violates the right of privacyThe petitioners also argue that the order violates the right to privacy by allowing for
the access of the personal data of the owner without his or her consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative functions and violated the citizen’s right to privacy.

Held:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no merit. The said order only applies to government
agencies who are already issuing identification cards even before the said order was implemented. The purposes of
the order were to: reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, convenience to the people served by the
government entities and insure compatibility. Section 17 Article VII of the Constitution also provides for the
President to have control to all executive departments, bureaus and offices. This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not need implementing legislation. This power of course is limited to executive
branch of the government and does not extend to other branches or independent constitutional commissions.

Gamboa v. Chan 677 SCRA 385

FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series
of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group
(PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered
on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials
of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College, 737 SCRA 92

FACTS
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of
her and her classmates wearing only their undergarments.some of their classmates reported said photos to their
teacher who through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned
them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining
the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.They prayed that
STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such
data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

ISSUE: Whether STC violated the students’ right to privacy.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the
user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational
privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot
be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher
and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was
for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

PEDRO PACIS vs. MANUEL R. PAMARAN, 56 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Ricardo Santos brought into this country Mercury automobile, model 1957. Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of
Customs, received from the Administrator, General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense, a
letter to the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a “hot car.” By
virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office. Thus he did ascertain that
although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car should be
P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued
a warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was parked on
Economia Street, Manila, and was then brought to the General Affairs Administration compound.
Then on August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner asking that
such warrant of seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car released on his
contention that the issuance of the warrant was unauthorized

ISSUE:
May petitioner effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court.?

RULING:
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace …”

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon, 66 SCRA 299

FACTS:
Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha
forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound
and take custody of the motor launch.
ISSUES:
Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the
crime.

HELD:
No, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no
search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant.
Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad
faith. Except for Madella who was merely acting under orders.

PONSICA VS IGNALAGA, 152 SCRA 647

FACTS:
The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local Government
Code1granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and order the arrest of the
accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by this Court; and is, in addition,
unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct preliminary investigations in an official who cannot be deemed a
"neutral and detached magistrate" within the contemplation of Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The
issue is hereby resolved adversely to the petitioners, with the stressed qualification that the mayor's power to order
arrest ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the new Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people, and that,
in any event, the investigation actually conducted by respondent mayor in the case at bar was fatally defective.

RULING:
While it is true that the mayors do "exercise general supervision over units and elements of the INP
stationed or assigned in their respective jurisdictions," they are not themselves directly involved in police work and
cannot in any sense be described, as the petitioners do, as being deeply involved in law enforcement functions. And
even if that "deep involvement" be conceded, it does not follow that this would necessarily preclude their assuming
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in conducting preliminary investigations of persons suspected of crimes.
As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority to do so
being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (2)
judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and regional state prosecutors;
and (d) such other officers as may be authorized by law. But only "the judge" may issue search and arrest warrants
after due determination of probable cause.
 PEDRO PACIS vs. MANUEL R. PAMARAN, 56 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Ricardo Santos brought into this country Mercury automobile, model 1957. Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of
Customs, received from the Administrator, General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense, a
letter to the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a “hot car.” By
virtue thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office. Thus he did ascertain that
although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car should be
P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued
a warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was parked on
Economia Street, Manila, and was then brought to the General Affairs Administration compound.
Then on August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner asking that
such warrant of seizure and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car released on his
contention that the issuance of the warrant was unauthorized

ISSUE:
May petitioner effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court.?

RULING:
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said “dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace …”

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon, 66 SCRA 299

FACTS:
Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later Alberto
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha
forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote
the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound
and take custody of the motor launch.
ISSUES:
Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor
launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the
crime.

HELD:
No, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no
search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant.
Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad
faith. Except for Madella who was merely acting under orders.

PONSICA VS IGNALAGA, 152 SCRA 647

FACTS:
The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local Government
Code1granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations and order the arrest of the
accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated by this Court; and is, in addition,
unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct preliminary investigations in an official who cannot be deemed a
"neutral and detached magistrate" within the contemplation of Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The
issue is hereby resolved adversely to the petitioners, with the stressed qualification that the mayor's power to order
arrest ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the new Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people, and that,
in any event, the investigation actually conducted by respondent mayor in the case at bar was fatally defective.

RULING:
While it is true that the mayors do "exercise general supervision over units and elements of the INP
stationed or assigned in their respective jurisdictions," they are not themselves directly involved in police work and
cannot in any sense be described, as the petitioners do, as being deeply involved in law enforcement functions. And
even if that "deep involvement" be conceded, it does not follow that this would necessarily preclude their assuming
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in conducting preliminary investigations of persons suspected of crimes.
As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority to do so
being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (2)
judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (3) national and regional state prosecutors;
and (d) such other officers as may be authorized by law. But only "the judge" may issue search and arrest warrants
after due determination of probable cause.