Constitutional Law 2: WEEK 1

TOPIC: INTRODUCTION TO BILL OF RIGHTS

[G.R. NO. 160792 : August 25, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY

ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT.
GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO
ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners, 

vs. 

GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and
SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents.

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321-armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an
upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate
surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused
the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On
31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center.
The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’
involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and
Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya
issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel
under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior
officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was
denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed
out that the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid
indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus is valid.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of
the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present
case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable.
After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped
from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their
petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP
Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court
orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it
substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such
sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable

access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The
detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings
before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees
denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of
security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells
and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to
another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility.
The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of
detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-
punitive response to valid security concerns.

AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read

by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters
for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.

NOTES:

 To invoke right to privacy in this case, the letter must be: (1) marked as confidential; or
(2) must be a letter to or from counsel of the detainee (privileged communication
between attorney and client).
 G.R. No. L-5621 March 25, 1953
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
vs. 
PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent
petition seeking authority to lay-off 44 men working in three of its departments, the first batch
to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of the petition and the rest 45 days thereafter, in
order that in the intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending picture. The ground
for the lay-off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly suffering during the current
year.

Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of financial losses has no basis in
fact it being only an act of retaliation on the part of respondent for the strike staged by the
workers days before in an attempt to harass and intimidate them and weaken and destroy the
union to which they belong.

When the urgent petition was set for hearing, at the request of counsel for respondent,
judge Roldan of the CIR, held an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of
respondent. He interrogated about 15 laborers who were then present in the place. Judge
Roldan allowed respondent to lay off the workers with respect to Unit No. 2 and those assigned
to the Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition that, in the event that work is
available in the future, they should be reemployed. Thereafter, a subsequent hearing was held
in connection with the workers assigned to Unit No. 1 and on the strength of the evidence
submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again found the petition justifiable and authorized their
lay off in an order under the same condition as those contained in his previous order.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the CIR may authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular
inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such layoff?
RULING OF THE COURT:

NO. Considering the merits of the controversy, the Court is of the opinion that the
required due process has not been followed. The court a quo merely acted on the strength of
the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the respondent company. The petition for
lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that the company was
incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the
place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested
party. As counsel for petitioner says, such inspection could at best witness "the superficial fact
of cessation of work but it could not be determinative of the larger and more fundamental issue
of lack of work due to lack of funds". This fundamental issue cannot be determined without
looking into the financial situation of the respondent company. In fact, this matter is now being
looked into by the court a quo in connection with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but
before finishing its inquiry it decided to grant the lay-off pending final determination of the
main case. This action is in our opinion premature and has worked injustice to the laborers.

WHEREFORE, the orders subject of the present petition for review are hereby set aside,
and it is ordered that the cause be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
giving to petitioner an opportunity to present its evidence in support of its opposition to the
urgent petition for lay-off of respondent company.
 G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants

FACTS:

Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public
service. One of the specific provisions of the said act is that every public officer, either within
thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of
January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar."

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within
the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets
and liabilities is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as
an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of an official is
violative of the constitutional rights.

RULING OF THE COURT:

NO. It does not violate any constitutional right.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily

assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his
assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. "The provision
of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and
legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a
reasonable measure of ensuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power."
 The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea
that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society."

NOTES:

EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND THE DEFENSE PROVIDED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

 “Inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its
domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory
action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due
process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the
security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore, he could
also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
 Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is
observed.
 The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun
the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of
greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was
therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
 G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON,

petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome

Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others,

that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch
Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her
company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. Even before they got
married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson
married Bettsy in September 1998.

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area.

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On November 15,
2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as
valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of

competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the
policy restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a
relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
its management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying an employee from a
competitor company is valid.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that
it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the
assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a
competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy
to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice
and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor
of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

NOTES:

EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships

between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate
relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks
to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of
such relationships.

G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006

 STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA,
Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA,
Respondents.

FACTS:

Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also
an employee of the company, whom he married. Before marriage, Josephine Ongsitco the
manager advised the couple that one of them must resign if they decided to get married
pursuant to a company policy to which Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997 Comia was hired
by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000.
Ongsitco likewise reminded them the company policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella
was also hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that
Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states that the company policy was decreed
pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. On
appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its assailed
Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the questioned policy violates the rights of the employee under the
Constitution and the Labor Code?

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. The Court ruled on the side of the respondents. Article 136 of the Labor Code which
provides:
“It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.”

It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job,
but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be detrimental to its business operations. It must be
reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free
from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in
one company.

NOTES:

 There are 2 types of employment policies involving spouses: policies banning only
spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and
those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the
same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).

 In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,

complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate
treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the
plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse
employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or
be fired are facially discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the
complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a
particular class.

 To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential
operation of the job involved; and,
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

G.R. No. 110223 April 8, 1997

 ARMY AND NAVY CLUB OF MANILA, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, as Judge
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 36 (formerly (Branch 17),
HON. A. CAESAR SANGCO, as Judge, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 17-MANILA and the CITY OF MANILA, represented herein by
MAYOR ALFREDO LIM, Respondents.

FACTS:

On January 1983 petitioner and herein respondent entered into a contract of lease for a
parcel of land with an area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay,
Manila. According to the contract agreed upon by both parties, herein petitioner should
construct a hotel on the land that was leased upon, wherein such construction should
commence within one year and should be completed within five years upon the turnover of the
property. Such improvements made upon the property should be turned over to the
respondent after the lease contract expires. Petitioner should also pay the respondent a sum
total of 250,000 Php annually, that would be equally divided to twelve months, such sum
should be paid to respondent within the first five days of each month without demand. Parties
also agreed to an increase of up to ten percent of the rent for every two years. Petitioner also
agreed to pay for the realty taxes that would be imposed upon the land and it would be
improvements and other necessary fees that would be incurred.

Petitioner however failed to construct a hotel on the land that was leased from
petitioner and a building was built instead which eventually became the known building of the
Army Navy Club. Consequently. herein petitioner failed to settle the rent that was agreed upon,
along with the realty taxes imposed upon the land and its improvements from 1983 up to May
1989. Such rental fees have already totaled to an amount of 1,604,166.70, while the tax
liabilities has already reached 3,818,913.81. However, on June 29, 1992 the National Historical
Commission the Army and Navy Club as a historical landmark.

Thus, an ejectment case was filed with the MTC of Manila which ruled in favor of herein
respondent. Petitioner eventually filed for an appeal with the RTC of Manila which
consequently affirmed the decision of the MTC. Herein petitioner then filed an appeal with the
CA, herein respondent court also affirmed the decision of the MTC and RTC of Manila.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in not recognizing the declaration of the
disputed property as a historical landmark by the National Historical Commission in granting the
ejectment suit filed by the respondent.
RULING OF THE COURT:

No. The court ruled that such recognition does not grant the petitioner a claim of
ownership over the land. For there is no law which states that such recognition awards
possessory rights over to the petitioner. The law merely states that it shall be the policy of state
to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of the
nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.

In addition, while the declaration that the Army and Navy Club is a historical landmark is
not objectionable, the recognition is, however, specious considering that there is no showing
that the above procedure has been complied with. The City of Manila even observed that the
signatories thereto are officers and members of the Club making such certification self-serving.
It behooves us to think why the declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) years after
the action for ejectment was instituted. We can only surmise that this was merely an
afterthought, an attempt to thwart any legal action taken against the petitioner.