101. NPC (National Police Commission) v.

Bernabe (police chief inspector)

FACTS: As per a newspaper article, respondent allegedly headed a syndicate encashing treasury
warrants of Police Commission personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended and separated
from the service. This led to a series of investigations, where he was ordered to explain through affidavit
on the charges against him. Subsequently, he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer
within five days from receipt of the complaint after his suspension. Eventually, a recommendation for his
dismissal was raised and resulted to a decision by the National Appellate Board sustaining the summary
dismissal, made by PNP Chief, of respondent from the PNP for grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a police officer. Respondent then appealed with the CA challenging his dismissal from the
police service on the ground of lack of due process (the case was decided by the Chief, PNP without the
benefit of a hearing, and therefore he was not given the opportunity to fully present his evidence and was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers). The CA ruled in favor of respondent as to the lack
of due process allegation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of the
charges filed against him.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. Due process does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this case, the record shows that respondent was
given notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit
answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP
to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum. Respondent was given more than
adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right to procedural and
substantive due process.

102. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita (chief inspector)

FACTS: Twelve administrative complaints were filed against respondent before the Summary Dismissal
Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the several cases
shall be consolidated into one for the "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" because at one incident he
allegedly approached and entered the compound of the complainant, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full
of armed policemen, and shouted invectives and remarks in a very, very loud voice while in the
performance of duty involving a near vehicular accident. The Board nonetheless, dismissed the Complaint
for conduct unbecoming of a police officer and instead charged respondent with simple irregularity in the
performance of duty. Thus, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, “which conviction is a nullity because of the lack of
procedural due process of law.” Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondent hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction by petitioner is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due
process of law.

RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is
deprived of the opportunity of being heard. The SC ruled that a finding of guilt for an offense, no
matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating
the rudimentary requirements of due process. Also, although he was given an opportunity to be heard on
the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense
for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. Further, it is
a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court. The
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita “committed breach of internal discipline by taking
drinks while in the performance of same” should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to
this particular offense.

103. Velayo v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were among the
candidates for mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent sought the
exclusion of Election Return of petitioner on the ground that it is incomplete and contains material defects.
Nonetheless, the Comelec issued a resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor. Velayo
claimed that he was denied due process because he was not furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation
proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that petitioner received from the Comelec was its en
banc resolution annulling his proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not notice of pre-proclamation proceeding is necessary for administrative due process
in COMELEC cases.

RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. In this case, the records will show that petitioner was not furnished any
notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. Velayo is a real party-in-
interest since he was the proclaimed mayor. His non-inclusionas respondent and his lack of notice of
the proceedings in the Comelec which resulted to the cancellation of his proclamation constitute
clear denial of due process. Further, It is true that RA No. 7166 provides for summary proceedings in
pre-proclamation cases and does not require a trial type hearing. Nevertheless, summary proceedings
cannot be stretched to mean ex parte proceedings. Summary proceedings cannot be stretched to mean
ex parte proceedings—summary simply means with dispatch, with the least possible delay, signifying that
the power may be exercised without a trial in the ordinary manner prescribed by law for regular judicial
proceedings.

104. Ramoran v. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Company, INC

FACTS: Petitioner was an accounting employee of Jardine. The Human Resource Development (HRD) of
respondent received from petitioner overtime (OT) authorization slips for alleged OT work on some days
on November and December 1993. The HRD post-auditing officers noticed some irregularities and
tampering in the OT slips submitted by petitioner. Hence, respondent conducted an administrative
investigation concerning petitioner for which the latter’s immediate supervisor denied having signed and
approved petitioner’s irregular OT authorization slips. Subsequently, petitioner’s employment was
terminated for violation of company rules. Notwithstanding said decision, respondent and Jardine Union
(representing petitioner) entered into an agreement that a Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall decide on
the matter of the legality of the termination of petitioner’s employment. Both parties also agreed on the
composition of said panel. Nevertheless, the panel upheld the termination and when the decision was
appealed to the CA, the same was denied. Now, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
process of law because of the composition and actuations of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process.

RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. In the
instant case, petitioner was apprised of the charges against her. During the administrative investigation,
petitioner attended and was given an opportunity to give her side. She consented to resorting to voluntary
arbitration and participated in the selection of arbitrators. Petitioner submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, by presenting her evidence and sought affirmative relief therein; hence,
she cannot now validly question the latter’s jurisdiction. Due process does not necessarily require
conducting an actual hearing but simply giving the party concerned due notice and affording an
opportunity or right to be heard.

105. Immam v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Nasser Immam and private respondent Hadji Yusoph Lidasan were both candidates for
Mayor of Matanog, Maguindanao in 1998 elections.
COMELEC (Office of the Election Officer, Matanog, Maguindanao) issued a certification that only the
votes cast in 41out of the 55 precincts were counted.
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Count the Ballots and for Holding of Special
Elections, alleging that election inspectors of 14 precincts left the polling places due to "violence,
terrorism, and armed threats perpetrated by armed men, hence the continuation of voting did not take
place."
Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor and took his oath of office, despite the pendency of the
aforesaid petitions.
Private respondent prayed to COMELEC that the proclamation of petitioner be declared void.
COMELEC issued its assailed order which suspended petitioner's proclamation
Petitioner prayed before COMELEC En Banc for the TRO directing the COMELEC to cease and desist
from enforcing and implementing the questioned order.
En Banc issued a Resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and ordering the
COMELEC in the meantime to desist until the validity of the Commission on Elections' Order is
resolved by this Court."
Petitioner assails the order issued by the COMELEC en banc since the consolidated cases were originally
heard by the COMELEC's First Division.

Issue: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated when the case was transferred to the
COMELEC en banc  without notice to him

Ruling:
NO. Petitioner himself prayed that the petition be heard by the Commission en banc which is correct as
the law provides that petitions for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC sitting en banc.
The fact that petitioner was not given notice specifically stating that the case was transferred to the en
banc  did not affect the legality of the order. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in the strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard.

106. Villarosa v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro in the 1998
elections and was proclaimed duly elected thereto. She filed her COC in which she stated that her
nickname is JTV. Private respondent Restor, a candidate of the same position, filed a letter-
petition addressed to COMELEC asking for the invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official nickname
of petitioner, and the nullification of all votes cast in the said nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not
publicly known by that name but instead as Girlie and that JTV actually pertains to the initials of her
husband and former Congressman. On election day, COMELEC en banc, issued a Resolution granting
private respondent’s petition.
Petitioner received a fax copy of this Resolution at which time voting has ceased and canvassing of votes
in some precincts has already gone underway.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation and a MR the aforesaid
Resolution. COMELEC En banc denied the motion.
OSG observed that even if the letter-petition was treated as an election matter which may be properly
heard firsthand by the COMELEC en banc, COMELEC should have given notice to petitioner before
resolving the issue therein. On the issue of the validity of the use of nickname, it opined that petitioner
may validly use the same as she is in fact Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and hence, there is no
misrepresentation. 
Issue:
W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling on private respondent Restors letter-petition
without according notice and hearing to petitioner.
Ruling:
YES. Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin
requirements of notice and hearing must be observed. Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in
the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 1998, that “JTV” is not a nickname by which petitioner is generally
or popularly known, was drawn purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the
COMELEC acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
We have declared that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. However, we find the foregoing rule
inapplicable to the circumstances of the case at bench. Petitioner filed an “Urgent Manifestation and
Motion”, which was promptly denied the following day. Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said
resolution by invoking due process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and arguments for
reconsideration.
Additional info: this is not administrative but quasi-judicial matter and may thus be dealt with firsthand by
the Commission en banc since the petition is not only for the invalidation of “JTV” as petitioner’s
authorized nickname, but also the nullification of all votes cast in that name.

107. Go v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Catalina Go filed for candidacy for both Governor and Mayor of Leyte. However, she filed
for withdrawal of her candidacy 28 minutes late after the deadline thru fax machine.
Private respondents filed separate petitions to deny Catalina due course and to cancel the COC of
Catalina. The case was then referred to the Law Department of COMELEC which gave due course to the
private respondent’s petitions without giving Catalina the opportunity to be heard or submit responsive
pleadings. Based on its report, Catalina was disqualified to run for both positions.

Issue:
W/N Catalina was denied procedural due process of law.

Ruling:
YES. COMELEC Law Department conducted an ex-parte study of the case without giving Catalina an
opportunity to be heard, or requiring her to submit comment or opposition or setting the case for hearing.
the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived
the petitioner of procedural due process of law. The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.

108. Mollaneda v. Umacob

Facts:
Respondent Umacob was a public school teacher. She went to the office of Mr. Rolando Suase to follow
up her transfer to a different district, but petitioner Mr. Arnold Mollaneda, the school superintendent, was
the one who entertained her. After entertaining her, he was molested by Mollaneda.
Respondent reported it to the Police and filed a complaint with the MTC. She also filed a complaint with
the CSC and gave copy of the affidavit to DECS.
The case was heard before the CSC, both parties attended together with their counsel. CSC found him
guilty and was dismissed from service.
Petitioner Mollaneda was claiming that he was denied due process.
Issue:
W/N Mollaneda was denied due process.
Ruling:
NO. he was not denied due process because he even attended the hearing with CSC. A person who
was given the opportunity to be heard has been given due process.
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer,
examiner or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on the basis of which
the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of
cases, this Court laid down the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings,
one of which is that “the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate.”

109. Cruz v. CSC

Facts:
Gilda Cruz took the CSC exam for Zenaida Patim. A fact finding investigation was conducted by CSC,
they took the seat plan with pictures and compared it with prior years. They found that a prima facie case
exist for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Cruz filed for answer denying all the allegations. Eventually, she raised that she was deprived of due
process because CSC was the complainant as well as the judge.
Issue:
W/N Cruz’s right to due process was violated because CSC was the judge as well as the complainant.
Ruling:
NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of
administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The
records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC.
No rights were violated because CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction and CSC is mandated to
hear and decide administrative cases.

110. Condilla v. De Venecia

OG Digester: ( Sorry I tried to relate the topic sa issue wala siya sa main ruling =( )

Facts: Locsin and Codilla are candidates for the 4 th district of Leyte. Codilla won despite having a
disqualification case against him and Locsin came in 2 nd. At the time of the elections the court has to rule
over the disqualification case against Codilla. However a Most urgent Motion to suspend proclamation
was filed against Codilla. A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry
receipt was attached to the pleading. The records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received
the motion. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt
was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner then the second
division issued the suspension of the petitioner’s proclamation on the same day. The proclamation of the
Codilla was then declared void and Locsin was declared winner of the election. Petitioner now contends
that he was deprived of due process since he did not receive the motion filed against and he only knew
the about the complaint due to telegraph. respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the
suspension of petitioner’s proclamation.
Issue: W/N the petitioner was denied of due process during the entire proceeding which led to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin
Ruling: Yes. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in
the petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent
Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone
answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail
Main Point: The COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent
candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the
filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the
opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side.

111. Associated Communication v. Dumlao

Facts: Petitioner Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. (ACWS) operated several
radio and television stations nationwide by virtue of a legislative franchise. PD 576-A terminated all
franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or television
broadcasting systems.  ACWS continued to operate its radio and television stations through permits
issued by the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
NTC granted ACWS renewable temporary permits and licenses for the continued operation of its radio
and television broadcasting systems. ACWS prayed that the NTC be ordered to release ACWS’s already
approved and paid for temporary permit to operate Channel 25 or to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Public Convenience .
Issue: W/N ACWS can plead denial of due process
Ruling: No. Neither could ACWS plead denial of due process as justification for its immediate resort to
the court. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, thus: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, x x x.” In order to fall within the protection of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and
matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”
Main Point: When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be made between matters of
procedure and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures
by which the law be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.

112. Villarosa v. Pomperada

Facts: Complainants Lina Villarosa and her son Jose Villarosa filed before this Court a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Osmondo Pomperada, charging him with deceit and gross misconduct Mrs.
Villarosa alleged that sometime in 1994 her late husband, Isidro, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of their son, Jose. According to complainants, the deed was neither dated nor notarized.
Subsequently, Jose Villarosa sold the property to Loreto Cauntoy and a deed of agreement. Jose filed a
case for recovery of possession and Cauntoy presented a notarized deed of sale. The document was
purportedly notarized by Atty. Osmondo V. Pomperada the complainants however presented from the
book of archives a different document based on the docketed number which means that Cauntoy and
Atty. Pomperada falsified the document. Atty. Pompera denied the claims filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that he was utterly deprived of his fundamental right of due process when
Commissioner Milagros San Juan submitted her report, recommending the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law and perpetual disqualification from being appointed Notary Public, without any formal
investigation having first been conducted.
Issue: W/N the lack of formal investigation deprives the respondent’s lawyer right of due process
Ruling: Yes. The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are
spared from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just due. Obviously,
these requirements cannot be taken lightly. Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the
sanction recommended by IBP, a formal investigation that would allow respondent lawyer a full right to be
heard is unavoidable.

113. Alauya v. Comelec

Facts: There was a declared failure of election in the 2001 election in the ARMM due to massive
substitution. Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alexander Menor (“Menor”),
who garnered the highest number of votes. Tamano also claimed that in almost all of the precincts in
these 5 municipalities, either petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. (“Alauya”) or private respondent Usman
T. Sarangani (“Sarangani”) obtained 100% of the votes such that their votes equalled the total number of
registered voters. Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates.
Petitioner Alauya was in the 3rd spot and filed to lift the suspension of his proclamation. Alauya filed the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order on March 1,2002. On March 5, 2002, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition. Based on the restraining order of the Court, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alauya who took his oath and has already assumed the position of Regional Assemblyman of the
Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM. Meanwhile, Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in
his petition praying for the setting aside of the subject COMELEC orders. Specifically, Sarangani prays
that the order suspending proclamation be extended to him so he may also take his oath and assume
office as regionalassembly member.
Issue: W/N petitioner Alauya was denied of due process?
Ruling: No. Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify him of any hearing conducted priorto the
issuance of the order dated January 7, 2002 in violation of Section 242 which requires notice and hearing
prior to the suspension of proclamation. A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if
he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings. There is no
denial of due process when a party is given an opportunity through his pleadings.
Main Point: A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was accorded the
opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings

114. Spouses Casimiro v. CA

Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of a parcel of land Adjoining their property on the
northern side was petitioners’ land during a relocation survey it was discovered that that the Casimiro
Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners. petitioners denied that there was an encroachment in
respondents’ land. They presented Geodetic Engineers from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile, defendant-
lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against petitioners spouses Casimiro, averring that they were
innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective lots. The Court of First Instance, Pasay
City, rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXI, set aside its earlier decision, and held that the report of
the engineers from the Bureau of Lands were more credible and accurate, and enjoy the presumption of
regularity and accuracy. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole question of the
proper location of the common boundary separating the adjoining lots of petitioners and respondents.
Petitioners complained of irregularities in the conduct of the relocation survey, the Court of Appeals found
nothing irregular in the conduct of the relocation survey.
Issue: W/N crucial that each party must have a representative present to ensure that the fixing of the
metes and bounds on the soil is accurately performed
Ruling: Yes. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due
process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his
right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
Main Point: Due Process; Indeed, the requirement of notice and representation in the proceedings is an
essential part of due process of law.

115. Sy v. CA

FACTS: Sahot, private respondent, was an employee of the trucking company owned by herein
petitioners. Before his dismissal, he got ill and cannot go back to work. Due to the absences, the
company illegally dismissed Sahot without enough notice. The case was first brought to the NLRC arbiter
where petitioners claim that Sahot was not illegally dismissed but was terminated because he refused to
go bac to work. The NLRC ruled in favor of Sahot and awarded him with separation pay with additional
benefits to be paid by the petitioners. The Case was then appealed before the CA which concurred with
the ruling of the NLRC. Thus, this appeal to seek the reversal of the CA’s decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of Sahot, herein private respondent, followed due process as
required by law.

RULING: No. From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the
separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company.

MAIN POINT: Procedural due process permits in dismissing an employee two written notices must be
furnished to the employee concerned. First, the particular act of omission done by the employee which
dismissal is sought. Second, the notice that the employee is dismissed after a reasonable time has lapse
for the employee to respond.

116. Namil v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners herein where the first set of candidates that was declared the winning candidates for
the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbag Sultan Kudarat on May 20, 2001. However, on May 21, 2001, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers declared private respondents as winning candidates for the same
position. This issue was raised before COMELEC and after investigation, declared private respondents as
the winning candidates by issuing Resolution no. 4615. The said resolution was passed without giving
due notice and hearing from the side of the petitioners. Thus, this action to nullify such resolution for GAD
on COMELEC’s part.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC’s powers is broad enough to enforce all election laws that in its
enforcement of such, the twin requirement of due notice and hearing may be forfeited.

RULING: No. Petitioners cannot be removed without due process of law. Although the COMELEC
possesses the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, the COMELEC is without
power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing.

MAIN POINT: Due process in quasijudicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and
hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any
motion to set aside his proclamation.

117. Bautista v. COMELEC

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition of COMELEC’s resolution nos. 5404 and 5584 that
nullifies the CoC of herein petitioner for the Punong Barangay Position in Lumbangan, Batangas. The
case was brought before COMELEC’s Law department where it rendered that Bautista is not eligible to be
a candidate. However, COMELEC en banc failed to issue a resolution to cancel petitioners CoC. Only
after his proclamation did COMELEC en banc issued resolution no. 5404, that cancels his CoC and
resolution no. 5584, which states his ineligibility for not meeting the registered voter of the place
requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when it issued resolution no. 5404
and 5584.

RULING: There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings.
However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing.

MAIN POINT: The requirements in due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute
lack of notice and hearing.

118. Office of OMB v. Coronel

FACTS: Respondent was a Senior Accounting Processor in Linamon Water District. In October 14, 1988,
said respondent called a meeting with different water districts in Lanao del Norte. They had a luncheon
meeting in one of the restaurants in Iligan City. The bill amounted to P1213. However, in a letter sent to
the OMB, the total should’ve been P213. After investigation, she, the respondent, was dismissed for
dishonesty under Rule 14 of the Omnibus Rules of the Administrative. After filing for a motion for
reconsideration, before the OMB, and which had been denied eventually by OMB Desierto and with a
notation “The Original decision stands” and without any justification, the case was referred to the CA. The
CA resolved the case in ordering the reinstatement of herein petitioner on the ground that the OMB’s
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, that the OMG failed to reconsider the credible evidence
provided by the respondent and that they failed to justify their decision in dismissing said respondent.
Thus, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to reverse the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-Coronel was denied due process when OMB Desierto’s decision
stated(notation) “The original decision stands” without giving any legal basis.

RULING: No. The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. What is proscribed is
the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In the case at bar, the respondent was given the opportunity to be
heard. She was not deprived of the due process as required by the constitution.
MAIN POINT: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to
explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

119. Erece v. Macalingay

FACTS: The issue erupted when herein petitioner-Erece, who was the Regional Director of Commission
on Human Rights of Region 1, did not allow the respondent employees to use his vehicle that was issued
by the said agency to him. This issue showed that the petitioner has been dishonest in declaring that he is
not using that said government vehicle to collect transportation allowance. The CSC took hold of this
issue and task a fact-finding committee. Erece was later on charged with dishonesty and grave
misconduct. An appeal before the CA was also made by the petitioner to which the appellate court
concurred with the decision of the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Erece, herein petitioner, was denied due process as he was not afforded the right
to cross examine his accusers and their witnesses.

RULING: No. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence.

MAIN POINT: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one’s side.

120. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung

FACTS: Bungubung is the Manager and Chairman of the Ports District Security Bids and Awards
Committee of the Port District Office (PDO) of Manila, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). An administrative
complaint was filed against him by a security agency that participated in the bidding for security services
of the PPA before the Ombudsman for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service. The same complaint was decided against Bungubung based on the affidavit of witnesses.
Respondent averred that the reliance by the Ombudsman on the said affidavits in determining his
administrative liability, despite the fact that the contents thereof were not personally attested to by the
affiants before the Ombudsman, was a clear violation of his right to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reliance by the Ombudsman on the affidavits in determining respondent’s
administrative liability was proper and did not deprive the respondent of due process.

RULING: Yes. The fact that no formal hearing took place is not sufficient ground to say that due process
was not afforded Bungubung. It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, including those
before the Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and
pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place
of their direct testimonies. Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, which
requirement was afforded Bungubung.

121. SEC v. Interport

FACTS: The Board of Directors of Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). IRC alleged that a press release announcing the
approval of the agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange
(PSE) and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. The SEC averred that
it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that
some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider
information. SEC Chairman then issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of
Material Facts. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered
into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act. The motion, however, was dismissed on the ground that the said Act had no implementing
rules and regulations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC may file a case against the respondents based on the assailed
provisions of the Revised Securities Act.

RULING: Yes. In all, this Court ruled that no implementing rules were needed to render effective Sections
8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate
authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations of Sections
8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.

MAIN POINT: The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law,
where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given.

122. Calinisan v. Roaquin

FACTS: Respondent Reynaldo Roaquin, a police officer, was charged by the government with murder for
killing Alfredo Taluyo in a nightclub squabble. Consequently, the PNP detained him at his assigned
station. While Roaquin was under detention, the PNP Headquarters issued an order discharging him from
the service based on a circular of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; notwithstanding that he had not
been administratively charged in connection with the offense of which he was charged in court. Years,
later, he was acquitted upon a finding that he acted in complete self defense. Following this development,
Roaquin asked the PNP to reinstate him into the police service. The same, however, was not awarded to
Roaquin on the basis of Finality of Disciplinary Action.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative action should have been filed against Roaquin for the Finality of
Disciplinary Action to take effect.

RULING: Yes. The Rules and Regulations in the Disposition of Administrative cases involving PNP
members before the PNP Disciplinary Authorities cannot be applied to case of the petitioner simply
because he was not charged of any administrative case. While the PNP may have validly suspended
Roaquin from the service pending the adjudication of the criminal case against him, he was
entitled after his acquittal not only to reinstatement but also to payment of the salaries,
allowances, and other benefits withheld from him by reason of his discharge from the service.

123. IBP v. Atienza

FACTS: In 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed an application
with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent
Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated Plaza Miranda
as the venue, instead of the Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari but having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners again, filed before the SC
assailing the appellate court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under
the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, and as alleged by the
Petitioners, the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A few days
later, the Manila Police District instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly
Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
RULING: No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this
certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal
proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the
said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at
the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the
civil action.
**Note on Case 134: Dyan lang talaga may proceedings involved re the case so dyan ko nalang finocus.

124. Domingo v. OMB and SK Officials

FACTS: A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) officials against petitioner as Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Fe T. Lao (Lao) for
malversation, falsification of public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondents alleged
that petitioner and Lao misappropriated the cash advance taken by respondents from the SK funds. They
added that petitioner gave a false statement in his Justification supporting the 2003 Barangay Budget and
Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had no incumbent SK officials at that time, contrary to the
fact that respondents are duly elected and incumbent SK officials of the barangay. The charge of
misappropriation and falsification of public document were later both dismissed. However, petitioner was
held administratively liable for the irregular submission of a falsified instrument to the Manila Barangay
Bureau (MBB) in connection with his barangay’s 2003 budget on the sole basis of the undated
Justification. At the outset, petitioner had questioned the existence of the Justification, claiming that his
purported signature thereon was forged.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been denial of due process.

RULING and MAIN POINT: Yes. The due process requirement mandates that every accused or
respondent be apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and the evidence in
support thereof be shown or made available to him so that he can meet the charge with traversing
or exculpatory evidence.

125. Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II) Board of Directors v. Castillejos
Consumers Association (CASCONA)

FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of the ZAMECO II. Respondent, an
organization of electric consumers, filed a letter-complaint with National Electrification Administration
(NEA) seeking the removal of the petitioners from the Board based on the NEA’s June 25, 1998
Financial Audit Report. NEA later issued a resolution removing the petitioners from office relying on the
NEA-ADCOM’s Report and Recommendations and the July 24, 2003 Audit Report that was not part of
the letter-complaint. Hence, petitioners insist that they were denied due process as they were never heard
on the charges as stated in the July 25, 2003 Audit Report cited as the bases for 3 of the 5 offenses in the
Resolution of the NEA which directed their removal from office. Allegedly, petitioners had been asked to
respond only to the charges under the June 25, 1998 Audit Report.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process.

RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process.
The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative enactment. The
right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule,
invalidate the administrative proceedings. The records disclose that NEA failed to inform the
petitioners that the audit disallowances contained in the 2003 Audit Report would constitute additional
charges in the administrative proceedings which served as the basis for the petitioners’ removal. Hence,
petitioners were never heard on the charges as stated in the 2003 Audit Report.

126. OMB v. Evangelista

FACTS: Respondents Evangelista, Melican and Limos are the mayor, municipal treasurer and accountant
respectively of Aguilar, Pangasinan. Villanueva, the Co-Chair of the Local School Board of Aguilar,
accused them of having misappropriated the Special Education Fund (SEF), which was allegedly used to
purchase speech kit tapes and textbooks without the approval of the LSB. The Ombudsman then placed
the respondents under preventive suspension. Respondents claim that they have been denied due
process since they were never furnished with a copy of Villanueva’s complaint. The case was elevated to
the CA which ruled in favor of the respondents and pointed out that under Section 26(2) of R.A. No. 6770,
the Ombudsman is required to inform the accused of the charges; yet, the respondents learned of the
charges against them only upon receipt of the suspension order. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prior notice or hearing is required for the issuance of a preventive suspension
order.

RULING & MP: NO. Pursuant to Section 24 of RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the governing
law, 2 requisites must concur to render the preventive suspension order valid:

1. That in the judgment of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman,  the evidence of guilt is
strong.
2. The second requisite may be met in three (3) different ways, to wit: (1) that the offense charged
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2)
the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondents’ continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.

While a preventive suspension order may stem from a complaint, the Ombudsman is not
required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint prior to ordering preventive
suspension. The requisites for the Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are clearly
contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. A prior notice or hearing is NOT required for the
issuance of a preventive suspension order. Hence, the respondents were not denied due process
when they were issued the preventive suspension order without first being furnished a copy of
Villanueva’s complaint.

127. Phil Export v. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC)

FACTS: The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) officers conducted a physical inventory and
special audit on petitioner Corporation and discovered that it had an unaccounted importation of
8,259,645 kilograms of used clothing for the period of 15 months. On the basis of the inventory and audit,
the PEZA Board passed a resolution canceling the PEZA Registration of petitioner Corporation as an
Ecozone Export Enterprise. Upon appeal, CA reversed the PEZA Resolution and held that there should
have been interrogations or inquiries conducted by the PEZA Board to give PCMC the opportunity to
defend itself from any charge directed against it. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent PCMC was afforded due process.

RULING: YES. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancies and was given
ample opportunity by the PEZA to be heard or to explain its side. It was also subsequently informed of the
decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration. Hence, PCMC cannot claim that they were denied
their right to due process of law. In any event, the Court ruled that any seeming defect in the
observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which PCMC did,
and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard thereon.

128. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary

FACTS: Former President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 13 which abolished and transferred the powers
of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

RESPONDENT: Respondent Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Pichay, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

PETITIONER: Petitioner contends that E.O. 13 is violative of the equal protection clause and the
guarantee of due process, pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government. (Petitioner is a presidential
appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.)

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 13 violates the equal protection clause and the guarantee of due process.

RULING: NO. The equal protection of the laws is embraced under the due process concept and
simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. There are substantial
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government from
non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. Further, petitioner
was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person
so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.

129. Arroyo v. DOJ

FACTS: The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 (to be composed of DOJ and COMELEC officials) which shall
conduct preliminary investigations on the alleged election anomalies during the 2004 and 2007 elections
involving herein petitioners. The Joint Committee later promulgated its Rules of Procedure. Petitioners
now claim that the Joint Panel (refers to the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team) does not possess
the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge because it is all at once the evidence-gatherer,
prosecutor and judge, and that the DOJ-COMELEC Joint Order No. 001-2011 and the Joint Committee
Rules have not been published, all of which violate their right to due process.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not creation of the Joint Panel and proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto
violated the right to due process. (2) Whether or not the nonpublication of the (a) DOJ-COMELEC Joint
Order No. 001-2011 and the (b) Joint Committee Rules violated the right to due process.

RULING:
(1) NO. It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation are subject to the requirements of
both substantive and procedural due process. Petitioners failed to prove that the Joint Panel itself
showed such bias and partiality against them. There was no proof that the Joint Panel made biased
statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party.

(2) NO, as far as the (a) DOJ-COMELEC Order 001-2011 is concerned as it only enables the COMELEC
and the DOJ to exercise powers already vested in them by the Constitution and other existing laws.
Publication is a necessary component of procedural due process so that all persons having an
interest in the proceedings may be notified thereof. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. However,
the (b) Joint Committee’s Rules of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors of the DOJ and the
COMELEC but also the conduct and rights of persons, or the public in general, and should have been
published.

130. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Department of Justice later received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United
States. On the same day, petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and
to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jimenez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers.

ISSUE: Whether or not an extraditee have a right of access to the evidence against him.

RULING: During the executive phase of an extradition proceeding, an extradite does not have the
right of access to evidence in the hands of government. But during the judicial phase, he has.

131. Cuevas v. Munoz

FACTS: Hong Kong Magistrate's Court issued a warrant for the arrest of respondent for 7 counts of
accepting an advantage as an agent contrary to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong, and 7
counts of conspiracy to defraud. The Philippine DOJ forwarded the request for provisional arrest to the
Anti-Graft Division of NBI. The NBI filed an application for the provisional arrest of respondent with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC of Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional
arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of Arrest null and void on the following
grounds: (1) that there was no urgency to warrant the request for provisional arrest under the RP-Hong
Kong Extradition Agreement and (2) that the requirement of dual criminality has not been satisfied as the
crimes for which respondent is wanted in Hong Kong, namely accepting an advantage as an agent and
conspiracy to commit fraud, are not punishable by Philippine laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to decide whether the rule of double criminality applies.

RULING: NO. The issue of whether or not the rule of double criminality applies was not for the
Court of Appeals to decide in the first place. The trial court in which the petition for extradition is filed
is vested with jurisdiction to determine whether or not the offenses mentioned in the petition are
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in the
applicable treaty. In this case, the presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC of Manila has yet to rule on
the extraditability of the offenses for which the respondent is wanted in Hong Kong. Therefore,
respondent has prematurely raised this issue before the Court of Appeals and now, before this Court.

132. Government of USA v. Purganan

FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to
furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. The Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.
Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required
by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case
a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of a potential extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceeding amount to a violation of due process.

RULING: NO. The Court iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances—such as those present in an
extradition case—call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because
notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest.

133. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge

FACTS: After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo and Imelda Rodriguez, they applied for bail which the trial
court. They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government filed a petition
where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on
Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled
the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very
urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and hearing is a violation
of co-petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: YES. The trial court’s immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to the Court’s
ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein. In this case, the cancellation
had been issued after the determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk . The Court believe that
the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not
be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary
liberty should not be discontinued.

134. Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong
Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case,
a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there
was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight
risk”.

ISSUE: Whether or not a potential extraditee can post bail.

RULING: YES. The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail. While the Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.

135. RCBC Capital Corporation v Banco De Oro Unibank

FACTS: The dispute between the parties arose sometime in May 2003 when RCBC informed respondent
and the other selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject shares, claiming there was an
overstatement of valuation of accounts and that the sellers violated their warranty under Share Purchase
Agreement. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the
International Chamber of Commerce-International Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA)
Respondents refuses to pay the cost of advance proceedings and so, the petitioners now pray that the
former be defaulted from participating in the proceedings and that the hearings be not suspended for the
reason of refusal of payment of costs by the respondents. The tribunal granted a partial award to the
petitioner and is about to grant a second partial award to RCBC. BDO then filed with the CA a motion for
preliminary injunction but it was denied hence, this case for urgent application for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tribunal committed an error in granting a partial award to RCBC resulting to
acting out of its jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. The case at bar does not present a non-disclosure issue but conduct allegedly showing an
arbitrator’s partiality to one of the parties. Even before the issuance of the Second Partial Award for the
reimbursement of advance costs paid by RCBC, Chairman Barker (of the tribunal) exhibited strong
inclination to grant such relief to RCBC, notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the Arbitration Tribunal
"has no power under the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay the advance on costs sought by the
ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against the Respondents’ refusal to pay.
MP: Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs – like arbitration, mediation, negotiation and
conciliation – are encouraged by this Court. By enabling parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they
provide solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and more productive of
goodwill and lasting relationship
But the most important feature of arbitration, is the public’s confidence and trust in the integrity of
the process. For this reason, the law authorizes vacating an arbitral award when there is evident
partiality in the arbitrators.

136. Angeles v Sison

FACTS: Petitioner, Jose Angeles, initiated an administrative case before the Office of the Dean, Gilberto
G. Mercado, of the Institute of Technology, FEU, by filing a complaint against the private respondents
Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran for alleged breach of the university's rules and regulations.
The same incident became also the subject of a criminal complaint for assault against a person in
authority instituted by the petitioner Jose Angeles in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against the
private respondents. The case was dismissed against Patawaran and later on the petitioner filed an
affidavit of desistance for the case against Picar and so that case too was dismissed.
However, the administrative case was continued by the petitioner Dean Gilberto G. Mercado.
Respondents now question the authority of the of the Dean and his committee to conduct the
administrative investigation as the incident happened outside the premises of the school and that the
Petitioner Angeles already desisted from pursuing a criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case against private respondent Picar upon the filing
of the affidavit of desistance of petitioner Jose Angeles has the effect of rendering this instant petition
moot and academic.
RULING: No. The administrative action before the school authorities can proceed independently of the
criminal action because these two actions are based on different considerations. In the former, the private
respondent's suitability or propriety as a student which is the paramount concern and interest of the
school is involved, while in the latter, what is at stake is his being a citizen who is subject to the penal
statutes and is the primary concern of the State.
There being no withdrawal of the complaint filed by petitioner Jose Angeles before the petitioner Dean
Gilberto Mercado, the administrative investigation should proceed.
MP: The pendency or the dismissal of the criminal action does not abate the administrative
proceeding which involves the same cause of action.

137. Malabanan v Ramento

FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University who
conducted a rally inside the school premises. The petitioners were found to be guilty for their holding of an
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for 1 academic year.
The validity of such is hereby assailed by the petitioners contending that the University failed to accord
respect to their constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech is the grievance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the university is violative of the constitutional rights of the students
RULING: Yes. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present.
It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit but even then, a one-year period of
suspension is much too severe.
MP: If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In
granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there
be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

138. Guzman v NU
FACTS: Petitioners are students of respondent National University, have come to the Court to seek relief
from their school's continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enroll. Petitioners contends that the
respondent university subjecting them to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be
any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend
themselves is a violation of their constitutional right to due process and education.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right to due process committed by the
respondent university.
RULING: Yes. It is apparent that the respondent university had never conducted proceedings of any sort
to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed committed any violation or defiance against
the school. Petitioners were being denied the right "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or
violation of disciplinary regulations" without due process.
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof.
MP: There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.

139. Alcuaz v PSBA

FACTS: Respondent school and the petitioners who are students therein entered into an that will govern
their activities within the school on the exercise of their democratic rights. In spite of the above-stated
agreement they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which was turned down by the school,
resulting in commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts by the petitioners within the school. The
petitioners were then blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-
1987.
Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed by the Philippine School of Business Administration,
Quezon City Faculty Union on the ground of commonality of issues and cause of action with that of the
petitioners who, later on were sanctioned by the investigating committee of the respondent school.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and
of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
RULING: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any
existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the
charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting parties. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract
to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and
teachers.
MP: Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation
of termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in courts of justice. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet
the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 706-707 [1986]).

140. NON VS JUDGE DAMES

FACTS: Petitioners, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-
enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet
seeking their readmission to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on the ground that they waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used
its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they
duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent
authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed
the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was accorded to petitioners.

RULING: NO. It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed
in Guzman v. National University, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from
the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere
afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass
actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
MAIN POINT: Imposition of sanctions on students requires observance of procedural due process. The
following are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process;
that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.

141. ADMU VS CAPULONG

FACTS: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of ADMU, died of serious physical injuries after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Respondent students, through a notice, where
required to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt, which they failed to
do so. The Investigating Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file
their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the
charges against respondent students, which found them guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled, which was granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas
and Mendoza, which was contested by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted, thus this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N there was denial of due process against the respondent students

RULING: NO. It cannot seriously be asserted that the requirements to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process (refer to prev case) were not met. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause
of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Granting that they were denied
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.
An administrative proceeding conducted investigate students’ participation in a hazing activity
need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD

142. UP VS LIGOT-TELAN
FACTS: Petitoner Ramon Nadal, was among those who applied for the Socialized Tuition Fee and
Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the “Iskolar ng Bayan” program of the University of the
Philippines (U.P.). During a random sampling scheme of verification of data on 1991, a team from UP
staff conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal wherein Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship
Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal’s application form. Nadal was
informed of the result of the investigation which showed that (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2)
the income of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers; and he was required to pay
back the benefits he received from the STFAP. The UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties
of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension
and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per
annum and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university. Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting
on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the
Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the
following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for Reconsideration, which this time
resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for mandamus
with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: W/N Nadal was denied due process.

RULING: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the
March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of
individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of
students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body.
At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special
BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his
undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which
means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.

143. GO VS COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN

FACTS: Kim Go was named among several high school students involved and present at a hazing rite
of Tau Gamma in the house of one Dulce, in Tondo Manila. Kim’s mother, Angelita Go, was then
informed of her son’s participation as a fraternity member The fourth year students involved were to be
allowed to graduate from Letran, whereas those who were not graduating were allowed to finish their
current school year but were to be barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran. Mrs. Go later on
submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s suspension so that he could take a previously scheduled
exam. Several conferences addressing the students involved in the fraternity were gone unattended by
the spouses Go despite consistent notification. The respondents proposed that students and their parents
sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with their suspension to which Spouses Go did not
sign, refusing to accept the findings that Kim was a fraternity member, and that there was a lack of due
process in the findings. Petitioners filed a complaint for damages claiming that respondents had
unlawfully dismissed Kim, and for the compensation for “business opportunity losses” they have suffered
while personally attending to Kim’s disciplinary case.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were denied due process in the opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case
RULING: NO. Reiterating the ruling in Guzman v. National University case, due process in student
disciplinary cases does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of Justice. They may be summary proceedings, and cross-examination is not an
essential part thereof. The viewing and examining of written statements is admissible in due process. The
written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to
suitably prepare a defense. Kim had enough time to prepare his response. The essence of due process,
the opportunity to be heard, had been given.
MAIN POINT: Due process in student disciplinary cases does not entail proceedings and hearings similar
to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of Justice. They maybe summary proceedings,
and cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.

144. LAO GI VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1958, Filomeno Chia Jr. was declared a Filipino citizen when the Secretary of Justice
rendered Opinion no. 191 as it appears that his father, Filomeno Chia Sr. (Lao Gi) is a Filipino citizen. In
1980, Minister of Justice rendered Opinion no. 147, cancelling and setting aside the citizenship of Lao Gi
on the ground that his citizenship was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Lao Gi filed a motion for
reconsideration and was denied. Charges of deportation were filed against the Chia’s which also alleged
that they refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that CID has no authority to reopen a matter long decided by Opinion no.
191, which was opposed by private prosecutor and CID's special prosecutor on the ground that
citizenship may be threshed out as occasion may demand and that due process was accorded to
respondents. CID denied both motions. Respondents filed for certiorari in which was dismissed by SC en
banc for lack of merit. Before the hearing of the deportation case, Commissioner Nituda gave
respondents 3 days to register as aliens to move for reconsideration and oppose their arrest.
Respondents filed for reconsideration and opposition but was denied by Nituda who directed them to
register as aliens within 2 days. Hearing for the deportation was set and on the same day, respondents
filed for certiorari and prohibition in the CFI, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. CFI dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and want of jurisdiction. Respondents appeal to CA and was dismissed, including
their motion for reconsideration. Thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was accorded to petitioners.
RULING: NO! Section 37 of the Immigration Act provides that arrest and deportation of aliens may be
done after a determination of the Board of Commissioners that a ground for deportation exists. After the
charges are filed, respondents should be notified of the grounds and a hearing should be conducted and
it is only after a hearing has been conducted may the alien be deported and the Opinions rendered will
bear weight in the determination of their citizenship. Nituda can only direct or order respondents to
register as aliens once there is a positive finding that the respondents are aliens. " This power is the
police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good. Since the
deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that: No
alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration. The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person
to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrest must be in
accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.

145. Domingo v. Scheer

FACTS:
 Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status to reside in the Philippines. He
married a Filipina and had 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa. One day, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received information that Scheer was wanted by the
German Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.
 The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer, relied on the correspondence
from the German Vice-Consul on its speculation that a warrant of arrest was issued by the District
Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of
the respondent in Palawan. Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the
respondent's motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor deported.
 Meanwhile, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against
the respondent for physical injuries. He informed the respondent in a Letter. The BOC still failed to
resolve the respondent's motion. Commissioner did not respond to the respondent’s Letter. The
respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan.
 In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She
wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. The
German Embassy replied on the negative. Scheer was apprehended in his residence on orders of the
petitioner. He was held in custody while awaiting his deportation. Petitioner refused to release the
respondent. Respondent’s counsel filed with the CA. He alleged that his arrest and detention were
premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional. BOC issued a Resolution denying the
respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The CA rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent granting his petition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BOC Commissioner committed GADLEJ in issuing its Summary Deportation,
and the arrest and detention of the respondent.

RULING: YES
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of
grace; such privilege is not absolute nor permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be
expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the
Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant
thereto.

146. PHILCOMSAT VS. Alcuaz

December 18, 1989
FACTS:
 By virtue of RA 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was
granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe and
PLDT.
 PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission. (RA 5514, Sec. 5)
 NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546
 PHILCOMSAT sued NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
 PHILCOMSAT asserted that:
o nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, granting its rate-fixing powers
o nor of EO 196, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
o That the exercise of which requires a hearing

ISSUE: Whether or not a hearing was required before NTC ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates.

RULING: YES.
Temporary rate fixing order is not exempt from the procedural requirements of notice and hearing.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such
power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different
rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless
otherwise provided by the applicable law.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD

147. Radio Communications, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

v. NTC & PLDT
April 23, 1990
FACTS:
 Respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent NTC for the Approval of Rates for Digital
Transmission Service Facilities. The respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case
for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.
 The respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing for PLDT's application. Petitioners except
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of affected parties.
 At the hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along with other petitioners which came to know of the pending
petition, appeared and moved to file an opposition or reply to said application. Petitioners alleged that
neither respondent Commission nor private respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this
provisional authority.
 According to petitioners, NTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing provisional authority to private respondent without prior notice and hearing when its
application is not for rate approval but for authority to engage in services outside its franchises, that
PLDT is limited by its legislative franchise to render only radiotelephonic services, exclusive of
radiotelegraphic or record services. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority in favor of PLDT, without prior notice to the petitioners.

RULING: NO.
Public Service Commission, empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without prior
hearing. Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is empowered to approve
provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, as
amended, the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the
subscriber’s investment to be effective immediately, without hearing. Further, the Public Service Act
makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are necessarily proposed merely, until
the Commission approves them (Republic v. Medina, supra). Moreover, the Commission can hear and
approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact
that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the
definitive rates approved after final and it was so stated in the case at bar, in the National
Telecommunications Commission’s order.

148. Maceda v. ERB

FACTS:
 Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondents, the oil
companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB then issued an
order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
 Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify said increase. 
 On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase
without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of said order, a hearing was
conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said hearing.
 The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due process
for having been issued without notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting the provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.

RULING: YES
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from
ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to
reduce or increase it further or to deny the application.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that:
“Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in
matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative,not quasi-judicial,
function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of
evidence governing court proceedings.”

149. Globe Telecom v. NTC and SMART

FACTS:
 SMART filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of SMART’s and Globe’s GSM networks. SMART alleged that Globe, with evident
bad faith and malice, refused to grant SMART’s request for the interconnection of SMS.
 NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
 Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the
documentation required for interconnection. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the
definition of value-added service or enhanced- service given in NTC Memorandum Circular, their
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory. The NTC also declared that both Smart and
Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it.
 Petitioner:
o filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside
the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case.
o claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render
SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all
 The CA issued a TRO. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC
decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require
the prior approval of the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Globe was correct that it need not to secure prior authority from NTC in order to
operate SMS as a deregulated special feature, therefore, exempted from rate or tariff regulations of NTC.

RULING: YES
According to NTC’s Memorandum Circular No. 14-11-97, the Commission deregulates the provision
of special features inherent to the Telephone Network, provided, that in the provision of the feature,
no law, rule, regulation or international convention on telecommunications is circumvented or
violated.  The Commission shall periodically update the list of special features in the Telephone
Network which, including the charging of rates therefor, shall be deregulated.
Section 4 of said Memorandum Circular provides:
“Authorized Telephone Service Providers shall continue to charge their duly approved rates for
special services for 3 months from the effectivity of this circular, after which they may set their own rates.”

With the passage of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 (PTA), it sets forth the regulatory logic,
mandating that “a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which
telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact with one another
in providing telecommunications services, with the end in view of encouraging their financial
viability while maintaining affordable rates.”

150. CORONA V. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31

FACTS: IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO.04-92), LIMITING THE TERM
OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR
CANCELLATION. RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92.
THE Office of the President ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92. THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVESECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER. RESPONDENTS
FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RULING: YES. THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK
DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONOF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURTSAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF
THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS ADEPRIVATION
AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUTPROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS.
AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICEAND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
OFPROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN ANADMINISTRATIVE BODY
EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. INTHE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS,SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN
ADMINISTRATIVEBODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE
ANDHEARING

THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKENON THE NATURE OF A

PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THATPPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE
RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTSTO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY
RETIREMENT.