FACTS:

The petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel
del MAr filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of
the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary,
unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege
the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. imposition of P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels
4.It is unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours.
5. Automatic cancellation of license for subsequent violation of the Ordinance.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Whether the ordinance is against the due process clause

Held:

1. There was a valid exercise of police power, the ordinance was regulatory
measure. It merely regulated the conduct business in order precisely to put an
end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. The ordinance is
aim to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the
revenue of the LGU concerned.
2. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on
its face.

There is no question that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to

minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.

The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of

transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients
and guests. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
 discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government.
ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARDS OF LEGAL INFIRMITY. — There is no controlling
and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property,
in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both
as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront
to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to be an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. -
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen
(18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent. In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O.
Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary

investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be

conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
without regard to the fine. (1a)

Facts:
Eldon Maguan was driving his car when the petitioner Rolito Go traveling in the wrong
direction on one-way street. Petitioner and Maguan cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard was able to
take down the petitioner car plate number. The police arrived shortly and verify to the
LTO that the car was registered to Elsa Ang Go. The following day, the police returned
to the scene of the shooting and conduct investigation.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2)
lawyers. The police detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police
station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. The police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner. Petitioner refused to execute waiver
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code despite the prosecutor informed the
petitioner that he could avail of right of preliminary investigation.
The complaint while still in the prosecutor, the victim Maguan died of the gunshot
wound. The prosecutor instead filing an information of frustrated homicide, the
information for murder with no bail and no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign waiver in relation to Article of 125 of the
RPC.
Counsel for petitioner filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
information was filed.
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be
suspended.
The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set until after the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation. However, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order,
embodying the following: (1) Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given
48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) Order which granted leave
to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated
11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the Order, contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due
process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in
view of public respondents' failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed
by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was
entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
The present petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court
issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to held in abeyance the hearing of the
criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
Issue:
two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless
arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and
second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation
Held:
1. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner
in the instant case falls within the terms of Rules of Court. Petitioner’s “arrest”
took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6)
 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover,
none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating
that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon
which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not,
however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
2. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail,
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v.
Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail
and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his
right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash
bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly,
the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part
of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave
to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and
that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls
under Rules of Court which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations
of lawful warrantless arrests.