 Leviste vs. Alameda, G.R. No.

182677, 3 August 2010, 626 SCRA 575, repeating

 Paderanga vs. Drilon repeating
 Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349
 Villaflor vs. Vivar, G.R. No. 134744, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 194
 Leviste vs. Alameda repeating
 Crespo vs. Mogul repeating
 Viudez II vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152889, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 345
 Sales vs. Sandiganbayan repeating
 Perez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131445, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 357
 Paderanga vs. Drilon repeating
 People vs. Sequino, G.R. No. 117397, 13 November 1996, 264 SCRA 79
 People vs. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, 27 December 2002, 394 SCRA 478, repeating
 Luz vs. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012, 667 SCRA 421

Case Name Leviste vs. Alameda

Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. Judge Elmo Alameda issued a commitment order against Leviste who was placed under
police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.

After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention, and his
arraignment was set.

The private complainants-heirs of the victim filed a motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper
offense. The RTC allowed the motion and allowed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the
proper offense and submit a recommendation. Leviste assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals. Leviste also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer
acting on the recommendation until after the CA resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to
grant him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial
determination of probable cause. He also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer
action on the admission of the Amended Information.

The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders admitting the Amended Information and directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

WON the heirs of the victim have the right to cause the reinvestigation of the criminal case below when the
criminal information had already been filed with the lower court – YES.

 Petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy
of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

 Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

 o When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a
preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In
the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended
party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.

o Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

o After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the

accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.

 A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. As an
exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest
without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been
conducted.

 Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal
cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court
for the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court.31

 BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may
proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of
inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial
authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available
to the private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of
Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities
within the applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.

 The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against
Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the
arrested person. Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.

 Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such
remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of inquest.

o Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party
under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000
National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall
"apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/
reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ
Secretary.
 o In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the
case through the regular course of a preliminary investigation.

 ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused
with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of
its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private
complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for
a reinvestigation.

 The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition.

o All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is
merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of
the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, 39 and is granted the
authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

o In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must
"examine the Information vis-à-vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make
the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and
substance."41

o The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to
prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom
to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated
by prosecutors.43

 In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a
cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course
of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

 A trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized that a trial court may, where the
interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.

 Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the
drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the
disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

 Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the
present case, the Court’s holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court: A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
  Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate
modification53 of the charge – is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court would
ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider
whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the
appropriate motion to be filed in court.

 More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the

information. Due process of law demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be
admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of
the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is
included in the original Information.

WON the trial court erred in not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of
probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the
reinvestigation – NO.

 There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists
and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be
held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is
a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.77

 The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed
by the RTC.

 To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor
and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.80

 What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of
 right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since
t]he extent of the judge’s examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances
of the case require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:

o The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the
judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The
Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not
adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of
probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the
accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case Name Paderanga vs. Drilon

An information for multiple murder was filed in the RTC against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora
Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the
accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since
then.

In an amended information, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as
a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among
others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment. The trial
court in an order denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has
in support of his defense."

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated herein
petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.

The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation
against petitioner at the instance of the latter's counsel. Said city prosecutor requested the DOJ to designate a state
prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against herein petitioner. State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the
amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused
therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed
when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-
affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The
motion was, however, denied.

WON the preliminary investigation as to Paderanga was complete – YES.

 Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by reason of the fact that at the time
the resolution of September 6, 1989 was issued, there were still several incidents pending resolution such as
the validity of the testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio Hanopol as bases for
preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, and the clarificatory questions
which were supposed to be propounded by petitioner's counsel to Roxas and Hanopol. Petitioner likwise
claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of April 25,
1989. These contentions are without merit.
 Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the subpoena
issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as a
malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this is
sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of
Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25, 1989 involved a
separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in the complaint attached to
the first subpoena issued to him earlier.

 Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of defense best
addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.

 Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute.1âwphi1 The fiscal has the
discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses
concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:

o (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the
parties so desire, they may submit questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may
propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

 Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."

 Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are
inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.

o It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-
examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if
petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they
were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he
cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely
because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said
testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper and not in the
preliminary investigation.

o Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the
case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be
admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the
prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court
can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to
compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
 PARTIES: Eduardo P. Pilapil , petitioner v.

Sandiganbayan, Francis Garchitorena and People of the Philippines, Respondnets.

DISPUTED MATTER: Whether a complaint may be filed for Malversation, if the PI conducted indicated
the crime of Malversation

FACTS:
 Pilapil, the congressman of the 3rd District of CamSur, received in behalf of the municipality of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur an AMBULANCEdonated by the Phil Charity Sweepstakes Offices
o However the ambulance was never delivered
 Jan 25,1989 L J. Garchitorena sent Dep. Obmudsman Colayco a complaint against the petitioner
regarding the said ambulance.
o The letter was then reffered to dep Ombudsman for Luzon, Manuel Domingo
 December 5,1990, Ombudsman Investigator Tolention issued a resolution finding no Probable cause
for MALVERSATION and recommended that case no OMB-1-89-0168 for Malversation of Public
Property under art 217 of RPC be dismissed. -> approved by Dep Ombudsman Domingo
 April 1,1991, Ombudsman Vasquez issued a resolution sustaining the finding of Investigator Tolentino
that there was no Malversation, but found a prima facie case for Violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 -
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
 April 3, 1991: an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, docketed as Criminal
Case No 16672 was filed,
 Pilapil then filed a motion to quash on May 2 1991, which was then denied. MR was also denied after.
 Oct 12 1991, a petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking the annulment of the
resolution of respondent sandiganbayan in the criminal case, dated June 27,1991, for denying his
motion to quash on the information and the MR.
o Petitioner predicated his motion to quash on the groud of lack of jurisdiction over HIS
PERSON because the same was filed without probable cause
o Petitioner further cites the fact the the information for violation of the ANTI-GRAFT Law
was filed although the complain upon which the preliminary investigation was conducted is
for malversation
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WoN the information for Violation of RA3019 should be quashed on the ground that the preliminary
investigation was for Malversation? - NO
o The absence of a PI does not affect the Court's Jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the
validity of the information. HOWEVER if there was no PI and the defendants, BEFORE
ENTERING their plea, invite the attention to the court of their absence, then the court should
conduct an investigation and not dismiss the information.
 Directing the fiscal to conduct such PI or remand to the lower court to conduct PI
o PI is merely inquisitorial and it only used to discover whether a person is reasonably charged with
a crime + for the prosecutor to prepare the complain or information
 Preliminary Designation of the offense in the directive to file a counter affidavit and
affidavits of the witnesses is not conclusive.
 Designation is only a conclusion of law of dep. ombudsman Domingo.
 The Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualifications of the crime, but he must be
guided by the evidence presented in the PI, which he must use to designate the offense
found in the filling of the information

o
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby dismissed for Lack of Merit

Villaflor v Vivar y Gozon

Panganiban, J. | Jan. 16, 2001
Topic 1: Remedies from preliminary investigation
Nature: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

PARTIES: GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR , petitioner

vs. DINDO VIVAR y GOZON respondent

DISPUTED MATTER: dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to
conduct a preliminary investigation

DOCTRINE: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or render
it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
Instead of dismissing the information, the court should hold the proceedings in abeyance and order the public
prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

SUMMARY: Two criminal cases were filed against the respondent, one for slight physical injuries and another
for grave threats. Subsequently, the earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn and another for
serious physical injuries was filed. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats on the
ground that the threat should have been absorbed by the serious physical injuries. The MTC denied the Motion to
Quash considering that the same is prohibited under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The RTC, however, granted
the motion to quash the informations, ruling that the criminal cases should be dismissed because the informations
were filed without preliminary investigation. Supreme Court held that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information, does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, nor does it
constitute a ground for quashing the information. Instead of dismissing the cases, the trial court should have
held in abeyance the proceedings and ordered the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. The
Court, however, noted that in fact a preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was conducted, but when
the information was amended because petitioner's injuries turned out to be more serious, a new preliminary
investigation was not necessary because the change made was only a formal amendment.

FACTS:
 Dindo Vivar allegedly mauled petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor at around 1:00 a.m. outside the Fat Tuesday Bar.
o After the severe beating he took from respondent, Villaflor decided to leave the premises together with
a friend who was in the restroom when the mauling incident took place. On his way out, Villaflor again
met respondent who told him, "Sa susunod gagamitin ko na itong baril ko" 4 ("Next time, I will use my
gun on you").
 An Information 3 for slight physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23365, was filed against
Respondent Dindo Vivar
 When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, an
Information for serious physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23787, was filed against
respondent.
o The earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn
 Another Informatiom for grave threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23728, was filed
 On April 14, 1997, respondent Vivar posted a cash bond of P6,000 in Criminal Case No. 23787 (for serious
physical injuries). Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as required by the trial court, he filed a Motion to
Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 23728 (for grave threats).
o He contended that the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical
injuries, should have been absorbed by the latter
o Criminal Case No. 23728 should be dismissed, as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
 MTC denied
 o prohibited under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
o Thus, Vivar was duly arraigned in Criminal Case No. 23728 (for grave threats), and he pleaded not
guilty.
 RTC granted
o criminal cases should be dismissed because the informations were filed without preliminary
investigation

ISSUES/HELD:

o Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two (2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries and
grave threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to conduct a preliminary investigation? No, RTC erred
when it dismissed the two criminal cases
o Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be considered a ground to
quash the criminal informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed against the accused-respondent?
No, lack of a preliminary investigation not provided for by the Rules
o Should respondent's entry of plea in the [grave] threats case and posting of cash bond in the serious
physical injuries case be considered a waiver of his right, if any, to preliminary investigation? Yes.

ISSUE # 1 - RATIO:

 Preliminary investigation = inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial."
o However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground
for quashing the information. The trial court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in
abeyance the proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
o Application: RTC erred when it dismissed the two criminal cases for serious physical injuries
(Criminal Case No. 23787) and grave threats (Criminal Case No. 23728) on the ground that the public
prosecutor had failed to conduct a preliminary investigation.
o Furthermore, we do not agree that a preliminary investigation was not conducted.
 In fact, a preliminary investigation for slight physical injuries was made by the assistant
city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City. The said Information was, however, amended when
petitioner's injuries turned out to be more serious and did not heal within the period specified
in the Revised Penal Code.
 A new preliminary investigation cannot be demanded by respondent.
 The change made by the public prosecutor was only a formal amendment.
 The Amended Information could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple and
obvious reason that it charged essentially the same offense as that under the original
Information. Moreover, if the original charge was related to the amended one, such that an
inquiry would elicit substantially the same facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not
necessary.

ISSUE # 2 - RATIO

Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides the grounds on which an accused can
move to quash the complaint or information

(a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
(c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so
(e) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
 (f) more than one offense is charged, except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment
for various offenses;
(g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) the information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) the accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged.

Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of a preliminary investigation

ISSUE # 3 RATIO

The failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, either because he had not
filed the motion or had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds.

Application: In this case, he waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave
threats.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City are REVERSED. No costs.

CRESPO V. MOGUL

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set
for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was
deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court. 

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA.
The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused.  Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused
then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining
order.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a
proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is
insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information
within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do
so, and Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move
for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by
the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so
for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and
vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for
review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that
an information be filed in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a