SALUD RAMOS vs. CA, ALEJANDRO CATAMBAY and ADELA MENDENACELI G.R. No.

L-52741 March 15, 1982

FACTS: The property in question was inherited by Catalina Ramos, mother of the petitioner, from her parents. The property was initially mortgaged to PNB but Catalina paid the loan, partly from the proceeds of another loan that she contracted from private respondents in 1933. Ramos alleges that her mother was made to sign a document guaranteeing payment of the amount advanced by said respondents; that in 1971she discovered for the first time that the title to said property had already been transferred in the name of private respondents by virtue of an extrajudicial adjudication executed by her mother pursuant to which the original certificate of title in the name of Gabriel Ramos and Francisca Catambay was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of her mother, who thereafter executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the private respondents; that the extrajudicial adjudication and deed of sale were simulated; that there was fraud in obtaining her mothers signature because the intention was to guarantee payment of the loan and not to sell and transfer ownership of the property. Respondents answer: the property was sold to them by Catalina Ramos on December 30, 1933, after she became the owner thereof by virtue of a summary adjudication as the only heir of the original owners, and that by virtue of the registration of the deed of sale in their favor, they were issued T.C.T. on May 12, 1934, and that since then, or for a period of more than 39 years, they had been in possession of said property as the exclusive owners thereof publicly, peacefully and adversely against the whole world and had religiously paid the real estate taxes thereof since 1934. They likewise alleged that the action is already barred by the statute of limitations.. ISSUE: W/N Ramos has a right to recover the land HELD: NO. Ramos was not able to provide sufficient evidence to prove her claims. In addition, from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, which seems to be more decisive, it appears too clear that private respondents have acquired title to the land in suit by virtue of possession in the concept of an owner. It is of record that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the litigated parcel of land since they bought the same in 1934 and since then, have been paying the real estate taxes due thereon and had declared said property in their name for taxation purposes. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, "while tax declaration and tax receipts are not necessarily evidence of title, they are strong evidence of possession for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes year after year for a property that is not in his actual possession." Action for reconveyance has already prescribed since it was filed only after 39 years from registration of property in respondents names. Since the prescriptive period in this case had already run since May 12, 1934 prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there can be no doubt that the former laws on prescription apply here, pursuant to Article 1116 of the Civil Code. Under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, adverse possession ripened into ownership after the lapse of ten (10) years, good or bad faith of the possessor being immaterial. for purposes of acquisitive prescription. In like manner, an action to recover title to or possession of immovable Property prescribed in the same period of 10 years. 13 The instant case, not having been filed within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued on May 12, 1934, prescribed in 1944 because the complaint was filed only on March 13, 1973, about 39 years later. Consequently, the possession of private respondents over the litigated property ripened into full ownership in 1944, ten years after May 12, 1934, when their possession which was actual, open, public and continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claims, commenced.

It becomes apparent, therefore, based on the foregoing considerations, that apart from being the vendee of the parcel of land in question as evidenced by the questioned deed of sale, which may be a source of respondents' right of ownership over the property, their said light had been rendered indisputable when the favorable effects of acquisitive prescription had set in on their side. Even the thirty-year period fixed in the new Civil Code for the acquisition of ownership by extraordinary prescription or for the extinction of the right of action over immovables, had expired when the present action was filed. MAGTIRA VS. CA, 96 S 680 FACTS: ISIDORO Magtira for and in consideration of the amount of P725.00, which he obtained from herein private respondent ZACARIAS Pangan, had entered into an agreement with the latter involving the a parcel of land evidenced by a public instrument. It should be noted that while the document is entitled "Kasulatang Sanglaan" the body thereof contains a statement that "inilipat ipinagbili nang biling mabibiling muli." ZACARIAS took possession of the property beginning February 8, 1926 and paid taxes thereon pursuant to the aforequoted agreement. Magtiras obtained P1000 from Zacarias after the execution of Agreement. In an undated private instrument signed by SOFIA and ZACARIAS, the Magtiras asked for and were given an extension of five years, or up to April 30, 1935, within which to "redeem." Petitioner maintains that on three occasions, she orally sought the redemption of the property by offering to ZACARIAS the sum of P1,000.00, but in all these instances, ZACARIAS pleaded for more time to remain in possession, giving as a reason his wish to see his daughter, who is the goddaughter of SOFIA a chance to complete her studies. To these entreaties of her "compadre", SOFIA declared she could not turn a deaf ear. On August 23, 1945, or 10 years and 4 months after the extended period up to April 30, 1935, ZACARIAS filed with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan an Affidavit for Consolidation of Ownership. Isidoro Magtira died intestate in 1953 leaving as his sole compulsory heir, the petitioner SOFIA. It is SOFIA's submission that it was only sometime in 1955 during the cadastral in Paombong, Bulacan, that she came to know that ZACARIAS was claiming ownership of the land which the latter wanted to be surveyed in his name. On June 18, 1956 SOFIA commenced this action against ZACARIAS for "accounting cancellation of real estate mortgage and for recovery of ownership" . In his Answer to the Amended Complaint, ZACARIA, insisted, among others, that during the period for repurchase the Magtiras evidenced no intention to repurchase the property, nor had they made any tender of payment, nor did they file the necessary action for the protection of their rights; that he has been in possession of the property for exactly 30 years, 4 months and ten days computed from February 28, 1926 to the date of the filing of the Complaint on June 18, 1956, so that he has acquired absolute ownership by extraordinary acquisitive prescription and plaintiff's right to recover the same had been extinguished by prescription;

ISSUE: W/N ZACARIAS Pangan has acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription. HELD: YES. Acquisitive prescription operates to bar any action by SOFIA. From the date of the filing of the Affidavit for Consolidation of Ownership by ZACARIAS with the Register of Deeds on August 23, 1945 up to the date of the filing of the complaint by SOFIA on June 18, 1956, or for almost 11 years, ZACARIAS enjoyed an uninterrupted, adverse, public and peaceful possession of the litigated property in the concept of owner, which under Article 1134 of the

Civil Code ripened into ownership by ordinary prescription through possession of at least ten years. Contary to SOFIA's claim, the period of prescription should be reckoned not merely from the time when she allegedly came to know of the claim of ownership of ZACARIAS during the cadastral survey in 1955, but from the date of registration of the Affidavit for Consolidation with the Register of Deeds because registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole world.

Rule of imprescriptibility of action may apply in a resulting trust - as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust When acquisitive precription runs in favor of a trustee in an express trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive Actions based on constructive trusts may prescribe. There may be laches in either resulting or constructive trust. An express truct cannot be proved by parol evidence. - A trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations FACTS: Spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on October 4, 1906 and October 26, 1880, respectively. They were survived by their 3 children. Moreover, Martin was survived by his 7 natural children (plaintiffs). In December 1906, a special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of said spouses was conducted. Rafael Ramos, a brother of Martin, administered the estate for more than 6 years. Eventually, a partition project was submitted which was signed by the 3 legitimate children and 2 of the 7 natural children. A certain Timoteo Zayco signed in representation of the other 5 natural children who were minors. The partition was sworn to before a justice of peace. The conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at P74,984.93, consisting of 18 parcels of land, some head of cattle and the advances to the legitimate children. thereof represented the estate of Martin. 1/3 thereof was the free portion or P12,497.98. The shares of the 7 natural children were to be taken from that 1/3 free portion. Indeed, the partition was made in accordance with the Old Civil code. Thereafter, Judge Richard Campbell approved the partition project. The court declared that the proceeding will be considered closed and the record should be archived as soon as proof was submitted that each he3ir had received the portion adjudicated to him. On February 3, 1914, Judge Nepumoceno asked the administrator to submit a report showing that the shares of the heirs had been delivered to them as required by the previous decision. Nevertheless, the manifestation was not in strict conformity with the terms of the judges order and with the partition project itself. 8 lots of the Himamaylan Cadastre were registered in equal shares in the names of Gregoria (widow of Jose Ramos) and her daughter (defendants), when in fact the administrator was supposed to pay the cash adjudications to each of them as enshrined in the partition project. Plaintiffs were then constrained to bring the suit before the court seeking for the reconveyance in their favor their corresponding participations in said parcels of land in accordance with Article 840 of the old Civil Code. Note that 1/6 of the subject lots represents the 1/3 free portion of martins shares which will eventually redound to the shares of his 7 legally acknowledged natural children. The petitioners action was predicated on the theory that their shares were merely held in trust by defendants. Nonetheless, no Deed of Trust was alleged and proven. Ultimately, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of res judicata, prescription and laches. ISSUE: W/N a trust had been constituted over the property in favor of the plaintiffs, such that prescription, laches or res judicata will not be applicable, enabling the plaintiffs to obtain ownership over the land. HELD: NO. Inextricably interwoven with the questions of prescription and res judicata is the question

TRUSTS: Rule 98 Parol Evidence Rule 130 Sec 9; Articles 1440 to 1457
1. Concept: SOTTO VS. TEVES, 86 S 154 2. Express: RAMOS VS. RAMOS, 61 S 284 Syllabus: Trust defined - In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the words 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts. Trust either express or implied Express created by the intention of the trust or of the parties No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral evidence No particular words are required for the creation; created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust

Implied come into being by operation of law may be proven by oral evidence

without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are super induced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts

Resulting trust defined trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (Art. 1448 to 1455) Constructive trust defined raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law; a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law; technically not a trust Acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of a trustee in an express trust. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust.

on the existence of a trust. It is noteworthy that the main thrust of plaintiffs action is the alleged holding of their shares in trust by defendants. Emanating from such, the Supreme Court elucidated on the nature of trusts and the availability of prescription and laches to bar the action for reconveyance of property allegedly held in trust (indicated in the Syllabus above). It is said that trust is the right, enforceable solely in equity to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It may either be express or implied. The latter is further subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts. Applying it now to the case at bar, the plaintiffs did not prove any express trust in this case. The expediente of the intestate proceeding, particularly the project of partition, the decision and the manifestation as to the receipt of shares negates the existence of an express trust. Those public documents prove that the estate of Martin Ramos was settled in that proceeding and that adjudications were made to his seven natural children. A trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. As already noted, an express trust cannot be proven by parol evidence. Neither have the plaintiffs specified the kind of implied trust contemplated in their action. We have stated that whether it is a resulting or constructive trust, its enforcement may be barred by laches. As there was inexcusable delay thereby making the plaintiffs action unquestionably barred by prescription and laches and also by res judicata. CUAYACONG VS. CUAYACONG, 129 P 439 LORENES VS. POSADAS 64 P 353 3. Implied: JUAN VS. YAP, MAR 30, 2011 KIEL VS. ESTATE OF SABERT, 46 P 193 THOMSON VS. CA, 298 S 280 FACTS: Petitioner Thomson was the Executive Vice-President and, later on, the Management Consultant of private respondent, the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. (AmCham) for over ten years, 1979-1989. In 1986, AmCham bought a share in the Manila Polo Club but had it listed in the name of Thomson, as indicated in an employment advice. Following AmCham's policy and practice, there was a yearly renewal of employment contract between the petitioner and private respondent. Separate letters of employment advice dated October 1, 1986, as well March 4, 1988 and January 7, 1989, mentioned the MPC share. But petitioner never acknowledged that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the share as requested in follow-up requests. When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal in 1989, he notified private respondent that he would no longer be available as Executive Vice President after September 30, 1989. Still, the private respondent asked the petitioner to stay on for another six (6) months. Petitioner indicated his acceptance of the consultancy arrangement with a counter-proposal in his letter dated October 8, 1989, indicating his intent to reimburse the purchase price of the MPC share at Php 110,000. AmCham rejected Thomsons counter-proposal. Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private respondent executed on September 29, 1989 a Release and Quitclaim. The quitclaim, expressed in general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share. On April 5, 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to the petitioner

demanding the return and delivery of the MPC share which "it (AmCham) owns and placed in your (Thomson's) name." Failing to get a favorable response, AmCham filed on May 15, 1990, a complaint against petitioner praying, inter alia, that the RTC render judgment ordering Thomson "to return the Manila Polo Club share to the plaintiff and transfer said share to the nominee of plaintiff." RTC awarded the share to Thomson on the ground that AmCham cannot own MPC share under its name, CA reversed and ordered that the share be transferred to a nominee of AmCham. Hence the petition.

ISSUE: W/N respondent court erred in holding that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the disputed share HELD: NO. Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he merely incurred a debt to respondent when the latter advanced the funds for the purchase of the share. On the other hand, private respondent asserts beneficial ownership whereby petitioner only holds the share in his name, but the beneficial title belongs to private respondent. To resolve the issue, we must clearly distinguish a debt from a trust. TRUST beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property Fiduciary (utmost trust & confidence) relation between a trustee and a beneficiary duty to deal with a specific property for the benefit of another DEBT a creditor has merely a personal claim against the debtor no fiduciary relation between a debtor and creditor implies merely an obligation to pay a certain sum of money

In the present case, as the Executive Vice-President of AmCham, petitioner occupied a fiduciary position in the business of AmCham. AmCham released the funds to acquire a share in the Club for the use of petitioner but obliged him to "execute such document as necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber". A trust relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated. Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his allegation of being merely a debtor when the private respondent paid the purchase price of the MPC share. Applicable here is the rule that a trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of property in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. Petitioner's denial is not adequate to rebut the trust. Time and again, we have ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and selfserving evidence, unworthy of credence. The arrangement of trust and confidence cannot be defeated by the petitioner's citation of the MPC rules to shield his untenable position, without doing violence to basic tenets of justice and fair dealing. So long as there has been no denial or repudiation of the trust, the possession of the trustee of an express and continuing trust is presumed to be that of the beneficiary, and the statute of limitations does not run between them. Repudiation of the trust can be inferred from Thomas intention to acquire the shares. The statute of limitation could start to set in at this point in time. The private respondent filed the necessary action on time (within 8 years) after repudiation of the trust, no basis for defense of prespription. As correctly held by the respondent court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said share to the nominee of private respondent. UY ALOC VS. CHO JAN LING, 19 P 202

MULLER VS. MULLER, 500 S 65

4. Prescription: AMEROL VS. BAGUMBARAN, 154 S 397 MARGUEY VS. CA, 300 S 655