Individuation of Physical Systems

A thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts (Humanities) 2013 by

Varun Bhatta

Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities Manipal University

Declaration

I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis entitled Individuation of Physical Systems has been carried out under guidance of Prof. George Varghese K and has not formed the basis for the award of any other degree, diploma or fellowship previously.

Place: Manipal

Date: 10/05/2013

Varun Bhatta

Certificate

The research embodied in this thesis entitled Individuation of Physical Systems was conducted by Varun Bhatta in the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities under the supervision and guidance of Prof. George Varghese K. It is hereby certified that the thesis submitted is a bonafide record of research done by the candidate in fulfillment of the requirements for Master of Arts (Humanities) degree, and that the thesis has not previously formed the basis for the awards to the candidate of any degree, diploma, associate ship, fellowship or any other similar title of any other university or society.

Place Manipal

Date 10/05/2013

Guide: Prof. George Varghese K

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like thank two of my professors who have equally guided, mentored and motivated me to do what I have set out to do here. I respectfully thank Prof. George for his constant encouragement, his frank opinions and giving me the freedom and enough space to work in my own style. And I sincerely respect Prof. Sundar for his guidance in this tough terrain and his critical, but positive, criticism. At the same time, I would like to thank rest of the faculty members at MCPH Meera, Nikhil and Gayathri for directly and indirectly shaping me to be what I am right now. I want to take this opportunity to remember few people without whom this whole experience would not have been complete and enjoyable. Pooja and Kaushik for sharing the same space, Raj and Asim for the intellectual interaction, Suhas for being a genuine friend, and Sammitha for the hope and warmthness.

ABSTRACT Individuation of Physical Systems

Varun Bhatta Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, 2013

The main aim of this thesis is to understand what individuation is and how physical objects and systems are described to be individuals. In order to understand that, first we have to understand how Metaphysics categorizes things into different types. While exploring this, I will be differentiating, first, concrete things from abstract things and later distinguish objects from quasi-objects, quasi-individuals. In this discussion we will realize that it is the ability to individuate which differentiates objects from other types of things. That being the case, we have to see what individuation is and when we can consider certain thing to be an individual. Here, I will discuss several ways through which an object acquires individuality. Having considered this, we will have to next explore the relationship between individuality and distinguishability. After discussing individuality from metaphysical viewpoint, we will have to understand how physics describes its objects and systems. During this discussion, we will consider how theories and laws describe their objects and thereby constitute them. Structural description of physical objects is also considered. Having understood the metaphysical understanding of individuation and physical description of objects, it is time to bring both of these together and explore individuation of physical systems and objects. In this exploration, I will consider how individuality is conceptualized in classical mechanical statistics, quantum statistics and quantum mechanics. Throughout this comparison and discussion, I will explain how we infer individuality through distinguishability. At the same time, in all these different kinds of systems, I will be exploring which among the several metaphysical views of individuation considered succeed in conferring individuality. During this discussion, it is realized that Principle of identity of indiscernibles fails for quantum objects. Further,

regarding quantum objects, nature of quantum entanglement and non-separability of entangled systems are explained and the implication of these for understanding individuality is discussed. Lastly, metaphysical under-determination of physical objects is considered. It is indicated, while exploring this, that this under-determination is the result of physics considering certain things and enquiring their individuality through theories. Since objects are constituted and described by scientific theories, several theories confer different kind of individuality to their objects and this result in under-determination.

Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1 1. Objects and Individuation ........................................................................................................................................ 2 1.1 Objects what kind of things are they? ...................................................................................................... 2 1.1.1 Criterion of Identity and Countability ................................................................................................. 3 1.2 Individuation of objects ..................................................................................................................................... 6 1.2.1 How do objects become individuated? ............................................................................................... 8 1.2.2 Individuality and Distinguishability.................................................................................................. 11 2. Physical objects and Systems............................................................................................................................... 15 2.1 Physical objects their nature and status .............................................................................................. 15 2.2 Systems general characteristics .............................................................................................................. 18 3. Individuation in Physical systems ..................................................................................................................... 22 3.1 Methods to distinguish and infer individuality..................................................................................... 22 3.2 Distinguishability and Individuality in Classical statistical mechanics ...................................... 25 3.3 Distinguishability and Individuality in Quantum statistical mechanics ..................................... 30 3.4 Distinguishability and Individuality in Quantum mechanics .......................................................... 36 3.4.1 Quantum entanglement.......................................................................................................................... 36 3.4.2 Separability of systems........................................................................................................................... 40 3.4.3 Holism and Non-separability of Quantum systems .................................................................... 43 3.4.4 Distinguishability and Individuality ................................................................................................. 46 4. Meta of Physics Individuality and Objects .................................................................................................. 49 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................... 56

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Introduction
The room that I am sitting in consists of a chair and table. I can take this chair and move it across the room or even break it. I know that there are two things (common sensically speaking) in the room because I seem them to be distinct and separate from each other. Somehow, if I tie a rope to each of these, then for some time I might consider them to be two different things, but when I try to move one of them, I will soon realise that these two have formed a whole. Considering a chair and table as two things was an easy task. Let us therefore consider a case where I have two identical chairs in my room. Now, since I see them at two different places, it is easy for me to tell why that there are two objects. Therefore, we seem to have a certain sense of skill to identify and distinguish things around us. But when what about things that we cannot keep track off? For example, consider that I am tracking a person who has an identical twin. This being the case, if I see the first twin at some restaurant having breakfast, then, if I happen to see one of the identical twin in a caf during the same evening, how sure I can be whether it is the same twin I saw in the morning? If I would have tracked the twin I saw in the morning till evening I could have been sure whether it was the same person or not. Therefore, only by being able to distinguish similar looking things, we can be sure of their identity. That was the case with similar looking things. But what about things which we cannot perceive directly? Science deals with things that are not directly accessible. In these cases how are we supposed to be sure of being able to distinguish and identify them? These need not be only microscopic, elementary particles. Even distant macroscopic astronomically objects also face this problem. It is important to consider how identity and distinguishability is understood in these cases as only during these cases we can see the nuances involved. Not all the things around us are this simple to identify and distinguish. For example, consider mountains, rivers. These geographical regions cannot easily be marked with surety such that one will be able to say this were the mountain ends. In this case, before we chart mountains, we have to define what should be a mountain so that we can demarcate them correctly. But the very question that we are asking seems to be quite absurd to start with as it presumes there is a single mountain. Therefore, how are we supposed to clearly known what would constitute a single mountain? This above question is regarding the individuality of things. When that is something becomes a single entity? It is these that we will be trying to understand in our present discussion. We will see that the notion of individuality, distinguishability and identity are all inter-related.

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1. Objects and Individuation

In this section, we will consider different kinds of things that metaphysics deals with. Along with that, we will be trying to understand things become individual.

1.1 Objects what kind of things are they?

We have so many kinds of thing around us. Apart from the quotidian ones, there are many other things which abstract and fictional. We talk about the waves on the beach, thoughts, dreams as things. In this sense of usage, we make use of things as a concept which generally stands for all the entities that can be referred to, can be talked about, irrespective of their specific characteristics. If we closely observe, we used entity in the previous sentence in similar sense.1 Thing or entity has a certain sense of universal applicability so as to comprehend the sum-total of existence, to apply to or to include whatever there may be (Laycock 2011). For Lowe, thing is anything that can be made the reference of a singular term or be the value of a variable of quantication (Lowe 1999, 34). Object serves a similar purpose a catch-all concept. But compared to entity or thing, I will be using object, following Lowe, in a much more narrow sense (Lowe 1999, 29). If objects refer to only certain kinds of thing, there are certain other kinds of things which are not objects. According to Lowe, there are four types of entities which exhaust ontology individual objects, quasi-objects, quasi-individuals and non-objects (Lowe 1999, 78). We can understand their characteristics by knowing what distinguishes them from the other three types of entities. As we will see, criterion of identity and countability of these things will play an important role in distinguishing these things. Therefore in the present section of our discussion the task is to first understand what distinguishes these things. It is only through that we can decide what types of things are subject of our discussion. Let me try to illustrate first the basic difference among all these types of entities so that we have some clarity on what we are dealing with. The initial distinction that we can draw among two types of entities is regarding their presence in space and time. The tea cup that is on the table has a specific location in space and has determinate presence across time. This not the case with universals, mathematical objects like numbers, lines, points. In this sense, there are certain things which are concrete because they are the occupants of spacetime ; accordingly, other kind of things are called abstract (Lowe 1999, 51). We will not be dealing with abstract things in this discussion. Next criteria that we have to focus on in order to distinguish things further are countability and identity. Let us take few things and see how countability and identity of them characterize them. Consider a matchbox having several matchsticks. I can open the box and count the sticks. I can carefully observe each of the stick and pick out the properties that are specific to it, which others might not have. In this sense, I can attach some identity to these sticks. Compared to this, consider that there is a closed, sealed box consisting of some balls such that there is a hole through which I can put my hand and touch the balls. The balls are identical to touch that is, by touching I cannot reidentify any of the balls. This being the case, I can put my hand and can count how many things are there in the box, but cannot associate any identity to them. Lastly, consider a packet of butter. I can cut this into half and still we have a two pieces of butter. I can keep cutting these pieces repeatedly (within the practical limit) and at every
When we want to talk about general concepts like entities, things, we cannot escape being circular; in the present work they will be used interchangeably
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______________________________________________ stage I end up with pieces of butter. In this sense, there is no unique way of making a piece of butter. Compared to this, if I break a matchstick, cut the ball into two, I dont get two matchsticks or two balls. In this sense, a matchstick and a ball have a certain sense of unity, oneness, which a piece of butter lacks. And it is because of the lack of this oneness, we cannot uniquely count how many pieces of butter there are. Therefore, compared to other objects discussed, a portion of butter lacks countability, even though we can still associate certain identity to it. Among these things considered, matchstick, balls in a box, a portion of butter exemplify individual objects, quasi-objects and quasi-individuals respectively. Identity of things, how things are counted are quite important in understanding what makes something an object and in the individuation of it. Therefore, let us consider these aspects in detail.

1.1.1 Criterion of Identity and Countability Identity of a thing assures that it is that thing itself and not something other thing. And the ability to count different things of the same kind implies that we consider these things of the same kind to be distinct. Countability is never an issue when we are dealing with things belonging to different kinds as they are readily distinct. Therefore, when we have many things of a particular kind, the way we attach separate identity to these things decide how we distinguish these and there by decide how many things there are the count. Therefore, we have to understand the relationship between how one decides the identity of a kind and countability in that kind. But, as we will see below, this relationship is not similar for all kinds of things. I We use things or entities generally to pick anything that can be referred. But when we refer to a particular object, it is of a particular kind. By referring to things of a particular kind or sort, we are providing a criterion to pick only certain things among all that are present. For example, by matchstick, I am not referring to anything, but a specific kind of thing. Matchstick, ball, butter are objects belonging to different sortals. By using an appropriate sortal for a particular object, we get to know mainly how to identify an instance of that kind (- the criterion of application) and how to count items of that type (- the principle of identity and principle of individuation) (Grandy 2008; Lowe 1999, 31). Apart from these, sortal also explains how the identity of a particular kind is maintained across time, answers question like what is it by specifying the essence of a kind, etc. (Grandy 2008). But as we will see in the discussion below, sortal need not provide all these criteria or principles for all kinds. The criterion of application, as explained above, tells, among the available set of things, how to apply a sortal and pick a thing of that particular kind. It helps in deciding whether a thing is of a particular kind or not. If there are many things in the room, and if I have to pick a pillow, the sortal pillow should provide me the information to identify a pillow among other available things (Lowe 1999, 59). At the same time, the criterion of identity for a particular sortal should instruct how to distinguish two objects of a particular kind (Grandy 2008). The criterion of identity, then, should provide identity conditions in a non-circular, informative way. Regarding this discussion, Lowe provides an interesting exception. According to him, there may be sortals which dont have well defined criterion of identity. There might be no non-trivial and non-

______________________________________________ circular way of stating the identity-conditions of such items (Lowe 1999, 60). What makes objects metaphysically distinct from other types of entities (like quasi-individuals, quasiobjects) is that they have determinate identity condition provided by suitable criterion of identity (Lowe 1999, 29). It should be noted that criteria of identity are not epistemic principles through which we can decide the truth values of identity statements about a particular object. In fact, they are logico-metaphysical principles which tell wherein identity consists (Lowe 1999, 45). Applying this to our examples considered above, to know what matchsticks are, one should know how to pick matchsticks among other things and at the same time to differentiate two matchsticks from each other. Understood in this sense, criterion of identity plays two functions or roles. First, it tells how to identify a thing of a particular sortal. Criterion of identity should list those important properties, parts and relations through which one can identify and pick a thing of a particular kind. There should be no ambiguity in picking a thing uniquely. In this sense, criterion of identity becomes similar to criterion of application. The second function of this criterion, which is important the first, is to tell how to distinguish two objects of a kind. Given that there are two matchsticks, the criterion should specify what makes them two distinct matchsticks but not the same matchstick. It is because of this, this criterion is called criterion of identity it dictates how a thing of a particular kind acquires that particular identity. But, as mentioned earlier, there are sortals which dont provide a determinate criterion of identity to distinguish objects of its kind. An example of this kind of sortal is persons. In this case, we can identify a particular person even though we dont have any way of accounting what constitutes the personal identity of that person and thereby differentiate people (Lowe 1999, 60). But it doesnt imply that there is no way we can determinately distinguish two persons. Therefore, two or more persons have determinate identity without there being any criterion of identity at the sortal level. But what if there are sortals which dont have any criterion of identity and at the same time the objects of that kind dont have any determinate identity of their own? II Consider the example of box consisting of balls. In this case, by touch, one cannot distinguish the balls from each other. But here, we can separate and identify different instances of ball-sortal as no two balls occupy the same space at the same time. But, we cannot reidentify and maintain the identity of these balls across times (- since the balls keep moving inside and it is only through my hand that I have access to these balls). Therefore, in this particular case, the ball-sortal helps in identifying, counting the objects which are ball; but we cannot associate a particular identity to all these and maintain it across time. Now, considering that this is a particular ad hoc example and the limitation here is just epistemological, what if there are certain kinds of things in the world which are distinct and countable, but cannot be identified? Quantum particles, for example electrons, are of this kind. We can know how many electrons are present in a particular atomic or molecular structure. But there is no way we can associate any identity to these electrons and reidentify them. In the case of balls, it was the limitation from our side which made associating identity to them. But in the case of electrons, the indeterminacy of providing any identity criterion is ontic. This is because these electrons are entangled and are in superposition (Lowe 1999, 62).

______________________________________________ Therefore, in this above case, we dont have a distinct criterion of identity for electrons, but they are still countable. They are countable because of Paulis exclusion principle no two electrons can be in the same quantum state. Unlike the individual objects that we considered till now, electrons lack identity, but are countable. This shows that countability of a particular kind of things doesnt necessarily imply that these things have identity. It implies from this that we cannot use sets to represent a collection of electrons in an atomic system (Lowe 1999, 71). The indeterminacy of these electrons implies that the set comprising of these electrons doesnt have any identity that is, there is no one single unique set which consists of electrons of a particular atomic system. Lowe calls this kind of things as quasi-objects (Lowe 1999, 70). Therefore, Lowe denies objecthood to electrons as they dont have identity. We will consider this aspect in detail in the further part of our discussion. III Countability of particular type of things doesnt guarantee identity to them, and thereby resulted in denial of their objecthood. But does identity of things of a particular kind assure their countability? Consider the third example that we have considered above a portion of butter. Now, as already mentioned, there is no unique way I can cut this portion. This implies that there is no unique number of parts of butter this portion of butter is comprised of. Practically, any considerable portion of butter is finitely divisible such that we reach a stage where the pieces of butter formed by repeatedly cutting cannot be further divided. But, we can think of ideal cases where portions of quantity of matter can be infinitely divisible to yield the same kind of matter. This kind of things is called homogenous stuff or quasi-individual (Lowe 1999, 76). But pieces of butter, irrespective of how they have been separated or cut into smaller parts, have determinate identity (Lowe 1999, 72). But what is missing for this kind of sortal concept is a principle of individuation. This doesnt imply that countability is not available for this kind of things we can still count how many pieces of butter are present. It is in this context we can clearly separate principle of individuation and countability. Principle of individuation tells what is to count as one instance of a given kind (Lowe 1999, 74). In the case of individual objects, e.g. matchsticks, they are individuated as matchstick itself. But in the case of portion of butter (and other mass-noun things) it is not individuated as portion of butter, but a piece of butter. Here, portion just stands for quantity of some matter, like water or butter. But piece possess certain sense of unity. This is similar in the case of water too: a portion of water signifies quantity in general; but a drop of water, a glass of water signifies specifically certain individuated quantity of water. Gold is never individuated as a portion of gold, but as a ring of gold. The gold is individuated by being shaped into a ring. These kinds of things are individuated derivatively we require something else (drop, piece, ring) to individuate quantity of matter. Therefore, we can count the number of instances of ring, but we can never count how many gold are present. In quasi-individuals, we never can know what one portion of stuff is. That is, a part of butter is never individuated as part of butter. Because of this, quasi-individual doesnt have determinate countability (as already mentioned this doesnt imply that they cannot be counted at all).

______________________________________________ IV Quasi-individuals have determinate identity, but no determinate countability. And quasi-objects have determinate countability, but no determinate identity. While discussing this, Lowe brings out an interesting distinction. Concrete entities unlike abstract ones constitute both matter and form. But quasi-objects, being concrete entities, lack matter, but possess form because of which they can still be counted. And quasi-individuals retain matter and lack form because of which they lack countability (Lowe 1999, 77). V At the beginning, we mentioned four different kinds of things which exhaust ontology. We have discussed the first three types above. The fourth type is non-objects. Here, non-objects refer to tropes or property-instances in things. For example, the shape and colour of a thing characterises how that thing is. Compared to objects, these non-objects neither have determinate identity conditions nor determinate countability (Lowe 1999, 78). They are different from universals in the sense that they occupy a particular spacetime position. And at the same time, unlike universals, they can cease to exist whenever the thing that possesses them changes. Since they are not concerned for our present discussion, we will not be considering them further.

1.2 Individuation of objects

I Consider that there are two chairs in a room. Let us discuss what all goes into considering them as two distinct chairs. First of all, the sortal concept-chair is required. This specifies what all parts, properties are supposed to be there in a thing to be called a chair and how these parts should be structurally related to each other. Therefore using this concept we realise that there are two chairs. This implies that there are two individual chairs each individual being independent of the other. Here, individuality implies singularity, wholeness and completeness. The thing that is identified as a chair is not half a chair; neither is it something which is very similar to a chair and that will become a chair by addition or subtraction of a part. But it is a chair and it being that chair is distinct from the other chair. But what is it that made each of these things a single chair and made both of them two chairs? From what each of these things derive their individuality? In other words, what individuates these two individual things from the matter that is distributed in this world? The straight-forward answer to this is the sortal-concept chair. And by saying so, we can say that we are equipped with certain concepts that help in picking out individual things. But this kind of epistemological individuation presumes metaphysical individuation the ability to pick out certain kinds of things as individuals in this world is based on the assumption that they have to be single (Lowe 2003, 75). Since they are metaphysically individuable, conceptually or epistemological individuation is possible. An individual thing acquires identity for being what it is. And at the same time, by being individual, a thing can be counted as one. Considering what we have discussed in the previous section, then individuation is fundamental for understanding how individual objects possess a criterion of identity and are countable. Let us therefore understand how things get individuated when is that something becomes an individual thing.

______________________________________________ II Principle of individuation for a particular kind of object decides what it is to count as one instance of that kind (Lowe 1999, 75). The sortal-chair tells how many chairs are present in the room. Each sortal (as discussed in section [1.1.I]) comes with a criterion of identity: If x and y are Ks, then x is identical with y if and only if x and y stand in relation R to one another (Lowe 2003, 76). The criterion of identity for a particular kind specifies what that relation R is. Now, equipped with this, if one is provided with two instances of the same objects, say chair, then he or she can tell whether both these instances are one and the same chair or these two are distinct. With criterion of identity I can identify how many individual chairs there are. Therefore, criterion of identity reflects individuality.2 With this, we can understand the basic characteristics of what it is to be an individual. Lowe specifies the following characteristics of individuality: first, individuality should make a thing the very thing that it is; secondly, it is that which makes a thing one entity; and thirdly, individuality should make it distinct from others (Lowe 2003, 78). We see here how individuated things, by being individual, acquire identity (the very thing that it is) and becomes capable of counting (by being one entity and distinct from others). By being one entity, individual things have a certain unity, completeness. Therefore, individuality implies a sense of independence an individual object, because of its individuality, is not dependent on others (Lowe 2003, 79).3 Because of this, Lowe considers that substances are the right candidates for individual things as it is substances which are attributed to have independent existence (Lowe 2003, 78). Substance is a thing which is capable of undergoing changes in its properties and relationships (Lowe 1999, 137). Since, study of substances are not concerned for our present discussion, we will not be considering them in detail. But this brief digression into independent substance was required for bringing out two important aspects of individuality. As mentioned, individuality implies the object being independent and complete by itself.4 This implies that, an individual object will not have any dependence on another entity. Here, we have to clear about another entity. Because, going by how we consider the metaphysical makeup of substance either bundle theory or substratum theory individual substances have certain kinds of relationship with their properties, their universals, tropes, etc. That being the case, further qualification of another entity is required we have to specify what kind of entity we are talking about. Since substances, by being independent objects, still bear relationship with their properties, universals, etc., another entity cannot be any of these as substances cannot come to be what they are without these basic relationships with properties or universals. That being the case, the independence of individual substances of not having any relationship with other entities has to be limited to only other individual substances (Lowe 2003, 79). Therefore, substances in order to be individual cannot be dependent on other substances. It is in this context of individual substances being independent we can consider the second aspect of individuality that I wanted to highlight regarding how an object becomes
But as we have saw in section II of 1.1, this doesnt hold good for quasi -objects like electrons. Here, what is being suggested is metaphysical independence and not causal independence. For a human who can be considered as an individual object - to be existing, he or she should have been caused by his or her parents. But, metaphysically, it need not have been the case. Therefore, what is being considered here is not how objects are causally independent or dependent. 4 Here, complete signifies that there is no other property or relationship with some other entity is required for that object to be what it is. By saying it is individual of a particular kind, it is already is that.
2 3

______________________________________________ individuated. Objects become individuated by bearing a relationship with some other entity (Lowe 2003, 75). What individuates an objects is an ontological relationship between entities i.e., it is the relationship between a substance, which is individual, and an entity, which individuates the substance. Understood in this sense, how things become individuated becomes a metaphysical enquiry. Going by what we have discussed above, the individuality of substances should not be because of other substances. But the way we have articulated it now, individuation is brought by having a relationship with certain entities. And substances have relationship with properties, tropes, universals in order to be what they are. Therefore it follows that, in order to understand how substances become individual, we have to see closely what are the relations that a substance has with its properties, universals, etc., which makes it an individual. Therefore, it is to this enquiry we will shift our focus.

1.2.1 How do objects become individuated? Until now, we were discussing what it is to be an individual object. Through this enquiry we understood that not all things can be individual. To be individual is to be independent from other substances, to have a determinant identity and countability. But how one can provide an explanation for certain things being individual? I Let us begin this question by considering the portion of butter that we considered at the beginning. Here, we have matter a portion of butter which has certain properties. But why is that it fails to have individuality? If I consider this portion of butter to exemplify a particular universal universal-butter then wouldnt that individuate this portion of butter and provide individuality? Or, if one doesnt believe in universals, and considers the substance to be consisting of bundle of properties, wouldnt these intrinsic properties provide individuality to this substance? Here, what is being asked is the following. If the portion of butter is a substance, wouldnt it suffice for it to have individuality? Because, to be a substance presumes that there are relations with properties, universals. Would not having these relations qualify a substance to be an individual? Should being individual be something more than being a substance? For Loux, universals are of two types properties and kinds (Loux 2006, 20). The first is the set of universals which are exemplified by things having certain properties. And, regarding kinds, things are certain individuals by belonging to a particular kind of an object. Even though properties and kinds are multiply exemplified, things have properties by possessing them and things are certain individuals by belonging to a particular kind. That is why, Loux considers kinds as individuative universals. Understood in this sense, by belonging to a particular kind, things become individuals. But if we analyse this from the Universalists side, then the universalbutter is exemplified by many portions of butter. Therefore, just exemplifying a universal is not sufficient for a substance to be an individual as it still doesnt explain how a particular portion of butter is the very portion of butter it is. That is, exemplifying a universal is not sufficient to make a substance distinct from other similar substances and make it the very substance it is. If we look substance from bundle theorists view, then also we dont have a satisfactory answer. We can consider that the particular portion of butter that we are considering has its own bundle of intrinsic properties which only this substance possesses and no other substance. But this still doesnt explain what makes this portion of butter a piece of butter (i.e., doesnt

______________________________________________ provide the unity to be one entity) and doesnt help in distinguishing from other portions of butter. (Lowe 2003, 80). But irrespective of which approach we take either universalism or bundle theory being a particular is the least criterion that an individual should satisfy. The chair in front of me is not a universal chair, but is one instance of it. By being a particular, this chair cannot be instantiated again. Some other chair may resemble this chair, but one cannot say that some other chair is an instance of this chair. It is in this sense any particular is an individual. A chair by being a particular chair in my room becomes an individual (French and Krause 2006, 6). But why cannot the very matter that constitutes the portion of butter provide it individuality? The matter that constitutes this portion of matter is impenetrable matter from no other substance can be present amidst this portion of matter. And this portion of matter would not be matter for some other substance. Therefore, shouldnt this matter itself provide the required individuality? This persuasion is similar to the one we considered in section (1.1.III) where we discussed how a portion of butter does not have a unique principle of individuation. Let us continue that argument further and see why that a quantity of matter, like portion of butter, lacks individuality. We saw that the portion of butter becomes individuable derivatively. What a portion of butter acquires by being a piece of butter? By being considered as a piece, the quantity of matter has been given a form. Without form, a quantity or portion of matter does not have the required intrinsic unity (Lowe 2003, 81). Without form, a quantity of matter need not be coalesced in a particular place it could be spread all over the space. It is the form which brings the matter together. It is by understanding this we can clearly distinguish portion and piece. A portion signifies just a quantity of matter. And a piece signifies a given stuff having a form. Lowe defines a piece of matter as the one which is maximally connected (Lowe 1999, 73). To be connected implies that every part or portion of the stuff is spatially connected to every other part either by directly being in contact with it or through series of contiguous parts. And being maximally connected implies that this portion of matter constituting the piece is not a part of some bigger portion of matter. Therefore, by being maximally connected, the piece of matter is discrete by not being part of a bigger portion of stuff and is contiguous throughout its matter. This is not guaranteed by a portion of matter where the matter could be spread all over the space. But I think this deficiency of form that portions of butter, water, gold possess is quite obvious. This is because the sortals that we are using point to just the type and quantity of matter. Compared to this, the sortal of matchstick is not just pointing to the matter that constitutes a matchstick, but also specifies the relationship the parts the chemical substance and the wooden stick have with each other. Considered independently, each of these would face the same problem of lack of form. For example, the sortal-wood would also lack individuality unless I specify some shape or form. Therefore, if it is the lack of form which a portion of butter lacks, would that be the one which provides individuality to it? But form alone doesnt individuate substances. By combining with matter, form provides individuation to it (Lowe 2003, 81). But, Lowe points out that substance is not just combination of matter and form.5 If that is the case, we have to provide an explanation for individuation at the substance level as it is supposed to be something more than just matter having a form. While discussing this, Lowe provides an interesting proposal
5

Here, Lowe is not clear on what else goes into constituting a substance other than matter and form.

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______________________________________________ whether a material sphere just is (identical with) a spherical piece of matter (ibid., 81)? If there is no difference between a substance and a quantity of matter in a particular form, then the substance individuates itself. Even though Lowe specifies that this is not a non-trivial explanation, I am not sure what it signifies as this explanation for individuality is tautologous. But why is that this kind of approach to explain individuality of a substance seems not satisfactory? This is because, as Lowe points out, the enquiry into the individuation of entities should show how they become individual. An explanation for this kind of enquiry should not be one which says that an entity is individuated by some other entity, which is in turn individuated by the first entity. This mutual individuation does not explain anything in the metaphysical sense as it does not provide an account for that (Lowe 2003, 93). Self individuation is of this kind of explanation where it does not elucidate how one entity comes to be individuated. Even though this kind of explanation seems tautologous, Lowe stands by it because it provides a terminus to explanatory regress (ibid., 93). II All concrete substances occupy certain space and are present for a particular duration of time. If that being the case, why is that space cannot individuate the substance? There are several ways to provide an answer to this question. Let us consider one approach; we will be considering other ways of answering this subsequently. According to Substantivalists version of space, space is also a substance that is comprised of individual points. Therefore, a particular substance is individuated by the region of space which is occupied by the matter that constitutes it (Lowe 2003, 82). Since matter is considered to be impenetrable, we can consider then that substances are individuated by the set of spatial points. But there are two problems with this approach of individuation. The initial problem is that we have to presume that space is self-individuated. In order to explain individuation of certain substances, we made use of space as the individuator. Space is individuated into points which are either parts of space again or limits of parts of space (Lowe 1999, 75). But when we ask how space is individuated into these points, we cannot fall back on something but invariably accept that it is self-individuated (Lowe 2003, 82). But, it is the second problem which is quite interesting. Let us presume for the time being that space is self-individuated. We also considered that substances are individuated by the specific spatial points they occupy. Therefore, a substance acquires its individuality by occupying a region of space. This region of space is an aggregation of points of space. But we dont know how this aggrega tion of points acquires its unity to provide individuality (Lowe 1999, 75)? Therefore, it is not clear how space provides individuality to its occupants. III If we consider substances to be comprised of a bare substratum, then we can say that it is the bare substratum which individuates substances. Or, if we are hesitant to take that route, and consider substances to be bundle of tropes, then we can say that by being the bundle of certain tropes, substances become individuals. Here, tropes of a particular substance are properties which are numerically distinct from other similar substances properties. Therefore, even though there are two similar substances, they are constituted by different set of tropes that are specific to each substance. It is because of this we can propose that tropes could individuate the substances. But, the tropes are in turn individuated by the substances they belong to. That is,

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______________________________________________ similar tropes are considered to be distinct from each other as they belong to different substances. Therefore, this explanation of individuation is circular where tropes and substances seem to individuate each other (Lowe 2003, 83).6 Apart from resolving to substratum and tropes, we can consider another approach. Substances can be considered to be individuated by individual essences. Individual essence of a substance is the property of being identical with oneself (Lowe 2003, 87). This essence is called haecceity. IV We considered several possibilities of how substances could be individuated. In all these, if we observe, our focus was on the entities that constitutes a substance like universals, properties, tropes, haecceity, etc. As mentioned at the beginning, our focus was limited because we thought substances should be individuated by themselves and not by some other substances. But when we try to take this approach, we invariably have to end with certain entities which are selfindividuated. Haecceity and bare substratum are self-individuated non-qualitative non-objects (Lowe 2003, 88). Therefore, it seems we have to invariably accept that self-individuation is a probable proposal. As Lowe mentions, Certainly, it seems that any satisfactory ontology will have to include self-individuating elements, the only question being which entities have this status space-time points, bare particulars, tropes, and individual substances all being among the possible candidates (Lowe 2003, 93). Therefore, it appears as at least some entities are selfindividuated and other objects acquire individuality by having a relationship with these individuals. 1.2.2 Individuality and Distinguishability Till now what occupied us was the metaphysical enquiry of how things acquire their individuality. And as we saw above, and with any other metaphysical questions, there is no certain, complete answer for pursuit of this kind. Even though we cannot know whether it is the bare substratum or haecceity which is providing the individuality to the substances, we are still capable of identifying individual substances. That is to say, in order to be aware of the individuality of substances it is not necessary to know how they acquire it. We can still attribute individuality to substances. We being able to attribute individuality without having settled the question how substances come to possess individuality in the first place lead us to a difficult situation regarding individuality. If I am able to pick out two chairs individually and able to count them, it implies that we are able to grasp the individuality the things have.7 But how are we supposed to evaluate our inability to associate any individuality to electrons or portion of butter? Are electrons not individuable because they do not have individuality? Or is that we are not able to grasp or know how to individuate them? Because, this inability to grasp the source of individuality is also present for what we have labelled as individual substances. The above discussion makes sure that the metaphysical need to know the source of individuation is not stressed beyond a required limit. Irrespective of the eternal scepticism that is created whether the things are really individual? we epistemologically consider certain things to be individual. Therefore, without further considering this metaphysicalThis is similar to self-individuation proposal that we considered in part I of the same section. This follows from (what has been mentioned in part I of section 1.2) the presumption that substances which are identified as individual are individuated metaphysically.
6 7

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______________________________________________ epistemological conflict of individuality, let us try to understand how we infer the individuality of things. I When we come across two chairs, we infer that they are two individual chairs by being able to distinguish one chair from the other. It need not be the case that we always require more than one chair to infer a chairs individuality. As discussed above (in part II of section 1.2), when we identify a thing as of a particular kind, we are provided with a criterion of identity using which we can infer an identity to this thing. Therefore, the ability to grasp a things individuality depends on whether we are able to associate an identity to it. The associated identity may be for a particular moment or the identity may be across a time period. Compared to the first case of synchronic identity, the latter case of diachronic identity helps in re-identifying the thing across time periods (Lowe 2003, 90). The possibility to associate an identity to a thing implies that we are able to distinguish that thing from other similar things. If we can distinguish one thing from others, then it seems we are able to associate certain individuality to it. It should be noted here that, it is our inability to distinguish one electron from others which implied that they are not individual objects. We can distinguish two individuals by comparing their properties (French and Krause 2006, 6). In fact, the criterion of identity functions on the same basis by comparing the properties of two instances of a particular kind, the criterion decides whether these two are the same instance or two different one. We are able to infer the individuality of things by distinguishing them. But, it is still a metaphysical question to ask what confers ones individuality (French and Krause 2006, 16). It appears from this that we can associate individuality to things in either of the two following ways. First way is to associate individuality by distinguishing the things through their properties. And in the second approach, individuality is conferred to the individuals through substratum or haecceity. French and Krause calls this approach as Transcendental Individuality where the object possesses individuality over and above the set of properties it has (2006, 11). In this present section, we will be considering how things are distinguished and what all properties of a thing facilitate in inferring its individuality. II To distinguish two things involves comparing their properties and seeing which set of properties that only one of these things have. By finding out this unique set of properties, we can infer the things individuality. This approach of comparing the properties of two things is based on the Principle of identity of indiscernibles (from now onwards referred to as PII) (French and Krause 2006, 11; Lowe 2003, 80). This principle states that two things whose properties are identical are in fact one and the same thing. This is in fact what has been stated as criterion of identity before. We compare two things by comparing their properties. But there is an initial clarification that has to be given about this comparison. If we presume that no two things can be at the same spatial location, then all things have different spatio-temporal properties. French and Krause call this as the impenetrability assumption (2006, 8). And since no two things have the same spatio-temporal properties, if we compare any two similar individual objects, then it is easy to establish the individuality of each of these things. But the spatio-temporal properties can

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______________________________________________ be considered as either relational properties that a thing possesses by being at a particular place or as non-relational properties. This distinction is based on whether spatial properties are considered to be relational or substantial.8 But why this distinction is important for the present discussion? If the spatio-temporal properties are substantial in nature, and hence non-relational, then the individual things possess these properties independent of other things. According to the relational understanding of space, the spatial properties that a thing possesses are relational properties among this and other things.9 Therefore, when we are comparing the properties of a thing with that of another things, then we have to decide whether we should include relational properties or not. Subsequently we can choose to overlook these relational properties and compare only the nonrelational ones. Accordingly, French and Krause provides three variations of establishing the distinction (or identity) using PII (2006, 10). What changes among these three variations is what set of properties of things we consider for establishing the distinction between them. We can, first, consider to compare all the properties non-relational, relational including spatiotemporal properties of the things (- label this as PII [1]). Secondly, we can choose to overlook the spatio-temporal properties and consider only non-relational and relational properties for comparing (- label this as PII [2]). The final option that we have is to compare only the nonrelational properties the so called monadic properties (- label this as PII [3]). As we can see, these three variations are arranged according to the increasing order of their logical strength. Then PII[3] is logical stricter criterion for identity than PII [2] and PII [1]. But, the properties that a thing possesses are of different kinds. The properties are relational and non-relational, extrinsic and intrinsic, essential and accidental (Swoyer and Orilia 2011). Therefore, monadic properties are strictly not just non-relational properties. And at the same time, we can have a relational property which is intrinsic to the object. French and Krause do not consider these nuances among the different varieties of properties because they have a structuralist interpretation of objects. But they do consider a viewpoint that non-relational properties may be understood as independent properties where independence here signifies that the object would have these properties independent of other things (French and Krause 2006, 43). We will see more of this in the following chapters. III What is important here is that this approach of establishing the distinguishability does not consider individuality through transcendental individuation either by substratum or haecceity. This is because PII is applied when we consider substance to be a bundle of properties. By considering what kind of properties constitutes identity of a particular kind of things, this approach provides a working model for establishing things individuality. If over and above these properties, the identity has to be established, then we have to invariably go for transcendental individuation. In what we discussed above regarding PII, we consider qualitative properties of an object and through that we try to infer its individuality by saying that other objects do not possess at least some of these. This way of understanding individuality is a qualitative approach (Dorato and Morganti 2012, 2). Compared to this, haecceity confers individuality to an object by
We have already considered a part of this argument in II part of section 1.2.1 Relational description of space considers that there is no substance as space and what exists is just relational properties among things.
8 9

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______________________________________________ providing it thisness. So, here we have to understand an important difference between thisness and suchness a qualitative property (Adams 1979, 6). A qualitative property can be expressed through a language provided it has the required predicates. Compared to this, the suchness haecceity should not be considered as non-qualitative (Adams 1979, 10). Even though it is primitive, according to Adams, we can still express it through suchnesses. However, Lowe, while considering this prospect, points to the circularity that might creep in while trying to express haecceity of an object (Lowe 2003, 87). For example, for an object As thisness can be expressed as the property which is being identical to A. In order to escape this, we might try to refer to this property without making direct reference to the object. Regardless of whether it can be expressed or it invariably points to our limitation to express it through our linguistic or cognitive abilities, we can never know of their actual presence. Compared to conferring individuality through thisness, inferring an objects individuality by evaluating its properties is a reductionist approach (Dorato and Morganti 2012, 2). But this approach of understanding that identity is supervenes on the properties, provides us two ways of understanding individuality (Dorato and Morganti 2012, 4). First is the metaphysical view in which PII is necessarily true. The other is an epistemic understanding through which numerical distinction can be established. It is because of this reason that PII provides a strong and weak understanding of individuality, we can use this to infer individuality. We will see in our following section how PII will help in interpreting individuality of physical things and systems, but fail to do so in few cases.

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2. Physical objects and Systems

In the previous section we considered objects in general and the metaphysical questions related to their identity and individuation. With this understanding we have to now approach and study physical systems systems that are studied by Physics. Till now we dealt with individuation and distinguishability in an abstract, ideal way. By applying this understanding we can see how the world around us is understood by Physics and other scientific disciplines. It is while studying these physical objects we will realise how an attempt to understand these has affected and further qualified or questioned our metaphysical understanding of objects.

2.1 Physical objects their nature and status

Our metaphysical enquiry into the nature of objects has pointed out that objects, among the several kinds of entities that belong to our ontology, are individual, independent from other individual objects, distinguishable from others and are hence countable. Individual objects are substances which have properties and have relations with other substances. Given this as the understanding, we have to see how Physics further qualifies individual objects. Therefore, it is the concern of the present section to enquire into this aspect. I We considered at the beginning of our discussion that we are dealing with only concrete objects objects which are the occupants of space and time. Markosian and Quine both categorize physical objects similarly. For Quine, physical object is the material content of any portion of space-time, however irregular and discontinuous and heterogeneous [it is] (Quine 1981, 10). And for Markosian, physical objects, unlike other objects which exist in time alone, are the occupants of space (Markosian 2000, 3). By saying this, both these authors separate abstract entities from the category of physical objects. Consideration of this kind not only includes material objects into the category of physical objects, but also other entities like events too (Markosian 2000, 2; Quine 1981, 11). Events, like material counterparts, also have spatio-temporal location. Along with events, Markosian lists several other objects which are included in the category of physical objects if we consider spatio-temporal location as the only criterion possible worlds, facts, mind, souls. But, in the present discussion we will be considering only material substances. Therefore, events, minds, facts, etc., will not be considered as physical objects in our present discussion. II In order to understand Quines conception of physical body, let us first see how he defines body. Body for Quine is special kind of physical object, one that is roughly continuous spatially and rather chunky and that contrasts abruptly with most of its surroundings and is individuated over time by continuity of displacement, distortion, and discoloration (Quine 1981, 13). Going by this definition, Quines body refers to the usual material objects that we have around us. A chair is spatially continuous, chunky (probably to be understood as discrete and having extension) and is individuated over time (- i.e., it has a unique spatio-temporal trajectory). But as we can see in the above definition, this kind of object is a special kind of physical object. Therefore, for Quine, physical object is a larger category including events and other things. A physical object, for Quine, need not be comprised of a single, distinct material object i.e.,

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______________________________________________ material content can be irregular and discontinuous.10 Quine quotes the Presidency of a country as an example for physical objects even though which person (a body) happens to be the President differs from time to time, the presidency has a single individuation and identity. Quine, having considered that the content of any portion of space-time, however miscellaneously scattered in space and time that portion be, counts as a physical object, proceeds to reduce these physical objects to portions of spacetime (Quine 1981, 16). By doing so, Quine is suggesting that all physical objects are nothing but spacetime in nature abandonment of physical objects in favor of pure space-time (Quine 1981, 17). It implies from this that the material aspect of physical objects can be reduced to spacetime positions. Quine does not stop at this stage and proceeds to reduce spacetime points to abstract mathematical classes (Quine 1981, 17). III Irrespective of what Quines intentions are, the above approach points to a characteristic view that Physics has about its objects. In order to understand it we have to know how it is placed in the current debate regarding physical objects their characteristics and their status in the ontology of things. But, before venturing into that part, there is an important interpretation of physical objects which I think is quite central to Physics. It is the law-constitutive approach to understand and explain what physical objects are. According to law-constitutive approach, physical objects are those objects which are the subject-matter of a particular physical theory (Brading 2011; Brading and Skiles 2012, 104). To be a physical object according to this view is to be something for which the laws of a particular physical theory applies. And moreover, the objects to which the laws apply have those properties which are provided by that theory. Here, it does not follow from this understanding that physical objects described by a particular theory are ontologically dependent on it (Brading and Skiles 2012, 104). But instead, all that we can say about those physical objects are that which the theory describes. Brading and Skiles, by saying that physical theories and their laws constitute physical objects, is trying to address a particular problem the notion of physical object faces with quantum mechanics. It is regarding the individuality of physical objects which quantum mechanics denies to its objects. According to quantum mechanics, the fundamental particles both fermions and bosons are not individuals as these particles lack concrete identity and distinguishability. If we recollect from our initial metaphysical discussions regarding objects, objects are the things which are individuals. If quantum mechanics denies individuality to their objects, then it implies that they are not dealing with objects (i.e., they are quasi-objects). It is in this context we have to understand what the authors are saying. If individuality was the criterion which decided the objecthood of the present physical objects, then they are not objects. But if we shift the stress from individuality to some other criterion like being lawconstitutive then we can still save the objecthood of these physical objects. Digressing a bit from our present discussion, according to these authors, for something to be considered as an object, it has to qualify certain criteria from physics, metaphysics and logic (Brading and Skiles 2012, 106). We discussed above how something qualifies as an object in the case of physics. For metaphysics, as we discussed in the previous section, the objects have
10

Consider Quines definition of physical objects provided in the part I of this section .

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______________________________________________ to be individual. And from the viewpoint of logic, the objects should be predicable. But because of the present problems that quantum particles faces, the authors argue that it is not the individuality which should be the criterion for something to be considered as an object; but the criterion is countability (2012, 108). Without going in to the details of their argument what is important for our present discussion regarding physical objects is that this argument shows how objecthood is considered from different viewpoints that of physics, metaphysics and logic. And moreover, this argument shows how theoretical understanding of physical objects revises our metaphysical understanding about objects. It is because of this, we see suggestion to a shift the criterion of objecthood as proposed by these authors from individuality to countability. IV The law-constitutive approach towards physical objects is not limited only to elementary particles. Brading has shown how Newton reconstituted what it is to be a physical object while working on his theories of motion (Brading 2011). According to Brading, for Newton, physical object was that which obeyed his laws of motion. Irrespective of this historical analysis, the lawconstitutive understanding shows how physical objects are conceptualised presently in a structural manner where the objects are not understand as objects alone, but as belonging to a particular structure which constitutes them and gives them properties. According to this structuralist understanding, physical theories do not tell us about the nature of things underlying the phenomenarather they tell us about its structure (Chakravartty 2003, 867). Physical objects are not just related and are interacting with each other but each of them occupies a specific position nodes in a structure (French 2006, 175). It is because of their structural position that they acquire the relational properties that they have. This shift in focus from objects to structure is warranted by two factors. First, whenever a new theory replaces another theory, it is the structures of these theories which have continuity. But the physical objects that these theories describe are completely redefined. Therefore, change in theory is not object oriented (French 2006, 170). The second factor which moved the focus is regarding how modern physics deals with objects. For fundamental particles like electrons individuality is not applicable. This means there is no way one can be specific about a particular electron and label it. But, these particles can be counted. Therefore, in this case, metaphysics which dictates that objects have to be individual and countable does not provide a way to interpret these particles. In other words, these particles are metaphysically under-determined (French 2011). Because of this under-determination, there are two divisions in scientific structural realism. One school (- epistemic structural realism) still respects physical objects. According to it, what we can know about the objects are there relational properties and their position in the structure. But we can never know the ontological status of these particles (Chakravartty 2003, 868). According to the other schools (- ontic structural realism) viewpoint, objects are redundant and what is out there is just structure and relations that it constitutes. It is in this context, we have to read Quines description of physical objects. Quine completely dismisses the materiality of physical things and reduces them to classes which are related to each other. Coming back to our discussion, with this different positions in scientific structuralism, there are several interpretations of physical objects. These physical objects can have intrinsic properties along with the relational ones. Or, according to another stance, they do not possess any intrinsic

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______________________________________________ properties and what they have are only relational properties. And, there are interpretations which still retain the classical way of understanding particles having intrinsic, relational and spatio-temporal properties (Ladyman 2009). The various arguments between the different schools in structural realism have brought forward rich understanding of physical objects. Chakravartty puts forward an argument on why we still require objects in our ontology (2003). In that, he provides various accounts of how physical objects play an active role in physical explanations. First, we require objects in physical interpretation of the world as they are the carriers of properties. In a structural interpretation of physical phenomena, relations in the structure play the fundamental role. But, it is a relation between what? We still require objects as the subjects between which relations exist. Therefore, Chakravartty claims that we have conceptual dependence on objects (2003, 871). Along with this, we have causal dependence on objects (Chakravartty 2003, 872). In physical interactions, objects undergo change and we provide a certain causality to explain this change. Therefore, in our casual explanations, we require an object which undergoes change in its properties. If we consider objects to be redundant and do not include it in our ontology, then how are we supposed to provide an account of change? What is important to observe here, irrespective of the validity of the argument, is how physical theories make use of physical objects to explain something. V In our present sections discussion regarding physical objects, we considered different characteristics of physical objects. What I have tried to brought forward through these various stances regarding the physical object, is to show how physical objects are talked about. By understanding the arguments about physical objects, we can learn a lot about how they are conceptualized. The metaphysical under-determination of the physical objects is an important aspect and this will be discussed in detail in the further part of the discussion.

2.2 Systems general characteristics

In this section let us briefly consider the nature of systems in a general way. This is important for our discussion as we will be discussing individuation of physical systems. Till now, we have been discussing about objects and their individuation. But we also have to consider objects related to each other and their individuation. It is in this context too that we have to know the general characteristics of systems comprised of two or more components. I Laszlo defines an empirical system to be a complex of interacting components together with the relationships among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process (Laszlo and Krippner 1998). With this definition we can list several important characteristics of system. System refers to a particular, isolatable entity or process. System is comprised of not only the components but also the relations that exist among them (Marchal 1975, 455). It is in this aspect a system is different from a summative aggregate of components. A summative aggregate is just group of components without the relations among them taken into consideration (von Bertalanffy 1968, 54). Compared to this, system is constitutive where the relations between the components are also the components of the system.

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______________________________________________ Accordingly, each component is affected by some other related component. And a component affects the characteristic of the whole (Laszlo and Krippner 1988). With respect to a system, since it is isolated, an environment can be defined such that a change in the components of the environment changes the state of the system and at the same time the system can bring about change in the environment (Laszlo and Krippner 1988). But it is important to understand how to draw the boundary between the system and environment. According to Marquit, the boundary is relative and it is usually drawn in such a way that components, properties, relations are excluded which are not essential for determining the behaviour of the system (Marquit 1980, 164). There by, a system would have a limitation of spatial extension, which may vary across time. More importantly, the consideration and isolation of system is decided by our method of analysis and what is that we want to study. Therefore, framing this understanding in the context of our present discussion, a system is explicitly and relatively individuated i.e., there is no one way to mark a clear boundary between system and its surrounding. But once, the system is entified has been considered as an individual entity it can be distinguished from other systems and can be identified and re-identified (Marchal 1975, 452). Once the boundary is draw, depending on that, we have an open or closed system (von Bertalanffy 1968, 39). II Before going further, we have to differentiate between theoretical systems and empirical systems. As mentioned at the beginning, empirical systems identify those manifestations of natural phenomena and process that satisfy certain general condition. A theoretical system is a complex of concepts, suppositions, and propositions having both logical integration and empirical reference (Laszlo and Krippner 1988). Therefore, empirical systems are those systems through which we can talk about what is happening in the world in a general way. They are extra-linguistic entities which can be described by theoretical systems (Marchal 1975, 450). Let us consider first how these empirical systems are constructed. After having drawn the required boundary and separating the system from the boundary, we have to decide in what detail we have to describe it (Marquit 1980, 160). As the system consists of matter at different levels, we have to consider a particular level such that only the laws applicable to that level are considered to describe the system. For example, if we consider a gaseous system, we can describe it in two ways. We can consider this gas as a whole and talk about it through ideal gas law theory. Or consider it to be comprised of collection of molecules and apply kinetic molecular theory to describe it. Marquit points out that depending on how we choose to describe the system, accordingly what we can describe about the system changes. Considering the same example of a gas system, the ideal gas description would allow us to talk about pressure and temperature of the system as a whole. This description would be based on the assumption that the system is a continuous fluid medium (Marquit 1980, 156). Otherwise, consideration of the system as constituted by discrete molecules discontinuously spread across the volume would result in describing the system to be constituted by elastic, spherical molecules bombarding each other. With respect to this Healey distinguishes between ultimate and basic parts of a system (Healey 1991, 399). The ultimate parts of a system would be that which is fundamental in nature and which cannot be further divided (for example, according to our present understanding quarks, leptons are ultimate parts). With respect to that, a basic part of a system would be one which a suitable theory describes the system is composed off. For example,

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______________________________________________ considering the gaseous system, molecules would be the basic part if we are using ideal gas theory to describe the system. But, in the above example, we have to distinguish the empirical system from the theoretical one. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical system tries to describe the empirical system. The empirical system is a volume of gas. As mentioned above, depending on what we have to understand, accordingly this volume of gas becomes a continuous medium or collection of vibrating molecules. Therefore what comprises a system is decided by what needs to be explained. Accordingly, this decides what is essential for systems description (Marquit 1980, 158). Then, these extra-linguistic entities that constitutes the target system are represented by the theoretical system. III We discussed in the above part how different types of theories describe system of their own kind. Regarding this, we have to understand how systems are separated from other systems and how systems are decomposed in to their components and how components compose systems. The main criterion which decides the separability of a system is its structural aspects (Belkind 2012). These structural aspects decide how system is related to other systems and how system is composed by its parts. For this, we need to understand two aspects. The first is regarding how to isolate a system. And second, we have to understand how the parts compose the whole. In other words, how a system can be decomposed into its parts? If we know these two aspects, we can understand the separability of systems. Accordingly, these two aspects can be understood by criterion of isolation and rules of composition respectively (Belkind 2012). According to Belkind, both of these the criterion of isolation and rules of composition encode assumptions about the structure of physical systems (2012, 4). These rules are specific for a particular kind of system. For example, if we consider a physically composite system, then the volume of the whole is equal to sum of the volumes of the constituents. This characteristic of the system is not merely a formal rule, reecting the mathematical function of addition; rather, it is a mathematical rule representing a structural assumption about the spatial properties of physical bodies (Belkind 2012, 3). Therefore, in the case of composite objects, there is no formal reason for the property of volume to be additive; it is rather based on what we think physical bodies are. Similarly, Belkind points out that the sum and decomposition of vectors by the composition rule, which says that the vectors can added or broken into several parts, involve concrete assumptions about relations between parts and wholes (Belkind 2012, 4). At the same time, energy and momentum conservation laws help in isolating systems. That is, if we have to isolate a system, we have to make sure energy or momentum is conserved for it. Belkind argues that these criteria of isolations too encode structural assumptions about physical systems (Belkind 2012, 5). IV In our discussions here, we will be studying various empirical systems how they are constituted, how a system is individuated, etc. In fact, consideration of individuation of a system will also include individuation of elements of a system as they also can be considered as systems in turn. While considering the individuation of a system, we will have to deal with the description of the system as well. We discussed in the previous section how physical objects are

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______________________________________________ law-constitutive. Therefore, how we describe a system or its elements will invariably guide how it or its elements are individuated. Moreover, the theory which describes the system would not be applicable to the components which comprise the system (as there would be another theory to explain them). This means that for a system level theory, its components are not objects (Brading 2010). Along with this, we also have to keep in mind the approximations and idealizations that are adopted while theorizing a target system. Basically, we approximate certain details while describing the target system. But when we are theorizing about this target system, idealizations are used in the theoretical systems (Norton 2012). 11 Therefore, by approximations, an inexact description of the target system is given. And it is only by idealizing we can construct a fictitious system which represents the target system.12

Weisberg further categorizes idealizations into three types [2007]. In fact, Weisberg considers the act of including only those factors which are essential for systems description as idealization particularly, minimalist idealization. 12 Teller makes that only through idealizations inexact truths that we have access to the world [2004]. By saying this, Teller makes idealizations essential to describe the world.
11

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3. Individuation in Physical systems

After having discussed the nature of physical things and systems, it is now time to consider how individuation of physical things belonging to a system is done. In this section, we will be considering theoretical examples from quantum statistics and mechanics. Using these examples, I will try to illustrate how identity and countability is assigned to the objects of these systems and what are the problems faced while doing that.

3.1 Methods to distinguish and infer individuality

In Chapter 1, especially in part II of section 1.2.2, we considered how things are distinguished and through that we infer individuality. In Physics, when we are dealing with systems having components, we establish the individuality of the components by distinguishing them from each other. What will be distinguished are the properties of the components. Therefore, in this section, we will consider different approaches through which we can infer individuality. I To begin with, let me illustrate a simple illustrative example in classical mechanics where the components of the system have to be assigned individuality and have to be distinguished (Shankar 1994, 260). 4 3 4 3

1 Prediction 1

1 Prediction 2 Figure - 1

There are two identical billiard balls on the board. As shown in the figure (figure-1), one is near the hole [1] and the other is near [2]. Let us label the ball near hole [1] as ball-1 and the other as ball-2. Here, they being identical imply that all their intrinsic properties (like size, mass, etc.) would be similar. At time t=0, both the balls will be hit and at time t=T, both of them will go to either of the two holes [3] & [4]. Now, when the balls are about to be hit, we can have two predictions. First prediction, say P1, might be that ball-1 will go to the hole [3] and ball-2 will go to hole [4] at t=T. The second prediction, say P2, will be the opposite of P1. (In the case of P2, we can see there has to be a slight delay in departure of one of the two balls so that they dont collide in the middle as their path cross over.) Since the balls are identical to each other, when

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______________________________________________ the event happens at t=T, by looking at the final outcome we wouldnt be able to evaluate which among these two predictions came true. That is, the final state is indistinguishable if one is not aware of which path the balls followed. But unless an observer watches, from t being 0 to T, the path of each ball, he cannot distinguish how the events enfolded as the final state is the same. One imagines in classical physics the fictitious observer who sees everything and disturbs nothing; if he can make the distinction, the distinction exists (Shankar 1994, 261; emphasis added). Therefore, if the observer perceives just the final outcome, he wouldnt be able to distinguish the final state which ball is in which hole? This is because, as the balls are indistinguishable, the labels given to the balls are just ad hoc and there is no difference in properties among them. And the only way to assign them individuality is by tracking their path through time. II Considering this is as the exemplary case, let us consider several ways through which we can infer the individuality of the balls. In fact, the above description of the example has all the characteristics that need to be illustrated about distinguishability and individuality. It is just that we need to make them explicit using standardized explanations. In part II of section 1.2.2, we had explained different versions of PII. Principle of identity of indiscernibles is a useful tool to distinguish two things. Let us apply this principle to the above example and see how we can discuss their individuality. To start with, consider that I am observing the above setup right from the beginning t=0. At t=T when the balls go into either of the two holes, I would have observed the path taken by both of these. Therefore, among the properties that I am aware of, the spatio-temporal properties of these two are different. Therefore, using PII [1], I can distinguish both of these balls. Here, each of these balls use at t=T have different locations and hence different spatiotemporal properties. At the same time, each of these balls has a unique spatial trajectory across time. Therefore, each of these two particles has unique space-time individuality (French and Krause 2006, 46). It should be noted here that this kind of individuality assumes impenetrability of matter such that no two things can be at the same place at the same time. Given that these two balls are indistinguishable, having a unique spatial trajectory guarantees not only distinguishability but also re-identifiability. In fact, when the motion of the two things, which are intrinsically indistinguishable, is represented in the Hamiltonian mechanics13, each of the equation of motion there is a unique solution (French and Krause 2006, 46). Therefore, two characteristics of spacetime individuality are impenetrability and continuity of spacetime trajectory. Here, the spacetime trajectory is guaranteed only by continuous observation from t=0 to t=T. Similar to this kind of individuality, Reichenbach proposes material genidentity (French and Krause 2006, 48). According to this, an identity can be associated to a particular particle which goes through several states across a time period. Here, Reichenbach proposes three criteria continuous observation or continuity in spacetime trajectory, impenetrability and the provision of labelling. If there is a possibility to label the particle, then there is no need of continuous observation. Therefore, in the case of our billiard ball example, if we could mark
Hamiltonian mechanics is a theory similar to classical mechanics which describes the motion of physical bodies.
13

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______________________________________________ the balls such that even though the observer comes at t=T, he would be able to know the final state configuration. As French and Krause rightly point out, these three criteria is not sufficient to provide an identity as the thing may undergo sortal change (2006, 48). III What are we supposed to do if we do not consider spatio-temporal properties as legitimate properties for inferring the identity of objects? Then PII [1] fails to distinguish these two objects. So in this case, shall we conclude that there are no two different balls, but a single ball? Before answering this question, first we should enquire why spatio-temporal properties would not be considered as credible properties for distinguishing two objects. More importantly we should ask why is that there are three variants of PII? Associating unique spatio-temporal properties to objects follows from our belief in impenetrability assumption. But what if this condition does not hold good for all objects (French and Krause 2006, 10)? In fact, quantum particles do not have unique, individuating spacetime trajectories (Redhead and Teller 1992, 212). And, more than one boson can occupy the same quantum state which implies impenetrability assumption does not hold good for them (French and Krause 2006, 166). If this is the case then we can have two options. The first option is to consider quantum particles not to be individuals and keep PII unmodified. In this case, PII would still include spatio-temporal properties. The second option is to accommodate quantum particles as individuals and weaken PII such that spatio-temporal properties are not considered while distinguishing two objects. In this case, PII [1] would not more be functional and it will be either PII [2] or [3] that we have to use. Therefore, irrespective of what we decide to do about this problem, the above argument provides an agreeable account of why there are different flavours of PII. Depending on what camp one belongs to, accordingly he or she can pick the suitable PII. But, why is that we have to save or modify PII? What will happen if quantum particles do not respect impenetrability? The concern here questions the foundational understanding of what it is to be a particular individual. In our metaphysical discussions regarding individuality, (section 1.2.2), we considered how criterion of identity for a particular thing has to be satisfied. And with this, we construed PII that no two individuals would be exactly similar and if they happen to be similar, then these two are one and the same thing. Here, the claim is that, for all things, if they are individuals, PII would apply. With this understanding, if we come across two particles which have the same properties, then we have a contradiction. Then, we have to concede that our understanding of individuals are deficient (and there can be instances that one thing can be present at two locations at the same time!) or try to rework our understanding. Therefore, in this kind of metaphysical concern, we cannot have multiple approaches for describing individuals. It is this inability (or sternness) of metaphysics which does not resolve whether quantum particles objecthood. In fact, we already considered briefly this metaphysical under-determination in part III of section 2.1. Coming back to the question that we asked at the beginning of this part, if we are not supposed to consider spatio-temporal properties, what are the implications? Consider the billiard ball example discussed above. Since we are not considering the spatio-temporal properties, how are we supposed to distinguish these two things? Accordingly we can consider PII [2]. But since these two are indistinguishable balls we are left with the question of how to distinguish these two things. Here, we can see the same desperation as what we confronted

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______________________________________________ when PII [1] failed. If PII [2] or [3] fails, then we are again left with no clear determinant option of inferring whether we have two things or only one. IV This discussion regarding how to distinguish and infer individuality brought out several important aspects of how Physics tries to deal with this issue. It is probably evident to understand why physics wants to infer individuality to its object to associate identity to them. But the important question to understand is how physics infer individuality. And it is through this discussion that we can see probable attempts of conferring identity. One important observation that we can make is regarding the inability to come up with a principle of identity and distinguishability which works for all prospective objects. We will discuss more regarding this when we consider unobservable particles and discuss their individuality. Individuality regarding the macroscopic objects like billiard balls, chairs seem straight-forward (unless we find something really wrong or inconclusive about the way we understanding individuality). But when we talk about the unobservable particles like electrons and their individuality, we face many hurdles and confusion. So it is by considering these discussions we can understand what individuality is and how individuation should be done.

3.2 Distinguishability and Individuality in Classical statistical mechanics

Statistical mechanics concerns itself with studying a system comprised of large number of parts molecules or atoms. By studying the behaviour of these smaller parts characteristics and behaviours of the system like entropy, thermal equilibrium are understood. That is, the relationship between the microscopic dynamics or uctuations (as governed by Schrodingers equation or Newtons laws of motion) and the observed properties of a large system (such as the heat capacity or equation of state) is understood (Chandler 1987, 54). I During late nineteenth century, this field was revolutionized by Boltzmann. He brought in new ways of interpreting systems through probabilistic means. What is interesting for us in this historical development of the scientific theory is to see how molecules comprising the large systems were individuated and distinguished. These molecules are indistinguishable through their state-independent properties. That being the case, it is interesting to see how the individuality of these particles was established. The individuality of the molecules is important in statistical approach as it is the properties and the behaviour of these particles which are taken into consideration in order to decide the characteristic of the system. Before Boltzmann, Maxwell, while studying the intermolecular interactions in this kind of large systems, had revised the interpretation by taking into account inter-molecular collisions. Till then, the assumptions were that all molecules had the same velocity and intermolecular forces were negligible (French and Krause 2006, 25). By making this move, the probabilistic way of understanding the system was introduced as it was not possible to handle large number of molecules and atoms constituting the system. At the same time, these parts were assumed to be obeying Newtons laws and thereby traversing distinct, deterministic trajectories. This approach still didnt provide clarity in understanding the systems. In order to

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______________________________________________ revise this understanding, Boltzmann proposes a new theory H-theorem. But this new revision still was based on the same understanding of gas systems which Maxwell had interpreted i.e., system consisted of large number of particles obeying Newtons deterministic laws and these particles are colliding with each other (French and Krause 2006, 27). Therefore, the binary collisions were still playing an important role in this way of probabilistic statistical analysis. In order to provide a reinterpretation, Boltzmann proposes Combinatorial approach. In this approach, energy was interpreted as a quantity of the system which can be divided among its constituents. That is, if the system is composed of these parts, suitably a fixed amount of energy can be associated to these components. Here, it is not that we are associating the same quantum of energy to each constituent. In fact, statistical mechanics considers that each of the components possess different value of energy so that the measured value of the total system is the average of all these possible variations. For an isolated system with xed total energy E, and xed size (perhaps specied by the volume V and numbers of particles N1, N2,...) all microscopic states are equally likely at thermodynamic equilibrium (Chandler 1987, 59). If there are n molecules, then the total energy of the macro-state constituted by these particles can be expressed by associating certain quantum of energy to each of these. Therefore, there is no unique combination through which the macro-state can be built. By permuting the particles of a system over different energy values, we can acquire different complexions of the system. That is, for a particular macro-state, there is no one way of associating energy to these particles; different combinations are possible. It should be noted that there is a limitation on the different number of complexions a system can have; but all these different complexions are equally probable. From these different possibilities, the most probable macro-state is got (French and Krause 2006, 30). II Let us understand this combinatorial approach to acquire different complexions a bit further. Consider a system having two particles such that there are two possible states each of them can acquire. These particles, as mentioned above, are indistinguishable i.e. their state-independent properties are identical. The different possibilities of distributing these two particles are shown below.

Configuration-1

Configuration-2

Configuration-3

Figure-2 In the above figure (figure-2), the two particles, since they are indistinguishable, are represented by dots with no labels. The two cells in each configuration represent the two possible states that the particles can occupy. Here, the cells represent the space in the phasespace of the system.14 So regarding the different possibilities, we can have four combinations configuration-1, configuration-2 and two occurrences of configuration-3. Here, configuration-3
Phase space of a particular system is the mathematical space in which all possible states of the system are represented. In this space, each point represents a unique state the system can be in. A phase space can be divided into several parts and each of these would be a cell.
14

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______________________________________________ accounts for two possibilities as either of the particles can be in each of the state. All these possibilities are different complexions of the same system. Now, among these possibilities, each of these configurations are equal probable and that is why equal probability weights are assigned 25% to each configuration-1 and 2; and 50% to configuration-3 (since this should be counted twice). In this approach of assigning equal probabilities to the possible state configurations, the question that should concern us in the context of present discussion is why configuration-3 has be associated double weightage (i.e., 50%)? We have mentioned at the beginning itself that these two particles are identical and hence indistinguishable. Therefore should it matter whether either of them occupies each state irrespective of the order? Yes even though these particles are indistinguishable, each particle occupying a different state is a different configuration even though the overall macro-state is the same. That is, for the same macro-state comprised by two particles, different complexions are possible and all this are of different configurations. What is being presumed in this way of analysing a system is that the parts i.e. molecules in this case are individuals and each of them has a particular distinct state (French and Krause 2006, 23). Just to draw comparison here with the billiard balls example, configuration-3 is similar to the final state of the balls at t=T. Since the balls were identical, the final state appeared same irrespective of which ball was in each of the holes. But, as we had discussed before, they being non-distinguishable does not imply that both the states (each ball occupying different holes) are the same. Similarly, configuration-3 would be actually two configurations disguised as one. III Let us consider what we have discussed till now regarding statistical mechanics and try to relate that to our present discussion. In Maxwells and early Boltzmanns interpretation of gaseous systems, molecules were those individuals which had a particular deterministic spacetime trajectory. The presumption behind this is that no two molecules will occupy a particular point in space at the same time. So, even though these were indistinguishable, the molecules were given spacetime individuality a unique trajectory (French and Krause 2006, 33). But in the later developments of the statistical interpretation, Boltzmann tries to reinterpret a system by providing each of its parts the molecules a particular state. As we discussed, among the different complexions a system can have, two or more particles of the system can be in the same state. Or, if it is possible by permutation, each particle of the system can have a unique state. This implies the state-dependent properties might be same among two or more particles if they happen to have the same state (e.g., in configuration 1 and 2, particles have the same state). Moreover, as discussed earlier, the trajectory of the particles are not all considered in this combinatorial approach, unlike Maxwells approach. Therefore, the assumptions regarding molecules in this approach are the particles are indistinguishable, they might share the same state and trajectory of the particles is not relevant. Since, trajectories of the particles are overlooked, French and Krause point out that the particles in this interpretation cannot be considered individual using spacetime individuality; therefore some other form of individuality transcendental individuality has to be invoked to provide individuality to these molecules (2006, 33).

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______________________________________________ IV So, why French and Krause discuss this history in the context of individuality and distinguishability? The authors point out that among the three stages of the historical development of classical statistics, the notion of molecule differs. In the first stage Maxwells interpretation the notion of molecule refers to the particles which have precise determination of position and velocity within a phase-space cell. In the second stage that of statistical development molecule refers to the particles which are distributed in the cells and here it is the trajectory of the cell (the collective trajectories of the particles) takes precedence. In the third stage, the notion of molecule refers to the distribution of the particles among different cells representing their state with no reference being made about their position inside the cells (i.e., with no reference to their spacio-temporal location) (French and Krause 2006, 35). So, among these three notions, the first and the second notion of molecule, as already mentioned, can be distinguished using spacetime individuality. And with respect to the last notion of molecule, if the particles are to be regarded as individuals, then the relevant Principle of Individuality must be some form of Transcendental Individuality, o ther than Space-Time Individuality (French and Krause 2006, 36). A physical theory tries to describe the behaviour of a system. And in trying to do so, the theory explicate the particulars involved. With respect to that, we discussed above how three different interpretations of molecule were given. Theories in order to explain certain behaviour, interpret the system in a particular way. For example, Boltzmann, in order to overcome several inconsistencies in Maxwells description of a gaseous system, tri es to reinterpret it such that the molecules are supposed to possess certain state. Given this description of a system, French and Krause are trying to see how the corresponding theory the combinatorial approach is trying to individuate the particulars molecules involved. To consider another example to substantiate this point, French and Krause describe how Bohms interpretation of quantum mechanics interprets the motion of two particles the trajectories of two particles which are non-coincident to begin with will never coincide (2006, 178). With this they imply that the assumption of impenetrability is built into these equations. Similarly, Newton by considering that physical bodies are impenetrable provided them the required individuality (French and Krause 2006, 40; Brading 2011). There are two important points that I am trying to bring out by considering all these. From the above discussion, we can see that a theory tries to give a particular understanding of the concerned target system. In that understanding, what is important to observe is how it tries to interpret the components which constitute the system. The theory tries to provide an explanation for a particular phenomenon and while trying to do that, it assumes the nature of components, their relation with each other and how the systems properties are constituted by that of the components, etc. So depending on the theory, what components are and their nature varies. Among all the different statistical theories we considered, in all of them the components have to be interpreted as individuals. It is this how the components are described to be individual which is important for our present discussion. And in the case of impenetrability we can observe similar aspect the individuality of the particles is built into the system by assuming that they are impenetrable. Therefore, theories while describing their objects presume certain properties of the objects which provide them individuality. Here, it might be explicit as was in the case of Newtons description it seems to me that God in the Beginning formed Matter in solid, massy,

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______________________________________________ hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles (French and Krause 2006, 40). Or it could be presumed in the formulation of theory like that of Bohms. What is important in all these cases is to understand what kind of individuality that is being used or presumed. It is for this reason that in Boltzmanns combinatorial interpretation (where the trajectories of the particles are not considered) French and Krause point that we have to presume the individuality of the particles are conferred by some form of transcendental individuality. Here, it is not that we are aware or guaranteed that the molecules are individual and now, having considered already that they are individual, we have to pick one of the possible explanations for their individuality. Instead, individuality of these molecules is foundational to this theorys explanation. For example, as explained in part I of this section, the configuration-3 is given double weightage because it represents two probable states particle 1 being in state 1 and particle 2 being state 2 and vice versa. Here, the label refers to the possible states that the particle can be in.15 With respect to this, French and Krause mention that, it is the third criterion of material genidentity which is important in the case of statistical mechanics as it is the possibility of labelling which is translated into a statistical property (French and Krause 2006, 49).16 And, the impenetrability criterion which Reichenbach considers is non-spatio-temporal in nature. Hence, material genidentity is not based on spatio-temporal impenetrability. But, it provides the individuality to the particles because they can be labelled. This being the case, Reichenbach claims that material genidentity is successfully attested by the experimental tests which verify the laws of statistical mechanics (French and Krause 2006, 49). At this point French and Krause point that what is verified by the experiments is that the labelling of the particles have physical significance and it does not imply from this that material genidentity is the right way of assigning the identity. Therefore, the individuality in this interpretation of molecules has to be based on some form of transcendental individuality. And we have to seek for the molecules individuality because this theory of labelling and knowing the state of the system is experimentally verified. V In this section, we considered several statistical interpretations and saw how individuality of the particles is grounded by these theories. Interestingly, the attempt following French and Krause was not to unify all these theories under one kind of individuation that is, the particles in all these theories being individuated by the same principle of individuation. The concern was more to see how each of these theories individuates its particles. Iin a way, French and Krauses attempt in their book is to consider different theories and see whether their methods of individuation are among the prescribed methods to Metaphysics different answers to this question can be given in terms of the [various metaphysical] views However, we shall argue, the physics itself does not unequivocally support one of these answers over the others (French and Krause 2006, 24).

there are N! different ways to assign the same set of distinct single particle state labels to the N particles. (Chandler 1987, 103) 16 In part II of section 3.1, we considered material genidentity proposed by Reichenbach. According to this, the particles could be identified as we can consider their continuous spacetime trajectory and these particles can be labelled.
15

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3.3 Distinguishability and Individuality in Quantum statistical mechanics

I Let us now shift our focus to quantum systems and see how individuality and distinguishability are discussed with respect to quantum statistical mechanics. Consider a quantum system S comprised of two identical quantum particles A and B. Here, the similarity of the components implies these particles having the same mass and charge. Similar to our previous examples, the components in this system too can occupy either of the two possible states 1 and 2. Now, classically, as we saw in section 3.2, there are four different ways we can consider the distribution of two particles across two states. They are (i) A and B are in state 1; (ii) A and B are in state 2; (iii) A is in state 1 and B is in state 2; (iv) A is in state 2 and B is in state 1 (French and Redhead 1988, 236). Just relating this to our previous example, situation (i) corresponds to configuration-1, (ii) corresponds to configuration-2 and possibilities (iii) and (iv) correspond to configuration-3. Before we discuss these different possibilities, I have to describe one important characteristic of quantum systems. Quantum particles are basically of two types fermions and bosons. This distinction between these two types will play an important role in understanding how A and B would occupy different states. Fermions refer to quarks, electrons, leptons, etc.; and bosons refer to particles like proton, Higgs-boson, etc. Fermions constitute matter and bosons are the force carriers. One of the characteristic differences between these two kinds of particles is the way they occupy, i.e. acquire, quantum state. Because of Paulis exclusion principle, two fermions constituting a particular system cannot occupy the same state. Whereas, two bosons can occupy the same quantum states in a given system (Shankar 1994, 264; French and Redhead 1988, 236). That being the case, if our A and B are fermions, then among the four possible state distributions we have considered, (i) and (ii) dont apply as both A and B cannot occupy state 1 or 2 simultaneously. But if they are bosons, possibilities (i) and (ii) hold good. To draw similarities between this example and the billiard balls example above, if our A and B are fermions, then they resemble the billiard balls two fermions cannot occupy the same state as two balls cannot go to a single hole. After having dealt with the first two possibilities, let us consider now (iii) and (iv). It is these possibilities which are in fact important for our present discussion regarding individuality and distinguishability. In the case of billiard balls and (classical statistical mechanics example of) molecules, even though two balls or molecules were indistinguishable, it is possible to know which particular object is in which state. In both of these cases, the objects could have been labelled and because of this they could be tracked across time. Therefore, cases (iii) and (iv) were different possibilities. Now, in the case of quantum system, is it possible to distinguish which states A and B are in? The answer is no. During the early formulation of quantum statistical mechanics, it was found that configurations (iii) and (iv) could not be distinguished from each other. This implied that assigning these particles labels for differentiating them and then allocating them different states did not make any difference. Since, particle labels are statistically otiose, quantum particles were considered non-individuals (French and Krause 2006, 143). And that is why, for statistical purposes, (iii) and (iv) put together were considered as the same configuration. The consideration of quantum particles as non-individuals was the received view for a sometime. But due to better understanding of the field, it was found that the equivalence of

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______________________________________________ configurations (iii) and (iv) was not because particles did not respect particle labels. It was due to the fact that these states were never occurred. Because of this, there was a possibility again for quantum particles to regain their individuality. What we have just concluded is not that simple and straight forward. To understand that we have to dwell a bit into quantum statistical mechanics and see why it considers configurations (iii) and (iv) are states that are never realised. Consider that the states that A and B can occupy are S1 and S2. Therefore, with this configuration (iii) and (iv) are represented as and . Here, means that A is in state S1. During the discussion of classical statistical mechanics, we considered configuration-(iii) as having two different variations. Even though molecules were indistinguishable, and would have been two different complexions. But in quantum statistical mechanics, these two configurations are considered as the same. This consideration by quantum statistical mechanics is given by Indistinguishability postulate (French and Redhead 1988, 238; Redhead and Teller 1992, 205; French and Krause 2006, 84). Indistinguishability postulate says that if we assign the available states in a system to the particles constituting that system in different order, then there is no overall change in the observation being done. That is, when a particular observation is being done on a composite system, the expectation value for that observation remains unchanged even when different permutations of assigning the states to the set of particles are done. Therefore, if the particles of the assembly are permuted, then there is no way of observably distinguishing the wave function which results from the original unpermuted wave function (French and Krause 2006, 134) and there being no measurement that we could perform which would result in a discernible difference between permuted (nal) and unpermuted (initial) states (ibid., 142). But, as Redhead and Teller explain, it would be invalid to conclude from this that since (iii) and (iv) configurations which happen to be different permutations of states being assigned to particles are equivalent states, i.e. they being considered as a single possibility (1992, 206). In fact, when along with this postulate, another postulate is applied to the system Symmetrization postulate we realise that (iii) and (iv) states never occur for quantum systems and what occurs is a particular single state. Indistinguishability postulate says for system like S that the permutation order of the particles for a given state of the system does not matter; and symmetrization postulate says that only few of the possible states are actually realized (French and Krause 2006, 143). That is why it was considered in quantum statistics that (iii) and (iv) will have single weightage put together. And the state that is allowed by symmetrization postulate is called the entangled state of the two particles. Therefore, it is not the case that the particles are identical and indistinguishable, but there is no observational difference between the two configurations (iii) and (iv). And moreover not all states were possible for quantum particles. Only one state was possible for quantum systems to form. It is because of this re-understanding of these systems, quantum particles were no more considered as non-individuals. But we still have to face few more challenges regarding the question whether individuality can be conferred to them? II Before we dwell into the discussion of individuality and distinguishability in the case of quantum statistical system, we will first have to enquire into the entangled state of S. In a two component system like S, when a particular property of the systems state like momentum,

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______________________________________________ velocity or spin is measured, then we do get two values, but these are not ordered (Shankar 1994, 263). That is, we cannot make out which value corresponds to which component there is no one-to-one mapping between the order of results acquired and the components. As Shankar puts it, given an unordered pair of numbers a and b, we can still define a unique sumbut no difference (Shankar 1994, 262). Here, it is not that we are having two values and the problem is just related to figuring out the order of the measured values. The claim here is that when two quantum particles form a system, the particles do not have a distinct state of their own. The particles are said to be entangled to each other. We will consider the nature of entanglement in detail in the subsequent sections. Let us see this characteristic quantum state of S in a bit more technical manner. The entangled state of quantum system S is given by the following expression ( ) ( )

Here, |> and |> denote the state-vectors of components A and B respectively. In quantum mechanics, the state of a particular quantum system is represented in the vector form (Albert 1992, 30; Ismael 2009). Every system would be in a particular state which would be represented by a state vector. Therefore, |> and |> are in fact vectors that are represented in a particular notational manner (called bra-ket notation) specific to mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. Let us try to understand what the above expression depicts about the state of S and what relevance it has on our current discussion. In quantum mechanics, a particular system composed of particles is either in pure or mixed state. If the system is in a pure state, it can be represented by a single, unique state vector. Since the state of this system is represented by a single vector, it is said to be in a pure state. All the particles in that system are in the same state and because of this all these particles state is represented by the same state-vector (Shankar 1994, 125). In contrast to this, we can consider a system in which all the particles are not in the same state. In that case, the system is said to be in a mixed state and we cannot represent its state by a single vector (as there is no single vector which represents the states of all particles). The mixed state of the system is represented by a density matrix. The density matrix of the system consists of all statistical information about the components state (Shankar 1994, 134). Using density matrix we can tell what is the probability of picking a particle having a specific state. Now, as already mentioned, quantum system S has two possible states that its components can occupy. In operational terms, this means that when a measurement is carried out on this system, we will find A and B in either of these two possible states. In quantum mechanics, measurement is always carried out for a particular observable any of the state properties like momentum, velocity, spin, etc. For example, if we are measuring spin property of the components, then A and B can have either up or down spin. Illustrating this with respect to the different possibilities listed above, possibility (i) means both A and B are having, say, up spin; (ii) implies A and B are having down spin; (iii) implies A has up spin and B has down spin; and (iv) represents the opposite state of (iii). Having considered, let us represent the first of these states in the bra-ket form.

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______________________________________________ In the above expression, |Si> signifies the state-vector of system S. |> signifies the state-vector for having up-spin. This means, if A has up spin, then when we measure its spin value, it will be a vector |> representing the up-state. And if A has spin-down, then we will get the output as |>. Here the subscript denotes the spin value is for which particle. |> and |> are called as eigen-states for the spin observable (Redhead and Teller 1992, 204). The above expression for (i) simply stands for the understanding that the state of the whole system is the product of state of its components. In an ensemble quantum system (system having more than one components) like S, given that the states of the components are known, the state of the system would be the product of these states because the measurement in quantum mechanics is probabilistic. Therefore, the measurement of a particular observable (like spin, momentum, etc.) of S is expressed by a joint probability given by the product of probability of measuring that in A and that of B (Albert 1992, 48). In the above case of (i), the probability of A and B being in state |> is 1 and being in state |> is zero. Similarly, possibility (ii) can be represented in the following manner.

III These two possibilities represented above indicate that S is in pure state its components have similar state values. But as already discussed, two fermions, like electrons, are never found in these two configurations. But this doesnt imply that S is in either of the following state |A>|B> or |A>|B> (each of which is representing (iii) and (iv) respectively). As already mentioned above, these two configurations never occur. What occurs is an entangled state of A and B. Because they are entangled, we cannot represent the state of S such that it can be expressed in the form (state of A) (state of B). In configurations like (i) and (ii), the state of S is nothing but the product of the states of the components A and B. That is, Ss state can be expressed as a composition of distinct state of A and distinct state of B. This relation between the state of the system and that of the components will be dealt in detail in the latter part of the discussion. But, with respect to entangled state of S, there is no way of representing its state such that it is expressed as composition of distinct states of A and B. For the entangled state, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics provides the following expression. ( ) ( )

The above expression of the state is similar to expression [1]. In this expression [2], it should be observed that there is no way we can rearrange it such that |S> can be expressed as the product of components distinct state (Albert 1992, 49). But, this does not imply that when we actually measure the spin of A and B, we will not get a distinct value we do get either spinup or spin-down for each of these. What is being expressed in [2] is the probabilistic outcome. Quantum mechanics provides certain ways to predict the outcome of a measurement given few initial conditions it will never provide deterministic prediction (d'Espagnat 1979, 165). So, quantum mechanics is saying that - if we happen to measure the spin of the components forming an entangled system, then the probabilistic outcome would be given by [2].

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______________________________________________ Here, a possible conflict may arise. The description of a state given by quantum mechanics may be what is expressed in [2]. And as I have mentioned above, when we measure we always find a discrete spin value for A and B its either up or down, but never a fractional value. So, is it not right to say that: A and B have particular spin value either up or down when they are entangled and [2] expresses just the probability; therefore, one has to measure and find the right state each particle are in? No! According to theory of measurement in quantum mechanics, the precise value of an observable before measurement does not make sense (Krips 2008; Zurek 2003). According to quantum mechanics, S is in [2] where neither A and B have precise up or down spin values. The states of the two spins in a system describedare not just unknown, but rather they cannot exist before the real measurement (Zurek 2003, 9). And when the measurement is done, the probability collapses into a particular value, randomly (Laloe 2001; Albert 1992). Now, let us go back to the expression [2]. The expression clearly cannot be factorized such that it can be represented as the product of independent states of A and B. Therefore, in quantum system, when the constituents A and B are entangled, there are no unique states that can be associated to these constituents. This implies that even though they are two components (A and B) and two possible states to occupy (either 1 or 2), entangled state is not a configuration where it can be said that A and B have such and such unique states. Instead there is only one configuration of the whole. The expression [2] is the generalised expression for a quantum system irrespective of whether it is fermions or bosons which constitute it.17 If the particles are bosons, then the state is represented by ( ) ( )

And if the components are fermions, then the state is represented by the following expression (French and Redhead 1988, 237). ( ) ( )

IV Having discussed all these, let us come back to our discussion regarding individuality and distinguishability. Regarding individuality in quantum statistical mechanics, configuration (i) and (ii) are not allowed if A and B are fermions. This is because of Paulis exclusion principle. This nature of fermions has been used to conclude that fermions respect PII: if two indistinguishable particles were having the same quantum state, then there would have been no ground on which they could have been distinguished. In the case of bosons, since configurations (i) and (ii) are admissible, PII fails here. It is because of this, individuality to them is not conferred by PII (French and Redhead 1988, 244; Redhead and Teller 1992, 211). In the billiard balls example as discussed above, (iii) and (iv) are distinct states. Even in classical statistical mechanics, this is the case configuration-3 was given double weightage. But
The generalized expression has in it. As we notice in expressions [3] and [4], it is only the sign which changes.
17

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______________________________________________ quantum statistical mechanics doesnt distinguish between these two states and counts them as a single state. As we discussed above, this is because these two states were considered equivalent by the indistinguishability postulate. What in fact happens is that there is a single state an entangled state. It is senseless to ask the independent states of the two components as we just have a singular state representation i.e. single state-vector (Shankar 1994, 262). Therefore, in the case of quantum system, possibilities (iii) and (iv) are in fact just one configuration the entangled configuration. That being the case, we realize that in quantum statistical mechanics, the particles label does not matter at all. That is, it is irrelevant which state the particles are in as overall the quantum state would be the same. In the case of classical statistical interpretations, components occupying different states would have resulted in different complexions. But in the case of quantum classical statistics, there is no complexions. This is because of the indistinguishability postulate that we considered above. It was because of this understanding, the individuality of quantum particles were reconsidered. French and Krause summarizes this shift of individuality in the case of quantum particles aptly With the reduction in statistical weight now explained by the inaccessibility of certain states, rather than by the non-classical metaphysical nature of the particles as nonindividuals, one can continue to regard them as individuals for which certain states are now inaccessiblejust because the particle labels are statistically otiose does not mean they are metaphysically so. Quantum statistics is effectively recovered by regarding such states as possible but never actually realized (French and Krause 2006, 148). In an entangled state, as explained in part III above, both the particles constitute the state of the system. Each of these does not have a distinct state of their own. More importantly, since they are in entangled state, they do have the same state-dependent properties (French and Redhead 1988, 240). Here, two particles having the same state contradicts Paulis exclusion principle which was supposed to keep particles distinct. Because of this, there is no way one can distinguish each of these using any form of PII. Therefore, PII fails here as well. This being the case French, Redhead and Teller suggest that if we have to confer individuality to these particles then transcendental identity is the only way (French and Redhead 1988, 244; Redhead and Teller 1992). As already mentioned, here we cannot even fall back onto spacetime individuation as these particles do not have any spacetime trajectory (Redhead and Teller 1992, 211). In the previous section (part IV of section 3.2), we considered how different theories were considering the individuality of molecules differently. Similar to that, Redhead and Teller argue that the very possibility of we labelling these particles as A and B is based on the assumption that these particles have a certain kind of transcendental individuality. Quantum statistical mechanics, having presumed the transcendental individuality of the particles, proposes the idea of assigning the states interchangeably using indistinguishability postulate to these labelled particles. But as we discussed now, in this entangled state, it does not make any sense to consider a particle in this entangled state and assign a state to it (Redhead and Teller 1992).

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______________________________________________ V In this discussion, we considered how quantum particles are considered as non-individuals because of their characteristic interpretation in quantum statistical mechanics. As we have seen before, the individuality of a component is understood by what role they while interpreting and describing the system they comprise. In the case of quantum statistical mechanics, the particles were considered to be non-individuals because their permutation across individual states did not result in an observable change at the system level. But the stronger case for their individuality was because of the interpretation of superposition states where particles are entangled. If a successful theory is the way we have to talk about certain systems, then what theory says and how it says about the nature of the particles decide their individuality. All possible ways to infer the individuality of the particles through PII was not successful. But this does not imply that there are no arguments either for quantum particles to be considered as individuals or saving PII (French and Krause 2006, 146). In the case of saving PII, some philosophers accept that quantum particles are non-individuals. That being the case, PII does not apply to these particles and hence PII still is a valid principle for individual objects. This being the case, we see that, PII does not really help us in individuation when we are dealing with quantum particles. We still are yet to understand the nature of entanglement and see how we are supposed to understand individuality in that case. It is this which will be occupying us in the following section.

3.4 Distinguishability and Individuality in Quantum mechanics

The main aim of this section is to understand the nature of quantum entanglement briefly and then see what light it has to shed to our present argument of individuation. The central notion which will be occupying us here is the principle of separability of systems. In section 3.3, we briefly considered the nature of two quantum particles entangled with each other. It was understood that we cannot associate each of these particles constituting this entangled system a state of their own. Till now, we have not discussed how these systems are situated spatially. It might be considered, for example that the particles which compose the system are spatially situated close to each other so as to be able to constitute a system like this. For example, the electron and the proton which constitute a Hydrogen atom are spatial contiguous. But this spatial contiguity is not respected when two electrons are entangled to each other. It is this which we have to explore and see how our conception of individuation has to be accommodated accordingly. 3.4.1 Quantum entanglement I Consider two electrons A and B which are independent and have their own independent states represented by |1> and |1>. This being the case, we can make both these particles interact with each other for a particular period of time. Having interacted with each other, these electrons will constitute a system S. In this configuration, the state of S can be represented as

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______________________________________________ |2> and |2> indicate that the states of these electrons have changed after having interacted with each other (Esposito, Giuseppe and Sudarshan 2004, 453). But, as we have discussed before, the expression of state of S given above is never the case if A and B are electrons. The right expression of Ss state is given by expression [1] (given in part II of section 3.3). We have already discussed the nature of the state described by this expression. The inability to express the state of S through distinct components of A and B is not possible in mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. But the inability to express the nature of whole through the nature of parts that comprise it is not only unique to quantum mechanics. We have several emergent systems where the complete description of the whole is not possible through that of the parts (Wimsatt 2007). And moreover, this nature of superposition of states is not unique to quantum mechanics. Therefore, we can see from the below quotation what is special about this quantum systems entanglement When we say that |> is an element of a vector space we mean that if |> and |> represent possible states of a particle so does a|>+b|>. This is called the principle of superposition. The principle by itself is not so new: we know in classical physics, for example, that if f(x) and g(x) [with f(0)=f(L)=g(0)=g(L)=0] are two possible displacements of a string, so is the superposition a[f(x)]+b[g(x)]. What is new is the interpretation of the superposed state a|>+b|>. In the case of the string, the state a[f(x)]+b[g(x)] has very different attributes from the states f and g: it will look different, have a different amount of stored elastic energy, and so on. In quantum theory, on the other hand, the state a|>+b|> will, loosely speaking, have attributes that sometimes resemble that of |> and at other times those of |>. (Shankar 1994, 117). Paraphrasing the above understanding in terms of our example, it is never the case that A and B have specific, well defined, state throughout their entanglement. For example, if we are measuring the spin properties of A and B along a particular axis, and acquire the value that As spin was up and Bs spin was down, then it does not imply the spin values of these particles were these even before we measured. It could have been the case that the spin value of A could have been down. It is to this aspect of entanglement that Shankar is referring to when he says attributes that sometimes resemble that of |> and at other times those of |>. II In a chemical compound, the molecules which form it have characteristics which they did not have when they were in isolation. The oxygen molecule behaves differently when it is forming the water molecule with two other hydrogen atoms compared to its characteristics when it is forming a nitrous-oxide molecule. Therefore, the state and properties of a components change suitably depending on which other components they are interacting with. In this context, even though we appreciate the non-determinacy that superposition state expresses, is there anything more to say about this quantum system other than the fact that two electrons when are spatially contiguous to form a system like S has such and such characteristics? Yes. Quantum entangled systems do not respect spatial separation. When we isolate the oxygen molecule from the nitrogen molecules, we know that the nitrogen molecules are no more influencing this oxygen molecule. Here, isolation signifies spatial separation taking the oxygen molecule far enough so that nitrogen molecules influence on chemical processes is

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______________________________________________ negligible. But this does not hold good in the case of system S. Having interacted with each other, A and B still constitute the same system S even if we spatially separate them. Let us understand this phenomenon bit more closely.

Apparatus-1

Source

Apparatus-2

Figure-3 Consider that we have a source which makes two electrons, say A and B, interact with each other such that they are entangled. In this state, let us separate both of them and send them two different apparatuses which are spatially separated. These apparatuses 1 and 2 as shown in the above figure, receive A and B respectively. There is no connection between these apparatuses. Here, the spin of a particle is measured along one of three available axes X, Y and Z. This being the case, we can choose to measure the spin of A along, say, X axis and that of B along Z axis (d'Espagnat 1979; Mermin 1985). Amidst all these different permutations possible, let us assume that the spin is measured along the same axis for both the electrons. If after separation A and B are sent to their apparatuses, we will either get up or down spin value for each of these. But, statistically, it has been found that if apparatus-1 measures As spin to be , then Bs spin would be or vice-versa. It should be noted that the spin value of each of these component particles is undetermined before the measurement. Here, in order to reach this conclusion statistically, the same measurement experiment is repeated for several entangled systems like S. Therefore, what is observed in all these repetitions is that spin-values of A and B are anti-correlated (d'Espagnat 1979; Mermin 1985).18 Whether either particle separately goes up or down on a given occasion is quite unpredictable. But when one particle goes up the other always goes down and vice-versa (Bell 2004, 140). III In fact, it was Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen who introduced correlated systems in a thought experiment presented in their famous paper of 1935 (Reichenbach 1944, 170; Fine 2012). In that paper, they were trying to understand a fundamental question with respect to quantum mechanics - Is the description given by the theory complete? (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). In order to understand what they mean by completeness of a theory, we have to understand the nature of entanglement in bit more detailed manner. Before we proceed with this, I have to mention a word on why is understanding entanglement important for our present discussion of individuation. Till now, we have been dealing with systems and objects which were spatially unified, contiguous. That is, chair, piece of butter, gas system are spatially discrete. And it is the individuation of these that we were concerned. While discussing the individuation of these things, it did not matter, for example, the
18

This is case when we measure the spin-values of A and B along the same axis.

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______________________________________________ two individual chairs were in fact made up of the same tree. What if we say that these chairs are not in fact two chairs but a single individual as they are made from the same tree?19 But we usually deal with this kind of problem by applying suitable sortal. But, the problem we are trying to understand regarding quantum entanglement is not similar to this kind. And more importantly, the question of entanglement has a direct bearing on individuality if we still abide by PII for individuation. Therefore, let us try to understand this phenomenon bit more clearly. Assume for the time being that the spin-values of A and B have determinate values before measurement when they are entangled. That being the case, the nature of this entanglement is that each of these has spin-value opposite of the other that is, one of them has and the other . This being the case, when we measure the spin of each of these particles in the apparatuses, we get the statistics which says that spin-values of these particles are anticorrelated. Understood like this, there is no problem with quantum mechanics, and nothing surprising about the result. But this kind of interpretation was not accepted during the early stages of quantum mechanics formulation by Bohr, Heisenberg, etc. (Fine 2012). Bohr and Heisenberg, for several experimental and formalisation reasons, had concluded that in quantum system the observable does not have a value before measurement (Krips 2008). Therefore for them, in a physical state not preceded by a measurement of an entity u, any statement about a value of the entity u is meaningless and the result of a measurement represents the value of the measured entity immediately after the measurement (Reichenbach 1944, 141). This implies that we cannot assume the following two things about quantum system. First, when we acquire some value for a particular observable, then we cannot assume that the system had that particular value before measurement. And secondly, the measured value is the one which the particle acquired right when we do the measurement; i.e., it did not have this value before measurement. This understanding expressed through our example above means the following. When we measure A and get that its spin-value is , then we should not conclude that it had this value before measurement. And of the two probabilities it could have had, either or , it acquired the value when we try to measure to it. But Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen showed that this understanding of measurement and systems reality leads to some seemingly paradoxical interpretations if one assumes a correlated quantum system. Consider S which has A and B correlated with each other. That being the case, consider A and B are separated from each other, and we measure only A and get to know that the value of the spin is . Now, since they are correlated, the spin value of B should be . But if we assume the above principles of measurement proposed by Bohr and Heisenberg, then the following implies. A and B do not have fixed spin values before measurement. A has the spin value only after measuring. And this means that only after measuring A, Bs spin value is fixed to . Now, the paradox is how an act of measurement at A fixes or provides the value for another system B which is spatially separated (Reichenbach 1944, 171)? Therefore, Einstein and et al. tried to show that if one presumes the principles of measurement explained above, then the measurement on one system physically affects the other system even if no measurement has been carried over on that system. Since quantum mechanics predicts this kind of behaviour of systems, it has to be the case that the quantum mechanical description of the
Of course, this line of argument is similar to an old question in the discussion of sortals: is statue a single thing that is made up of marble or there are two things marble and statue present in the same location (Grandy 2008)?
19

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______________________________________________ physical reality given by wave functions is not complete (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). By saying this, Einstein and et al. wanted to show that quantum mechanicals interpretation of measurement is wrong it is not the case that systems acquire value when we measure them; instead, a system has a particular value for an observable before and after measurement (Reichenbach 1944, 118). Having this understanding, they commented that there are certain hidden variables which quantum theory is not yet referring to and has not yet accommodate or given a place in its formalization (Krips 2008). Once these hidden variables are accounted, then the measurement of quantum systems would not have any more randomness in it measurement is possible such that we can know what the real value of the observable is, before and after the measurement. An understanding of this kind presumes that the system is not affected by the act of measurement. That is, the system does not acquire a particular state just because we happen to measure it. But, later, during 1960s, Bell showed that for quantum systems this kind of assumption of reality cannot be true. If quantum system had some determined value for an observable, then statistically we can do some predictions (Bells inequality). But, when we perform relevant experiments, we see that these statistical predictions do not hold good for quantum measurement. From this it was concluded that for quantum systems like A and B, it is meaningless to say that they have a particular value for an observable before measurement (Bell 2004; Mermin 1985, d'Espagnat 1979). 3.4.2 Separability of systems The paper by Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR paper) attempts to highlight the incompleteness of quantum physics and through that questions the reality described by that theory. But according to Howard, Einstein was disappointed by how the paper was structured as it didnt depict his notion of incompleteness. The consideration of this is quite important for our present discussion. Instead, as Howard shows through historical analysis, Einsteins problem with quantum mechanics was with the way it was trying to individuate the systems and their states (Howard 1985, 175). Howard tries to bring out two aspects of Einsteins incompleteness. The first incompleteness is regarding the probabilistic prediction that quantum mechanics provides for a particular measurement. Compared to categorical Boolean yes or no predictions of classical theories, quantum mechanics assigns probability. For example, if one measures the spin of A along a particular axis, then the outcome that quantum mechanics assigns is . Therefore, according to Einstein, quantum mechanics is incomplete as it gives incomplete results of an outcome (Howard 1985, 178). Einsteins second aspect of incompleteness is directly related to what has been explained in the previous section. When we measure some observable in A, then according to quantum mechanics, value of that observable at B is also fixed. Therefore, for quantum mechanics, it does not matter that A and B are spatially separated. Therefore, being spatially separated is not a criterion for being independent systems according to quantum mechanics. It is because of this, Einstein considered quantum mechanics to be incomplete. As Howard points it out, for Einstein truly puzzling feature of quantum mechanics, its most obj ectionable departure from the classical world view, is not its way of treating conjugate parameters, but its way of treating spatially separated, previously interacting systems (Howard 1985, 180). We see here a connection between a system being individual and being spatially separate.

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______________________________________________ Therefore, in this section, let us understand what separability is and its relevance to individuation. I We discussed in section 2.2 about the basic characteristics of systems. The standard architecture of the systems discussed was the following a system is comprised of certain components and these components are interrelated. One of the basic assumptions that go into the conceptualization of systems is how system supervenes on its components. Here, supervenience implies that the all the intrinsic properties of the system are based on that of the components and the relations that exists among them (Healey 1991, 400; Healey 2009; McLaughlin and Bennett, 2011). This interpretation where the properties of the system are completely based and are determined by that of the physical components is considered as physicalism or particularism (Healey 1991, 400; Teller 1986, 72). Having this as our foundational understanding of systems and their components, let us discuss their nature further. System, as we have considered, is a spatial occupant. The physical systems do occupy some region of space. And, considering that a system is supervenient on its parts, the parts are to be found within the spatial region that the system occupies. This understanding, even though may sound trivial, is quite foundational to the way we understand the whole and its parts. The matter that composes the chair is to be found within that chair. Therefore, a system is always found in a particular region of a space and whatever comprises that is found within that same spatial region. Here, we see a spatial foundation for understanding systems and their parts (Healey 1991, 403). In fact, it is with this basic assumption we understand and decide what among the available components constitute a particular system if the component is within the spatial region of the system, then it constitutes that system. It should be noticed that this understanding of system and components is based on our initial assumption that the system supervenes on its components. And since we have considered only physical systems, all these systems (as discussed in chapter 2) are spatio-temporal. Therefore, first I explained the relationship between the parts and the whole they comprise. Next, I brought out the relationship between how parts and systems are related in space. With this, we can understand that a whole comprising its parts implies that the spatial region of the whole consists within it the parts that constitute it. This is based on the assumption that we made all physical systems are space occupants. Having brought the relationship between systems and the spatio-temporal regions they occupy, we can understand how systems can be isolated. If there are two systems, then they cannot be in the same spatial-region. Here, we are considering two physical systems considered by the same scientific theory. We considered in chapter 2, how a particular theory defines its systems and objects. Then the system considered and what it is constituted by depends on the theory which we are using and the context of enquiry (Healey 2009). Therefore, it can be the case that two systems, each being defined by two different scientific theories, can be at the same spatial region. Having said that, let us consider what spatio-temporal separability is. Healey defines it as the following any physical process occurring in a region R of space-time is spatiotemporally separable in R (Healey 1991, 406). In other words, this means that all systems are confined to a given spatio-temporal region.

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______________________________________________ With this, we can understand what state separability principle is. Howard defines the separability principle as the following Regardless of their history of interaction, any two systems, A and B, separated by a non-null spatiotemporal interval possess their own separate real states, of such kind that the joint state is completely determined by the separate states (Howard 1997, 20). Therefore, first we understood that a system is confined to a particular spatio-temporal region. Since, systems are confined to their own spatial regions, the states that they have are also separated. This is what state separability principle describes. In this definition given above, there are two criteria mentioned. The first is regarding the spatial separation which is expressed through non-null spatiotemporal interval.20 This criterion, which is called the locality principle, implies that system is determined by what happens locally (Healey 1991, 406). Therefore, given any two space-like separated systems, A and B, the separate real state of B, say, cannot be influenced by eventsin the vicinity of system A (Howard 1997, 20). We can see from this that locality principle presumes two separable systems (Howard 1989, 227). This implies that the effect a system has on another system is always over a spatio-temporal distance, which separates these two systems (Howard 1989, 226). This understanding immediately follows from our spatio-temporal separability of systems, which says that systems are spatially separated. Let us now understand the second criterion (the joint states) in the above definition. It the second criterion indirectly points to another important principle. If there is a system comprised of sub-systems, these sub-systems are confined to their own spatiotemporal regions. That being the case, going by our understanding of supervenience of states, the state of the system is based on the states of these two systems. Therefore, a system formed out of two separate systems would be a joint system. It follows from this that if we take a component out of the system, the system does not supervene on this part anymore. And more importantly, this newly isolated part has its own state. This means that once systems are spatially separated, they are no more related (Howard 1989, 225). With the possibility of this process we can see that since the components can be separated, the states can also be separated the states of the components being separated from that of the whole (Healey 2009). It is this which is considered as the state separability principle. II From the above discussion, we can clearly see how space separability results in state separability (Healey 2009). This understanding of systems and their separability considers space as the individuator (Howard 1997, 16). In fact, since spatial separation is the fundamental ontological principle governing the individuation of physical systems and their associated states, Einstein conceptualizes his field theoretical approach on spatial separation (Howard 1989, 225). We have already seen the argument for spatiotemporal individuality (based on the presumption of impenetrability) in our earlier discussion. Even in the present part of the discussion, it is the impenetrability of things and systems which acts as the governing rule for separability. Therefore, space, by not allowing two systems or things to occupy the same place, individuates them.

Non-null interval signifies that for an electromagnetic signal to pass from one system to another, it should take at least some time duration.
20

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______________________________________________ For Einstein, separability was a necessary condition for reality mutually independent existence of spatially distant things (Howard 1985, 190). Locality and separability principles were considered by Einstein as fundamental as they are necessary conditions for formulation and testability of physical laws. This is because spatial separability was foundational for objectivity which science demands. By being spatially separated from a system, one can observe it without interfering with it (Howard 1985, 191). Einstein stressed on the principle of spatial separability because it was only by secluding a system to a particular space one can isolate and talk about it.21 3.4.3 Holism and Non-separability of Quantum systems I Having understood what separability of systems is, let us come back to our discussion regarding quantum entanglement. We saw that particles A and B, which constituted the correlated system S, were separated spatially. Quantum correlated system is supposed to exhibit both nonseparability and holism (Healey 1991, 418). After having understood state and space separability in the previous section, let us try to understand the nature of entangled quantum state regarding its non-separability and its holism. In part III of section 3.3, we already discussed how the state of an entangled system cannot be factorized such that it can be expressed in the form of (state of A) (state of B). It is this inability to provide each of the particles a particular state which is being considered now as non-separability of states. The system S has a particular state which is not the joint product of the states of A and B. If we have to express it through what we have discussed in the previous section, the state of S does not supervene on the states of A and B. It is because of this, entangled systems are considered to be holistic (Teller 1989; Healey 1991). Holism is the case where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. When we discuss in the later part of this section, we will see that in this case of holism, the parts do not have any role to play in the state of the system. But it is exactly the opposite the systems state decides the state of these systems. To understand this, consider the spin property of the system S. As we have specified, before spin properties of A and B has to be either or . Therefore, the spin property value of S is zero.22 Here, the systems spin property (being zero) supervenes on the spin property of the components. Therefore, in which ever order we measure the spin of these two components, the spin of the system always turns out to be zero. To say that quantum entanglement is holistic in nature does not imply that the system is non-separable. As Healey says, holism and non-separability are two different, but related concepts (1991, 394). To understand non-separability of quantum systems, let us consider spatial system separability and non-separability. Healey provides the following definitions for these two cases. Spatial separability: The qualitative, intrinsic physical properties of a compound system are supervenient on the qualitative, intrinsic physical properties of its spatially separated component systems together with the spatial relations among these component systems (Healey 1991, 410).
But for Bohr this was never a problem as these two spatially separated interacting particles were still part of the same phenomenon and it is in this sense they are not separated (Barad 1998, 174). 22 The spin-up of one particle cancels out the spin-down of the other
21

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______________________________________________ Spatial non-separability: There exists a compound physical system, not all of whose qualitative, intrinsic physical properties supervene on the qualitative, intrinsic physical properties of its spatially separated component systems together with the spatial relations among these component systems (Healey 1991, 412). Compare these definitions with the ones provided by Howard (mentioned in part I of section 3.4.2). I think there is an interesting difference in interpretation that needs to be observed here. In the case of Howards definition, we see when two systems are separated from each other, how local and isolated one system is from other systems. Therefore, if we have to understand non-separability from how Howard defines separability, then non-separability of two systems would be the failure to create two independent systems, which had been forming a single system before, by separating and placing them at two different spatial locations. Compared to this, in the definition of spatial separability of Healey, we have a system composed of separate components such that it supervenes on their properties and the spatial relations that exists between them. Therefore, it follows from it that the state of the system can be easily factorizable into the states of these systems when they are separated spatially. In the definition of non-separability given by Healey, we see that there are two systems which are spatially separated and related. But the system that they constitute has certain properties which do not directly supervene on them and their spatial relations. This means that the systems state, which these two components are forming, does not supervene on the properties of these parts and spatial relations. Comparing these two, in the case of Howard, we can see that the main concern of nonseparability of systems is that space does not act as the individuator. And it is because of these, the stress in his definition is on individuation when we spatially separate related systems. But for Healey, as we can see clearly in his definitions, the concern is not individuation of the systems. In fact, by the very construction of the definition we can see that Healey presumes a system that is being formed by two systems spatially separated. Therefore, for Healey, it is the non-supervenience of the systems properties which is a concern. As we will discuss nonseparability in the case of quantum entanglement, we see both these interpretations playing an equally important role. Having understood this, now we can see the difference between holism and nonseparability. In the case of holism, the concern is that the whole does not supervene on the parts and their relations. And in the case of non-separability, the problem is that the properties of the whole do not respect spatio-temporal properties of the parts (Healey 1991, 408). II Every physical object occupies certain spatio-temporal region. Having presumed impenetrability of space, there can be individual things provided that they are limited and confined to a specific region. Stated otherwise in terms of systems, there can be individual systems only when they are confined to certain spatial regions. If there are two systems which are not limited and confined to their own space and if they happen to be spatially adjacent, then there is only one system and not two. This being our understanding, let us consider the case of quantum correlated system. Here, two particles A and B are spatially separated. But this spatial separation is not a sufficient

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______________________________________________ criterion to separate these two systems and make them independent. This is because we are considering that these two spatially separated systems have the same state. So, therefore, in this case of entanglement, it is the failure of limitation of the state of the system to a confined region which is defying individuation. Here, the state of a correlated system shouldnt be confused with state of a normal physical system spread across physical space. For example, as we discussed in part I of the previous section (3.4.2), a gaseous systems state is confined to its volume. When I have to measure some property of this gaseous system, I would operate on the volume of matter to which it is confined. In this sense, this kind of state of the system is spread across a specific region of the physical space. But, in the case of quantum systems, the space that is considered is called Hilbert space a mathematical space (Healey 1991, 416). It is in this space, the state of the system is distributed. It is in this aspect of quantum entanglement, we can see Howards concern of non-separability where the systems are not separated by space. III When we consider the representation of quantum system like S in Hilbert space, the spatial separation between A and B are not included while representing their dynamical states (Healey 1991, 419). This shows that the spatial separation is not considered at for understanding the properties of the system. Therefore, the process of entanglement cannot be ascribed to any intrinsic, qualitative properties or any spatial relations of A and B (Healey 1991, 419). Therefore, the correlated state of S is independent of the spatial separation that exists between A and B. It is this non-separability the non-supervenience of the properties of the system on the spatial relational or intrinsic properties of the components that Healey is referring to when he mentions non-separability. With respect to this interpretation of non-separability, Karakostas provides two kinds of the state non-separability strong and weak non-separabilities. As we have seen already, in the case where the entangled particles are measured for their spin, the spin value of each is perfectly anti-correlated i.e., if spin of one particle is measured to be , the other would have spin or vice versa. In this kind of entangled state, the states of A and B dont constitute S; in fact, the state of S decides the states of A and B. Therefore, the state of the whole determines the states of the parts in this case. Considering that we cannot assign distinct states to the parts, Karakostas considers this as the strong or relational form of non-separability. In this case there are no parts that compose S as we are unable to assign distinct states to them (Karakostas 2004, 290). This interpretation of separability is strong as the state of S doesnt acknowledge the states of the parts. And at the same time, this separability is relational because none of the intrinsic properties of A and B constitutes this holistic spin property of S. And this holism is maintained even when these two components are spatially separated (Healey 2009; Teller 1986). Karakostas proposes a weak or deconstructional interpretation of non-separability (Karakostas 2004, 291). Given that there is no way we can clearly factorize the state of the system into independent components states, there is many-to-one mapping from states of the components to the state of the whole. That is, for the given systems state, we can come up with several equivalent systems for the components.23 But these representations of components states are reduced as they dont account for the correlation that exists between the
23

The density matrix of S can have several different forms like singlet state, triplet state, pure state.

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______________________________________________ components. That is, when we try to provide independent states to these parts, none of these state representations of the parts account for the correlation that exists between the systems A and B. For example, one of the ways the each of the states of A and B can be represented is | > + |>. Given these states of the components (or any other reduced ones), we cannot reconstruct the state of S. Therefore, this interpretation of non-separability is weak as even though we can attempt to represent the independent states of the components, these representations put together cannot fully stand for the state representation of the whole. At the same time, this interpretation is deconstructional as this suppresses, overlooks the existing correlation among the parts. It is this overlooking which results in there being no unique way of representing the states of the components (Karakostas 2004, 294). According to Karakostas, quantum mechanics doesnt specify how to uniquely decompose a compound system into its subsystems; but the opposite of this is possible. 3.4.4 Distinguishability and Individuality I The conception of quantum particles, right from the beginning of quantum mechanics as a field, was different than a classical object. Quantum particles, unlike classical counterparts, are not localised at a particular position as if they are smeared over a particular region. The values of the properties they possess are probabilistic they have range of values they can potentially take and they acquire a value when the measurement is done. Along with this, there is another important difference between classical objects and quantum particles. Various properties of the classical objects like size, weight, etc., can have any contingent value. But compared to these, quantum particles properties are sharply delineated. The charge, mass, spin, etc., are all prescribed by the respective theories. Therefore, quantum particles are also nomological objects (Krause 2005, 8). This being the case, the discourse of quantum theory still refers to these entities as objects (Krause 2005, 3). Probably, this point to the propensity we have to divide the world into objects so that we can refer to them and talk. This tendency has been referred to as objectuation (Krause 2005, 5). What is being pointed out here is that even though the entities being referred in quantum mechanics theory is nowhere similar classical objects, the discourse of the theory and even the mathematical and logical formalizations retains the particle grin (Krause 2005, 4). The objects that are referred in classical logic and mathematics are distinguishable and have identity. But, when we come to the quantum domain, the nature of these objects is not easy to decide. Therefore, it is the import of this vocabulary into quantum mechanics which creates confusion. After having considered several important characteristics regarding quantum systems, let us see what we can say about their individuality and distinguishability. Most of the important points regarding quantum particles have already been discussed in the previous section (section 3.3). So here, we will consider the discussion related to quantum inseparability only. II We considered that quantum correlated systems exhibit non-separability. With respect to this kind of system, it is not straight-forward how are we supposed to understand and confer individuality to the particles that constitute the system. In order to discuss that, let us consider the system S which was separated into its components A and B such that they are still entangled.

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______________________________________________ This being the case, we can have two positions regarding the state-hood of A and B after they have been separated: (a) these systems have the same state or (b) systems A and B have their own independent states. The above two possibilities is basically regarding non-separability of the states of the entangled systems. That is, since they are entangled, how are we supposed to understand the nature of their state? Is it that they share the same state or both of them have their own states? The option (a) was proposed by Howard and this follows from his understanding of space being the individuator (Howard 1989). We considered in the previous two sections (3.4.2 and 3.4.3) how Howard tries to interpret separability and non-separability. Therefore, considering the same line of argument, Howard proposes the following argument to interpret the states of the entangled particles. Classically, spatial separation should result in individuation of systems and their state. But in correlated system, even though two particles are spatially separated they are entangled. Therefore, he concludes non-classical feature of the quantum-mechanical interaction formalism is precisely its denial of the separability of the states of the two systems (Howard 1989, 231).24 This implies, even though they are separated from each other, these systems share the same state. For French, this interpretation that there is only one state that is distributed across these two systems is quite problematic. This conclusion would make distinguishability of the quantum objects impossible (French 1989, 8). Quantum particles are indistinguishable based on their intrinsic properties. At the same time, we cannot even distinguish these particles based on their spatio-temporal location. That being the case, the only way to assure their distinguishability is through their state properties. Therefore, for French, this is not acceptable as we would not be able to decide the status of their individuality. In order to circumvent this, French provides an alternative interpretation of states of the entangled particles. We have already discussed how electrons occupy a particular quantum state and exclude others from having it. This was due to Paulis exclusion principle. That being the case, I can take an electron and know its state. But consider the case of entangled systems like A and B. If we try to study only A or B, then also we will get the properties of their respective state. But when we do correlation measurements for these two particles, it is only then we realise that these two particles are correlated (French 1989, 12). Therefore, with this, French concludes the following characteristics of correlated system. First, it is only by doing correlation measurements on both the particles we will realise whether these two are correlated or not. This implies that when we interact with only one of the particles, we would not be able to know about the correlation. There is another important point to realise here. We have already mentioned that what quantum mechanics provides as the state expression is just a prediction a set of possibilities. But this does not imply that when we measure the observable of a quantum particle we really get these values. Therefore, when we measure a correlated particle, for example, we do get proper spin value either up or down. We can infer some important points regarding what we just discussed. Correlated particles do have specific values. This implies that there are intrinsic properties specific to each of these particles. For example, French says that each electron in a system, by occupying certain quantum state, exclude other electrons from having that state. At the same time, these particles, when tested only for correlation, show entangled behaviour. Therefore, French consider
24

He arrives at this conclusion by interpreting Jarretts completeness conditio n as separability condition.

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______________________________________________ entanglement as a relation that two correlated electrons have. But this entanglement relation does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the systems. Because of this, this correlated system exhibits holism (French 1989, 12). By giving an interpretation like this, French deviates from Howard by implying that there are two different systems with two different states. But what makes them correlated is an inherent, non-supervenient relation between these two particles (Teller 1986). By giving an interpretation like this, French provided individual states to these particles. Howard, interpreting that these two systems share the same state, had considered them to be non-individuals. This means that according to Frenchs interpretation correlation does not result individuality loss of the two particles. It is just that they have a state which supervenes on them.

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4. Meta of Physics Individuality and Objects

In the previous chapter we considered several physical systems and understood how Physics and philosophers talk about the individuality of things that constitute those physical systems. Having done that, we have to reflect on what and how we have discussed about those physical things and the nature of individuality that was being conferred to them. Therefore, in this present section, let us understand how science talks about individual things, and there by understand the nature of individuality it deals with. By doing that we can compare it with the questions of individuality metaphysics is interested in and thereby see what an abstract metaphysical enquiry has gained from an empirical science and in which direction this science should head towards guided by the right metaphysical questions. I We considered different physical systems and objects in our discussions (chapter 3). In the case of classical statistical mechanics, we saw how molecules were conceptualised. These conceptualizations were foundational to the theories which tried to explain how energy of the whole gaseous system can be understood through the components which constituted this system. During this discussion, we saw how two different theories of understanding the gaseous system statistically by Boltzmann had two different unique conceptualizations of molecules. The difference between both these conceptualizations was regarding how individuality was conferred to these objects. Following this consideration, we saw how similar problems arose in statistical quantum mechanics. But here we saw how distinguishability between the objects and the states that they occupy was not possible. With this, quantum particles had to be reconceptualised as the standard understanding of classical statistics did not help in understanding quantum systems. The immediate reaction was to consider them as non-individuals as there was no way of distinguishing these particles and the permutation of individual particles across different states did not manifest in any change at the system level. For these particles to regain their individuality, proper interpretation and development of quantum theory were required which could explain why these particles behaved so. Here, it should be observed how the indistinguishability postulate provided a theoretical backing for their individuality. But even with this attempt, providing individuality through distinguishability (i.e., using PII) still proved difficult. The discussion of individuality in quantum mechanics brought in important understanding of how individuation should be understood. With the nature of entanglement, we explored separability of system and state and realised how important these conceptions are for our understanding of individuality. In this case, we had to understand how to interpret entanglement an interaction between two systems having the same state or two systems having different states. Throughout all these discussions we saw how a theory which talks about a particular kind of objects should provide a sense of individuality to them. In fact, objects were those which were explained a particular theory. Because of this tight linkage between theory and law constituting objects, individuality of these objects were always conferred. Another main reason for considering several systems and different interpretations of these systems were to see whether the individuality conferred by these theories to the objects was the ones which

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______________________________________________ metaphysics generally provides. Therefore, other than seeing how Physics provides individuality to these objects, we discussed throughout all these different considerations whether our metaphysical understanding of individuality the metaphysical package sufficiently hands the objects which occupy our world. During this discussion, we saw the failure of PII to distinguish and infer individuality to quantum particles and how we have to subscribe to TI transcendental individuality to explain their individuality. II The above discussion summarizes what we have done till now. It is now time to make an attempt to go bit further and see what all possible questions and interpretations we can ask and provide. Regarding what we have understood till now, there are certain important points which we have to explore further to understand the nature of the relationship between objects and individuation. Therefore, in this conclusive discussion, what I will attempt to do is to consider how nature of this relationship between objects and individuation. During our discussion I will also consider the influence of the present discussion of individuation in physical systems on metaphysics and vice versa. First, let us try to understand the relationship between theory and the individuation of the objects it deals with. For concreteness purpose, let us consider Frenchs discussion regarding non-separability of entangled electrons (considered in part II of section 3.4.4). For French, there are two ways one can distinguish two systems. First is through spatio-temporal positions of the systems and the second is through properties that each system have (French 1989, 5). But, we saw how Howards interpretation of non-separability of systems resulted in a situation which made both the systems involved in entanglement have the same state. This being the case, we do not have any way to distinguish these systems as both of them have the same state and distinguishing through spatio-temporal properties does not hold good for quantum systems. That is, metaphysics does not provide any means other than these two to distinguish the systems. Seeing that we do not have any way to distinguish these particles if we subscribe to Howards interpretation, French states that this way of interpreting entanglement is simply taking metaphysics way too far (French 1989, 8). And having said that, French provides an alternative interpretation of entanglement which has been discussed in part II of section 3.4.4. What should catch our attention here is that French did not accept Howards interpretation as that would have made electrons strongly indistinguishable. Therefore, a alternative interpretation was required. But this kind of an approach makes us ask the question what should decide saving the individuality of a thing? We have already discussed how theories should provide individuality to their objects. But here we see that an explanation of a particular phenomenon which consist these objects is a valid explanation only if it retains the individuality of the objects. For French, regarding this situation, metaphysics under-determines the individuals considered by science (French 2011). We discussed this briefly in part IV of section 2.1. But what results in an under-determination like this? It is here, I think, where the foundational relationship between individuation and objects is formed in scientific approach. Consider the different systems that we have discussed. In all these systems, molecules, quantum particles are first considered as things and then different possible interpretations are provided. These interpretive theories try to describe these things. What we attempted to do during our

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______________________________________________ discussion in chapter 3 is to see how these theories ground the individuality of these things. Therefore, we start with things and see how we can provide explanations which explain the phenomena and at the same time make these things individuals. I think, it is this circularity which creates this metaphysical under-determination. Here, I am not saying that anything which becomes a part of a theory will inevitably end up being an individual. We have, for example, ether and phlogiston which were considered to be things out there in the world; but later it was realized that it is not so the case. French and Ladyman also provide similar interpretation We see, on a scintillation screen for example, bright flashes of lightand this fact seems to support a metaphysics of individuality for quantum objects. On the basis of such observable phenomena we then try to carry over our metaphysics of individuality which is appropriate for the classical domain, but then the way particle permutations are treated in quantum mechanics is quite distinct from classical physics and the above metaphysical under-determination arises (French and Ladyman 2003, 41; emphasis added). But, the reason for under-determination they provide is the result of wrong association of classical theoretical understanding to quantum particle. This happens because, as I have mentioned, Physics first considers its study objects and then talks about their individuality through various theories. This is indirectly implied in what French and Krause mention physics itself permitted different standardssupported by different lines of fallible reasoningto be applied and likewiseadopting a different understandingleads to a different metaphysical position (French and Krause 2006, 192). III We have seen till now, how Physics attaches individuality to their objects. But at this stage, the question that we should ask is why Physics would want to associate individuality to its objects? French, while discussing the structural conception of objects, describes how the individuality of the objects played an important role. The first aspect is the connection between objectivity and individuality. Objectivity is the capability of certain things to have mind independent existence. From this, the mind independent reality of classical individual objects was considered to be because of their individuality (French and Ladyman 2003, 38). At the same time, the spatio-temporal persistence of individual objects was supposed to ground classical mechanics. Regarding this, French and Ladyman quotes Cassirer consideration of objectivity objective denotes a being which can be recognized as the same in spite of all changes in its individual determinations and this recognition is possible only if we posit a spatial substratum (French and Ladyman 2003, 38). Therefore, for Cassirer, individuality provided the object the oneness because of which it persisted through all changes. We considered several situations in which the individuality of electrons was questioned. Regarding this, we saw how French, Krause, Teller provided different ways to understand these phenomena such that the individuality of electron can be saved. But throughout this, French, Krause, Teller and others never explain why it is so important for an electron to be an individual? That is, what will happen if we consider electron to be a non-individual? One of the ways to answer this question is to say that there has not yet been a strong reason for not

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______________________________________________ considering electrons and other quantum particles to be non-individuals. We discussed in part IV of section 3.3 how quantum particles like electrons regained back their individuality. The initial understanding was that for a quantum system, it does not matter what physical states the constituent quantum particles are in as this amounted to the same state of the system. But it was later found that it is not to be case most of these possible states that the electrons can occupy never occurred. Therefore, the quantum particles were considered as non-individuals when it was believed that they cannot have distinct state of their own. But when this view was rectified, they became bearers of a unique state. This indicates, I think, the mark of an individual object the ability to possess a certain state which can change over time. It is regarding the same aspect of object which made us consider substances as the right candidates for objecthood (part II in section 1.2). It is not sufficient for a quantum particle to possess certain intrinsic properties like charge and mass as they do not change over time. In fact, Cassirer considers electrons not to be individuals because of the same reason (French and Ladyman 2003, 39). IV But with the current understanding, we still face metaphysical under-determination. This is because in quantum world, all the three variations of PII fail completely, and we have to consider TI for conferring individuality to electrons. That being the case, we are left with certain inability to decide how distinguish the particles. To overcome this inability, a fourth kind of PII has been suggested by Dorato and Morganti (2012). According to this, two quantum particles like electrons can be distinguished as irreflexive relation holds good between them (Dorato and Morganti 2012, 5). Irreflexive relations are those relations which take two entities such that both of these entities together satisfy this relation. An example for irreflexive relations is ___ goes in the opposite direction to ___. With this kind of relation, Dorato and Morganti argue that we will be able to distinguish seemingly indistinguishable particles like electrons. This kind of distinguishability provides numerical distinctness unlike other types of indistinguishability methods which provide qualitative differences. Having this as the basis, Dorato and Morganti argue that we should consider numerical distinctness as the main criterion for individuality rather than going for qualitative distinguishability or transcendental individuality (Dorato and Morganti 2012, 13). Going by this, it is sufficient to understand how many individuals are there in a given system. But the authors do not explain how the number of distinct individuals in a particular system is provided. V In the previous discussion regarding numerical distinctness, the authors assume the number of individuals at the formal level of system description is known. This being the case, there still seems to be a strong relation between theory and the objects it describes. In order to overcome this French and Ladyman suggest a structural path where structure is ontological prior compared to objects. We have discussed briefly regarding structuralism in science section 2.1. According to French and Ladyman, our current ontology is based on objects that is, primarily it is objects which exist. Once the relata are given, the relations among these happen. But, this ontology is based on the metaphysics of individuality (French and Ladyman 2003, 37). It is because of this setup, according to the authors, our current Physics faces

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______________________________________________ metaphysical under-determination where we have two kinds of options available objects as individuals and objects as non-individuals. French and Ladyman mention how the relationship between objects and laws is reversed in this structural interpretation. In the classical interpretation, laws were used to interpret objects and describe their behaviour. This assumed that the objects are present out there and we have to provide a suitable theory to explain their characteristics. In fact, this is similar to what we have been discussing till now: there are systems consisting of individuals; we provide certain theory to explain them and provide them individuality. And as I have made it clear in this section, it is this approach which is causing the metaphysical under-determination. What French and Ladyman propose is to reverse this setup it is the laws which constitute the entities. Therefore, entity constitute no longer the self-evident starting point but the final goal and end of the considerations (French and Ladyman 2003, 40). In this interpretation, conditions of accessibility of the structure is considered as conditions of the objects of experience (French and Krause 2003, 39). By making this shift, we reach an interesting position. If we would have considered objects as ontologically prior, then we have to face the problem of individuation. But if we consider structure as ontologically prior and the objects just the constituents of this structure, it implies that individuality of these objects is already present in the structure. With our classical approach, given that there are objects, we discussed several possible ways their individuation could be explained. But with this move, given that there is individuality built into the structure, we have to decide how to break the objects. Saunders summarizes this point aptly The world is a structure, and it is thought of as such in exact physical, interpreted mathematical terms, but how it is to be broken down into parts, to be spoken of predicatively, can be a more rough and ready affairsufficientfor all practical purposes (Saunders 2003, 132). VI The above parts discuss how science has reconceptualised the idea of individuality. With respect to what all we have discussed till now, let us consider few metaphysical questions regarding individuality and see what more we can understand regarding the nature of individuality. The argument that I want to consider briefly here is regarding mereological wholes. Let us consider an ordinary thing e.g., a chair. Regarding this individual object, two possible interpretations are possible. Both these views consider individual objects to be comprised of mereological simple parts parts which cannot be broken down further (Korman 2011). According to the current understanding of science, the fundamental particles would be mereologically simple those which are not composed further by parts. The first kind of interpretation considers that none of these mereological wholes - like chairs, balls, rock, etc. exist. What is present just these mereological simples. This interpretation is labelled as eliminativism as according to this view there are no objects. Some eliminativists believe there are only certain objects which are present, for example, humans. According to this interpretation, a statue is nothing but mereological simples arranged statuewise. According to the second kind of interpretation, all these objects that we mentioned exist. Along with that, there are many more mereological wholes which also exist. This school is called

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______________________________________________ Universalism. Let us consider an example and explain their position. In a room, consider that there is a table and chair. Therefore, according to the normal interpretation, we have two mereological wholes. But an universalist would say that there are more than two objects in that room. For her, the chair and one of the legs of the table would form another object; the table and one of the arm rest would constitute another object. Therefore, according to this interpretation, there are many more objects than any normal interpretation would allow (Korman 2011). For argumentative purpose, let us consider eliminativists argument. For an eliminativist like Van Inwagen, there are two important questions which lie at the foundation of compositional wholes. Here the compositional wholes should be considered equivalent to individual objects. The first question is called the Special composition question Suppose one had certain (nonoverlapping) objects, the Xs, at ones disposal; what would one have to do what could one do to get the Xs to compose something? (Van Inwagen 1990, 31). Let us try to understand this question. In simple terms, if one has certain parts, then how, using these parts, one can compose something? Here, what is central to the question is the conception of compose. For example, consider the question - if I have few wooden blocks, how can I compose a bigger block out of this? Here, the bigger block says something about the composition which has been formed out of those wooden blocks. Therefore, what Van Inwagen is asking is regarding the formation of a composition. Given that we have certain parts, how can we add them to form a whole? There are certain important aspects that we have to see here. First is regarding the unity of the whole. If we can compose something, then it implies that what has been composed is different from its parts. The whole, in this sense, has a sense of unity which the parts did not have. Therefore, what we have to do if we have to create a whole? Van Inwagen, with consideration to this question, provides several solutions like contact, physical bonding between the components, etc. But he provides rigorous mereological arguments to show that none of these tell us what a whole is. With that, he asks another question regarding composition. It is called the General composition question which is put simply asks what is a whole (Van Inwagen 1990, 39)? There is a particular intention to bring these metaphysical questions in the present discussion. From the above argument we can see that compositionality assumes that there are parts which have formed a whole. With respect to this Van Inwagen questions the act of compositionality and the idea of whole. If we keep this parallel to our present discussion, then the similar questions that we can ask are what are individuals and what is individuation? In fact, individuation and composition arrive at an individual object from two different directions. With respect to individuation, some quantity of matter is isolated, cut-up to form an individual. Throughout our discussion, we never considered the composition of an individual object and its reduction to its parts. But, compositionality accrues certain parts and forms a whole. Here, as Van Inwagen pointed out through his question, whole should be something different than its parts; otherwise, we are not composing anything. Our brief consideration of separability of states and systems seems very much similar to compositionality. In the case of systems, they were separable because there was a particular process, a state that was specific to that particular region of space. It is that which gave them a sense of whole. And in our holism discussion, we saw how wholes might have some property that does not supervene on the parts that form them. But, if we analyse this understanding of separability and holism a bit more closely, keeping in mind the questions asked by Van Inwagen, it will be difficult to maintain what constitutes a particular separable whole. Therefore, by

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______________________________________________ bringing this parallel out, I wanted to show how metaphysics is still relevant to our scientific interpretation.

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