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Maria Ivanova
Global Environmental Politics, Volume 13, Number 4, November 2013, pp. 1-11 (Article) Published by The MIT Press
Maria Ivanova
Maria Ivanova*
In June 2012, nearly fty thousand people gathered in Rio de Janeiro for the largest-ever global environmental summitthe UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio20). Long before the conference started, observers were predicting its failure. Designed with a wide range of objectives, the conference seems destined to fail, noted Michel Rocard, former prime minister of France. Without consensus, no action can be taken, and consensus will be impossible, he further remarked.1 Indeed, as soon as Brazils president Dilma Rousseff declared the conference closed, analysts pronounced it a colossal failure of leadership and vision2 and said it showed that governments have given up on the planet.3 Many activists also criticized the fty-page outcome document, entitled The Future We Want, as weak and lacking vision. Greenpeace dubbed it the longest suicide note in history.4 Indeed, high hopes and expectations for bold commitments by governments to a new, ambitious, collective global vision and concrete action remained unfullled. Governments renewed their political pledges to sustainable development but stopped short of concrete and comprehensive targets and timetables. They committed nancial, technological, and institutional resources, but not at the scale necessary to address persistent global problems. Progress seemed more palpable on the sidelines of Rio20 as hundreds of voluntary commitments sprang up and pledges of over $513 billion poured in. Was this global conference another wasteful talk shop or the causal mechanism behind aggregate shifts in international politics? What happened at Rio that represented a real change in the context of global environmental governance?
* The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions, as well as Marija Bingulac, Munyaradzi Chenje, Natalia Escobar-Pemberthy, Stanley Johnson, Brice Lalonde, Tse Yang Lim, and Ambassador John W. McDonald for comments on earlier drafts. 1. Rocard 2012. 2. Leape 2012. 3. George Monbiot. After Rio, We Know. Governments Have Given up on the Planet. The Guardian, June 25, 2012. 4. Kumi Naidoo, Executive Director of Greenpeace International, quoted in Time, June 26, 2012. Leape 2012.
Global Environmental Politics 13:4, November 2013, doi:10.1162/GLEP_e_00194 2013 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
In this article, I offer an assessment of the Rio20 conference grounded in a historical perspective and reect on its results and consequences. I argue that the conferences impacts are subtle, yet signicant. Three main areas stand out: reform of international institutions, sustainable development goals (SDGs), and participation as principle and practice. The global decisions in these domains and the unprecedented local engagement provide critical junctures likely to shape global environmental governance for the next two decades.
Maria Ivanova
Europe was engrossed in the euro crisis; the US was wrestling with economic challenges following the nancial crisis and was embroiled in the 2010 presidential elections; the Middle East was in political turmoil, and China and India were experiencing growth and stability concerns. Countries visions for the multilateral system have diverged sharply, and political commitment to a shared vision for an economic, social, and environmental future has become increasingly difcult, or perhaps impossible. Against this backdrop, Rio20 did not seek to repeat the Rio Earth Summits achievements. Instead, its intention was to secure renewed political commitment for sustainable development, assessing the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of the major summits on sustainable development and addressing new and emerging challenges.8 Seeking to integrate and balance environment, economy, and society, sustainable development remains an aspirational concept with multiple meanings for multiple constituencies. It also underscores the reality that there is no single overarching solution to contemporary environmental, economic, or social problemsmuch less so to all of them collectively. The ambiguous nal outcome of Rio20, The Future We Want, has been perceived both as a meaningless potpourri of issues and as a successful outcome of a global gathering many considered doomed to failure.
ble concern under the broad rubric of sustainable development. The document lists twenty-six thematic areas including biodiversity, climate, water, and energy, environmental and social costs of production and consumption, jobs, social exclusion, and equity, among others. While the document highlights the interconnectedness among issues that cut through the environmental, economic, and social classications, it offers no targets, timelines, or specic objectives. Inclusive of every possible topic within sustainable development, it does not prioritize any areas or express a particular sense of urgency. Its most important achievement, some observers lamented, was simply that it did not regress. Yet The Future We Want did achieve what the authorizing resolution (64/236) called for in securing renewed political commitment for sustainable development. It outlined the reform of environment and sustainable development institutions; authorized new political processes, including a process on articulating SDGs; brought a broad spectrum of issues within the sustainable development mandate; and offered a wide range of actors license to move toward solving them. Despite signicant political constraints and predictions of imminent failure, Rio20 set the agenda of the next two decades for global environmental and sustainability governance. As of June 2013, three UN General Assembly resolutions operationalized the results of Rio20: 67/203 on Rio20 follow-up, 67/213 on UNEP, and 67/L.72 on the high-level political forum on sustainable development. Another resolution, 67/246, provided a budget of about $10 million for follow-up in 2013. Two processes are still in negotiation: on sustainable development goals and on a nancing strategy for sustainable development. The key to understanding Rio20s impact lies in discerning the detail in the broad political statements and the numerous ofcial and unofcial activities that constituted the conference.
Maria Ivanova
council from fty-eight countries to universal membership; by increasing its nancial resources through greater contributions from the UN regular budget; and by expanding its role in capacity building and implementation. The outcome document, UNEP Governing Council decision 27/2 on institutional arrangements, and UN General Assembly resolutions 67/213 of December 21, 2012, and 67/251 of March 13, 2013, explicitly afrmed UNEPs leadership role in environmental governance. These documents accord UNEP some key attributes of a specialized agencyuniversality, more stable and predictable nances, and formal authoritywithout the limitation of a lengthy treaty negotiation process. As a result of Rio20, UNEP became the only UN subsidiary organ with universal membership, as its governing council transformed into the UN Environment Assembly. This change is expected to grant UNEP greater legitimacy vis--vis member states and multilateral environmental agreements. Universal membership in the environment assembly will formally involve all UN member states in decision-making, thus according its decisions greater legitimacy. It will also allow UNEP greater ability to engage in the work of the conventions. With conferences of the parties comprising from 116 to 197 members, the conventions have reportedly been reluctant to accept UNEP as an authority. However, even the UN General Assembly holds no formal authority over the conventions, and a specialized agency status would not grant UNEP authority over the conventions without signicant amendments to their existing structures. Ultimately, UNEP has to earn the necessary inuence to coordinate and oversee the work of the conventions and produce a coherent response to environmental challenges. Financially, UNEP also emerged in a stronger position. Afrming the need for secure, stable, adequate and predictable nancial resources for UNEP, Resolution 67/213 committed contributions from the UN regular budget in a manner that adequately reects the organizations administrative and management costs.11 This is an explicit return to Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972, which created UNEP. The new resolution noted that the costs of servicing the Governing Council and providing the small secretariat . . . shall be borne by the regular budget of the United Nations and that operational programme costs, programme support and administrative costs of the Environment Fund shall be borne by the Fund.12 Importantly, Resolution 67/213 also requests the UN Secretary-General to ensure that the budgetary resources UNEP receives correspond to the scope of its work program, which will increase the share of UN regular budget resources from the current 4 percent of UNEPs total budget (or $6 million per year).13 Contributions from the UN regular budget to UNEPs core operational needs would serve a role similar to that of assessed contribu11. UNGA 2013b. 12. UNGA 1972. 13. Scanlon 2012, p. 3.
tions in specialized agencies, a stable and predictable amount providing certainty for a core budget. UNEP could then raise program resources through entrepreneurial means. Indeed, support for UNEP at Rio20 went beyond rhetoric and came from unexpected quarters. Chinas premier and Brazils president announced contributions of $6 million each, putting them among UNEPs top twenty donors.14 Through the renewed political commitment to UNEP, countries formally afrmed the organizations mandate in its entiretyfrom the initial General Assembly resolution to the latest political declaration. They emphasized that it was important for UNEP to enhance its voice and ability to realize its coordination mandate, by increasing its engagement in key coordination bodies and by leading efforts to formulate UN system-wide strategies on the environment. Importantly, governments afrmed a greater role for UNEP in helping nation states to build capacity and implement environmental commitments, a role that would bring the organization closer to on-the-ground activities. In a rare institutional reform move, governments decided to abolish the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)the central institutional outcome of the 1992 Rio Earth Summitand replace it with a high-level intergovernmental political forum. Despite several attempts to revamp its program of work and its format, the CSD had failed to catalyze sufcient political commitment and action. Its futile negotiations (such as in 2007 on energy and climate change) illustrated the fundamental disagreements between states on the nature, scope and ambition of the sustainable development agenda and the role, relevance and value of the CSD itself.15 Unable to address contemporary global challenges and add value to existing processes, the CSD had come to be seen as ineffective and even counterproductive. Moreover, opposition to the CSD came from many UN agencies, which saw its efforts as duplicative, particularly in the environmental eld. The core functions of the new high-level political forum are to provide political leadership for sustainable development, follow up and review progress in implementation of sustainable development commitments, enhance integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in a holistic and crosssectoral manner at all levels, and provide an action-oriented agenda, ensuring due consideration of new and emerging challenges.16 The forum will convene at the heads of state level in the General Assembly every four years beginning in 2014, and annually at the ministerial level in the Economic and Social Council. The ambitious mandate carries the power for more effective coordination and integration of sustainable development at all levels. It also poses the peril of vacuous promises if not properly operationalized and executed. Rio20s outcome document and the General Assembly resolution creat14. Ivanova 2011. 15. IISD 2007. 16. UNGA 2013a, para 2.
Maria Ivanova
ing the forum set out a comprehensive vision for a new UN institution, but they do not provide a clear division of labor between the environment and sustainable development institutions. Thus the potential for overlap, duplication, and competition between the new forum, UNEP, other UN institutions, and multilateral environmental agreements remains signicant and threatens to perpetuate the dynamic that led to the institutional reform in the rst place.
processes to enhancing the participation and effective engagement of civil society in multiple governance aspects.18 Paragraphs 42 to 55 of the outcome document afrm the commitment to engage non-state actors in processes that contribute to decision-making, planning and implementation of policies and programmes for sustainable development at all levels. While a broad norm of participation had been in existence, governments began to apply it more forcefully after Rio20. In negotiations during the rst universal UNEP governing council in 2013, some governments insisted, in the face of opposition, that civil society participation in deliberations on environmental matters be explicitly required within the new UN Environment Assembly. This norm has also been adopted in the new high-level political forum on sustainable development, where it extended beyond the traditional nine major groups to explicitly include academic institutions and other stakeholders.19 During the 10 days of the conference, 4,000 side events took place in Rio, 500 of them at the ofcial conference center. Myriad local initiatives have sprung up in cities and on campuses across the planet. Governments, businesses, civil society groups, and universities registered over 600 voluntary commitments in energy, transport, green economy, disaster reduction, desertication, water, forests, agriculture and more, and mobilized over $513 billion to meet them. The peoples summitorganized as a counter-conference across the citybrought together 15,000 people looking for alternatives to the ofcial government processes under the banner, Come re-invent the world. Meanwhile, acknowledging the feebleness of previous commitments from the private sector, two hundred CEOs met in their own parallel eventthe Business Action for Sustainable Development Conferenceto encourage business to implement change at scale. Leaders of thirty-seven banks, investment funds, and insurance companies signed on to the Natural Capital Declaration, committing to help build an understanding of their impacts and dependencies on natural capital; embed natural capital into their products and services; report or disclose on the theme of natural capital; and account for natural capital in accounting frameworks.20 Thirty prominent insurance companies worth over $5 trillion launched the Principles for Sustainable Insurance, aiming to green the sector and provide insurance tools for risk management. Hundreds of judges, chief justices, and prosecutor generals gathered at the World Congress on Justice in Rio to articulate the role of courts in environmental policy. Thousands of students and faculty from across the world engaged in Rio20 as thinkers and doers, articulating education and sustainability goals and initiatives in campuses and communities worldwide. Civil society engagement in articulating a new global vision for sustainable development has continued beyond the conference. UN Secretary-General
18. UNGA 2012, para 76(e), 76(h). 19. UNGA 2013a, para 16. 20. Natural Capital Declaration 2012.
Maria Ivanova
Ban Ki-moon convened a high-level panel to advise on the global development agenda beyond 2015 and prepare a bold yet practical development vision . . . for a global post-2015 agenda with shared responsibilities for all countries and with the ght against poverty and sustainable development at its core.21 Cochaired by the presidents of Indonesia and Liberia and the prime minister of the UK, the panel includes eminent people from government, academia, NGOs, and business and has engaged in a sustained dialogue with civil society around the world.
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same time, Brazilian governors signed the 2012 Rio Declaration, committing to 20-percent reduction in energy consumption in public buildings and emissions from transportation by 2020. Rios City Hall proposed tax incentives for green construction. Banco do Brasil announced a large loan to clean up the lagoons in Barra da Tijuca. And the Brazilian government announced the creation of Rio Centre, the World Centre for Sustainable Development, which will engage in knowledge creation and dissemination locally and globally. In essence, Rio20s lasting legacy will likely be subtle yet signicant through the institutions it reformed, the values it reafrmed, the global goals it launched, and the local initiatives it inspired. Indeed, it might just be the critical juncture catalyzing the formation of a new group of leaders, the adaptive, perceptive leaders of tomorrow attuned to local realities, globally.
References
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Melamed, Clare and Paul Ladd. 2013. How to Build Sustainable Development Goals: Integrating Human Development and Environmental Sustainability in a New Global Agenda. Research Report. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute. Natural Capital Declaration. 2012. 37 Finance CEOs Announce Commitment on Natural Capital at Rio20. Available at http://www.naturalcapitaldeclaration.org/2012/ 06/37-nance-ceos-announce-commitment-on-natural-capital-at-rio20/, accessed January 29, 2013. ONeill, Kate. 2007. From Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond: The Evolving MetaRegime for Global Environmental Governance. Unpublished paper presented at the Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Amsterdam, Netherlands. Rocard, Michel. 2012. Dont Blame it on Rio. February 22. Available at http://www .project-syndicate.org/commentary/don-t-blame-it-on-rio, accessed January 29, 2013. Scanlon, John E. 2012. Enhancing Environmental Governance for Sustainable Development: Function-Oriented Options. Governance and Sustainability Issue Brief Series: Brief 5. Center for Governance and Sustainability: University of Massachusetts Boston. Available at http://www.umb.edu/cgs/publications/issue_brief_series, accessed May 2, 2013. Seyfang, Gill, and Andrew Jordan. 2002. The Johannesburg Summit and Sustainable Development: How Effective Are Environmental Conferences? In Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2002/2003, edited by Olav Schram Stokke and ystein B. Thommessen, 1939. London: Earthscan Publications. UN (United Nations). 2012. UN Secretary-General Appoints High-Level Panel on Post2015 Development Agenda. Note to Correspondents. July 31. Available at http:// www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid2455, accessed May 2, 2013. UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme). 2012a. Global Environmental Outlook (GEO-5). Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations. . 2012b. Measuring Progress: Environmental Goals & Gaps. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme. UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 1972. Resolution 2997 (XXVIII): Institutional and Financial Arrangements for Environmental Cooperation, December 15. . 2010. Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. A/64/236.31, March 31. . 2012. The Future We Want. A/66/L.56, July 27. . 2013a. Format and Organization aspects of the high-level political forum on sustainable development. A/67/L.72, June 27. . 2013b. Report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme on its twelfth special session and the implementation of Section IV.C, entitled Environmental pillar in the context of sustainable development, of the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. A/RES/67/213, March 15.