PRELIMINARY CHAPTER INTRODUCTION CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Criminal Procedure is the method prescribed by law for the apprehension and

prosecution of persons accused of any criminal offense, and for their punishment, in case of conviction. Criminal procedure is concerned with the procedural steps through which a criminal case passes, commencing with the initial investigation of a crime and concluding with the unconditional release of the offender. It is a generic term used to describe the network of laws and rules which govern the procedural administration of criminal justice, e.g., laws and court rules (e.g.. Rules of Criminal Procedure) governing arrest, search and seizure, bail, etc. SOURCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1. 2. *. -. &. 0. The panish !aw of Criminal "rocedure. #eneral $rders %o. &', dated (pril )*, 1+,,. (mendatory (cts passed by the "hilippine Commission. The various quasi acts, the "hilippine .ill of 1+,), the /ones !aw of 1+10, the Tydings12c3uffie !aw and the Constitution of the "hilippines. The 4ules of Court of 1+-, and the 1+0-, 1+'& and 1+'' 4ules on Criminal "rocedure. 5arious 4epublic (cts, e.g., 4.(. %o. )-,6 %ew 4ule 1)7, providing for attachment6 4.(. %o. )+0, /udiciary (ct of 1+-' denning criminal jurisdiction, and ..". .ig. 1)+ as amended by 4.(. %o. 70+16 4.(. %o. ')-+, Creating the andiganbayan6 4.(. %o. '*-+, The peedy Trial (ct of 1++'. "residential 3ecrees, e.g., ".3. %o. +116 4.(. %o. 7*), regu1 lating the authority of "rosecuting 8iscals to Conduct "reliminary Investigation. Constitution 9 4ights of an (ccused under (rticle III. The Civil Code. (Arts. 32, 33 and 34) /udicial decisions applying or interpreting our laws which form part of our legal system. 4.(. %o. '-+*, The peedy Trial (ct of 1++'. Circulars. The 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure.

4esort is made to secret in:uiry to discover the culprit and violence and torture were often employed to e;tract a confession. The /udge was not limited to the evidence brought before him but could proceed with his own in:uiry which was not confrontative. 2. Accusatorial. The accusation is e;ercised by every citizen or by a member of the group to which the injured party belongs. (s the action is a combat between the parties, the supposed offender has the right to be confronted by his accuser. The battle in the form of a public trial is judged by a magistrate who renders the verdict. 3. The Mixed System. This is a combination of the in:uisitorial and the accusatorial systems. Thus, the e;amination of defendants and other persons before the filing of the complaint or information may be in:uisitorial. This is particularly true in the "reliminary e;amination, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. <nder the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, a criminal action may be instituted by complaint of the offended party or by information filed by the 8iscal and once the criminal action is filed in court, the accused has the right to confront and cross1e;amine his accuser. It has, however, been held that=
>(s a general rule, a court proceeding in our judicial set1up is accusatorial or adversary and not in:uisitorial in nature. It contem1 plates two contending parties before the court which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial.>-

>Criminal due process re:uires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly processes of law. In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step1by1step procedure re:uired by the rules. The reason for this is to assure that the tate makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty e;cept that of the guilty.>

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS "CRIMINAL JURISDICTION" is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by= ?1@ the geographical limits of the territory over which it presides, and ?)@ the actions ?civil and criminal@, it is empowered to hear and decide. ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES The elements of jurisdiction of a trial court over the subject matter in a criminal case are= a. b. The nature of the offense andAor penalty attached thereto6 and The fact that the offense has been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

The non1concurrence of either of these two elements may be challenged by an accused at any stage of the proceedings in the court below or on appeal. 8ailing in one of them, a judgment of conviction is null and void. REQUISITES FOR JURISDICTION VALID EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL

7. '. +. 1,. 11. 1). 1*.

IMPORTANCE OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES >(ll trial courts, the andiganbayan included, are reminded that they should take all the necessary measures guaranteeing procedural due process from the inception of custodial investigation up to rendition of judgment. They are not to turn a blind eye to procedural irregularities which transpired before the criminal case reached the court. The validity and sufficiency of the information are important.>

Three important re:uisites must be present before a court can validly e;ercise its power to hear and try a case= a. b. c. It must have jurisdiction over the subject matter6 It must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed6 It must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

THREE SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1. Inquisitorial. The detection and prosecution of offenders are not left to the initiative of private parties but to the officials and agents of the law.

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the

proceedings in :uestion belong.' JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW The "hilippine Courts have no common law jurisdiction or power, but only those e;pressly conferred by the Constitution and statutes and those necessarily implied to make the e;press powers effective. STATUTE IN FORCE AT COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS DETERMINES JURISDICTION /urisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action and not at the time of its commission even if the penalty that may be imposed at the time of its commission is less and does not fall under the courtBs jurisdiction. /urisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by1law. It cannot be fi;ed by the will of the parties nor can it be ac:uired or diminished by any act of the parties. In determining whether a case lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court, reference to the applicable statute on the matter is indispensable. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of action. The principle, however, is different, where jurisdiction is dependent on the nature of the position of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
In Subido . Sandiganba!an, jurisdiction was determined by the position of the accused at the time of t"e commission of t"e offense. The crime of arbitrary detention was allegedly committed on /une )&, 1++) when accused was a Commissioner of the .I3. 4.(. %o. 7+7& took effect on 2ay 0,1++& vesting the andiganbayan with e;clusive jurisdiction for crimes committed by public officers corresponding to #rade )7. The information was filed on )' /uly 1++& when accused was already a private citizen. Ce claimed that under the law at the time of the commencement of the action, the andiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him for the offense charged. CD!3= 4epublic (ct %o. 7+7& ?amended by 4.(. %o. ')-+@ as regards the andiganbayanBs jurisdiction, mode of appeal and other proce1 dural matters, was held as a procedural law and may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested rights. It was held that the andiganbayan has no jurisdiction over an anti1graft

case allegedly committed by public officers who at the time of the filing of the information falls below #rade )7.

JURISDICTION COMPLAINT

DETERMINED

BY

ALLEGATIONS

OF

otherwise. /urisdiction over criminal cases cannot be conferred by consent. Dven if a party fails to file a motion to :uash, he may still :uestion the jurisdiction of the court later on. 2oreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu #ro#rio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. e. If under the law the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it cannot take cognizance of the case, notwithstanding the silence or ac:uiescence of the accused. The e;ception is when there is estoppel by laches to bar attacks on jurisdiction. f. Dstoppel by !aches to Fuestion /urisdiction in Criminal Cases #enerally, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. The principle, however, earlier laid down in the case of $i%am . Sibong"ano!2&& which bars a party from attacking the jurisdiction of the court by reason of estoppel by laches have been e;tended to criminal cases. ee, however, 'u(ume . Court of&A##eals, holding that accused or the court may motu #ro#rio raise lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case for the first time on (ppeal. )mmunit! from suit is a %urisdictional question. g. "rinciple that there is no estoppel against tate

The averments in the complaint or information characterizes the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. In order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be e;amined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law for such facts fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the findings the court may make after the trial. PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION a. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by= ?1@ the geographical limits of the territory over which it presides, and ?)@ the action ?civil and criminal@ it is empowered to hear and decide. (s the :uestion of jurisdiction is always of importance, if the prosecution fails to prove that fact, the court may always permit it to present additional evidence to show the fact that the crime was committed within its jurisdiction. The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby ac:uires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. Ehen after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby ac:uired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. d. !ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is fatal and an objection based upon this ground may be interposed at any stage of the proceedings. /urisdiction is conferred only by the sovereign authority which organizes the courts. Ehen jurisdiction over an offense has not been conferred by law, the accused cannot confer it by e;press waiver or

b.

c.

The settled rule is that the tate is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers and employees. Indeed, in Cru(, *r. . Court of A##eals, the Court declared=
. . . Dstoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. (s we declared in Peo#le . Castaneda, >there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subse:uent correct application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.>

The Court also held in C"ua . Court of A##eals+

. . . Ehile ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are e;ceptions. (mong them are=

?a@ ?b@ ?c@ ?d@

when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates6 when the broader interest of justice so re:uires6 when the writs issued are null and void6 or ,"en t"e questioned order amounts to an o##ressi e e-ercise of %udicial aut"orit!... .

officers mentioned above, e;clusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in 0atas Pambansa 0ig. 122, as amended, was applied to the pending criminal case in the andiganbayan. The previous law vests jurisdiction in the 4TC where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to alary #rade )7. The term 3#rinci#al3 was deleted so that under the amendment, if an accomplice belongs to alary #rade )7, then jurisdiction is with the andiganbayan even if none of the principals belong to a lower salary grade. The amendment was applied retroactively. JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSE a. In criminal cases, the court must e;amine the complaint for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out and the punishment provided by law for such act, fall within the jurisdiction of the court. If the criminal act charged is punished by law with a penalty which pertains to the jurisdiction of the court, it falls under the original jurisdiction thereof, although the penalty it may have to impose in accordance with the evidence is below that which falls under its jurisdiction. b. Ehere a complaint is presented in court charging the defendant with murder, at the close of the trial, the court finds that the crime committed was assault and battery only. /ustices of the peace have original jurisdiction over the offense of assault and battery, the complaint, however, gave the Court of 8irst Instance jurisdiction over the alleged crime. It retains jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing the penalty provided for by law for the crime proved to have been committed. c. Ehere the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person of the accused, it is not necessary, in order to maintain that jurisdiction, to decide the case correctly. The Court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. d. It is not a jurisdictional defect and one which deprives the court of its authority to try, convict and pass sentence, that h.

a criminal action is brought in the name of the City of 2anila instead of the united tates. The fact constitutes a mere defect or error curable at any stage of the action, it does not deprive the court of the power to pronounce a valid judgment and impose a valid sentence, and it cannot be made the basis of a writ of "abeas cor#us e. The court having jurisdiction of the offense has also jurisdiction to determine the disposition of the instrument used in the commission of the crime. (s an accessory penalty, the instrument used in the commission of the offense shall be forfeited unless it belongs to a third person who is not liable for the offense which the instrument was used to commit. It is the duty of the court therefore to dispose of the same upon the application of any person interested. The person to whom the instrument belongs has a right to take his proceeding to the court having jurisdiction of the offense for the purpose of having his rights in the premises determined. f. Ehere a court is given jurisdiction over a specific class of crimes, that jurisdiction will continue whether that class be enlarged or diminished or whether the penalty for a violation be increased or diminished. Ehere the military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of a military officer at the time of the alleged offenses, the jurisdiction having been vested, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings. /urisdiction once ac:uired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. ubject matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegation of a criminal information. In Peo#le . Purisima, the Court stressed that=
>; ; ;. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the juris diction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evi dence that would be presented at the trial, but by the e;tent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint.

h.

( conviction or ac:uittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, like all proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and is therefore no bar to subse:uent indictment and trial in a court which has jurisdiction of the offense. ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION $nce jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. $rdinarily, jurisdiction once ac:uired is not affected by subse:uent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Thus, it has been held that the andiganbayan or the courts as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of4.(. %o. 7+7&. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation. EXCEPTION TO PRINCIPLE OF ADHERENCE Ehere, however, the subse:uent statute e;pressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is applicable to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Ehere a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. 4.(. %o. 7+7& by virtue of rather than a rule. ection 7 belongs to the e;ception

g.

The provision is transitory in nature and e;presses the legislatureBs intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not began in the andiganbayan. To this e;tent 4.(. %o. 7+7& is retroactive. In another case, the court held that although the andiganbayan has jurisdiction at the time the charge was filed, it lost jurisdiction upon the enactment of 4.(. %o. 7+7& because he falls below the rank of full colonel, and trial has not yet begun. In .acson . /-ecuti e Secretar!, the amendment in 4.(. %o. ')-+ that in cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to alary #rade >)7> or higher, as prescribed in the said 4epublic (ct %o. 07&', or military and "%"

If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction

answer for any crime committed by him e;cept in the jurisdiction where it was committed. aid rule is1 based on the legal provision which prescribes the essential re:uisites of a good complaint or information, one of which is the allegation that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint or information is filed and that said court has authority to try it. (s was said in the case of 4nited States . Cunanan, the jurisdiction of the Courts of 8irst Instance of the "hilippine Islands, in criminal cases is limited to certain well1defined territory, so that they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed outside of that limited territory. /urisdiction of the Courts in criminal cases rests upon a differ ent footing from that in civil cases. In criminal cases, the people of the tate is a party.

The same rule was set forth and amplified in Peo#le 0uissan in the following terms=

the time of cohabitation, assigned as error as the conviction thereon amounted to a conviction without informing the defendants of the nature and character of the offense, and besides e:uivalent to a conviction without due process of law. %o such :uestion having been raised before final judgment in the trial court, but every ingredient of the crime having been established in the evidence, there was no error committed upon which to base a reversal of conviction. ACTION BY COURT WHERE IT HAS NO JURISDICTION Ehen the record discloses that the crime as alleged in the complaint was not committed in the province wherein the trial was had, and the accused was not arrested in that province and defendant had not fled therefrom, the Court of 8irst Instance of that province has no jurisdiction to impose sentence. In such cases, if the court has reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, the accused should be remanded to the court of proper jurisdiction for trial. It has been held that where the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of ordering the transfer, the court should dismiss the case. Cowever, in Re#ublic . Asuncion, and Cunanan v. Arcco, the Court sanctioned the transfer of the cases from the 4TC for lack of jurisdiction to the andiganbayan, while in .acson . $"e /-ecuti e Secretar!, the Court (en bane) ordered the transfer of the cases from the andiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction to the 4egional Trial Court of Fuezon City which has e;clusive original jurisdiction over said cases. In Cu!co u. Sandiganba!an, the court ordered the andiganbayan to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, but informed the $mbudsman that it may re1file the cases with the court of proper jurisdiction, the 4TC of Iamboanga City. In his concurring opinion, Chief /ustice 3avide, /r., asked to 4D8D4 the case to the 4TC instead of dismissing the cases. It is believed that under its supervisory authority, the upreme Court and even the Court of (ppeals may properly refer the case to the court of proper jurisdiction. Courts of the first and second level is without authority to order the transfer. If the said courts believe that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its jurisdiction is limited to simply dismissing the case.

;;; GiHn criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trialor even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial but by the e;tent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is ac:uired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether or not the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information.

Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the ma;imum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court ?provided it has subject1matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to@ even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the e;clusive jurisdiction of an inferior court. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be ac:uired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 8urthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. (nd once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. Cowever, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one can not be held to

The interests of the public re:uire that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. (s a result, it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in constitution, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the place where the crime was committed. Ehile the laws here do not specifically and in terms re:uire it, it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be brought and conducted, e;cept in cases especially provided by law, in the province where the crime is committed. /udicial divisions or districts ?now regions@ are always fi;ed by law so that any changes or alterations of the same can only be effected by e;press legislation and not by mere inference or deduction. "roceedings in a criminal case before a judge acting without jurisdiction are void, but this fact will not preclude the filing of a new complaint upon the dismissal of the former proceeding. WHEN PLACE OF CRIME NOT ALLEGED Ehere the place of the commission of the offense was not specifically charged, the place may be shown by the evidence. Thus, the insufficiency of the complaint charging adultery without stating the place where the acts of adultery were committed, or that the accused knew the woman was married at

JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL CASES

MUNICIPAL

TRIAL

COURTS

IN

of the amount of the fine. (s a conse:uence, the 4egional Trial Courts have no more original jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the offense is punishable by more than four ?-@ years and two ?)@ months up to si; ?0@ years. ?-@ The provisions of ection *)?)@ of ..". .ig. 1)+, as amended by 4.(. %o. 70+1, apply only to offenses punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both, in which cases the amount of the fine is disregarded in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Cowever, in cases where the only penalty provided by law is a fine, the amount thereof shall determine the jurisdiction of the court in accordance with the original provisions of ection *)?)@ of ..". .ig. 1)+ which fi;ed the original e;clusive jurisdiction of the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts over offenses punishable with a fine of not more than 8our thousand pesos. If the amount of the fine e;ceeds 8our thousand pesos, the 4egional Trial Courts shall have jurisdiction, including offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, where the amount of the fine does not e;ceed i; thousand pesos. Cowever, this rule does not apply to offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence which are under the e;clusive original jurisdiction of the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts, irrespective of the amount of the imposable fine.> The opening "aragraph of ection *) e;cepts cases falling within the e;clusive original jurisdiction of 4egional Trial Court and of the andiganbayan 9 from the e;panded jurisdiction of the aforementioned courts even if the offense is punishable with imprisonment not e;ceeding si; ?0@ years. In other words, where jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the offense and not by the penalty, jurisdiction should remain in the 4egional Trial Court or the andiganbayan. 8or e;ample= 1@ !ibel is punishable by #rision corrreccional in its minimum and ma;imum period or fine or bail. (Article &@

4epublic (ct %o. 70+1 which took effect on (pril 1&, 1++amended ..". .ig. 1)+, otherwise known as >The /udiciary 4eorganization (ct of 1+',> by D;panding the /urisdiction of the aforementioned courts as follows= D;clusive $riginal /urisdiction ;;; DC. ). ection *) of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows=
> DC. *). Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. D;cept in cases falling within the e;clusive original jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court and of the andiganbayan, the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts shall e;ercise= ?1@ D;clusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction6 and ?)@ D;clusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not e;ceeding si; ?0@ years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof= Pro ided, "o,e er. That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have e;clusive original jurisdiction thereof.>

354, R.P.C.) (rticle *0,, however, of the same code as amended, provides that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation shall be filed in the Court of 8irst Instance, etc.> )@ /urisdiction over Dlection $ffenses

DC. )0'. *urisdiction of courts. The regional trial court shall have the e;clusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, e;cept those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. 8rom the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

*@ (4TIC!D J 9 /urisdiction $ver 3angerous 3rugs Cases

DC. *+. Jurisdiction. The Court of 8irst Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, and /uvenile and 3omestic 4elations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this (ct= Pro ided, That in cities or provinces where there are ./uvenile and 3omestic 4elations Courts, the said courts shall take e;clusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under si;teen years of age.

-@

Cases which falls under the original and e;clusive jurisdiction of the andiganbayan regardless of the imposable penalty. Thus, the aforementioned e;ception refers not only to ection ), of..". .ig. 1)+ providing for the jurisdiction of 4egional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodged in 4egional Trial CourtsB e;clusive jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.g., ?a@ (rticle *0, of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended by 4.(. %os. 1)'+ and -*0* on written defamation or libel6 ?b@ 3ecree on Intellectual "roperty ?".3. %o. -+, as amended@, which vests upon Courts of 8irst Instance e;clusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty6 and ?c@ more appropriately, ection *+ of 4.(. %o. 0-)&, as amended by ".3. %o. --, which vests on Courts of 8irst Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the /uvenile and 3omestic 4elations Courts concurrent e;clusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said (ct. Cases which fall under the original and e;clusive jurisdiction of 8amily Courts under 4epublic (ct %o. '*0+ known as the 8amily Courts (ct of 1++7.

Interpreting the foregoing law, the upreme Court issued (dministrative Circular ,+1+- as follows=
ubject= #uidelines in the implementation of 4epublic (ct %o. 70+1, Dntitled >(n (ct D;panding the /urisdiction of the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts, (mending 8or the "urpose .atas "ambansa .ig. 1)+, otherwise known as the /udiciary 4eorganization (ct of 1+',.>

8or the guidance of the .ench and the .ar, the following guidelines are to be followed in the implementation of 4epublic (ct %o. 70+1, entitled >(n (ct D;panding the /urisdiction of the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts, (mending for the "urpose .atas "ambansa .ig. 1)+, otherwise known as the B/udiciary 4eorganization (ct of 1+',B>= ?*@ The criminal jurisdiction of the 2etropolitan Trial Courts, 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts under ection *)?)@ of..". .ig. 1)+, as amended by 4.(. %o. 70+1, has been increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not e;ceeding si; ?0@ years irrespective

CIVIL LIABILITY IRRESPECTIVE OF KIND OR NATURE Ehere the offense charged is within its e;clusive competence by reason of the penalty prescribed therefor, an inferior court shall have jurisdiction to try and decide the case irrespective of the kind and nature of the civil liability arising from the said offense. The jurisdiction of the court is also determined by the amount of the fine and imprisonment. .ut an indemnification or a reparation or a restitution is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction of the courts is not fi;ed by the incident but by the nature of the crime itself. !egally speaking, the nature of the crime is determined by the punishment imposed. Thus, it has been held that the jurisdiction of courts of justice of the peace over crimes is determined e;clusively by the amount of the fine and imprisonment imposed by the law, that is by the legal nature of the crime, and in no matter and to no e;tent whatever by the civil incidents which accrue to the person injured by the commission of said crime. Thus, an inferior court has jurisdiction over a case of simple seduction defined and penalized under (rticle **' of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended, with arresto ma!or, regardless of the civil liability that may be imposed under (rticle *-& of the same code. This supersedes 4.S. . 0arredo. O !"# I$%&'()*" P"+(* ,"' 9 The additional penalty for habitual delin:uency is not considered in determining which court shall have jurisdiction over a criminal case because such delin:uency is not a crime. SPECIAL JURISDICTION IN CERTAIN CASES In the absence of all the 4egional Trial /udges in a province or city, any 2etropolitan Trial /udge, 2unicipal Trial /udge, 2unicipal Circuit Trial /udge may hear and decide petitions for a writ of "abeas cor#us or application for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent 4egional Trial /udges sit. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS 4egional Trial Courts shall e;ercise e;clusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the e;clusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, e;cept those now falling under the e;clusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the andiganbayan which shall hereafter be e;clusively taken cognizance by the latter.

JURISDICTION OVER COMPLEX CRIMES /urisdiction over the whole comple; crime must logically be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the ma;imum and most serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the comple; crime. ( comple; crime must be prosecuted integrally, as it were, and not split into its component offenses and the latter made the subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS 4epublic (ct %o. '*0+ established 8amily Courts granting them e;clusive original jurisdiction over child and family cases namely=
a. Criminal case where one or more of the accused is below eighteen ?1'@ years of age but not less than nine ?+@ years of age, or where one or more of the victim is a minor at the time of the com mission of the offense6 Pro ided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to "residential 3ecree %o. 0,*, otherwise known as the >Child and Kouth Eelfare Code.> i. j. Cases against minors cognizable under the 3angerous 3rugs (cts, as amended6 5iolations of 4epublic (ct %o. 701,, otherwise known as the > pecial "rotection of Children (gainst Child (buse, D;ploitation and 3iscrimination (ct,> as amended by 4epublic (ct %o. 70&'6 and Cases of domestic violence against= 1@ Eomen 9 which are acts of gender based violence that result, or are likely to result in physical, se;ual or psychological harm or suffering to women6 and other forms of physical abuses battering or threats and coercion which violates a womanBs personhood, integrity and freedom of movement6 and Children 9 which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, e;ploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

The jurisdiction of the andiganbayan under "residential 3ecree %o. 10,0, as amended by D;ecutive $rder %o. 1'-, has been changed by 4D"<.!IC (CT %$. ')-+ 9 >(% (CT T$ T4D%#TCD% TCD 8<%CTI$%(! (%3 T4<CT<4(! $4#(%II(TI$% $8 TCD (%3I#(%.(K(%, (2D%3I%# 8$4 TC(T "<4"$ D "4D I3D%TI(! 3DC4DD %$. 10,0.> *urisdiction. The andiganbayan shall e;ercise e;clusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving= >a. 5iolations of 4epublic (ct %o. *,1+, as amended, otherwise known as the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct, 4epublic (ct %o. 1*7+, and Chapter II, ection ), Title 5II, .ook II of the 4evised "enal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense= ?I@ $fficial of the e;ecutive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as #rade B)7B and higher, of the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+ ?4epublic (ct %o. 07&'@, specifically including= >?a@ "rovincial governors, vice1governors, members of the sangguniang #anlala,igan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads6 >?b@ City mayors, vice1mayors, members of the sangguniang #anlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads6 >?c@ $fficials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher6 >?d@ "hilippine army and air force colonels, captains, and all officers of higher rank6 naval

k@

)@

>?e@ $fficers of the "hilippine %ational "olice while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher6 >?f@ City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and official and prosecutors in the $ffice of the $mbudsman and special prosecutor6 and >?g@ "residents, directors or trustees, or managers of government1owned or 1controlled corporations,

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN CHANGED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. -2./

state universities or educational institutions or foundations6 >?)@ 2embers of Congress and officials thereof classified as #rade B)B and up under the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+6 >?*@ 2embers of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution6 >?-@ Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution6 and >?&@ (ll other national and local officials classified as #rade B)7B and higher under the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+. >b. $ther offenses or felonies whether simple or comple;ed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection ?a@ of this section in relation to their office. >c. Civil and criminal case filed pursuant to and in connection with D;ecutive $rder %os. 1, ), 1- and 1-1(, issued in 1+'0. LIn cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to alary #rade B)7B or higher, as prescribed in the said 4epublic (ct %o. 07&', or military and "%" officers mentioned above, e;clusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in 0atas Pambansa 0ig. 122, as amended. >The Sandiganba!an shall e;ercise e;clusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the e;ercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. >The Sandiganba!an shall have e;clusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the ,rits of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, "abeas cor#us, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo ,arranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which be filed under D;ecutive $rder %os. 1, ), 1- and 1-1 (, issued in 1+'0=

Pro ided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be e;clusive of the upreme Court. >In case private individuals are charged as co1principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including those employed in government1owned or 1controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall e;ercise e;clusive jurisdiction over them.> CONSEQUENCE OF AMENDMENTS (s a conse:uence of these amendments, the andiganbayan partly lost its e-clusi e original %urisdiction in cases involving= a. b. c. 5iolations of 4.(. %o. *,1+6 4.(. %o. 1*7+6 and Chapter II, ection ), Title 5II of the 4evised "enal Code. (Article 216, 7irect 0riber!8 Article 211, )ndirect 0riber!8 andArticle 212, Corru#tion of Public 9fficials).

case. DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION 4epublic (ct %o. ')-+ collated the provisions on the e;clusive jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. Its original jurisdiction as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposed by the law on crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of the acused government officials and employees. To determine the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan in cases involving violations of 4ep. (ct %o. *,1+, the reckoning period is t"e time of t"e commission if t"e offense. I+0*12"' &33,0,(*' '%"0,3,0(**4 $"+ ,&+"2 "5"+ ,3 )"*&6 G#(2" 27 The specific inclusion of the officials from ?a@ to ?g@ constitutes an e;ception to the general :ualification relating to officials of the e;ecutive branch as >occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade )7 and higher, of the Compensation and Classification (ct of 1+'+. In other words, violation of 4ep. (ct %o. *,1+ committed by officials specifically enumerated in ?a@ to ?g@ regardless of their salary grade. (ll other officials below grade )7 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts. PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT FALL WITHIN THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF REP. ACT NO. 381/ AND CHAPTER II9 SECTION 29 TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE : BRIBERY (ART. !"#, INDIRECT BRIBERY (ART. !!# AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS (ART. ! # 4ep. (ct %o. 7+7& has grouped them into five categories, to wit= ?1@ $fficials of the e;ecutive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade )7 and higher6 ?)@ 2embers of Congress and officials thereof classified as #rade >)7> and up under the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+6 ?*@ 2embers of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution6

The andiganbayan retains jurisdiction only in cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection ?a@ ection - above and, generally, national and local officials classified as #rade >)7> and higher under the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+. 2oreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, i(., that which is higher than #rision correccional or imprisonment for si; years or a fine of"0,,,,.,,6 it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, ection - above. Cowever, it retains its e;clusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with D.$. %o. I. JURISDICTION OFFICERS OF SANDIGANBAYAN OVER PUBLIC

"rior to the amendment (R.A. :o. ;2;5), jurisdiction of the andiganbayan for felonies other than violation of 4.(. %o. *,1+ as amended, otherwise known as the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct, 4epublic (ct %o. 1*7+, and Chapter II, ection ), Title 5II of the 4evised "enal Code, embrace all other offenses provided, t"e offense ,as committed in relation to #ublic office and t"e #rescribed #enalt! is more t"an si- !ears. <nder the present law, both the nature of the offense and the positions occupied by the accused are the conditions sine qua non before the andiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the

?-@ Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution6 and ?&@ (ll other national and local officials classified as #rade >)7> and higher under the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of 1+'+. The andiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the first classification= >a. 5iolations of 4epublic (ct %o. *,1+, as amended, otherwise known as the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct, 4epublic (ct %o. 1*7+, and Chapter II, ection ), Title 5II, .ook II of the 4evised "enal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense. The e;clusive jurisdiction of the andiganbayan over those public officers holding positions classified as #rade )7 refers to 5iolations of4.(. %o. *,1+, (ct %o. 1*7+ and Chapter II, ection ), Title 5II, .ook II of the 4evised "enal Code referring to 2alfeasance and 2isfeasance in office ?1@ ?)@ ?*@ ?-@ (rt. ),-, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment6 (rt. ),&, /udgment rendered thru negligence6 (rt. ),0, <njust Interlocutory $rder6 (rt. ),7, 2alicious 3elay in the administration of justice6 ?&@ (rt. ),', "rosecution of offenses6 negligence and tolerance6 ?0@ (rt. ),+, .etrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor 9 4evelation of secrets6 ?7@ (rt. )1,, 3irect .ribery6 ?'@ (rt. )11, Indirect .ribery6 ?+@ (rt. )111(, Fualified .ribery6 ?1,@(rt. )1), Corruption of public officials. which does not include the crime of 4ebellion or cou# d&etat. Eith respect to other offenses or felonies whether simple or comple;ed with other crimes committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection ?a@ in relation to their office. In other words, the case would fall under the andiganbayan if the crime is committed >in relation to public office e;cept the crimes of rebellion and cou# d&etat. S(+2,;(+)(4(+ !(' <1#,'2,0 ,&+ "5"+ ,3 C&=A001'"2 ,+ M(*5"#'( ,&+ )"*&6 G#(2" 27

Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and penalized by (rticle )17 of the 4evised "enal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined and penalized by (rticle )), of the same Code. The public office of the accused 2unicipal 2ayor 5irginio D. 5illamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. (ccused mayorBs position is classified as # )7. ince the (mended Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co1accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as # )- and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment6 the andiganbayan still has e;clusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property. The determinative fact is that the position of her co1accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as # )7, and under the last paragraph of ection ) of 4ep. (ct %o. 7+7&, if the position of one of the principal accused is classified as # )7, the andiganbayan has original and e;clusive jurisdiction over the offense. WHEN IS AN OFFENSE DEEMED COMMITTED IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE The office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. The test is whether the offense cannot e;ist without the office. DETERMINATION OF WHEN CRIME IS IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE H&6 & D" "#$,+" 6!" !"# ,+3&#$( ,&+ '133,0,"+ *4 (**";"' !( !" 0#,$" 6(' 0&$$, "2 ,+ #"*( ,&+ & %1)*,0 &33,0" There are two ways of determining whether or not the infor1 mation charges that the offense was committed in relation to public office. The statement that the >committed in relation to public office> is not sufficient.

a.

Ehere the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the "rosecutor to state in the Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. Thus, the public office of the accused 2unicipal 2ayor 5irginio D. 5illamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public funds or property.

b.

Ehen specific factual allegations of crime committed in relation to public office re:uired These are offenses or felonies which are intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct.

Ehere the office is not a constituent element of the offense charged there must be s#ecific allegation of facts that it was intimatel! related to t"e disc"arge of t"eir official duties. The andiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in ection ?a@?l@ to ?&@ under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the discharge of his official duties or functions 9 whether improper or irregular. The re:uirement is not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law. In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional court, not the andiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Thus, for jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers in relation to public office to fall within jurisdiction of the andiganbayan 9 the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the information. There must be specific factual averments of this relation, e;cept when the office is a constituent element of the offense charged.

8or instance, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, where the offense therein charged in the information is intimatel! connected ,it" t"e res#ecti e offices of t"e accused and ,as #er#etuated ,"ile t"e! ,ere in t"e #erformance, t"oug" irregular or im#ro#er, of t"eir officials functions and "ad no #ersonal moti e to commit t"e crime and ,ould not "a e committed it "ad t"e! not "eld t"eir #ublic office and merel! obe!ed t"e instruc<don of their superior officer, the offense may be said to have been committed in relation to their office. As e-#lained b! t"e Court
>In Peo#le . =onte%o, where the amended information alleged 9 !eroy . .rown, City 2ayor of .asilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and ; ; ; special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp ; ; ; at Tipo1tipo which is under his command ; ; ; supervision and control where his co1 defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set1up established by said 2ayor of .asilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co1 defendants arrested and maltreated (walin Tebag who died in conse:uence thereof.

The difference between 2ontilla and 2ontejo is that, whereas in the former ?2ontilla@, the murder was committed outside office hours and for personal or political motives, the victim in the latter case ?2ontejo@ was killed while he was undergoing custodial investigation in the police substation. The crime in 2ontejo would not have been committed were it not for the fact that the accused were actually discharging official functions at the time. Thus, the offense charged in 2ontejo was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office6 besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime6 thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. <pon the otherhand, although the information alleged that the principal accused committed the crime in relation to their public office, but there is no s#ecific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimatel! related to t"e disc"arge of t"eir official duties as police officers, or does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and therefore, within the e;clusive original jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court, and not the andiganbayan.
>Thus, the informations do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation but merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of e;tracting or e;torting the sum of "*&*,,,,.,, abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. 8or the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at all, as a conse:uence of, and while they were discharging official functions. The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and of the offense. The case did not come under the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. 8or purposes, however, of ac:uisition of jurisdiction by the andiganbayan, the re:uirement imposed by 4.(. %o. ')-+ that the offense be >committed in relation> to the offenderBs office is entirely distinct from the concept of taking advantage of oneBs position as provided under (rticles 171 and 17) of the 4evised "enal Code. ). The crime of rape with homicide is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. In =ontilla . >ilario, this Court, described the >offense committed in relation to the office> as follows=
>The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same e;cept when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased. .ut the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element6 and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof6 not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from t"e manner of t"e cornmission of t"e crime. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitionerBs office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.

The court held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. In the afore1cited case of Peo#le . =onte%o, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganba!an. Ehat is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accusedBs official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to :ualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Ehere however, from the allegations of the information, it does not appear that the official positions of the accused were connected with the offenses charged, it cannot be said that they are charged of an offense committed in relation to their official position.

Conse:uently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the dis1 charge of official functions of the accused "%" officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the e;clusive original jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court, not the Sandiganba!an. 1. 8alsification of an official document is not within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan unless committed in relation to the public office of the public officer. Thus, in the case of .artolome, there is no showing that the

=oreo er, it is not e en alleged in t"e information t"at t"e commission of t"e crime c"arged ,as intimatel! connected ,it" t"e #erformance of t"e #etitioner&s official functions to ma?e it fall under t"e e-ce#tion laid do,n in Peo#le . =onte%o.3

*.

(cts of !asciviousness filed against an 2TC /udge committed against Court personnel whom he is authorized to recommend appointment under upreme Court circular 9 and used his official position in committing the act complained of, the crime was held as having been committed in relation to his office.

Ehile public office is not an element of the crime of lasciviousness 9 he could not have committed the crime charged were it not for the fact that as "residing /udge of the 2TCC branch, he has authority to recommend her appointment as bookbinder. The crime committed as alleged in the amended information are intimately connected with his office. ( mere allegation that the crime was committed in relation to public office is not what determines the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. Ehat is controlling is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accuserBs official duties and the commission of the of the offense charged, in order to :ualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. -. Ehere the killing committed by a "%" officer was committed while in the course of trying to restore local public order which had been breached by a fistfight between the victim and two other individuals, the killing was committed in relation to the accusedBs public office. Ehere the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of2eycauayan, .ulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in (rticle )') of the 4evised "enal Code against complainant imeon #. !egaspi, a municipal councilor6 and. The $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill !egaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitionerBs administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitionerBs official functions. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech.> Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the andiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. 0. The same principles were stressed in Soller . Sandiganba!an, where the 2unicipal 2ayor and others were charged in the andiganbayan with $bstruction of (pprehension and "rosecution of Criminal $ffenses as

denned and penalized under ".3. %o. 1')+ for tampering with the autopsy and police reports to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of the victim. .ut aside from noting the absence of specific factual allegations, that the offense was committed in relation to public office, the court found that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not among the duties and functions and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be basis for construing that that the criminal acts imputed to the mayor. $f tampering and falsifying the autopsy reports, were committed in relation to his office. 7. Ehere the Informations allege that petitioner, then a >public officer,> committed the crimes of murder and frustrated murder >in relation to his office,> i.e., as >Community Dnvironment and %atural 4esources $fficer> of the 3D%4. It is apparent from this allegation that the offenses charged are intimately connected with petitionerBs office and were perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. In its 4esolution dated (ugust )&,1++), the andiganbayan held that petitioner was >on duty up in order to prevent incursions into the forest and wooded area,> and that petitioner, as a guard, was >precisely furnished with a firearm in order to resist entry by force or intimidation.> Indeed, if petitioner was not on duty at the 3D%4 checkpoint on /anuary 1-, 1++,, he would not have had the bloody encounter with 2ayor Cortez and his men. Thus, based on the allegations in the Informations, the andiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the cases. JURISDICTION EXPLAINED NOT DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS

This was a mistake that misled the prosecution in subse:uent cases. Thus, in Re#ublic . Asuncion, the information did not disclose that the offense of homicide charged against the accused who was a member of the "%" was committed in relation to the office of the accused, but the trial court, during the progress of the trial dismissed the case without prejudice for refiling in the andiganbayan. The upreme Court en bane speaking thru /ustice 3avide, /r., surmised that the absence of an allegation that the crime was committed >in relation to his office> was because of t"e erroneous doctrine in 7eloso u. 7omingo which conveyed the impression that this was not necessary. Cence, the court a quo was directed to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the respondents in relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the andiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. $therwise, the court a quo shall proceed with the case. In Cunanan u. Arceo, the information for murder against a "%" contained no averment that the offense charged was in relation to his public office, hence, the court proceeded to trial and after ooth parties have presented their evidence declared the case submitted for decision. The trial court applied Re#ublic . Asuncion, and conducted a hearing solely to ascertain if accused had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, and found that he did. The trial court accordingly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction for refiling with the andiganbayan pursuant to the >(suncion 4uling.> In a further order, the trial judge modified the dismissal by ordering instead the transfer of the case to the andiganbayan. The upreme Court speaking thru the Third 3ivision did not consider the absence of an allegation in the information that the offense was committed in relation to his office. The Court stated=
It is firmly settled that jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter

&.

In Re#ublic u. Asuncion, t"e Court stressed that the foregoing re:uisites must be alleged in the information for the andiganbayan to have jurisdiction. It was, however, held in one case that under ection -, ".3. %o. 10,0, when the penalty prescribed by law is higher than Prision Correccional, the andiganbayan has jurisdiction, without stating that the offense was committed in relation to the offenderBs office.

10

that is conferred by law. Ehenever the above two ?)@ re:uisites are present, jurisdiction over the offense is vested in the andiganbayan. This is true even though the information originally led before the 4TC did not aver that the accused public officer public had committed the offense charged in relation to his office. In other words, the absence in the old information filed before the 4TC af an allegation that petitioner Cunanan has committed the offense in relation to his office is immaterial insofar as determination of the locus of jurisdiction is concerned. Indeed, it may be recalled that bhe Asuncion ruling involved a situation where the information similarly did not contain an averment that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged while carrying out his official duties. It was precisely to address the situation that the upreme Court in Asuncion fashioned the rule directing the conduct of a preliminary ar separate hearing by a trial court to determine the presence or absence of that jurisdictional element.

employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however be alleged in the information for the andiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under ection -?a@?)@. This allegation is necessar! because of t"e unbending rule t"at %urisdiction is determined b! t"e allegations of t"e information. In the subse:uent case of Peo#le . =agallanes, where the accused were charged with kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein some of the accused were members of the "%", the information does not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely alleged that the accused, for the purpose of e;tracting and e;torting money, abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. The upreme Court thru the 8irst 3ivision speaking thru /ustice 3avide, /r., also the #onente in t"e Asuncion case stated= 3'or t"e #ur#ose of determining %urisdiction, it is t"ese allegations t"at s"all control, and not t"e e idence #resented b! t"e #rosecution at t"e trial.3 ()talics Su##lied) The court held that the allegations of >taking advantage of his position or their respective positions> incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of >offenses commited in relation to public office.> In =ontilla u. >ilario, such an allegation was merely considered as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance and not as one that :ualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. (lso, in 0artolome u. Peo#le of t"e P"ili##ines, despite the allegations that the accused public official committed the crime of falsification of official document by >taking advantage of their official positions,> the court held that the andiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case, because >the information ?did@ not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commissison of the offense.> (ccordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused. "%" officer or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court and not of the andiganbayan. This was also the ruling in .acson . /-ecuti e Secretar!.

It should, however, be noted that under 4epublic (ct %o. 7+7&, jurisdiction of the andiganbayan over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty. It is enough that theyare committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, ection -, 4.(. %o. ')-+. It is when the erring public official is not among the enumerated functionaries, that jurisdiction by courts other than the andiganbayan is to be determined by the penalty prescribed by law. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN OVER (. PCGG <nder ection ) of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1-, the andiganbayan has e;clusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the >funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally ac:uired by former "resident 8erdinand D. 2arcos ; ; ; civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The decision of the andiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari e;clusively by the upreme Court.> In the e;ercise of its functions, the "C## is a co1e:ual body with the 4egional Trial Courts and co1e:ual bodies have no power to control the other. The 4egional Trial Courts and the Court of (ppeals have no jurisdiction over the "C## in the e;ercise of its powers under the applicable D;ecutive $rders and ection )0, (rticle J5III of the 1+'7 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the "C## acting for and in behalf of said Commission. ). E>0*1',5" J1#,'2,0 ,&+ &5"# C('"' F,*"2 )4 PCGG The e;clusive jurisdiction of the andiganbayan over civil and criminal cases filed by "C##, as well as incidents arising from, incidental or related to such cases is subject to review on certiorari e;clusively by the upreme Court. The fact of se:uestration alone does not, however, automatically oust the 4TC of jurisdiction to decide upon the :uestion of ownership ?of the subject gaming and office e:uipment of the "hilippine Casino $perators Corporation@. The "C## must be a party to the suit in order that the

The 4TCBs initial assumption of jurisdiction over the offense charged in this case did not, therefore, prevent it from subse:uently declaring itself to be without jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction having become apparent from subse:uent proceedings in that case. JURISDICTION MUST BE DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT The foregoing pronouncements is not in accord with the well1 settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint and not by the finding of the court after trial. The (suncion case did not hold that the absence of an allegation of the offense having been committed >in relation to his office> as immaterial, but justified the absence thereof as having been caused by the erroneous ruling in the case of 7eloso . 7omingo. The court did not fashion the rule directing the conduct of a preliminary or separate hearing to determine the absence or presence of that jurisdictional element. It did so only because of the peculiar circumstance that the omission may have been due to inadvertence in view of the misleading pronouncement in 7eloso. Asuncion "as not, "o,e er, de#arted from t"e rule t"at %urisdiction is to be determined b! t"e allegations of t"e com#laint. $n the contrary, Asuncion stressed that the public officers or

11

andiganbayanBs e;clusive jurisdiction may be correctly invoked. .ut where the "C## is not a party to the case, and the complaint is solely between "(#C$4 and "C$C, the 4TC has jurisdiction under ec. 1+ of..". .ig. 1)+ over "(#C$4Bs action for recovery of personal property, even if said property was under se:uestration by the "C##.

The Court ruled that se:uestered assets and corporations are legally and technically in custodia legis, under the administration of the "C##. D;ecutive $rder %o. ) specifically prohibits the transfer, conveyance, encumbrance, or otherwise depletion or concealment of such assets and properties, under pain of penalties pre1 scribed by law. Thus, an action which can result in the deterioration and disappearance of the se:uestered assets cannot be allowed, unless there is a final adjudication and disposition of the issue as to whether these assets are ill1gotten or not, since it may result in damage or prejudice to the 4epublic of the "hilippines. The andiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul a judgment of partition by the 4TC involving a se:uestration related property. 2. J1#,'2,0 ,&+ D&"' N& J12;$"+ I+0*12" Q1"' ,&+' &3 B1',+"''

( rule of thumb might be thus= if the "C## can be properly impleaded on a cause of action asserted before this Court as a distinct entity, then this Court would generally e;ercise jurisdiction6 otherwise, it would not, because, then the B"C## characterB of the act or omission in :uestion may, at best, be only incidental. (fter all, the presence of "C## representatives in se:uestered companies does not automatically tear down the corporate veil that distinguishes the corporation from its officers, directors or stockholders. Corporate officers whether nominated by the "C## or not act, insofar as third parties are concerned, are (sic) corporate officers. Contracts entered into by the an 2iguel Corporation, for e;ample, in connection with its poultry operations and the cancellations thereof, are not "C## activities which would justify the invocation of this CourtBs jurisdiction, even if the contract or suit were unanimously approved by its board of directors where "C## representatives sit.

0.

S(+2,;(+)(4(+ <1#,'2,0 ,&+ ,+0*12"' (** ,+0,2"+ ' 3#&$9 ,+0,2"+ (* & &# #"*( "2 & %#,+0,%(* 0(1'"' &3 (0 ,&+ In subse:uent cases jointly decided on (ugust 1,, 1+'', the Court pointed out that= >?the@ e;clusive jurisdiction conferred on the andiganbayan would evidently e;tend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill1gotten wealth, but also to Ball incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases,B such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the se:uestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum.> !ikewise, in the case of Re#ublic . Sandiganba!an, the Court ruled that while the "C## is ordinarily allowed a free hand in the e;ercise of its administrative or e;ecutive function, the andiganbayan is empowered to determine in an appropriate case, if in the e;ercise of such functions, the "C## has gravely abused its discretion or has overstepped the boundaries of the power conferred upon it by law. The Court stated=
(ny act or order transgressing the parameter of the objectives for which the "C## was created, if tainted with abuse of discretion, is subject to a remedial action by the andiganbayan, the court vested with e;clusive and original jurisdiction over cases involving the "C## including cases filed by those who challenge "C##Bs acts or orders ettled is the rule that when a law confers jurisdiction upon a court, it is deemed to have all the incidental powers necessary to render the e;ercise of such jurisdiction effective

This Court added=

The subject matter of petitionerBs proposed complaint1in1intervention involves basically, an interpretation of contract, i.e., whether or not the right of first refusal could andAor should have been observed. The :uestion of whether or not the se:uestered property was lawfully ac:uired by 4oberto . .enedicto has no bearing on the legality of the termination of the management contract by %4C3CBs .oard of 3irectors. The two are independent and unrelated issues and resolution of which may proceed independently of each other. . . . ?T@he andiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed complaint1in1intervention. The original and e;clusive jurisdiction given to the andiganbayan over "C## cases pertains to ?a@ cases filed b! t"e PC@@, pursuant to the e;ercise of its power under D;ecutive $rder %os. 1, ) and 1-, as amended by the $ffice of the "resident, and (rticle J5III, ection )0 of the Constitution, i.e., where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill1gotten wealth, as well as all incidents arising from, incidental to or related to suc" cases and ?b@ cases filed b! t"ose ,"o ,is" to question or c"allenge t"e commission&s acts or orders in suc" cases.

The Court, however, ruled that andiganbayan is without jurisdiction where the matter does not really seek to :uestion the propriety of the se:uestration by the "C## or any matter incidental to or arising out of such se:uestration but deals mainly with what is a business judgment. The Court pointed to >olida! )nn (P"ils.), )nc. u. Sandiganba!an, where the issue related to a management agreement terminated by the .oard of 3irectors of a se:uestered corporation, )A* of the members of such board being composed by "C## nominees. The action for intervention was lodged andiganbayan in the main se:uestration case. with the

The petitioners in that case averred that the andiganbayan has jurisdiction over the action since the action to terminate the management agreement bears the imprimatur of the "C## nominees sitting at the .oard, making "C## the real party1in1interest. The 4esolution of the andiganbayan, which was upheld by the upreme Court, ruled on the contrary, thus=
This Court is of the view that its jurisdiction refers to acts of the "C## acting as suc" whether alone or with other persons, natural or juridical, and not generally where "C## representatives act as part of another juridical person or entity.

JURISDICTION OVER FORFEITURE CASES (fter reviewing the legislative history of the andiganbayan and the $ffice of the $mbudsman, the Court declared that 9
><nder 4.(. %o. ')-+, the andiganbayan is vested with e;clusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of 4.(. %o. *,1+, 4.(. %o. 1*7+, and Chapter II, ec. ), Title 5II, .ook II of the 4evised "enal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense.

In PC@@ . Sandiganba!an, the Court stated that there is a need to vigorously guard se:uestered assets and preserve them pending resolution of the se:uestration case before the andiganbayan, considering the paramount public policy for the recovery of ill1gotten wealth.

12

It is a civil procreedings in rem but criminal in nature

JURISDICTION OVER MONEY LAUNDERING CASES The (nti money1laundering law provides for two kinds of cases which are independent of each other. The criminal action for anti1money 9 laundering offense (Sec. 4) and the civil forfeiture proceedings (Sec. 12) which may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. (. T!" C#,$,+(* A0 ,&+ R"%1)*,0 A0 N&. /1?8 (' ($"+2"2 @T!" A+ ,=M&+"4 L(1+2"#,+; A0 &3 2881A 2"3,+"' =one! .aundering 9ffense. 2oney laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following= ?a@ (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property. ?b@ (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph ?a@ above. ?c@ (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is re:uired under this (ct to be disclosed and filed with the (nti12oney !aundering Council ?(2!C@, fails to do so. JURISDICTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING CASES The regional trial courts shall have jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. The foregoing section apparently refers to the criminal offense of anti1money laundering as defined in ection - of the law. (. T!" C,5,* F&#3", 1#" P#&0""2,+;' ).

The law provided that in petitions for civil forfeiture the 4evised 4ules of Court shall apply. In conse:uence thereof, the upreme Court issued the 9

The law created an (nti12oney !aundering Council ?(2!C@ 9 tasked with implementing the law, was empowered ; ; ; ?*@ to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and all other remedial proceedings through the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral6 ?-@ to cause the filing of complaints with the 3epartment of /ustice or the $mbudsman for the prosecution of money laundering offenses6 ?&@ to initiate investigations of covered transactions, money laundering activities and other violations of this (ct. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE DISTINGUISHED It is to be noted that under the (nti12oney !aundering (ct, so far as Civil 8orfeiture is concerned it is the (2!C that is authorized to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and all other remedial proceedings through the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral with the 4egional Trial Court. There is no similar authority to file such cases with the andiganbayan. It is only in criminal cases that the (2!C is authorized to cause the filing of complaints with the 3epartment of /ustice or the $mbudsman for the prosecution of money laundering offenses. .ut unlike Civil 8orfeiture under 4.(. %o. 1*7+ which specifically authorized its filing by the $mbudsman or thru the $ffice of pecial "rosecutor in the andiganbayan. %o similar authority have been granted the $mbudsman with respect to civil forfeiture under the (nti1money !aundering !aw. JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN OVER PUBLIC OFFICERS a. The /urisdiction of the $mbudsman to investigate and prosecute "ublic $fficers for any illegal act or omission is not e;clusive but a shared concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. The $mbudsmanBs primary power to investigate dependent on the cases cognizable by andiganbayan. is

4<!D $8 "4$CD3<4D I% C( D $8 CI5I! 8$48DIT<4D, ( DT "4D D45(TI$%, (%3 84DDII%# $8 2$%DT(4K I% T4<2D%T, "4$"D4TK, $4 "4$CDD3 4D"4D D%TI%#, I%5$!5I%#, $4 4D!(TI%# T$ (% <%!(E8<! (CTI5ITK $4 2$%DK !(<%3D4I%# $88D% D <%3D4 4D"<.!IC (CT %$. +10,, ( (2D%3D3. The 4ule e;pressly provided that 9 The 4ule shall govern all proceedings for civil forfeiture, asset preservation and freezing of monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense under 4epublic (ct %o. +10,, as amended. The 4evised 4ules of Court shall apply suppletorily when not inconsistent with the provisions of this special 4ule. Title II of the 4ule provided only for Civil 8orfeiture in the 4egional Trial Court. Thus 9 ). Part! to )nstitute Proceedings. The 4epublic of the "hilippines, through the (nti12oney !aundering Council, represented by the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral, may institute actions for civil forfeiture and all other remedial proceedings in favor of the tate of any monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense.
DC. *. Aenue of Cases Cogni(able b! t"e Regional $rial Court. ( petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located6 DC.

#ro ided, "o,e er, that where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located outside the "hilippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in 2anila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner. T!" R1*" D&"' N& P#&5,2" 3&# C,5,* F&#3", 1#" B"3&#" !" S(+2,;(+)(4(+

b.

The $mbudsmanBs primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former. .ut the authority is authorized agencies. concurrent with other similarly

13

Cowever, the $mbudsman may take over the investigation of such case at any stage from any investigative agency of the #overnment. This is only directory. SANDIGANBAYAN JURISDICTION NOW WITH CERTIORARI

The decision of the andiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari e;clusively by the upreme Court. In the e;ercise of its functions, the "C## is a co1e:ual body with the 4egional Trial Courts and co1e:ual bodies have no power to control the other. The 4egional Trial Courts and the Court of (ppeals have no jurisdiction over the "C## in the e;ercise of its powers under the applicable D;ecutive $rders and ection )0, (rticle J5III of the 1+'7 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the "C## acting for and in behalf of said Commission. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CASES FILED BY PCGG The e;clusive jurisdiction of andiganbayan over civil and criminal cases filed by "C##, as well as incidents arising from, incidental or related to such cases is subject to review on certiorari e;clusively by the upreme Court. JURISDICTION TO ANNUL JUDGMENTS The andiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the 4egional Trial Court in a se:uestration related case, such as a judgment of the 4egional Trial Court for the enforcement of a foreign judgment involving property that has been lawfully se:uestered. JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY AND PNP 4epublic (ct %o. 7,&& 9 (% (CT T4D%#TCD%I%# CI5I!I(% <"4D2(CK $5D4 TCD 2I!IT(4K .K 4DT<4%I%# T$ TCD CI5I! C$<4T TCD /<4I 3ICTI$% $5D4 CD4T(I% $88D% D I%5$!5I%# 2D2.D4 $8 TCD (42D3 8$4CD $8 TCD "CI!I""I%D , $TCD4 "D4 $% <./DCT T$ 2I!IT(4K !(E, (%3 TCD 2D2.D4 $8 TCD "CI!I""I%D %(TI$%(! "$!ICD, 4D"D(!I%# 8$4 TCD "<4"$ D CD4T(I% "4D I3D%TI(! 3DC4DD . DCTI$% 1. 2embers of the (rmed 8orces of the "hilippines and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens (rmed 8orces #eographical <nits, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the 4evised "enal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinance, regardless of whether or not civilians are co1accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, e;cept when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service1 connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court1 martial= Pro ided, That the "resident of the "hilippines may, in the

interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. (s used in this ection, service1connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in (rticles &- to 7,, (rticles 7) to +), and (rticles +& to +7 of Commonwealth (ct %o. -,', as amended. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court1 martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the 4evised "enal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances. DC. ). ubject to the provisions of ection 1 hereof, all cases filed or pending for filing with court1martial or other similar bodies e;cept those where the accused had already been arraigned, shall, within thirty ?*,@ days following the effectivity of this (ct, be transferred to the proper civil courts= Pro ided, That the Chief of the (rmed 8orces of the "hilippines shall, upon petition before commencement of trial and with the written consent of the accused, order the transfer of such e;pected case or cases to the proper civil courts for trial and resolution. DC. *. "residential 3ecree %os. 1')), 1'))1(, 1'&, and 1+&), and all acts general orders, e;ecutive orders, and other presidential issuances, rules and regulations inconsistent with this (ct are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. The law does not include violations of 4epublic (ct *,1+ otherwise known as the (nti1#raft !aw even if service1 connected. 5iolation of this law falls under the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan or the 4egional Trial Court depending on the nature of the position of the offender. JURISDICTION OVER THE PNP BY REGULAR COURTS DC. -0. *urisdiction in Criminal Cases. (ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving "%" members shall be within the e;clusive jurisdiction of the regular courts6 Pro ided, That the courts1martial appointed pursuant to "residential 3ecree %o. 1'&, shall continue to try "C1I%" members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth (ct %o. -,', otherwise known as the (rticles of Ear, as amended and D;ecutive $rder %o. 17', otherwise known as the 2anual for Courts12artial6

4.(. %o. 7+7& e;pressly conferred certiorari jurisdiction in the andiganbayan, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. WHERE PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED ACCOMPLICE OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL AS MERE

ection - of "residential 3ecree %o. 10,0, as amended by "residential 3ecree %o. 1'01, provides in part >that in case private individuals are charged as co1principals, accomplices, or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government1owned or 1controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.> The rule that >accessory follows the principal> appears to underlie the provision of "residential 3ecree %o. 10,0, for when private individuals are charged as co1principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, the implication is that the latter was charged as principal. Cence, if a public officer or employee is charged as a mere accomplice or accessory with a private individual, as principal, the corollary implication is that the former shall be tried jointly with the latter in the ordinary courts. The rationale is justified by the total absence of a provision in "residential 3ecree %o. 10,0 directing that all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, without distinction, be tried by the andiganbayan, even if the criminal involvement of the public officer is minor or subordinate and inferior to that of the private individuals charged as principals in the case. The jurisdiction of the andiganbayan is not meant to be so broad and all1encompassing. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN OVER PCGG <nder ection ) of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1-, the andiganbayan has e;clusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the >funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally ac:uired by former "resident 8erdinant D. 2arcos ; ; ;> civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases.

14

Pro ided, furt"er, That criminal cases against "C1I%" members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this (ct shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.1-* MEANING OF REGULAR COURTS It has been held that the term regular courts in 4.(. %o. 0+7& means ci il courts. ection -0 of

them as long as civil courts are open and functioning. (ny judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The upreme Court clarified in $an u. 0arrios that >$laguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Cence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or ac:uittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the $laguer decision. uch final sentences should not be disturbed by the The upreme Court went on to state= tate.>

accused who has not been arrested, in the pre1suspension hearing re:uired under said law, is a voluntary appearance. The filing of a motion to dismiss presupposes that the accused is within "hilippine territory6 otherwise, the 3 oluntar! a##earance3 is an e;ercise in futility. "hysical control is indispensable. If the accused is outside of the "hilippines, he cannot be said to be under the physical control of the Court. 5oluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment. uch jurisdiction once ac:uired is not lost upon the instance of the parties, such as when the accused escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated. In such case, the Court may proceed with the trial in absentia of the accused, provided that there has been an arraignment. The cases holding that where the accused, after his arrest, filed a petition for bail, it is too late for him to object thereafter to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest are no longer true. <nder ection )0, 4ule 11- of the ),,, 4ules on Criminal "rocedure=
DC. )0. 0ail not a bar to ob%ections on illegal arrest, lac? of or irregular #reliminar! in estigation. (n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued thereof, or from assailing the regularity or :uestioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to remove from courts martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the "%" and to vest it in the courts within the judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which as contradistinguished from courts martial, are the regular courts. Courts martial are not courts within the "hilippine judicial system6 they pertain to the e;ecutive department of the government and are simply instrumentalities of the e;ecutive power. $therwise stated, courts martial are not regular courts. The andiganbayan are regular courts within the contemplation. JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURT ( military officer being dropped from the roll amounts to a dishonorable discharge which does not terminate his amenability for the trial in a court martial for the offense he had committed while an officer of the military. The fact that Colonel (badilla was dropped from the rolls should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and e;pected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution. Cis refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service. MILITARY COURTS CIVILIANS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER lawBs

>$nly in particular cases where the convicted person or the tate shows that there was a serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on 9laguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.>

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON WHEN ACQUIRED /urisdiction over the person of the accused is ac:uired upon his arrest or upon his voluntary appearance. RULE IN MILITARY PROCEEDINGS The rule that jurisdiction over a person is ac:uired by his arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to proceedings under military law. WAIVER (ny objection to the procedure leading to the arrest must opportunely raised before the accused enters his plea. The accused is also barred from raising the :uestion jurisdiction over his person if he enters his plea instead objecting to the irregularity of the issuance of the warrant arrest. VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE In a prosecution under 4epublic (ct %o. *,1+, the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct, the appearance of a counsel for an be of of of

( military commission or tribunal cannot try and e;ercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by

In applications for bail, however, the (CC< D3 2< T .D I% C< T$3K $8 !(E to be entitled to bail. )f t"e accused is c"arged ,it" a ca#ital offense or an offense #unis"able b! reclusion #er#etua or life im#risonment, the /udge must have jurisdiction over the person of accused and over the case. The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the re:uirements therefor. Thus, in 'eliciano . Pasicolan, where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter, filed a

15

motion asking the court to fi; the amount of bail bond for his release pending trial, the upreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to >all persons> where the offense is bailable. This rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. The Court should not even allow a motion for bail to be set for hearing unless it has ac:uired jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the case by its filing in Court. Custody $o% Acquired& The accused must be in custody of the law, either= a@ b@ .y virtue of a warrant or warrantless arrest6 or Ehen he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court by surrendering to the proper authorities.

Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be e;emplified by the so1called >house arrest> or, in case of military offenders, by being >confined to :uarters> or restricted to the military camp area. The accused who desires to :uestion the jurisdiction of a court over his person must appear in court only for the specific purpose, and if he raises other :uestions, he waived the objection to :uestion the jurisdiction over her person. 8ailure to :uash the information on the ground that, by the defective arrest, the court did not ac:uire jurisdiction over the person of the accused is a waiver to :uestion jurisdiction over his person. <nder ection ),, 4ule 1- of the 1++7 4ules on Civil "rocedure= >The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.> There is, however, an e;ception to the rule that filing plead ings seeking affirmative relief constitutes oluntar! a##earance, and the conse:uent submission of oneBs person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a s#ecial a##earance. These pleadings are= ?1@ in ci il cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included6 ?)@ in criminal cases, motions to :uash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused6 and ?*@ motions to :uash a warrant of arrest. The first two are conse:uences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

The third is a conse:uence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to :uash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, e;cept in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. Cowever, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so1called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief %otwithstanding this, there is no re:uirement for him to be in the custody of the law.

$"e mere filing of an a##lication for bail is not sufficient. This principle is, however, only for purposes of bail. In other cases, the filing of motion or other papers invoking affirmative relief is a submission to courtBs jurisdiction. Cence, an application for admission to bail of a person against whom a criminal action has been filed, but who is still at large is premature. (s a matter of course, upon voluntary appearance of the accused, the judge should re:uire another motion for bail and set the same for hearing, with the prosecution notified thereof. <nless the accused is in the custody of the law, the court may not even set his application for bail for hearing. EXCEPTIONS WHEN MERE FILING OF MOTION SUFFICIENT In Paderanga . Court of A##eals (su#ra), the accused having filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest, as he was then confined at the hospital, and his counsel manifested before the court at the hearing of the motion that he was submitting custody of the person of the accused to the local chapter president of the Integrated .ar of the "hilippines, and for purposes of said hearing on his bail application, he be considered as being in the custody of the law, the upreme Court held that he may at that point and in the factual ambiance thereof, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED BY ARREST OR VOLUNTARY SURRENDER NOT CONDITION FOR COURT TO GRANT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF D;cept in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first ac:uire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even aefore the court ac:uires jurisdiction over the person of the accused s authorized under ection 0?a@, 4ule 11) of the 4evised 4ules of criminal "rocedure and the 4evised 4ules on ummary "rocedure. In Allado . 7io?no, the case was dismissed on motion of the iccused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts . Court of A##eals, the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the ecretary of /ustice.

16

(nd in .acson . /-ecuti e Secretar!, the Court ordered the case transferred from the andiganbayan to the 4TC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. It was held in Peo#le . C"un, that where the accused believed that the order of the holding that bail for the crime charged against him is not a matter of right is null and void, he need not wait to be arrested before filing the corresponding petition in an appropriate proceeding assailing the order. THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE @A.M. N&. 88=B=83=SCA EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 19 2888 RULE 118 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

preliminary investigation.

econdC <nder the former rule, the commencement of actions by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for preliminary investigation were limited to cases falling under the jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court. ection 1 has accordingly been amended by removing therefrom the limitation to offenses commenced by complaint before the appropriate officer for preliminary investigation only to those offenses cognizable by the 4egional Trial Court, but This is no longer true. included to a limited e;tent cases cognizable by the municipal trial courts. ection

<nder

ection 1 of 4ule 11), e;cept as provided in

7 of said rule, referring to lawful arrests without a warrant, preliminary investigation is re:uired for an offense #unis"able b! im#risonment of at least four (4) !ears, t,o (2) mont"s and one (1) da!.

It should also be noted section &, 4ule II of (dministrative %o. ' of the $ffice of the $mbudsman provides that= >Cases falling under the jurisdiction of the $ffice of the $mbudsman which are cognizable by municipal trial courts, including those subject to the 4ule on ummary "rocedure may only be filed in court by Information approved by the $mbudsman, or the

SECTION 1. Institution of Criminal Actions

The reason why originally there was no preliminary investigation in cases triable by justice of the peace or municipal courts was because they involved only minor offenses or misdemeanors.

proper 3eputy $mbudsman in all other cases.>

ThirdC <nder the former rule, prescription is interrupted in all cases upon the institution of the criminal action.

There are three ?*@ amendments in this rule=

The criminal cases then e;clusively triable by municipal courts were those where the penalty provided by law did not um1 The 1+'' (mendments abandoned the ruling of the upreme Court in Peo#le u. 9larte and adopts the ruling in 'rancisco u. Court of A##eals, to the effect that the filing of the ubse:uently, however, the offenses e;clusively triable by municipal courts were increased to those punishable with imprisonment of not e;ceeding four years and two months andAor a fine of"-.,,,.,, and were further increased to those punishable with imprisonment not e;ceeding si; ?0@ years irrespective of the amount of the fine. complaint with the fiscalBs office also interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. This includes cases filed with the ombudsman for prelimi1 nary investigation. e;ceed si; months imprisonment andAor a "),,.,, fine.

8irst= The removal of cases governed by the 4ule on of criminal actions above provided for.

mary "rocedure in special cases from the manner of institution

The opening phrase in the former 4ule 9 3'or offenses not sub%ect to t"e rule on summar! #rocedure in s#ecial cases3 was deleted.

This phrase was ane of the basis of the ruling of the upreme Court in the case of Baidi ia the interruption of the period of prescription. . Re!e1 e;cluding Clearly, therefore, these offenses were not minor or misdemeanors re:uired.
ince, the type of offenses that re:uires preliminary investigation have been e;panded by amendment to ection 1, 4ule 11) to offenses punishable by imprisonment of at least four ?-@ years, two ?)@ months and one ?1@ day, ection 1 re:uired such cases to first be filed for

The 4ule does not apply to violations of municipal ordinances and special laws.

offenses subject to summary procedure from the general rule on

and

yet

no

preliminary

investigation

was In Baidi ia u. Re!es, the court held that the interruption of the prescriptive period upon the institution of the complaint under ection 1 of 4ule 11,, does not apply to cases for

<nder the amendment, the institution of all criminal actions shall be the same.

violation of special acts and municipal ordinances.

17

This is governed by (ct %o. **)0 and is interrupted only by the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

"eriods of "rescription for 5iolations "enalized .y .egin To 4un.>

pecial !aws hall

complainant of the complaint or the certificate or repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary=

and 2unicipal $rdinances and to "rovide Ehen "rescription

The Court clarified in Reodica u. Court of A##eals, that even if the case is governed by the 4evised 4ule on ummary "rocedure ?which is not a violation of a municipal ordinance or special law@, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, prescription is interrupted with the filing of the complaint in the 8iscalBs office. In view, however, of the ruling in Baidi ia . Re!es, that

It provides among others that >violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.>

Pro ided, "o,e er, That such interruption shall not e;ceed si;ty ?0,@ days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay

The e;ception therefore, includes violations of municipal ordinances. (nd is interrupted even if the case filed is not within the jurisdiction of the court. ( distinction is made between the 3institution3 and the 3commencement3 of a criminal action. PRESCRIPTION INTERRUPTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION EVEN IF COURT IS

the rules cannot amend special laws, and under (ct %o. **)0, the period of prescription for offenses punishable by special laws, prescription shall only be interrupted upon the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment, the rule has accordingly been amended to e;cept therefrom offenses punishable by special laws so far as prescription is concerned.

8or offenses which re:uire a preliminary investigation, the criminal action is instituted by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for preliminary investigation.

"rescription is interrupted with the filing of the case even if the court is without jurisdiction. The Court, citing $larte and the subse:uent cases of

The main basis of the said ruling of the

upreme Court

The appropriate officer may be the fiscal or the municipal circuit trial court.

'rancisco . Court of A##eals and Peo#le . Cuaresma. Thus, even if preliminary investigation is not re:uired, >the prescriptive period for the :uasi offenses was interrupted by the filing of complaint with the fiscalBs office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the case.>

was that under (ct %o. **)0 as amended, the prescriptive period for violation of special laws and municipal ordinances was interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint or information in court.

The criminal action is commenced when the complaint or information is filed in court.

This ruling was confirmed in the case of Reodica

. Court

In offenses cognizable by inferior courts, the complaint or information is filed directly with said courts, or the complaint is filed with the fiscal. Cowever, in 2etro 2anila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the fiscal. /-ce#tions+ <nless otherwise provided by special laws (Act 332C) includes violations of municipal ordinance@ "rescription Commences from commission or discovery until institution of judicial proceedings. It may, however also be noted that under the Matarungan F&# V,&*( ,&+ &3 S%"0,(* L(6' It has been settled that the computation of penalized by special laws. ection ) of (ct %o. **)0 governs of offenses defined and

ofA##eals11 as an e;ception to the general rule under (rticle +1 of the 4evised "enal Code that the filing of the complaint, whether for preliminary investigation or for action on the merits, interrupts prescription.

Cence, the phrase 3unless ot"er,ise #ro ided in s#ecial la,s3 ,as inserted as an e;ception to the general rule that such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged.

"ambarangay

!aw

while

the

dispute

is

under

mediation

conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under e;isting laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with punong barangay.

prescription

(ct %o. **)0, as amended is entitled= >(n (ct To Dstablish

The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the

18

ection ) of (ct %o. **)0 was correctly applied by the anti1graft court in determining the reckoning period for DC. -1). Conciliation. prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of 4epublic (ct %o. *,1+, as amended. ?a@ Pre<condition to filing of com#laint in court. %o complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within ince the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the !upon chairman or the #ang?at, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the !upon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by ec. ). "rescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy ?1@ Ehere the accused is under detention6 ?)@ Ehere a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for "abeas cor#us proceedings6 This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. ?*@ Ehere actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support #endente life8 and ?-@ Ehere the action, may otherwise, be barred by the The Civil !aw rules on prescription is applicable to criminal C&+2, ,&+ P#"0"2"+ & F,*,+; &3 C('" ?c@ Conciliation The !ocal #overnment Code of 1++1 which took effect on /anuary 1, 1++), e;pressly repealed "residential 3ecree %o. 1&,', otherwise known as the Matarungang "ambarangay !aw. among members of indigenous cultural communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities. statute of limitations. the !upon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. paragraphs ?e@ and ?g@ of prescriptive period is which provides= ection *, 4.(. %o. *,1+, as amended,

national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Ehen disputes involve ICCsA"s, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the ection ) of (ct %o. **)0, as amended,

The %ational Commission on ICCsA"s %CI" through its regional offices shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving ICCsA"s, provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the %CI" unless the parties have e;hausted all remedies provided under their customary laws to settle the dispute as certified to by the Council of DldersA!eaders who participated in the attempt at such settlement.
3ecisions of the %CI" shall be appealable to the Court of (ppeals by way of a petition for review.

?b@ D"ere #arties ma! go directl! to court. The parties may go directly to court in the following instances=

DC.

-,'.

Sub%ect

=atter

for

Amicable

Settlement8

/-ce#tion $"ereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes e;cept= ?a@ Ehere one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof6 ?b@ Ehere one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions6

?c@ $ffenses punishable by imprisonment e;ceeding one ?1@ year or a fine e;ceeding 8ive thousand pesos ?"&,,,,.,,@6

In lieu thereof, Chapter 7, Title I, .ook III provides for the Matarungang "ambarangay.

Cowever, under Re#ublic Act :o. E3;, the ICCsA"s shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the

?d@ $ffenses where there is no private offended party6

?e@ Ehere the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by

"ertinent provisions of the law are as follows=

19

an appropriate lupon6 ?f@ 3isputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, e;cept where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon6and ?g@ uch other classes of disputes which the "resident may determine in the interest of justice or upon the

e;ecution of the law violated.

complaint or information, or both of which are filed in court.

The provincial fiscal is not among the three.

If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an information, the same may be filed by the fiscal. Cowever, a >complaint> filed with the fiscal prior to judicial action may be filed by any person.

The information filed by him which instituted the proceeding cannot be considered as a complaint.

1@

2eaning of the term 3offended #art!.3 The person actually injured and whose feeling is offended.

recommendation of the

ecretary of /ustice. )@

e.

"rivate persons may denounce a violation of banking laws.

The court in which non1criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu #ro#rio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

( widow, however, maybe considered an offended party within the meaning of the applicable rules of court entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her husband.) f.
/ustice 3avide, /r., citing ection 1), 4ule 11, refers to an >offended party> in the commission of a crime, public or private, as the party to whom the offender is civilly liable in light of (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code that >every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

( complaint with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.

( criminal action cannot be instituted against a juridical person.

SEC. 2. The Complaint or Information

g.

To subscribe and swear to criminal complaint is not ministerial.

Invariably then, the private individual to whom the Criminal actions must be commenced in t"e name of t"e Peo#le of t"e P"ili##ines. .ut the defect is merely of form and curable at any stage of the trial. offender is civilly liable is the offended party. In bigamy both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances .ut the absence of an oath does not invalidate the complaint. <nless the complaint charged is a private offense.

*@ SEC. 3. Complaint 'efined W!& M(4 F,*" C&$%*(,+ a. b. The offended party. (ny peace officer. d.

The right to commence criminal prosecution is confined to representatives of the government and persons injured6 otherwise, it shall be dismissed.

h.

The right to file complaint is personal and abated upon death.

.ut $ne who is not the offended party file a complaint for preliminary investigation. <nless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation.

MAY INJUNCTION PROSECUTION

ISSUE

TO

RESTRAIN

CRIMINAL

The general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

"ublic interest re:uires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.

c.

$ther public officer charged with the enforcement or

(s a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a

20

There are, however, e;ceptions, among which are= a. To afford ade:uate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused6 Ehen necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions6

b.

c.

Ehen there is a prejudicial :uestion6

d.

Ehen the acts of the officer are without or in e;cess of authority6

e.

Ehere the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation6

f.

Ehen double jeopardy is clearly apparent6

g.

Ehere the court has no jurisdiction over the offense6

h.

Ehere it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution6

i.

Ehere the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance6

j.

Ehen there is clearly no #rima facie case against the accused and a motion to :uash on that ground has been denied6 and

k.

"reliminary injunction has been issued by the Court to prevent the threatened unlawful petitioners.

upreme arrest of

21

SEC. .. Information defined D,' ,+;1,'! I+3&#$( ,&+ 3#&$ C&$%*(,+

(s distinguished from information, a complaint is=

>In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the tate shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. This is based on the doctrine of #arens #atriae.3 that=

The amendment inadvertently failed to reproduce the statement

Cowever, in 2unicipal Trial Courts or 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case.

Ra#e is now a crime against person and conse:uently can be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.

a. b. c.

D;ecuted by a private party, etc.6 upported by oath of the complainant6 and %eed not necessarily be filed with the court.
REC PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION B9 RULE 118 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DA.M. N&. 82=2=87=SC. A%#,* 189 2882E

This

authority

shall

cease

upon

actual

intervention

of

the

prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the 4egional Trial Court.

This does not, however, mean that the persons mentioned therein may no longer prosecute the case under the conditions mentioned in the old rule.

(n information not properly signed cannot be cured by silence, ac:uiescence or even by e;press consent.

(cting on the 2emorandum dated ) 8ebruary ),,) of Court

It must be filed with the court, otherwise it is not an information.

administrator "resbitero /. 5elasco, /r. submitting for this CourtBs consideration and approval the proposed amendment to (""4$5D the amendment to ec. &, 4ule !1, of the 4evised 4ules of Criminal "rocedure, the Court 4esolved to ec. &, 4ule 11, so as to read as follows=

The amendment was merely intended to regulate the appearance of the private prosecutor and stress the direction and control of the public prosecutor in the prosecution of criminal cases.

EFFECT OF LACK OF INTERVENTION BY FISCAL IN TRIAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE .efore the 1+'& amendment, the upreme Court, in

SEC. B. (ho must prosecute criminal actions

<nder the 1+'& amendments, the following sentences were added to the first paragraph of ec. - of the old 4ule 11,, to wit=

3Section 5. D"o must #rosecute criminal actions. (ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.

@arcia . 7omingo, citing Cariaga . *usto, held that the absence of the (ssistant 8iscal is not a jurisdictional defect but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene.

In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the "rosecution $ffice or the 4egional tate "rosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court.

>Cowever, in the 2unicipal Court or 2unicipal Trial Courts when there is no fiscal available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case.
This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the 4egional Trial Court. This is based on the 4esolution of the upreme Court in Peo#le . 0eriales.3

The rule was modified in Peo#le

. 0eriales where it was

held that although the 8iscal turns over the active conduct of the trial to the private prosecutor, he should be present during the
$nce so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private

prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

proceedings 9

Thus, in the case of Peo#le . =unar, the Court upheld the right of the private of the prosecutor witnesses therein because to the conduct the e;amination government

In the third paragraph of fol1owing was added=

ection - of the old 4ule 11,, the

This amendment to 4ule 11, shall take effect on the first day of 2ay ),,) following its publication in two newspapers of general circulation on or before *, (pril, ),,).

prosecutors were present at the hearing6 hence, the prosecution of the case remained under their supervision and control.

22

In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been authorized by the special counsel 4osario 4. "olines to present the evidence for the prosecution, nevertheless, in view of the absence of the City 8iscal at the hearing on 3ecember 1*, 1+7-, it cannot be said that the prosecution of the case was under the control of the City 8iscal.

either to 3r. TansingcoBs competency or his #ost mortem findings, the doctorBs testimony was dispensed with.

The authority, however, of the provincial prosecutor to appeal for the "eople of the "hilippines is confined only to the proceedings before the trial court.

The defense likewise waived the fiscalBs presence on that date.> In appeals before the Court of (ppeals or to the Court either by petition for review or certiorari, the In 0ra o . Court of A##eals The proceedings was held #eneral is the sole representative of the "eople. upreme olicitor

It follows that the evidence presented by the private prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered as evidence for the plaintiff, the "eople of the "hilippines.

to be valid even without the physical presence of 8iscal as distinguished from 0eriales case, where no 8iscal appeared to prosecute. ervice thru the "rovincial "rosecutor is inefficacious and shall be sufficient ground for dismissal on the petition as provided in section *, 4ule -0.

There was, therefore, no evidence at all to speak of which could have been the basis of the decision of the trial court.

Cere, the 8iscal appeared but left the prosecution to the private prosecutor under his supervision and control. F,'0(*F' D,'0#" ,&+ ,+ P#&'"01 ,&+ "rior to the filing of a case in court=

2oreover, as aptly observed by the

olicitor #eneral, >to

permit such prosecution of a criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an obno;ious precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of the prosecuting arm of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their bounden duty to see to it not only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the innocent should be ac:uitted 9 a duty that can only be effectively and sincerely performed if they actively participated in the conduct of the case, especially in the e;amination of the witnesses and the presentation of documentary evidence for both parties.

The Court noted in a subse:uent case that the public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the e;ercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. b. a.

( prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled to file a par1 ticular criminal information. The Court cannot interfere with the 8iscalBs discretion and control of criminal prosecution. The Court cannot compel the fiscal to prosecute or file information within a certain period of time.

Cowever, it is necessar! t"at t"e #ublic #rosecutor be #resent at t"e trial until t"e final termination of t"e case8 otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.

c.

The absence, however, of a prosecutor cannot be raised by The decision appealed from was set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for another arraignment and trial. an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice. N"0"'', 4 &3 S"#5,0" & G&5"#+$"+ C&1+'"* 8ailure to serve pleadings and orders upon government counsel renders the court orders issued uponsuch petitions or motions of an accused as void. %otice, however, given to the fiscal is notice to the private ince no objection was interposed by appellantBs counsel, prosecutor.

It is the rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations thereof.

The same principle was not, however, observed in Peo#le . =alinao, where the upreme Court did not consider the absence of the fiscal prejudicial to the accused >for only 3r. %icanor !. Tansingco was presented to testify on his autopsy report on the deceased 2anang.

(lthough this power and prerogative of the 8iscal to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to secure a

23

conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case.

evidence to support at least a#rima facie case.

The prosecuting fiscal has no more control over said cases, the same having been transferred to the court.

The better procedure would be to appeal the 8iscalBs decision to the 2inistry of /ustice andAor ask for a special prosecutor.

The courts try andAor convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. The situation is akin to the pronouncement made in .ansang u. @arcia, that whenever a formal complaint is The possible e;ception is where there is an unmistakable presented in court against an individual, the court steps in and takes control thereof until the same is finally disposed of.

The failure of the 8iscal to include the other public officials who appear to be responsible for the offense charged as co1 accused in the information does not vitiate the validity of the information since the matter of prosecuting witnesses for the "eople is a prerogative of bhe prosecuting fiscal.

showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the e;ecutive.

Cowever, t"e matter of instituting an information s"ould .ut in such a case, the proper remedy to call for such e;ception prohibition. is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or be distinguis"ed from a motion b! t"e fiscal for t"e dismissal of a case alread! filed in court.

The manner by which the prosecution of a case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non1 inclusion if other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused. 2oreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co1accused in the same case must first avail itself of other ade:uate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. The prosecutor cannot be compelled to include in the information, a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt e;ists. ( case dismissed before arraignment maybe refiled.

The judge may properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution.

This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and, therefore, within its discretion and control.

In the landmark case ofCres#o u. =ogul, the FULL CONTROL BY THE COURT ONCE INFORMATION FILED IN COURT Cowever, in cases where the information had already been filed in court, the latter ac:uires jurisdiction over them. Court, sifter a review of past precedents held=

upreme

Ehile the prosecuting officer is re:uired by law to charge all those who, in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt e;ists.

>The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or ac:uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
(lthough the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor.

$therwise stated, the jurisdiction of the court become vested upon the filing of the information and, once ac:uired, its jurisdiction continues until the termination of the case.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the ecretary of /ustice or in special cases by the Ehere the information had already been filed in court, it should therefore dispose of them, one way or the other, resolving all motions brought before it including motions to .ut even the upreme Court cannot order the prosecution dismiss, filed by the 8iscal, or deciding the cases on the merit. of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient "resident of the "hilippines.

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.

The determination of the case is within its e;clusive jurisdiction and competence.

24

( motion to dismiss the case filed by the 8iscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.

resolution of the 8iscal to the

ecretary of /ustice, on the ground Thus, should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, the permission of the court must be secured.

that the crime committed was murder, the 4TC refused to defer the arraignment, and allowed the accused to post bail in the sum of "),,,,, each.

It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the investigation. ecretary of /ustice who reviewed the records of the

The accused were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

(fter

such

reinvestigation,

the

finding

and

recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the court for appropriate action. ecretary of /ustice found the case to be murder, but The upreme Court clarified that while the fiscal has the :uasi1judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been brought to the Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the court.

Thus, it is now settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or the ac:uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.

The

withdrew its recommendation to amend the information to murder upon learning the accused have already been arraigned.

( motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the court, who has the option to grant or deny the same.

The Court found the 8iscal and /udges concerned to have gravely abused their discretion in not deferring the arraignment pending disposition of the appeal to the ecretary of /ustice.

It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instruction of the investigation.> ecretary of /ustice who reviewed the records of the

The Court should have suspended the arraignment of this information for homicide and await resolution on the petition for PRINCIPLE WAS FURTHER STRESSED IN review to 3$/ on the ground that the crime is for murder.

The only :ualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the people to due process.

THE

'IMAT)*AC +. +I**,$therwise, In this case, the accused were charged with murder before the 2unicipal Court which found a probable cause for murder and issued warrants for the arrest of the accused without bond, after which the records were forwarded to the "rovincial 8iscal. MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION TO BE ADDRESSED TO COURT In Aelasque( . $uquero, it was held that a motion for should be murder. the arraignment may be set aside, and The Court has the final say on any subse:uent disposition or action, since the case is brought before it which will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it is shown that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in e;cess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to such lack or e;cess of jurisdiction. COMPLAINT CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN WITHOUT COURTFS CONSENT BY FISCAL

information amended if 3$/ finds that the proper information

Eithout the accused having been arrested, the 8iscal conducted a reinvestigation and received the evidence of the accused, found the case to be homicide.

reinvestigation should, after the court had ac:uired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone.

The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the 8iscal without The offended party appealed to the ecretary of /ustice. %either the ecretary of /ustice, the tate "rosecutor, nor the courtBs consent.

the fiscal may interfere with the judgeBs disposition of the case, In the meantime, despite the appeal, the prosecutor filed the information for homicide, and despite the objections of the offended party on the ground that they have appealed the much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the Court is the sole judge of that. The provincial fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle #rosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings.

25

of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been The power to dismiss is vested solely in the court, i.e., the presiding judge. ee however, @al e( . Court of A##eals, upholding the 2oreover, where the 3$/ had already given due course to the petitionerBs petition for review, it was premature for respondent judge to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the ground that >since the case is already pending for trial, to follow whatever opinion the ecretary of /ustice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this court. filed in court.>

The only option of the judge was to proceed with the arraignment of the accused and, thereafter, conduct a pre1trial and trial on the merits, should he enter a plea of not guilty. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the court should merely adopt the recommendation of the "rosecutor.

right of the prosecution to withdraw the information for homicide, the evident purpose was to refile a case of murder against the same accused before arraignment even without notice and hearing. F,'0(* E+ , *"2 & )" H"(#2 &+ M& ,&+ & D,'$,'' Cowever, while the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed ?after the complaint or information has been filed in court@ still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter.

In 2ontesa, the stand of the prosecution is to maintain the information, in which case there is nothing more for the court to do but to proceed with the case.

Thus,

where and

the

judge the

granted $ffice

the of

motion

for

The situation is different if the motion of the fiscal is for the dismissal or withdrawal of the information. ULTIMATE TEST OF TRIAL COURTFS INDEPENDENCE IS WHERE FISCAL FILES A MOTION TO DISMISS The filing of upreme Court stressed that the real and ultimate test the motions to suspend proceedings and defer

reinvestigation

directed

the

"rovincial

"rosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation, the former was deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the #overnment to consider the so1called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand. of the independence and integrity of the trial court is not the

Ce is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed.

Caving done so, it behooved the judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. VALID BASIS OF JUDGEFS FINAL ACTION WHERE FISCAL STANDS ON INFORMATION The findings and conclusion of the "rovincial "rosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should be the sole and only valid basis of the judgeBs final action ?not that of the (ssistant "rovincial "rosecutor@.

arraignment at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to ,it"dra, t"e information on t"e basis of a resolution of t"e #etition for re ie, reversing the /oint 4esolution of the investigating prosecutor.

It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscalBs view that the Court should e;ercise its e;clusive authority to continue or dismiss the case. T!" P(#($" "#' &3 !" C&1# F' C&+ #&* The upreme Court, clarified in =arcelo . Court of

.efore that time, the pronouncement in Cres#o u. =ogul, that >once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction of the accused or ac:uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court,> did not yet become relevant or applicable.

A##eals, that there is nothing in Cres#o . =ogul, which bars the 3$/ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor.

Ehere the "rovincial "rosecutor to which the judge had deferred the matter for reinvestigation, had finally resolved to stand on the information and to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged, the judge did not have the option to dismiss the case on the basis of the disapproved resolution of the (ssistant "rovincial "rosecutor.

Cowever, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the ecretary of /ustice, but in faithful e;ercise of judicial prerogative. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this con1

It merely advised the 3$/ to, >as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action

26

clusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution.

therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.

I.

Control by "rosecution

1. Ehat is imperatively re:uired is the trial judgeBs own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper e;ercise of judicial discretion merely to accept or reject the prosecutionBs word for its supposed insufficiency or to simply rely on Cres#o . =ogul. (ccordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a #rima facie case e;ists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the courtBs bare denial of a motion to withdraw information pursuant tc the ecretaryBs resolution is void. Ce is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action.
FISCAL MAY BE COMPELLED TO PROSECUTE CASES ALREADY FILED

Ehat case to file6 Ehom to prosecute6 2anner of prosecution6 and 4ight before of "rosecution to even Eithdraw without information notice and arraignment

(s such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense, the servant of the law, the two1fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers.

). *. -.

hearing. There must be leave of court after prior notice and hearing.

case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. II. Control by Court $nce Case is 8iled

1. ). *. -. &.

uspension of (rraignment6 4einvestigation6 "rosecution by 8iscal6 3ismissal6 and 3owngrading offense or dropping of accused even before plea.

%otwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused.

Ce cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

(t least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Ehere there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case

The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility muc" less lea e t"e #rosecution of the case at the "ands of a private prosecutor.

III. !imitations on Control by Court

1.

"rosecution entitled to notice of hearing6

(t all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control. $therwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void.

on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. ). The supervision and control of the prosecutor e;tends to the civil liability instituted with the criminal action if it was not filed separately, reserved or there is no private prosecutor who intervened. -. *. "rosecutionBs stand to maintain prosecution should be respected by court6 Court must await result of petition for review6

In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government >since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the This is so because >the tate.> prosecuting officer is the

DEVELOPMENTS .R,M CR/S0, TO 'IMAT)*AC& a. 3istinction between control of prosecution and control of court

<ltimate test of courtBs independence is where fiscal files motion to dismiss or to withdraw information6

representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where the obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all6 and whose interest,

&.

Court has authority to review ?power of /udicial

27

4eview@

'*&*, the (nti14ape !aw of 1++7 which took effect on $ctober )), 1++7, reclassifying rape as a crime against person and is now a >public crime.>

of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding. P1#%&'" &3 R1*" The complaint re:uired ?in (rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code@ was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused, but is a condition precedent to the e;ercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.

ecretaryBs recommendation and reject it if there is grave abuse of discretion.

C&+0"% &3 P#,5( " C#,$"' N ee, ?0,@ days. however, ec. ll?c@, 4ule 110, The term 3#ri ate crimes3 in reference to felonies which cannot be prosecuted e;cept upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. The 4esolution of the offenses #er#etua. punishable by ecretary of /ustice death or reclusion 8ar from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who is offended in such crimes but also the tate. may be appealed to the $ffice of the "resident in uspension of arraignment does not e;ceed si;ty

uch condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended women and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.

0.

To reject or grant motion to dismiss court must make own independent assessment of evidence.

Dvery violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the and protect. tate is committed to uphold

Thus, while the complaint filed by a mental retardate may have been technically defective in the sense that complainant was incompetent, this defect has been cured when complainantBs brother "ernando (lcala took the witness stand for the prosecution.

7.

/udgment is void if there is no independent assessment discretion. and finding of grave abuse of

If the law imposes the condition that private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted e;cept upon complaint filed by the offended party, it is, >out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.>

The

brotherBs

testimony

shows

that

consent

and

CRIMES PROSECUTED UPON COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED PARTY The rule categories= on crimes that must be prosecuted upon

willingness of the family of the complainant, who can not give her consent obviously, to have the private offense committed against the latter publicly tried.

$nce a complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. ubstantially, this is what is re:uired by the rules.

complaint filed by the offended party may be classified into three

This is shown by the fact that after filing a complaint, any a. b. c. In crimes of adultery and concubinage6 In offenses of seduction, abduction, or acts of lascivious1 ness6 Criminal actions for defamation which consist in the It is true, the institution of the action in so1called private crimes is at the option of the aggrieved party. imputation of an offense mentioned above. pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be unavailing.

Dvidently, by undergoing trial, the family of complainant chose to denounce the injustice committed against the latter in public and thus agreed to bear the personal effects of said e;posure.

<ndoubtedly, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to try the case.

4ape was e;cluded as a private crime in view of 4.(. %o.

.ut it is e:ually true that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control

28

C&$%*,(+0" 6, ! R1*" I' J1#,'2,0 ,&+(* Ehile the complaint re:uired in said (rt. *-- is merely a condition precedent to the e;ercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties, and such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. Compliance with 4ule 11,, not merely a formal re:uirement. ection &, is /urisdictional and

factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprit.

CAPACITY AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT THE TIME OF FILING OF ACTION FOR ADULTERY Ehere the complainant had already been divorced, he can no longer file the complaint. aid the upreme Court=

Ehen it is said that the re:uirement in (rticle *-- that there should be a complaint of the offended party or his relative is /urisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding.

It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case.

Corollary to such e;clusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a familiar and e;press rule in civil actions6 in fact, lack of

The CourtBs jurisdiction is vested in it by the /udiciary !aw. <nder (rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted e;cept upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. <nlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts It has since long been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a /urisdictional, and not merely a formal re:uirement. Ehile in point of strict law, the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the /udiciary !aw, the re:uirement for a sworn written complaint is just as /urisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the Court cannot e;ercise its jurisdiction to try the case. It is significant that while the tate, as #arens #atriae, was added and vested by the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure with MEANING OF TERM 1J)RIS'ICTI,-A*1 the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, GrapeH and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her It was e;plained in Peo#le . $anada (su#ra), that this parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the /udiciary (ct of 1+-', not by the 4evised "enal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the OFFENDED PARTY IN ADULTERY MUST HAVE THE STATUS9 authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, IN PROSECUTIONS FOR ADULTERY AND CONCUBINAGE9 THE PERSON WHO CAN LEGALLY FILE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE THE OFFENDED SPOUSE9 AND NOBODY ELSE

legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an e:uivalent e;plicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same re:uirement and rationale would not apply.

<nderstandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the tate, through the "eople of the "hilippines, the offended party, being merely the complaining witness therein.

grandparents or guardian of the offended party.

The

so1called

e;clusive

and

successive

rule

in

the
Cowever, in the so1called >private crimes,> or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter e;clusively within his power and option.

prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage.

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely es1 tablished and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably e;ist at the time he initiates the action.

It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subse:uent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status e;isted prior to but ceased before, or was ac:uired subse:uent to but did not e;ist at the time of, the institution of the case. Ee would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity

29

to do

bring his wife and the alleged paramour to justice being too evident. E>0*1',5" R,;! &3 O33"+2"2 P(# 4 W!"+ &3 A;" )f t"e offended #art! is of age, t"e rig"t to file t"e FILING OF SUFFICIENT VERIFIED STATEMENT BEFORE COURT

writing in the form of searching :uestions and answers. $n the basis of that e;amination, a warrant of arrest was issued.
In his appeal, .ulaong contends through his counsel de officio that the lower court did not ac:uire jurisdiction over the case because the information filed by the city fiscal is fatally defective for not containing the verification re:uired in 8orm )- of the (ppendi; to the 4ules of Court.

com#laint is e-clusi e and successi e. %one of these persons has authority to proceed if there is any other person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity to appear and institute an action. Ehere, however, the victim who was also of age is incapacitated by reason of insanity or physical incapacity, the complaint filed by the father is alid. In a case where the 8iscal filed an Information charging the accused with &telling some #eo#le in t"e neig"bor"ood t"at said 'austa 0ra o (a married ,oman) ,as a #aramour of one Sangalang, a man not "er "usband,& and 8austa .ravo did not subscribe to the complaint, the upreme Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

The contention has no merit.

The forms prescribed in the 4ules of Court >serve as mere illustrations.>

/urisdiction over the crime charged in this case is conferred by law,

OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition prescribed in (rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code has been complied with is the interest of the aggrieved committed. DEATH OF COMPLAINANT DURING PENDENCY OF CASE DOES NOT EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY The death of the complainant during the pendency of the case is not a ground for e;tinguishment of criminal liability whether total or partial. party to seek judicial redress for the affront

It ruled that since the accused imputed to 8austa .ravo the commission of adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, the Information filed by the 8iscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court of origin.

not by the complaint or information which is merely the means by which jurisdiction is invoked or which gives the court the occasion for e;ercising its jurisdiction.

It must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without sustaining the motion to :uash and dismissing the case. "ursuant to ection 1 of paragraph ?a@ of ".3. %o. 77, under which the (ssistant City 8iscal conducted the preliminary investigation, the statement of the complainant was sworn to before the aforesaid Investigating 8iscal. (ssuming that the recitals in said sworn statement contain all those re:uired of a complaint under the rules, a copy of said verified statement of the complainant under the rules should be filed with respondent court in order to comply with the re:uirements of (rticle *0, of the 4evised "enal Code6 otherwise, the respondent 8iscal should file with said court, a verified complaint of the offended party.

INITIATION OF COMPLAINT SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE

IN

FISCALFS

OFFICE

IS

( 3Sala!sa!3 or sworn statement of the offended party, which prompted the 8iscal to con1duct a preliminary investigation and then to file an information in court, is not the complaint contemplatedAre:uired by (rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code.

The 4ule was modified in Aalde#enas u. Peo#le, which held that the complaint filed by the offended woman and her mother before the /ustice of the "eace Court and forwarded to the C8I of Cagayan, in which the corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape was filed and was considered as sufficient compliance with the law.

DEATH OF COMPLAINANT BEFORE FILING OF CASE IN COURT The fact that before a criminal information for adultery could be filed, the offended party who had already filed a sworn complaint with the fiscal died, is not sufficient justification for dismissal of the information, the desire of the offended party to

COMPLAINT FILED BY OFFENDED PARTY IN INFERIOR COURT SUFFICIENTG OFFENDED PARTY NEED NOT SUBSCRIBE INFORMATION In this case, the complaint for abduction with rape Bagainst .ulaong was filed in the city court by the offended girl and her father. That complaint was sworn to before the city judge. It was the basis of the preliminary e;amination. The judge e;amined the witnesses under oath. The e;amination was reduced to

It is not necessary for the complainant to sign and verify the information filed by the 8iscal. The complaint adopted by the 8iscal and attached to and made part of the corresponding information filed after investi1

30

gation is sufficient.

ince the filing of a complaint for any of the offenses enumerated in (rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code, by the person or persons mentioned therein is jurisdictional, the filing thereof is sufficient to initiate a valid prosecution, and no information need be led any longer by the 8iscal. COMPLAINT AND

The right and power of the court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the filing of the complaint, and a change in the allegations thereof as the manner of committing the crime should not operate to divest the court of the jurisdiction it has already ac:uired.

In Peo#le

. Sun#ongco, the failure of the prosecution to

formally offer in evidence the sworn complaint of the offended party or the failure to adhere to the rules is not fatal and does not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

If the complaint is forwarded to the Court as part of the record of the preliminary investigation of the case, the court can take judicial notice of the same without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence of the prosecution. S"210 ,&+9 A)210 ,&+9 A0 &3 L('0,5,&1'+"'' The right is e;clusively and successively reposed in the offended party, her parents or guardian in the order in which they are named.

EFFECT OF VARIANCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND THE EVIDENCE

The right or power to try the case should be distinguished from the right of the accused to demand an ac:uittal unless it is shown that he has committed the offense charged in the information even if he be found guilty of another offense6 in the latter case, however, even if the court has no right to find the accused guilty because the crime alleged is different from that proved, it cannot be stated that the court has no jurisdiction over the case.

( distinction should be made where there is a variance in the allegations in the complaint of the manner the crime was committed and the allegations in the information6 and a variance between the allegations in the information and the evidence adduced by the prosecution. a. Ehere the complaint filed was for forcible abduction, while the information filed by the 8iscal was for rape inasmuch as the crime if rape is different from the crime of forcible abduction alleged in the complaint, said complaint could not serve as a basis for the court to ac:uire jurisdiction over the crime actually committed. Ehere, however, the complaint was for rape, a change in the manner of committing the crime of rape from that as alleged in the complaint does not divest the court of its jurisdiction. c.

Ehere the complaint signed by the complainant charged the accused with abduction with rape detailed in her sworn statement which form part of the records of the preliminary investigation, even if the body of the complaint does not specify the elements of forcible abduction, if the information sufficiently charged the comple; crime forcible abduction with rape, the court validly ac:uired jurisdiction.

This is out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. NO NEED TO FILE INFORMATIONG FILING OF COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT In a case involving crimes against chastity, the prosecution may be conducted by the fiscal on the basis of the complaint filed in the inferior court. There is no need to file an information. Cence, the other contention of the accused that the information should have been signed by the offended girl is wrong. b.

d.

Ehere the information, however, charged the accused of rape by force and intimidation, he cannot be convicted of rape on the ground that the victim was raped while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason as it would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, e;cept when there is a failure to object thereto during the trial in which case the accused may be convicted of the rape proved even if committed in a manner different from that alleged in the information. O !"# C('"'

The power of jurisdiction of the court is not over the crime of rape when committed on a minor and demented girl, but over rape, irrespective of the manner in which the same may have been committed.

The court, therefore, erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction to try the crime charged in the information simply because it charges the accused with having a.

(rticle *-- of the 4evised "enal Code, reproduced in ection -, 4ule 11, of the 4ules of Court, does not re:uire that the offended girl in a crime against chastity should sign the information filed by the fiscal.

committed the crime on a demented girl, instead of through the use offeree and intimidation. The father has no preferential right over the mother to file the complaint.

31

b.

( complaint must be filed by the legal guardian. (n oath that he is the guardian was held as sufficient. The error may, however, be corrected without sustaining the motion to :uash and dismiss the case.

The death of offended party in a criminal case for libel or defamation does not e;tinguish criminal liability of accused.

c.

Ehere the complaint is for attempted rape, the city court has jurisdiction to try the case for acts of lasciviousness, the crime allegedly committed as per in:uest fiscalBs findings, though the complainant did not sign a complaint for acts of lasciviousness, lasciviousness. attempted rape includes acts of Ehere the statement of the complaint was sworn to before the investigating fiscal6 and the recitals in the sworn statement contain all those re:uired of a complaint under the rules, a copy of the verified statement of the offended party may be filed in court 8iscal should have prepared another Time of the offense under the former rule was changed to 3(TD of the offense. Thus, where the information was based on the criminal complaint filed with the fiscalBs office which conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation and the records conformably with the procedure then in force was transmitted to the trial court, such circumstance does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Ehat facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated )m#uting #rostitution, does not indicate an adulterous act and can be prosecuted de officio. Ehere, however, in addition to allegedly calling the complainant a whore, the private respondent is also charged in one information with having described the former as a >paramour of my husband,> this is a clear imputation of adultery. must be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. A** E*"$"+ ' &3 C#,$" M1' )" A**";"2 It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. SEC. ?. Sufficiency of complaint or information

Ehile

the

complaint for acts of lasciviousness, this is not jurisdictional 9 the complaint started the criminal action because a private crime can not be prosecuted de officio.

d.

Ehere the accused is charged with rape committed thru force and intimidation, he cannot be convicted of rape committed under paragraph ) of (rticle **& when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious.

e.

In robbery with rape or rape with homicide, the complaint of offended party is not essential. D"3($( ,&+ ( published letter stating that a woman employee had

The main purpose of re:uiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Ce is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the ofiense. M( "# &3 E5,2"+0"G N""2 N& )" A5"##"2 Cowever, it is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense.

( paramour is >one who loves or is loved illicitly.>

>illicit relationship with another who is the formerBs paramour> imputes adulterous relationship between the two. wife. ( prosecution for libel based thereon cannot be made without the sworn complaint of the offended party. ince the accused imputed the commission of adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, the Information filed by the 8iscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court of origin. ( mistress, also called a lover, accordingly, that imputation is covered by 4ule 11,. (s a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished DEATH OF OFFENDED PARTY IN CASES OF LIBEL OR DEFAMATION from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. $ne taking the place without legal rights of a husband or

32

8or instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

ammunitions outside of his residence. The contention is without merit. Ehat is important is that the information states that the accused is being charged of an offense under 4.(. %o. 701, (s the court had stated in Peo#le . Austria, the based on the complaint of the offended party, to which the accused had ade:uately responded. presentation of evidence >cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally e;ist.

R"('&+()*" C"# (,+ 4 ,' S133,0,"+ 2oreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices.

<nder these conditions, the accused was fully apprised of the accusation against him. The information was not merely defective but it does not

(ll that is re:uired is that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the e;act offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her conviction, in a subse:uent prosecution for the same offense.

charge any offense at all.

The purpose and objective of the constitutional mandate are discharged and satisfied.

Technically speaking, that information does not e;ist in contemplation of law.> The accused may not be said to be taken by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age of the offended In an information for rape ?committed before 4.(. %o. party, when he had received the initiatory complaint where he was told how old the offended party was. 70&+@ without alleging the age or complainant, the accused was convicted of statutory rape there being no objection to evidence or minority. Thus, even if the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which is an essential element of the The information was not void but merely defective which is curable by evidence admitted without objection. T!" S1)' (+ ,(* C&$%*,(+0" R1*" It has been held that a complaint is under the 4ules one of the two charging instruments for the offense of which the accused was tried and convicted here. crime of statutory rape, or the element of force and intimidation or the age of the complainant or the information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of >violation of 4.(. %o. 701,> without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated the Court treated the informations as merely defective and that the deficiency was cured either because the complaint supplied the omission or by the failure of the accused to assail the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information and by competent evidence presented during trial, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to Ehile the criminal action was instituted by the complaint of the offended party, the information signed only by the fiscal ushered in the formal trial process. The Court did not consider the omissions sufficient to invalidate the information, holding that the character of the .ut both are accusations in writing against the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary legal steps for his defense. crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, as they may be conclusions of be informed is violated.

E33"0 ' &3 F( (**4 D"3"0 ,5" I+3&#$( ,&+ Conviction or ac:uittal under a fatally defective information for want of certain essential allegation is not necessarily void when no objection appears to have been raised at the trial and the fatal defect could have been supplied by competent proof.

It was, however, held in )lo, et al. . Court of A##eals, that a substantial defect in the information cannot be cured by evidence, for that would jeopardize their right to be informed of, the true nature of the offense they are charged.

The

upreme Court applied the case of Peo#le u. Austria, aid the

holding that an information which does not charge an offense at all cannot be validated by the presentation of evidence. upreme Court= 3(t)"e #etitioner contends t"at under t"e allegation in t"e information t"at t"e accused ,it"out aut"orit! of la,, did t"en and t"ere ,illfull!, unla,full! and feloniousl! "a e in "is #ossession and under "is custod! and control t"e firearms and ammunitions enumerated t"erein,3 the prosecution may prove that the accused carried the firearms and

33

law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.

crime in either of the following manner= ?1@ by the use of the word >conspire> or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc. or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subse:uent indictment based on the same facts W!"+ C!(#;"2 (' ( M&2" &3 C&$$, ,+; !" C#,$"

constituting conspiracy.

In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term >conspire> or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy.

The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which ade:uately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and cause of.the accusation against him. ?)@

Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the ade:uacy The re:uirements of the sufficiency of the information are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as a mode of committing the crime as in the case of "lunder consisting of several predicate crimes. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. An allegation of cons#irac!, or one t"at ,ould im#ute criminal liabilit! to an accused for t"e act of anot"er or ot"ers, is indis#ensable in order to "old suc" #erson, regardless of t"e nature and e-tent of "is o,n #artici#ation, equall! guilt! ,it" t"e ot"er or ot"ers in t"e commission of t"e crime. accused. of evidence that may be re:uired to prove it.

The information may not refer to specific sectionAs of 4.(. %o. 701, alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, but it is all to evident that the body of the information contains an averment of theBacts alleged to have been performed by petitioner which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under ection & of 4.(. %o. 701,.

(s to which section of 4.(. %o. 701, is being violated by petitioner is inconse:uential.

Ehat is determinative of the offense is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. S133,0,"+04 &3 A**";( ,&+' &3 C&+'%,#(04 In our jurisdiction, N N N conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself.

The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conpsiracy and make them responsible as co1principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.

Ehere conspiracy e;ists and can rightly be appreciated, The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be e:ually responsible for the acts of the others. the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.

Ehen conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by of Criminal "rocedure. ection 0, 4ule 11, of the 4evised 4ules

The

information

must

state

that

the

accused

have

confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a communit! of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused.

5erily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co1accused as well.

8ollowing the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of the

uch an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words >conspired> or the phrase >acting in conspiracy,> must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts

In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not

34

collective

35

WHEN CONSPIRACY CHARGED AS A CRIME This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and Ehen conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. To comply with these fundamental re:uirements of 8or e;ample, the crime of >conspiracy to commit treason> is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the #overnment or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. b. The failure, however, to designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act or an In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set fort" t"e facts and circumstances t"at "a e a bearing on t"e cul#abilit! and liabilit! of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. c. The title of information or designation of offense is not controlling. 9ne suc" fact or circumstance in a com#laint against t,o or more accused #ersons is t"at of cons#irac!. It is the actual facts recited in the information that determines the nature of the crime. Fuite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not e;cepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof N""2 & D"',;+( " S ( 1 " V,&*( "2 a. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. "ursuant to the above, ection 0, 4ule 11, of the The real nature of offense is to be determined not by its designation or title given by the 8iscal but the facts alleged in the body of the Information. erroneous speficication of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recites the facts constituting the crime charged. the Constitution and the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned in the charge. to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

information for con iction of accused who may therefore be convicted of a crime more serious than that named in the title or preliminary part if such crime is covered by the facts alleged in the body of the information and its commission is established by the evidence.

SEC. 7. -ame of the accused

The word 3disco ered3 under the former rule was changed to 3ascertained.3

Drror in the name or identity should be raised on arraignment. P1#%&'" &3 R1*" To enable the court to ac:uire jurisdiction over his person and to inform him of the facts.

Ehere the accused has been sued as /ohn 3oe in an information filed in due form, and after due investigation by the 8iscal, his identity became known, his true name may be inserted without further need of preliminary investigation where one had already been properly conducted pursuant to the charter of Fuezon City and the nature of the crime is not changed.

d.

It is the province of the Court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.

Dven the justice of the peace, during the preliminary investigation of a case, is without authority to determine the character of the crime committed. Cis declaration upon the point is merely an opinion which in no wise binds the trial court.

5erbal motion to correct spelling is sufficient.

4ules of Court, e;pressly re:uires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. e.

Ehere the accused 4oberto Cultura was indicted in the information as >/ose> Cultura ?his fatherBs name@, but it was clearly proven that he was part of the group that killed the victim and did not raise the :uestion of his identity at the

Allegations #re ail o er designation of t"e offense in t"e

36

arraignment and ac:uiesced to be tried under that name, he is deemed to have waived to raise the :uestion of his identity for the first time on appeal. a. Ehen the victim is under eighteen ?1'@ years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step1parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common1law spouse of the parent of the victim. Ehen the victim is under the custody of the police or mili1 tary authorities.

4.(. %o. 70&+ (7eat" Penalt! .a,) 4elationships which includes step1daughter and minority in incestuous rape are in the nature of :ualifying circumstances, must be specifically alleged and proved to warrant imposition of death penalty.

SEC. -. 'esi2nation of the offense

$mission cannot be cured by evidence. b. Cence, penalty should only be reclusion #er#etual

SEC. /. Cause of the accusation A$"+2$"+

c.

Ehen the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consangguinity.

The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under (rticle **& of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended by 4.(. %o. 70&+, are in the nature of :ualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty.

d. The former rule did not re:uire :ualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the complaint or information. e. (ccording to jurisprudence, aggravating circumstances proven by the evidence, although not alleged in the information, may be taken into account as such aggravating circumstances. f.

Ehen the victim is a religious or a child below seven ?7@ years old. (s special :ualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information6 Ehen the offender knows that he is afflicted with (c:uired Immune 3eficiency yndrome ?(I3 @ disease. The allegation that Irma is %elsonBs niece is not specific Ehen committed by any member of the (rmed 8orces of the "hilippines or the "hilippine %ational "olice or any law enforcement agency. If the offender is merely a relation 9 not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim 9 the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is >a relative by consanguinity or affinity Gas the case may beH within the third civil degree.> enough to satisfy the special :ualifying circumstance of relationship. otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

Fualifying

circumstances not alleged but proven are

considered as aggravating. g. This is no longer true. Ehen by reason on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

HISTORY OF AMENDMENT. A**";( ,&+' & W(##(+ D"( ! P"+(* 4 "ursuant to ection 11 of the amendatory statute ($"e

The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship of the offender is a special :ualifying circumstance which should both be alleged and proved with certainty in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The informations in these cases merely allege that Irma is the >niece> of %elson.

7eat" Penalt! .a,), the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the last paragraph of (rticle **& of the 4evised "enal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances=

In these eight ?'@ cases, complainant never said she was below 1' years of age when she was allegedly raped by her father on any of the dates stated in the complaint.

he could be a niece beyond the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity.

Cence, the informations are fatally defective in this respect.

37

The factor that characterizes the charge is the actual

In Peo#le u. :une(, the Court stressed= trict application of the

Dvery crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names ?plaintiff and defendant@ and circumstances.

recital of facts.

rule re:uiring the allegation of the :ualifying circumstances mentioned in ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 70&+ was further enunciated in Peo#le . 7ima#ilis. Ehile the Information there alleged that the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused, it was not accepted as a proper allegation of the :ualifying circumstance that the accused was the >common law spouse of the parent of the victim> and the death penalty imposed by the trial court was once again reduced to reclusion #er#etua.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated they being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.> It is essential therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to them as >as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.> It imperative that the Information filed with the trial court

Taking into account the growing number of cases where :ualified rape under ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 70&+, although proven during trial, could still not be properly penalized because of defects in the Information,

The purpose of the rule is to fully apprise the accused of the true charge against him.

Ee urge the prosecuting fiscals who are charged with the responsibility of preparing Informations to state with particularity the attendant circumstances provided for under ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 70&+.

The rule broadens the concept and scope of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

be complete 9 to the end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense.

Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the

2ore specifically, in :ualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the actual relationship between the parties, as worded in 4.(. %o. 70&+, must be alleged in the Information.

The life and liberty of the accused should not be left to the ability or inability of his counsel to promptly object against the admissibility of what the law or rule re:uires to be specifically alleged.

elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused.

$therwise, Ee shall continue to fail both the law and the victims whom the law have sought to protect.

The Court in Peo#le u. =ende(, cited the 1+*& case of This was e;plained in 4.S. . Farelsen+ Peo#le . $so, that the allegation of the complaint that the accused had carnal intercourse with the offended woman >The object of this written accusations was, >against her will> or >without her consent> is insufficient to warrant a conviction for rape, although the evidence proves the commission of the crime and reiterated the importance of duly informing the accused of the accusation against him as a constitutional right that cannot be taken lightly, more so, if the penalty to be imposed is grave, such as the forfeiture of his life.

Cence, the formulation of the foregoing rules that mandate not only the :ualifying but also the aggravating circumstances to be specified in the information

The 4ule now re:uires aggravating circumstances must not only be proven but it must also be alleged, otherwise, it should not be considered.

'irst+ To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense6 and

R" #&(0 ,5" A%%*,0( ,&+ &3 R1*" The rule being remedial and favorable to the accused may be applied retroactively to pending cases. P1#%&'" &3 R1*"

Second, to avail himself of his conviction or ac:uittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and

The essence of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is that >every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information> so as to >enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Ce is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.>

$"ird to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had in order that this re:uirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.

38

:ualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted In setting out the elements of a crime in the information or complaint, the pertinent provisions of the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, specifically, ection + of 4ule 11,, provides the following guideline the cited provision is one of the many provisions in the 4ules of Court that serves to implement the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. 8or rape to be :ualified as heinous, warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the circumstances of the 4elevant to this case is the phrase 3a #erson of common understanding,3 which has its origin in this jurisdiction in the phrase 3a #erson of ordinar! intelligence.33 (lthough a husband is subject to punishment by death in The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. case he commits rape against his wifeBs daughter, where the information alleged the accused, who is the stepfather of complainant, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the latter who was then below eighteen years of age, but the evidence The raison d&etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. shows that the accused is not the complainantBs stepfather because he and complainantBs mother were not really married but only lived in common1law relationship or where the charge is that the victim is the daughter of the accused when the evidence Eithout allegation of relationship in cases of statutory rape, proof alone of relationship unless specifically alleged in the information would not warrant imposition of the death penalty. shows that she is a mere stepdaughter or whether the relationship is by affinity or consanguinity in the third degree the death penalty cannot be imposed because the relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually proven <nder e;isting jurisprudence, in the absence of proof of aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion #er#etua and not death. Ehere there are two indivisible penalties if there is no aggravating circumstance the lesser penalty should be imposed.
LGTHaking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen ?1*@ year old ?sic@ daughter. . .>

between the victim and the accused because as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of >taking advantage of superior strength.>

or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence, like the complainantBs minority, may be considered as an aggravating.

The Court further e;plained that=

E>(0 R"*( ,&+'!,% & )" A**";"2

>.e it in terms of synta; or composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that the generic aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of (rticle **&.

minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the information for rape.

The afore1:uoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 1' years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed.>

S%"0,3,0 A**";( ,&+ &3 R"*( ,&+'!,% (+2 M,+&#, 4 Dven if the information alleged that the victim is the natural daughter of the accused, where there is a difference in their surname, the mere testimony of the victim that the accused is his father is not sufficient to establish the :ualifying circumstance of relationship, even if such relationship was not denied by the accused.

Ehere the informations alleged=

>G(Hnd taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old.. .>

#ranting that the relationship within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity was duly proved during the trial, still such proof cannot be appreciated to justify the imposition of the death penalty because he would thereby be denied of his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The court may appreciate as an aggravating circumstance the victimBs minority, which was pleaded in the informations and proved by her birth certificate.

the Court spared the life of the accused, despite the mention of the age of the victim and the word >daughter> in said informations, on the ground that the :uoted informations failed to duly allege the spe cial :ualifying circumstances of the victimBs minority and the relationship

(ccused cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its :ualified form.

In those cases, when either one of the twin special

39

e;emplary damages within the conte;t of (rticle ))*, of the E>(0 A;" &3 V,0 ,$ $1' )" A**";"2 The allegation in the information that complainant is the >minor daughter> of accused1appellant is insufficient. R1*" &+ E>"$%*(#4 D($(;"' In line with the ruling in Peo#le . Catubig, the :ualifying %ew Civil Code, even if the information or criminal complaint has not alleged said circumstances as re:uired by the rule. circumstances of minority and relationship, though not specified in the complaint, can serve as basis for awarding e;emplary (s held in Peo#le of the crime. To warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the :ualifying circumstance of the rape victim being below seven years of age should be aptly alleged in the information. . Puertollano, the information must damages. In Peo#le . Cac"o#ero, the award of e;emplary damages

was deleted since the aggravating circumstances to justify the ward were not alleged and proved. THE MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE ALLEGED NOT ONLY IN PREAMBLE BUT IN ACCUSATORY PORTION The fact of filiation and minority must be alleged in the accusatory portion of the information.

state the e;act age of the victim at the time of the commission (lthough the rape was committed in 1++7, before the 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure took effect, the court held that the retroactive application of the rules does not absolve accused from civil liability

$therwise, the death penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion #er#etua as provided for in the second paragraph of (rt. **& of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended.

Thus,

the

use

of

deadly

weapon

is

:ualifying

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or the preamble of the information, nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated ; ; ;, but from the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information.>

circumstance or when the crime is committed by two or more persons, the penalty is reclusion #er#etua to death if the commission of the crime was attended by an aggravating circumstance.

C$2"(4D=

The use of a deadly weapon was considered as :ualifying and not aggravating for purposes of imposing the death penalty which was, however, considered as aggravating to award e;emplary damages. In Peo#le . Canie(o the circumstance of deadly weapon

Ehere relationship is not stated in the >cause of the accusation,> or in the narration of the act or omission constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or opening statement of the complaint and the complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not state in the accusatory portion the specifications of the acts constitutive of the offense, that he is charged as the father of the victim.

It has, however, been held that where the information state that the offense was committed with the aggravating circumstances of insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of the fact the accused is the father of the complainant, properly plead the special circumstance of relationship of father and daughter that would enable a >person of sufficient understanding> to know what offense is intended to be charged.

was not alleged but proven and was considered as generic aggravating 9 but did not make any difference in the imposition of the penalty since under (rticle 0* where the penalty involved are two indivisible penalties of reclusion #er#etua and there are no :ualifying circumstances, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion #er#etua shall be imposed regardless of the aggravating circumstance.

uch omission is prejudicial to the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him. PLEA OF GUILTY INFORMATION TO ALLEGATIONS IN BODY OF

The accused could not have been misled by the wording of the informations.

D;emplary damages was, however, awarded. ( person of ordinary intelligence could not plead with logic that he had no notice that he is being charged with the repeated rape of his fifteen1year1old daughter. Thus an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or :ualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of

Thus, the plea of guilty is not on the offense alleged in the preamble but for the crime alleged in the accusatory portion of the information.

40

The fact that accused1appellant has not denied the Thus accused did not, in fact, plead guilty to a capital offense designated in the preamble but only to that part of the complaint that charges only simple rape under (rt. **&, for which the penalty is only reclusion #er#etua, and not for rape under 4.(. %o. 70&+, :ualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father of the victim who is a minor, for which the penalty is death. (ny circumstance that would :ualify or aggravate the crime charged must be specified in the information. .ecause of its failure to discharge this burden and the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding ec. *, 4ule 110, 8ollowing the established rule that a penal statute, whether substantive or procedural, shall be given a retroactive effect if favorable to the accused, aggravating circumstances not alleged cannot be appreciated. NOT INVOLVING It is different with regard to the relationship of the of1 fended party and accused1appellant, because the latter admitted APPLICATION TO ALL CRIMES IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY Thus, where the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulnnes, nocturnity or .efore the amendment the retroactive effect of non1 allegation of aggravating circumstance even if proved is inapplicable for the crime of robbery, the same not involving the imposition of the death penalty. (lthough the information does not specifically allege treachery as a :ualifying circumstance in the commission of the 8or said crime, what remains applicable is the old rule that generic aggravating circumstances if duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in determining the proper imposable penalty, even if such circumstances is not alleged in the information. crime, the allegation in the information that the victim was four years old at the time of the killing is sufficient compliance with section 0, 4ule 11, of the 4evised 4ules of Criminal "rocedure, as amended. Milling a child by an adult constitutes treachery even if the mode of attack by the assailant is not proved by the prosecution because a child of tender years could not be e;pected to put up a defense and hence at the mercy of his or her assailant. THE JUDGMENT MUST MAKE AN EXPRESS FINDING OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES The decision of the trial court must contain an e;press and categorical finding that the complainant was below 1' years old when the crime of rape was committed to justify the imposition of the death penalty. MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES NEED NOT ALLEGE WITH SPECIFICITY WHETHER IT IS QUALIFYING OR AGGRAVATING It was earlier held that where the information, did not allege with specificity as :ualifying the killing to murder ?it merely alleged >with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation@ although established by the evidence, under the present 4evised 4ules of Criminal "rocedure, treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance only. This was reiterated in an en bane decision of the Court in Peo#le . =anlansing, holding that where none of aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations with specificity as a :ualifying circumstance elevating the killing to murder, There must not only be proof of minority but also of the relationship between the accused and the victim. nighttime or treachery or abuse of superior strength not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated. "erforce, the death penalty imposed by the trial court in each of the eight ?'@ cases should be reduced to reclusion #er#etua as provided in the second paragraph of (rt. **& of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended. that complainant is his daughter. as to the minority of the victim, the :ualifying circumstance of minority and relationship cannot be appreciated in these cases. The failure to allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape is fatal and conse:uently bars conviction of its :ualified form which is punishable with death. allegation in the complaints that 2ylene was below 1' years of age when any of the crimes was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden.

Ce cannot therefore properly invoke offense.

which re:uires reception of evidence on a plea to a capital

The court clarified that with the amendment, the principle is now applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases where the aggravating circumstances would increase the penalty to death.

The court, therefore gave fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth, they must prepare well1crafted informations that allege the circumstances :ualifying and aggravating the crimes charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the proper penalty.

41

ascused should only be convicted of homicide. The words >aggravatingA:ualifying,> >:ualifying,> >:ualified This is no longer true. by,> >aggravating,> or >aggravated by> need not be e;pressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are In a #er curiam 4esolution, the Court in Peo#le declared= The ruling was reiterated in Peo#le
3

evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.

. Aquino

specified in the Information.>

8ollowing the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of the . Paulina and Peo#le . crime in either of the following manner= ?1@ by the use of the word >conspire> or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc. or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subse:uent indictment based on the same facts. In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. C&+'%,#(04 C!(#;"2 (' ( C#,$" Thus, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.

LEe therefore reiterate that

ections ' and + of 4ule 11, merely

. @arin holding that the appellant may no longer rely on the rulings (lba and 2analansing because of the ruling in Peo#le Aquino and Peo#le . Paulino. WHEN DEFECT IN INFORMATION SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE CUREDC THE ?)@

re:uire that the Information allege, s#ecif! or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to :ualify the offense.

These

circumstances

need

not

be

preceded

by

the

words

BaggravatingA:ualifying,B B:ualifying,B or B:ualified byB to be considered as :ualifying circumstances.

The information must state that the accused have confed1

It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial.

erated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused.

uch an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of

Ehen the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as :ualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law.

the words >conspired> or >confederated> or the phrase >acting in conspiracy,> must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy.

This includes the death penalty in proper cases.>

In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term >conspire> or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy.

<nfortunately, this is one of those cases.

8or e;ample, the crime of >conspiracy to commit treason> is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the #overnment or to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. N N N CONSPIRACY CHARGED AS MODE OF COMMITTING A CRIME The re:uirements of the sufficiency of the information are

The allegation of the twin circumstances of minority and relationship in the Information, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial, compels the Court to impose the death penalty. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the ade:uacy of evidence that may be re:uired to prove it. To guide the bench and the bar, this 4esolution clarifies and resolves the issue of how to allege or specify :ualifying or aggravating circumstances in the Information. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the

42

different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case of "lunder consisting of several crimes. b.

or mentioned in the charge.

CRIME The foregoing doctrines refer to the special :ualifying circumstances that are re:uired to be specifically alleged in the information.

The failure, however, to designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act or an erroneous specification of the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recites the facts constituting the crime charged.

There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.

It would seem to be different when there is a mere variance in the mode of the commission of the crime.

The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and make them responsible as co1principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.

c.

The title of information or designation of offense is not controlling. (. 4eal %ature of Crime 3etermined by 8acts (lleged in Complaint or Information and %ot by Title a. Ehat controls is not the designation of the offense but its description, and in the case of attending circumstances, not their denomination but their function. If the killing was committed with the attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in (rticle )-' of the 4evised "enal Code, then the offense committed is murder although they are mistakenly called aggravating in the information.

It is the actual facts recited in the information that de1 termines the nature of the crime.

The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be e:ually responsible for the acts of the others.

The real nature of offense is to be determined not by its designation or title given by the 8iscal but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.

a.

:eed to 7esignate Statute Aiolated. d. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is the province of the Court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named.

Dven the justice of the peace, during the preliminary investigation of a case, is without authority to determine the character of the crime committed. b. Cis declaration upon the point is merely an opinion which in no wise binds the trial court.

They are :ualifying circumstances nonetheless.

"ursuant to the above,

ection 0, 4ule 11, of the

4ules of Court, e;pressly re:uires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. e.

Thus, where the information characterized the killing as having been committed by taking advantage of superior strength, a circumstance which :ualifies a killing to murder, the information sufficiently charged the commission of murder.

This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

Allegations #re ail o er designation of t"e offense in t"e information for con iction of accused who may therefore be convicted of a crime more serious than that named in the title or preliminary part if such crime is covered by the facts alleged in the body of the information and its commission is established by the evidence. c. In a prosecution for robbery with rape, the fact that the information did not mention (rt. **& of the 4evised "enal Code but (rts. )+* and )+- of that Code will not prevent conviction of an accused under (rt. **&.

To comply with these fundamental re:uirements of the Constitution and the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated

EFFECTS OF VARIANCE IN MODE OF COMMISSION OF

The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of

43

the nature of the accusation against him is not violated thereby.

This principle was reiterated in Peo#le

. $orres, .. Dssential Dlements Inferred from (llegation in Information

wherein the Court again held that it is not the technical name given by the 8iscal appearing in the title of the Information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information, where the accused charged with violation of #eneral $rder %o. 0 for carrying with him an unlicensed firearm punishable with life imprisonment was held guilty under the 4evised (dministrative Code punishable by imprisonment of one to five years.

(s former Chief /ustice 2oran pointed out= >If the above re:uirement is not complied with and no name has been given to the offense alleged to have been committed, the defect is merely of form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.

Ehile the general rule is that an inference in the complaint and conclusions such as >#rave abuse of confidence> are not allowed the following terms were interpreted by the upreme Court is follows=

>Caving committed the offense criminally and feloniously, and with intent to kill> sufficiently avers discernment on the part of the accused who was a minor.

This is especially so where the facts pleaded are clearly constitutive of a specific offense. c. (lthough the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information

In such cases, the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or information. &. This is so because from a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. The offense of fraud denned under the 4evised "enal Code is malum in se, whereas ..". .ig. )), also known as .ouncing Checks !aw, is a special law which It in no way aids him in his defense on the merits. punishes the issuance of bouncing checks, a malum #ro"ibitum. The real :uestion is not that he did commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. 8raud or estafa under the 4evised "enal Code is a distinct offense from the violation of the .ouncing Checks !aw. C. ..". .ig. )) cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of estafa under 4"C, (rticle *1&, )?d@.

>Eillfully, unlawfully> covers >knowingly> in illegal fishing. Eillful damage to property includes reckless imprudence.

>3eceit and promise of marriage was treated as mere surplusage in :ualified seduction case.>

>Intent to gain> is presumed to be alleged in an informa tion where it is alleged that there was unlawful taking and appropriation by the offender.

!imitation on 4ule that an (ccused may be Convicted of a Crime which is 2ore erious than that %amed in the Title so erious $ffense !ong as the 8acts (lleged the 2ore

?a@ (n accused could not be convicted under one act when he is charged with a violation of another if the change from one statute to the other involves= 1@ a change of the theory of the trial6 re:uires of the defendant a different defense6 or surprises the accused in anyway.

If he did, it is of no conse:uence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.>

They are different offenses, having different elements.

)@ *@

Ehere appellant is accused of violating a particular provision of the 4evised "enal Code on estafa, she may not be convicted for violation of ..". .ig. )) without trenching on fundamental fairness. ?b@ )llegal construction Ehere the information for illegal construction does not specifically describe and locate

44

the building alleged to have been illegally constructed, it is fatally defective because it is impossible on its face to identify the house allegedly constructed without the necessary building permit.

The general rule is that an accused cannot be convicted of a different mode of the commission of the offense charged in the information.

of force or intimidation.

(ppellant was charged with rape committed by means offeree or intimidation.

Ehere the law distinguishes between two cases of It can be :uashed. violation of its provision, an information for violation thereof must specify under which of the two cases, the defendant In several cases, the accused whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt, although affirmed by the upreme Court, escaped lethal injection because of the failure of the prosecution to specifically allege the :ualifying circumstance of relationship or age in heinous crimes. stands accused of. Ehere the accused is charged with rape committed thru force and intimidation, he can not be convicted of rape committed under paragraph ) of (rticle **& when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, e;cept when there is no objection. The upreme Court therefore urged the prosecuting It was held that an accused cannot be convicted of rape of a mental retardate if this is not alleged in the information. It cannot be made the basis of conviction, without violating appellantBs right to due process, in particular to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. It was likewise held that the accused cannot be This is what the amendment seeks to accomplish. convicted under paragraph ) or * of (rticle **& of the 4evised "enal Code, because none of the modes of committing rape specified therein were alleged in the The amendment did not, however, limit the re:uire1 ment to :ualifying circumstances but also included To convict him under either of these statutory The court held that the absence of an allegation in the information of this mode of committing the crime of rape was deemed waived by the absence of an objection and the Thus in convicting appellant, the trial court relied upon The re:uirement would also prevent a repetition of the errors by the prosecutors in Re#ublic . Asuncion, Arceo . Cunanan, Peo#le u. =agallanes and .acson u. /-ecuti e Secretar!, where the prosecution failed to specify the :ualifying facts that the crimes were committed in relation to their public office. (ppellant was charged with rape committed by means This contradicts the allegation in the information. a finding that complainant was unconscious when the appellant had carnal knowledge other. The Court cited Peo#le u. Abiera, holding that the accused charged with rape through one mode of commission may still be convicted of the crime if the evidence shows another mode of commission, provided that the accused did not object to such evidence. presentation of evidence to the contrary. aggravating circumstances. Information. Cowever, in Peo#le u. Atien(a, involving the rape of a 1*1year old minor charged with rape committed in 122C by force and intimidation there was no objection to evidence of subnormal mental incapacity ?that is, her mental capacity was e:uivalent to an ' year1old@. provisions is to deprive him of the constitutional right to be Ehere there is no aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reclusion #er#etual informed of the accusation against him. fiscals to state with particularity the fact of minority and the actual relationship between the parties as worded in 4.(. %o. 70&+. It must be spelled out in more concrete terms. The element of unconsciousness on the victimBs part was not alleged much less specified in the information. $therwise put, his offense fell under (rticle )001(?1@ of the 4evised "enal Code.

.ut in convicting him of rape committed while his victim was supposedly unconscious, the trial court applied (rticle )001(?l@?b@ of said Code.

45

(ccordingly, appellant can be convicted of the crime 8ailure to object to evidence of the mode of charged through either the second or third circumstance of committing such crime. OBSERVATIONSC LIMITATION ON WAIVER a. There is waiver and conviction allowed based on evidence even if not alleged in the information, citing separate opinion of then now C./. 3avide in Peo#le of nature and cause of accusation. . =oreno, on waiver of constitutional right to be informed The information in the foregoing cases charges an offense but allowed waiver because of a variance between the allegation and proof in the mode of commission of the offense without any objection. commission of crime different from that alleged in the information is considered a waiver=

accused1appellant did not touch upon this point when something more valuable than any property that a person could ever inherit in his lifetime is in danger of being taken away eternally.

It is elementary that the e;istence of waiver must be positively demonstrated since a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.

The standard of waiver re:uires that it 3not onl! must be oluntar!, but must be ?no,ing, intelligent, and done ,it" sufficient a,areness of t"e rele ant circumstances and li?el! consequences.3

In this case, the accusatory portion failed to specifically allege that the rape was committed through force or intimidation, the prosecution was able to establish by evidence without any objection that the accused1 appellant that tended to prove that he committed the rape by force and intimidation.

Ehere the information charges no offense at all or would result in convicting the accused for a more serious offense than the offense charged waiver for failure to object should not be allowed.

There must thus be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relin:uish the right.

The court itself stated that the rules on the validity or invalidity of a waiver are not something we have crafted overnight to suit the instant case.

2ere silence of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender thereof6 the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the e;istence and validity of such waiver.

b.

imilarly, in Peo#le of the victim by

. 9rbita, the Information against means offeree, violence and

accused1appellant alleged that he had carnal knowledge They have been e;tant since time that is now immaterial to recall. intimidation, against the latterBs will and consent.

%ecessarily, where there is a reservation as to the nature of any manifestation or proposed action affecting the right of the accused to be heard before he is condemned, certainly, the doubt must be resolved in his favor to be allowed to proffer evidence in his behalf.

It did not allege her mental state.

In civil cases, we overturn decisions because the waiver of certain rights was not done in accordance with the re:uisites.

3uring the trial, however, the prosecution proved that the victim is a mental retardate and the accused1 appellant was convicted under paragraph ) of (rticle **& of the 4evised "enal Code. Cence, in )ntestate /state of t"e .ate Aito 0orromeo . 0orromeo, this Court set aside the waiver of hereditary rights because it was not clearly and convincingly shown that the heir had the intention to waive his right or advantage voluntarily. (lthough initially deficient, the criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the prosecution introduced In criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at stake, obviously, the rule on waiver cannot be any less.

$ur criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step1 by1step formula to be followed by courts in cases punishable by death.

The reason for this is to ensure that the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is preserved and the tate makes no mistake in taking life and liberty e;cept that of the guilty.

evidence of the complainantBs mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby waiving the procedural defect.

In this light, we are at a loss why counsel de oficio for

46

Cence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration that such a different or e;traordinary approach has been undertaken voluntarily and intelligently.

dreary work rather than protect the rights of his client.

information which charges the accused of raping his si; year1old daughter or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, or of committing se;ual abuse against her 111year old daughter.

$f course, it may be stretching the argument too much to ascribe fatal incompetence upon herein accusedBs counsel for this solitary instance of fau- #as.

8or otherwise, as in the instant case, denial of due process can be successfully invoked since no valid waived or rights has been made. done. .ut, for sure, we must in:uire if the waiver was validly

Eaiver is not allowed where the information charges no offense.

(n indictment must fully state the elements of the The Court noted with deep regret the failure of the trial court to in:uire from accused1appellant himself whether he wanted to present evidence6 or submit his memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any6 or in default thereof, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. In Peo#le . 7onato,3 the Court e;pounded on what rights specific offense alleged to have been committed.

and privileges may be waived, i(.+ 8or an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, >(lthough the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
>Ehile it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.>

even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information

b.

Eaiver is not allowed where the :ualifying circumstance is different from the :ualifying circumstance alleged in the information.

The in:uiry is simply part and parcel of the determination of the validity of the waiver, i.e., 3not onl! must be a,areness of t"e rele ant circumstances oluntar!, li?el! but must be ?no,ing, intelligent, and done ,it" sufficient and consequences.3 which ought to have been done by the trial court not only because this was supposed to be an uncomplicated and routine task on its part, but more importantly since accused1 appellant himself did not personally, on a person1to1person basis, manifest to the trial court the waiver of his own right.

Ehere the accused alleged to be the father of the victim who is under 1' years of age is charged with rape under paragraph ) of (rticle )001( punishable by reclusion tem#oral he cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of (rticle )001( punishable by death, even if this was duly established.

Ehile it is established that rights may be waived, (rticle 0 of bhe Civil Code e;plicitly provides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. c.

Eaiver is not allowed where it would result in a more serious penalty.

(s things stand, both this Court and the trial court being asked hook, line and sinker to take the word of counsel de oficio whose own concern in that particular phase of the proceedings a quo may have been compromised by pressures of his other commitments.

Thus, in the following cases, waiver was not allowed as it would iolate the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and, conse:uently, a denial of due process.

<nder sections ' and +, 4ule 11, failure to allege aggravating or :ualifying circumstances, even if proved without objection cannot be availed of to :ualify or aggravate the offense charged.

8or all we know, the statutory counsel of the indigent accused at that time of the trial, although not evident in the other aspects of his representation, only wanted to get rid of a. (n accused cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness or of violation of4.(. %o. 701, under an The court ruled that the relationship and minority of

47

the victim are special :ualifying circumstances which cannot be considered unless specifically alleged in the information.

be alleged.

language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the e;ception is omitted, the indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the e;ception. (nd, when the evident intent and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and penalize generally an act as, for instance, the smoking of opium, and the statute desires to withdraw from its operation a limited class of persons, one charged with its violation is bound to show that he falls within the e;ception, whether the e;cepting proviso is found in the enacting clause or in a separate provision of the statute.

(n e;ception in a penal statute by which certain particulars The right to be arraigned cannot be waived. 9 There can be no trial in absentia without arraignment 9 which must be in the presence of the accused. are withdrawn from or e;cepted out of its enacting clause, defining a crime concerning a class or species, need not be denied in an information charging a violation of said statute.

5ariance, however, on date of commission of rape is irrelevant. H(), 1(* 2"*,+H1"+04 ( mere statement of habitual delin:uency is a conclusion of law and a plea of guilty to such an information does not make the accused a habitual delin:uent. The information should specify the dates= ?1@ of the commission of previous crimes6 ?)@ of the last conviction or release6 and ?*@ of the other previous conviction or release of the accused. ABSENCE OF ALLEGATION OF RECIDIVISM AND HABITUAL DELINQUENCY In the (bsence of allegations in )nformation of Recidi ism and >abitual 7elinquenc! the evidence was properly objected to as inadmissible. imilarly, the :ualifying circumstance of treachery must be specifically pleaded or alleged with sufficient clarity as to be readily understood and not merely deduced. N";( ,5" (+2 E>0"% ,+; A**";( ,&+' Ehen an e;ception or negative allegation is not an ingredient of the offense and is a matter of defense it need not

(nd where a denial is unnecessarily alleged in the information, it need not be proved by the prosecution, for it is not an essential element of the violation charged, but a matter of defense which must be proved by the accused if he relies upon it.

( negative allegation of recruiting without a license, forms 8or instance, the $pium !aw provides that >save upon the prescription of a duly licensed and practicing physician, veterinarian, or dentist, no person shall inhale, snuff, chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise take or use any such drug in his body or permit the same to be used upon him by another.> ?1@ 3Dit"out necessar! license3 is an ingredient of violation of Circular %o. 0, of the Central .ank prohibiting the import In an information charging a violation of this statute, it is not necessary to allege that the person charged is not under the e;ception contained in the statute, i.e., that he did not use the prohibited drug upon the prescription of a physician, veterinarian or dentist, nor is it necessary to prove such allegation if made unnecessarily, because said e;ception is a matter of defense which the accused must prove. To determine whether the e;ception is or is not a matter of defense, the following test has been approved= If the language of the law defining the otfense is so entirely separable from the e;ception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to said e;ception, the pleader may then safely omit such reference, as the e;ception is a matter of defense which must be shown by the accused.
Ehere the law distinguishes between two cases of violation of its provision, an information for violation thereof must specify under which of the two cases the defendants stands accused of.

an essential element of the crime charged. Cence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily establish the date when the complainant was recruited.

and e;port of "hilippine coins and notes.

?)@ Eant of Certificate to practice medicine is an essential element of the crime of illegal practice of medicine.

?*@ In illegal possession of firearm, the information must allege that accused has no license to possess firearm.

(n accused charged with murder by means of stabbing cannot be convicted of homicide thru drowning, otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be violated, so also a person may not be convicted of :ualified seduction where the information charges him with rape by means offeree, violence and

If, however, the e;ception is so incorporated with the

48

intimidation.

5enue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.

within the period of the statute of limitation and before the commencement of the action.

)nference in com#laint and conclusions are not allowed. 3@ra e abuse of confidence3 is a conclusion of law. R&))"#4 6, ! H&$,0,2" 8ailure to state in the information that the killing of the victim was committed >by reason of or on occasion of the robbery,> does not bar conviction of accused of the special comple; crime of robbery with homicide. Ehenever alleged. possible, the place where the written To determine venue in libel cases, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at the time. Ehere the complaint for rape charges accused with having committed the crime >on or about the month of /une 1+7'> and the affidavit shows that it was committed for >sometime prior to said period and subse:uent thereto,> attaching thereto the affidavit of the complainant that she was abused before the start of classes in /une 1+7' which may thus be considered as part of the complaint, the discrepancies between the accusation and the complaint as to the time of occurrence of the carnal copulations in rape do not affect the essential rights of the accused, where the acts occurred within the period of time alleged in both writings, and the difference noted in other respects was of a That SEC. 18. 0lace of commission of the offense P1#%&'" &3 R1*"C T$ C$E TD44IT$4I(! /<4I 3ICTI$%. SEC. 11. 'ate of Commission of the ,ffense a. b. c. d. 5iolation of domicile8 "enalty on keeper, watchman and visitor of an opium den 8 Trespass to dwelling 8 5iolation of election law, e.g., *, meter1radius carrying of deadly weapon prohibited. a. b. c. The remedy is a motion for .ill of "articulars under 4ule 110, ec. 0. V"+1" &3 C#,$,+(* A0 ,&+ 3&# W#, "+ D"3($( ,&+ C#,$"' W!"#" T,$" ,' E''"+ ,(* Infanticide6B 5iolation of (bortion. The complaint must allege a specific time and place when and where the offense was committed, but when the time so alleged is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proved as alleged, and the complaint will be sufficient if the evidence shows that the offense was committed at anytime It was held that the complaint was sufficient to sustain a conviction even if the proof showed that it was committed in unday tatutes (/lection .a,)8 and ?1@ that the crime was committed at any time within the period of limitation and ?)@ before or after the time stated in the complaint or indictment and before the action is commenced. Thus, an information charging the commission of the crime of robbery in 3ecember 1+,), was filed in 2arch 1+, 1+,*. 3$ime3 of the commission of the offense was changed to 37A$/.3 The evidence is admissible and sufficient if it shows= allegation would be a sine qua non if the formal, rather than a substantial, character. circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. 3About3 is a very comprehensive term which when used with regards to time, may cover a considerable e;tent thereof.

defamation was printed and first published should likewise be

C#,$"' W!"#" P*(0" ,' E''"+ ,(*

.<T in 4.S. . Smit" it was held that the proof need not correspond to the allegation, unless the time and place is material and of the essence of the offense as a necessary ingredient in its description.

( general allegation in the complaint that the felony was committed within the jurisdiction of the court is sufficient.

49

/anuary 1+,*. In case of offenses against property, the designation of the It was, however held, in 4.S. . 7ic?ao, that an allegation name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.
LTo allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a certain girl between $ctober 1+1,, and (ugust 1+1), is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense, and that indefiniteness is not cured by setting out the date when a child was born as a result of such crime.

name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

from $ctober 1+1, to (ugust 1+1) is defective=

In 4.S.

. Fe#ner, the Court laid down the rule that when

an offense shall have been described in the complaint with NAME OF OFFENDED PARTY IN OFFENSES AGAINST PROP= ERTY In Sa!son . Peo#le (su#ra), the petitioner vigorously sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the

(n information for bigamy must state the time and place of the second wedding.

information charging him of attempting to defraud Drnesto 4ufino, r. andAor .ank of (merica because the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution shows very clearly that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud 2over 8ilms, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Drnesto 4ufino, r.

(ccordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the owner of the che:ue, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.

5ariance, however, on date of commission of rape is irrelevant.

Time is irrelevant in rape> and violations of the 3angerous 3rugs !aw cases.

Ce firmly asserts that his conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

SEC. 12. -ame of the ,ffended 0arty

"etitionerBs claim is unavailing. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against The rule in this jurisdiction is that >variance between the property under the 4evised "enal Code, since the check, which was the subject matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of conviction of the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually 2ever 8ilms, Inc., and not Drnesto 4ufino, The rules on criminal procedure re:uire the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. In case of offenses against property, the designation of the a. O !"# C('"' Dven if the names of offended parties are not alleged, if the offense belongs to the class of harmful ones ?illegal practice of medicine@, the victims of petitioner should be considered .ank of (merica as alleged in the information. r. nor

N($" &3 O33"+2"2 P(# 4 The rules on criminal procedure re:uire the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.

allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an ac:uittal.>

In crimes against property, the object taken or destroyed should be particularly described to properly identify the crime ?if the name of the offended party is unknown@.

50

as offended parties.

The information is defective when it charges two or more offenses.

setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case. CASES WHERE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE (n information is defective for duplicity where the accused is charged in one complaint for assaulting three ?*@ persons by different acts while they were asleep, an information which charges two violations of the 4evised "enal Code contained in two separate provisions is duplicituous. (n information for malversation of public funds through

b.

(n erroneous allegation as to the person injured is of form which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the accused on the merits. The rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information has for its aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to prove his defense.

c.

The name of the offended party is, however, material in slander.

The The act of insulting J is distinct from a similar act of insult against K, even if the insult is preferred by the same person, in the same language, and at about the same time.

tate should not heap upon the defendant two or

more charges which might confuse him in his defense. E33"0 ' &3 D1%*,0, 4 &3 O33"+'"' C!(#;"2 Ehere the accused is charged in one information with more than one offense and makes no objection to the information on the ground that it charges more than one

falsification of public documents and loss and destruction of public documents for purposes of concealing a crime was held as defective. o is an information which charges estafa and falsification to conceal the defraudation.

d.

In robbery, ownership is not necessary.

e.

The damage inflicted in estafa need not fall on the same person against whom deceit was directed.

offense, the prosecution may properly submit evidence as to the commission of each and all offenses charged and the court may properly enter judgment for each and every offense proved and impose the proper penalties for each offense. (. I+0*1',&+ &3 D,33"#"+ N(##( ,&+ &3 F(0 ' A0 ' &3 O33"+'"' & C&$%*" "

f.

In robbery ,it" essential.

iolence against or intimidation of person,

the allegation of the ownerBs name in the information is ( motion to :uash that more than one offense charged should therefore be filed, otherwise it is deemed waived and the g. The omission of value in theft cases is not fatal. accused may be convicted for as many offenses charged and proved. Ehere the different acts or specifications charging the accused with having committed the offenses charged therein were included in the information merely to describe and to narrate the different and specific acts, the sum total of which constitutes a crime, the validity of the information cannot be assailed on the ground that it charges more than <nder ection *, 4ule 117, the accused may move to :uash the complaint or information on the ground that more than one offense is charged e;cept in those cases in which e;isting laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. SEC. 13. 'uplicity of the offense P1#%&'" &3 R1*" one offense, because those different acts or offenses may serve merely as a basis for the prosecution of one single crime.>

h.

Peo#le

. A ellana, an information for murder is not

defective where anotherBs name not the victimBs name is placed in the information. It is merely clerical.

<pon the other hand, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them

In the case of 4.S. . Cernias, it was held that while it is true that each of those acts charged against the conspirators was itself a crime, the prosecutor in setting them out in the information did no more than to furnish the defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial, not only as a basis upon

51

which to found an inference of guilt of the crime of conspiracy but also as evidence of the e;tremely dangerous and wicked nature of that conspiracy.

medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.

>eld+ That a complaint alleging these facts did not charge more than one offense.

>eld+ That the information was not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were merely different means ". T#"('&+ of committing the same offense, notwithstanding the fact that they are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. ( #erson accused of an offense is not c"arged b! t"e number of counts or #aragra#"s, but b! t"e s#ecific criminal 0. S,+;*" (0 !( V,&*( "' D,33"#"+ S ( 1 "' acts regardless of t"eir number contained in one #aragra#" or in one count. ( single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. ( person accused of an offense is not considered as having been charged by the number of counts or paragraphs into which the acts charged may have been grouped in the information, but by the specific criminal acts The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for >the same offense.> two ?or more@ offenses arising from the same act are not >the same.> charged, even if two or more of them are contained in one paragraph or in one count.

The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in the different modes prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set forth under different counts specifying the way of its perpetuation, or the acts resulted from a single criminal impulse.

%either is there duplicity when the other offense described is but an ingredient or an essential element of the real offense charged nor when several acts are related in describing the offense.

).

S,+;*" O33"+'" C&$$, "2 )4 D,33"#"+ M"(+'

It is >a well1settled rule in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense,> and the defendants, may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which the complaint may be separated has been made out.

Ehile it is convenient that each count or paragraph should contain only one offense or one specific act of trea1 son for the sake of clearness, this does not justify the inference or claim that all of the acts charged under one count or paragraph should be considered as only one act of offense, and proof of all the acts included therein is each necessary to prove the charge.

The 4ules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid con fusing the accused in preparing his defense.

Cere, petitioner

however, with four

the

prosecution with

charged

offenses,

each

Information f. E33"0 &3 F(,*1#" &3 !" P#&'"01 ,&+ & P#&5" A** A0 ' C!(#;"2 W!"#" E(0! A0 C&+' , 1 "' T#"('&+ )4 I '"*3

charging only one offense.

It is not objectionable, when a single offense may be committed by the use of different means to charge in the alternative, the various means by which the crime may have been committed.

2.

F(*',3,0( ,&+ If a person is being charged with four specific acts The defendant, a municipal treasurer, received from different persons for personal cedulas more than the amount allowed by law falsified the records of his office so under one count, and each constitutes a complete act of treason by itself independently of the others, the failure of the prosecution to prove all does not entitle the accused to be ac:uitted of the whole count or of all the charges contained therein when any one or more of the acts are proved.

Thus, the defendant was accused of the t"e =edical .a,.

iolation of

that they showed the receipt of the lawful amount only, and in his monthly statements to the provincial treasurer made similar false statements.

The information charged both illegal practice

of

52

proved beyond reasonable doubt. ;. R&))"#4 ,+ B(+2 There is, however, comple; crime of murder with frustrated murder where a single shot hit both victims. (n information which charges the commission of >robbery in a band or brigandage> and alleges facts showing the commission of an act of robbery by a band of robbers, simply sets out the same fact in different aspects and is not bad for duplicity. Dach incident of se;ual intercourse and lascivious acts with a child under the circumstances mentioned in 4epublic !. T!" A+ ,=G#(3 L(6 (ct %o. 701, is a separate and distinct offense. b. <. V,&*( ,&+ &3 C!,*2 A)1'" L(6 a. $"e single larcen! rule 1@ )@ *@ -@ Theft of 1* cows6 theft of si; roosters6 illegal charging of fees by lawyer from revenue victims6 Illegal approval of the application for the legalization of stay of *) aliens, constitutes only one crime

The concept was not applied 9 1@ )@ *@ In Dstafa committed on different occasions. In 2alversation and falsification on different ocassions The 7& estafa cases was committed by conversion by agent of collection from different customers on different dates. -@ &@ 4obbery and fencing are two separate crimes. P#,+= 0,%*" of 'elito Continuado is not applicable. In a ingle Information for murder for shooting three persons 9 where evidence did not show that a single shot had slain three different persons, the appellant was properly held liable for three separate murders and sentenced #er#etrua. 0@ In Peo#le . 7uca! several victims dying from separate shots constitute separate offenses and if there to three separate penalties ofreclusion

ection *?e@ of the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness by the use of the phrases 3manifest #artialit!,3 3e ident bad fait"3 and 3gross ine-cusable negligence.3

THE PRINCIPLE OF '/*IT, C,-TI-)A',

/ustice Fuiason e;plains the "rinciple of 7elito Continuado ?continuing crimes@ in Santiago . @arc"itorena. In this case, *) (mended Informations for violation of the

They merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in ection *?e@ of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.

(nti1#raft !aw alleged that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about $ctober 17, 1+'' favoring *) aliens.

The

several

acts

were

considered

by

the

court

as

constituting only one crime. ,. M1#2"# 6, ! D&1)*" L"'' S"#,&1' P!4',0(* I+<1#,"' 8or delito continuado to e;ist, there should be a plurality of Ehere in describing the offense of murder with double less serious physical injuries, the information states that appellant >feloniously attack, assault and shoot for se eral times the victims,> it in effect charged accused with several distinct and separate crimes, as it is the allegations or actual recitals in the information rather than the technical description of the crime that controls. In appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the The defective information not having been timely objected to, however, said defect of duplicity of charges cannot be heard belatedly on appeal and accused may be convicted of as many offenses as are charged therein and D;amples of 7elito Continuado. perpetrator. acts performed during a period of time, unity of penal provision violated, and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

is no objection for duplicity, the accused should be convicted of all offenses charged in one information.

It is not the act of pressing the trigger like a Thompson submachine them. The firing of several bullets by the accused although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Dach person fell by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. gun that determines the number of felonies committed, but the number of bullets which actually produced

53

attempted murder. E>0"% ,&+' & R1*" &+ D1%*,0, 4 The rule on duplicity of offenses does not apply where the law prescribes a single penalty for various offenses such as a comple; crime under (rticle -' of the 4evised "enal Code or special comple; crime such as 4obbery with Comicide or with 4ape or 4ape with Comicide, or 4ebellion comple;ed with murder, robbery and kidnapping. R1*" &+ C&$%*"> C#,$"' The precise language of the statute used in alleging the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as in charging the commission of a comple; offense like that of 4obbery with Comicide, the information alleges each element of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of a separate prosecution. Ehere, however component offenses are not alleged in the information as re:uired by ections ' and + of 4ule 11, they cannot give rise to a special comple; crime, consistent with the Thus, although the phrase by reason or on occasion of the robbery as provided for by the 4evised "enal Code, was not literally used in the recital of facts alleging the commission of the two crimes of robbery with homicide, the information as filed sufficiently and distinctly alleges the commission of the two crimes of robbery and homicide and ade:uately informs the accused of the crime charged. Ehen each one of the two deceased was killed by different and separate sets of shots, fired respectively, through two <nder (rticle -' of the 4evised "enal Code, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its ma;imum period. WHEN ONE OFFENSE IS NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMIT= TING THE OTHER a. b. 8alsification of cedulas to commit malversation. Dstafa thru falsification. independent sets of acts of the accused, each one aimed e;clusively at a victim, for each victim killed, there is a separate and independent crime of murder. N& D1%*,0, 4 ,+ R(%" W, ! H&$,0,2" There is no duplicity in an information for rape with homicide. ( comple; crime is committed when two persons are killed as a result of the same murderous act of the accused. (ccused who abducted the victim and had se;ual intercourse with her for several days is not guilty of separate offense but the continuing offense of abduction with rape. )@ 4obbery with homicide and rape only one crime. right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. It is sufficient that the information contains allegations which state that one offense was a necessary means to commit the other. 8or a criminal complaint or information to charge the commission of a comple; crime, the allegations contained therein do not necessarily have to charge a comple; crime as denned by law. If the acts are so disconnected as to constitute separate and distinct offenses or crimes, then of course, it would not be error to charge each of said acts in different complaints but where the acts are so related as to constitute in fact but one offense, then a complaint will not be defective if the crime is described by relating two acts in the description of one offense. The information in :uestion in the present case contains allegations properly charging the commission of the comple; crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest, and the court a quo committed error when it ordered its dismissal. To be a comple; crime, the offense must be a necessary means for committing the other, but if one offense is to conceal the other, the accused may be convicted for both offenses as in case of arson to conceal homicide or falsification to conceal malversation. OTHER CASESC 1@ Milling of four victims on the same occasion of the robbery is robbery with :uadruple homicide 9 only one crime. Ehen two or more acts combined in the commission of one crime, the complaint is not necessarily defective because it contains a description of two acts.

The throwing of a hand grenade at the "resident with the intention of killing him resulting in the death and injuries of several persons constitutes the comple; crime of murder with Ehere seven persons committed rape with homicide in

54

conspiracy with each other, every one of the seven accused may separately be charged for rape with homicide.

reason of the sale, and that the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for the possession of the opium seized.

$n petitionersB claim that the charge for violation of (rticle *0& of the 4"C >absorbs> the charges for violation of".3. %o. 1,07, ".3. %o. +'-, and 4.(. %o. 7+-), suffice it to say that a mala in se felony ?such as 4eckless Imprudence 4esulting in 3amage to "roperty@ cannot absorb mala #ro"ibita crimes ?such as those violating ".3. %o. 1,07, ".3. %o. +'-, and 4.(. %o. 7+-)@.

There is no duplicity in a charge of estafa committed by the accused for misappropriation of the purchase price of several lots owned by the Cometrust Corporation which were fraudulently received by the accused against seven lot buyers on the prete;t that she was authorized to do so and which she misapplied to her personal use instead of remitting the money to the owner corporation, and seven other separate informations of estafa committed against the seven lot buyers.

)@

Ehen "ossession of 3rugs (bsorbed in

ale

In Peo#le is further

. .acerna, possession of marijuana was held apprehended in possession of another

as absorbed in the sale thereof, e;cept where the seller :uantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. Ehat makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (cul#a)8 what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. REBELLION CANNOT BE COMPLEXED WITH ANY OTHER OFFENSE COMMITTED IN THE COURSE THEREOF The celebrated case of /nrile . Sala(ar, reiterated the

The crime of estafa committed against the corporation and those committed against the lot buyers are definitely separate felonies.

Ehere aside from selling one block of marijuana to the arresting officers, accused1appellants were also caught in possession of another 1).,- kilograms of marijuana in twelve individually wrapped blocks, hidden in a bag under a table in their house.

They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, #er#etrated b! different acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused in%ur! to different #arties.

>ernande( Rule, which ruled out the comple;ing of rebellion witl1 any other offense committed in its course under either of the clauses of (rticle -' of the 4evised "enal Code either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

Their possession thereof gives rise to a disputable presumption under ection *?j@, 4ule 1*1 of the 4ules of Court, that they were the owners of the same.

(.

T!" P#,+0,%*" &3 A)'&#% ,&+ ). 1@ 3rugs Cases Ehere complainant was forcibly taken away for the In Peo#le . Salamat, the illegal possession of 1*7 cans of opium and sale of *7 cans of opium was held as two isolated acts and not one, each of which is punishable in themselves. The trial court, thus, correctly held that the rape charged and proved in Criminal Case %o. --)0* already $nly in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its totality the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agreed upon, could it be said that the possession of the opium was a necessary means to effect the delivery by 0. A)'&#% ,&+ 2&"' +& ,+0*12" '%"0,(* *(6' absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case %o. --)0-. purpose of se;ually assaulting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the forcible abduction. F&#0,)*" A)210 ,&+ A)'&#)"2 ,+ R(%"

The rule was reiterated in /nrile u. Amin, where the upreme Court ruled that the crime of Carboring or Concealing a Criminal was absorbed by the crime of rebellion for which enator Dnrile had already been charged and can not therefore be made the subject of a separate criminal action.

The

upreme Court went on to e;plain=

>The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.

It is described as a vast movement of men and a comple; net of intrigues and plots. /urisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.

55

In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Conasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion.

hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. "etitionerBs alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his act of conspiring with Conasan was committed The Court held that= >This argument is specious in rebellion cases.> in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion punished in (rticles 1*- and 1*& of the 4"C. In the light of the $ernande3 2&0 #,+", the prosecutionBs theory must fail. Thus, national, as well as international laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common The rationale remains the same. crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as >common> offenses, and assume the political comple;ion of the main crime of which they are (ll crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. mere ingredients and conse:uently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or comple;ed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of Peo#le . Prieto is instructive.>

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action.

Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision.

Dven so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty is (rticle -' of the 4evised "enal Code provides.

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of (rticle -' of the

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTION FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION In Peo#le

INDEPENDENT

. /lias Rodrigue(, the accused, after having

/ust as one can lot be punished for possessing opium drug, in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because *ossession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of reason. THE PRINCIPLE OF ABSORPTION IN REBELLION APPLIES TO SPECIAL LAWS The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the 4evised "enal Code6

4evised "enal Code.

pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearm.

The >ernande( and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. The Court ruled= >(n e;amination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted Conceding the absence of a comple; crime of rebellion with murders, etc., still, by his plea of guilty, the accused1 appellant has admitted all the overt acts described in the

These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping, etc., as provided in the 4evised "enal Code.

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

56

information6 and that if any of such acts constituted an independent crime within the jurisdiction of the lower court, then the averment in the information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to appellantBs conviction and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.> E+#,*" D&0 #,+" N& A%%*,0()*" ,+ S1)5"#',&+ In Peo#le . Asuncion, it was held that the crime of illegal

the crime. Eith either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not e;ist. 4.(. %o. ')+amended ".3. %o. 1'00 abandoned previous rulings that :ualified use of firearms and murder are In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime of rebellion. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM KILLING WITH THE USE THEREOF AND UNLAWFUL <nder the present rule, the unauthorized use of licensed or unlicensed firearm is simply an aggravating circumstance in the commission of homicide or murder and no longer a separate offense, effectively modifying Peo#le . Gui%ada, and its progeny. separate offenses.

possession of firearms under ".3. %o. 1',0 is not absorbed in the charge of subversion under 4.(. %o. 17,,.

Thus, it has been held that the principle of absorption does not apply to illegal possession of firearms in connection with the crime of subversion but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of ection 1 of ".3. %o. 1'00 was committed so as to :ualify to the penalty of death. The charge should therefore be amended to simple illegal

(n accused may, moreover, be charged with as many P&*, ,0(* M& ,5" M1' B" S!&6+ In Peo#le u. .ouedioro, the court held that divested of its common comple;ion, any ordinary act, however, grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and separate provisions of the 4evised "enal Code or by a specified law as the 4"C, the prosecution of one is not a bar to In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. There is no comple; crime of illegal possession of 8irearm The political motive of the act s"ould be conclusi el! demonstrated. used in Comicide but they may be filed separately ?:ualified illegal possession of firearm is only one offense@. the other, but such crimes should be alleged in separate information. crimes as defined in our laws even if these arose from one incident.

possession of firearm, and was accordingly deemed amended by the upreme Court. It should, however, be noted that under e;isting laws (R.A. :o. E224) if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance and cannot be the subject of a separate prosecution. THE PRESENT FIREARMS LAW ON ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual knows.

Peo#le

. 7eunida, reiterated the same principles, but

Ehere murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer :ualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide, as the case may be.

pointed out that the use of unlicensed firearm must be alleged, otherwise, the crime is only murder. A)(+2&+$"+ &3 D&0 #,+" In case homicide or murder is committed with the use of

It is not enough that overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.

In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance.

.oth purpose and overt acts are essential components of

unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be merely considered as aggravating.

57

In view of the amendments introduced by 4epublic (ct %o. ')+- to "residential 3ecree %o. 1'00, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order.

Cence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.

separate

informations,

under

e;isting

law,

the

provisions

considering the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crime as aggravating cannot be given a retroactive effect, lest it would ac:uire the character of an e- #ost facto law.

Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case. 8ollowing the doctrine enunciated in Peo#le Peo#le The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted cou# d&etat. (s the law stands today, there can be no longer be a separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms $therwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either= 1@ as essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted cou# d&etat8 or as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. THE LAW HAS A RETROACTIVE EFFECT ONLY IF IT IS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED 4.(. %o. ')+- is given retroactive effect in the sense that The same may only done where no other crime is com1 mitted. the use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of a crime is considered merely as an aggravating circumstance and not as a separate crime. The provisions of 4.(. %o. ')+- may be applied retro1 actively so as to prevent conviction of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm because this accrues to the benefit of the appellant. It is only when the new law will be advantageous to the accused that the !aw may be given retroactive effect, such as when it will spare him from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. I**";(* P&''"'',&+ A' S"%(#( " &33"+'" Thus, where at the time accused was charged in two (ccused1appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. separate informations, one with robbery with homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm punishable with reclusion #er#etua to death and another for the use of an unlicensed firearm punishable by death, the e;isting law allows the filing of the It does not, however, mean that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. It cannot, however, be applied retroactively to aggravate the crime of homicide or murder. under ".3. %o. 1'00 in view of the amendments introduced by 4epublic (ct %o. ')+-. ince this is favorable to the accused, it shall be given Instead, illegal possession of firearms is simply taken as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide pursuant to ection 1 of 4.(. %o. ')+-. )@ Thus, while it is true that under 4.(. %o. ')+-, the use of an unlicensed firearm aggravates the crimes of homicide or murder, the provisions of the said law cannot apply to the case at bar because the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said law on /uly 0, 1++7. retroactive effect. $n the separate charge of illegal possession of firearm, this is not allowed under the new law. against accused1appellant merely as an . =olina and aggravating Cence, the penalty should be reclusion #er#etua. hould the Court appreciate the use of an unlicensed fire1 arm, the higher penalty of death shall be imposed. . .a(aro, among others, the possession of firearms

circumstance.

%either can accused1appellant be charged with simple illegal possession.

(n accused cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with >the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,> inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of the unlicensed firearm.

58

In general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes e;pressly indicated in 4epublic (ct %o. ')+- are involved ?murder or homicide under ection 1 and rebellion, insurrection, ection *. sedition or attempted cou# d& etat under >8rom the viewpoint of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the prosecution should split the action against the defendant, by filing against him several informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries, thru reckless negligence, before the Court of 8irst Instance, and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless negligence before the justice of the peace or municipal court. $ne thing is, however, certain.
uch splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience

crimes and #rosecution.

The rule was clarified in Peo#le u. Cano+ It was, however, held in .onto?, *r. informations must be filed. /-am#le+ 3amage to property in sum of "7',.,, and light "hysical Injuries thru 4eckless Imprudence cannot be made in a single information 9 if slight physical injuries prescribes, it must be dismissed. Eithout mentioning .onto?, *r. Court in 0uerano Peo#le . 0uan . @orgonio, the upreme . @orgonio, that if eparate one offense is light, there is no comple; crime.

Thus, where the other offense charged in a Criminal Case for violation of C$2D!DC 4esolution %o. *,-& 9 is not one of those enumerated under 4.(. %o. ')+-, the respondent judge was correct in not :uashing the information in the Criminal Case.

It was however, made clear in the en bane decision in Agote u. .oren(o, that there can be no separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm where another crime was commited at the same time for instance, violation of the C$2D!DC resolution on gun ban even if the firearm was not being actually used or discharged, holding that there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed such as illegal possession of dangerous drugs. R"0I*"'' I$%#12"+0" C('"' Ehere both damage to property with less serious physical injuries were caused by one single act of defendant, the information cannot be split into two 9 one for physical injuries and another for damage to property.

to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would re:uire the presentation of substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal court and the Court of 8irst Instance.

. Court ofA##eals, reiterated the rule in

Eorse, still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court and appeal to the Court of 8irst Instance, said evidence would still have to be introduced once more in the latter court.>

4eiteration of .onto? . @orgonio+

The Court in Reodica

. Court ofA##eals, 2; held that reckless

(s stated in Peo#le . 0uan+ 4eason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or ac:uitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
8or the essence of :uasi1offense of criminal negligence is the e;ecution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and damage to property is not a comple; crime and cannot be the subject of a single information, they are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties, reiterating the ruling in .onto? u. @orgonio.

The two offenses cannot be comple;ed because each offenses is not a grave or less grave felony.

The two offenses may, however, be consolidated since under the e;panded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts damage to property thru reckless imprudence now falls under its jurisdiction. SEC. 1.. Amendment or Su4stitution

If there is damage to property only, the amount fi;ed therein should be imposed but if there are also physical injuries, there should be an additional penalty for the latter.

The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the conse:uence is only taken into account to

The information cannot be split into two6 one for physical injuries and another for the damage to property, for both the injuries and the damages committed were caused by one single act of physical injuries and damage to property.

determine the penalty, it does not :ualify the substance of the offense.

(nd, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense ?criminal negligence@ remains one and the same, and can not be s#lit into different

AMENDMENT EXPLAINEDC WHEN LEAVE OF COURT BEFORE PLEA REQUIRED

59

Cowever, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the <nder the former rule, amendment whether as to form or substance is a matter of right before plea. $nce the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the The rule was, however, amended by re:uiring >any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or e;cludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.> Thus, the complaint cannot be withdrawn by the 8iscal The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. The provincial fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle #rosequi criminal The amendment is designed to remove the absolute control of the prosecution of a criminal action after the filing of information even before a plea is entered which seems to be the case as provided for in the first sentence of the first paragraph that the complaint or information may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads6 however, under the amended rule, any amendment before plea, which lessens the gravity of the offense charged andAor e;cludes any of the accused from the complaint or information, must be filed with leave of court and the parties, especially the private complainant shall be duly furnished copies of the order resolving the motion therefor and e;plaining the reasons for such disposition. The upreme Court stressed, however, that the real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of the trial court is not the filing of the motions to suspend proceedings and defer arraignment at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the /oint 4esolution of the investigating prosecutor. The amendment under the second par may only be made especially with notice to the offended party. This is in accord with the ruling in Cres#o . =ogul, It is .efore that time, the pronouncement in Cres#o . =ogul W!( $(4 )" A$"+2"2 $nly a valid information may be amended. The power to dismiss is vested solely in the court, i.e., the presiding judge. to the actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. FINDING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND NOTICE TO PARTIES In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the courtBs denial of a motion to withdraw information pursuant ecretaryBs resolution is void. 8or this reason the amendment re:uires parties, especially the private complainant to be duly furnished copies of the order resolving the motion therefor and e;plaining the reasons for such disposition. without the courtBs consent. The only :ualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the people to due process of law. Ehat is imperatively re:uired is the trial judgeBs own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper e;ercise of judicial discretion merely to accept or reject the prosecutionBs word for its supposed insufficiency or to simply rely on Cres#o u. =ogul. Court. information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the ecretary of /ustice, but in faithful e;ercise of judicial prerogative. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this con1 clusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution.

intended to prevent the prosecution from abusing the process of amendment before plea by dropping any of the accused from the information or reducing the offense charged whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation of the fiscal or a review by the Ailon. ecretary of /ustice, similar to what happened in the case of 7imatulac u.

that >once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction of the accused or ac:uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court, did not yet become relevant or applicable.>

(n information filed before the effectivity of the law C&1# M1' M(I" I+2"%"+2"+ A''"''$"+ punishing the offense may not be amended after the law had come into effect.

60

T,$" & A$"+2 (mendment of an information may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge.>

The amendment in a libel case which merely specifies the specific address in 2akati where the libelous articles were first printed and published is merely formal. C!(+;" &3 D( "' &3 C&$$,'',&+ &3 C#,$"

The phrase >on or about> employed in the information does not re:uire the prosecution to >prove any precise date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant.

The prosecution is free to amend the information without leave of court before arraignment. "rovided, the amendment does not downgrade the nature of the offense charged or e;cludes any accused from the complaint or information. TEST AS WHEN RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PREJUDICED BY AMENDMENT days, The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is, when a defense under the complaint or information as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. The amendment of the complaint for rape changing the date of commission of the crime alleged in the original $n the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment as to form that can be made at any time. <nder (n amendment which neither adversely affects the substantial right of the accused, e.g., does not deprive him of his right to invoke prescription nor affects andAor alters the nature of the offense originally charged nor involves a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to re:uire the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense is an amendment as to a matter of form. ection 1, of 4ule 11, of the 4ules of Court >it is information from 8ebruary 1*, 1+70 to 8ebruary &, 1+70 as testified to by the complainant, a difference of only eight ?'@ days was only a matter of form and did not prejudice the rights of the appellant. %or will the amendment or correction cause any surprise on the accused, who has been furnished the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses, all of which uniformly state that the date of the commission was (ugust )', 1+'1. Thus, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of #rave Coercion from /une )-, 1+'1 to (ugust )', 1+'1 is more formal than substantial and would not prejudice the rights of the accused, as the said proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense of grave coercion.

In case of surprise, the Court may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary to meet the amendment.>

In the case of Peo#le u. Riuera, the amendment of the information as to the date of the commission of the offense from 2arch ), 1+0- to 2arch ), 1+0& which was due to a clerical error in the last digit of the year, the difference of one year or twelve months was merely a matter of form and does not prejudice the rights of the accused, reiterating the ruling in the case of 4.S. . Ramos, where the 8iscal was permitted to amend the date of the commission of the offense from /une 10, 1+1, to /une 1+11. R1*" N& A%%*,0()*" W!"#" D,'%(#, 4 ,' G#"( The petitionerBs argument that the time or date of the commission of the offense is not a material ingredient of the crime of :ualified theft cannot be given much weight in this case because the disparity of time between the years 1+0- and 1+0+ is so great as to defy appro;imation in the commission of one and the same offense.

The difference in dates is only about two months and five which disparity is amply comprehended within the allegation of >on or about.>

Ehile it has been held that e;cept when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this court stated that this does not mean that the prosecution officer may be careless about fi;ing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing.

not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed e;cept when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the date of the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.>

61

The

prosecution

is

given

the

chance

to

allege

an

of an opportunity to produce evidence for their defense if they had desired, in relation to said amendment >Conse:uently, the accused is not thereby denied any opportunity to present evidence in his defense.>

jurisdiction of the court. (ll other matters are merely of form. H(), 1(* D"*,+H1"+04 (dditional allegations of habitual delin:uency and

appro;imation of time of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given appro;imate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

The foregoing cases should, however, be distinguished )n Are alo u. :e#omuceno, the amendment which was allowed was the allegation in the information that . carried the revolver and C, the knife, instead ofC carrying the revolver and ., the knife. The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error because the difference is not only in the year but also in In Peo#le . *ose#" Casey, the amendment after the month and the last two digits of the year, and the difference >is so great as to defy appro;imation in the commission of one and the same offense.> D,'0!(#;" R1*" & )" S ( " 6, +"'' 1+2"# W, +"'' P#& "0 ,&+ arraignment was to include one of the accused 4icardo 8eli; alias 3Carding $u,ad3 who was then armed with a firearm. from the case of Peo#le u. 9#emia, where the difference in dates was from 1+-7 to 1+&).

recidivism is not a substantial amendment.

They do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of :ualified theft contained in the information.

%either do they tend to correct any defect in the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject1matter of the case.

The

upreme Court, after stating the test as to whether a

The said new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction.

defendant is prejudiced by the amendment, stated that= >( look into our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not e;pose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by 4evised 4ules of Court. ection 1*, 4ule 11, of the

The foregoing rule applies in withdrawing or discharging to be a state witness before plea some accused under the witness protection rule without the need of proving the re:uirement for the discharge of a state witness despite a pending motion for their discharge under the applicable rule. ection 17, 4ule 11+ unless they are retained in the information in which case section 17, 4ule 11+ is

They do not alter the prosecutionBs theory of the case nor possibly prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume A22, ,&+(* A**";( ,&+' &3 C&+'%,#(04 In Regala . C'), the defendant was charged with murder.

In 4.S. . dela Cru(, the amendment in the information for brigandage sought to be made was to eliminate the words >led by one ilverio> and to substitute the words >under the an 2iguel> after the prosecution rested PROHIBITED AMENDMENTSG WHAT ARE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS (mendments that are prohibited after the accused has pleaded are amendments in substance. (nd the substantial matters in the complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the command of !uciano

(fter accused.

the

plea,

the

fiscal

presented

an

amended

information wherein two other persons were included as co1

but before the presentation of the evidence of the defense.

There was the further allegation that the accused and his co1defendants had conspired and confederated together and mutually aided one another to commit the offense charged.

The

upreme Court allowed the said amendment holding

that it did not prejudice in any sense the right of the accused as >it did not affect the essence of the crime charge, but merely an accidental detail of the same> and it did not deprive the accused

The admission of the amendment was upheld by the upreme Court holding that the amendment is a mere matter of

62

form. (fter a reinvestigation, the prosecution moved to amend In Peo#le in permitting . Bulueta, an information for 2alversation of the misappropriation, the accused acted in The amendments upreme would Court, not citing Regala, the held that the prejudice accused whose the information with the inclusion of two other accused alleging conspiracy. public property was amended with the additional assertion that cons#irac! with Commissioner !lanes who was subse:uently booked for malversation of the identical property also in the same court.

participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. upreme Court held that there was a substantial

The

In Peo#le guilty.

. =ontenegro, the accused was charged with

amendment.

robbery before the C8I of Fuezon City and entered a plea of not

urely, the preparations have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. .efore the trial could proceed, the fiscal sought to amend the complaint= 8or undoubtedly, the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co1conspirator (ngel !lanes in furtherance of the controversy. 1@ )@ *@ from robbery to robbery in an uninhabited place6 alleging conspiracy among all accused6 and deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original information substituting them with a different set of items. upreme Court citing and :uoting "eople . Bulueta

The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. The (su#ra), held that the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents1accused which was not previously included The upreme Court distinguished the case from 4egala by in the original information is a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.

e;plaining that the amendment therein did not modify the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and deed.

Cere there is an innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to make matters worse, is inconsistent with the original allegations.

In Peo#le

. Court of A##eals, the accused

i;to 4uiz who

was charged with murder entered a plea of not guilty.

63

AMENDMENTS AFTER PLEA CHANGING THE NATURE OF OFFENSE CHARGE IS PROHIBITED The upreme Court held that the proposed amendments in

A22, ,&+ &3 I+ "+

& G(,+

A$"+2$"+

& C&+3&#$ & E5,2"+0" A**&6"2

Ehere intent to gain could already be inferred from the allegations of the information, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the complaint for robbery, and which therefore adds nothing essential to the conviction for the crime charged is a formal amendment and can be made at any time. AMENDMENT TO ALLEGE OFFENSE COMMITTED IN RELA= TION TO OFFICE It has been held that after the case of homicide committed

(mendments to conform to the evidence to be presented during the trial is permissible. MISTAKES TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE AMENDMENT BY SUBSTITUTION If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with 4ule 11+, ection 11, provided, the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

the amended information are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from >4obbery> punishable under (rticle ),+ to >4obbery in an <ninhabited "lace> punishable under (rticle *,) of the 4evised "enal Code, thereby e;posing the private1respondent accused to a higher penalty as computed to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of >not guilty> during their arraignment.

2oreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them.

by

"%"

officer

was

transferred

by

the

4TC

to

the

andiganbayan after trial, on the ground that the offense was committed in relation to the public office of the accused and, therefore, falls under the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan, an

Section 11 of Rule 112 provides that when it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charge, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him.

amendment to allege that the offense of homicide committed by a member of the "%" was committed >in relation to his office> may be made at any time before arraignment before the andiganbayan, and indeed by leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by the andiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder@, the :ualifying circumstance alleged in the information, or the defenses that accused may assert before the andiganbayan.

It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories after the fact of the minor who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information.

In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper offense.

To charge them now as accessories after the fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the court. In other words, the amendment may be made before the andiganbayan without surprising the accused or prejudicing his substantive rights. (n amendment deleting the word >orally> from a charge of grave threats to conform to the evidence is merely a formal amendment since it did not affect the nature of the crime as originally charged. Ehere the amendment was not substantial, no second plea The particular manner in which the threat made is not a :ualifying ingredient of the offense. is necessary. NO NEED OF ARRAIGNMENT WHERE AMENDMENT MERELY FORMAL

The rule, therefore, does not apply where the accused may be convicted of any other offense necessarily included in the offense charged.

Ehere the original complaint for rape charged her father with the crime of rape allegedly committed on or about the 1*th day of 8ebruary but during the trial, the complaining witness testified that she was raped by her father on 8ebruary & of the same year, there was no need for the court to dismiss the original complaint and direct the fiscal to file the proper

64

complaint.

also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights .e that as it 1may, it is :uite plausible under ection 1- of of the accused. 4ule 11, that, instead of an amendment, an information for homicide may also be dismissed before the accused pleads, to Cence, in the case of 7imalibot . Salcedo, the accused give way to the filing of a new information for murder. therein were originally charged with homicide and were released on bail. Cowever, the then provincial fiscal, after a review of the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution, discovered that the killing complained of was perpetrated with the :ualifying circumstances victim. of treachery, taking advantage of superior That is from the filing of the information up to and before trial, while amendments during trial and be fore %udgment is governed by Conse:uently, an amended information for murder was filed against the accused who were ordered re1arrested without the amount of bail being fi;ed, the new charge being a capital offense. "erusal of the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure will show that there are only two provisions concerning the dismissal of an information other than on motion of the accused, namely, The Court ruled therein that the amendment was proper, pursuant to ection 1*, 4ule 1,0 of the 1+-, 4ules of Court .ut then, it may be contended that these rules speak of a dismissal by the court when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense, but make no mention of a dismissal made upon application of the prosecution. That is not necessarily so. (no, Section 14, Rule 116 of t"e 12E5 Rules on Criminal Procedure), thus= upreme Court >Cere, these rules properly apply, since it is undisputed that the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the competent court when the complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge the crime of murder.
<pon the authority of said rules, the amendment could therefore be made even as to substance in order that the proper charge may be made.

The trial judge could have simply granted the motion for leave to amend the complaint.

1@ )@

(mendment and cope of 4ule

ubstitution 3istinguished

In @al e( /ustice

. Court of A##eals the e;tensively discussed

upreme Court thru amendments by

4egalado

substitution of a defective information by the correct one.

The above section contains two parts= $ne authorizes the amendment of an information or complaint ?involving the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information@ in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads, and thereafter, only as to matters of form.

strength, and employing means to weaken the defense of the

ection 11, 4ule 11+ when a mistake has been

made in charging the proper offense.

The other provides that, if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense ?substitution@, provided the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy.

ection 1- of 4ule 11, and

ection 11 of 4ule 11+.

D;plaining stressed=

ection 1- of 4ule 11,, the

>The first paragraph provides the rule for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
<nder the second paragraph, the court can order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided, the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the ofifense proved does not necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the original information.>

?a@ 4ule 11+6

ection 11, Court Initiates

ubstitution

4ule 11+ is the rule specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is necessarily being presented, hence, the trial court is now in a better position to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes.

The claim that such amendment can only refer to matters of specification affecting the elements constituting the crime is not correct, for there is nothing in the rule to show that the nature of the amendment should only be limited to matters of specification.

It has been the rule that under the first paragraph of ection 1-, 4ule 11,, the amendment of the information may

The change may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.>

It would primarily be the function of the court to motu #ro#rio order the dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the appropriate information.

65

which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in Ee do not discount the possibility of either the prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal and substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view, that would be a rare situation. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor This provision, therefore, is more directly and can and should institute remedial measures for the dismissal of the original information and the refiling of the correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties. $n the other hand, substitution re:uires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in In the subse:uent case of$ee"an?ee, *r. ?b@ 4ule 11,, ection 1-, "rosecutor Initiates ubstitution et al., however, mean as follows= 4ule 11,, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance for the prosecution of offenses. ection 1>It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects= a. (mendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge6 (mendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original The situation under said ection 1- contemplates a information has to be dismissed6 longer time span, inclusive of the period from the filing of the information up to and before trial. c. Ehere the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the ince no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary investigation. retaking of the plea of the accused6 in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information6 and $f course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the prosecu1 tor who can initially determine the same. d. (n amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense The second paragraph of ec. 1* of the old 4ule 11, was amended in 1+'& as follows= 3$"e court s"all dismiss t"e origi nal com#laint or information u#on t"e filing of a ne, one c"arging t"e #ro#er offense in accordance ,it" Rule 116, Sec. 11.3 The foregoing pronouncements may be deemed to have been accordingly modified by the amendment to ection 1- in the sense that even before plea, the prosecution may not amend the information to, downgrade the offense charged or drop any of the accused from the information without leave of court. D,'$,''(* O+*4 A3 "# N"6 O+" ,' F,*"2 thereof, provides in its second ?now third@ paragraph the procedure and re:uisites for the substitution of a defective information by the correct one. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of ection 1-, 4ule 11,, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient6 (lthough, just like ection 11 of 4ule 11+, the otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.> permissible stage for effecting that substitution is >at any time before judgment,> unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that >it appears ; ; ; that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, ; ; ;.> b. . =ada!ag, the original charge, hence, the accused cannot claim double jeopardy. principally directed to the trial court to invest it with the re:uisite authority to direct by itself the dismissal and refiling of the informations therein contemplated. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it re:uired that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. the original charge, hence, substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.

ection 1- of 4ule 11, was clarified to

66

Ehether the new charge for direct assault with less serious .oth rules were clarified so that the dismissal of the original complaint or information would be done only after a new one has been filed. physical injuries is by way of amendment or through a new information is, immaterial since in both instances accusedBs former conviction would be a bar to a subse:uent prosecution for the second offense. There is no double jeopardy if there is no identity of offenses. This was the dictum laid down in the case of Peo#le . Cariaso. Thus= . 0onotan, and which doctrine was reiterated in the case of Tacas

substitution of the original one may be allowed=

?a@ that no judgment has as yet been rendered6 ?b@ the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or of any other offense necessarily included therein6 and ?c@ the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy.

$"us, an amendment of t"e information to c"ange t"e crime c"arged from >omicide to t"e more serious offense of murder after t"e accused "ad #leaded not guilt!, not allo,ed.

If there is identity of offense, then the accused should be convicted of the offense charged necessarily included in the offense proven or of the offense proven necessarily included in the offense charged. SUBSTITUTION APPLIES ONLY WHERE NO JUDGMENT RENDERED The amendment or the filing of a new case where there had been a mistake in charging the proper offense after the dismissal of an e;isting one, spoken of and therein provided for apply, only to an original case where no judgment has as yet been rendered.

>The charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries contained in the fiscalBs information is not included in the charge contained in the complaint of the chief of police, which is merely that of less serious physical injuries un:ualified by any allegation that those injuries were inflicted upon the offended municipal councilor, admittedly a person in authority, while he was in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof, a :ualification essential to the offense charged in the information.

To dismiss the homicide charged and file another charge for murder will place the accused in double jeopardy.

To amend the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above1 :uoted provision.

The converse is no less obvious, that is, the charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries as set out in the informa1 tion necessarily included the offense of less serious physical injuries charged in the complaint, especially because in both the information and the complaint, the physical injuries inflicted are alleged to have re:uired

8or certainly, a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form6 it is one of substance with very serious conse:uence.

2uch less does the said section apply to an appealed case. S1)<"0 & R1*" &+ D&1)*" J"&%(#24

medical assistance of a period of 1- days and incapacitated the offended party from labor for the same period of time.

(s proof that the offense charged in the information includes the offense charged in the complaint, conviction of the defendants of this latter offense may, without :uestion, be had under the information if the other ingredients of the crime charged in said information are not proved.

.ut can the amendment be justified under the second paragraphO

The reason is obvious and that is because the right to amend or to file a new complaint or information charging the proper offense after the dismissal of the original complaint or information is subject to the rule on double jeopardy.

The answer is, %o.

Cence, the defense of double jeopardy was well taken. The order of dismissal was thus affirmed precisely on the very same constitutional ground relied upon in this petition.>

Ehere the original charge was that of less serious physical injuries, for which the accused was convicted, the prosecution cannot on appeal withdraw the case of physical injuries and file a case of direct assault.

8or the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal of the information.

L,$, ( ,&+ & R1*" &+ S1)' , 1 ,&+ In other words, the provision contemplates the filing of a There are thus limitations before a new information in substituted not an amended information.

67

c. .ut, it may be asked, can not the information for homicide against the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and another information for murder be filedO Conse:uently, although the offenses charged under the three new informations necessarily include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of informations was not a fatal error. The answer, again, is %o. ( contrary ruling, would sacrifice substantial justice for 8or the petitioner having pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file another charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy. 8urthermore, petitionersB right to speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after The principle does not apply where the information for homicide alleges >using superior strength> in which case, an amendment to murder even if the prosecution have already presented two witnesses maybe allowed as this is a mere formal amendment. Ehere a physical injury case has been filed before a 2unicipal /udge, but, after trial, he is of the opinion that a The body of the information already charges the crime of murder. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT WHERE WITHDRAWAL MADE frustrated murder was committed, he should decide the case on the merits and not order the filing of an information in the C8I. D1 4 &3 J12;" & R"+2"# D"0,',&+ the motion to withdraw the original information was granted. e. formal nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. d.

In Peo#le u. *aralba The (mendment consists of description of wound from lacerated to stab wound to conform to the evidence. There was no change of offense charged. %o need to rearraign.

(n (mendment to allege that co1accused who were minors acted with discernment is one of form as far as principal accused is concerned.

In Peo#le

. Padica, amendment as to correct name is

merely a matter of form. Issue as to identity must be raised during arraignment in a demurrer on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, otherwise there is estoppel or waiver.

SEC. 1B. P*(0" W!"#" A0 ,&+ ,' & )" I+' , 1 "2. : I$%#&%"# V"+1"

It is the duty of the judge to render the decision as the evidence warrant under the information as filed for serious physical injuries, and not dismiss the case on his idea or belief that there was evidence of intent to kill the intended victim. In criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction. 5enue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. uch order is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to e;cess of jurisdiction. <nlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of a. In $ee"an?ee . =ada!ag (n amendment from frustrated murder to consummated murder due to supervening event of death is merely formal. In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one can not be held to answer for any crime committed by him e;cept in the b. The difference in serial numbers of firearms in case of illegal possession is fatal. aid rule is based on the legal provision which prescribes the essential re:uisites of a good complaint or information, one jurisdiction where it was committed. jurisdiction.

In @al e( . Court of A##eals (su#ra), the propriety of the withdrawal of the original information for homicide before arraignment, was upheld there having been no grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion and, more importantly, in consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before petitioners were arraigned, hence, before they were placed in jeopardy.

Thus, even if a substitution was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached.

68

of which is the allegation that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint or information is filed and that said court has authority to try it. (s was said in the case of 4nited States . Cunanan, the

complaint was not committed in the province wherein the trial was had, and the accused was not arrested in that province and defendant had not fled therefrom, the Court of 8irst Instance of that province has no jurisdiction to impose sentence.

preliminary investigation which is a function of the D;ecutive 3epartment and not the /udiciary.> PLACES WHERE ACTION MAY BE INSTITUTED GENERAL RULE a. In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the 2unicipality or territory wherein the crime was committed or where any one of the essential ingredient of the offense took place. Thus, subject to e;isting laws, the commission of an offense is, triable only in the courts of the place where the offense was allegedly committed.

jurisdiction of the Courts of 8irst Instance of the "hilippine Islands, in criminal cases is limited to certain well1defined territory, so that they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with an offense alleged to have been committed outside of that limited territory.

In such cases, if the court has reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, the accused should be remanded to the court of proper jurisdiction for trial P1#%&'" &3 R1*"

/udges of the court of the Court of 8irst Instance of a district court must e;ercise their jurisdiction within the territorial limits of their provinces and no further.

( criminal case should be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place.

/urisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information which are controlling. W!"+ P*(0" &3 C#,$" N& A**";"2 Ehere the place of the commission of the offense was not specifically charged, the place may be shown by the evidence.

If all the acts material and essential to the crime and This is a fundamental principle, the purpose being not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.> P&6"# & C!(+;" V"+1" Ehere the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, it is but logical that the court should have the power to decide where the balance of convenience or Ehere defendant was charged with attacking a postal clerk in a moving train within the limits of 2anila, it was claimed that the Court of 8irst Instance of 2anila was without jurisdiction, but as defendant offered no proof upreme Court may against such jurisdiction, the lower court was justified in taking jurisdiction. inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the e;igencies of truth and impartial justice. <nder the 1+'7 Constitution, the b. In offenses committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including t"e #lace of de#arture and arri al. re:uisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or province, the court of that municipality or province has sole jurisdiction to try the case.

Thus, the insufficiency of the complaint charging adultery without stating the place where the acts of adultery were committed, or that the accused knew the woman was married at the time of cohabitation, assigned as error as the conviction thereon amounted to a conviction without informing the defendants of the nature and character of the offense, and besides e:uivalent to a conviction without due process of law.

%o such :uestion having been raised before final judgment in the trial court, but every ingredient of the crime having been established in the evidence, there was no error committed upon which to base a reversal of conviction.

order a change of venue or place or trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. c. >( petition for change of venue of the preliminary investigation should however, be addressed to the ecretary of /ustice who has control and supervision over the conduct of a

Ehere the crime for violation of ".3. %o. &*) known as the (nti1"iracy and (nti1Cighway 4obbery !aw of 1+7- was committed aboard a jeepney, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where the vehicle passed during the trip including

Ehen the record discloses that the crime as alleged in the

69

the place of departure and arrival.

The act of carrying away the thing stolen is not an indispensable re:uisite of theft.

In transitory or continuing offenses, some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case.

d.

In offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage 9 in the proper court of the first #ort of entr! or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of the international law. g. Ehere the offense charged was full! committed in the City of 2anila where the automobile was allegedly stolen from its parking place in "ort (rea the fact that said automobile was later found in 4izal City is not an essential ingredient of the crime but a mere circumstance which could add nothing to Ehere the crime was actually committed is immaterial where the crime was committed while the vessel is in transit. Cence, criminal action. this circumstance cannot be made the nature of the offense or to its consummation.

$ffenses are continuing or transitory upon the theory that there is a new commission, continuance or repetition of the offense wherever the defendant maybe found.

uch offenses may be tried by the Court of any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found.

determinative of the jurisdiction of the trial court over the >In transit> simply means >on the way or passage> while passing from me place to another in the course of transportation. It was, however, held in a case that where the asportations of cigarettes commenced when they were In a prosecution under (ct %o. &&, regulating the transportation of animals on vessels, as amended by (ct %o. )7&, the information need not allege that the court was sitting at a port where the animals were disembarked. taken out of dark (irbase and continued when the goods pushed through 5alenzuela, .ulacan until they were seized in Fuezon City, the Courts in any of these places had jurisdiction over the offense. T#(+', &#4 (+2 C&+ ,+1,+; O33"+'"'

In such a case, the complaint should alleged that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court and not at the place where it was originally committed. The theory is that a person may be indicted in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case e;cludes the others.

e.

The place where the action is to be instituted is subject to e;isting laws >such as offenses which fall under the e;clusive jurisdiction of the located at Fuezon City. andiganbayan which may be andiganbayan which is instituted and tried only in the

In this jurisdiction, where the strict common law rules If all the acts material to the crime and re:uisite of the consumption thereof occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. touching the finding of indictments have no controlling influence, offenses committed partly in one province and partly in another, that is to say, where some acts material and essential to the crime and re:uisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, are triable in either province, and the appropriate courts in each province have concurrent jurisdiction of such offenses, distinguished, as to estafa, accounts collected in one place and to be paid over to principal in 2anila6 estafa committed by insurance agent, premiums collected in Iloilo but payable in 2anila6 estafa committed aboard a ship in "hilippine Eaters.

f.

In the earlier case of Peo#le carabaos in #apan, %ueva

. =ercado, involving theft of Dcija, and took them to

There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and re:uisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the court taking cognizance of the case e;cludes the other.

large catties, it was held that where the accused stole the "ampanga, where he was found, the crime is triable only in %ueva Dcija and not in "ampanga.

The unlawful taking of a movable thing consummates in the crime of theft.

These are the so1called transitory or continuing crimes.

The theory upon which a person accused of a transitory or continuing offense may be tried in any jurisdiction within which

70

he is found is based upon the ground that there is a new commission of the same offense in the jurisdiction where he is found.

may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed.

purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts In such a case, the complaint should allege that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court and not at the place where it was originally committed. material and essential to the crime and re:uisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will ?3efendant, as an enlisted seaman in the .ureau of %avigation, accused of desertion in violation of 1+',.@ TRANSITORY DISTINGUISHED AND CONTINUING OFFENSES ec. + of (ct %o. e;clude the others. Cowever, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and re:uisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. ESSENTIAL ADULTERY REQUISITES OF CONTINUOUS CRIMEG .igamy being defined by (rticle *-+ as the contracting >of a second or subse:uent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceeding,> it is self1evident that the place where The rule is that crimes >committed partly in one province and partly in another, that is to say, where some acts material and essential to the crime, and re:uisites to its consummation, occur in one province and some in another, are triable in either D;ample of this, are where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another or libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one place to another. This means that to make the offense triable in more than one province, the acts perpetrated in any one of them must be impelled by the same criminal purpose or aim. The term 3continuing3 must, however, be understood in the sense similar to that of 3transitor!3 and is only intended as a factor in determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action pursuant to ection 1&, 4ule 11,. In Peo#le . Ba#ata and 0ondoc, it was held that adultery is not a continuing offense. To hold with the trial court that the celebration of the first >The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case, against the interest of society.> 8or it to e;ist, t"ere s"ould be #luralit! of acts #erformed In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime se#aratel! during a #eriod of time8 unity of penal provision infringed upon or violation6 and unity of criminal intent or ince the second marriage of the accused occurred in marriage was an essential ingredient of the bigamy is to assume that when the petitioner married his first wife, he did so with intent already to marry his second consort6 and there is nothing on record to warrant such assumption. The continued e;istence of the first marriage is without definite locus. province. Ehat is essential is that the first marriage be not legally terminated, actually or by legal presumption, when the subse:uent wedlock takes place6 and it is upon the celebration of that subse:uent marriage that bigamy is committed, not before. the first marriage was celebrated is immaterial to the criminal act, intent and responsibility of the accused. IN BIGAMY9 PLACE WHERE FIRST MARRIAGE (AS CELEBRATED IS IMMATERIAL In adultery, the last unity does not e;ist because the culprits perpetrate the crime in every se;ual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous act to consummate it.

( transitory offense is one where any of the essential ingredients took place, such as abduction, while a continuing estafa, mal ersation and offense is one which is

consummated in one place, yet by reason of the nature of the offense, the violation of the law is deemed continuing.

This is so because persons charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed to the e;clusion of the other.

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3avao outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court, and in all criminal prosecutions, the actions must be instituted and tried in the municipality or province where the offense or any of its essential ingredients was committed, the Court of 8irst Instance for the province of Iloilo is devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the crime charged. V"+1" ,+ E' (3( a. ( bicycle was purchased by the owner of a tobacco factory in the municipality of$bando, in the province of.ulacan, to be used by defendant, an employee, on condition that it was to be returned to the owner of the factory at the termination of his employment, in the municipality of 2alabon, province of 4izal. 3efendant sold the bicycle to a third person who lived in the municipality of $bando.

c.

C, entered into a contract at 2anila, by virtue of which he was obligated to render accounts to his principal in 2anila.

The theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part com1 mitted.

<nder said contract, C collected certain moneys for his principal in Cebu and failed to account for same to his principal in 2anila.

Cowever, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and re:uisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or province, such has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.>

CD!3= The court of 2anila had jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed, as the contract of employment was made in 2anila.

T!" P*(0" &3 D"*,5"#4 &3 C!"0I The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fi; or determine the place where they were e;ecuted.

d.

(n agent who is entrusted with collecting payments on policies for an insurance company and who collects such a payment in Iloilo and appropriates the same to his own use there though by his contract, the premium collected were payable at the office of the company in 2anila, may be tried for estafa in the Court of 8irst Instance of Iloilo or of 2anila.

Ehat is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof the consummation as an obligation.

3efendant having failed to comply with his obligation to the owner of the bicycle in 2alabon, the crime charged against him was committed in that municipality, and the justice of the peace in 2alabon had jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. The general principles governing jurisdiction in cases of estafa punishable under (rticle *1&, paragraph )?d@ of the 4evised "enal Code have been defined in Peo#le . Habut, to wit= b. /stafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. >Dstafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under (rt. *1&, par. )?d@ of the 4evised "enal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense.
Its basic elements of deceit and damage, may independently arise in separate places.

(n undelivered bill or note is inoperative.

E' (3( )4 I''1,+; ( B&1+0,+; C!"0I <ntil delivery, the contract is revocable. (nd the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means 3(t)"e #a!ee or indorsee of a bill or note, ,"o is in #ossession of it, or t"e bearer t"ereof.3

3elivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto.

$ne of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party.

The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was e;ecuted and delivered to the payee.

Ehere the respondent has its principal place of business and office in 2anila, the failure of petitioner ?accused@ to remit the insurance premiums she collected caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in 2anila, the 4egional Trial Court of 2anila has jurisdiction.

In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. ection 1-?a@, 4ule 11, of the 4evised 4ules of Court provides= BIn all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

Ehere it was in 2alolos, .ulacan where the checks were uttered and delivered to complainant at which place, her business and residence were also located, the criminal pros1 ecution of estafa may be lodged therein.

72

The giving of the checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to a messenger and part time employee cannot be treated as valid delivery of the checks, because a mere 3messenger3 or 3#art<time em#lo!ee3 is not an agent of complainant. T!" P*(0" W!"#" O)*,;( ,&+ W(' C&+' , 1 "2 The place where the obligation was constituted is also a valid basis for criminal jurisdiction to attach in a prosecution for estafa.

handed and delivered to the sales supervisor of Cornelio, who holds office in that municipality.

2C, 2r. 4uben

A' R";(#2' !" B&1+0,+; C!"0I The offense also appears to be continuing.

The two checks were deposited by receiving these checks from its #uiguinto account of

2C at the ."I,

an True, the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance and the .ouncing Checks !aw penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check.

8ernando, "ampanga, where it maintained its accounts after ales $ffice which bank later on made the corresponding deductions from the 2C in the amounts covered by the dishonored anta checks upon receiving information that the checks so issued by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at 2aria, .ulacan.

The case, therefore, could have been filed also in .ulacan.

Ehere, the place of business of the offended party, is in 2alolos, .ulacan, from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the two private respondents, payment thereof should be considered effected in 2alolos, .ulacan.>

( case of estafa and violation of ..". .ig. )) was filed against the accused in "ampanga, the accused contested the jurisdiction of the court.

The determinative factor ?in determining venue@ is the place of the issuance of the check.

.ut it is also true that knowledge on the part of the maker The upreme Court held= or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
>(s regards t"e /stafa case+ Ehile the subject check was issued in #uiguinto, .ulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in 8ernando, "ampanga, ,"ere it ,as uttered and deli ered. an

?I@f the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was constituted.

another.

The receipt by the two private respondents at Caloocan City of the tires and gas supplies from 2alolos, .ulacan, signifies but the consummation of the contract between the parties.
(lthough the check was received by the the payee, 2C. 2C upervisor at #uiguinto, .ulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to

Cence, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the DTC of "ampanga. KNOWLEDGE BY DRAWER OF INSUFFICIENCY AND DISHONOR AS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BIG. 22 The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless check.
The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means the payee or indorsee of the bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.

It was the result of an obligation previously contracted at 2alolos, .ulacan.

aid supervisor was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.

ince the instant case, it was in 2alolos, .ulacan, where the checks were uttered and delivered to complainant at which place, her business and residence were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa may be lodged therein.

Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment.

In a case, two checks were issued and signed by the accused in connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasion at #uiguinto, .ulacan and which checks he

The element of deceit, therefore, took place in

an 8ernando,

"ampanga, where the check was legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the court in that locality.>

(nother essential element is subse:uent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or

73

would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 8or violation of the .ouncing Checks !aw, on the other

are on a different plain.

There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of..". .ig. )) had been ac:uired.

5iolation of ..". .ig. )) is a transitory offense. Mnowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another.

hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor re:uired. $n the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of 2akati6 that petitioner is a resident 4ather, the elements of..". .ig. )) are= ?a@ the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value6 ?b@ the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment6 and ?c@ the check is subse:uently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. of Caloocan City6 that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in 2alabon6 that the drawee bank is likewise located in 2alabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in 2akati.

Conse:uently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in 2alabon where the checks were delivered or in Malookan where they were dishonored.

5erily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in 2anila, which are esssential elements necessary for the 2anila Court to ac:uire jurisdiction over the offense for violation of ..". .ig. )). A)210 ,&+ Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense.

The court, however, clarified that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument.

Ehere there is no evidence to show that at the time of issue, accused was in 2anila, there would be no basis in upholding jurisdiction of the 2anila Trial Court over the offense for violation of ..". .ig. )). THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF B.P. BIG. 22 HAVE TO BE TREATED AS SEPARATE OFFENSES HAVING DIFFERENT ELEMENTS The mere fact that the court has jurisdiction over an estafa case does not necessarily mean it has jurisdiction over the bouncing checks case or violation of ..". .ig. )) involving the same check.

Cence, it is incorrect for respondent "eople to conclude that inasmuch as the 4egional Trial Court of 2anila ac:uired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also ac:uired jurisdiction over the violations of..". .ig. )). Cence, it may be tried in the court of municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or anywhere one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

The crime of estafa and the violation of ..". .ig. )) have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be established.

The girl being taken with her consent from 2anila to "asig, 4izal "rovince, both the judges of the Court of 8irst Instance of 2anila and of 4izal have jurisdiction and are competent to take cognizance of the crime of abduction.

Thus, where the records clearly indicate that business The crime of estafa and violation of ..". .ig. )) have to be treated as separate offenses having different elements and, necessarily for a court to ac:uire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. The various charges for violation of ..". .ig. )), however, dealings were conducted in a restaurant in 2anila where sums of money were given to petitioner, the lower court ac:uired jurisdiction over the estafa case. It is true that the abduction was commenced in 2anila, but it may well be said that it was consummated in "asig.

74

K,2+(%%,+; /urisdiction over criminal cases cannot be conferred by Ehere an information charges the offense of kidnapping for ransom with murder, the victim was kidnapped within !ucena City and at that very moment, the intention becomes evident that the accused wanted to detain him for ransom, the Court thereat has jurisdiction to try the case of murder filed against the accused, although the killing was committed outside the city limits. F(*',3,0( ,&+ &3 P#,5( " D&01$"+ The crime of falsification of a private document is consummated at the time and place where the document is falsified, whether the document is or is not thereafter put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. Ehere persons are kidnapped and detained in .ulacan, then taken to %ueva Dcija, defendants may be tried and punished in .ulacan, where the crime was commenced and consummated, though continued elsewhere.
In a case, defendant was fould guilty of homicide. Counsel for defense contended that the Court of 8irst Instance of 2anila, in which the case was heard, had no jurisdiction as the offense was committed outside the city limits.

proceeding pending in the Court of 8irst Instance of Iloilo province. consent. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in 2anila, but the intention to give false evidence in Iloilo, by means of such affidavit. L,)"* The rules on venue on libel in Article 3C6 of t"e Re ised Penal Code as amended b! R.A. :o. 12E2 and R*. :o. 43C3 may C#,$" W, !,+ C, 4 L,$, ' be stated thus= a. Ehether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the 4egional Trial Court of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the 4egional Trial Court of the province where he actually resided at the time of the The Court of 8irst Instance of 2anila has jurisdiction over a crime of robbery committed upon a steamboat in the .ay of 2anila at a point two and a half miles beyond the city limits. c. P"#<1#4 The lower court oflloilo found that the crime charged commission of the offense.

Midnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing crime where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another.

>eld+ (s the crime was committed within two and a half miles of

b.

E' (3( )4 R(,*#&(2 C&+210 &# Ehere a railroad conductor collects one peso and twenty1 two centavos from a passenger and issues a false ticket for a shorter journey for which the charge is eighteen centavos, the estafa is committed where his account was rendered and the stub of the false ticket was turned in.

the city limits, the court had the necessary jurisdiction.

If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in 2anila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the 4egional Trial Court of 2anila.

<nder (rticle )+ of the #eneral Compilation of !aws upon Criminal "rocedure, jurisdiction is vested in the court, where accused made use of the document ?stub of the ticket@ alleged to be false.

(#er%ur!) in the information was completed in 2anila, inasmuch as the affidavit upon which the charge of perjury rested was subscribed and sworn to before a notary in the city, and sustained a demurrer, dismissing the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

d.

If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of 2anila, the action may be filed in the Court of 8irst Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.

The fact that the Court of 8irst Instance of 2anila took jurisdiction of the estafa because the place of its commission was not clearly shown, is not an obstacle to the court declaring itself without jurisdiction as soon as the lack of jurisdiction appeared.

8or the guidance, of both the bench and the bar, the Court It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the information that defendant, by means of such affidavit, swore to and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal finds it appropriate to reiterate its earlier pronouncement in the case of Agba!ani, to wit=

75

action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time.
Ehenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.

jurisdictional waters the court stated in certain cases, the comity of nations is observed, as in =ali u. Fee#er of t"e Common *ail, wherein it was said that disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with e;clusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public may be suppressed and the offenders punished by proper authorities of the local jurisdiction.

respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Ehen the e;act place where the crime was committed is unknown and the strong presumption arises at the trial that it was committed on board a ship navigating within the waters included in the territory of this (rchipelago, the court competent to try such a crime is that of the district and province at one of whose ports the ship or vessel arrives.

That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.

It may not be easy at all times to discover to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs.

CRIMES ON BOARD FOREIGN MERCHANT SHIPS WITHIN TERRITORIAL LIMITS There are two fundamental rules in International !aw regarding jurisdiction to punish crimes committed abroad foreign merchant vessels=

2uch will depend upon the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that a felonious homicide is a subject for local jurisdiction6 and if the authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere with it. CRIMES COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(4T. 2. A##lication of its #ro isions. 9 D;cept as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the "hilippine (rchipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who=

The offense of failing to provide suitable means for The 8rench rule, according to which such crimes should not be prosecuted in the court of the country within which they are committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory6 and securing animals while transporting them on a ship from a foreign port to a port in the "hilippine Islands, is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the "hilippines when the forbidden conditions e;isted during the time the ship was within territorial waters, regardless of the fact that the same conditions e;isted The Dnglish rule, based on the territorial principle, followed by the <nited tates, according to which such crimes are in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they are committed. (lthough the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their $f these two rules, the last one obtains in this jurisdiction, as the "hilippines was then a territory of the <nited tates. ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute, a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an e;tension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited within the "hilippine Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Ehether the courts of the "hilippines have jurisdiction over a crime ?such as smoking of opium within our territorial limits@ committed aboard foreign merchant vessels anchored in "hilippine soil. when the ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.

a.

hould commit an offense while on a "hilippine ship or airship6

b.

hould forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the

"hilippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the #overnment of the "hilippine Islands6

c. number6

hould be liable for acts connected with the introduction into

these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding

d.

Ehile being public officers or employees, should commit an

In certain cases, the comity of nations is observed.

offense in the e;ercise of their functions6 or

e.

hould commit any of the crimes against national security and

the law of nations, defined in Title $ne of .ook Two of this Code.

In the present case, a can of opium was landed, thus constituting an open violation of the laws of the land, with Ehile under ec. 1&?d@ >other crimes committed outside of

76

the "hilippines but punishable therein under article ) of the 4evised "enal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed.>

Inter5ention of the ,ffended 0arty in Criminal Action The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the I+ "#5"+ ,&+ &3 O33"+2"2 P(# 4 D;plaining the scope of the 4ule and the meaning of offended party, the Court stated that under ection &, 4ule 11, $n the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party ror the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. <nder (rticle 1,- of the 4evised "enal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused= of the 4ules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

Ehere the crime is committed by a public officer in relation to his office and is classified as #rade )7 and higher, jurisdiction is with the andiganbayan. WITHIN THE

WHEN PROCEEDINGS ARE CONDUCTED PREMISES OF THE PENAL INSTITUTION

control of the public prosecutor.

( sister of detention prisoner 2ario, accused in a criminal case for robbery with homicide re:uested the transfer of the case from the 4egional Trial Court at Calamba, !aguna to the original court, the 4egional Trial Court of Fuezon City. 2ario is a life termer and had been ordered committed to the %ational .ureau of "risons in 2untinlupa.

(4T. 1,-. D"at is included in ci il liabilit!. The civil liability established in (rticles 1,,, 1,1, 1,) and 1,* of this Code includes= 1. ). *. 4estitution6 4eparation of the damage caused6 Indemnification for conse:uential damages.

Pursuant to Administrati e Circular :o. 2, dated 7ecember 2, 12;C, and Administrati e Circular :o. C, dated 7ecember 5, 12;;, he cannot be brought out of the penitentiary for appearance or attendance in other criminal cases in any court without authority from the upreme Court. The prosecution of offenses is a public function.

Ehen the offended party, through counsel, has asserted <nder ection 10, 4ule 11, of the 4ules of Criminal his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance. "rocedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and ine;pensive administration of justice.

aid circulars also provide that judges in 2etro 2anila who shall re:uire the appearance or attendance of such prisoners as witness or as accused before their respective courts shall conduct such proceedings within the premises of the penal institution.

8rom

ections & and 10 of 4ule 11,, it can clearly be

inferred that while criminal actions as a rule are prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, however, an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted e;cept at the instance of the offended party. The only e;ception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or e;pressly reserves his right to institute it, in which case, he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution.

( separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time1consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case.

The Court resolved to grant 2s. !lantoBs re:uest but the trial of the case shall be conducted within the premises of the %ational "enitentiary. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.

Eith the implied institution of the civil action in the crimi1 SEC. 1?. nal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.

77

(nd, in any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official. If there are offended parties, petitionerBs contention that no damages are to be recovered in the criminal action must be untenable.

public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.

<nder public function of prosecuting offenses can be

ection 10, 4ule 11, of the 4evised 4ules of

Criminal "rocedure, the offended party may also be a private Dven in cases which do not involve any civil liability, an offended party may appear not only as a matter of tolerance on the part of the court. The individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actuall! or directl! injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. performed not e;clusively by fiscals or other public officers, but by private attorneys in cases where they are allowed to intervene as private prosecutors. In this respect, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and those that can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. T!" R,;! & N& ,0" &3 O33"+2"2 P(# 4 OFFENDED PARTIES FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI=GRAFT LAW AND FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS The offended party may be the tate or any of its (fter all, in the performance of their professional duties, lawyers are officers of the court and assume public and official responsibilities. uch party must be one who has a legal right6 a sub1 stantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evi1 dence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities.

In either case, the law gives the offended party the right to intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right only when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute one.

uch interest must not be a mere e;pectancy, subordinate or inconse:uential.

instrumentalities, including local governments or government1 owned or controlled corporations which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.

Ehere the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider the appearance of counsel merely as a matter of tolerance. The offended party is entitled to be notified and heard on motions filed in the criminal #roceedings especially when there is a conflict in the positions between the public prosecutor and of the offended party. O33"+2"2 P(# ,"' ,+ I**";(* P#(0 ,0" &3 M"2,0,+" In an information for illegal practice of medicine a private prosecutor was allowed to intervene.

The interest of the party must be personal6 and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

8or instance, in malversation of public funds or property under (rticle )17 of the 4evised "enal Code, frauds under (rticle )1* of the 4evised "enal Code, and violations of the 8orestry Code of the "hilippines, ".3. %o. 7,&, as amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused. The controlling consideration is the public character of a 8or violations of ection *?e@ of 4ep. (ct %o. *,1+, any document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. In the felony of falsification of public document, the e;istence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial.

party, including the government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused.

The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.

(ll the witnesses who testified before the fiscal are offended parties it appearing that the offense alleged in the information belongs to the class of harmful ones. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the

WHEN MAY THE OFFENDED PARTY LOSE HIS RIGHT TO

78

INTERVENE IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE (n offended party loses right to intervene in the

It was earlier held in a case for illegal possession of firearms and violation of the 3angerous 3rugs !aw that= >It is a;iomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again.

prosecution of a criminal case, when he has waived the civil action or e;pressly reserved his right to institute the civil action arising from the offense.

This is true even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he has waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (lthough they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not Reser ation of rig"t of ci il damages8 offended #art! losses rig"t to inter ene. Ehere the offended party in a crimi1 nal case has e;pressly reserved his right to present an independent civil action for damages arising from the offense charged, he loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. F,*,+; &3 S"%(#( " C,5,* A0 ,&+ <ndoubtedly, an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action arising from the offense. Their only function is to testify. even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action. him and actually handles the e;amination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence.

The fact that he was not so informed made the irregularity even more serious.>

It was, however, held that the offended party has the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the order considering the information against petitioner as withdrawn even without the conformity of the public prosecutor or to file motion for reconsideration of a decision of the criminal prosecution. L";(* P"#'&+(*, 4 &3 O33"+2"2 P(# 4 Ehile it is the ol#en that may bring or defend actions on upreme upreme Court enjoining a

behalf of the 4epublic of the "hilippines or represent the people or the state in criminal proceedings pending before the Court or Court of (ppeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the court of law.

In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else.>

It follows that a motion for revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses ?who never even testified@ should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge.

It follows that the offended party has legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal. The case was distinguished from Caes . )ntermediate

8or by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify the action of these wit 1 nesses.

A##ellate Court, which is a violation of the dangerous drugs law where there is no immediate and direct offended party.

2oreover, if the court, independently of the appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the

T!" R,;!

& F,*" M& ,&+ 3&# R"5,5(*

The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper.

79

accused.

The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

d.

The rule also incorporated Circular &71+7 on the filing of actions for violation of .atas "ambansa .ig. )) mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the check involved.

This is no longer provided for.

The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION This does not include recovery of civil liability under SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and ci5il actions C!(+;"' ,+ !" R1*" ( ( G*(+0" a. The rule changes the 1+'& rule as amended in 1+''. (rticles *), **, *- and )170 of the Civil Code of the "hilippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation.

In other cases, no filing fees shall be re:uired for actual damages. H,' &#4 &3 A$"+2$"+ %o other rule in criminal procedure have been as hotly debated upon as the rule on prosecutions of civil actions. The rule have been amended four times. a. /uridical .asis of the "rinciple of Implied Institution of the Civil (ction with the Criminal (ction 3ual Concept of Civil !iability

c.

The rulings in S"afer

. *udge, R$C of 9longa#o Cit!, . . Cantos

allowing a third1party complaint, and the ruling in *a ier )ntermediate A##ellate Court, as well as Cabaero allowing a counterclaim are no longer in force.

<nder the 1+'& 4ule, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from crime including the civil liability under (rticles *), **, *- and )170 of the Civil Code of the "hilippines arising from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Thus, a court trying a criminal case cannot award <nder the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal unless the offended party waives the civil action reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code provides that every person criminally liable shall also be civilly liable (e-< delicto) while (rticle )170 of the Civil Code provides that b. <nder the former rule a waiver of any of three civil actions e;tinguishes the others. ( criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainantBs civil liability. >whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. damages in favor of the accused. (ny claim which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. Civil obligations arising from the criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of (rticle )177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter ), "reliminary Title, on Cuman 4elations, and of Title J5III on Cuman 4elations, regulating damages. <nder the 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, these pleadings are no longer allowed. <nder (rticle 11&7 of the Civil Code of the "hilippines, obligations may arise, inter alia, from acts or omissions punished by law (e-<delicto) and from quasi<delict.

80

Code, or create an action for quasi<delict or cul#a<contractual under

The same act or omission which gives rise to two separate and distinct sources of civil liability may be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, subject only to the limitation that the satisfaction of either bars recovery of the other, on the principle that plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission.

uch fault or negligence, if there is no pre1e;isting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi< delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.>

(rticles 1+,)11+1, of the Civil Code.>

The other differences pointed out between crimes and cul#a aquiliana are=

The Code e;pressly provides that responsibility for the fault or negligence for quasi<delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the "enal Code, subject only to the limitation that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. )@ That conse:uently, the "enal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage6 .riefly stated, the negligent act causing damages may produce two kinds of civil liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability arising from the crime under (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code, or create an action for quasi<delict or cul#a e-tra<contractual under (rticles 1+,)11+1, of the Civil Code. *@ That delicts are not as broad as quasi<delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, quasi<delicts, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. 0. The distinct nature of the dual concept of the civil liability was stressed in 7iana following words= . 0atangas $rans#ortation . @arcia, in the Co., citing the earlier case of 0arredo The plain inference is that the civil liability based on delict springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. 1@ That crimes affect public interest, while quasi<delicts are only of private concern6

$therwise stated, civil liability, although arising from the same act or omission, may not only be prosecuted either in a criminal or civil action, but in a criminal and civil action.

The procedural enforcement of these distinct civil liabilities, albeit based on the same act or omission, are likewise separate and distinct, subject only to the ca eat under (rticle )177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of civil liabilities.

C,5,* L,(),*, 4 B('"2 &+ C#,$"

The civil liability based on a crime, unless reserved, is generally enforced in the criminal action, and was governed by the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, more particularly 4ule 111 on the prosecution of civil actions, which provides that when a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party e;pressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

>These two cases involve two different remedies.

uch civil liability is a necessary conse:uence of criminal responsibility, and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding e;cept where the injured party reserves his right to avail himself of it in a distinct civil action.

(s the Court aptly said= ( quasi<delict or cul#a aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

).
( distinction e;ists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi<delict or cul#a e-tra< contractual.

M&2"' &3 E+3&#0"$"+

Civil liability under (rticle )170 was then enforced separately by means of a civil action and is governed by the 4ules on civil actions.

The dual concept of civil liability, e-<delicto and quasi< delicto, has thus brought about a dual mode of enforcement.

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal

Conse:uently, when a criminal action is filed, what was deemed impliedly instituted thereunder was only the

81

civil liability arising from or based on the crime.

namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party, its dominant and primordial objective is the punishment of the offender.

3.

T!" I+2"%"+2"+ C,5,* A0 ,&+'

Thus, the accused may be held civilly liable in the criminal action, if he is found to be criminally liable.

In 1+-+, the ?new@ Civil Code of the "hilippines introduced the so1called independent civil actions.

The civil action is merely incident and conse:uent to If the accused is ac:uitted, he cannot be held civilly liable in the criminal action. the conviction of the accused, which may even be waived or the prosecution thereof reserved in a separate civil action. These are (rticles *), **, and *-.

The obvious reason, as stated in Peo#le u. Amistad is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, since what was deemed impliedly instituted, unless reserved, was the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged, and no other.

This is because criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the tate, and to impose the corresponding penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender6 the action between the private person and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.

These articles allow the injured party to file a civil action for damages in the cases mentioned therein which may also constitute criminal offenses entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

uch civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action and shall re:uire only a preponderance of evidence.

Thus, where the accused is ac:uitted in the criminal This is also the civil liability that is deemed case, the interest of the tate ends, and no civil liability arising from the crime charged could be imposed upon him.

e;tinguished with the e;tinction of the penal even with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not e;ist.>

This has raised the :uestion of whether or not a reservation to file a separate civil action for the cases mentioned therein is necessary for the e;ercise of such right.

Ehat the private offended party should do is to file a separate civil action.

2.

E(#*4 R1*,+;'

The the other.

upreme Court flip1flopped from one e;treme to

In the early stages of criminal procedure, the policy was to strictly adhere to the distinct and discrete nature of the criminal from purely civil actions, and the civil liability that is sought to be enforced thereunder. The 4ule was originally governed by 4ule 1,7 of the Ehat is deemed impliedly instituted and governed by the rules on criminal procedure, unless reserved, was only the civil liability arising from the crime, while civil liability based on other sources of obligation such as :uasi1delict may be enforced only in a purely civil action.
>Ehen a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party e;pressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. Thus, what was deemed impliedly instituted unless there is a waiver or reservation is the civil liability arising from the crime.>

$ne school of thought is of the considered view that ". O#,;,+(* R1*"9 T!" 1/.8 R1*"' &3 C&1# the provisions of the Civil Code are substantive in nature which may be e;ercised by the injured party even without any reservation. 1+-, 4ules of Court which then provided that= ( contrary rule is unconstitutional.

Thus, the criminal action as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from a crime may proceed simultaneously and independently of the other, without any reservation subject only to the limitation that,

Ehile the criminal action may have a dual purpose,

82

the injured party cannot recover twice for the same act or omission as provided for in (rticle )177 of the Civil Code. ;. T!" A$"+2$"+ '

e;tinction

of

the

civil,

unless

the

e;tinction

proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not e;ist.

The other school of thought is of the view that the provisions of the new Civil Code or the e;ercise of the right granted under the Civil Code is merely procedural which may be regulated under the 4ule1making power of the upreme Court.

1@

8irst (mendment

In view of the provisions of the new Civil Code on the so1called independent civil actions, the rule was amended in 1+0- by adding a new section, i(.

In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

To simplify the proceedings and avoid conflicting decisions, all civil actions for the recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission should only be litigated in one proceeding.

The reservation re:uirement for $ther Civil (ctions= The

DC. ). )nde#endent ci il action. In the cases provided for in (rticles *1, *), **, *- and )177 of the Civil Code of the "hilippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as re:uired in the preceding section. and shall re:uire only a preponderance of evidence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, >N N N the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi< delict or cul#a e-tra<contractual.

upreme Court, however, declared

ection ) as

inoperative. Thus, in =endo(a @arcia . 'lorida, that=

. Arrieta, :uoting from

The injured party must have to elect whether he chooses to prosecute his claim in the criminal action or in a separate civil action either by a timely reservation or the filing of the civil action prior to the institution of the criminal action.

The gravity and comple;ity of the :uestion is best e;emplified by the four amendments of the 4ule.

DC. *. 9t"er ci il actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed,

distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality.

ome legal writers are of the view that in accord ance with

The minutes of the proceedings from the 8ernan to the 3avide, /r., committee disclose the heat of the debate and the numerous sessions not only of the Committee but also by the Court en bane.

a.

Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal ac1 tion has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action6 b. (fter a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage dered6 it may be found, until final

(rticle *1, the civil action based upon quasi<delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.

Cence6 the proviso in

ection ) of 4ule 111 with reference to ;

; ; (rticles *), ** and *- of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ; ; a and are intended to constitute as e;ceptions to the general rule stated in what is now ection 1 of 4ule 111.

.y no means can it be said that the issue had been finally laid to rest.

If the 4evised 4ule on Criminal "rocedure have been delayed, it is because of 4ule 111. It took the court several sessions before the present rule was reluctantly adopted, which ended with a rule similar to the 1+-, 4ules of Court, prior to the four amendments. c.

judgment in the criminal proceeding has been ren1

The prouiso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, (rticles *),** and *- of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation re:uired in the #ro iso. ; ; ;>

D;tinction of the penal action does not carry with it

83

criminal action. The 1+'& amendment did not live very In his concurring opinion in the above case, 2r. /ustice (ntonio .arredo further observed that inasmuch as (rticles )170 and )177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the 4evised "enal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case6 that not within the power of ection ) of 4ule 111 is It actually restored the 1+0- amendment. upreme Court to The rule further clarified the civil actions that are deemed impliedly instituted is not confined to civil actions arising from a crime but also the civil actions to recover civil liability under (rticles *), **, *- and )170 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission ). econd (mendment of the accused unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, (ccordingly, the 12E5 Rules on Criminal Procedure did away with the need for 4D D45(TI$% in cases provided for in (rticles *), ** and *- of the Civil Code of the "hilippines and instead recognized that >an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case.
>The 1+'' amendment e;pands the scope of the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted ; ; ;.

long.

Cowever, in view of (rticle )177 of the said code which provides that the offended party may not recover twice for the same act or omission of the accused, and in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, these objections were overruled.

*.

Third (mendment

In 1+'', 4ule 111 was amended for the third time.

inoperative, >it being substantive in character and is the promulgate6 and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with (rticle )177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the 4ules of 1+-,.>

In any event, the offended party was not precluded from filing a civil action to recover damages arising from quasi<delict before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for damages under (rticles *), ** and *- before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action.

or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

It is only in those cases where the offended party has not previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.

/;plaining the amendment, /ustice /ose K. 8eria, then a member and later chairman of the 4evision of 4ules of Court Committee elucidated=

Ehile it was ruled in Abella u. =ara e,u that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the 1+'' amendment.

uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall re:uire only a preponderance of evidence.>

uch a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the 4evised "enal Code and damages under (rticles *), **, *- of the Civil Code of the "hilippines, but also damages under (rticle )170 of the said code. ; ; ;>

Eithout such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliediv instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted.

<nder the 1+'& amendment, what is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless there is a reservation or a prior civil action filed is the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.

uch civil actions are not limited to those which arise >from the offense charged.>

$bjections were raised to the inclusions in this 4ule of quasi<delicts under (rticle )170 of the Civil Code of the "hilippines. In other words, the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether

This is the civil action that may be reserved in the

84

arising from crimes (e- delicto or from quasi delict under (rt. )170 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action@. The court, however, went further by limiting the civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal only to the civil liability arising from the offense charged.

4ule 1,7 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the accused in the criminal case which he may assert either in the same criminal case or in a separate action.

This includes the right to recover damages against the employer pursuant to (rticle )1', in relation to (rticle )170 of the Civil Code. Dlsewise stated, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions including the action for :uasi1delict against the employer can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

(ll decisions to the contrary are no longer controlling. The independent civil actions under (rticles *), **, *and )170 are no longer deemed or impliedly instituted with the criminal action or considered as waived even if there is no reservation.

<nder this rule, a waiver from failure to reserve does not include a cause of action not arising from civil liability involved in the criminal case but from cul#a contractual, such as a civil case is based on alleged cul#a contractual incurred by the "hilippine (ir !ines, Inc. because of its failure to carry safely the deceased passenger to his place of destination.

The reservation applies only to the civil liability arising from the offense charged.

The criminal case involves the civil liability of the The employer may no longer be held civilly liable for accused, who bear no relation whatsoever with said entity and are complete strangers to it.

-.

8ourth (mendment

quasi delict in the criminal action as ruled in =aniago (su#ra) and San )ldefonso lines (su#ra) and the #ro "ac ice decision in Rafael Re!es $ruc?ing Cor#oration (su#ra), and all other similar cases, since quasi<delict is not deemed instituted with the criminal.

The 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure is a virtual return to the 1+-, 4ules of Court ?and the 1+'& amendment@ which deemed as instituted with the criminal action only the civil liability arising from the offense charged.

The accused are complete strangers to the respondent company.

The latter is not in any way involved therein. "laintiff is If at all, the only civil liability of the employer in the criminal action would be his subsidiary liability under the 4evised "enal Code. The failure, therefore, on the part of the plaintiff to The rule has also done away with third party complaints and counterclaims in criminal actions. reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be deemed as a waiver on her part of the right to institute a separate civil These claims must have to be ventilated in a separate civil action. action against the respondent company based on its contractual liability, or on cul#a aquiliana under (rticles 1+,) to 1+1, to of the Civil Code. concerned with the civil liability of the latter, regardless of the civil liability of the accused in the criminal case.

The civil liability is deemed instituted 9 not merely >impliedly> instituted with the institution of the criminal action.

The amendment modified the recommendation of the Committee on the 4evision of the 4ules of Court to deem as impliedly instituted only the civil liability of the accused from all sources of obligation arising from the same act or omission. The fourth amendment is similar to the original rule in 4ule The purpose of the Committee was to limit the civil liability to be instituted with the criminal action to that of the accused and not the employer. 1,7 of the 4ules of Court and the 1+'& amendment.

The two actions are separate and distinct and should not be confused one with the other.

<nder (rticle *1 of the Civil Code= >Ehen the civil

85

action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.>

may be brought by the injured party and may proceed simultaneously6

In cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the 4evised "enal Code and an action for :uasi1delict under the Civil Code.
The "rinciple (llowing ." .ig. )) eparate Civil (ctions noT (llowed for 5iolations of

The civil liability is not e;tinguished where ac:uittal is based on reasonable doubt.

It may further be noted that (rticle *1 is not among the civil actions that are deemed impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal. (n act or omission causing damage to another may give It may likewise be noted that in Cor#us imprudence or criminal legligence cases. . Page, the rise to two separate liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1@ civil liability e- delito, under (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code, and independent civil liabilities, such as those ?a@ not arising from an act or emission complained of as a felony, e.g., cul#a contractual or obligations arising from law under (rticle *), of the Civil Code, intentional (nd, in /icano . >ill, the court ruled that the concept torts under (rticles *) and *-, and cul#a aquiliana under (rticle )170 of the Civil Code6 or of quasi<delict includes intentional acts, i.e., acts or omissions punishable by law. ?b@ where the injured party is granted a right to file an The foregoing concepts would allow more than one civil action to recover civil liability arising from the same act or ommission. Dither of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against The only limitation is against double recovery. the offender ?separately and simultaneously@ subject, however, to the caveat under (rticle )177 of the Civil Code that the attended party cannot recover damages This is in effect the present rule. T!" P#,+0,%*" &3 S,$1* (+"&1' C,5,* A0 ,&+' Thus, civil liability arising from crime and civil liability arising from (rticles *), **, *- and )170 :uasi1delict or contract are entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that C,5,* A0 ,&+' ,+ C('"' &3 N";*,;"+0" twice for the same act or emission or under both causes. Cowever, a separate civil action based on subsidiary liability cannot be instituted during the pendency of the criminal case. independent and distinct criminal action. court ruled that (rticle ** did not contemplate reckless
Two eparate Civil !iabilities from ame (ct or $mission

The principle does not apply to violations of ..". .ig. )) which provides that >The criminal action for violation of .atas "ambanss .ig. )) shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.

%o reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.>

Cowever in =aceda Cor#us ** also covers

. Caro, the court observed 6hat committed thru criminal

. Page is not controlling and held that (rticle crimes

)@

negligence.

The Court e;plained that this rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with ..". .ig. )) cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.

.ecause ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and some times, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof

The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is e;pected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks.

It is also e;pected to e;pedite the disposition of these cases.

Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried.

It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the 4ules

86

is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.

violation of ..". .ig. )) filed by the for the issuance of bouncing checks in payment of the same obligation which deemed as included the civil action recovery of the sum of money sought to be recovered in the civil action.
(ction .ased on Compromise (greement held as 3ifferent from 5iolation of ..". .ig. ))

for insufficiency or lack of funds.

The 4ules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.

The issuance of worthless checks is prohibited because of its deleterious effects on public interest and its effects transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.

The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. (n action, however for collection based on violation of a 2emorandum (greement entered into where parties also agreed Dven then, the 4ules encourage the consolidation o the civil and criminal cases. to dismiss the criminal proceedings for violation of ..". .ig. )) was held as not violative of the rule against forum shopping because, there is no identity of parties, rights or causes of action, sand relief sought. The Court stated= Ee have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time1 consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. HERE9 THE TWO CASES INVOLVED ARE THE INSTANT CIVIL CASE FOR COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY WHERE PETITIONER IS THE DEFENDANT9 AND THE B.P. BIG. 22 CASES WHERE PETITIONER IS THE ACCUSED.
Clearly, there is no identity of parties for in the criminal case, the e;ists.

In the present civil case, no such transcendental public interest

R,;!

& I+ "#5"+" ,+ E' (3( C('"'

The fact, however, that the 4ules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in ..". .ig. )) cases canot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal action for estafa.

%othing in the current or rules on ..". .ig. )) vests the jurisdiction of the corresponding civil case e;clusively in the Court trying the ..". .ig. cases.

This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.

plaintiff is the

tate with !igon only as a complaining witness. In the case

at bar, !igon himself is the plaintiff.

Ehere petitionersB rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
In the instant case, the cause of action is petitionerBs breach of contract as embodied in the 2emorandum of (greement, while in the criminal case, it is the violation of ..". .ig. )). There is also a difference in the causes of action.

In promulgating the 4ules, the Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases.

In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of..". .ig. )), (rticle *1 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.

"rivate complainantBs intervention in the prosecution of the estafa and ..". .ig. )) is justified not only for the prosecution other interests, but also for the speedy and ine;pensive administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution despite the necessary inclusion of the corresponding civil6 action in the proceedings for violation of ." )) pending before the 2TC.

There is also a difference in reliefs sought because in the civil case, what is sought is the enforcement of the terms in their 2emo randum of (greement, while in the criminal case, it is the punishment of the offense committed against a public law.

The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis #endentia.

(s we e;plained in @o criminal liability.

. 7imagiba, civil liability differs from

The only limitation is that a recovery in one bars the other.

Thus, the complaint for recovery of sum of money based on a contractual debt filed in the 4egional Trial Court was dismissed because of the pendency of a criminal case for
Ehat is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay an obligation but the issuance of checks that subse:uently bounced or were dishonored

$n the other hand a separate civil action for failure to comply with the obligations under the Trust 4eceipts was

87

allowed although the a criminal case for violation of the Trust receipts law had already been filed.

arising from the dredging contracts subject of the criminal action.

deemed abandoned.>
D;tent of 3amages (warded in Civil !iability (rising from Crimes

(ccording to the Court= THE RIGHT TO FILE A SEPARATE COMPLAINT FOR A SUM OF MONEY IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 31 OF THE CIVIL CODE9 TO WITC
>(rticle *1. Ehen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.>

Cowever, the Court held that petitionerBs counterclaim is deemed abandoned by virtue of amended. ection - of ".3. %o. 10,0, as Civil liability arising from crime includes, moral damages, e;emplary damages and loss of earning capacity.

The last paragraph of amended, provides that=

ection - of ".3. %o. 10,0, as

(ttorneyBs fees may be awarded but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when e;emplary damages are awarded.

(ny provision of law or 4ules of Court to the contrary not1 withstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the

!ife e;pectancy is included in award of damages.

Ehere the complaint against petitioners was based on the failure of the latter to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the Trust 4eceipt e;ecuted by them.

The only civil liability that may thus be imposed in a criminal action is that arising from and conse:uent to the criminal liability oi the accused on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. This includes restitution, reparation of damages caused

andiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the crimi1 nal action shall be recognized=

This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for >misuse andAor misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts>, punishable under ection 1* of the Trust 4eceipts !aw (P.7. :o. 115) in relation to (rticle *1&?1@, ?b@ of the 4evised "enal Code.
Pro ided, "o,e er. That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the andiganbayan or the appropriate andiganbayan or the

and indemnification of conse:uential damages. Complementary thereto, are the subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietor of establishments, employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry, for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, employees in the discharge of their duties. B#&(2"# C&+0"% &3 C,5,* L,(),*, 4 In 0anal . $adeo, *r., a case of violation of ..". .ig. )),

court, said civil action shall be transferred to the

appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

.eing based on an obligation e- contractu and not edelicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter.
The andiganbayan 4ule= "rohibition against eparate Civil (ction

The Court held that "etitionerBs counterclaim in the civil case pending with the 2alabon trial court for the return of the amount 3"EC paid %IC is an action to recover civil liability edelicto.

?( law making the issuance of a bouncing check criminal@ the Cowever, this action to recover civil liability e- delicto is by lower court rejected the appearance of a private prosecutor on the ground that ..". .ig. )) does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and, hence it is not a crime against property but public order. .y mandate of 4.(. %o. ')-+, the counterclaim filed earlier in the separate civil action with the 2alabon trial court >shall be The upreme Court, in setting aside the order, gave a operation of law included in the criminal cases filed with the andiganbayan.

"etitioner 3"EC the offended party in a criminal case for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation of ection *?e@ and ?g@ of 4.(. %o. *,1+ pending in the andiganbayan lodged its own counterclaim to the collection case filed with the 2alabon Trial Court, praying for the return of its payment made to the %avotas Industrial Corporation ?%IC@

88

broader concept of the civil liability that may be recovered in a criminal action. The upreme Court said= "EVERY PERSON WHO9 CONTRARY TO LAW9 WILFULLY OR NEGLIGENTLY CAUSES DAMAGE TO ANOTHER9 SHALL INDEMNIFY THE LATTER FOR THE SAME. 4egardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
<nderlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely= ?1@ the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the tate whose law he had violated6 and the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission, ; ; ;.>

criminal case, unless a waiver or the reservation of the civil action is made. W!"+ R"'"#5( ,&+ M(4 B" M(2" The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action arising from the offenses charged shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

"GENERALLY9 THE BASIS OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME IS THE FUNDAMENTAL POSTULATE OF OUR LAW THAT EVERY MAN CRIMINALLY LIABLE IS ALSO CIVILLY LIABLE."

conse:uence of the wrongful act of another.

The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime. Dvery crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party6 and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses.

The purpose of the rule re:uiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

?)@

5iewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.

The #ro iso re:uiring that the reservation may be made before the prosecution starts to present evidence was brought about by the cases of $actaquin . Palileo, =anio . @addi, where despite the appearance of a private prosecutor, the offended party was not able to present evidence on the damages because of the plea of guilty of the accused who was accordingly sentenced.

Civil liability is however, improper in illegal possession of firearms :ualified by murder. The civil liability arising from the death may be claimed

In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and pro;imate cause thereof.

either in a separate action or impliedly instituted with the criminal action for murder or homicide.>

The
Dffect of 8ailure to (llege 3amages in Complaint or Information

upreme Court in ,he case of Re!es

. 7i!, stressed

the need to give the offended party in opportunity to make a reservation, and held that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved

The fact that there is, no claim or allegation of damages in 3amage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Dvery person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly uch is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. It has, therefore, been held that even if the complaint or information is silent as to the damages or the intention to prove and claim them, the offender is still liable for them, and the (rticle ), of the %ew Civil Code provides= offended has the right to prove and claim for them in the liable. the complaint of information is of no legal conse:uence.

party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter i reservation in the record to file a separate civil action

89

4eservation %eed not be D;press but 2ay .e Implied

The Court held that the dismissal was improper and ruled thus= "TRUE9 APPELLANTS9 THROUGH PRIVATE PROSECUTORS9 WERE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE : WHETHER PROPERLY OR IMPROPERLY WE DO NOT DECIDE HERE : IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST APPELLEEFS DRIVER9 BUT IF THAT AMOUNTED INFERENTIALLY TO SUBMITTING IN SAID CASE THEIR CLAIM FOR CIVIL INDEMNITY9 THE CLAIM COULD HAVE BEEN ONLY AGAINST THE DRIVER BUT NOT AGAINST APPELLEE WHO WAS NOT A PARTY THEREIN.
(s a matter of fact, however, inspite of appelleeBs statements to the contrary in its brief, there is no showing in the record before <s that appellants made of record their claim for damages against the driver or his employer6 much less does it appear that they had attempted to prove

informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the re:uirement of an e;press reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presented its evidence.

Ehile a reading of the afore1:uoted provisions shows that the offended party is re:uired to make a reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action, jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not necessarily be e;press but may be implied which may be inferred not only from the acts of the offended party but also from acts other than those of the latter.

Ehere a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged has been reserved, the heirs of the deceased are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused.

In

the

Aintola

case,

the

fact

that

plaintiff

actively

intervening in the prosecution of the criminal case through a private prosecutor, is of no moment.

The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of the deceased "*,,,,,.,, as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation.

In ruling that the Dstafa case is not a bar to the institution of a civil action for collection, this Court held that=

such damages.

$"e failure of t"e court to ma?e an! #ronouncement in its decision

"DIET IS INACCURATE FOR THE VINTOLAS TO CLAIM THAT THE JUDGMENT IN THE ESTAFA CASE HAD DECLARED THAT THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE CIVIL ACTION MIGHT ARISE9 DID NOT EXIST9 FOR IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT THE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL EXPRESSLY DECLARED THAT FTHE REMEDY OF THE BANK IS CIVIL AND NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE.F
This amounts to a reservation of the civil action in I.((Bs favor for the Court would not have dwelt on a civil liability that it had intended to e;tinguish by the same decision.>

concerning t"e ci il liabilit! of t"e dri er and ) or of "is em#lo!er must t"erefore be due to t"e fact t"at t"e criminal action did not in ol e at all an! claim for ci il indemnit!.3

E33"0 &3 R"'"#5( ,&+ !ater, in *arantilla, the Court ruled that the failure of the trial court to make any pronouncement, favorable or It has been held that the prescription of action does not prescribe for the civil action that have been reserved in the criminal action. unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action, for nowhere in the 4ules of Court is it provided that if the court fails to determine the civil liability, it becomes no longer enforceable. :ote+ <nder ection ), 4ule 111 during the pendency of

In the 0ernaldes case, plaintiffs spouses %icasio .ernaldes, r. and "erpetua .esas together with their minor son, /ovito, filed a complaint for damages against defendant .ohol !and Transportation Co. for the death of /ovitoBs brother %icasio, /r. and for serious physical injuries obtained by /ovito when the bus in which they were riding, fell off a deep precipice. %othing in the records at hand shows that private respondent ever attempted to enforce its right to recover civil liability during the prosecution of the criminal action against petitioners.

the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding shall be tolled. W(,5"# &3 C,5,* L,(),*, 4 A#,',+; 3#&$ C#,$" The civil liability arising from a crime may be waived.

3efendant bus company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that in the criminal case earlier filed against its bus driver, plaintiffs intervened through their counsel but did not reserve therein their right to file a separate action for damages.

Thus, even if there was no reservation in the criminal case and that the civil action was not filed before the filing of the criminal action but before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was %o counterclaim, cross1claim or third1party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be

90

litigated in a separate civil action.

the criminal case, to file any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof in a separate civil action, since the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.

dredging contracts with the offended party obviously does not fall under (rticles *), ** or *- ?on Cuman 4elations@ of the Civil Code. %either does it fall under (rticle )170 ?on auasi<delict) of the Civil Code.

( court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused.

The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability.

The accused is therefore forced to litigate se#aratel! his counterclaim against the offended party.

<nder

ection * of 4ule 111, civil actions falling under

(rticles *), **, *- or )170 may proceed independently and separately from the criminal case.

( criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainantBs civil liability, if any.

If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi<delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi<delict is filed. The only other possibility is for the accusedBs civil action to fall under (rticle *1 of the Civil Code which provides= ART. 31. WHEN THE CIVIL ACTION IS BASED ON AN OBLIGATION NOT ARISING FROM THE ACT OR OMISSION COMPLAINED OF AS A FELONY9 SUCH CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL PRO= CEEDINGS AND REGARDLESS OF THE RESULT OF THE LATTER. (n e;ample of a case falling under (rticle *1 is a civil action to recover the proceeds of sale of goods covered by a trust receipt.

The Court ruled in Cabaero liability of the accused, thus=

. >on. Cantos, that a court

trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil

2oreover, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke (rticle )177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.

DTHUS9E THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONFINE ITSELF TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT AND THE POSSIBLE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED ARISING OUT OF THE CRIME.
The counterclaim ?and cross1claim or third1party complaint, if any@ should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.

To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi<delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and e:ual protection of the law.

This

paragraph

addresses

the

lacuna

mentioned

in

%otably, the Court did not order the consolidation but allowed the civil action to proceed se#aratel!, otherwise, it would defeat the prohibition against a counterclaim.
!imitation on eparate Civil (ction by an (ccused in the andiganbayan

uch civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action for violation of the trust receipt law.

Cabaero on the >absence of clear1cut rules governing the prosecution ofimpliedly instituted civil action and the necessary conse:uences and implications thereof.> The civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding. S"%(#( " C,5,* A0 ,&+ B4 !" A001'"2 Thus, the accused may file a separate civil action based on quasi<delict arising from the same incident and may proceed simultaneously and independently of the criminal case against him as provided under section 1?0@ which allows >the accused in

In such a case, the validity of the contract, on which the civil action is based, is not at issue.

( separate civil action for collection of sum of money filed by the accused against the offended party while the criminal case in the andiganbayan is pending cannot be consolidated andiganbayan has no jurisdiction with the criminal case, for the criminal cases filed with the

Ehat is at issue is the violation of an obligation arising from a valid contract 11 the trust receipt.

over collection cases, nor can it proceed independently of the andiganbayan.

Cowever, when the civil action is based on a purported contract that is assailed as illegal #er se, as when the e;ecution of the contract is alleged to violate the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct, (rticle *1 does not apply.

The accusedBs collection case for unpaid services from its

91

In such a situation, the contract if proven illegal cannot create any valid obligation that can be the basis of a cause of action in a civil case.

tracts can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Commencing with Pa%arito . SenerisCE followed by 9(oa . Ada. de =adulaC2 and Catacutan . >eirs of Fadusale,;6 it is now settled that the subsidiary liability of the employer, including the amounts thereof, may be determined in the same criminal proceed ings and is reviewable either by writ of error or through a petitior for review on certiorari on pure :uestions of law.

This calls then for the application of the second paragraph of ection ) of 4ule 111 which states that >if the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.>

<nder (rticle 1-,+ of the Civil Code, a contract >whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,> or a contract that is >e;pressly prohibited or declared void by law,> is void from the very beginning.

The appeal shall be governed by appeals in criminal cases, Conse:uently, the civil case for collection pending in the since this is but a continuation of the civil proceedings, the period to be counted not from the promulgation of judgment but from the notice of the order.

%o party to such void contract can claim any right under such contract or enforce any of its provisions.

2alabon

Trial

Court

must

be

suspended

until

after

the

termination of the criminal cases filed with the

andiganbayan.

<nder

ection *?g@ of the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices

In contrast, where the civil action is based on a contract that can remain valid even if its violation may constitute a crime, the civil action can proceed independently.

The principle was stressed in Husa! . Adil,;1 a case of less serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, with the upreme CourtBs statement that= >The employer is in substance and effect, a party to the criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.B B(',' &3 E$%*&4"#F' S1)',2,(#4 L,(),*, 4

(ct, entering into a contract that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government is >declared to be unlawful.>

If the act of entering into the contract is assailed as a crime in itself, then the issue of whether the contract is illegal must first be resolved before any civil action based on the contract can proceed.

Thus, in estafa thru violation of the trust receipt law, the violation of the trust receipt constitutes a crime.

Cowever, the trust receipt itself remains valid, allowing a civil action based on the trust receipt to proceed independently It bears emphasis, however, that before the employerBs subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that then should be a criminal action whereby the employeeBs R" #&(0 ,5" A%%*,0( ,&+ &3 A$"+2$"+ It has been held although the incident and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the If no criminal action was instituted, the employerBs liability would not be predicated under (rticle 1,* of the 4evised "enal Code. 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively. S1)',2,(#4 L,(),*, 4 To be treated differently is the subsidiary liability of the criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. of the criminal case.

$nly the

andiganbayan has the jurisdiction to decide

whether the act of entering into such contract is a crime, where the salary grade of one of the accused is #rade )7 or higher, as in Criminal Cases %os. 10''+110+,, filed with the andiganbayan.

(rticle *1 speaks of a civil action >based on an obligation not arising from the act ; ; ; complained of as a felony.>

$"is clearl! means t"at t"e obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime. employer.

The judgment in the criminal action announcing the employee to be civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of the liability but also as to its amount, from which no appeal by the employer lies from the judgment of conviction.

Ehere, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in itself, no civil action based on such con1

92

The employer must be afforded due process, by holding a hearing to determine his liability on the basis of the conditions re:uired by law, namely= ?a@ the e;istence of an employer1employee relation ship6 ?b@ that the employer is engaged in some kind of agency ?c@ that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties ?not necessarily any offense he may commit@6 and ?d@ that said employee is insolvent. $bligations arising from crimes are governed by (rticle 1101 of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal laws, subject to the provision of(rticle )177 and the pertinent provisions of Chapter ), "reliminary Title, on Cuman 4elations, and of Title J5III of .ook I5 of the Civil Code.

(rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

In default of the persons criminally liable, employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties.

(rticle ** of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.

93

uch civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and re:uires only a preponderance of evidence. D;plaining how the foregoing amendment came about, /ustice %arvasa ?later Chief /ustice@ in @eneral In *oaquin liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. (ny action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature. F,*,+; F""' ,+ E' (3( 0('"' ection ), of 4ule 1-1 (pproved on eptember 1-, 1+++ . Aniceto, the Court held that (rticle ** stated= "THE LAST TWO @2A PARAGRAPHS PRESCRIBE A RULE DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN MANCHESTER9 AND IN THE 1/-B RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
<nder the 1+'& 4ules, the filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action had to be paid first to the Clerk of the Court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard to whether the claim for such damages was set out in the information or not.

a@

when >the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information> filed in court, then >the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial>6

. Clara all,

contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil b@

in any other case, however 9 i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply >constitute a first lien on the judgment, e;cept in an award for actual damages.>

<nder the 1+'' 4ules, however, it is only when Bthe amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information that the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

The ruling in @eneral

. Clara all, especially the last

subparagraph above1:uoted, was actually intended to apply to a situation wherein either= ?1@ the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or ?)@ the complainant e;pressly claims moral, e;emplary, temperate andAor nominal damages but has not specified (%K amount at all, leaving the :uantification thereof entirely to the trial courtBs discretion and %$T to a situation different where types the litigant specifies sought be some not amounts separately or or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the of damages individually :uantified.

In any other case 9 i.e., when the amount of damages other than the civil action >to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, ages.> nominal, temperate or e;emplary damages shall ?merely@

provides that filing fees in estafa cases are also re:uired where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen days following the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or would be separately prosecuted. F,*,+; F"" (' ( L,"+ Ehen the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or e;emplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these 4ules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment e;cept in an award for actual damages.

constitute a first lien on t"e %udgment e;cept in an award for actual dam1

The CourtBs plain intent 9 to make the 2anchester doctrine, re:uiring payment of filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under ection 1, 4ule 111 only when >the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information has thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions.> To hold otherwise, would be to permit litigants to continue availing of one more loophole in the rule on payment of filing fees, and would not serve to attain the purpose of the revised ec. 1 of 4ule 111, which is >to discourage the gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscalBs office to include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees.> 8or the guidance of all concerned when a civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action in accordance with SEC. 2. (hen Separate Ci5il Action is Suspended ection 1, 4ule 111 of the 4ules of Court 9 because the offended party has %$T waived the civil action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action 9 the rule is as follows=

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial

94

S1'%"+',&+ &3 C,5,* A0 ,&+ A#,',+; 3#&$ C#,$"' D;cept for civil actions provided for in (rticles *), **, *and )170 of the Civil Code, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

termination of the criminal cases filed with the

andiganbayan.

where the Civil action does not also fall under (rticles *), **, *and )170 of the Civil Code.

The suspension of the civil case for collection of sum of money ?based on an obligation arising from contracts alleged to be a crime pending before the andiganbayan@ will avoid the andiganbayan possibility of conflicting decisions between the contracts. In fine, a civil action may not be suspended under 4ule 111 where the action is not to enforce civil liability from the crime charged.
Consolidation of Civil with Criminal (ction Dven if not (rising from Crime

and the 2alabon trial court on the validity of %ICBs dredging The action contemplated herein is a civil action arising from a crime. If the If reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed, it has to be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action. andiganbayan declares the dredging contracts 2ay consolidation of civil actions with the criminal action be allowed where the civil action is not to enforce civil liability arising from a crimeO illegal and void ab initio, and such declaration becomes final, then %ICBs civil case for collection of sum of money will have no legal leg to stand on. )n :aguiat It may, however, be consolidated upon application with the court trying the criminal action. Cowever, if the andiganbayan finds the dredging contracts valid, then %ICBs collection case before the 2alabon trial court can then proceed to trial. (rticle *1 speaks of a civil action >based on an obligation not arising from the act ; ; ; complained of as a felony.>
%o suspension if civil action does not arise from Crime

. )ntermediate A##ellate Court, the petitioner

filed a complaint for specific performance with damages to compel the respondent to deliver to him certificates of title covering their lots which he had already paid for under a contract to sell.

( criminal action was likewise filed against the respondent for violation of ".3. %o. +&7 regulating the sale of subdivision, etc., and providing penalties therefor.

$"is clearl! means t"at t"e obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime.

In @andiongco u. Penaranda, the

upreme Court affirmed

/udge "enarandaBs refusal to suspend the civil case for legal separation and support with damages based on concubinage "etitioner moved to consolidate the two ?)@ cases on the basis of 4ule 111, ection *?a@. despite the filing of a concubinage case with the municipal court.

Ehere, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in itself no civil action based on such contracts can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Cis reason is that

ection ) of 4ule 111 of the 1+'& 4ules

The trial court granted consolidation but the Court of (ppeals reversed the order.

on Criminal "rocedure refers to civil actions to enforce the civil This calls then for the application of the second paragraph of ection ) of 4ule 111 which states that >if the criminal action (n action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other within the contemplation of (rticles +7 to 1,' of the Civil Code. Conse:uently, the civil case for collection pending in the 2alabon Trial Court must be suspended until after the The principle applies even with the 1+'' (mendments is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.> liability arising from the offense charged.

The

upreme Court held that the civil actions that may be ection *?a@, 4ule 111 is one for civil liability

consolidated under

arising from the criminal offense or of e-<delicto of which the civil action in this case is not one, but which is based on the contract to sell or a civil action arising e-<contracto, hence, 4ule 111 is not applicable.

95

The

upreme Court, however, justified the consolidation of ection 1, 4ule *1 of the 4ules of . Peralta,I where the Court

imposable accessory or other penalties, included in the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated therein irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof, no longer applies since the civil action to be consolidated does not arise from the criminal offense charged.

The Court allowed the indemnity in the foregoing case despite the erroneous procedure of petitioner in seeking a remedy in filing a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal from the erroneous order of the trial court dismissing the action on the ground prescription since it is an action for :uasi1delict.

the action for specific performance with the criminal action for violation of ".3. %o. +&7 under Court as interpreted in Canos

sustained the order of a trial court to consolidate a civil action ?an action for the recovery of wage differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages@ with a criminal action ?for violation of the 2inimum Eage !aw@, it was held that= "A COURT MAY ORDER SEVERAL ACTIONS PENDING BEFORE IT TO BE TRIED TOGETHER WHERE THEY ARISE FROM THE SAME ACT9 EVENT OR TRANSACTION9 INVOLVE THE SAME OR LIKE ISSUES9 AND DEPEND LARGELY OR SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE SAME EVIDENCE9 PROVIDED9 THAT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES TO BE CONSOLIDATED AND THAT A JOINT TRIAL WILL NOT GIVE ONE PARTY AN UNDUE ADVANTAGE OR PREJUDICE THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF ANY OF THE PARTIES9 X X X" The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court6 in short, the attainment of justice with the least e;pense and ve;ation to the parties litigants. N N N be

The Court stressed that it is >loathe to deprive petitioners The period of prescription of the civil action which cannot instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall not run, refer to the civil action arising from a crime that has not been reserved or when it is filed ahead of the criminal action. D;tinction of the penal action does not carry with it The civil action that may be reserved is the civil arising from the crime. Cowever, the civil action based on delict may be e;tin1 The civil arising from a :uasi1delict is not suspended but may proceed simultaneously. guished if there is a finding in a final judgment that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not e;ist. e;tinction of the civil. E33"0 ' &3 J12;$"+ &3 A0H1, (* of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and a final judgment of conviction based solely on technicality.>

The subsidiary liability may only be enforced after the final judgment of conviction.

Dven if there is a finding in a final judgment that the act or omission from which the civil might arise did not e;ist, this would only refer to the civil liability arising from the offense since this is the only civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action.

The consolidation of two ?)@ cases where petitionerBs counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will be conducive to the early termination of the two ?)@ cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties6 as well as to the speedy administration of justice.

Cowever, prescription of the cause of action quasi<delicto does not operate as a bar to in action to enforce the civil liability arising from the crime especially where the latter action had been e;pressly reserved.

It is a fundamental postulate of our law that >every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.>

The dismissal of the action based on cul#a aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the (nd even if an accused is ac:uitted of the crime charged, such will not necessarily e;tinguish the civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the $nce there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the in criminal cases which is crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employer. civil might arise did not e;ist. employer.

<nder this principle, civil actions under (rticles *), **, *and )170 may be consolidated with the criminal action subject to jurisdictional constraints.

The

rule

on

jurisdiction

In the landmark case of Padilla

. Court of A##eals, the

determinable by the prescribed penalty regardless of other

upreme Court en bane, thru /ustice Cugo #utierrez emphasized that the court may award civil liability in the same proceedings

96

ever if the accused is ac:uitted. Dven

D1 4 &3 C&1# before the

& A6(#2 C,5,* L,(),*, 4 1+'& amendments, the settled

pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the com1 plainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of ac:uittal.

This was to be followed in Peo#le @eroc", Ai(conde u. )AC, Peo#le

*alandoni, =a-ima

. .igon, and other cases, until ection ),

jurisprudence is that it is the duty of the trial judge to award civil liability in favor of the offended party despite the ac:uittal of the accused unless the fact from which the civil might arise does not e;ist. 1@ In a case, the trial judge in not having included civil liability in the decision, stated that it cannot e;ercise discretion alone in determining the liability upon the mere allegations, the same being evidentiary. )@ the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil6 or the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is ac:uitted. the ac:uittal is based on reasonable doubt6 (c:uittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation of the civil case connected therewith where=

the doctrine found its way in the third paragraph of

4ule 1), of the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, which provided that >in case of ac:uittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.>

<nder The 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure= >In case the judgment is of ac:uittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

*@

Considering, however, the fact that the trial courtBs atten1 tion was drawn to the e;istence of a lapsus in the decision, in the motion for reconsideration filed by the complainant, within the reglementary period, and taking into account the petition to supply what had been omitted, the trial judge could have set the motion for reconsideration for hearing, in order to receive evidence, as to the value of the properties admittedly stolen by the accused, or to the return of the goods, if it was still feasible. In an identical case, where the lower court had failed to provide for the corresponding civil liability, the upreme Court ordered the said case remanded to the court of origin, for the purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused. In Caina . Peo#le, however, the e;tinction of the liability imilarly, >e;tinction of the penal action does not carry with it the e;tinction of civil liability unless the e;tinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ists.> Thus, the ac:uittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily e;tinguish the civil liability unless the Court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ist.

In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ist.>

There has been a change in the language of the rule.

Ehereas the 1+'& rule was more categorical in re:uiring that >the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party,> the present rule simply states that >the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ist.>

civil was inferred from a finding that there is no negligence even The principle applies even in cases of ac:uittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not e;ist. if the ac:uittal is based on failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

It seems fairly obvious, however, that despite the ac:uittal of the accused, if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise do e;ist, when the ac:uittal is merely because of failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt then the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. The duty of the court to a award, civil liability inspite of ac:uittal is compellable by mandamus.

imilarly, Sanc"e(

. 'ar /ast 0an? and $rust Com#an!,

held that recourse to appeal the civil aspect from a judgment of ac:uittal may only be resorted if the nature of he courtBs judgment fall under any of the three categories stated above, as reiterated in Sala(ar . Peo#le (su#ra) otherwise, the e;tinction

In .ontoc and *arantilla, the court held that under the present jurisprudential matters, where the trial court ac:uits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a

of the penal e;tinguish the civil.

The civil is deemed instituted with the criminal here the

97

presence of any instances precluding the automatic institution of the civil action together with the criminal complaint. <nder the Civil Code, when a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be prosecuted.
"rinciples (llowing1 4eservation eparate Civil (ction 3espite (c:uittal Dven Eithout

There being no delict, civil liability e- delicto is out of the :uestion, and the civil action, if any, which ma! be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.

which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal The second instance is an ac:uittal based on reasonable doubi on the guilt of the accused. proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for This is the situation contemplated in 4ule 111 of the 4ules of Court.

CIVIL ACTIONS BASED ON CRIME In Calalang . )ntermediate A##ellate Court, where a civil

damages against the alleged offender.

uch civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence.

action for damages based on the crime of murder was held as not e;tinguished by the dismissal of the criminal case by the 8iscal for failure of the complaint to establish a #rima facie case, the upreme Court reiterated the case of Peo#le u. Aele(, that the dismissal of the information or the criminal action ?upon motion of the fiscal@ does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal or e;tinction of the penal action does not carry with it the e;tinction of the civil action.

In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not e;empt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only

<pon the defendantBs motion, the court may re:uire the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. This is the situation contemplated in (rticle )+ of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is >for the same act or omission. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings. (lthough the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. K,+2' &3 A0H1, (* >o,e er, t"e %udgment in t"e criminal #roceeding cannot In a criminal action, our law recognizes two kinds of ac:uittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. be read in e idence in t"e ci il action to establis" an! fact t"ere determined, e en t"oug" bot" actions in ol e t"e same act or omission.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties.

3ifferent rules as to the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings also e;ist.

In a criminal action, the

tate must prove its case by

8irst is an ac:uittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of.

$"e reason for t"is rule is t"at t"e #arties are not t"e same and secondaril!, different rules of e idence are a##licable.

evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Therefore, the insufficiency of evidence to support a murder charge does not imply that there is no sufficient evidence to support the civil case based on the same alleged act.

This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.

Cence, notwithstanding herein petitionerBs ac:uittal, the Court of (ppeals in determining whether (rticle )+ applied, was not precluded from looking into the :uestion of petitionerBs negligence or reckless imprudence.

98

Illustrative Case= IN A PROSECUTION FOR ESTAFA OR SWINDLING THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF A COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT9 THE CIVIL IS DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY INSTANCES PRECLUDING THE AUTOMATIC INSTITUTION OF THE CIVIL ACTION TOGETHER WITH THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT @THE OFFENDED PARTY WAIVES THE CIVIL ACTION9 RESERVES THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY OR INSTITUTES THE CIVIL ACTION PRIOR TO THE CRIMINAL ACTIONA.
4espondentBs right to damages was deemed prosecuted in the criminal proceeding.

delict. In This was the teaching of/lcano in par. ?c@, . >ill, where it was e;pressly held that the e;tinction of the civil liability referred to ec. ) of 4ule 111 refers e;clusively to civil liability arising from crime6 whereas, the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi<delict only and not as a crime is not e;tinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. In other words, an ac:uittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not e;ist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on t"e crime. Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be prosecuted where the accused was ac:uitted on the ground that the accused (pplication of the rule was illustrated by /ustice 4elova in =arcia . Court of A##eals, as follows= >$therwise stated, unless the
act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non1e;istent in the final judgment, the e;tinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the e;tinction of the civil liability.

prosecution

for

estafa

or

swindling

through

falsification of a commercial document, the civil is deemed instituted with the criminal where the in the absence of any instances precluding the automatic institution of the civil action together with the criminal complaint ?the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action@.

4espondentBs right to damages was deemed prosecuted in the criminal proceeding.

Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be prosecuted where the accused was ac:uitted on the ground that the accused has not committed the crime Imputed to her.

has not committed the crime imputed to her.

Civil (ctions %ot .ased on Crime %ot D;tinguished

This refers to the Civil liability arising from the crime that was deemed instituted with the criminal.

COMPARE :
Ehere petitioner sought to enforce respondentBs obligation to make good the value of the checks in e;change for the cash he delivered to respondent such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the other ?under (rticle *1@ and its filing after the dismissal of the criminal case for estafa and maybe prosecuted without violating the rule against forum shopping, since they are based on different causes of action, e;pressly allowed by law.

(c:uittal in
Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self1defense, his ac:uittal by reason thereof will e;tinguish his civil liability. Ce has not incurred any criminal liability.

a criminal

action

bars

the

civil

arising

therefrom where the judgment of ac:uittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to him.

(s earlier ruled by the

$n the other hand, if his ac:uittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. Cis ac:uittal is not due to non1e;istence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently identified as the perpetrator.

upreme Court, the civil liability

that is deemed e;tinguished is the civil liability based on crime.

.ut not the civil liability based on sources of obligation other than the criminal offense although arising from the same act or omission.

The dismissal of the criminal case is not res %udicata even if the civil is alleged to arise from delict, since the nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action. Ehere the court states that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible, this declaration fits well into the e;ception of the rule which e;empts the accused from civil liability.

The second sentence of

ection *?b@ before under the

1+'& 4ules provides that in other cases, the person entitled to the action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.

W!( C,5,* A0 ,&+ I' E> ,+;1,'!"2

!ikewise, in Alborno( . Alborno(,
33

it was the ruling that >where

The rule of e;tinction was limited to civil actions based on cul#a criminal and does not include cul#a aquiliana or quasi<

the judgment in a criminal action contains an e;press declaration that the basis of claimantBs action did not e;ist, the latterBs action for civil liability is barred under ection l?d@, 4ule 1,7 of the 4ules of Court.>

99

The rule clearly contemplates the filing of a separate civil action. (rticle )+ of the Civil Code e;pressly provides that when the accused in a criminal prosecution is ac:uitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.

each other, and a favorable and unfavorable judgment in either case cannot be considered as a bar to the other.

=endo(a . Arrieta, will not find application.

This provision clearly provides for a separate civil action ( private prosecutor may intervene in the criminal action without waiving the right to file a separate civil action under (rticles *), **, *- and 21;C regardless of t"e result of t"e criminal action. for restitution, reparation and indemnity for the damages suffered by the offended party without reference to the source of the obligation but was held to refer to (rticle )+ of the Civil Code which provides that when the accused in a criminal prosecution is ac:uitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved $n the issue of whether or not an action for damages beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.

uch action re:uires only a preponderance of evidence.

The civil liability therefor under (rticles *),**, *- and )170 or those where the source of civil obligation is not based on the criminal offense is not affected by the result of the criminal action.

arising from a vehicular accident may plaintiff recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for damages based on :uasi1 delict, but not recover twice for the same act, the court wrote=

( quasi<delict or cul#a aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.

In other words, the e;tinction of the civil liability referred to in par. ?e@ of ection *, 4ule 111 ?1+0- 4ules@, refers e;clusively to civil liability founded on (rticle 1,, of the 4evised "enal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a :uasi1delict only and not as a crime is not e-tinguis"ed e en b! a declaration in t"e criminal case t"at t"e criminal act c"arged "as not "a##ened or "as not been committed b! t"e accused.

>Conse:uently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or ac:uitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both sides, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.>

( distinction e;ists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi<delict or cul#a contractual.

The same negligence causing damages may produce civil

D;tinction of "enal 3oes not D;tinguish Civil !iability

liability arising from a crime under the "enal Code, or create an action for quasi<delicto or cul#a e-tra<contractual under the Civil Code.

In =endo(a . Arrieta, it was held that where the ac:uittal .riefly stated, cul#a aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. was not based upon reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can no longer be instituted.

$"erefore, t"e acquittal or con iction in t"e criminal case is entirel! irrele ant in t"e ci il case. . 7ianila, that =endo(a . Arrieta
Dffect of 1+'' (mendment and The 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure

It results, therefore, that the ac:uittal of 4eginal Cill in the criminal case has not e;tinguished his liability for quasi<delict, hence that ac:uittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Criminal (ctions To 4ecover Civil !iability (rising 8rom 3elict and Civil (ctions .ased on Fuasi13elict may "roceed imultaneously

It was clarified in @ula for damages barred.>

was based on cul#a criminal for which reason >we held the suit

#iven the 1+'' amendments, where the accused is ince the cause of action of plaintiff1appellant is based on cul#a aquiliana and not cul#a criminal thus precluding the application of the e;ception in Thus, a civil action arising from the crime charged and a ec. *?c@ of 4ule 111 and the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal case that accused was ac:uitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in ac:uitted on the ground that his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt or that the obligation is purely civil without the court making a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party, what would be the effect of such judgment on the civil aspect of the case. Eill the foregoing rulings permitting the prosecution of a separate civil

civil action with the civil code provisions as the source of obligation may proceed simultaneously and independently of

100

action still applyO

SEC. 3. (hen Ci5il Action may 0roceed Independently

prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least e;pense to the parties litigant, would have the easily sustained if a not even consolidation, their thereby preventing unseeming, and perhaps

In >eirs of t"e .ate $eodoro @uaring the court wrote that

. Court of A##eals, The civil action which should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action is that arising from delict and not the civil action based on quasi<delict or cul#a aquiliana.

ec. )?b@, 4ule 111 of the 4ules of Criminal

"rocedure which provides that e;tinction of the penal action does not carry with it e;tinction of the civil, unless the e;tinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not e;ist> and that this rule contemplates a civil action arising from a crime and not a civil action arising from a quasi delict.

ludicrous, spectacle of two ?)@ judges appreciating, according to respective orientation, perception prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions.

"arenthetically, >physical injuries> under (rticle ** is used in a generic sense. ( civil case for replevin may proceed independently of the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion. consummated, frustrated and attempted Ehile both cases are based on the same facts, the :uantum of proof re:uired for holding the parties liable therein differ. C&+'&*,2( ,&+ &3 C#,$,+(* (+2 C,5,* C('"' !ibel 9 ( criminal case for libel and a separate and independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the libel may be consolidated for joint trial, where the two ?)@ cases involve common or identical :uestions of fact and law, and SEC. .. /ffect of 'eath on Ci5il Actions D"( ! &3 A001'"2 &+ A%%"(* The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall e;tinguish the civil liability arising from the delict.

The

court

underscored

the

statement

in

$a!ag

It

includes

Alcantara, that the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi delict only and not as a crime is not e;tinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed.

homicide and death arising from delict which includes reckless imprudence or quasi<delict.

8urther cited by the court to the same effect is @ula u. 7ianala.

In 0unag

. Court of A##eals, a separate action for

would even have the same witnesses6 and thus avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, and save unnecessary costs and e;penses, and simplify the work of the trial court.

3amages based on forcible abduction with rape was allowed despite prior dismissal of case by the 8iscal at the preliminary investigation stage.

/urisdiction of Court to "ass upon 2otion for 4econsid1 eration of $ffended "arty in Connection with Civil !iability 3espite (ppeal by (ccused

In fact =c?ee . )AC stressed the need for consolidation of criminal and civil actions to prevent conflicting decisions.

In $orri%os The final decision of guilt in criminal action is not relevant to civil action based on quasi<delict.

. Court of A##eals,B a case of estafa, where

despite the death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal, which thereby e;tinguished his criminal liability, the appeal was allowed to proceed with respect to the issue of civil liability of the accused ?arising from a contract of purchase and sale@.

If the court, independently of the appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the accused.

There is no legal impediment against such consolidation.

ection 1, 4ule *1 of the 4ules of Court which seeks to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse,

?The rule was not observed in Peo#le . Satorre, where the case for 2urder was dismissed in view of the death of the

101

appellant.@

e;tinguished by his death, but the civil liability remains. >1. 3eath of the accused pending appeal of his conviction e;tinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based thereon.

Cowever, in Peo#le u. Salcedo, where the accused in a murder case died during appeal, the case was dropped with respect to his criminal liability only.

The claim of the government for the civil liability survives but only if the offense can be proved.

The This was followed by Peo#le death of the accused, the . Senda!diego a case of malversation thru falsification, where it was held that despite the upreme Court can continue to e;ercise appellate jurisdiction over an accusedBs possible civil liability for the money claims of the claimants arising from criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case has been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, (rticle *, of the Civil Code.

upreme

Court

continues

to

e;ercise

appellate

(s opined by /ustice 4egalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability e- in senso strictiore.

jurisdiction over the petitionerBs possible civil liability for the money claims of the government arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, in much the same way as when no criminal action had been filed. %o separate civil action need be instituted. ). Thus, as every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not punishable by law, subse:uent decisions of the held that while the criminal liability of an upreme Court appellant is

Corollarily,

the

claim

for

civil

liability

survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

Ehen a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal pro1 ceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.@

(rticle 11&7 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission= a. b. c. d. *. !aw Contracts6 Fuasi1contracts6 ;; ;6 and Guasi<delicts.

e;tinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists.

The

upreme Court further stated that

endaydiegoBs

In such case, the heirs of the deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil liability.

appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.

Ehere the civil liability survives, as e;plained in %umber ) above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to amended. ection

ABANDOMENT Though the death of an accused1appellant during the pendency of an appeal e;tinguished his criminal liability, his civil liability survives. BASED ON CRIME

OF

S/-'A6'I/7,8

DEATH

OF

ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY

1, 4ule 111 of the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure as

Peo#le . 0a!otas, overruled Peo#le . Senda!diego, where D;tinction of criminal liability does not necessarily mean that the civil liability is also e;tinguished. it was held that despite the death of the accused during the pendency of the appeal, the proceedings shall continue for the purpose of determining his civil liability arising from the crime. In Peo#le . :a oa, and in Peo#le . Senda!diego, the The upreme Court en bane held in 0a!otas ?which is a -.

This separate civil action may be enforced either against the e;ecutorAadministrator or the estate of the accused depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as e;plained above.

upreme Court ruled that only the criminal liability ?including the fine, which is pecuniary, but not civil@ of the accused is

8inally, the private party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in

case of rape@ that=

102

cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its e;tinction, the private offended party instituted together with the civil action.

proposal was for the Court to continue in the same proceedings vith the other civil actions that were deemed impliedly instituted vith the criminal, despite the death of the accused. ince, however, he 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure limited the civil liability leemed instituted with the criminal action to the civil liability aris1ng from the offense, there is no more need for the proposal since with the death to the accused, the civil liability arising from the offense is also e;tinguished. The rule was, however, retained by the Court to apply to the separate civil actions under ection * of the same 4ule. This would, however, only apply if these actions are consolidated with the criminal. $therwise, since these are purely civil actions, the effects of death should be governed by the 4ules on Civil procedure.10

ection 7 limits a prejudicial :uestion to a 3#re iousl! instituted ci il action3 in order to minimize possible abuses by the subse:uent filing of a civil action as an afterthought for the purpose of suspending the criminal action.

In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of (rticle 11&& of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension prescription. on a possible deprivation of right by

a.

The rule on precedence of the criminal action does not apply when the civil action is a prejudicial :uestion. 1

b.

"rejudicial :uestion is an e;ception to precedence of criminal case.

Thus the

upreme Court applying this set of rules to the SEC. B. Jud2ment in Ci5il Action not a 9ar (ccording to jurisprudence, a prejudicial :uestion involves
C$22D%T= "rejudicial Fuestion, 3efined= Dlements of a "rejudicial Fuestion

case at bench held that the death of the appellant e;tinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained dismissed.> of, i.e., rape. Conse:uently, the appeal was

a similar issue in a civil action which was pending when the criminal action was instituted or before the amendment, in a civil action filed after the institution of the criminal action.

0a!otas was reiterated in Peo#le

. Rosali%os,ll where

during the pendency of the appeal convicting the accused of murder, the latter died, the court ordered the dismissal of the criminal liability of accused and ordered the substitution of his heirs as to the civil liability.

WHILE EVERY PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE IS ALSO CIVILLY LIABLE9 THE CONVERSE IS NOT TRUE. EXTINCTION OF THE PENAL DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF THE CIVIL UNLESS THE EXTINCTION PROCEEDS FROM A DECLARATION IN A FINAL JUDGMENT THAT THE FACT FROM WHICH THE CIVIL MIGHT ARISE DID NOT EXIST.
imilarly, a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from the civil liability is no bar to a criminal action unless the civil is a prejudicial :uestion which involves an issue similar or intimately

It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Cowever, in light of 0a!otas, the appeal was dismissed both as to the criminal and civil aspects thereof.

The ruling in 0a!otas and its progeny which re:uire the fil1 ing of a separate civil action arising from the same act or omission where the accused dies during the pendency of the action was criticized since these civil actions are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless reserved waived or a separate civil action was filed. COMMENT ON THE NEW RULE

related to the issue raised in the criminal, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The doctrine of prejudicial :uestion comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are SEC. ?. Suspension 4y Reason of 0re:udicial ;uestion pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely1related that an issue must be pre1emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the e;istence of a prejudicial :uestion in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.

SEC. 7.
The original proposal of the Committee was to modify 0a!otas. $he

/lements of 0re:udicial ;uestion

103

that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and Ehere the civil case is not based on a fact distinct and separate from the estafa, as both actions arose from the same fact or transaction, the former does not constitute ,a prejudicial :uestion, for the determination of the criminal action. CASES a. An Action for :ullit! of a 7eed of Sale 0ased on t"e @round t"at )t is a 'orger! and is S#urious is Pre%udicial to a Criminal Action for /stafa based on t"e /-ecution of said Sale b. $"e #endenc! of an intestate #roceeding ,ill not constitute a #re%udicial action in a criminal case for $"eft of standing cro#s filed b! a #erson claiming to "a e a alid contract of lease on t"e #ro#ert! from its legal o,ner against a #erson claiming co<o,ners"i# of t"e land leased ,"ose claim is #ending in an intestate #roceeding.3 spurious.

do not involve the pivotal :uestion of who planted the sugarcane and, therefore, are not determinative %uris et de %ure of guilt or innocence in the Criminal (ction.

If as the #uanteros contend, they were the ones who did the planting, that is a matter of defense that may be interposed by them in the Criminal (ction.

It is not an issue that must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before proceedings in the Criminal (ction may be undertaken.

Dven if the Intestate Court should annul the project of partition and uphold private respondentBs ownership of the lots herein, that would not be determinative of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the standing sugar crop, which petitioner claims he has planted in good faith by virtue of a valid contract of lease with the mortgagee.

8or a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issue raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. c.

d.

A ci il action for accounting and reco er! of sum of mone! are not determinati e of t"e innocence or guilt of #etitioner in t"e #rosecution for se ent!<fi e (;5) counts of estafa The issues in the civil case for accounting and recovery of sums of money are not determinative of the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the prosecution of the seventy1five ?7&@ counts of estafa.
N N N the only :uestion to be resolved in the criminal cases for estafa is whether or not the petitionerBs acts of receiving and collecting monies from the customers in payment for goods purchased, and failing to immediately account for and deliver the said collections having deposited them in his own personal bank accounts constitute estafa under (rticle *1&?l1b@ of the 4evised "enal Code. N N N a finding in the civil case for accounting and recovery of a sum of money is not %uris et de %ure determinative of the innocence of the petitioner in the subse:uent seventy1five ?7&@ criminal cases of estafa filed against him.

/%ectment+ Pendenc! of an e%ectment case does not constitute a #re%udicial question to t"e c"arge of t"e t"eft filed b! alleged lessee against a #erson claiming co<o,ner< s"i# rig"ts ,it" t"e lessor, for illegal "ar est of sugarcane on land leased.

Ehere the defense ?as defendant@ in the civil case of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case, the civil case constitutes a prejudicial :uestion.

"endency of action for damages based on illegal possession of property not a prejudicial :uestion to the charge of theft filed by the alleged lessee against the plaintiff in the damage suit.

If the first alleged sale is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged.

(s the two cases are based on the same facts, and the entitlement to damages being predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in the Criminal (ction, no necessity arises for that civil case to be determined ahead of the Criminal (ction. e. A ci il case for Annulment of 7eed of Sale not #re%udicial to Criminal Case for /stafa Arising from )ssuance of Rubber C"ec?.3

( conviction in the criminal case ?if it were allowed to proceed ahead@ would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action

tated differently, the issues raised in the civil cases

(t the time the acts complained of in C4 %o. 1-)*11 were committed, the deed of sale sought to be later

104

annulled in C5 %o. '70+ was binding upon the parties thereto, including the petitioners.

( Civil Case for the Collection of a um of 2oney (llegedly Dmbezzled is not a "rejudicial Fuestion to the Criminal (ction arising from the same (cts of Dmbezzlement

c.

(rticle ** manifests that as between the civil and criminal

cases arising from the same fraudulent act, the doctrine of the prejudicial :uestion cannot be invoked as both cases may proceed independently of each other, i.e., in the same way that the civil suit can be tried, so must the criminal prosecution run its course.

The two ?)@ essential elements for a prejudicial :uestion to e;ist are= ?a@ the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action6 and ?b@ the resolution of such issue in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (s correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in C4 %o. 1-)*11 is whether or not the petitioners could be found guilty under .atas "ambansa .ig. )) or under (rticle *1&, %o. )?d@ of the 4evised "enal Code.

Thus, as teller authorized to receive payments of electric bills from the electric cooperativeBs customers, #odofreda allegedly embezzled to her own use money collected from different consumers.

Ehen (ction for (nnulment of 2arriage "rejudicial to .igamy Case

Ehen she refused to pay the amount defrauded, the cooperative sued her for damages. !ater, at the instance of the cooperative, several informations for estafa were filed against her before the municipal court.

a.

( civil action involving the nullity of a second marriage is of prejudicial character and should be resolved before the criminal case for bigamy.

(fter pleading not guilty to the estafa charges, #odofreda moved to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground that the collection suit is a prejudicial :uestion.

!ikewise, a civil action involving title to property should first be decided before a criminal action for damages to said property.

CD!3=

The reason is that in said cases the procedure in a

a. %o prejudicial :uestion e;ists.

civil proceeding and not of the criminal case is more fitted to decide, as for e;ample, the issue of validity or nullity of the marriage.

2ore

specifically,

what

private

respondents
The issue in the civil action is the cooperativeBs right to recover from #odofreda the amount allegedly embezzled by the latter.

complained of in C4 %o. 1-)*11 is that the Checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to the drawee bank.

The issue in the criminal case is whether her failure to account for

.ut in all such cases the prejudicial civil :uestion refers to a dispute of purely civil character but connected in such manner to the crime on which the criminal case is based and is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

<ndeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitionersB obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist.

her collections as a teller constitutes estafa under (rticle *1& of the 4evised "enal Code.

( finding in the civil case for or against #odofreda is not %uris et de%ure determinative of her innocence or guilt in the estafa cases.

(nd because petitionersB checks were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are answerable under the law for the conse:uences of their said acts. B. MOREOVER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE EXPLICITLY STATES THAT IN CASE OF DEFAMATION9 FRAUD AND PHYSICAL INJURIES A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES9 ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION9 MAY BE BROUGHT BY THE INJURED PARTY.
uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall re:uire only a preponderance of evidence.

( civil action filed by the husband involving the nullity of a second marriage is of prejudicial character and should be resolved before the criminal case for bigamy.

(nd even if C5 %o. '70+ were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners1 accused in C4 %o. 1-)*11.

In such a case, the prejudicial civil :uestion refers to a dispute of purely civil character but connected in such manner to the crime on which the criminal case is based and is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

105

The

rule

does

not,

however,

apply

where

the

bigamy case pending decision on the validity of the two marriages. The Court held that the mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriage entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that >prejudicial :uestions> are automatically raised in civil actions to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial :uestion to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the accusedBs consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis for his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the second case is markedly different.

3omestic 4elations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with !eonilo, contracted in 1+7'.

complaint for annulment was filed by the wife. Thus=

>a@ The filing, while the bigamy case is pending, of a civil action by the woman in the second marriage for its annulment by reason offeree and intimidation upon her by the man, is not a bar or defense to the criminal action.

he alleged that she consented to entering into the marriage, since she had no previous knowledge that !eonilo was already married to 4osalinda.

3onato interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force was employed by "az to get !eoniloBs consent to the marriage.

The civil action does not decide that he entered the marriage against his will and consent, because the complaint therein does not allege that he was the victim of force and intimidation in the second marriage.

.efore the second marriage was solemnized, !eonilo and "az had lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of wedlock for at least five years, for which reason, the re:uisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to (rticle 70 of the %ew Civil Code.

It was he who used the force or intimidation and he may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.>

(t the time petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies have been contracted appeared to be indisputable. (nd it was the second spouse, not the accused who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation, ; ; ; (ssuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by the accused, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. "arties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity the marriage is so declared can be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage e;ists. Therefore, "e ,"o contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. d@ 7onato . .una !eonilo was charged with bigamy in

b.

o also is an annulment of marriage filed by the first wife not prejudicial to bigamy.

.efore the criminal case could be tried, !eonilo moved to suspend the proceedings on the ground that the annulment case raises a prejudicial :uestion, which must be determined before the criminal case can proceed.

c.

In .andic"o

. >on. Reloua, the first wife charged the

accused with .igamy for contracting a second marriage without first dissolving their marriage.

The second wife, likewise, filed an annulment of her marriage with the accused on the ground offeree, threats, accused character. and and intimidation because of allegedly its employed by allegedly bigamous

The trial court denied the motion to suspend the proceedings, citing .andic"o . Relo a.

The

upreme Court sustained the trial judge.

The issue before the 3omestic 4elations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of !eoniloBs guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.

(ccused filed a third party complaint against the first wife praying that his first marriage be declared null and void on the ground that his consent to the first marriage was obtained by means of threats, force, and intimidation, and moved for the suspension of the

the Court of 8irst Instance.

The information was based on the complaint of "az. .efore !eonilo could be arraigned, "az filed with the

106

8urthermore, it was "az, !eoniloBs second wife, who filed the complaint for annulment of the through deceit. econd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained

nullity of a previous marriage maybe invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.

second marriage is not #er se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

"ertinently, (rticle *-+ of the 4evised "enal Code o that in a case for concubinage, the accused need criminalizes >any person who shall contract a second or subse:uent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.> not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

!eonilo cannot apply the rule on prejudicial :uestion since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered a prejudicial :uestion to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that .eonilo&s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress in order to establish that his act in the subse:uent marriage was an involuntary one and as such, the same cannot be the basis for conviction.

The Court, however, hastened to add that even if his marriage is void from the beginning the subse:uent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense, citing .andic"o u. Relo a, cited in 7onate . .una,3 holding that >so long as there is no such declaration ?of nullity@ the presumption is that the marriage e;ists.

( plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes t"e mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during t"e subsistence of a alid marriage.

$bviously, !eonilo merely raised the issue of prejudicial :uestion to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. "rior to !eoniloBs second marriage, he had been living with "az as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy "ad alread! been consummated.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage his consent was assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subse:uent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subse:uent marriage, and a subse:uent )@ to criminal #rosecution for bigam! marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is ( declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the tateBs penal laws are concerned. The tateBs penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of (s a second or subse:uent marriage contracted during this special contract between spouses, and punish an individualBs deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. concerned.

Thus,

!eoniloBs

averments

that

obtained by "az through force and undue influence in entering a subse:uent marriage is belied by the fact that both he and "az e;ecuted an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was "az who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

(n (ction for declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity is not a prejudicial :uestion

the subsistence of petitionerBs valid marriage to 5illareyes, petitionerBs second marriage to (ncajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitionerBs psychological capacity or incapacity.

1@

to criminal #rosecution for concubinage

(lthough the judicial declaration of the nullity of a ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automaticall! void, the nullity of this marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the

<nder (rticle -, of the 8amily Code= >The absolute

107

inculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects.

complaint.

If at all, it should be the latter that should be suspended.

( pending civil case may, however, be considered to be in (mong these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. In proper cases, a pending administrative case may also be considered in the nature of a prejudicial :uestion to a civil There is therefore a recognition ,ritten into t"e la, itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal conse:uences. case. Thus, an administrative case between parties involving a parcel of land subject matter of an ejectment case is a prejudicial :uestion which would operate as a bar to said (mong these legal conse:uences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Thus, it has been held that the :uestion of ownership To hold otherwise would render the tateBs penal laws which is pending in a civil case a prejudicial :uestion justifying suspension of proceedings in the criminal case for violation of the (nti1 :uatting !aw.
$TCD4 C( D

( civil action instituted to resolve whether the designations of certain persons as sectoral representatives were in accordance with law constitutes a prejudicial :uestion is<a< is a criminal case for violation of the anti1graft law premised on the accusedBs partiality and evident bad faith in not paying the formerBs salaries and per diem as sectoral representatives.

the nature of a prejudicial :uestion to an administrative case.

There is no prejudicial :uestion where the outcome of the civil case is not in any way determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal cases. RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION SECTION 1. 0reliminary In5esti2ation 'efined8 (hen Required
8ormerly, the right to a preliminary investigation refers only to offenses cognizable by the 4egional Trial Court. In view, however, of the e;panded jurisdiction of the 2unicipal Trial Court under 4.(. %o. 70+1, jurisdiction over certain offenses which before falls under the e;clusive jurisdiction of the 4egional Trial Court were vested in the 2unicipal Trial Court and accordingly, under the former rule were no longer entitled to preliminary investigation. The present rule includes among offenses entitled to preliminary investigation those punishable by at least four (4) !ears, t,o (2) mont"s and one (1) da!, even if the same is cognizable by the 2unicipal Trial Court.

ejectment case.

on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the conse:uences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
There is no prejudicial :uestion where one case is administrative and the other is civil

(n action to cancel copyright is not prejudicial to criminal prosecution for infringement of copyright.

( civil action of replevin is not prejudicial to theft. It has been held that one thing is administrative. Ehere the issue before the Court of (ppeals is the authen1 Fuite another is the criminal liability. ticity of a motion to withdraw which at the same time is the object of a falsification charged pending in C8I, there is a prejudicial :uestion involved in the civil case which justifies the The determination of the administrative liability for suspension of the criminal case. falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. Pisalban u. $esoro, a criminal case for falsification of an affidavit presented in a cadastral case should not be suspended The dismissal of the administrative case does not to await termination of civil case. necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative

P1#%&'" &3 P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+ (s provided for in the foregoing section, the preliminary investigation should determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well1grounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. (nd if the evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information.
The "urposes of a "reliminary Investigation or a previous In:uiry of Mind are 9 ome

a.

for the investigating prosecutor to determine if a crime has been committed.

108

b.

to protect the accused from the inconvenience, e;pense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppres1 sive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, e;penses and an;iety of a public trial6 and to protect the state from having to conduct useless and e;pensive trials. S0&%" &3 P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+

granted@ is a >substantial one.> Its denial over his opposition is a >prejudicial error in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or property without due process of law.> Ehile that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and, hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right6 it is a substanti e right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably e;posed to prolonged an;iety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of e;pense6 the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitionerBs claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Ehile a preliminary investigation is not an occasion for a full and e;haustive display of the parties evidence, being merely an in:uiry to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, the right to such preliminary investigation is still an indispensable element of our criminal justice system that may not be treated lightly, let alone ignored. The right of the accused not to be brought to trial e;cept when remanded therefor as a result of a preliminary e;amination before a committing magistrate, has been held as a substantial one. Its denial over the objections of the accused is prejudicial error in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or property without due process of law. If it is not waived may amount to a denial of due process. (s stated in a case, the olicitor #eneralBs argument that the right to a preliminary investigation may be waived and was in fact waived by the petitioner, impliedly admits that the right e;ists. ince the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive its denial. If he demands it, the tate may not withhold it.

opportunity to submit countervailing evidence. "robable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. "reliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full e;ercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross1e;amine his accusers to establish his innocence. Thus, the lack of authentication of the document presented during the preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the investigation. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is >to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.> The Court have maintained a consistent policy of non1 interference in the determination by the $mbudsman of the e;istence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the e;ercise of its discretion. Ehile it may be true that the documents were unauthenticated, this is a matter of defense best passed upon after a full1blown trial. (s ruled in Debb . 7e .ean, 3t"e validity and the merits of a partyBs defense or accusation as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary investigation level.> E33"0 &3 A)'"+0" &3 P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+ (s the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to :uash the complaint or information, the proceedings upon such information in the andiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case should be remanded to the office of the $mbudsman for him or the pecial "rosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courtBs jurisdiction over the case, but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. %or do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective6 but, if there were no preliminary investigation and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, t"e court, instead of dismissing t"e information, s"ould conduct suc" in estigation, or order t"e fiscal to conduct it. 2oreover, the absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify petitionerBs release because such defect did not nullify the information and the warrant of arrest against him.

c.

d.

"reliminary investigation is merely in:uisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose e;cept that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. N( 1#" &3 R,;! & P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+

%either the 1+*& nor the 1+7* ?or 1+'7@ Constitution re:uires the holding of a preliminary investigation. It is a settled doctrine that the right thereto is of statutory character and may be invoked only when specifically created by statute. It is not a fundamental right and is not among the rights guaranteed to him in the .ill of 4ights. It may be waived e;pressly or by silence. (s stated in =arcos u. Cru(, >the preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution6 its origin is statutory and it e;ists and the right thereto can be invoked when so established and granted by law. It is so specifically granted by procedural law. If not waived the absence thereof may amount to a denial of due process. Thus, the right of accused ?to a preliminary investigation when

The purpose is, however, satisfied if the accused is given all the

109

C$2"(4D=

In Rolito @o . Court of A##eals, despite the fact that trial on the merits had began and the prosecution had already presented four witnesses, the trial was ordered suspended and the accused allowed to be released on bail pending the preliminary investigation. The right to bail was emphasized in $olentino . Camano, *r. R,;! M(4 )" W(,5"2 The right to a preliminary investigation may be waived by failure to invoke the right prior to or at least at the time of their plea. The rule was restated in Peo#le . =onte erde, where the upreme Court stated= "A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS MANDATORY AND A CERTIFICATION THAT SUCH INVESTIGATION WAS HELD IS REQUIRED9 STILL THIS RULE DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ISSUE IS RAISED ONLY AFTER CONVICTION.
(fter a plea of not guilty to the information, an accused is deemed to have foregone the right of preliminary investigation and to have abandoned the right to :uestion any irregularity that surrounds it.>

N& W(,5"# W!"+ P#&%"#*4 I+5&I"2 ( waiver, whether e;press or implied, must be made in clear and une:uivocal manner. 2ere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City "rosecutor cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation, where petitioner has been vigorously invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings before the City "rosecutor. The right is not waived even if the accused had filed an application for bail and arraigned over his objections and trial on the merits already began with four witnesses having testified where accused had from the beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted and forthwith brought the case on certiorari to the upreme Court. P#"'1$% ,&+ &3 R";1*(#, 4 The accused who alleges lack of preliminary investigation must prove such allegation convincingly. Ehen it does not appear from the record that a preliminary investigation was not granted, it must be presumed that the proceedings in the trial court were in accordance with law. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court will presume that the fiscal or officer who conducted the re:uisite investigation did so in accordance with law. E33"0 &3 L(0I &3 C"# ,3,0( ,&+ !ack of certification by the fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted does not vitiate the information, as a preliminary investigation is not an essential part of the information. The absence of a certification is waived by the failure to allege it before the plea.
Cases on 4ight to a %ew "reliminary Investigation Ehere (llegation on Complaint Is (mended

4epublic (ct %o. &1',, approved eptember ', 1+07, as invoked by them anew from respondent court, i(., the submittal of the testimonies in affidavit form of the complainant and his witnesses duly sworn to before the investigating fiscal, and the right of accused, through counsel, to cross1e;amine them and to adduce evidence in their defense. In line with the settled doctrine as restated in Peo#le . Abe%uela, respondent court shall hold in abeyance all proceedings in the case before it until after the outcome of such new preliminary investigation.

In Peo#le . .ambino, !ambino, before commencement of trial, demanded his right to preliminary investigation. Cis motion for preliminary investigation was denied by the trial court which, in due course of time, convicted !ambino. $n appeal, the upreme Couri held that the trial court did not err in denying !ambinoBs motion for preliminary investigation because said motion was filed after he had entered a plea of not guilty and because he took no steps to bring the matter to a higher court to stop the trial of the case. The right to a preliminary investigation shall be deemed waived for failure to invoke it during arraignment in Peo#le u. Aalencia Peo#le . >ubilo, Peo#le . 7e Asis, or by failing to go to (ppellate Court on certiorari to :uestion denial. The right to a preliminary investigation may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Consenting to be arraigned and entering a plea of not guilty without invoking the right to preliminary investigation is a waiver. It should be invoked prior to or at least, at the time of the plea. It is also deemed waived by going to trial without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of preliminary investigation. It may be waived e;pressly or by silence.

The need to conduct a new preliminary investigation when the defendant demands it and the allegations of the complaint have been amended, has been more than once affirmed by the upreme Court=
>?a@ ;;;, the Court finds that since the information for alleged violation of the (nti1#raft !aw was filed without any previous notice to petitioners and due preliminary investigation thereof, and despite the dismissal of the original charge for falsification as being without any factual or legal basis,B #etitioners are entitled to a ne, #reliminar! in estigation for t"e graft c"arge, with all the rights to which they are entitled under section 1 of

110

OTHER CASES ON WHETHER OR NOT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NEEDED a.

ANOTHER

c.

If after preliminary investigation, a case is filed in the Court of 8irst Instance which was dismissed, the 8iscal cannot file another information charging a different offense based on the same preliminary investigation. Ce must conduct another preliminary investigation. The principle does not apply where the original information was not dismissed.

Ehere the amendment to an information is not substantial, there is no need of another preliminary investigation. )n Almeda . Aillalu(, the amendment as to habitual delin:uency was not considered substantial.

d.

( new preliminary investigation is not called for where the court orders the filing of correct information involving a cognate offense, such as unfair competition to infringement of trademarks.> Ehere only a formal amendment was involved 9 such as frustrated murder to consummated murder where death of the victim supervened a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. If the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an in:uiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an in:uiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary. In @as#ar . Sandiganba!an, the upreme Court pointed out that there is no rule or law re:uiring the Tanodbayan to conduct another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it. It is a fundamental principle that ,"en on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment. (nother preliminary investigation must be undertaken and thereafter, based on the evidence adduced, a new information should be filed. E>0"% ,&+ & R,;! &3 P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+

( motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had ac:uired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. %either the ecretary of /ustice, the tate "rosecutor, nor the 8iscal may interfere with the /udgeBs disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that. The private complainant cannot move for reinvestigation. .ut he can appeal to the 3$/ or the $mbudsman as the case maybe. C(1 ,&+ )4 C&1# ,+ G#(+ ,+; R",+5"' ,;( ,&+ Courts are, however, called upon to e;ercise great restraint in granting any reinvestigation with the conse:uent delay involved, since the weighing and evaluation of such evidence in defense of the accused against the tateBs evidence is best left to its judgment and its verdict rather than to that of the prosecution. To ferret out the truth, trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation. It cannot be denied that in the search for truth, a trial has distinct merits over a reinvestigation. ( preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, unlike a trial, is summary in nature. The direct e;amination of witnesses is substituted by the complainantBs sworn statement and that of his witnesses, and by the counter1affidavit of the respondent and his witnesses. Ehile the respondent may be present at the investigation, he has no right to cross1e;amine the witnesses against him. To ferret out the truth, therefore, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation. 4ather than delay the trial of private respondents waiting for the conduct and outcome of a reinvestigation, it is best that respondent /udge set the case for immediate trial (s a general rule, the practice of holding in abeyance a criminal case already filed for reinvestigation of a case filed by the fiscal upon the accusedBs motion to present evidence or newly discovered evidence should be discouraged because it generates the impression that the accused would be able to fi; his case or that it would be easier for him to manipulate and maneuver its dismissal in the fiscalBs office.

b.

In 0andiala u. Court of 'irst )nstance of =isamis 9ccidental, where the preliminary investigation was for robbery in band ?with one of the two accused waiving the second stage@, the Court held that the provincial fiscal could not file against the accused an information for the graver crime of robbery with kidnapping, without giving the accused >ample opportunity at full<blo,n #reliminar! in estigation to demonstrate that what the fiscal regards as BkidnappingN in the legal sense was merely an incident of, and is therefore absorbed in the crime of robbery.> The Court noted once again that >?(@ preliminary investigation, it must be borne in mind, is a practical device created by statute and by mandate of our 4ules of Court, principally for the purpose of preventing hasty, malicious and ill1advised prosecution,> and pointedly emphasized that >?T@he 4ules of Court on the matter of preliminary investigation, construed in their intregrated entirety, direct that, in the circumstances here obtaining, the 8iscal, if he believes that he should raise the category of the offense, must conduct a preliminary investigation anew as to the entire charge. 8undamental principles of fair play dictate this course of action. The 8iscal is not allowed by the 4ules of Court to wait in ambush6 the role of a 8iscal is not mainly to prosecute, but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the courts in dispensing that justice.> ( new preliminary investigation is not, however, necessary after the amendment of the information, where there has been no change in the nature of the crime charged which is rebellion, and moreover, petitioner, who was already in custody when the amended information was filed, should have asked, but did not, for a re1investigation of said case within the period of five days from the time he learned of the amended information.

e.

f.

g.

h.

/-ce#tion There is no right of preliminary investigation under ection 7, 4ule 11) when a person is la,full! arrested unless there is waiver of the provisions of (rticle 1)& of the 4evised "enal Code. There is no waiver of the right to a preliminary investigation despite trial and presentation of four ?-@ witnesses over the objection of the accused. There is a right to preliminary investigation where warrantless arrest is not lawful.
2otion for 4einvestigation (ddressed to Trial /udge

111

S/C. . O33,0"#' A1 !&#,J"2 & C&+210 P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+' <nder the ..". .ig. 1)+ 9
DC. *7. Preliminar! )n estigation. /udges of 2etropolitan Trial Courts, e;cept those in the %ational Capital 4egion, of 2unicipal Trial Courts, and 2unicipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by the 4egional Trial Courts.

The C$2D!DC may, however, deputize other prosecuting arms of government to conduct the investigation and prosecute the offense in Court b. The 1+'7 Constitution mandates the C$2D!DC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws This means that the C$2D!DC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving, election offenses for the purpose of helping the /udge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is e;clusive with C$2D!DC , whether it involves a private individual or public officer or employee, and in the later instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the offender that matters. (s long as the offense is an election offense, jurisdiction over the same rests e;clusively with the C$2D!DC in view of its all1embracing power over the conduct of elections. Cence, the "rovincial "rosecutor, as such assumes no role ii the prosecution of election offenses. If the 8iscal or "rosecutor file6 an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the C$2D!DC. Ce does not do so under the sole authority of his office.
"reliminary Investigation of $mbudsman andiganbayan CaseP a. $ffice of the

$mbudsman is plenary and un:ualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the andiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause >any illegal act or omission of any public official> is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by 4.(. %o. 077, to cases cognizable by the andiganbayan, particularly in ection 1&?1@ giving the $mbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan, and ection 11?-@ granting the pecial "rosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the $mbudsman to such cases. ection 1& of 4.(. %o. 077, gives the $mbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the $mbudsman >to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.> The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the e;clusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The e;ercise by the $mbudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the legislature to the $mbudsman are very kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and by public officers and employees during powers granted by the broad and encompass all non1feasance committed their tenure of office.

The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in ection 1, paragraphs ?a@, ?b@, ?c@, and ?d@ of "residential 3ecree %o. +116 Pro ided, "o,e er. That he shall forward the records of the case if after the preliminary investigation the /udge finds a #rima facie he shall forward the records of the case to the "rovincialACity 8iscal for the filing of the corresponding information with the proper court. %o warrant of arrest shall be issued by the /udge in connection with any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation, unless after an e;amination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complaint and his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause e;ists. (ny warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served anywhere in the "hilippines. The upreme Court has e;panded the offenses offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four ?-@ years, two ?)@ months and one ?1@ day without regard to the fine even if it is cognizable by municipal trial courts. The provisions of".3. %o. +11 had been incorporated in *. ection

(.2. %o. ,&1'1)01 C ?Dffective $ctober *, ),,&@ removed the authority of first level judges to conduct preliminary investigations. <pon effectivity of the amendments, first level courts shall no longer accept new cases for preliminary investigation, which fall under the e;clusive jurisdiction of other levels.
$ther "ersons (uthorized to Conduct "reliminary Investigation

The $mbudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular court as well. The authority of the $mbudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in ection 1& and ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 077,. ection 1& vests the $mbudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when sue act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

"ower to Investigate, to file and to prosecute, distinguished

( distinction should be made between the power to investigate, to file and to prosecute ombudsman cases. ( prosecutor has a shared authority to investigate and prosecute ombudsman cases not cognizable by the andiganbayan.

a.

The C$2D!DC is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses punishable under the $mnibus Dlection Code and to prosecute offenses in court.

112

Eith respect to cases cognizable by the andiganbayan, the ombudsman has primary authority to investigate and e;clusive authority to file and prosecute andiganbayan cases ection &, 4ule II of (dministrative %o. ' of the $ffice of the $mbudsman provides that= >Cases falling under the jurisdiction of the $ffice of the $mbudsman which are. cognizable by municipal trial courts, including those subject to the 4ule on ummary "rocedure may only be filed in court by Information approved by the $mbudsman, or the proper 3eputy $mbudsman in all other cases.> <nder 4epublic (ct %o. 077,, the power to investigate and prosecute cases which are cognizable by the andiganbayan is now lodged with the $mbudsman. This includes $mbudsman cases which are cognizable by regular courts.
The $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor ?The Tanodbayan@

jurisdiction in accordance with section ll?-c@ of 4.(. %o. 077,, i(., >to perform such other duties assigned to it by the $mbudsman.> c. Ehile the $mbudsmanBs investigatory and prose1cutory power is plenary and un:ualified, the authority of the pecial "rosecutor is limited. Ehile the $mbudsdman may delegate his investigatory function, including the power to conduct administrative investigation, to the pecial "rosecutor, the latter has no power to preventively suspend which is only granted to the $mbudsman and the 3eputy $mbudsman. If the $mbudsman delegates his authority to conduct administrative investigation to the pecial "rosecutor and the latter finds that preventive suspension is warranted, the pecial "rosecutor may recommend to the ombudsman to place the said public officer or employee under preventive suspension.> c11 2oreover, unless authorizing by the $mbudsman the special prosecutor is not authorized to file an information. (ll that was delegated to the special prosecutor by $ffice $rder %o. -,1,& was the discretional authority to review and modify the deputy ombudsman1authorized information, but even this is subject to the condition that such modification must be >without departing from, or varying in any way, the contents of the basic resolution, order or decision.> The doctrine was made operative to cases filed upon the finality of the decision. d. 7eloso . 7omingo upheld the primary and concurrent jurisdiction of $mbudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under section 1&?i@ of 4.(. %o. 077, to all kinds of malfeasance by any officer or employee during his tenure of office. P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+ B4 O$)12'$(+ ection 1' of 4.(. %o. 077, allows the $ffice of the $mbudsman to promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective e;ercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties. The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the 4ules of Court are made suppletory. (ccordingly, the $ffice of the $mbudsman promulgated (dministrative $rder %o. ,7 known as the 4<!D $8 "4$CD3<4D $8 TCD $88ICD $8 TCD $2.<3 2(% (A##endi- F)

and (dministrative $rder %o. ,' C!(4I8KI%# (%3 2$3I8KI%# CD4T(I% 4<!D $8 "4$CD3<4D $8 TCD $2.<3 2(% The order clarified that= >The preliminary investigation of an $mbudsman case does not have to be conducted strictly in accordance with ection *, 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court. aid rule shall be applied as modified by 4ule II of (dministrative $rder %o. ,7 of the $ffice of the $mbudsman. "articular attention is directed to the provisions thereof of which are not e;actly in conformity with ection *, 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court, such as, those on the= ?1@ issuance of an order in lieu of subpoena for the filing of counter1affidavits6 ?)@ prohibition against a motion to dismiss, motion for a bill of particulars, and second motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation6 ?*@ manner of conducting clarificatory :uestioning6 and the ?-@ form of affidavits and counter1affidavits. It is to be understood, however, that the preliminary investigation $mbudsman case in accordance with 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court is perfectly valid. The changes in such procedure effected by (dministrative $rder %o. ,7 are designed merely to e;pedite the process of preliminary investigation and to conform with the provisions of 4epublic (ct %o. 077,. The officer who review a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review.
"rimary /urisdiction 4efers To Cases in 4elation To "ublic $ffice of (ccused

(s a new $ffice of the $mbudsman was established, the then e;isting Tanodbayan became the $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor which continued to function and e;ercise its powers provided by law, e;cept those conferred on the $ffice of the $mbudsman created under the 1+'7 Constitution.
3istinction between $ffice of the $mbudsman and $ffice of the "rosecutor pecial

a.

The jurisdiction of the office of the $mbudsman should not be e:uated with the limited authority of the pecial prosecutor under ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 077, which was established after the creation of the $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor. The office of the special prosecutor is merely a component of the $ffice of the $mbudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the $mbudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan.

The primary jurisdiction, refers to cases in relation to public office of accused Gand punishable for more than si; years or a fine of "0,,,,.,,.H The $mbudsmanBs primary power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the andiganbayan. Thus, the public prosecutor may conduct preliminary investigation of 2ayorBs criminal acts not in relation to his public office. 8or $mbudsmanBs authority to overrule investigatory prosecutor, see Cru( . Peo#le, and ec. 4, Rule 112.

b.

$"e 9ffice of t"e S#ecial Prosecutor ?the Tanod .ayan@, was made an organic component of the $ffice of the $mbudsman, who under the supervision and control and upon authority of the $mbudsman may conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. $r to prosecute cases outside the andi1ganbayanBs

113

(ny officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation who is investigating an offense or felony committed by public officer must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the office of the $mbudsman who may either= ?a@ take over the investigation of the case pursuant to ection 1&?1@ of 4.(. %o. 077, or ?b@ deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to section *1 thereof. In light of the broad powers conferred by law on the $mbudsman and the pecial "rosecutor, it is completely inconse:uential that the complaint by which a criminal case was instituted charging a crime cognizable by the andiganbayan 9 might have been originally filed with the Iloilo "rosecution $ffice, or the preliminary investigation therein conducted.
"ower Includes all Criminal Cases Involving "ublic $fficers and Dmployees

It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan and, in the e;ercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of #overnment, the investigation of such cases ection 11 grants the $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor, an organic component of the $ffice of the $mbudsman... the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. It states= 3Sec. 11. tructural $rganization. 9 --- -------

2oreover, the jurisdiction of the $ffice of the $mbudsman should not be e:uated with the limited authority of the pecial "rosecutor under ection 11 of 4.(. %o. 077, GwhoseH power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases ,it"in t"e %urisdiction of t"e Sandiganba!an. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the $mbudsman to these types of cases. The $mbudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government....
The "residential Commission on #ood #overnment ?"C##@

?-@ The $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the $mbudsman, have the following powers= (a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan6

"rosecution for 5iolations of 4(. %o. *,1+ ?(nti1#raft !aw@ and 4(. %o. 1*7+ ?<ne;plained Eealth@ <nder D;ecutive $rder %o. 1-, signed by "resident (:uino on 2ay 7,1+'0. The "residential Commission on #ood #overnment with the assistance of the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral and other government agencies, were empowered to file and #rosecute all cases in estigated b! it under D;ecutive $rder %o. 1, dated 8ebruary )', 1+'0 and D;ecutive $rder %o. ), dated 2arch 1), 1+'0, as ma! be ,arranted b! its findings. The "residential Commission on #ood #overnment s"all file all suc" cases, whether civil or criminal, ,it" t"e Sandiganba!an, ,"ic" s"all "a e e-clusi e and original %urisdiction t"ereof. <pon the other hand, civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for conse:uential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under 4epublic (ct %o. 1*7+, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other e;isting laws, in connection with D;ecutive $rder %o. ), dated 2arch 1), 1+'0, may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence. 8rom the foregoing provisions of law, particularly ections )?b@ and *?a@ of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1 and ections 1 and ) of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1-, the "C## has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill1gotten wealth cases of the former "resident, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the "resident to the "C## to be filed with the andiganbayan. The authority to investigate e;tended to the "C## includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. The ruling was further clarified in Cru(, *r. . Sandiganba!an+

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the $mbudsman is plenary and un:ualified. It pertains to an! act or omission of an! #ublic officer or em#lo!ee ,"en suc" act or omission a##ears to be illegal, un%ust, im#ro#er or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the andiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause >any illegal act or omission of any public official> is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. The reference made by 4.(. %o. 077, to cases cognizable by the andiganbayan, particularly in ection 1&?1@ giving the $mbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan, and ection 11?-@ granting the pecial "rosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the $mbudsman to such cases. ection 1& of 4.(. %o. 077, gives the $mbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the andiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the $mbudsman >to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.> The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the e;clusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.

In its 4esolution $n 2arch ),, ),,1 The Court in @eorge 4! Sandiganbayan, ,"ic" ,as reiterated in $ffice of the $mbudsman v. .reua, categoricall! stated t"at+ >the $mbudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.> Dlaborating on its n ruling nullifying its earlier decision, writes= THE AUTHORITY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE OFFENSES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IS FOUNDED IN SECTION 1B AND SECTION 11 OF R.A. NO. ?778. SECTION 1B VESTS THE OMBUDSMAN WITH THE POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE9 OFFICE OR AGENCY9 WHEN SUCH ACT OR OMISSION APPEARS TO BE ILLEGAL9 UNJUST9 IMPROPER OR INEFFICIENT9 THUSC
> ec. 1&. Po,ers, 'unctions and 7uties. The $ffice of the $mbudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties= ?1@ )n estigate and #rosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, an! act or omission of an! #ublic officer or em#lo!ee, office or agenc!, ,"en suc" act or omission a##ears to be illegal, un%ust, im#ro#er or inefficient.

114

THE COURT THEN HELD THAT SECTIONS 2@AA AND 39 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 19 IN RELATION WITH SECTIONS 19 2 AND 3 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1.9 SHOWS THAT WHAT THE AUTHORITY OF THE RESPONDENT PCGG TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE COVERS AREC
a. The investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill1gotten wealth under 4epublic (ct %o. 1*7+, accu1 mulated by former "resident 2arcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the "hilippines or abroad, including the takeover or se:uestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office andAor using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationship6 and b. The investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the ac:uisition of said ill1gotten wealth as contemplated under ection )?a@ of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1. Cowever, other violations of the (nti1#raft and Corrupt "ractices (ct not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, re:uire a previous authority of the "resident for the "C## to investigate and prosecute the same in accordance with ection )?b@ of D;ecutive $rder %o. 1. $therwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the $mbudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief tate "rosecutor and his assistants, and the state prosecutors. c. The "C## would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under 4ep. (ct %os. *,1+ and 1*7+. The "C## may, however, investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the (8" for violations of4.(. %os. *,1+ and 1*7+ only in relation to D.$. %os. 1, ), 1-, and 1-1a, i.e., insofar as they involve the recovery of ill1gotten wealth of former "resident 2arcos and his family and his cronies. d. The appropriate prosecutory agencies that may investigate and file the petition under 4.(. %o. 1*7+ and file the petition for forfeiture of une;plained wealth against a private citizen are the provincial prosecutor and the olicitor #eneral 8or violation of 4.(. %o. *,1+ and 1*7+ of those who are still in office the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the office of the $mbudsman. <nder "residential 3ecree %o 10,0, as amended and .atas "ambansa .ig. 1+&, violation of 4ep. (ct %os. *,1+ and 1*7+ shall be tried by the andiganbayan. It is a civil procreedings in rem but criminal in nature

une;plained wealth amassed after )& 8ebruary 1+'0 and the prosecution of the parties involved. (fter reviewing the legislative history of the andiganbayan and the $ffice of the $mbudsman, the Court declared that "UNDER R.A. NO. -2./9 THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS VESTED WITH EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ALL CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF R.A. NO. 381/9 R.A. NO. 137/9 AND CHAPTER II9 SEC. 29 TITLE VII9 BOOK II OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE9 WHERE ONE OR MORE OF THE ACCUSED ARE OFFICIALS OCCUPYING THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS WHETHER IN A PERMANENT9 ACTING OR INTERIM CAPACITY9 AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSEC
?1@ $fficials of the e;ecutive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as #rade B)7B and higher, of the Compensation and "osition Classification (ct of +'+ ?4.(. %o. 07&'@, spe1 cifically including= ?a@ "rovincial governors, vice1governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads6 ?b@ City mayor, vice1mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads6 $fficials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher6 P"ili##ine arm! and air force colonels, na al ca#tains, and all officers of "ig"er ran?8 $fficers of the "hilippine %ational "olice while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher6 City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the $ffice of the $mbudsman and special prosecutor6 "residents, directors or trustees, or managers of government1owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions

the Court will not interfere nor pass upon the findings of the $mbudsman to avoid its being hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the $ffice of the $mbudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, and that it will not review the e;ercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. The court, however, stressed that while it is the $mbudsman who has full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the andiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the andiganbayan, and no longer the $mbudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed without the approval of said court.
%o Injunction (gainst $mbudsman to 3elay Investigation

<nder ection 1- of 4epublic (ct %o. 077,= %o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the $mbudsman under this act, unless there is a #rima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the office of the $mbudsman. 2oreover, no court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the $mbudsman e;cept the upreme Court, on pure :uestion of law. R"$"24 The remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the office of the $mbudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non1 administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with the upreme Court and not with the Court of (ppeals. J1#,'2,0 ,&+ &5"# $&+"4=*(1+2"#,+; 0('"' The (nti money1laundering law provides for two kinds of cases which are independent of each other. The criminal action for anti1money1laundering offense and the civil forfeiture proceedings which may be filed separately and proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. (. T!" C#,$,+(* A0 ,&+ 4epublic (ct %o. +10, as amended ?The (nti12oney !aundering (ct of ),,1@ 3efines 9

?c@ ?d@ ?e@

?f@ ?g@

e.

The "C## may, however, also investigate and prosecute graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the "resident to the "C## to be filed with the andiganbayan. N&+=,+ "#3"#"+0" 6, ! O$)12'$(+ The Court recognizing the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the office of the $mbudsman and for reasons of practicality, declared in an en bane resolution dated (ugust *,, 1++*, issued in 9cam#o u. 9mbudsman, that

The law underwent several changes. <nder 4.(. %o. 077, the $mbudsman was granted the authority to investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill1gotten andAor

115

=one! .aundering 9ffense. 2oney laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following= 1@ (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property. (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph ?a@ above. (ny person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is re:uired under this (ct to be disclosed and filed with the (nti12oney !aundering Council ?(2!C@, fails to do so.

The 4ule shall govern all proceedings for civil forfeiture, asset preservation and freezing of monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense under 4epublic (ct %o. +10,, as amended. The 4evised 4ules of Court shall apply suppletorily when not inconsistent with the provisions of this special 4ule. II of the 4ule provided only for Civil 8orfeiture in the 4egional Trial Court. Thus 9
TIT!D

other remedial proceedings through the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral with the 4egional Trial Court. There is no similar authority to file such cases with the andiganbayan. It is only in criminal cases that the (2!C is authorized to cause the filing of complaints with the 3epartment of /ustice or the $mbudsman for the prosecution of money laundering offenses. .ut unlike Civil 8orfeiture under 4.(. %o. 1*7+ which specifically authorized its filing by the $mbudsman or thru the $ffice of pecial "rosecutor in the andiganbayan. %o similar authority have been granted the $mbudsman with respect to civil forfeiture under the (nti1money !aundering !aw. SEC. 3. 0rocedure
C$22D%T= 1. (mendment in paragraph ?a@ re:uires that the complaint should be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting papers relied upon by him ?the complainant@ to establish probable cause. ( significant amendment is the )nd paragraph of par. ?b@ regarding respondentBs right to e;amine all other evidence submitted by the complainant of which he may not have been furnished and to obtain copies thereof at his e;pense. If such records are voluminous the complainant may be re:uired to specify and identify those which he intends to present against the respondent to support the charge against the latter and these shall be made available for e;amination, copying or photographing by respondent at his e;pense. The amendment was brought about because of the case of Commissioner of )nternal Re enue . Court ofA##eals, where among the issues raised is the failure of the complainant to produce the documents in support of the complaint. 8or obvious reasons, objects as evidence need not be furnished either party but shall be made accessible for e;amination, copying or photocopying by the complainant or respondent at the e;pense of the re:uesting party. ). The amendment in paragraph ?c@ prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss. This is a significant amendment. It abrogates the ruling in Commissioner of )nternal Re enue . Court of A##eals, where the court castigated the investigator for proceeding without first acting on respondentsB motion to dismiss. ince a

)@

). Part! to institute #roceedings. The 4epublic of the "hilippines, through the (nti12oney !aundering Council, represented by the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral, may institute actions for civil forfeiture and all other remedial proceedings in favor of the tate of any monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense.
DC. *. Aenue of cases cogni(able b! t"e regional trial court. 9 ( petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located6

DC.

*@

).

J1#,'2,0 ,&+ &3 M&+"4 L(1+2"#,+; C('"' The regional trial courts shall have jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by public officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the andiganbayan. The foregoing section apparently refers to the criminal offense of anti1money laundering as defined in section - of the law.

Pro ided, "o,e er. That where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located outside the "hilippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in 2anila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner.

The 4ule does not provide for civil forfeiture before the andiganbayan. The law created an (nti12oney !aundering Council ?(2!C@. 9 tasked with implementing the law, was empowered= ?*@ to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and all other remedial proceedings through the $ffice of the olicitor #eneral6 ?-@ to cause the filing of complaints with the 3epartment of /ustice or the $mbudsman for the prosecution of money laundering offenses6 ?&@ to initiate investigations of covered transactions, money laundering activities and other violations of this (ct. 2. C,5,* (+2 C#,$,+(* F&#3", 1#" D,' ,+;1,'!"2 It is to be noted that under the (nti12oney !aundering (ct, so far as Civil 8orfeiture is concerned it is the (2!C that is authorized to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and all

0.

T!" C,5,* F&#3", 1#" P#&0""2,+;' The law provided that in petitions for civil forfeiture the 4evised 4ules of Court shall apply. In conse:uence thereof, the upreme Court issued the 4<!D $8 "4$CD3<4D I% C( D $8 CI5I! 8$48DIT<4D, ( DT "4D D45(TI$%, (%3 84DDII%# $8 2$%DT(4K I% T4<2D%T, "4$"D4TK, $4 "4$CDD3 4D"4D D%TI%#, I%5$!5I%#, $4 4D!(TI%# T$ (% <%!(E8<! (CTI5ITK $4 2$%DK !(<%3D4I%# $88D% D <%3D4 4D"<.!IC (CT %$. +10,, ( (2D%3D3 The 4ule e;pressly provided that 9

116

motion to dismiss is now a prohibited pleading, the investigator may properly ignore such a motion. The amendments re:uire the respondent to submit counter1affidavits and other supporting documents relied upon by him for his defense. *. The amendment in sub1par, ?d@ re:uires the prosecutor to resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter1affidavitGsH within the ten ?1,1day period. In sub1par, ?e@, the clarificatory hearing shall only be limited to facts and issues which the investigating officer believes need to be clarified. The clarificatory hearing shall be held within ten ?1,@ days from submission of the counter1affidavit and other documents, or from e;piration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five ?&@ days. &. The investigation shall then be deemed concluded and the investigating officer shall, within ten ?1,@ days, determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial upon the evidence adduced.

innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, e;pense and an;iety of a public trial, and to protect the state from useless and e;pensive trials. The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.> Cowever, in order to satisfy the due process clause, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. ( preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the tate. 2ore important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a #rima facie case or that no probable cause e;ists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. (lthough there is no general formula or fi;ed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its e;istence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the prosecutor ?judge@ conducting the e;amination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the prosecutor ?judge@ nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons. uch a preliminary investigation must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in ection *, 4ule 11) of The 4evised 4ules on Criminal "rocedure. This procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due process. c. The "roceedings are Considered as /udicial in %ature Thus, the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which is defined as >an in:uiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well1founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,> is, like court proceedings, subject to the d.

re:uirements process.

of both

substantive

and procedural due

This is because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a :uasi1 judicial officer, but only to the e;tent that, like :uasi1judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the e;ecutive department e;ercising powers akin to those of a court. 3$/ is not a :uasi1judicial agency6 "reliminary Investigation is not a :uasi1judicial proceeding reviewable under 4ule -* The Court, however, clarified that= ( preliminary investigation is not a :uasi1judicial proceeding, and the 3$/ is not a :uasi1judicial agency e;ercising a :uasi1judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. The Court pointedto its ruling in 0autista u. Court of A##eals, holding that a preliminary investigation is not a :uasi1judicial proceeding, thus=
GtHhe prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Ce does not e;ercise adjudication nor rule1making functions. "reliminary investigation is merely in:uisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose e;cept that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. Ehile the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a :uasi1court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

-.

P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+ : C&+0"% a. ( preliminary investigation is merely in:uisitorial, but it is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions acts as a :uasi1judicial officer. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is the initial step towards the criminal prosecution of a person. (fter such preliminary investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is sufficient ground to engender a well1founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial, then the corresponding complaint or information shall be filed in the competent court. It is the filing of said complaint or information that initiates the criminal prosecution of the accused when he is brought to court for trial. b. Importance of "reliminary Investigation The upreme Court stressed the importance of a preliminary investigation or how the same should be conducted in order for it to conform with the essential re:uisites of due process and reiterated its ruling in the cases of Salonga . Pano, et al., and @eronimo . Ramos, that= >The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the

Though some cases describe the public prosecutorBs power to conduct a preliminary investigation as :uasi1judicial in nature, this is true only to the e;tent that, like :uasi1judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the e;ecutive department e;ercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. ( :uasi1judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule1 making. ( :uasi1judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such

117

that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. uch is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the ecretary of /ustice is reviewing the formerBs order or resolutions. ince the 3$/ is not a :uasi1judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of (ppeals under 4ule -*, the resolution of the ecretary of /ustice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, not appealable to the Court of (ppeals via a petition for review under 4ule -*. >o,e er, the 4esolution of the 3$/ ecretary is appelable administratively to the $ffice of the "resident where the offense charged is punishable by Reclusion #er#etua.3 The availability of the remedy of a petition for review under 4ule -* of the 4ules of Court to appeal the 3ecision and 4esolution of the $ffice of the "resident effectively foreclose the right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari.
4D "$%3D%T C(%%$T .D C$2"D!!D3 T$ <.2IT C$<%TD41(88I3(5IT .D8$4D C$2"!(I%(%T C( <.2ITTD3 IT (88I3(5IT 6 C4I2I%(! I%5D TI#(TI$% (%3 "4D!I2I%(4K I%5D TI#(TI$% 3I TI%#<I CD3

In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. $ne cannot be a prosecutor and judge at the same time. Caving gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be e;pected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor. ince a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only evidence may be considered. Ehile reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court.
2eaning of "robable Cause for "urpose of 8iling Information

The term does not mean >actual or positive cause>6 nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. D" "#$,+( ,&+ &3 P#&)()*" C(1'" (s summed up in Debb u. de .eon, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing t"at more li?el! t"an not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. "robable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. (s well put in 0rinegar . 4nited States, while probable cause demands more than >bare suspicion,> it re:uires >less than evidence which would justify ; ; ; a conviction.> ( finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. Thus, probable cause should be determined in a summary but scrupulous manner to prevent material damage to a potential accusedBs constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and e;haustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity and merits of a partyBs defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of the testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
%o %eed to et Investigation for Clarificatory Fuestioning

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import actual certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not re:uire an in:uiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes an offense charged. "recisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. Probable cause is the e;istence of such facts and circumstances as would e;cite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. (s a protection against false prosecution and arrest, the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent must, however, be strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for arresting the accused It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so.

The respondent undergoing a preliminary investigation may not be compelled to submit a counter1affidavit before the submission of complainantBs affidavit. The general power of investigation of the "C## as consisting of two stages6 the first stage, called the criminal in estigation, is a fact1finding in:uiry conducted by law enforcement agents, whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses and afterwards assess the evidence so that, if they find sufficient basis, they can file a complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage, called t"e #reliminar! in estigation stage, is conducted for the purpose of ascertaining if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial. Caving found petitioner #rima facie guilty of violation of 4ep. (ct %o. *,1+ for which reason it issued a freeze order against him and filed a civil complaint for recovery of alleged ill1gotten wealth, the "C## could not thereafter act as an impartial judge in conducting a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints based on the same facts found by it to constitute #rima facie evidence against petitioner.

Considering the low :uantum and :uality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the court held that the 3$/ "anel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the %.I witnesses for clarificatory :uestions.

118

The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory :uestions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. "robable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. "reliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full e;ercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross1e;amine his accusers to establish his innocence. It is not the proper forum for an e;haustive production of evidence.
tages of "reliminary Investigation= 8ormer and "resent 4ule

propositions, namely= ?1@ that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is >not a judicial function ; ; ; ?but@ part of the prosecutionBs job, a function of the e;ecutive,> ?)@ that wherever >there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially e;ecutive to them,> and the fact >that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately e;ercised.> The 1+'' (mendments to the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, declared effective on $ctober 1, 1+'', did not restore that authority to /udges of 4egional Trial Courts6 said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
/udgesB "ower ?3uty@ to Conduct "reliminary D;amination

ection *, 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court e;pressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter1 affidavit, to e;amine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory :uestions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to e;amine or cross1e;amine. The parties may propound :uestions thru the investigating officer. A)'"+0" &3 C&1+'"* Ehere the accused is not represented by a counsel during the preliminary investigation, such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary investigation should be raised before the trial court. Ehen so raised, the trial court is called upon not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or re:uire the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. This is the proper procedure since the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. 2uch less did it affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity of the proceedings. The most that should be done is to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.
%o 4ight to Counsel 3uring "reliminary Investigation

The Court, pointed out in Sangguniang 0a!an of0atac . *udge /fren Albano, that the two stages under the old rule, namely= ?1@ t"e #reliminar! e-amination stage, during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed, and the accused is guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused hold for trial6 and ?)@ t"e #reliminar! in estigation #ro#er, where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after he is allowed to present his evidence in his favor if he so desires, was changed by "residential 3ecree %o. +11, upon which the present rule is based which removed the preliminary e;amination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. %ow, the proceedings consist only of one stage.
/<3#D $8 4D#I$%(! T4I(! C$<4T ?8$42D4!K C$<4T $8 8I4 T I% T(%CD@ %$ !$%#D4 C(5D (<TC$4ITK T$ C$%3<CT "4D!I2I%(4K I%5D TI#(TI$%

This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line, 4TC /udges also lost the power to make a preliminary e;amination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause e;ists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest ?or search warrant@. uch a power 9 indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power 9 has been and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the .ill of 4ights in the 1+*&, the 1+7* and the present 1+'7 Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear. Ehile an 4TC /udge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority when such a pleading is filed with his Court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of alta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in nature. N& R,;! &3 C#&''=E>($,+( ,&+ It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross1e;amine the witnesses which the complainant may present.

It has been held that there is nothing in the rules which renders a preliminary investigation invalid because defendant was without counsel. ee, however, Peo#le . Abano, where the confession obtained during preliminary investigation without the assistance of counsel was held as inadmissible. T!" R,;! &3 A001'"2 & D,'0&5"#4 P#&0"21#"' In Debb u. de .eon, the court held that an accused is entitled during preliminary investigation to discovery procedure. Ehile recognizing the absence of any provision in the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure for discovery proceedings during preliminary

That authority, at one time, reposed in them under ections 1*, 1- and 10, 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court of 1+0- was removed from them by the 1+'& 4ules on Criminal "rocedure, effective on /anuary 1, 1+'&, which deleted all provisions granting that power to said judges. The upreme Court had occasion to point this out in Salta . Court of A##eals, and to stress as well certain other basic

119

investigation, the Court held that such failure does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. "reliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused6 ; ; ; and upheld the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the %.I, the original copy of the sworn statement and the 8.I report considering their e;culpatory character, and hence, un:uestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. <nder the present rule, the respondent shall have the right to e;amine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his e;pense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be re:uired to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for e;amination or copying by the respondent at his e;pense.
"reliminary 3esignation of $ffense %ot Conclusive

fairness which taints the preliminary investigation. In a petition for forfeiture under 4.(. %o. 1*7+ respondent must be furnished a copy of the resolution directing the filing of a petition for forfeiture and to file a motion for reconsideration. The notice must be sent at the right address. P#"*,$,+(#4 I+5"' ,;( ,&+ M1' B" C&$%*" "2 Ehere the rules of the $mbudsman (R.A. :o. C;;6, Sec. ;, Rule )), Administrati e 9rder :o. ;), allows a party to file a motion for reconsideration, but the respondents were not furnished a copy of the resolution and an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration before the filing of the information against them in court, the upreme Court held that, they were deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the information against them, which warranted the remand of the case to the $ffice of the $mbudsman to complete the preliminary investigation. The failure, however, to furnish the respondent with a copy of an adverse resolution pursuant to ection 0, 4ule II of the 4ules of "rocedure of the $ffice of the $mbudsman, does not affect the validity of information thereafter filed. 4nder ection 7?b@ of the same 4ule no motion from reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be entertained after the information shall have been filed in court, e;cept upon order of the court wherein the case was filed. Thus, when re:uired by law the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantial right and its denial amounts to a denial of due process. Its absence, however, is not a ground for a motion to :uash. G"+"#(* C&1# M(# ,(* <nder 2ilitary law, the conduct of investigations is primarily governed by (rticles 71 of the (rticles of Ear, which provides= Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, and under oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in tact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. %o charge will be referred to a general court martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include in:uiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline.

(t such investigation, full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross1e;amine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall e;amine available witnesses re:uested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. .efore directing the trial of any charge by general court1martial the appointing authority will refer it to his staff judge advocate for consideration and advise. SEC. .. Resolution of In5esti2atin2 0rosecutor and its Re5ie%
C$22D%T = 1. <nder the amendment, whether the recommendation of the investigating officer is to file or dismiss the case, he shall, ,it"in fi e (5) da!s from "is resolution, forward the records of the case to the provincial or city #rosecutor or chief state prosecutor or, for offenses cogni(able b! t"e sandiganba!an in t"e e-ercise of its original %urisdiction, to t"e ombudsman or "is de#ut! the latter shall take appropriate action thereon within ten ?1,@ days from receipt and s"all immediately inform the parties of said action. 8or offenses cognizable by the andiganbayan in the e;ercise of its original jurisdiction, the records should be remanded to the $mbudsman, since it is the latter that has primary jurisdiction to investigate, file and prosecute said cases.B The rule recognize the right of a party to appeal to the ecretary of /ustice and re:uires that the parties be notified of the recommendation of the action to be taken thereon. <nder ec. 11 of 4ule 110, among the grounds for suspension of the arraignment is when= >?c@ ( petition for review of the prosecutorBs resolution is pending at either the department of justice or the office of the president= Pro ided, That the period of suspension shall not e;ceed si;ty ?0,@ days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.>

The preliminary designation of the offense in a directive to file counter affidavits is not conclusive as to the true nature of the offense charged. T!" R,;! & )" P#"'"+ N& A)'&*1 "

The %ew 4ules on Criminal "rocedure does not re:uire as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation6 the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics. Thus, preliminary investigation can be conducted e-<#arte if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after due notice. The fiscal need not call the witnesses for clarificatory :uestioning if the evidence on hand already yields probable cause. T!" R,;! & N& ,0"

).

*.

R&*" &3 !" P#&'"01 &# "rosecutors should not allow, and should avoid giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for the political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of

The, respondent is, however, entitled to be notified of the proceedings and to be present thereat. The fact that he was not so notified is a denial of fundamental

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serving the interest of justice even1handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. $nly by strict adherence to the established procedure may the publicBs perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.

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$fficer Conducting "reliminary Investigation 2ust be Impartial

D,'0#" ,&+ &3 P#&'"01 &# The investigating fiscal has discretion to determine the specificity and ade:uacy of averments of the offense charged. Ce may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the in:uiry, or proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his ne,, in due and proper form. It is not his duty to re:uire a more particular statement of the allegations of the complaint merely upon the respondentsB motion and specially where, after an analysis of the complaint and its supporting statements, he finds it sufficiently definite to apprise the respondents of the offenses with which they are charged. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. Ce has the :uasi1judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Indeed, under ection -, 4ule 11) of the ),,, 4ules of Criminal "rocedure, the Information shall be prepared by the Investigating "rosecutor against the respondent only if he or she finds probable cause to hold such respondent for trial. The Investigating "rosecutor acts without or in e;cess of his authority under the 4ule if the Information is filed against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefor.
3uty of Investigation 8iscal6 Dffect of (bsence of Certification

(n indispensable re:uisite of due process is that the person who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. (lthough such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or in:uires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. ufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an ac:uittal. ( preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial in:uiry. It is a judicial proceeding. (n act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. Ehile the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a >judge,> by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a :uasi1judicial officer. It should be realized that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the e;istence of #rima facie case before filing the information in Court. (nything less would be a dereliction of duty. The officer who review a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review.

The designation of the offense by the 8iscal is not binding upon the Court.
4emedies if There is %o "reliminary Investigation

(bsence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of information. It is not a ground for a motion to :uash. (bsence of "reliminary Investigation is not a ground for motion to :uash. 3ismissal for lack of "reliminary Investigation is not allowed, The remedy is to hold in abeyance proceedings and order the 8iscal to hold preliminary Investigation The same principles were stressed in $orralba . Sandiganba!an.
"roper 8orum to 4aise (bsence of "reliminary Investigation

The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the 4egional Trial Court and not the upreme Court. (bsence of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings that could be waived. H()"(' C&#%1' N& ( R"$"24 If there was no preliminary investigation, the remedy is not a petition for "abeas cor#us but a motion before t"e trial court to quas" t"e ,arrant of arrest, andAor the Information on grounds provided by the 4ules, or to ask for an investigationAreinvestigation of the case. Cabeas cor#us would not lie after the Earrant of Commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. o it is e;plicitly provided for by ection 1-, 4ule 1,) of the 4ules of Court ; ; ;. )lagan was a reiteration of the upreme CourtBs ruling in Peo#le . Casiano. The same rule was reiterated in 7oromal . Sandigaba!an.

If a preliminary investigation was actually conducted, the absence of certification by the investigating fiscal that it was conducted is not fatal. (bsence of certification as to holding of "reliminary Investigation does not affect validity of information. The certification >that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case6 that there is a reasonable ground to engender a well1founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof is sufficient. The failure to state therein that the accused was informed of the complaint and was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence is fatal and untenable.
3esignation of $ffense by 8iscal %ot .inding <pon Court

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If there was no preliminary investigation, the accused must 9 ?a@ refuse to enter a plea upon arraignment and object to further proceedings upon such ground6 ?b@ insist on preliminary investigation6 ?c@ file certiorari if refused6 ?d@ raise lack of preliminary investigation as error on appeal6 ?e@ file prohibition. W!"+ H()"(' C&#%1' (**&6"2 >abeas Cor#us was allowed as a remedy for irregular preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge in a murder case, who without legal authority for being dis:ualified as a relative within the *rd degree and without proper preliminary e;amination ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest as a conse:uence of which accused was illegally detained. The judge then remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor who was then held as without authority to lift the warrant of arrest. The judge was considered, as in construe five custody of the accused, by virtue of an illegal warrant of arrest. A%%"(*' & !" S"0#" (#4 &3 J1' ,0" The power of supervision and control by the 2inister of /ustice over the fiscals cannot be denied. (s stated in :oble%as . Sales, > ection 7+ of the 4evised (dministrative Code defines the e;tent o a department secretaryBs power. The power of control therein contemplated means ?the power of the department head@ to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power of control implies the right of the "resident ?and, naturally, of his alter ego@ to interfere in the e;ercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.> 8or, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the 2inister of /ustice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecution. Ce would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders

or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court. (s he has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the 2inister of /ustice has the ultimate power to decide which as between conflicting theories of the complainant and the respondents should be believed. Thus, the 3$/ $rder allows the filing of an Information in court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still e;ercise the right to seek review of the prosecutorBs recommendation with the ecretary of /ustice. P&6"# &3 S"0#" (#4 & R"5,"6 The power of the ecretary of /ustice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court is well settled. In =arcelo . Court of A##eals, reiterated in Roberts . Court of A##eals, the Court clarified that nothing in Cres#o . =ogul, forecloses the power or authority of the ecretary of /ustice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.
%ature of /ustice ecretaryBs "ower of Control over prosecutors

commission of acts6 review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units6 ; ; ;.B

upplementing the afore:uoted provisions are ection Q of4.(. %o. *7'* and ection *7 of (ct -,,7, which read=
B ection *. ; ; ; The Chief tate "rosecutor, the (ssistant Chief tat? "rosecutors, the enior tate "rosecutors, and the tatt "rosecutors shall ; ; ; perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the ecretary of /ustice in the in terest of public service.B

SECTION 37. THE PROVISIONS OF THE EXISTING LAW TO TH@ CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING9 WHENEVER A SPECIFIC POWER AUTHORITY9 DUTY9 FUNCTION9 OR ACTIVITY IS ENTRUSTED TO A CHIEF OF BUREAU9 OFFICE9 DIVISION OR SERVICE9 THE SAME SHALL B@ UNDERSTOOD AS ALSO CONFERRED UPON THE PROPER DEPARTMENT HEAD WHO SHALL HAVE AUTHORITY TO ACT DIRECTLY IN PURSUANCE THEREOF9 OR TO REVIEW9 MODIFY9 OR REVOKE ANY DECISION OR ACTION OF SAID CHIEF OF BUREAU9 OFFICE9 DIVISION OR SERVICE." FSUPERVISIONF AND FCONTROLF OF A DEPARTMENT HEAD OVER HIS SUBORDINATES HAVE BEEN DENNED IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS FOLLOWSC FIN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW9 SUPERVISION MEANS OVERSEEING OR THE POWER OR AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER TO SEE THAT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM THEIR DUTIES.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.B

The nature of the /ustice ecretaryBs power of control over prosecutors was e;plained in .edesma u. Court of A##eals, in this wise= "DECISIONS OR RESOLUTIONS OF PROSECUTORS ARE SUBJECT TC APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE WHO9 UNDER THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE EXERCISES THE POWER OF DIRECT CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER SAID PROSECUTORSG AND WHO MAY THUS AFFIRMG NULLIFY9 REVERSE OR MODIFY THEIR RULINGS. SECTION 3/9 CHAPTER -9 BOOK IV IN RELATION TO SECTIONDSE BG -9 AND /9 CHAPTER 29 TITLE III OF THE CODE GIVES THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF PROS= ECUTOR AND THE PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTION OFFICES.
The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in *', paragraph 1, Chapter 7, .ook I5 of the Code= ection

4eview as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of e;haustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. (s a rule, only after administrative remedies are e;hausted may judicial recourse be allowed.> Cence, after the 4esolution of the provincial fiscal have already been affirmed the resolution of the "rosecutor which in effect is

B?1@ Su#er ision and Control. upervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever s specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate6 direct the performance of duty6 restrain the

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a finding of the ecretary of /ustice himself as to the e;istence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial, the 8iscal should not conduct another reinvestigation and the court should not entertain the same. The ecretary of /ustice who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the respondents should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or overrule the decision of the ecretary. ( motion for reinviestigation on the ground of newly discovered evidence must be filed before the ecretary of /ustice rules on an appeal from a resolution in a preliminary investigation. The Court still reiterated in the ),,& case of Serag, the 1++case of 2arcelo for the Court to suspend the proceedings until after the ecretary of /ustice had resolved the motion with finality and cited ection 7 of 3$/ Circular %o. 7, which provides=
DCTI$% 7. Action on t"e #etition. The ecretary of /ustice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to re:uire consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. (ny arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the ecretary of /ustice from e;ercising his power of review.

A##eals, that there is nothing in Cres#o . =ogul which bars the 3$/ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the 3$/ to, >as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.> The ecretary of /ustice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the ecretary of /ustice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In 4oberts, the Court went further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority of the ecretary of /ustice >without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of ection -, 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court.> Ehile the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners were not barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. .y holding that only homicide was committed, the "rovincial "rosecutorBs $ffice of"ampanga effectively >dismissed> the complaint for murder. (ccordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said ection 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, demonstrated what un:uestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. ection 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed only in case of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of ection -, 4ule 11), 4ules of Court would be meaningless.
%eed to 3efer (rraignment if 3$/ had (lready #iven 3ue Course to (ppeal

/ustice may have on the matter would independence and integrity of this court.>

undermine

the

Thus the complainant cannot be stripped of the ecretaryBs authority to act on and resolve the motion of the private complainant on the "rosecutorBs insistence that the accused be arraigned on /une 0, ),,). Indeed, under ection 7 of 3$/ Circular %o. 7,, the ecretary of /ustice may resolve the said motion despite the arraignment of the petitioners. $nce a petition for review is filed with the 3$/ it behooved the 4TC to suspend the proceedings until after the ecretary of /ustice had resolved the motion with finality, including the consideration of the motion of the "rovincial 8iscal for the admission of the econd (mended Information for homicide, the dismissal of Criminal Case %o. +)0 and the arraignment of the "etitioner for homicide. The court reiterated its earlier ruling in =arcelo . Court of A##eals (su#ra). COMPARE
<nder ection ll?c@ of 4ule 110 the period of suspension shall not e;ceed si;ty ?0,@ days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. ?This is a new 4ule under the ),,, 4ules on the 4evised 4ules of Criminal "rocedure.@ The period of suspension shall not e;ceed si;ty ?0,@ days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office after the e;piration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 3espite the foregoing provision and ruling, the Court in the ),,& case ofSerag (su#ra) reiterated the 1++- ruling in the case of=arcelo (su#ra) for the Court to suspend the proceedings until after the ecretary of /ustice had resolved the motion with finality and cited ection 7 of3$/ Circular %o. 7, which provides=
DCTI$% 7. Action on t"e #etition. The ecretary of /ustice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to re:uire consideration.

2ore importantly, the ruling in Solar /ntertainment, )nc. . >a,, that the thirty1day period to suspend the arraignment ?as provided for in ection ) of Circular %o. *'1+'@ is not absolute was reiterated in the ),,0 case of .umanla, . Peralta, /r.
ecretary of /ustice to 4efrain $nly as 8ar as "racticable from 4eview of Cases (lready 8iled in Court

In 7ee . Court of A##eals, the upreme Court reiterated its pronouncement in Cres#o . =ogul, that the ecretary of /ustice as far as practicable, should refrain from entertaining a petition for review of appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The Court, however, clarified en bane in Roberts . Court of

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. (ny arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the ecretary of /ustice from e;ercising his power of review. This may be interpreted to mean that while the Court may not suspend the arraignment beyond the 0, day limitation, it may still suspend the trial pending final resolution by the 3$/. <nder the peedy Trial 4ule any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused including but not limited to those

Ehere the 3$/ had already given due course to the petitionerBs petition for review, it was premature for respondent judge to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the ground that >since the case is already pending for trial, to follow whatever opinion the ecretary of

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enumerated in ection * of 4ule 11+ in computing the time within which trial must commence shall be e;cluded 9
f) An! #eriod of dela! resulting from a continuance granted b! an! court motu #ro#rio, or on motion of eit"er t"e accused or "is counsel, or t"e #rosecution, if t"e court granted t"e continuance on t"e basis of "is findings set fort" in t"e order t"at t"e ends of %ustice ser ed b! ta?ing suc" action out,eig" t"e best interest of t"e #ublic and t"e accused in a s#eed! trial.I2

The preliminary investigation proper 9 whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the e;pense, rigors and embarrassment of trial 9 is the function of the "rosecutor. "reliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is e;ecutive in nature. It is part of the prosecutionBs job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary e;amination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.> 3etermination of "robable Cause %ot a D;ceptions upreme Court 8unction=

h. i. j.

Ehere it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution6 Ehere the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance6 Ehen there is clearly no #rima facie case against the accused and a motion to :uash on that ground has been denied6 and "reliminary injunction has been issued by the upreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

The upreme Court stressed that the real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of the court is not the filing of the motion to suspend at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the /oint 4esolution of the investigating prosecutor. .efore that time, the pronouncement in Cres#o . =ogul, that >once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction of accused or ac:uittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court,> did not yet become relevant or applicable. Cowever, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the ecretary of /ustice, but in faithful e;cercise of judicial nrerogative on the duty of the trial judge to make an independent assessment and finding of the evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper e;cercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutionBs word for its supposed insufficiency. In the absence of such a finding, the order of the court denying or granting the motion is void. The procedure of appeals to the ecretary of /ustice were consolidated and modified by 3epartment of /ustice Circular %o. 7, dated /uly *, ),,, entitled ),,, %8 4<!D $% (""D(! (A##endi- ') and 3epartment Circular %o. 7,1( dated /uly 1,, ),,, 3D!D#(TI$% $8 (<TC$4ITK T$ 4D#I$%(! T(TD "4$ DC<T$4 T$ 4D $!5D (""D(! I% CD4T(I% C( D . 3etermination of "robable Cause, Dither D;ecutive or /udicial "rerogative

k.

In these e;ceptional cases, the Court may ultimately resolve the e;istence or non1e;istence of probable cause by e;amining the records of the preliminary investigation, and may also restrain a preliminary investigation. The Court in the >*-+> "epsi1Cola cases recognized the several thousands of complainants in Criminal Case %o. F1+*1-*1+' ?in which the order of arrest was appealed to the 3$/@, and several thousands more in different parts of the country who are similarly situated as the former for being holders of >*-+> "epsi crowns, any affirmative holding of probable cause in the said case nay cause or provoke, the filing of several thousand cases in various courts throughout the country. Inevitably, the petitioners would be e;posed to the harassments of warrants of arrest issued by such courts and to huge e;penditures for premium on the bail bonds and for travels from one court to another throughout the length and breath of the archipelago for their arraignments and trials in such cases. Eorse, the filing of these staggering number of cases would necessarily affect the trial calendar of our overburdened judges and take much of their attention, time and energy, which they could devote to other e:ually, if not more, important cases. uch a frightful scenario would seriously affect the orderly administration of justice, or cause oppression or multiplicity of actions 9 a situation already long conceded to be an e;ception to the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction. The Court, however, refused to reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal Case %o. +*1-*)+', as it did, in Allado and Debb for, as reasoned out by the Court, the respondent /udge did not, in fact, find that probable cause e;ists, and if he did he did not hrve the basis therefor as mandated by Soli en, )nting, .im, Allado, and even Debb.

The Court thus pointed out that ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the e;ecutive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in e;cess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, e;ceptions to the rule, among which were enumerated in 0roc?a . /nrile, as follows= a. b. c. d. e. f. g. To afford ade:uate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused6 Ehen necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity or actions6 Ehen there is a prejudicial :uestion6 Ehen the acts of the officer are without or in e;cess of authority6 Ehere the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation6 Ehen double jeopardy is clearly apparent6 Ehere the court has no jurisdiction over the offense6

In criminal prosecutions, the determination of probable cause may either be an e;ecutive or judicial prerogative. In Peo#le . )nting, the Court aptly stated= "JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS ALIKE SHOULD DISTINGUISH THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY WHICH DETERMINES PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST FROM A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROPER WHICH ASCERTAINS WHETHER THE OFFENDER SHOULD BE HELD FOR TRIAL OR RELEASED.
Dven if the two in:uiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the /udge.

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2oreover, the records of the preliminary investigation are not with the court but with the 3$/. The upreme Court held that the trial court and the 3$/ must be re:uired to perform their duty. The Court, therefore directed the 3$/ to resolve on the merits, petitionerBs petition for review of the /oint 4esolution of the Investigating prosecutors and thereafter file the appropriate motion or pleading before respondent /udge which he shall then resolve in the light of Cres#o . =ogul. In the meantime, respondent /udge was directed to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners. <nder section ll?c@, 4ule 110, <pon motion of the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended when a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the 3epartment of /ustice or the office of the "resident6 Pro ided, That the period of suspension shall not e;ceed si;ty ?0,@ days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
3etermination of "robable Cause in "reliminary Investigation D;clusively "ertains to "rosecutor

one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a 4egional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort e;clusively pertains, by law, to said e;ecutive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime. Ehether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor 9 i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the e;istence of probable cause in a case 9 is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. There is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for such a determination. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of an information against him by the public prosecutor, to pre1empt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the :uashal or dismissal of the indictment on t"e ground t"at t"e e idence u#on ,"ic" t"e same is based is inadequate. %or is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth ade:uate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused. (:.0.+ D"ere, "o,e er, t"e #ublic #rosecutor finds t"at #robable cause e-ists as regards se eral sus#ects but unaccountabl! files t"e information onl! against some, but not all of t"em, mandamus ,ill lie to com#el "im to include in t"e indictment t"ose "e "as e-cluded.) .esides, the function that this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it does not generally do, and if at all, only e;ceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action where the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion #er#etua, or death has been imposed by a lower court ?after due trial, of course@, or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as regards a particular factual conclusion in the judgment of such lower court. Ehat, in sum, is being attempted in this Court is to reverse the established and permanent order of things 9 for the Court to act before trial and judgment by a lower tribunal6 to re:uire it to perform the role of trier of facts 9 which, to repeat, it does not generally do, the issues properly cognizable by it being normally limited e;clusively to :uestions of law to make it do something that even the trial court may not do at this stage of the

proceedings 9 itself to determine the e;istence of probable cause6 to usurp a duty that e;clusively pertains to an e;clusive official (su#ra, at note 3) to conduct a preliminary investigation or review the findings and conclusions of the public prosecutor who conducted one. The matter is not within the review jurisdiction of the Court as this is clearly specified in the Constitution, a jurisdiction which even the Congress may not increase >without N N N ?the CourtBs@ advice and concurrence.> 8rom the pragmatic aspect, it is also an undesirable thing, for the result could well increase the already considerable work load of the Court. 8urthermore, any judgment of this Court in this action would be inconclusive, as above intimated. It would not necessarily end the case. It would not, for instance, prevent the complaining witnesses from presenting additional evidence in an effort to have the information ultimately filed in the proper court against the accused, or the respondents from asking for a reinvestigation and presenting additional or other evidence warranting the dropping of the case. The Court would thus have wielded judicial power without a definite settlement of rights and liabilities. There are set rules, and procedural mechanisms in place for the determination of probable cause at the level of the public prosecutor, the 3epartment of /ustice and, to a certain e;tent, the 4egional Trial Court. %o recourse to this Court should normally be allowed to challenge their determinations and dispositions. I therefore vote to refer to the 3epartment of /ustice for resolution, the petition for the review of the /oint 4esolution issued by Investigating "rosecutor 4amon #erona.
8inding of "robable Cause by "rosecutor To hold (ccused 8or Trial 3istinguished 8rom 8inding of "robable Cause of /udge To Issue Earrant

In a separate opinion. Chief /ustice %arvasa e;pressed concurrence with the disposition of the case, that the determination of whether or not probable cause e;ists to warrant the prosecution in court of the petitioners should be consigned and entrusted to the 3epartment of /ustice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor. 8urther elucidating on his reasons, the Chief /ustice stated= "IN THIS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION9 THIS COURT IS BEING ASKED TO ASSUME THE FUNCTION OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. IT IS BEING ASKED TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AS REGARDS PETITIONERS.
2ore concretely, the Court is being asked to e;amine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the> parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices Bto engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.B>

It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor,

The foregoing dis:uisition of the Chief /ustice should, however, be taken in the light of the distinction of whether the preliminary investigation is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is e;ecutive in nature.

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It is part of the prosecutionBs job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary e;amination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge, but it is only after the first kind have been e;hausted, that the second kind comes in and the Cres#o rule applies. .efore that time, the pronouncement in Cres#o that >any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or ac:uittal of the accused rests in the discretion of the court >is not yet relevant and applicable. Ehen the second kind comes in, the court must, then e;ercise independent judgment, personally evaluate the documents and evidence adduced before the 8iscal, and determine for itself the e;istence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. If there is a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information, the court must e;ercise its judicial prerogative, make an independent assessment of the evidence and make its own findings it not being sufficient for the valid and proper e;ercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutionBs word for its supposed insufficiency.
8inding by /udge of "robable Cause %ot ubject to /udicial 4eview

(s a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of public prosecutor courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence.
4emedy Ehere 2inister of /ustice 4efuses 8iling of Case

faculty may not be interfered with, for a prosecution may not be compelled by mandamus to file a criminal information where he is convinced that he does not have the necessary evidence against an individual, ; ; ;.> Ehile the prosecuting officer is re:uired by law to charge all bhose who, in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt e;ists. The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the arosecutor. The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the ecretary of /ustice or in special cases by the "resident of the "hilippines. .ut even the upreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a #rima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. The possible e;ception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the e;ecutive. .ut in such a case, the proper remedy to call for such e;ception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. 2oreover, before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co1accused in the same case must first avail itself of other ade:uate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such reconsideration of decision. The rule is thus settled that the courtBs duty in an appropriate case is confined to determining whether the e;ecutive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in e;cess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, although it is entirely possible that the investigating fiscal may erroneously e;ercise the discretion lodged in him by law, this does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the e;traordinary remedy of correction and annulment by the e;traordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to e;cess of jurisdiction. The remedy of mandamus does not lie to compel public respondents to file an Information against private respondents. There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents which would warrant the overturning of their decision to dismiss the complaint against the private

The remedy of complainant in a case where the 2inister of /ustice would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an information for the complaint with which the respondents are charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in (rticle *& of the Civil Code, which provides= "ART. 3B. WHEN A PERSON9 CLAIMING TO BE INJURED BY A CRIMINAL OFFENSE9 CHARGES ANOTHER WITH THE SAME9 FOR WHICH NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION IS GRANTED IN THIS CODE OR ANY SPECIAL LAW9 BUT THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE FINDS NO REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED9 OR THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY REFUSES OR FAILS TO INSTITUTE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS9 THE COMPLAINANT MAY BRING A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE ALLEGED OFFENDER. SUCH CIVIL ACTION MAY BE SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. UPON THE DEFENDANTFS MOTION9 THE COURT MAY REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A BOND TO INDEMNIFY THE DEFENDANT IN CASE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE FOUND TO BE MALICIOUS." If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings. A5(,*(),*, 4 &3 A%%"(* F#&$ DOJ The 4esolution of the 3$/ ecretary is appealable administra1 tively to the $ffice of the "resident where the offense charged is punishable b! Reclusion #er#etua. ?8rom the $ffice of the "resident 9 the aggrieved party may file an appeal with the Court of (ppeals pursuant to 4ule -* G upraH@
<navailability of 2andamus or Certiorari To Compel 8iling of Cases

2oreover, a finding probable cause by the judge for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest after an evaluation of the documents and other supporting evidence, should no longer, in the meantime, be subject to judicial review, e;cept in the regular course of appeal, for to paraphrase the Chief /ustice in his separate opinion, that would be asking the court to e;amine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties, before the trial, and, on the basis thereof make a conclusion as whether or not, it suffices to establish the guilt of the accused. There are set of rules, and procedural mechanisms in place for the determination of probable cause at the level of the public prosecutor, the 3epartment of /ustice and, to a certain e;tent, the 4egional Trial Court. %o recourse to the higher court should normally be allowed to challenge their determinations and dispositions.
8indings of "robable Cause as "rosecutors Dntitled to Cighest 4espect

The prosecutorBs finding of probable cause is entitled to highest respect. This is a function that the court should not be called upon the perform.

In .im u. Court of A##eals, the Court reiterated the rule of long standing that the matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative of the prosecuting fiscal as a :uasi1judicial officer, who assumes full discretion and control of the case and this

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respondents, corollarily, there is also no ground to issue a writ of mandamusl Ehere the preliminary investigation falls under the first kind, the decision whether or not to dismiss the complaint against private respondents is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal, and ultimately that of the ecretary or <ndersecretary ?acting for the ecretary@ of /ustice ?which ordinarily is not compellable by mandamus. E>0"% ,&+ W!"+ M(+2($1' A5(,*()*" Cowever, if government prosecutors make arbitrary choices of those they would prosecute under a particular law, e;cluding from the indictment certain individuals against whom there is the same evidence as those impleaded, the fault is not in the law but in the prosecutors themselves whose duty it is to file the corresponding information or complaint against all persons who appear to be liable for the offense involved, a duty that should be performed responsibly, without discrimination, arbitrariness or oppression. If that duty is not performed evenhandedly, the persons aggrieved are not without remedy. They may avail of the remedy of mandamus to compel compliance with that duty by the prosecutors concerned. :9$/+ It was held in Ha# u. )AC, that certiorari does not lie to annul the 2unicipal judgeBs order finding probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged and conse:uently ordering their arrest. 4emedies are= ?1@ ?)@ ?*@ ?-@ ?&@ posting bail6 ask provincial fiscal for reinvestigation6 petition for review6 motion to :uash information6 if denied appeal, the judgment after trial. 1,-

umming up, the Court in C"ing held=

. $"e Secretar! of *ustice

In =endo(a<Arce . 9ffice of t"e 9mbudsman (Aisa!as), this Court held that the acts of a quasi<%udicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined= ?a@ ?b@ ?c@ ?d@ ?e@ when necessary to afford ade:uate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused6 when necessary for the orderly administration of justice6 when the acts of the officer are without or in e;cess of authority6 where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance6 and when there is clearly no #rima facie case against the accused.

%ot only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of >speedy disposition> of cases as embodied in ection 10 of the .ill of 4ights ?both in the 1+7* and the 1+'7 Constitution@, the inordinate delay is violative of the accusedBs constitutional rights. ( delay of close to three ?*@ years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case. The suggestion that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information, is without merit. The absence of a preliminary investigation can only be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. .ut an undue delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back the time. The principle is not, however, applicable where the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation cannot be imputed solely to the prosecution but because of incidents which are attributable to the accused and his counsel. SEC. B. (hen (arrant of Arrest may Issue
C$22D%T= a. The provisions of the former ection & relating to the preliminary investigation by a judge were deleted. ection 0 was modified ?bb@ by deleting reference to preliminary investigation by the 2TC are changing the same to prosecutor accordingly transposed to ection &. The first paragraph on the issuance of warrant of arrest by the 4egional Trial Court is in conformity with the rulings of the upreme Court. The former 4ule simply provides that a warrant of arrest may be issued by the 4egional Trial Court upon the filing of the information. This was because before the 1+'7 constitution, a warrant of arrest may be issued by the 4egional Trial Court on the basis merely of the certification of the investigating fiscal that there is probable cause. <nder the 1+7* not only the /udge but also by any responsible officer, which includes a fiscal, may determine Constitution probable cause. This is no longer true. <nder the 1+'7 Constitution it is only the

The Court also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary investigation ?in that case, the $ffice of the $mbudsman@ acts without or in e;cess of his authority and resolves to file an Information despite the absence of probable cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of certiorari. If the ecretary of /ustice reverses the 4esolution of the Investigating "rosecutor who found no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the ecretary of /ustice acts contrary to law, without authority andAor in e;cess of authority. uch resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under 4ule 0& of the 4evised 4ules of Civil "rocedure. In the same manner, just as the Court may resolve to overrule the finding of probable cause as in Allado . 7io?no, the Court may also overrule the decision of the judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Cowever, while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to e;amine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accusedBs constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play and to protect the tate from the burden of unnecessary e;penses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Dffect of 3elay in Conducting "reliminary Investigation

b.

E>0"% ,&+ W!"+ C"# ,&#(#, (' ( R"$"24 A**&6"2 Cowever, certiorari was allowed as a remedy to annul dismissal of the petition for review by the ecretary of /ustice for lack of jurisdiction since the dispute involves an intra1corporate one which ?then@ falls under the jurisdiction of the ecurities and D;change Commission. Certiorari was allowed also to annul the $rder of the DTC /udge for the issuance of warrant of arrest on the ground that there was no probable cause.

The long delay in the termination of preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. ubstantial adherence to the re:uirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.

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judge who is authorized to determine personally the e;istence of probable cause. Cence, jurisprudence evolved, that for purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally evaluate the prosecutorBs report, the evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation. These jurisprudence are now capsulized in the present rule. <nder this rule, the judge must determine the e;istence of probable cause within ten ?1,@ days from the filing of the information. This is intended to prevent prolonged detention of a person who is arrested without a warrant, only to turn out that the arrest was not lawful. If the accused had already been arrested, the judge must within the same period often ?1,@ days determine the e;istence of probable cause and issue an order of commitment. The judge may, on the other hand, disregard the prosecutorBs report and re:uire the submission of additional evidence to determine the e;istence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause, he shall dismiss the case. c. In cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court, which re:uire a preliminary investigation, the preliminary investigation shall be conducted by the prosecutor 1@ If such preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecutor, the procedure in the preceding section ?&a@ on the issuance of a warrant arrest shall be applied upon the filing ol the information. <nder this situation, probable cause may be determined by the /udge on the basis of the evidence adduced before the prosecutor, which conducted the preliminary investigation. )@ ubsection ?c@ is new provision. D"en ,arrant of arrest not necessar!. ( warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph ?b@ of this section, or if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 0 of this 4ule or is for an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the e;ercise of its original jurisdiction. <nder this subsection, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the 2unicipal Trial Court in accordance with section ?&b@ of this rule or if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 0 hereof, the court shall then proceed in the e;ercise of its original jurisdiction.

grounds stated therein. It is usually directed to regular officers of the law, but occasionally, it is issued to a private person named in it. J&!+ D&" W(##(+ ' Earrant of arrests issued against 3*o"n 7oe3 whom the witnesses to the complaint could not identify are in the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as >totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.> uch warrants are void because they violate the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.
/udge 2ay %o !onger 4ely on 8isca!s Certification

submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses 6o aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e;istence of probable cause. ound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would he unduly laden with the preliminary e;amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. b. The doctrine was reiterated in /nrile . Sala(ar, holding that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make a personal e;amination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by #ersonall! evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. N N N the /udge does not have to personally e;amine the complainant and his witnesses. The "rosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. Cowever, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the 8iscalBs bare certification. (ll of these should be before the /udge. The e;tent of the /udgeBs personal e;amination of the report and its anne;es depends on the circumstances of each case. Ee cannot determine beforehand how cursory or e;haustive the /udgeBs e;amination should be. The /udge has to e;ercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the /udge by the Constitution. It can be as briefer as detailed as the circumstances of each case re:uire. To be sure, the /udge must go beyond the "rosecutorBs certification and investigation report whenever necessary. Ce should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the courtBs probing :uestions when the circumstances of the case so re:uire. It is the e;clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e;istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not re:uired to personally e;amine the complainant and his witnesses.

The earlier rulings of the upreme Court which allows the /udge in the e;ercise of its discretion, whether or not to determine the e;istence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on the basis of the 8iscalBs Certification which were capsulized in Circular %o. 1), dated %ovember *,, 1+'7 have in effect been abandoned by the upreme Court in the light of the 1+'7 Constitution which provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e;cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after e;amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. a. The withdrawal started with the case of Soli en . =a?asiarC decided after the effectivity of the 1+'7 Constitution where the upreme Court then held that the addition of the word >personally> after the word >determined> underscores the e;clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e;istence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the e;istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not re:uired to personally e;amine the complainant and his witnesses. 8ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall= ?1@ personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e;istence of probable cause and, in the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest6 or ?)@ if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscalBs report and re:uire the

W(##(+ &3 A##"' 9 D"3,+"2 ( warrant of arrest is a legal process issued by competent authority, directing the arrest of a person or persons upon

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8ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall= ?1@ personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e;istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest6 or ?)@ if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscalBs report and re:uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e;istence of probable cause. In Cru( . Peo#le (su#ra), petitioner would have respondent court order the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in its determination of the e;istence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The upreme Court held= >8irst and foremost, as hereinabove stated, in a preliminary e;amination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause.> In Debb u. 7e .eon, the upreme Court again reiterated the doctrine in the seminal case of Soli en . =a?asiar (su#ra), in the issuance of warrants of arrest by the 4TC. "etitioners in the Debb case challenged the validity of the warrants of arrest issued in said case on the following grounds= ?1@ the issuance of the warrants of arrest was made in a matter of few hours6 ?)@ the failure of the judge to issue orders of arrest6 ?*@ the records submitted to the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause6 ;;;. 9 petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a searching e;amination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents on the part of the judge. (fter pointing out the differences in the issuance of a search warrant and a warrant of arrest and its ruling in Soli en . =a?asiar (su#ra), the upreme Court stressed that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine #ersonall! t"e #robabilit!, and not t"e certaint! of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de no o hearing to

determine the e;istence of probable cause. They just #ersonall! re ie, the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial e idence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the 3$/ panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. D;plaining its ruling in Allado u. 7io?no, which reversed trial courtBs finding of probable cause and ordered outright dismissal of the case, the Court stated that (llado ruling is predicated on the utter failure of evidence to show the e;istence of probable cause. the the the the

information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case under ection &G0H, 4ule 11) which is without prejudice. The trial court is mandated to immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause e;ists to issue a warrant of arrest and after having evaluated the resolution of the fiscal and supporting information.
The %eed for "ersonal Dvaluation of 3ocuments %ot 2erely 4esolution

The absence or presence of probable cause is to be determined from the material avernments of the information the appendages thereof as enumerated in 4ule 11), ection ' of the 4ules. The Courts attention was again focused on the issuance of warrants of arrest in the en bane decision in Roberts u. Court of A##eals, where the court emphasized the need for the court prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest to evaluate >the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes ?if any@, and all other supporting documents behind the "rosecutorBs certification which are material in assisting the /udge to make his determination of probable cause.> The teachings then of Soli en, )nting, .im, Allado, and Debb, reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutorBs certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The court went on to e;plain that in Debb, this Court assumed that since the respondent /udges had before them not only the )0 page resolution of the investigating panel, but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter1 affidavits of the respondents, they ?judges@ made a #ersonal e aluation of t"e e idence attac"ed to t"e records of t"e case. O+ !" N""2 & M(I" S"%(#( " F,+2,+; &3 P#&)()*" It was held that where, the information was not accompanied by any document, and there is nothing in the records or evidence supporting the prosecutorBs finding of probable cause e;cept the /oint 4esolution as bases thereof and does not "a e t"e records or e idence su##orting t"e #rosecutor&s finding of #robable cause, the Court declared the $rder for the issuance of the warrant of arrest as invalid. The court found it strange that there is no specific finding of probable cause but a mere directive to issue the warrants of arrest.

%ot even the cor#us delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case. #iven the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, the court there stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal e;amination of the complainant and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the e;istence or non e;istence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar rests on a different factual setting. The various types of evidence e;tant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioners. The Court concluded=
>Clearly then, the Constitution, the 4ules of Court, and our case law repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted searching e;amination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule re:uiring the issuance of an $rder of (rrest prior to a warrant of arrest.>

O1 #,;! D,'$,''(* The absence of probable cause for the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the :uashal of the

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The Court rejected the argument that the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. >Compliance with a constitutional re:uirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture or even convincing logic.> The Court in Roberts rejected the court of appealsB finding that the /oint 4esolution is sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by the respondent judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed e;ists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. Thus= >To bolster its finding, the Court of (ppeals held that the mere silence of the records or the absence of any e;press declaration in the :uestioned order of 2ay 17, 1++* as to where the respondent /udge based his finding of probable cause does not give rise to any adverse inference on his part. The fact remains that the /oint 4esolution was at respondent /udgeBs disposal at the time he issued the $rder for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. (fter all, respondent /udge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties. (nd this presumption prevails until it is overcomed by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Dvery reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption, and in case of doubt as to an officerBs act being lawful or unlawful, it should be construed to be lawful.> The Court e;pressed its inability to agree with this dis:uisition, for it merely assumes at least two things= ?1@ that respondent /udge (suncion had read and relied on the /oint 4esolution6 and ?)@ he was convinced that probable cause e;ists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners. %othing in the records provides reasonable basis for these assumptions. In his assailed order, the respondent /udge made no mention of the /oint 4esolution, which was attached to the records of Criminal Case %o. F1+*1-*1+' on )) (pril 1++*. %either did he state, he found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. (nd, for an undivinable reason, he directed the issuance of warrants of arrest onl! after /une )1, 1++*. If he did read the /oint 4esolution and, in so reading, found probable cause, there was absolutely no reason at all to delay for more than one

month the issuance of warrants of arrest. The most probable e;planation for such delay could be that the respondent /udge had actually wanted to wait for a little while for the 3$/ to resolve the petition for review. (ll told, it would seem from the foregoing discourse of the court that t"ere is need to issue an order finding #robable cause #rior to t"e issuance of a ,arrant of arrest. D,''"+ &+ N""2 & I''1" S"%(#( " O#2"# The foregoing statements would appear to negate the pronouncement in Eebb that there is no need for the court to first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest, and the presumption of regularity resorted to in justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the mere availability of the records before the court in /nrile . Sala(ar (su#ra), even in the absence of a separate finding of probable cause. In his dissent with the concurrence of /ustice 2endoza, /ustice 4eynato "uno found as sufficent basis to justify a finding of probable cause the 171page /oint 4esolution of the Investigating "rosecutor, and pointed out that Soli en and other related cases did not establish the absolute rule that unless a judge has the com#lete records of the preliminary investigation before him, he cannot lawfully determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest. Soli en only held that it is the #ersonal res#onsibilit! of the judge to determine probable cause on the basis of the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal6 that he must inde#endentl! evaluate the report and supporting documents if he finds no probable cause on the basis thereof, he can re:uire submission of additional supporting affidavits of witnesses. There is nothing in Soli en that re:uires prosecutors to #"!sicall! submit to the judge the complete records of the preliminary investigation especially if they are voluminous. %or is there anything in Soli en that holds the physically submit the complete records of the constitutionally infirm a finding of probable cause even if it was made on the basis of an e;haustive report or resolution. omission to case would by a judge prosecutorBs

respondent /udge to make a finding of probable cause. >Ehen /udge (suncion issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners, I assume as did the respondent Court of (ppeals, that he had studied the Information and 171page 4esolution of the prosecutors and that he agreed with the prosecutorBs findings of probable cause. It is unnecesary for him to issue an $rder just to reiterate the findings of the prosecutors, ;;;B (pparently to reconcile these conflicting views, the Court en bane in >o . Peo#le, laid down the following principles=
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES The court en banc summed up the following principles= 'irst, The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge, Ehether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even il both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding ,1 evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives, Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. $bviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutorBs report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. Cowever, the judge must decide independently. Cence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutorBs bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the e;istence ?or none;istence@ of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the e;istence of none;istence of probable cause is lodges in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. "arenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also sc much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable Cis honoi to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether tc issue a warrant of arrest. .astl!, it is not re:uired that the complete or entire records oi the case

Indeed, in Debb . de .eon, we sustained the finding of probable cause made by the trial judge even if the complete records of the preliminary investigation were not elevated to the said judge. /ustice "uno further maintains that there was no need for

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during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e;amined by the judge. Ee do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e;amine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. Ehat is re:uired, rather that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents ?such as the complaint, affidavits, counter1affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any@ upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e;istence of probable cause. The point is= he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutorBs recommendation. (lthough the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer. Thus, a warrant of arrest is void where the court did not personally determine the e;istence of probable cause but based the same merely on= ?1@ the resolution of the "anel of Investigators of the $mbudsman recommending the filing of the information, and ?)@ memorandum of the office of the pecial "rosecutor denying the e;istence of a prejudicial :uestion. The court, however clarified that= >It is not re:uired that the issuing judge categorically state in his resolution that he personally determined the e;istence of probable cause. It is enough that it may easily be gleaned from the resolution directing the issuance of the warrant that he performed his duty in accordance with the constitutional mandate on the matter. 8indings of "robable Cause as "rosecutors Dntitled to Cighest 4espect

the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function, which must be determined separately, the Court, nonetheless ruled that the findings of the prosecutor is entitled to the highest respect. Thus, >5erily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutorBs determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. Indeed, it would be unfair to e;pect, the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the nature and the objective of a preliminary investigation. Cere, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged6 they merely determine >whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well1founded belief that a crime ; ; ; has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.> Dvidentiary matters must be presented and heard during the trial. Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination. The court stressed that its rulings in Allado . 7io?no and Salonga . Pano, which set aside the trial courtBs findingBs on the e;istence of probable cause, are e;ceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to e;ist.
4uling 3oes %ot 3eviate from %eed of "ersonal Dvaluation

the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. ( judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer. In merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor, the judge has abdicated his duty under the constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Conse:uently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void. In Co%uangco . Sandiganba!an, the court declared the warrant of arrest issued in said case void because the respondent court did not personally determine the e;istence of probable cause but based the same merely on= ?1@ the resolution of the "anel of Investigators of the $mbudsman recommending the filing of the informa1 tion and memorandum of the $ffice of the pecial "rosecutor denying the e;istence of a prejudicial :uestions.

?)@

The /udge may order the production of the records and determine on the basis thereof the e;istence of probable cause or return the record and direct the 8iscal to conduct further investigation.
Dffect of 4efusal by "rosecution to (dduce (dditional Dvidence

The prosecutorBs finding of probable cause is entitled to highest respect. This is a function that the court should not be called upon to perform. (s a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence. Ehile recognizing that the determination by the "rosecutor of probable cause to hold the accused for trial is an e;ecutive function as distinguished from the determination by the judge in

The Court held that the trial court may disregard the 8iscalBs report and re:uire submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. The failure or refusal of the petitioner to present further evidence, although a good ground for the respondent /udge not to issue a warrant of arrest, is not a legal cause for dismissal. The judge was directed to proceed with the case, it being understood that, if within ten ?1,@ days after notice by the judge, the petitioner fails or refuses to present other evidence, the dismissal will stand for lack of prosecution. Cowever, a.Alla.do . 7io?no, it was held that the /udge may dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause.
3etermination of "robable Cause for Issuance of Earrant of (rrest

The foregoing principles refer to the findings of the prosecutor for the purpose of filing the case in court which should be distinguished from the determination by the judge of probable cause foi the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than

%o %eed of Conducting Cearing 8or /udicial determination of

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"robabe Cause to Issue Earrant <nder the present rule the 4ule does not re:uire case to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused. )f t"e %udge finds #robable cause on t"e basis t"ereof, "e s"all issue a ,arrant of arrest or, if t"e accused "as alread! been arrested, a commitment order ot"er,ise. >e ma! eit"er dismiss t"e case outrig"t or to aid "im in determining t"e e-istence of #robable cause8 require additional e idence ,it"in t"en (16) da!s from notice s"ould t"e *udge still find no #robable cause, "e s"all dismiss t"e case. The Court in @o ernment of t"e 4nited States of America >on. @uillermo @. Purganan, held that= .

witnesses. 5alidating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the #rima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage 9 if he so desires 9 in his effort to negate a #rima facie findingJ uch a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full1blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of e;traditions.
The (ccused is not, however, "rohibited from 8iling a 2otion to 3ismiss on the #round of !ack of "robable Cause

In view, however, of the e;panded cases, which re:uire preliminary investigation even of cases that are not cognizable by the 4egional Trial Court as now defined in section 1 hereof, the present section was accordingly amended. <nder the amendment, a complaint or information may only be filed after an in:uest conducted in accordance with e;isting rules6 Pro ided, "o,e er, That in the absence or unavailability of an in:uest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. The former rule allows a direct filing in court in cases of lawful arrest without a warrant e;cept in 2etropolitan 2anila and chartered cities, without an in:uest. Cowever, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this 4ule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of (rticle 1)& of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended. <nder the former rule, the waiver may be made with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non1availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. 4nder t"e amended rule, t"e ,ai er ma! be made onl! ): $>/ PR/S/:C/ 9' >)S C94:S/. #ursuant to Section 2 ofRA. :o. ;43E.) The former rule provides that if a lawyer is unavailable, a responsible person of his own choice would be sufficient. This was, however deleted in view of the provisions of section ) of 4.(. %o. 7-*' limiting the assistance to that of a lawyer, which in this case appears to be restrictive. If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation the accused may, within five ?&@ days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his 7/'/:S/ AS provided in this 4ule. The re:uest for preliminary investigation should be made before plea, otherwise the right to ask for a preliminary investigation shall be deemed waived.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself re:uires only the e;amination 9 under oath or affirmation 9 of com#lainants and the ,itnesses t"e! ma! #roduce. There is no re:uirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In >o . Peo#le and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge re:uired to go to the e;tent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. (ll we re:uired was that the >judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e;istence of probable cause.> In Debb . 7e .eon, the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest= >(gain, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, %udges do not conduct a de no o "earing to determine t"e e-istence of #robable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the pros1 ecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by sub1 stantial evidence.> (t most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further e;amine com#lainants and t"eir

It has been held that the absence of probable cause for the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the :uashal of the information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case under ection 0 ?now ec. &@, 4ule 11) which is without prejudice. The trial court is mandated to immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause e;ists to issue a warrant of arrest and after having evaluated the resolution of the fiscal and supporting information. If the Court may motu propio dismiss the case for lack of probable cause then it could do so when a motion to dismiss on such ground is filed as was done a.Allado u. 7io?no. In cases governed by the 4ule on ummary "rocedure, the court may likewise dismiss the case outright, for patently being without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in custody. SEC. ?. (hen accused la%fully arrested %ithout %arrant
C$22D%T=

NOTES The rule was originally taken from section 1& of 4ule 11), >where the accused is detained without a warrant for his arrest> which in turn was taken from 4epublic (ct %o. -,+, as amended by 4epublic (ct %o. 1),1, which reads=
>In all cases brought to the $ffice of the City 8iscal involving crimes cognizable by the Court of 8irst Instance, where the accused is not already in the legal custody of the police, no complaint or information shall be filed without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation, where such accused can be subpoenaed and

THE FORMER RULE EMBRACED ONLY LAWFUL ARRESTS FOR CRIMES COGNIKABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

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appears before the investigating fiscal, with the right to cross1e;amine the complainant and his witnesses= Pro ided, That when the accused is detained, he may ask for a preliminary investigation, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of (rticle $ne Cundred Twenty1five of the 4evised "enal Code, as amended= And #ro ided, furt"er, That if the case has already been filed in court, he may ask for a reinvestigation thereof later on with the same right to cross1e;amine the witnesses against him= Pro ided, finall!, That notwithstanding such waiver, the said investigation must be terminated within seven days from its inception.>

The rule as now modified refers to all persons lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense which re:uires a preliminary investigation. There are two ?)@ situations contemplated under this rule= .irst, is when the person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense which re:uires a preliminary investigation, and no complaint or information has yet been filed, in which case, he may ask for a preliminary investigation by signing a waiver of the provisions of (rticle 1)& of the 4evised "enal Code. To prevent pro longed detention pending preliminary investigation, the accused may apply for bail even if no information have been filed. In any event the preliminary investigation must be terminated within fifteen ?1&@ days from its inception. Second, when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense which re:uires a preliminary investigation and the complaint or information was filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation in which case the accused may within five ?&@ days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in the 4ule. T!" I+H1"' In:uest is an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal case involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether or not said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. To safeguard the rights of the accused who was arrested without a warrant, 3epartment Circular %o. 01, dated eptember )1, 1++*, re:uires the arresting officer to bring the arrestee before the in:uest fiscal who shall determine whether or not said person should remain in custody and correspondingly be charged in court or that he be released either for lack of evidence or further investigation.

The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and ade:uately e;plained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever. The rule is not applicable if the person is not lawfully arrested without a warrant It was thus held in @o . Court of A##eals, .arranaga . Court of A##eals+ "WHEN THE POLICE FILED A COMPLAINT FOR FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE WITH THE PROSECUTOR9 THE LATTER SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY SCHEDULED A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR CHARGING PETITIONER IN COURT FOR THE KILLING OFELDON MAGUAN.
Instead, the "rosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that ection 7 of 4ule 11) was applicable and re:uired petitioner to waive the provisions of (rticle 1)& of the 4evised "enal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. 2oreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.>

similar rule held that as the accused in that case did no e;ercise his right within the five1day period, his motion for reinvestigation was denied. The case should be distinguished from Rolito @o A##eals (su#ra). . Court o,

In said case, #o not only asked for preliminary investigation on the very day the information was filed, but he is also clearly entitled to a preliminary investigation. ection 7, 4ule 11) is clearly not applicable because #o was not lawfully arrested, the right to demand preliminary investigation was subject to the condition that he should claim it seasonably. Ce did not do so. (ccordingly, he effectively waived his right to a preliminary investigation
The 4ight To .ail "ending "reliminary Investigation

It may be noted that under ection 7 ?now ec. 0@ of 4ule 11), i person lawfully arrested may post bail before the filing of the information or even after its filing without waiving his right to preliminary investigation, provided that he asks for a preliminary investigation by the proper officer within the period fi;ed in the said rule.> W(,5"# &3 I**";(* A##"' The accused may be estopped to :uestion the illegality of the arrest by entering a plea of not guilty without moving to :uash th information on such ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to an arrest was cured when accused voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Court by entering a plea of not guilty >and GbyH participating in the trial.> Ehere the Earrant of (rrest is void for want of probable cause, the appropriate remedy is certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a T4$ rather than actively participate in the proceeding. SEC. 7. Records S/C. <. C('"' +& #"H1,#,+; ( %#"*,$,+(#4 ,+5"' ,;( ,&+ +&# 0&5"#"2 )4 !" R1*" &+ S1$$(#4 P#&0"21#"
Earrant of (rrest in Cases which 3o %ot 4e:uire "reliminary Investigation

Cowever, since an information had already been filed and the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or affect the jurisdiction of the court, the upreme Court instead of ordering the dismissal of the case directed the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and allowed the accused in the meantime to post bail.>
"eriod to 8ile 2otion 8or "reliminary Investigatio%

The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a warrant has been characterized as mandatory by the court. In Peo#le . 'igueroa, the upreme Court applied a substantially

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In cases which falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court, which does not re:uire a preliminary investigation nor does it fall under the 4ules on ummary "rocedure, the case may either be filed in court by a prosecutor or directly filed in court by the offended party. The amended rule in the issuance of warrants of arrest by the 2unicipal Trial Courts for actions filed in the e;ercise of its original /urisdiction provides for two distinct situations. The case may be filed directly in the municipal trial court or by the prosecutor in 2etro 2anila or other chartered cities. If the complaint is filed with the "4$ DC<T$4 for offenses which do not re:uire a preliminary investigation the procedure outlined in ection *?a@ of this 4ule shall be observed. <nder ection *?a@, the complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents 4D!ID3 <"$% .K CI2 T$ D T(.!I C "4$.(.!D C(< D, in such manner of copies as there are respondent, plus two ?)@ copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any "4$ DC<T$4, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally e;amined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily e;ecuted and understood their affidavits. The prosecutor shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant EITCI% TD% ?1,@ 3(K 84$2 IT 8I!I%#. In other words, he may either dismiss the case or file it in court without any further investigation since this refers to cases that are not entitled to preliminary investigation. The "rosecutor has no authority to issue a warrant of arrest. It is only the court that may do so. ( case cognizable by the 2unicipal Trial Court may, however, be filed in court directly by the complainant or by the prosecutor, without preliminary investigation. O% ,&+' &3 !" J12;" The /udge has three ?*@ options in the issuance of a warrant of arrest=

(.

D"ere filed directl! ,it" t"e munici#al trial court. if the complaint or information is filed directly with the municipal trial court. The procedure in section *?a@ of this rule shall be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. $therwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, after personally e;amining in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching :uestions and answers, or

supporting evidence of the complainant or if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause he may re:uire the submission of additional evidence to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e;istence of probable cause. $"is is in line ,it" t"e #ragmatic inter#retation b! t"e Su#reme Court t"at under t"e Constitution t"e %udge does not "a e to conduct a #ersonal e-amination of t"e ,itnesses but that for purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the /udge must personally evaluate the prosecutorBs report, the evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation. These jurisprudence are now capsulized in the present rule, where the judge needs only to evaluate t"e re#ort of t"e Prosecutor and t"e su##orting documents. ound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary e;amination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. M"(+,+; &3 P"#'&+(* E>($,+( ,&+ Ehere the respondent judge personally e;amined the witnesses for the prosecution adopting as his own personal e;amination the :uestions asked by the investigating officer as appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative, the court considered this as sufficient. 4epublic (ct %o. *'*' does not prohibit the municipal judge from adopting the :uestions asked by a previous investigator. M"(+,+; &3 E>($,+( ,&+ 1+2"# O( ! The finding of the trial court that the complaint was >supported by statements of the witnesses under oath> and the record also shows the sworn statements of the witnesses to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent /udge, satisfies the second re:uirement. M"(+,+; &3 S"(#0!,+; Q1"' ,&+' (+2 A+'6"#' The term 3searc"ing questions and ans,ers3 means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary e;amination which is to determine >whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial,> such :uestions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof.

..

Ce may personally evaluate the affidavits and supporting evidence attached to the complaint or information if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may re:uire the submission of additional evidence to aid him in determining the e;istence of probable cause. Cowever, instead of issuing a warrant of arrest, the court may issue summons if it is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under immediate custody. %o warrant of arrest shall issue for offenses which fall under the original jurisdiction of the court if such warrant had already been issued during the preliminary investigation by the same court pursuant to section 0?b@ Kno, sec. 5L of this rule the court shall instead proceed to hear the case in the e;ercise of its original jurisdiction. %o warrant of arrest may be also be issued for cases covered by the 4evised 4ule on ummary "rocedure. T!" N& N"0"'', 4 R1*"

C.

The 3necessit!3 rule restores the 1+'& amendment which was deleted in 1+''. The statement that the judge determines whether there is need for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice only applies to warrants of arrest issued by the 2unicipal /udge during a preliminary investigation. D,'0#" ,&+ & D,'%"+'" 6, ! S"(#0!,+; Q1"' ,&+' The foregoing provisions have provided an alternative mode of determining probable cause in cases filed for trial by allowing the municipal judge to personally evaluate the affidavits and

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Ehat would be searching :uestions would depend on what is sought to be in:uired into, such as= the nature of the offense, the date, time and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission6 the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense6 the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. the points that are the subject of in:uiry may differ from case to case. The :uestions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the judge making the investigation. (t any rate, the court a quo found that respondent /udge was >satisfied that the :uestions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T1 gt. "atosa partake of the nature of his searching :uestions and answers as re:uired by law,> so the respondent /udge adopted them.> P#"*,$,+(#4 E>($,+( ,&+ M(4 )" E>=%(# " "reliminary e;amination is not an essential part of due process of law. "reliminary e;amination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. There is no need of warrant or bail in cases covered by the 4ule on ummary "rocedure. RULE 113 ARREST SECTION 1. 'efinition of arrest SEC. 2. Arrest8 ho% made W!( C&+' , 1 "' A##"' The act relied upon as constituting an arrest must have been performed with the intent to effect an arrest and must have been so understood by the party arrested. (lso, the person making the arrest must be acting under some real or pretended legal authority for taking the person into custody. It is not necessary, however, that there be an application of actual force, or manual touching of the body, or physical restraint which may be visible to the eye, or a formal declaration

of arrest. It is sufficient if the person arrested understands that he is in the power of the one arresting and submits in conse:uence. Cowever, in all cases in which there is no manual touching or seizure or any resistance, the intentions of the parties to the transaction are very important6 there must have been an intent an the part of one of them to arrest the other, and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission was necessary. There can be no arrest when the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of any restraint of his liberty. .ut the mere submission of a person whether pretended or actual, will not constitute an arrest, if he is not at the time actually within the power of the officer. If an officer having authority to make an arrest lays his hand upon the person of the prisoner, however lightly, with the intention of taking him into custody, there is an arrest, even though he has not succeeded in stopping or holding him even for an instant. (n arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.

This Court may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. $therwise, this court cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. %otoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance6 it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Ehere, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there e;ist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation 9 not condonation should be the rule6 otherwise, this Court would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation. Thus, it may be true that (nseimo .alagtas was a notorious criminal, a life1termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts.>
8orce %ecessary to $vercome (ctual 4esistance to (rrest In Peo#le . 7elima, a prisoner escaped from jail. Ce was found armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. (ccused policeman asked him to surrender but prisoner answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman fired his revolver but did not hit the criminal who ran away. Ce pursued, firing and killing the prisoner. >eld+ The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to e;treme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by circumstances.

%o <nnecessary or <nreasonable 8orce shall be <sed in 2aking (rrest

(lthough an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. The doctrine is restated in the 4ules of Court thus= >%o violence or unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.> (nd a peace officer cannot claim e;emption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. A##"' &3 N& &#,&1' C#,$,+(* The court noted in one case= >It is suggested that a notorious criminal Bmust be taken by stormB without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited.

In another case, the deceased was creating a disturbance when the defendant, a policeman, attempted to arrest him and take him to the #residensia. The deceased resisted the arrest by striking the accused with a calicut whereupon the latter shot him with his revolver causing the formerBs death.

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The Court held= >(lthough a police officer may employ force to overcome active resistance to an arrest, it is not reasonably necessary to kill his assailant> to repel an attack with a calicut, and only an incomplete defense is made out. ( police officer is not justified in using unnecessary force in effecting arrest or in treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be affected otherwise. P&*,0" O33,0"# M1' S (+2 H,' G#&1+2
In 4.S. . =o%ica $ne of the Constabulary soldiers, the deceased, was placed under arrest. Ce resisted and finally succeeded in freeing himself. Ce then struck a policeman with the fist, drew a mess kit knife and brandishing it attacked the accused, another policeman. The accused retreated a step or two, drew his revolver and fired killing the soldier. >eld+ ( police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight, his duty re:uires him to overcome his opponent. The force re:uires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may e;ert therefore differ somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered in self1defense. .earing this in mind, we do not think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon6 he might perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Eas he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his armsO It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policemanBs club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not re:uired to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and e:ual struggle.

on bail or on recognizance. The prisoner whether under preventive detention or serving fail sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointee, while in detention. This is a necessary conse:uence of arrest and detention. SEC. .. /xecution of (arrant The rule does not re:uire a return of the warrant of arrest but only a report to the judge who issued the warrant and, in case of the officerBs failure to e;ecute the same, shall state the reasons therefor. ( warrant of arrest does not become stale or functus oficio unlike a search warrant which is valid only for ten days. ( warrant of arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the warrant lifted. SEC. B. Arrest %ithout %arrant8 %hen *a%ful

ground to belie e3 was changed to 3"e "as #ersonal ?no,ledge of facts3 to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. Controversy arose in the interpretation of what are those fact which must be within the personal knowledge of the person effecting the arrestO $therwise stated, what are the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The restrictive interpretation is that the facts constituting the crime must be personally known by the person effecting the arrest, hence, there are cases which e;cluded even an eyewitness identification allegedly because of lack of personal knowledge by the arresting officer. T!" R"5,'"2 R1*"' &+ C#,$,+(* P#&0"21#" (s revised, the present rule reads= "@BA WHEN AN OFFENSE HAS JUST BEEN COMMITTED AND HE HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED IT." The present rule removed the re:uirement that an offense must have in fact been committed and clarified that probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts refer to >facts and circumstances> that the person to be arrested has committed it. uch knowledge would be sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest for an offense that has just been committed. The amendment is in accord with upreme Court decisions that the indubitable e;istence of a crime is not necessary to justify a warrantless arrest and that Bpersonal knowledge of facts,B in arrests without warrant must be based upon #robable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. ( reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, cou#led 3,it" good fait" on t"e #art of t"e #eace officers ma?ing t"e arrest. The only difference is that in flagrante arrests, under subpar. ?a@, the facts constituting probable cause occur in the presence of the arresting person, while in hot pursuit, knowledge of the

A$"+2$"+ ' & !" R1*"9 E>%*(,+"2 a. b. 8ormer 4ule ?1+0-@ ec. C, Rule 113 Ehen an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it6 and

SEC. 3. 'uty of Arrestin2 ,fficer

C$22D%T=

1/-B AMENDMENT b@ Ehen an offense has in fact %ust been committed, and he has #ersonal ?no,ledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it6 and R"('&+ F&# 1/-B A$"+2$"+ In 1+'&, the rule, which was transposed to section & of 4ule 11*, introduced a significant change. ubsection ?b@ of section &, 4ule 11* inserted the word 3%ust3 before been committed, and the phrase 3"e "as reasonable

(s a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under custody of the law. Ce is placed in actual restraint to liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. Ce must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released

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facts occurred after the commission of the crime. (lthough probable cause eludes e;act and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It, likewise, refers to the e;istence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item?s@, article?s@ or object?s@ sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
"ersonal Mnowledge of 8acts Constituting "robable Cause

The law e;pressly allowing arrests without a warrant is found in ection &, 4ule 11* of the 4ules of Court. ( warrantless arrest under circumstances contemplated under ec. &?a@ has been denominated as one 3in flagrante delicto3 while that under ection &?b@ has been described as a >hot pursuit arrest.> b. ( peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, e;cept in those cases e;pressly authorized by law. Ehat he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal in cities, or directly with the justice of the peace courts ?now municipal courts@ in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of a person charged with having committed a public offense even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. c. ection )-0* of 4evised (dministrative Code recognized as basis for warrantless arrest was repealed by 4.(. %o. -,+ otherwise known as the Charter of 2anila. E>0"% ,&+ $"e rules recogni(e and allo, arrests ,it"out ,arrant and a search and seizure without warrant incident to a lawful arrest whether the arrest is with or without a warrant. (s stated in Peo#le . Faqui =alasugui, the Constitutional precepts do not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. To hold that no criminal can in any case be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large e;tent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most e;pert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. It is the duty of a policeman to arrest those who disturb an assemblage by words and blows constituting a breach of the peace and the defendant who re:uested the arrest and the officer who made it did not incur criminal responsibility.

2unicipal councilors and lieutenants or 3barrios3 are charged with duty of maintaining order, and preserving and protecting life and property in the 3barrios3 specially placed under their direction in conformity with ec. *7 of (ct %o. '), and are therefore clothed with authority to make arrests without warrants, not inferior to those powers usually conferred upon peace officers, more especially those of peace officers known as >constables> in (merican and Dnglish law. Thus, the !ieutenant of a 3barrio3 was held to be within lawful performance of his duties when he attempted to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto conducting a clandestine cockpit. (ny officer charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest without a warrant any person who is committing, or has committed, a breach of peace in his presence. S&1#0" &3 R1*" &+ W(##(+ *"'' A##"' a. ( warrantless arrest in this jurisdiction as an e;ception to the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure was originally governed by 4ules )7, )', )+ and *, of the "rovisional !aw for the (pplication of the "enal Code, which authorized among others the arrest of persons when there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty of some offense, provided= 'irst. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to crime had been committed. Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime. The upreme Court in the 1+,+ case 4.S. . 'ortale(a (su#ra), likewise pointed to section *7 of (ct %o. 1'* ?Charter of 2anila@ which designated customs officials, including police officers or peace officers who may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace6 or may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view. b. The e;tent of a peace officersB arrest powers in the "hilippines without warrant and the limitations therein was upheld by the upreme Court in the 1+17 case of 4.S. . Santos and as stated in the !egislature in the Charter of the

In its resolution denying the 2otion for 4econsideration in the 4mil . Ramos cases, the majority opinion e;plained the meaning of Personal Fno,ledge of 'acts (under section 5KbL), as follows=
>It has been ruled that Bpersonal knowledge of facts,B in arrests without warrant must be based upon #robable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. ( reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, cou#led 3,it" good fait" on t"e #art of t"e #eace officers ma?ing t"e arrest.3 The foregoing standards were again adopted in warrantless >hot pursuit> arrest in the 1+++ case of Peo#le . 7oria. As observed by an eminent author there does not e;ist ?and never will e;ist@ a >bright line> marking the e;act boundaries of probable cause, so that a warrant should be upheld when the initial judgment of the magistrate could considerably have gone either way.
#eneral "rinciples6 Earrantless (rrest %ot (llowed

a.

(s a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant e;cept in those cases e;pressly authorized by law.

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City of 2anila and ?)@ the (dministrative Code and ?*@ ec. ))&', edition of 1+17 which enjoins 2unicipal policemen to >e;ercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses. The decision, likewise cited the common law rule on the arrest of suspicious night walkers. c. In the 1+*+ case of Peo#le . Anc"eta the upreme Court pointed to section '-' of the (dministrative Code and (rticle 1)- of the 4evised "enal Code as allowing members of the Constabulary or policemen to make arrests without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have grounds to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has been committed precisely by the person arrested. <nder Common,ealt" Act :o. 1E1 (Sec. 3), an arrest without warrant may be made by agents of the 3epartment of /ustice (i.e., the Chief of the 3ivision of Investigation and his subordinates@ for a crime which has been committed in their presence, or within their view, or in cases where the person making the arrests has reasonable grounds to strongly believe that the person so arrested is guilty of such crime and where there is likelihood of the person escaping before a legal warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested shall be immediately taken before the competent Court of /ustice. <nder this law members of the investigation staff of the .ureau of Investigation shall be peace officers and as such have the power to make arrests, searches and seizure in accordance with e;isting laws and rules.
Darlier 4ulings ?.efore 1+-,@= (rrest .ased on uspicion, Eere Celd 5alid

meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. In this case, as the priest engaged in a :uarrel was down and was being maltreated, he shouted >policeP policeP> and the police heard this and attempted to arrest appellant, he resisted arrest and struck the police. (ppellant was held guilty of assault upon an agent of a person in authority. d. 4.S. u. 0atallones ( peace officer can justify an arrest without warrant if there is reasonable ground of suspicion tending to show that a person committed or is about to commit any crime ,1 breach of the peace, and if he acts in good faith. <nder such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable for coercion or arbitrary detention. 4.S. . Sanc"e( The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed, where such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. $ne of the duties of the police is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of the judicial or e;ecutive authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the act constituting the violation or to prosecute and secure the punishment thereof. $ne of the means conducing to these ends being the identification of the person of the alleged criminal or lawbreaker, the duty that directly devolves upon the police to make the arrests or detentions for t"e purposes of such investigation cannot be :uestioned, (su#ra) Cearing the screeching of tires followed by a thud and seeing the sideswiped victim is a crime committed in oneBs presence to justify a warrantless arrest. f. In a case of arbitrary detention, the upreme Court held that there is :o need of fact of commission of offense to %ustif! t"e detention. "robable cause for an arrest without warrant is allowed where there is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. %o crime was committed here. The persons merely entered an uninhabited camarin but their arrest was justified to prevent the commission of a g.

crime. Common !aw rule applied. /ustice 2alcolm stated that=

>$ne should, however, not e;pect too much of an ordinary policeman. Ce is not presumed to e;ercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. $ften he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Dven the most conscientious officer must at times be misled. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be e;culpated. $therwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law.>

d.

e.

In Peo#le . Fagui =alasugu a warrantless arrest for a crime committed not in arresting officerBs presence but made on the same day was justified . In other words, such arrest or detention does not necessarily presume that really a crime had been committed. It is sufficient that there was ample ground to believe honestly and reasonably that the cause of the surrounding phenomena at the time was a crime that has just been or was about to be committed and that the person detained was responsible for it. Peo#le . Anc"eta, reiterated the ruling laid down in 4.S. . Santosand adopted that of a decision of the upreme Court of pain of %ovember &, 1'+). I+21), ()*" E>,' "+0" &3 C#,$" N& R"H1,#"2

h.

The bases of the rulings are 4ules )7 and )', "rovisional 4ules for (pplication of "enal Code, 4evised (dministrative Code and ection *7 Charter of 2anila which allows warrantless arrest based on reasonable ground of belief. The following cases are illustrative= a. b. c. 4.S. u. 0urgueta warrantless arrest of accused while :uarreling in public with 2unicipal Councilor. 4.S. . 'ortale(a upholding warrantless arrest of operator by barrio lieutenant of a clandestine, cockpit operation. 4.S. u. Samonte < =eaning of committed in one&s #resence Seeing or >earing at a 7istance. (n offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the

Thus, under the pre11+-, rulings, a lawful warrantless arrest does not re:uire the indubitable e;istence of a crime. It is sufficient if the officer effecting the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the e;istence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the person sought to be detained has participated therein, a warrantless arrest was made on the basis of information given by one of the accused naming his companions who, on the basis thereof, was arrested without a warrant. The arrest was considered as lawful.

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R"' #,0 ,&+' &+ W(##(+ *"'' A##"' In Sa!o, et al. . C"ief of Police, the court, however, held that= "THE LAW RESTRICTS THE CASES WHEN A PEACE OFFICER MAY ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANTG THE SO=CALLED COMMON LAW RULE RELATING TO OTHER CASES OF ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT HAS NO APPLICATION IN THIS JURISDICTION9 AND EXCEPT AS AUTHORIKED BY SUCH STATUTE9 AN ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IS ILLEGAL. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT A WARRANT BEYOND THE CASES PROVIDED BY LAW IS DEROGATORY OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLEFS LIBERTY" P#"'"+ R1*" &+ W(##(+ *"'' A##"' The law e;pressly allowing arrests without a warrant is found in ection &, 4ule 11* of the 4ules of Court. ( warrantless arrest under circumstances contemplated under ec. &?a@ has been denominated as one 3in flagrante delicto3 while that under ec. &?b@ has been described as a 3"ot #ursuit arrest.3 The foregoing rule specifies the instances when warrantless arrests may be made by a peace officer or a private person. The old 4ule was modified as follows= ?a@ the phrase 3about to commit an offense3 was changed to >is attem#ting to commit an offense,3 because the old phraseology implied that no offense had as yet been committed, ?b@ the word 3%ust3 was inserted before 3been committed,3 and the phrase >he has reasonable ground to believe> was changed to 3"e "as #ersonal ?no,ledge of facts3 to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.-The 1+-, 4ules of Court ?effective /uly 1, 1+-,@, provided for warrantless arrest in section 0 of 4ule 1,+ thereof. These were taken from the "rovisional !aw for the application of the "enal Code and sections )1 and )) of the (merican !aw Institute -& with one significant change. The warrantless arrest under subsection ?b@ re:uires as a condition thereof that an 3offense "as in fact3 been committed. In 1+'& rule, which was transposed to section & of 4ule 11*, introduced another significant change. ubsection ?b@ of section &, 4ule 11* inserted the word 3%ust3 before been committed, and the phrase 3"e "as reasonable ground to belie e3 was changed to 3"e "as personal ?no,ledge of facts3 to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay.-0

A%%*,0( ,&+ &3 P#"'"+ R1*" 3espite the 1+'& amendments on warrantless arrest, the court appears to have returned to pre1amendment doctrines in the application of the rule.
In 8lagrante (rrests ?8or crimes committed in presence of arresting person@

The arrest cannot be justified by discovery thereafter that the person was committing a crime. K+&6*"2;" M1' B" A T,$" &39 N& A3 "#9 A##"' (n offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance caused thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or the offense is continuing6 or has not been consummated at the time when the arrest is made. Mnowledge of the commission of the crime in oneBs presence must precede the arrest. The law re:uires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made 9 the process cannot be reversed. In other words, the acts must be known to the officer at the time of their commission through his sensory perceptions. Thus, there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the part of accused1appellant that he had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to commit a crime. (s applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that >reliable information> alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Cence, in Peo#le u. Aminudin, we ruled that >the accused1 appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. Ehat he was doing was descending the gangplank of the 2A5 Eilcon + and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.> The reliance of the prosecution in Peo#le the policeBs actions is misplaced. . $angliben, to justify

ec. &?a@, 4ule 11*, ec. 1), 4ule 1)0 arrest for crimes )n Presence of arresting officer. ECD% I% CI "4D D%CD, TCD "D4 $% T$ .D (44D TD3 C( C$22ITTD3, I (CT<(!!K C$22ITTI%#, I $4 (TTD2"TI%# T$ C$22IT ( C4I2D. E''"+ ,(* R"H1,', "' 4eliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence of and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. To constitute probable cause, two re:uisites must concur= ?a@ the person to be arrested must e;ecute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime6 and ?b@ such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of e;ecution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. $vert or e;ternal act has been defined as some #"!sical acti it! or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more t"an a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by e;ternal obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, ,ill logicall! and necessaril! ripen into a concrete offense. ( warrantless arrest is not justified by the mere fact that a crime is being committed in oneBs presence. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such commission. The knowledge must precede the arrest.

In the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the 5ictory !iner

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Terminal compound in an 8ernando, "ampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs. (t +=*, in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and re:uested him to open his bag but he refused. Ce acceded latel on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night ol his arrest. In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already hac prior knowledge from the very same informant of accused1 appellantBs activities. The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged ille gal activities of accused1appellant. Considering that the identity address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused1appellant and searching his person Ehatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours be fore accused1appellantBs arrest was not a product of an >on1the1spot tip which may e;cuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest (ccordingly, the arresting teamBs contention that their arrest of accused1appellant was a product of an >on1the1spot> tip is untenable )n 4andolph 3avid v. #loria 2acapagal1(rroyo, t"e Court stressed+
The Constitution provides that >the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be in iolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e;cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after e;amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.> The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.

the "%" operatives arrested him on the basis of"" 1,176 t"ird, he was brought at Camp Maringal, Fuezon City where he was fingerprinted, 3hotographed and booked like a criminal suspect6 fourt", he was created brus:uely by policemen who >held his head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car8 fift", he was charged with 5iolation of atas "ambansa .ilang .ig. '', and Inciting to edition6 si-t", "e was detained for seven ?7@ hours6 and se ent", he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. %either of the two ?)@ e;ceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner 3avidBs warrantless arrest. 3uring the in:uest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of ..". .ig. '',, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t1 shirts with the invective 39ust @loria :o,3 and their erroneous assumption that petitioner 3avid was the leader of the rally. Conse:uently, the In:uest "rosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Ce noted that petitioner 3avid was not wearing the subject t1 shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. 8urther, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of ..". .ig. '', as it was not even known whether petitioner 3avid was the leader of the rally. I!!< T4(TI5D C( D =
2eaning of "ersonal Mnowledge .ased on ensory "erceptions

bus, policeman $bina intercepted her and showed her his I3 identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, >"lease go with me, let us settle this at home.> CD!3= (ppellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. "at. 3aniel $bina did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught inflagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.

PEOPLE V. BURGOS
trict Interpretation Personal Fno,ledge )nter#reted. The need to strictly adhere to the rule was stressed by /ustice Cugo #utierrez, /r., in no uncertain terms in Peo#le . 0urgos In this case Cesar 2asamlok surrendered to the "C on =a! 12, 12E2 stating that, he was forcibly recruited by 4uben .urgos a member of the %"(, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. ( joint team of members of the "C1I%" was dispatched the following day to arrest 4uben .urgos and they were able to locate and arrest him while he was plowing his field. Interrogation was made in the house of the accused. Ce first denied possession of the firearm but later, upon further :uestioning, the team with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (fter the recovery of the firearm, the accused likewise pointed to the subversive documents which the "C found kept in a stock pile ofcogon, at a distance of three meters apart from his house. (ccused when confronted with the firearm readily admitted the same as issued to him by the team leader of a sparrow unit. The lower court justified the arrest, search and seizure without warrant under ection 01(, 4ule 11* of the 4ules of Court. The upreme Court held the arrest as unlawful.

"eople v. Claudio 9 "at. $bina a member of the %(4C$TIC <%IT, was on board the 5ictory !iner, seated on the second seat at the back. Ehile he was thus seated, suspect (nita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of $bina. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a woven buri bag made of plastic containing her bag behind "at. $binaBs seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt ?sick@ nervous. Eith the feeling that there was something unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. .ut it was only at an 8ernando, "ampanga when he was able to go to the bag. Ce inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic marijuana at the bottom. Ce could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the (%TI1%(4C$TIC <%IT. Ce did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached $longapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Calte; #asoline tation in ta. 4ita. 4ight after the accused alighted from the

L<nder ection 0?a@ of 4ule 11*, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.> There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Ehatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar 2asamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellantBs wife. (t the time he was arrested, he was not committing a crime but was plowing his field. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally, nothing that is discovered afterwards cannot make it lawful (44D T <%!(E8<! ECD4D E( $""$4T<%ITK T$ $.T(I% E(44(%T %$ <4#D%CK (%3 TCD4D I

In the .rief (ccount submitted by petitioner 3avid, certain facts ire established= first, he was arrested without warrant6 second,

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In Peo#le . Aminnudin, the "C officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Ce was identified by name. (cting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of /une )&, 1+'-, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an %.I forensic e;aminer, who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. $n the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against (minnudin. CD!3= Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused1 appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under 4ule 11* of the 4ules of Court. The present case presented no urgency. 8rom the conflicting declarations of the "C witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search (minnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the 2A5 Eilcon +. Cis name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. (nd from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Ket they did nothing. %o effort was made to comply with the law. The .ill of 4ights was ignored altogether because the "C !ieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a >search warrant was not necessary.> The accused1appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. Ehat he was doing was descending the gangplank of the 2A5 Eilcon + and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehen1 sion. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers ?and not a judge@ that authorized them to pounce upon (minnudin and immediately arrest him. Dven e;pediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. Cence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

substantially identical factual setting. To the trial courtBs justification that there was no time to obtain a search warrant because the information was received at -=,, oBclock in the afternoon, and that the ship was to dock at 7=,, a.m., the court pointed to (dministrative $rder %o. 1) which allows applications for search warrants even after office hours. C$2"(4D= Ehere there was %o $pportunity to $btain Earrant
In Peo#le . Sa!con ( warrantless arrest, search and seizure based on information from a %(4C$2 agent that a suspected habu courier was arriving at 3umaguete City on board a vessel and who was pointed to by another agent was justified although the suspect was not perceptively committing a crime but ?like (minnudin@ merely alighted from the vessel. The search and seizure was justified under the principle justifying the search of moving vehicles as there was no time to obtain a warrant. The case was distinguished from Aminnudin where there was time to obtain a search warrant. The record shows that the %(4C$2 officers were uncertain as to the precise date and time appellant would arrive from 2anila6 all they knew is that he would be taking a boat from 2anila to 3umaguete on the morning of ' /uly 1++). 2ore specific details were received earlier in the morning that the appellant would be arriving the same morning. Clearly, the agents had to act :uickly but there was not enough time to obtain a warrant of arrest or search warrant.

Thus, to justify the arrest without warrant, under ection 0 ?a@, it is not enough that a crime is actually being committed in his presence. The person or peace officer making the arrest must be personally aware of the commission of such crime.> "eople v. 2engote The police received a telephone call that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of /uan !una and %orth .ay .oulevard at Tondo. The police responded and saw two men >looking from side to side,> one of whom was holding his abdomen. The police approached them and identified themselves as policemen whereupon the two tried to ran away. The other lawmen surrounded them and searched them and one of them was found with an unlicensed firearm and live ammunition. Eas the search and seizure legalO >eld+ It is illegal. (t the time of the arrest, the appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. This is not a crime. The police did not know then what offense if at all had been committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the appellant, ;;; (s for the illegal possession of firearm, the police discovered this only after he had been searched and investigated. The upreme Court cited the cases of 0urgos, Ali" Castro and Aminnudin holding that it would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting to commit it. "eople v. 4odriguez The arrest, search and seizure was held illegal in view of the admission by the police that he did not actually see the appellants transacting but only saw them acting suspiciously. The court held that the cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging e;cept by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being the fruit of the poisonous tree. In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible >for any purpose in any proceeding.

2ere suspicion Insufficient WHERE THE ACCUSED CARRYING A BURI BAG WAS ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY AND WAS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM AND EXPLOSIVE9 THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ARGUED THAT WHEN THE TWO POLICEMEN APPROACHED THE PETITIONER9 HE WAS ACTUALLY COMMITTING OR HAD JUST9 COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICERS AND CONSEQUENTLY THE SEARCH AND SEIKURE OF THE CONTRABAND WAS INCIDENTAL TO THE LAWFUL ARREST IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 129 RULE 12? OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
The upreme Court held=

>(t the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

C$2"(4D=

(rrest .ased on

uspicion6 Ehere there is <rgency

Aminnudin

was

reiterated

in

Peo#le

/ncinada,

under

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Ehere around +=*, in the evening the police on a surveillance mission noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag ,"o ,as acting sus#iciousl! and they confronted himand re:uested him to open the red travelling bag but the person refused. 8ound inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. (ccused was held to havev been caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls s:uarely within the e;ception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is conse:uently valid. In contrast, to the Aminnundin case, Tangliben presented urgency. (lthough the trial courtBs decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused1appellant as carrying marijuana. 8aced with such on1the1spot information, the police officers had to act :uickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. Ee cannot therefore apply the ruling in (minnudin to the case at bar. To re:uire search warrants during on1the1spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it e;tremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. <pon being informed by their civilian informer that there would ie a transaction involving the buying and selling of marijuana which would take place on that same day, "atrolmen immediately proceeded to the vicinity where the alleged transaction would take place. Ehile positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant and Earner 2ar:uez ay the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them t"e police officers@. They saw 2ar:uez giving something to appellant who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object to 2ar:uez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while appellant, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. The court a quo correctly ruled= The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under ec. &?a@, 4ule 11* of the 4ules on Criminal "rocedure. The subse:uent arrest of 2ar:uez and accused were made under the principle of hot pursuit. The recovery of the marijuana from 2ar:uez and the "1+,.,, from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since 2ar:uez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. .ut even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of 2ar:uez and accused, still, the search on their persons were incidental to their valid warrantless arrest.>

Compare 2ere time to obtain a warrant not sufficient to invalidate a warrantless arrest. To be considered likewise is whether or not a warrant may be issued under the circumstances.
In .o >o Ding (su#ra), it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. (side from this, they were also certain as to the e;pected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. .ut such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the re:uirements for the issuance of a search warrant. till and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. In Peo#le . =ontilla, the opportunity to obtain a warrant was not considered as sufficient to invalidate the legality of the warrantless arrest. 8or, under the circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. The informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there could be such delivery or the precise time of the suspectBs arrival, or of his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving with, or being brought by someone separately from the courier. The court ruled that in determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered especially in rural areas. hift In /urisprudence= Earrantless (rrest <nder 4easonable #round of uspicion ection &?a@ .ased $n

b.

4easonable #round to .elieve 4ule (pplied The upreme Court e;plained that petitioners were not caught in the act, does not make their arrest illegal. "etitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the one with /ohn herman being naked. <nder those circumstances, the CI3 agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed 3#edo#"ilia3 defined as psycho1se;ual perversion involving children.> >"edophilia for unusual se;ual activity in which children are the preferred se;ual objects> olicitor #eneralBs 4eturn of the Erit, on p. 1,1. Ehile not a crime under the 4evised "enal Code, it is a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the tate to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, social well1being of our youth.

c.

"eople v. (llan 4odriguez 4easonable ground based on tip of informer 9 delivery of suspicious stuff to tricycle driver justified warrantless arrest. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. The e;act location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. They witnessed the person hand deliver a suspicious stuff to the tricycle driver who in turn gave something to the person. The suspicious stuff taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The attending circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed.

a.

"robable Cause .ased on

urveillance6 %o Crime Committed d.

In >ar e! . C)7 Commissioner Santiago, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three ?*@ months during which period their activities were monitored. The upreme Court justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant due to the e;istence of probable cause.

"ersonal Mnowledge <nder ection &?a@ Eas %ot !ikewise trictly $bserved in the 8ollowing Cases= In these cases, the fact that the search yielded possession of illegal articles was included as a justification for a warrantless (rrest under ection &?a@ although the arresting officer at

143

the time of arrest has no personal knowledge of a crime being committed in their presence as prescribed in 4.S. . Samonte (su#ra)8 Sa!o . C"ief of Police (su#ra)8 Peo#le . 0urgos (su#ra)8 and Peo#le . Posadas
2eaning of "ersonal Mnowledge of 8acts Constituting "robable Cause ufficient

%or was he arrested %ust after the commission of the offense for his arrest came a da! after the shooting incident. Ce was arrested in the hospital. eemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. The Court, however, justified the arrest of 4olando 3ural for being a member of the %ew "eopleBs (rmy ?%"(@ an outlawed subversive organization. > ubversion being a continuous offense, the arrest of 4olando 3ural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the tate are in the nature of continuing crimes.> The Court then went on to :uote @arcia<Padilla . /nrile,21 where the upreme Court held= >8rom the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under "residential "roclamation %o. ),-&, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and e;isting jurisdiction in our jurisdiction.> )@ In @.R. :os. E45E1<E2, the arrest of (melia 4o:ue and Eilfredo .uenaobra who admitted membership in the %"( and officers andAor members of the %<8C1C"" were likewise justified for the same reasons stated in 4=).. The arrest without warrant of 4o:ue was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunition without license to possess. *@ In Anonue o . Ramos, the arrest of 3omingo (nonuevo and 4amon Casiple without a warrant was also found to be justified. .oth are admittedly members of the standing committee of the %<8C and, when apprehended in the house of 4enato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry. The record of these two ?)@ cases shows that at about 7=*, oBclock in the evening of (ugust 1*,1+'', 3omingo T. (nonuevo and 4amon Casiple arrived at the house of 4enato Constantino at 2arikina Ceights, 2arikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist1 lines. &@ -@

Ehen frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. (nonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Cence, they were brought to "C Cead:uarters for investigation. 8ound in their possession were the following articles= ?c@ ?d@ 5oluminous subversive documents 8irearms and ammunitions.

In its resolution denying the 2otion for 4econsideration in the 4mil . Ramos cases, the majority opinion e;plained the meaning of Personal Fno,ledge of 'acts, as follo,s+ It has been ruled that B"ersonal Mnowledge of 8acts,B in arrests without warrant must be based upon #robable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. ( reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, 3cou#led ,it" good fait" on t"e #art of t"e #eace officers ma?ing t"e arrest.3
The Continuing Crime "rinciple to /ustify Earrantless (rrest

(nonuevo and Casiple claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest. The upreme Court held the claim as without merit. >The record shows that 3omingo (nonuevo and 4amon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their persons when they were apprehended.> In 9ca!a u. Aguirre, the arrest without warrant, of 5icky $caya was justified under the 4ules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 1) 2ay 1+'', agents of the "C Intelligence and investigation of the 4izal "C1I%" Command, armed with a search warrant issued by /udge Dutropio 2igrino of the 4egional Trial Court of"asig, 2etro 2anila, conducted a search of a house located at .lock 1+, "hase II, 2arikina #reen Ceights, 2arikina, 2etro 2anila, believed to be occupied by .enito Tiamson, head of the C""1%"(. In the course of the search, 5icky $caya arrived in a car driven by 3anny 4ivera. ubversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .-& cal. pistol were found in the car of 5icky $caya. (s a result, 5icky $caya and 3anny 4ivera were brought to the "C Cead:uarters for investigation. Ehen 5icky $caya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of ".3. %o. 1'00 was filed with the 4egional Trial Court of "asig, 2etro 2anila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case %o. 7*7. 3anny 4ivera, on the other hand, was released from custody. In answer to her claims that sheB.,was illegally arrested, the upreme Court held that 5icky $caya was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. In /s#iritu . .im, the respondents claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest ?on %ovember )*@ since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in the afternoon of )) %ovember 1+'', during a press conference of the %ational "ress Club. 3eogracias Dspiritu through tri1media was urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on %ovember )*, 1+'', to force the government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from

The 4mil u. Ramos, and seven other petitions for "abeas cor#us were all based on the ground that the arrests of the petitioners were made without warrant and that no preliminary investigation was first conducted so that the information filed against them are void. The upreme Court in a #er curiam decision, however, found that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for "abeas cor#us have been filed, were freshly committed and that the accused were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified. The court then proceeded to give a brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight petitioners.
1@ In 4mil . Ramos, one of the petitioners, 4olando 3ural who was then confined in the hospital for a gunshot wound was positively identified as a member of the sparrow unit who went on top of the hood of the C("C$2 2obile patrol car. The upreme Court found that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two soldiers. Ce was charged with the crime of 7ouble =urder ,it" Assault u#on Agents of Persons in Aut"orit!.

144

detention of the president of the "I T$% ?"inagkaisahang ng Tsuper at $perators %ationwide@.

amahan

8urther heard was 3eogracias Dspiritu taking the place of "I T$% president 2edardo 4oda and also announced the formation of the (lliance 3rivers (ssociation to go on nationwide strike on %ovember )*, 1+''. "olicemen waited for petitioner outside the %ational "ress Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. Ce was ne;t seen at about &=,, oBclock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphathizers at the corner of 2agsaysay .lvd. and 5alencia treet, ta. 2esa, 2anila where he was heard to say= >.ukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot no. ang Cebu at .icol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto noting pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ma 4oda hanggang sa magkagulo na.> The police finally caught up with the petitioner on )* %ovember 1+''. Ce was invited for :uestioning and brought to "olice head:uarters after which an Information for violation of (rt. 1-) of the 4evised "enal Code was filed against him before the 4egional Trial Court of 2anila. The upreme Court held that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is in accordance with the provisions of 4ule 11*, ec. &?b@. 0@ In :a(areno . Station Commander, the record of this case shows that at about '=*, oBclock in the morning of 14 7ecember 12EE, one 4omulo .unye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. 2olina and 2endiola treets in (labang, 2untinlupa, 2etro 2anila. $ne of the suspects in the killing was 4amil 4egala who was arrested by the "olice on 2E 7ecember 12EE. <pon :uestioning, 4egala pointed to %arciso %azareno as one of his companions in the killing of the said 4omulo .unye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up %arciso %azareno and brought him to the police head:uarters for :uestioning. The upreme Court held= >Dvidently, the arrest of %azareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to ec. &?b@, 4ule 11*, 4ules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co1accused 4amil 4egala in the killing of 4omulo .unye II6 and after investigation by the police authorities. (s held in Peo#le . Anc"eta+ >The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary re:uisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable e;istence of a crime. 8or the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the e;istence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds e;ist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.>

145

THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS ARREST In Peo#le . =almstedt
The receipt of information by %(4C$2 that a Caucasian coming from agada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the %(4C$2 officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. 8rom these circumstances arose a #robable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the %(4C$2 officers in re:uiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag ?which was discovered to contain hashish@ as well as the two ?)@ travelling bags containing two ?)@ teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them were prompted by accusedBs own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the %(4C$2 that a Caucasian coming from agada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the %(4C$2 agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. (ccused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs ?hashish@. ( crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls s:uarely under paragraph ?1@ of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.> Ehile it is true that the %(4C$2 officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. ufficiency of Mnowledge of "robable Cause 4eiterated Dn .ane

the travelling bag and carton bo; which appellant was carrying at the time. The court held that the officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent pair of luggage for personal effects. The Court therein wrote= >the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in ection &?a@.> (ccording to the court, the conventional view is that probable cause, while a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The court pointed out that under 4ule 11) of the 4ules of Court, the :uantum of evidence in preliminary investigation is such evi1 dence as suffices to >engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondentBs probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same 4ule, that is, that the investigating fiscal >finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,> or where >a probable cause e;ist.> It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
C$2"(4D=

packed inside a plastic bag. In determining whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid. The Court noted that there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest. The identity of the accused was ascertained. The accused was not acting suspiciously, and distinguished the case= a. from Peo#le . $angliben (su#ra), where policemen were confronted with an on the spot tip. 2oreover, the policemen knew that the 5ictory !iner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business address. 2ore significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. Cis actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that (ruta was acting suspiciously. b. from Peo#le . =almstedt. In =almstedt, where there was no reasonable time for the police authorities to obtain a search warrant, and his actuations also aroused suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. In (ruto, there was time to obtain a search warrant, her identity was priorly ascertained, and she was not acting suspiciously. 2almstedt was searched abroad a moving vehicle, a legally accepted e;ception to the warrant re:uirement, (ruta on the other hand, was searched while she was about to cross the street. c. from Peo#le . 0agista, where probable cause was drawn from the fact that the accused fitted the description given by the %(4C$2 informant and that it involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact the police officers erected a checkpoint in view of the confidential information from the regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of the accused would be bringing marijuana from up to north. from =analili . Court of A##eals, where the court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused to determine if he was actually >high> on drugs due to suspicious actuations, he was observed to have reddish eyes

WHEN WARRANTLESS ARREST BASED ON INFORMATION INVALID In Peo#le . Aruta, the police was tipped off by his informant that a certain >(ling 4osa> will be arriving from .aguio City the following day with a large volume of 2arijuana. The police proceeded to the place at -=,, p.m. of the following day and deployed themselves near the "%.. ( 5ictory !iner .us arrived. Two females and a male got off, and the pointed to >(ling 4osa> carrying a traveling bag. The police approached her and in:uired about the contents of the traveling bag which she handed to the police, who, upon inspection found dried leaves of marijuana d.

"robable cause as a ground to justify a warrantless arrest in flagrante was reiterated in the en bane decision in Peo#le u. =ontilla. In this case, an informer informed the police the day before that a drug courier whom he could recognize would be arriving in Cavite from .aguio City. (s soon as the appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand pointing to him from the waiting shed, the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside

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and to be walking in swaying manner 9 he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen 9 coupled with the fact that based on the information, this area was a haven for drug addicts. The Court noted that in all the above1cited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless search. 8urthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each case. %o reference was made to =ontilla. In applicable earlier decisions, the upreme Court held that there was probable cause in the following instances= ?a@ where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused6 ?b@ where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been acting suspiciously6 ?c@ where the accused fled when accosted by policemen6 ?d@ where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policeman who had earlier received confidential reports that the said accused would transport a large :uantity of marijuana6 and ?e@ where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy 9 one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged 9 the said accused where bringing prohibited drugs into the country O !"# C('"' 6!"#" !"#" 6(' +& P#&)()*" C(1'" There is, no probable cause where the arresting team was only armed with knowledge of the suspectBs >attire> which the witness could not even remember. $"e team did not "a e a #"!sical descri#tion of t"e sus#ect nor "is name. They were not even given a specific place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the 2uslim (rea in Fuiapo, near the 2uslim 2os:ue.

Ket the arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were only eating "alo<"alo at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. Ehile ",- Clemente claims that accused had a >bulging waistline,> this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused. In another case, the police officers were informed that accused were repacking drugs. (ccompanied by an informer, they peeped first through the window before they saw the activities of the suspects inside the room and entered the house and arrested the suspects. The court held that the arrest, search and seizure were illegal. They should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the activities and identities of the suspects were already known and if there was probable cause, they should have applied for a search warrant. The court reiterated the 7 situations of a warrantless search and held that the arrest, search and seizure do not fall on any of them. In another case, the court noted that the DTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, ?constituting probable cause@ but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that >accused was caught red1handed carrying the bag1full of GsHhabu when apprehended.> In short, there is no probable cause. (t least in Peo#le . $angliben, the Court agreed with the lower courtBs finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation@ constitute of probable cause impelled. In another case, the olicitor #eneral proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable cause 9 persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CC<(Bs watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the .acnotan seas, CC<(Bs illegal entry into the "hilippines ?he lacked the necessary travel documents or visa@, CC<(Bs suspicious behavior, i.e., "e attem#ted to flee ,"en "e sa, t"e #olice aut"orities, and t"e a##arent ease b! ,"ic" CC<( can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of "hilippine laws.

The Court, however, found that these do not constitute >probable cause.> T"**= (*" C*1"' &3 P#&)()*" C(1'" R", "#( "2 %one of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drugs confidential report andAor positive identification by informers of courier?s@ of prohibited drug andAor the time and place where they will transportA deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest e;ists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in :uestion. CC<( was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. (nd despite claims by CI3 and .(3<( that CC<( attempted to flee, (!2$ITD testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at conversation when the officers approached him. In Peo#le . .uaa, a buy1bust operation was conducted against the accused. (fter he had gone inside his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana and received the marked money, the designated #oseur<bu!er gave the signal to his fellow police officers who closed in and arrested the accused. In the course of the arrest, a police officer noticed something bulging at accusedBs waistline, which turned out to be an unlicensed .*' caliber 3#alti?3 with two live bullets. (ccused was charged with illegal possession of firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a lawful arrest. BUY=BUST OPERATIONS CONSIDERED AS I- .*A7RA-T/ ARR/STS .uy1.ust $perations 9 0ust $peration earch and eizure "ursuant to 0u!<

Ehat is a buy1bust operationO

147

( buy1bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest6 it is a form of entrapment which has been repeatedly accepted to be valid means of arresting violators of the 3angerous 3rugs !aw. In a buy1bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty1bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. )n flagrante arrests are usually made in drug cases during a buy1 bust operation. ( buy1bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is the employment by peace officers to catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of entrapping or capturing a lawbreaker. The term, in connection with violation of the 3angerous 3rugs (ct, is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch malefactor in flagrante delicto. .ut, while buy1bust operation is a recognized means of entrapment for the apprehension of drug pusher, it does not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the 3angerous 3rugs (ct as it is susceptible to mistake as well as to harassment, e;tortion and abuse. The Court therefore stressed that the "&)<"0 ,5"" "' in buy1 bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and ade:uately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the #oseur< bu!er and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the >buy1bust> money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that the law1abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost.

(t the same time, however, e;amining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accusedBs predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delin:uency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. P#,+0,%*" &3 C&+ ,+1, 4=,+ B14=B1' O%"#( ,&+' The buy1bust operation and the search and seizure pursuant to the buy1bust operation must be continuous= .uy1.ust $peration Continuous. and earch 4ejected for %ot .eing

Certainly, the arrest was not made in the course of a >hot pursuit> of Cruz, because he was not in 2arikina during the >buy1bust> operation. In such a case, the police should have first secured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant before they arrested and bodily searched Cruz.

This case should be distinguished from Peo#le u. Cuac"an, involving a continuing buy bust operation where after the sale, the shabu was handed to a policeman a block away who after determining it was shabu which took only a few minutes immediately proceeded to the house of the appellant and arrested him. In the case, the police conducted a buy1bust operation. (s planned, "at. <ggadan and the informant proceeded to the residence of their :uarry while "fc. 4eyes and the other members of the team posted themselves in strategic places. (fter a few minutes, "at. <ggadan together with the informant, reported to "fc. 4eyes that he had succeeded in buying shabu from the appellant at the same time presenting the merchandise to "fc. 4eyes. (fter determining it was shabu, "fc. 4eyes and his men immediately proceeded to the residence of the appellant and found in one of the rooms several men seated around a table, engaged in pot session and several paraphernalia. "at. <ggadan pointed to the appellant to "8C 4eyes as the person who earlier sold habu to him. Thereupon, "fc. 4eyes frisked accused1appellant and found in his person the two 1,,.,, peso bills he gave to "at. <ggadan as buy1bust money and a :uantity of shabu contained in a plastic bag. The court justified the warrantless arrest under ection &, 4ule 11* of the 4ules of Court on warrantless arrest and the obligation of the police to apprehend even without a warrant of arrest. "at. <ggadan witnessed the illegal act of selling shabu on the occasion of the buy1bust operation in front of the room of the accused. Ce did not make the arrest right then and there because there were only himself and the informant as against the different male and female voices he heard from both rooms of appellantBs house. Considering that the operation took place inside the house of appellant, understandably "at. <ggadan and his informant had to get out of the house and inform their backup that the sale had been consummated.

Thus, in Peo#le . /nrile, an arrest based on information of a person who was entrapped to selling marijuana that the source of the 2arijuana was Dnrile and led the police to DnrileBs house and after calling for the latter pointed to him as the source of the marijuana was held as invalid. In Peo#le . 0autista, an arrest and search based on information of the #oseur<bu!er to the police who were outside the house waiting that he was able to buy the shabu from the appellant inside the house who immediately went inside and arrested the appellant was held as valid. In Peo#le . 0uena entura, an arrest based on information of the seller after he was apprehended in a buy1bust operation that the source of the marijuana was the accused who was then arrested in a follow1up operation was held as invalid citing the case of Peo#le u. /nrile. In Peo#le . =erabueno, the upreme Court found=

DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF BASILIO9 THE POLICE LEARNED THAT THE SUPPLIER OF THE MARIJUANA WAS CRUK. A POLICE TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO ANTIPOLO9 RIKAL9 WHERE CRUK LIVED. THE FIRST MISSION RETURNED WITHOUT FINDING CRUK.
The team returned to (ntipolo at 7=,, ".2. of the same day. (ccording to the police, they met Cruz on their way to his house while Cruz claimed that the police just barged into his house. .ut assuming that the version of the police is the correct one, there was no reasonable basis to place Cruz under arrest without a warrant and then search him, also without a warrant.

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8urthermore, weighty consideration is the fact that, as previously stated, "at. <ggadan immediately gave the shabu to "fc. 4eyes who was only a block away and after the latter had determined that it was shabu, which only took a few minutes, they all immediately proceeded to the house of appellant and arrested him. It was a continuing buy1bust operation which, as the phrase connotes, commenced with buying shabu and culminated in his arrest. ince his arrest was lawful, it follows that the incidental search was also valid. In another case, the arresting officers were informed by the %(4C$2 Chief that a transaction had been agreed upon in !as "inas, 2etro 2anila for the delivery of habu to take place in 4oom %o. 77 of the Cyatt Terraces at .aguio City. <ndercover agents waited for the appellant inside the room, but the latter did not show up in the afternoon, but the following morning. (ppellant with an undercover agent arrived at 4oom %o. 77. The latter signaled that appellant had habu with him. Ehile the sale of the habu which was agreed upon with a Chinese business man in !as "inas, 2etro 2anila, did not take place in the presence of the agents, the delivery or attempted delivery of the subject matter took place in their presence. The Court held the warrantless arrest of appellant inside 4ooir 77 was merely the culmination of an entrapment operation and that the taking of shabu from appellant was either done immediately be fore, or was an incident to a lawful arrest. T!" H& P1#'1, A##"' Dlements= a. b. c. (. $ffense have been committed6 $ffense has just been committed6 "robable cause based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that persons to be arrested committed it. F,#' E*"$"+ C M"(+,+; &3 ,ffense Committed The present rule abandons the pronouncement in Peo#le . 0urgos, that in arrests without a warrant under ection 0?b@, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. ( crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

The rule now is the indubitable e;istence of a crime is not necessary to justify a warrantless arrest. In Peo#le . Ramos, an informant apprised the police of the presence of a drug pusher at the corner of *rd treet and 4izal (venue, $longapo City. (cting on such information and in their presence, their superior, Captain Castillo, gave the informant marked money to buy marijuana. The informant, now turned #oseur<bu!er, returned with two sticks of marijuana. Captain Castillo again gave said informant marked money to purchase marijuana. The informant poseur1buyer thereafter another two sticks of marijuana. returned with ).

To justify a warrantless arrest not on ec. &?a@ but ec. &?b@, the upreme Court held that the usual observation of a bulge on the waist of Carillo, along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officerBs professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the tests of the rules. Conse:uently, under the facts, the firearms taken from Carillo can be said to have been incidental to a lawful and valid arrest under ec. &?b@, 4ule 11*. S"0&+2 E*"$"+ C M"(+,+; of :ust 4een committed 3*ust been committed3 connotes immediacy in point of time, per dissent of *ustice $ee"an?ee cited by C.*., 'ernan in his concurring dissenting in 4mil . Ramos. It means a very short time ago. The arrest must be made almost immediately as soon after these acts, not at anytime after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed. The time interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. 1@ /s#iritu . .im The arrest of the accused one day after commission of the crime of Inciting to edition was held to be valid. Peo#le . :a(areno (rrest made 1- days after com1 mission of the crime is valid. "eople v. ucro

The police officers then proceeded to the corner of *rd treet and 4izal (venue and effected the arrest of appellant. The upreme Court with /ustice #utierrez as #onente, held, from the above facts, that it may be concluded that the arresting police officers had personal knowledge of facts implicating the appellant with the sale of marijuana to the informant1poseur1buyer. The arrest was held legal and the conse:uent search which yielded ), sticks of marijuana was lawful for being incident to a valid arrest. The fact that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt does not undermine the legality of the appellantBs arrest. It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. The legality of detention does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed when such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. Peo#le . /uaristo, cited the doctrine in Peo#le . Sucro (su#ra), when crime is deemed committed in oneBs presence 9 e.g., hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at the scene thereof.

)@ 3)

The fact that 2acabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana sticks and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from the accused1appellant clearly indicates that accused had just sold the marijuana sticks to 2acabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored ucreBs nefarious activity. -@ Rolito @o . Court of A##eals (rrest si; days after commission of the crime based on information from

149

alleged eyewitness held unlawful. ( warrantless arrest three ?*@ days after commission of the crime or 1+ hours thereafter were held to be unlawful. 0. T!,#2 E*"$"+ C P"#'&+(* K+&6*"2;" &3 F(0 ' 8ollowing are the doctrines under the 1+'& 4ule on the meaning of Personal Fno,ledge of 'acts .ased on Information 4ejected 1@ )@ *@ -@ Peo#le . 0urgos, personal knowledge based on, in1 formation by suspect rejected. Ali" . Castro, ?%eed for personal knowledge@ Peo#le . Aminnudin Earrantless arrest based on tip of informer who pointed to the suspect was rejected. Peo#le u. Sucro, citing Peo#le . 0ati "olice officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. In Peo#le u. Al are( (rrest based on surveillance by informant who was once a policeman was held to be valid. Peo#le . 0riones Earrantless arrest made by a police officer based on disclosure by eyewitness who disclosed the identity of the perpetrator was rejected. Peo#le . Cendana (rrest based on information from unknown sources given a day after the commission of the crime was rejected. Peo#le . $onog (rrest based on knowledge of facts gathered from investigation was held valid. In this case there was an oral confession. +@ :a(areno . Station Commander of =untinlu#a (rrest based on information of a suspect 1- days aftel commission of crime held as valid. This is of doubtful validity. 1@

"etitionerBs arrest took place si; ?0@ days after the shooting of 2aguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of ection &?a@, at the time petitioner had allegedly who 2aguan. %either could the arrest effected si; ?0@ days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when Gthe shooting hadH ii fact just been committed within the meaning of ection &?b@. 2oreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot 2aguan The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitness to the shooting 9 one stated that petitioner was the gunman6 another was able to take down the alleged gunmanBs car plate number which turned out to be registered in petitionerBs wife name. That information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
"ersonal Mnowledge of 8acts .ased on Information (llowed

*@

In Peo#le u. 0autista, held as valid an arrest made by the station commander, who was outside the house, based on information of t"e #oseur<bu!er after the purchase was made. aid case cited in 4.S. . Santos, which justified a warrantless arrest on reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. In Peo#le u. Sa!con, warrantless arrest of debarking passenger from vessel based on information was held valid. C9=PAR/+ Peo#le . /nrile Information by co1accused that Dnrile gave him the marijuana is invalid. In Peo#le . /ncinada, the court held that= >4aw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.> Cowever, in Peo#le . =ontilla (su#ra), the court observed that >although information gathered and passed on by law enforcers are vague and piece1meal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would e;pect from a professional spymaster, such tip1offs are sometimes sucessful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant.>

-@

&@

In Peo#le . =adriaga, personal knowledge based on information of the co1accused pointing to accused as to source of marijuana, was held as valid. In Peo#le . @erente, the policemen arrested #erente only some three ?*@ hours after #erente and his companions had killed .lace. They saw .lace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death6 a piece of wood and a concrete hollow which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eyewitness, Ddna Ddwina 4eyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, #erente as one of the killers. <nder those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of .lace and of facts indicating that #erente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest #erente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

&@

0@

)@

In Sanc"e( . 7emetriou. The Earrantless arrest based on the sworn statement of Centeno by an officer who had no personal knowledge is unlawful but the defect was cured by the filing of charges and issuance of warrant of arrest. In Peo#le . (coI, a group held up a passenger jeepney "olicemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. $ne of the victims saw four persons walking towards 8ort .onifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. Ce pointed them to the policemen. Ehen the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. Three were caught and arrested. Dach was found in possession of an unlicensed revolver and charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused claimed that the warrantless seizure of firearms was illegal. The Court rejected their plea and held that the search was a valid incident of a lawful arrest. The subse:uent search of accused1appellantBs person and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful.

7@

'@

1,@ Rolito @o u. Court of A##eals (su#ra, 'ebruar! 1222) *ustice 'eliciano as #onente (rrest 0 days after shooting based on information of alleged eyewitnesses was held unlawful

"ersonal Mnowledge of 8acts .ased on 4easonable #rounds of

uspicion

150

4ule is now the 4ule

In its resolution denying the 2otion for 4econsideration in the 4mil . Ramos cases, the majority opinion e;plained the meaning of personal knowledge of facts, as follows=
>It has been ruled that &#ersonal ?no,ledge of facts,& in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (Sub%ecti e) The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. (9b%ecti e) ( reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.>

speaking thru /usice 4eynato "uno wrote, >"ersonal knowledge> of facts arrests without warrant under ection &?b@ of 4ule 11* must be based upon >probable cause> which means an >actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion> and reiterated the rule in 4mil . Ramos. In this case, accused1appellant #addao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co1accused. ",* 2anlangit, however, declared in his direct e;amination that appellant 3oria named his co1accused in response to his ?",* 2anlangitBs@ :uery as to where the marked money was, (ppellant 3oria did not point to appellant #addao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant #addao conspired with her co1accused in pushing drugs. (ppellant 3oria may have left the money in her house. Eith or without her knowledge, with or without conspiracy. ave for accused1appellant 3oriaBs word, the %arcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. aid the <. . upreme Court=

must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the e;istence of probable cause. In doing so, however, the e;pertise of the officer are to be taken into account. This is as it should be for there would be little merit in securing able trained men to guard the public peace if their actions were to be measured by what might be probable cause to untrained civilians. In assessing the conduct of the police officer, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. The test is= Eould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appreciated.
"ersonal Mnowledge of the 3eath of 5ictim and 8acts Indicating that (ccused Eas the (ssailant

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in section &, 4ule 11*, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested but whether they are probably guilty thereof. %ot evidence of guilt but 3#robable cause3 is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. The Courts should not e;pect of law1enforcers more than what the law re:uires of them. <nder the conditions set forth in ection &, 4ule 11*, particularly paragraph ?b@ thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and ac:uitted, the arresting officers are not liable. .ut if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under (rticle *) of the Civil Code andAor for other administrative sanctions. The same principle was stated in Peo#le u. Aruta. "robable cause in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. The foregoing standards were also adopted in warrantless >hot pursuit> arrest. Thus, in the 1+++ case of Peo#le u. 7oria, the Court en bane

In Peo#le . $onog, the police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab wounds. (n informer pointed to the accused as the person who had killed the victim. That afternoon, police officers arrested the accused. $n their way to the police station, a policeman noticed bloodstains on the accusedBs pants which, when e;amined, was found to be the same blood type >,> found on the fatal knife. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest and ruled that the blood1stained pants, having been seized as an incident of a law1 ful arrest, was admissible in evidence. In Peo#le . @erente, the police arrested the accused three hours after the victim had been killed. They went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block used by the killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. ( neighbor of the accused who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the assailants. The warrantless arrest was held valid under 4ule 11*, ec. &?b@. In Peo#le . *a! son, there was a shooting. The policemen sum1 moned to the scene of the crime and found the victim. (ccused1 appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact accused1appellant had not gone very far ?only ten meters away from the 3l"a,<)"a,3), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused1appellant was the assailant. The court upheld the warrantless arrests as valid.

"THE ARREST MUST STAND UPON A FIRMER GROUND THAN MERE SUSPICION THOUGH THE ARRESTING OFFICER NEED NOT HAVE IN HAND EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE TO CONVICT.
The :uantum of information which constitutes probable cause or evidence which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a felony has been committed must be measured by the facts of the particular case. ( significantly lower :uantum of proof is re:uired to establish probable cause than guilt.>

"robable cause may, however, not be established simply by showing that the officer who made the challenged arrest or search subjectively believed that he had grounds for his action. #ood faith alone is not sufficient. The probable cause test is an objective one. The mere subjective conclusion of a police concerning the e;istence of probable cause is not binding in the court which

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In another case, the police officers were informed that accused were repacking drugs. (ccompanied by an informer. They peeped first through the window before they saw the activities of the suspects inside the room and entered the house and arrested the suspects. The court held that the arrest, search and seizure were illegal. They should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the activities and identities of the suspects were already known and if there was probable cause, they should have applied for a search warrant. The court reiterated the seven ?7@ situations of a warrantless search and held that the arrest, search and seizure do not fall on any of them. ONLY COURTS COULD DECIDE THE QUESTION OF PROBABLE CAUSE SINCE THE STUDENTS WERE NOT BEING ARRESTED I- .*A=7RA-T/ '/*ICT, In Posadas . $"e >on. 9mbudsman, the %.I agents tried to effect an arrest four da!s after commission of t"e crime and had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime and what they had were t"e su##osed #ositi e identification of t,o alleged e!e,itnesses, t"e court "eld t"is is insufficient to %ustif! t"e arrest ,it"out a ,arrant b! t"e :0). The Court distinguished the case from that of Peo#le relied upon by the prosecution to justify the arrest. . $onog,

$"ird, the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In the words of 4ule 11*, ec. &?b@, the crime had >just been committed> and the arresting officer had >personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it.> The court reiterated the rule in Peo#le . 7oria (su#ra), that=
&3Personal ?no,ledge& of facts in arrests without a warrant under ection &?b@ of 4ule 11* must be based upon Bprobable causeB which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspension are reasonable when, the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficientl! strong in t"emsel es to create t"e #robable cause of guilt of t"e #erson to be arrested. A reasonable sus#icion t"erefore must be founded on #robable cause, cou#led ,it" good fait" on t"e #art of t"e #eace officers ma?ing t"e arrest.3

3rug >pushers> or couriers do not customarily go about their enterprise or trade with some e;ternal visible sign advertising the fact that they are carrying or distributing or transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the application of the rules in ection &?a@ and ?b@, 4ule 1** of the 4ules of Court needs to take that circumstances into account. The Court has had to resolve the :uestion of valid or invalid warrantless arrest or warrantless search or seizure in such cases by determining the presence or absence of a reasonable or probable cause, before that such a felony ?possessing or transporting or delivering prohibited drugs@ was then in progress. In 0arros, the Court listed the kinds of causes which have been characterized as probable or reasonable cause supporting the legality and validity of a warrantless search and a warrantless arrest in cases of this type=

"THIS COURT HAS IN THE PAST FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT WITHOUT A JUDICIAL WARRANT AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES IN SITUATIONS WHERE
?1@ ?)@ there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana6 agents of the %arcotics Command ?>%arcom>@ of the "hilippine %ational "olice ?>"%">@ had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted6 ),%arcom agents were informed or >tipped off> by an undercover >deep penetration> agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date6 %arcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from agada, 2ountain "rovince, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the %arcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waist1 line, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when re:uested to do so6 and %arcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana.>

To allow the arrest which the %.I intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the e;istence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. $"e la, aut"orities a #olice officer or e en an ordinar! citi(en to arrest criminal offenders onl! if t"e latter are committing or "a e %ust committed a crime. $therwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the re:uirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects. (rt. Ill, ec. ) of the Constitution. R1*" ,+ D#1; C('"' The upreme Court in Peo#le . Sa!con pointed out that=

?*@

?-@

In Tonog, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. <pon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for e;amination at the crime laboratory. The :uestion in that case involved the admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that $onog does not apply to this case. 'irst, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latterBs invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains an the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody.

?&@

Caution=

The governmentBs drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. .ut it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do.

>It is important to note that unlike in the case of crimes like, e.g., homicide, murder, physical injuries, robbery or rape which by their nature involve physical, optically perceptible, overt acts, the defense of possessing or delivering or transporting some prohibited or regulated drug is customarily carried out without any e;ternal signs or indication visible to police officers and the rest of the outside world.

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8ealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. %othing can destroy a government more :uickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own e;istence. R1*" &+ E'0(%""' Ehen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. (n officer may arrest without a warrant, a prisoner who has escaped from custody after trial and commitment, and it has been held that even a private person may without a warrant, arrest a convicted felon who has escaped and is at large. (n officer may arrest without a warrant, a prisoner who has escaped from custody after trial and commitment. Dven a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a convicted felon who has escaped and is at large, since he might also, before conviction, have arrested the felon. D asion of ser ice of sentence8 Arrest, ,it"out a ,arrant, #rinci#le a##lied. 4ule 11* of the 4evised 4ules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion6 for, under ection 0?c@ thereof one of the instances when a person may be validly arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. <ndoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime 9 evading the service of his sentence. SEC. ?. Time of Ma>in2 Arrest SEC. 7. Method of Arrest 4y ,fficer 4y +irtue of (arrant SEC. -. Method of Arrest 4y ,fficer (ithout (arrant

D1 4 &3 A##"' ,+; O33,0"# (t the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Ce shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most e;pedient means 9 by telephone if possible 9 or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. %o custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. (ny statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether e;culpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
"rocedure, #uidelines and 3uties of (rresting or Investigating $fficer

against him6 c. Ce must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice6 Ce must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him, and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf6 That whether or not the person arrested has lawyer he must be informed that no custodial investigation any form shall be conducted e;cept in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made6 The person arrested must be informed that at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most e;pedient means 9 telephone, radio, letter or messenger 9 with his lawyer ?either retained or appointed@, any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or any one from his immediate family or by counsel or be visited or by conferences with duly accredited national or international non1governmental organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished6 Ce must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same6 In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing (%3 in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak6 That the person must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any stage of the process that he does not wish to be :uestioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced or the interrogation must ceased ?sic@ if it has already begun6 The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process regardless of whether he may have answered some :uestions or volunteered some statement6 and

d.

e.

f.

g.

Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court as guardian of the rights of the people, and in the light of the new legal developments, laid down an updated procedure, guidelines and duties ,"ic" t"e arresting, detaining, in iting or in estigating officer or "is com#anions must do and obser e at t"e time of ma?ing arrest and again at and during t"e custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and 4epublic (ct %o. 7-*'= a. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Dvery other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person6 b. Ce must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence

h.

i.

j.

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k.

Ce must also be informed that any statement or evidence as the case may be obtained in violation of any of the foregoing whether inculpatory or e;culpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. SEC. /. Method of Arrest 4y 0ri5ate 0erson SEC. 18. ,fficer may Summon Assistance SEC. 11. Ri2ht of ,fficer to 9rea> into 9uildin2 or /nclosure SEC. 12. Ri2ht to 9rea> ,ut from 9uildin2 or /nclosure SEC. 13. Arrest After /scape or Rescue SEC. 1.. Ri2ht of Attorney or Relati5e to +isit 0erson arrested

AS USED IN THIS ACT9 "CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" SHALL INCLUDE THE PRACTICE OF ISSUING AN "INVITATION" TO A PERSON WHO IS INVESTIGATED IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE HE IS SUSPECTED TO HAVE COMMITTED9 WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE LIABILITY OF THE "INVITING" OFFICER FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW. SEC. . : AA ANY ARRESTING PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE9 OR ANY INVESTIGATING OFFICER9 WHO FAILS TO INFORM ANY PERSON ARRESTED9 DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE9 SHALL SUFFER A FINE OF SIX THOUSAND PESOS @P?9888.88A OR A PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN EIGHT @-A YEARS BUT NOT MORE THAN TEN @18A YEARS9 OR BOTH.
The penalty of perpetual absolute dis:ualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

WRITING AND SIGNED BY SUCH PERSON IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS COUNSEL OR IN THE LATTERFS ABSENCE9 UPON A VALID WAIVER9 AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ANY OF THE PARENTS9 ELDER BROTHERS AND SISTERS9 HIS SPOUSE9 THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR9 THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE9 DISTRICT SCHOOL SUPERVISOR9 OR PRIEST OR MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL AS CHOSEN BY HIMG OTHERWISE9 SUCH EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN ANY PROCEEDING. In other words, if there is a valid waiver, and the lawyerBs pres 1 ence is waived, the confession must still be signed in the presence of any persons enumerated above. 1. A%%*,0( ,&+ &3 A0 1(* F&#0"9 M(+1(* T&10!,+; &3 !" B&249 P!4',0(* R"' #(,+ &# ( F&#$(* D"0*(#( ,&+ &3 A##"' ,' N& R"H1,#"2 It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.1 a. ( letter1invitation is e:uivalent to arrest. Ehere the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designated interrogation site as a military camp, this is obviously a command or an order of arrest. b. <nder R.A. :o. ;43E, the re:uisites of a custodial interrogation are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely invited for :uestioning,

<nder 4epublic (ct %o. 7-*'=

"SECTION 2@BA : ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE9 OR ANYONE ACTING UNDER HIS ORDER OR IN HIS PLACE9 WHO ARRESTS9 DETAINS OR INVESTIGATES ANY PERSON FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE SHALL INFORM THE LATTER9 IN A LANGUAGE KNOWN TO AND UNDERSTOOD BY HIM9 OF HIS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL9 PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE9 WHO SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE ALLOWED TO CONFER PRIVATELY WITH THE PERSON ARRESTED9 DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. ?a@ (ny person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non1governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Cuman 4ights or by any international non1governmental organization duly accredited by the $ffice of the "resident. The personBs >immediate family> shall include his or her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

THE SAME PENALTIES SHALL BE IMPOSED UPON A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE9 OR ANYONE ACTING UPON ORDERS OF SUCH INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR IN HIS PLACE9 WHO FAILS TO PROVIDE A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL TO A PERSON ARRESTED9 DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE IF THE LATTER CANNOT AFFORD THE SERVICES OF HIS OWN COUNSEL. BA ANY PERSON WHO OBSTRUCTS9 PREVENTS OR PROHIBITS ANY LAWYER9 ANY MEMBER OF THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY OF A PERSON ARRESTED9 DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION9 OR ANY MEDICAL DOCTOR OR PRIEST OR RELIGIOUS MINISTER CHOSEN BY HIM OR BY ANY MEMBER OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY OR BY HIS COUNSEL9 FROM VISITING AND CONFERRING PRIVATELY WITH HIM9 OR FROM EXAMINING AND TREATING HIM9 OR FROM MINISTERING TO HIS SPIRITUAL NEEDS9 AT ANY HOUR OF THE DAY OR9 IN URGENT CASES9 OF THE NIGHT SHALL SUFFER THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN FOUR @.A YEARS NOR MORE THAN SIX @?A YEARS9 AND A FINE OF FOUR THOUSAND PESOS @P.9888.88A. UNDER SEC. 2@DA9 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 73.- ANY EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESION MADE BY A PERSON9 ARRESTED9 DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" @WHICH SHALL INCLUDE AN "INVITATION FOR INVESTIGATION" SHALL BE IN

2. I**";(*, 4 &3 A##"' D&"' N& R"+2"# !" P#&0""2,+;' V&,2 6!"#" N& ,$"*4 O)<"0 ,&+ & !" I##";1*(#, 4 ,' M(2" a. ee also Peo#le arrest. . =acam3 for waiver of illegality of

( motion to :uash should be filed. The illegality of the arrest or the procedure in ac:uiring jurisdiction of the person of an accused must be raised before plea. GIHt is too late for appellant to raise the :uestion of his arrest without a warrant. Ehen accused1appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon

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arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. (ppellant is thus estopped from :uestioning the legality of his arrest. It is well1settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the ac:uisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. .esides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. Ce did not move for the :uashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Conse:uently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. 2oreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after the trial free from error. b. Thus, the unlawfulness of an arrest does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

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