Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines

Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as
amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is
the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that
the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection,
because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of
discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law,
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance
to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of
right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection
insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the
creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those
who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as
petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached
by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are
more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)
Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to
the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the
right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the
SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft
and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating
the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7,
P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does
not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better
than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate
decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the
trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly
ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise
limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the
trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and
corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and
then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases
when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity,
detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices
that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan
only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption
can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution).
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress


Republic Act No. 6670 August 4, 1988
AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS AND TERMS USED IN
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO INSTITUTE A
MODIFIED PERFORMANCE BUDGET SYSTEM
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Section 13 of P.D. 1177 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 13. Submission of the Budget. The President shall, in accordance with
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, submit to the Congress within thirty (30)
days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the General
Appropriations Bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. Additional appropriations
proposals may be submitted which correspond to part of the expenditure estimates
submitted as part of the budget proposal: Provided, That continuing appropriations
may be enacted for public works, highways and other infrastructure projects which
require more than one year for construction. In such cases, revenue estimates for
the future years shall be used in the evaluation of funding availability.
"The President may transmit to Congress, from time to time, such proposed
supplemental or deficiency appropriations as are, in his judgment, (a) necessary on
account of laws enacted after the transmission of the Budget, or (b) otherwise
needed in the public interest."
Section 2. Section 24 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 24. Appropriations for Personal Services. Appropriations for personal
services shall be considered as included in the amount specified for each budgetary
program and project of each department, bureau, office or agency, and shall be
itemized. The itemization of personal services shall be prepared by the Secretary for
consideration and approval of the President as provided in Section 30 hereof:
Provided, that the itemization of personal services shall be prepared for all agencies
of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches and the Constitutional bodies
down to the division chief level and in the case of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Integrated National Police down to the rank of second lieutenant,
except as may be otherwise approved by the President for positions concerned with
national security matters: Provided, further, That appropriations for casual and/ or
temporary employees shall be in lump-sum based on the number of man-hours to be
rendered."
Section 3. Section 26 of the same decree is hereby repealed.
Section 4. Section 27 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 27. Infrastructure and Other Bills. The public works, highways and other
bills requiring appropriations may be filed at any time during the sessions of the
Congress and shall be considered by the Congress upon their being reported out by
the corresponding Committees."
Section 5. Sections 28 and 29 of the same decree are hereby repealed.
Section 6. Section 30 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 30. Content of the General Appropriations Act. The General Appropriations
Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each
agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations for each program
and project, including statutory provisions of specific agency or general applicability.
The General Appropriations Act shall contain an itemization of personal services
which shall be prepared by the Secretary before enactment of the General
Appropriations Act."
Section 7. The following words, phrases or terms wherever they appear in Presidential
Decree No. 1177, as amended, are hereby amended to read:
(a) "Ministry of the Budget" shall read "Department of the Budget and Management";
(b) "Minister of Budget" shall read "Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management";
(c) "National Assembly" and "Batasan" shall read "Congress";
(d) "Ministry" and "Ministries" shall read "Department" and "Departments,"
respectively; and
(e) "Minister" shall read "Secretary."
Section 8. All laws, decrees, executive orders, and letters of instruction inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act and the Constitution are hereby repealed, superseded and/or
modified.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: August 4, 1988.
Garcia v. Mojica
Posted on October 3, 2012
G.R. No. 139043
September 10, 1999
Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a
contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers
the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998 upon F.E.
Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding
the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract
signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to
conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of
the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-
0132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to
criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials
involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,
approved this recommendation
Issues:
1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local
Government Code.
Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of
office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his
past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered
into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of the
elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate
could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular
aspect of his life and character.
Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during
his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was
perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At
that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus,
any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became
extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries
under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the
contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case, other
than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total
exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed
in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the question of his
administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC
(60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively
suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy
Ombudsman.
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis
Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not
punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against
then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner,
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several
disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension
effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day
preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines



RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is
bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to
be no ifs and buts about it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension,
the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and
employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis--vis
Congress Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing
the assailed preventive suspension order.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261
NOV. 10, 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by
the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice
ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint
or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The
"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation
of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of
the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court
and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but
also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House
of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora
of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME114
SCRA
FACTS:The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an
assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13,
1976, who had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3
rd
of July
1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed
for the confirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the
Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the
following
contentions:1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the
Piguing spouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to
private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional
prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is
not applicable.
2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the
Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of
their imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply
fora judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.
3.Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is
contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.
RULING:1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a
juridical person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14of the
1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000hectares in area. In fine,
only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines are allowed to apply for
confirmation under the PLA.
2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is
contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by
Not finished..
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest:
Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership
to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares