G.R. No.

128067 June 5, 1998

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA FILSYSTEMS (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-KMU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and FILSYSTEMS, INC., respondents.

PUNO, J .:
Assailed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Resolution and Order
1
of the public
respondent, dated June 28, 1996 and November 18, 1996, respectively, dismissing petitioner's
petition for certification election.
It appears that petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems (SAMAFIL-NAFLU-
KMU) is a registered labor union with Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-10-1575-95
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on October 25, 1995. On
November 6, 1995, petitioner union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the rank-
and-file employees of private respondent FILSYSTEMS, Inc. before the DOLE National
Capital Region (NCR).
2
Attached as annexes to the petition are the Certificate of Registration
issued by the DOLE, copies of union membership signed by thirty three (33) rank-and-file
employees of respondent company, the Charter Certificate showing its affiliation with the National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU-KMU), the list of union officers, the certification of the union
secretary of the minutes of the general membership meeting, the Books of Accounts and its
Constitution and By-Laws.
3

Private respondent opposed the petition. It questioned the status of petitioner as a legitimate
labor organization on the ground of lack of proof that its contract of affiliation with the
NAFLU-KMU has been submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30)
days from its execution.
4

In reply, petitioner averred that as a duly registered labor union, it has "all the rights and
privileges . . . to act as representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining
with employers."
5

On January 12, 1996, Med-Arbiter Paterno D. Adap dismissed the petition for certification
election. He ruled that petitioner, as an affiliate of NAFLU-KMU, has no legal personality on
account of its failure to comply with paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of Section 3, Rule II of the
Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,
6
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In matters of affiliation of an independently registered union, the rules provide that
the latter shall be considered an affiliate of a labor federation after submission of the
contract or agreement of affiliation to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within
thirty (30) days after its execution.
Likewise, it mandates the federation or national union concerned to issue a charter
certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which
shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from
issuance of such certificate.
A close examination of the records of the case does not reveal that the federation
and the independent union have executed a contract or agreement of affiliation, nor
had it shown that it has submitted its charter certificate to the Bureau of Labor
Relations, within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate as
amended by the rules.
Petitioner argued that it has complied with all the requirements for certification
election pursuant to the mandate of Sec. 2, Rule V of Book V of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code; that the rule cited by respondent is not included in the Rule
citing the requirements for certification election.
We disagree with petitioner's contention. The rule cited by the petitioner, Sec. 2, Rule
V, Book V, sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D, E, F and G, refers to an independently
registered labor organization which has filed a petition for certification election.
In the case at bar, an independently registered union has affiliated with a federation,
hence, strict compliance with the requirements embodied in Sec. 3, paragraphs A, B
and E of Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code
should be complied with.
Record discloses that petitioner has not shown to have executed a contract or
agreement of affiliation nor has it established that is has submitted its charter
certificate to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) within thirty (30) days from its
execution.
Thus, petitioner in this case having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement,
there was no valid affiliation. Consequently, petitioner has no legal personality
because the union failed to attain the status of legitimacy for failure to comply with
the requirements of law.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It reiterated its
contention that as an independently registered union, it has the right to file a petition for
certification election regardless of its failure to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU.
7

On February 26, 1996, private respondent opposed the appeal. It argued that petitioner
should have filed its petition for certification election as an independently registered union
and not as a union affiliated with NAFLU-
KMU.
8

Meanwhile or on February 7, 1996, another union, the Filsystems Workers Union (FWU),
filed a Petition for Certification Election in the same bargaining unit. On March 22, 1996, the
Med-Arbitration NCR Branch granted the petition. The certification election held on April
19, 1996, was won by FWU which garnered twenty six (26) votes out of the forty six (46)
eligible voters. The FWU was certified on April 29, 1996, as the exclusive bargaining agent of
all rank-and-file employees of private respondent. Eventually, FWU and the private
respondent negotiated a CBA.
9

On June 11, 1996, the private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of petitioner as it
has become moot and academic. It also invoked Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code stating that "once a union has been certified, no
certification election may be held within one (1) year from the date of issuance of a final
certification election [result]."
10

In opposing the Motion to Dismiss Appeal, petitioner contended that its appeal is not moot as
the certification election held on April 19, 1996, was void for violating Section 10, Rule V of
the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code,
11
viz:
Sec. 10. Decision of the Secretary final and inappealable. The Secretary shall
have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the
records of the case. The filing of the appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter
stays the holding of any certification election. The decision of the Secretary shall be
final and inappealable.
Petitioner further argued that the CBA executed between the FWU and the private
respondent could not affect its pending representation case following Section 4, Rule V of
the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code
12
which states:
Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. The representation case shall not, however,
be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or
during the last 60 days of the subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the
representation case.
On June 28, 1996, respondent Secretary dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner on
the ground that it has been rendered moot by the certification of FWU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of respondent company. Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated November 18, 1996.
13

Before this Court, petitioner contends:
I
Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to acting without
or in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the pending appeal in the representation
case was rendered moot and academic by a subsequently enacted collective
bargaining agreement in the company.
II
Public respondent committed a serious legal error and gravely abused its discretion
in failing to hold that the legal personality of petitioner as a union having been
established by its Certificate of Registration, the same could not be subjected to
collateral attack.
The petition is meritorious.
I
We shall first resolve whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
when he effectively affirmed the Resolution dated January 12, 1996 of the Med-Arbiter
dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election for failure to prove its affiliation with
NAFLU-KMU.
The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med-Arbiter is flawed, proceeding as it does
from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that petitioner is an independently
registered labor union as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As
a legitimate labor organization, petitioner's right to file a petition for certification election on its
own is beyond question.
14
Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-
KMU cannot affect its right to file said petition for certification election as an independent union.
At the most, petitioner's failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with NAFLU-KMU. Still,
however, it can pursue its petition for certification election as an independent union. In our rulings,
we have stressed that despite affiliation, the local union remains the basic unit free to serve the
common interest of all its members and pursue its own interests independently of the
federation.
15

In fine, the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certification election on
account of its non-submission of the charter certificate and the contract of affiliation with the
NAFLU-KMU with the BLR. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion in
sustaining the Med-Arbiter's Resolution.
II
We shall now resolve the issue of whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was rendered
moot and academic by the subsequent certification election ordered by the Med-Arbiter, won
by FWU and which culminated in a CBA with private respondent.
Public respondent's ruling is anchored on his finding that there exists no pending
representation case since the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner was
dismissed by the Med-Arbiter. According to the public respondent, the legal effect of the
dismissal of the petition was to leave the playing field open without any legal barrier or
prohibition to any petitioner; thus, other legitimate labor organizations may file an entirely
new petition for certification election.
We reject public respondent's ruling. The order of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioner's
petition for certification election was seasonably appealed. The appeal stopped the holding
of any certification election. Section 10, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the
Labor Code is crystal clear and hardly needs any interpretation.
Accordingly, there was an unresolved representation case at the time the CBA was entered
between FWU and private respondent. Following Section 4, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, such CBA cannot and will not prejudice petitioner's
pending representation case or render the same moot.
16
This rule was applied in the case
of Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) v. Trajano 17 where we held that "[t]here should be no obstacle to the
right of the proper time, that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement
. . ., not even by a collective agreement submitted during the pendency of the representation case." Likewise, inAssociated Labor
Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,
18
we held that a prematurely renewed CBA is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election.
Finally, we bewail private respondent's tenacious opposition to petitioner's certification
election petition. Such a stance is not conducive to industrial peace. Time and again, we
have emphasized that when a petition for certification election is filed by a legitimate labor
organization, it is good policy for the employer not to have any participation or partisan
interest in the choice of the bargaining representative. While employers may rightfully be
notified or informed of petitions of such nature, they should not, however, be considered
parties thereto with an inalienable right to oppose it. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union.
Thus, inConsolidated Farms, Inc. II v. Noriel,
19
we declared that "[o]n a matter that should be
the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer
is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This
Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely
internal affair of labor. . . . [While] it is true that there may be circumstances where the interest of
the employer calls for its being heard on the matter, . . . sound policy dictates that as much as
possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For it is does not, it may lend itself
to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to
the concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit of welfare legislation
intended to protect labor and promote social justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look
with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading to the free and
untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order
of the public respondent are set aside. The Bureau of Labor Relations is ORDERED to hold
a certification election in respondent company with petitioner as a contending union. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
In this appeal, petitioner Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. (hereafter Yokohama, for brevity) assails
the Decision
1
dated April 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74273 and its
Resolution
2
dated August 15, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiters
order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
ordered an election with (1) "Yokohama Employees Union" and (2) "No Union" as choices.
3
The
election held on November 23, 2001 yielded the following result:
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION - 131
NO UNION - 117
SPOILED - 2
---------
250
VOTES CHALLENGED BY [YOKOHAMA] - 78
VOTES CHALLENGED BY [UNION] - 73
---------
-
TOTAL CHALLENGED VOTES - 151
TOTAL VOTES CAST - 401
4

Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees. On the other hand, the Union
challenged 68 votes cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes by
alleged supervisor-trainees. Yokohama formalized its protest and raised as an issue the eligibility to
vote of the 78 dismissed employees,
5
while the Union submitted only a handwritten manifestation
during the election.
On January 21, 2002, the Med-Arbiter resolved the parties protests, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
x x x x
2. The appreciation of the votes of the sixty-five (65) dismissed employees who contested
their dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission shall be suspended until the
final disposition of their complaint for illegal dismissal. . . .
3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) so-called "newly-regularized" rank-and-file employees
shall be appreciated in the final tabulation.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
6
(Emphasis supplied.)
On May 22, 2002, the DOLE Acting Secretary disposed of the appeals as follows:
WHEREFORE, the partial appeal of [Yokohama] is DENIED and the appeal of [the union]
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Thus, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 21 January 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
x x x x
2. The votes of dismissed employees who contested their dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall be appreciated in the final
tabulation of the certification election results.
3. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) newly regularized rank-and-file employees shall be
excluded.
x x x x
SO RESOLVED.
7
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary.
8
The appellate
court held that the 78 employees who contested their dismissal were entitled to vote under Article
212 (f)
9
of the Labor Code and Section 2, Rule XII
10
of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor
Code. However, it disallowed the votes of the 68 newly regularized employees since they were not
included in the voters list submitted during the July 12, 2001 pre-election conference. The appellate
court also noted that Yokohamas insistence on their inclusion lends suspicion that it wanted to
create a company union, and ruled that Yokohama had no right to intervene in the certification
election. Finally, it ruled that the unions handwritten manifestation during the election was
substantial compliance with the rule on protest.
Yokohama appealed.
On September 15, 2003, we issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the
May 22, 2002 Decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the October 15, 2002 Resolution of the
DOLE Secretary, denying Yokohamas motion for reconsideration.
11

In a manifestation with motion to annul the DOLE Secretarys entry of judgment filed with this Court
on October 16, 2003, Yokohama attached a Resolution
12
dated April 25, 2003 of the Med-Arbiter.
The resolution denied Yokohamas motion to suspend proceedings and cited the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The resolution also certified that the Union obtained a majority of 208 votes in the
certification election while "No Union" obtained 121 votes. Yokohama also attached an entry of
judgment
13
issued by the DOLE stating that the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the Med-Arbiter was
affirmed by the DOLE Secretarys Office on July 29, 2003 and became final on September 29, 2003.
In a subsequent manifestation/motion with erratum filed on October 21, 2003, Yokohama deleted an
allegation in its October 16, 2003 manifestation which was included "through inadvertence and
clerical mishap." Said allegation reads:
x x x x
. . . Notably, the Resolution dated 29 J uly 2003 which affirmed the Resolution dated 25 April
2003 is still not final and executory considering the timely filing of a motion for its
reconsideration on 15 August 2003 which until now has yet to be resolved.
14

In this appeal, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISALLOWING
THE APPRECIATION OF THE VOTES OF SIXTY-EIGHT REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE [DOLE SECRETARYS] DECLARATION THAT [THE UNIONS] MANIFESTATION ON
THE DAY OF THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH
THE RULE ON FORMALIZATION OF PROTESTS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
APPRECIATION OF VOTES OF ALL OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY
DISMISSED FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND ABANDONMENT OF WORK WHICH
ARE CAUSES UNRELATED TO THE CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
15

We shall first resolve the last assigned issue: Was it proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed
employees?
Petitioner argues that "the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the votes of the dismissed employees
should be appreciated." Petitioner posits that "employees who have quit or have been dismissed for
just cause prior to the date of the certification election are excluded from participating in the
certification election." Petitioner had questioned the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees.
Respondent counters that Section 2, Rule XII
16
of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code
allows a dismissed employee to vote in the certification election if the case contesting the dismissal
is still pending.
Section 2, Rule XII, the rule in force during the November 23, 2001 certification election clearly,
unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to vote during the certification
election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending at the time of the election.
17

Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although
their cases were still pending at the time of the certification election on November 23, 2001. These
cases were filed on June 27, 2001
18
and the appeal of the Labor Arbiters February 28, 2003
Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.
19

Even the new rule
20
has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of
dismissal, dismissed employees are eligible or qualified voters. Thus,
Rule IX
Conduct of Certification Election
Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. . . . An employee who has been dismissed
from work but has contested the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the
time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be considered a
qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the time of the
conduct of the certification election.1avvphi 1
x x x x
Thus, we find no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of Appeals
in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees.
Finally, we need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized
rank-and-file employees, even if counted in favor of "No Union," will not materially alter the result.
There would still be 208 votes in favor of respondent and 189
21
votes in favor of "No Union."
We also note that the certification election is already a fait accompli, and clearly petitioners rank-
and-file employees had chosen respondent as their bargaining representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated April 9, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74273 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2003
are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on September 15, 2003 is hereby
DISSOLVED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146206 August 1, 2011
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
The issues in the present case, relating to the inclusion of employees in supervisor levels 3 and 4
and the exempt employees in the proposed bargaining unit, thereby allowing their participation in the
certification election; the application of the "community or mutuality of interests" test; and the
determination of the employees who belong to the category of confidential employees, are not novel.
In G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v.
Laguesma,
1
the Court held that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical and internal
business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San
Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) are not to be considered confidential employees, because the same do
not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances. Consequently,
they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having
"community or mutuality of interests," constitute a single bargaining unit. They perform work of the
same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a common
stake in concerted activities. It was immaterial that the three plants have different locations as they
did not impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.
2

Pursuant to the Court's decision in G.R. No. 110399, the Department of Labor and Employment
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) conducted pre-election conferences.
3
However, there was a
discrepancy in the list of eligible voters, i.e., petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San
Fernando plant and 33 for the Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82, respectively.
4

On August 31, 1998, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan issued an Order
5
directing Election
Officer Cynthia Tolentino to proceed with the conduct of certification election in accordance with
Section 2, Rule XII of Department Order No. 9.
On September 30, 1998, a certification election was conducted and it yielded the following
results,
6
thus:
Cabuyao
Plant
San Fernando
Plant
Total
Yes 23 23 46
No 0 0 0
Spoiled 2 0 2
Segregated 41 35 76
Total Votes Cast 66 58 124
On the date of the election, September 30, 1998, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and
Challenge to Voters,
7
questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that
some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that
there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner. Specifically, it argued that
certain employees should not be allowed to vote as they are: (1) confidential employees; (2)
employees assigned to the live chicken operations, which are not covered by the bargaining unit; (3)
employees whose job grade is level 4, but are performing managerial work and scheduled to be
promoted; (4) employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong plant; (5) non-SMFI employees; and (6)
employees who are members of other unions.
On October 21, 1998, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order directing respondent to submit proof showing
that the employees in the submitted list are covered by the original petition for certification election
and belong to the bargaining unit it seeks to represent and, likewise, directing petitioner to
substantiate the allegations contained in its Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters.
8

In compliance thereto, respondent averred that (1) the bargaining unit contemplated in the original
petition is the Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation, now known as San Miguel Foods, Inc.; (2)
it covered the operations in Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas and its home base is either in
Cabuyao, Laguna or San Fernando, Pampanga; and (3) it submitted individual and separate
declarations of the employees whose votes were challenged in the election.
9

Adding the results to the number of votes canvassed during the September 30, 1998 certification
election, the final tally showed that: number of eligible voters 149; number of valid votes cast
121; number of spoiled ballots - 3; total number of votes cast 124, with 118 (i.e., 46 + 72 = 118 )
"Yes" votes and 3 "No" votes.
10

The Med-Arbiter issued the Resolution
11
dated February 17, 1999 directing the parties to appear
before the Election Officer of the Labor Relations Division on March 9, 1999, 10:00 a.m., for the
opening of the segregated ballots. Thereafter, on April 12, 1999, the segregated ballots were
opened, showing that out of the 76 segregated
votes, 72 were cast for "Yes" and 3 for "No," with one "spoiled" ballot.
12

Based on the results, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order
13
dated April 13, 1999, stating that since the
"Yes" vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, respondent is certified to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products
Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.
On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution
14
dated July 30, 1999, in OS-A-
2-70-91 (NCR-OD-M-9010-017), affirmed the Order dated April 13, 1999, with modification that
George C. Matias, Alma Maria M. Lozano, Joannabel T. Delos Reyes, and Marilyn G. Pajaron be
excluded from the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent. She opined that the
challenged voters should be excluded from the bargaining unit, because Matias and Lozano are
members of Magnolia Poultry Processing Plants Monthly Employees Union, while Delos Reyes and
Pajaron are employees of San Miguel Corporation, which is a separate and distinct entity from
petitioner.
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration
15
dated August 14, 1999 was denied by the then
Acting DOLE Undersecretary in the Order
16
dated August 27, 1999.
In the Decision
17
dated April 28, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55510, entitled San Miguel Foods, Inc. v.
The Honorable Office of the Secretary of Labor, Bureau of Labor Relations, and San Miguel
Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
Resolution dated July 30, 1999 of the DOLE Undersecretary, stating that those holding the positions
of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.
Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration
18
dated May 23, 2000 was denied by the CA in the
Resolution
19
dated November 28, 2000.
Hence, petitioner filed this present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THE BARGAINING UNIT DEFINED BY THIS COURT'S
RULING IN G.R. NO. 110399.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE -
SPECIFICALLY, THIS COURT'S DEFINITION OF A "CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE" -
WHEN IT RULED FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE "PAYROLL MASTER" POSITION IN THE
BARGAINING UNIT.
III.
WHETHER THIS PETITION IS A "REHASH" OR A "RESURRECTION" OF THE ISSUES
RAISED IN G.R. NO. 110399, AS ARGUED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
Petitioner contends that with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 110399
20
identifying the specific
employees who can participate in the certification election, i.e., the supervisors (levels 1 to 4) and
exempt employees of San Miguel Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, the
CA erred in expanding the scope of the bargaining unit so as to include employees who do not
belong to or who are not based in its Cabuyao or San Fernando plants. It also alleges that the
employees of the Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis plants of petitioners predecessor, San Miguel
Corporation, as stated in G.R. No. 110399, were engaged in "dressed" chicken processing, i.e.,
handling and packaging of chicken meat, while the new bargaining unit, as defined by the CA in the
present case, includes employees engaged in "live" chicken operations, i.e., those who breed chicks
and grow chickens.
Respondent counters that petitioners proposed exclusion of certain employees from the bargaining
unit was a rehashed issue which was already settled in G.R. No. 110399. It maintains that the issue
of union membership coverage should no longer be raised as a certification election already took
place on September 30, 1998, wherein respondent won with 97% votes.
Petitioners contentions are erroneous. In G.R. No. 110399, the Court explained that the employees
of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis
constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An
appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all
or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
21

In National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers
Union United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils,
22
the Court, taking into account the
"community or mutuality of interests" test, ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting
of the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan
[Del] Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. It held that while the existence of a
bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining
unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping
is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining
units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
23
Certainly, there is a mutuality of
interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions
mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them
both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions
are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
24

Thus, applying the ruling to the present case, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that there
should be only one bargaining unit for
the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis
25
of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in
"dressed" chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in "live" chicken operations.
Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of work, mode of
compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of interest.
Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are
actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single
bargaining unit.
Petitioner asserts that the CA erred in not excluding the position of Payroll Master in the definition of
a confidential employee and, thus, prays that the said position and all other positions with access to
salary and compensation data be excluded from the bargaining unit.
This argument must fail. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies in the field of labor relations.
26
The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee - that is, the confidential relationship must
exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed
responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in
the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is
a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the "confidential employee rule."
27

A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or with the custody, handling
or care and protection of the employers property.
28
Confidential employees, such as accounting
personnel, should be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to confidential information
may become the source of undue advantage.
29
However, such fact does not apply to the position of
Payroll Master and the whole gamut of employees who, as perceived by petitioner, has access to
salary and compensation data. The CA correctly held that the position of Payroll Master does not
involve dealing with confidential labor relations information in the course of the performance of his
functions. Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and regulations and
confidential labor relations, it follows that he cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.
Corollarily, although Article 245
30
of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any
labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to
assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and, hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.
31
Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-
and-file bargaining unit. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any
labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees, because if allowed to be
affiliated with a union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident conflict of
interests and the union can also become company-denominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the union membership.
32
Having access to confidential information, confidential
employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or
spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
33
1avvphi 1
In this regard, the CA correctly ruled that the positions of Human Resource Assistant and Personnel
Assistant belong to the category of confidential employees and, hence, are excluded from the
bargaining unit, considering their respective positions and job descriptions. As Human Resource
Assistant,
34
the scope of ones work necessarily involves labor relations, recruitment and selection of
employees, access to employees' personal files and compensation package, and human resource
management. As regards a Personnel Assistant,
35
one's work includes the recording of minutes for
management during collective bargaining negotiations, assistance to management during grievance
meetings and administrative investigations, and securing legal advice for labor issues from the
petitioners team of lawyers, and implementation of company programs. Therefore, in the discharge
of their functions, both gain access to vital labor relations information which outrightly disqualifies
them from union membership.
The proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions
rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
36
Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the issue in
the
present case pertaining to the coverage of the employees who would constitute the bargaining unit is
now a foregone conclusion.
It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers; hence, an employer
lacks the personality to dispute the same. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to
question the process of certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers.
37
Law and
policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining
representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management.
A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to
no other.
38
The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article
258
39
of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.
40

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court writes finis to the issues raised so as to forestall future
suits of similar nature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2000 and Resolution dated
November 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55510, which affirmed with
modification the Resolutions dated July 30, 1999 and August 27, 1999 of the Secretary of Labor,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95011 April 22, 1991
M.Y. SAN BISCUITS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ACTING SECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATIONS, respondents.
Ambrosio B. De Luna for petitioner.
Pedro A. Lopez for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J .:p
The issue presented by this petition is whether or not the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has the authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties in a petition for certification election.
On May 12, 1989, private respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization
(Union for short) file a petition for certification election as a bargaining agent for a group of
employees of petitioner M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc. before the med-arbiter of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE).
After the parties submitted their position papers, on August 25, 1989, the med-arbiter issued an
order dismissing the petition for lack of merit as there is no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and the delivery drivers/helpers represented by respondent Union.
1

Meanwhile, respondent Union and several others filed before the NLRC Branch of Region No. IV a
complaint for underpayment of wages; non-payment of 13th month pay; service incentive pay and
COLA; damages and attorney's fees.
On February 9, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the said complaint on the
ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties.
2
On February 26, 1990
private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In the certification election case, private respondent appealed to the Secretary of DOLE. On
December 15, 1989, then DOLE Secretary Franklin Drilon promulgated a resolution reversing the
decision of the med-arbiter, thus finding that there exists an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondent.
3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of this resolution on January 22, 1990 and a
manifestation on February 12, 1990 asking that action be held in abeyance pending consideration of
the other case where the labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties.
4
On April 16, 1990, public respondent issued an order
denying the relief sought in the manifestation of petitioner.
5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
therefrom
6
but it was denied on June 18, 1990.
7

Thus, this petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction and temporary restraining order based on the following grounds:
I. The Acting Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma abused his discretion in denying
the Manifestation filed by Petitioner on the ground of a Prejudicial question involving
the issue of employer-employee relationship pending before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
II. The Hon. Secretary has no jurisdiction to determine the existence of [an]
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent.
8

On September 19, 1990, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the
respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice and granted the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the questioned orders dated
December 15, 1989 and June 18, 1990.
The main thrust of the petition is that the public respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties and that its
determination is vested in the NLRC.
The petition must fail.
Under Article 226 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), of which
the med-arbiter is an officer, has the following jurisdiction
Art. 226. Bureau of Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have
original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either
or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
work places whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the
implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be
the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, the BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inter alia, decide all
disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Necessarily, in the exercise of this jurisdiction
over labor-management relations, the med-arbiter has the authority, original and exclusive, to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
Apropos to the present case, once there is a determination as to the existence of such a
relationship, the med-arbiter can then decide the certification election case.
9
As the authority to
determine the employer-employee relationship is necessary and indispensable in the exercise of
jurisdiction by the med-arbiter, his finding thereon may only be reviewed and reversed by the Secretary of
Labor who exercises appellate jurisdiction under Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
provides
Art. 259. Appeal from certification election orders. Any party to an election may
appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the rules and
regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
for the conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided
within fifteen (15) calendar days.
When as in this case Secretary Drilon of DOLE rendered a resolution dated December 15, 1989
reversing the order of the med-arbiter dated August 25, 1989 by declaring the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties, such finding cannot be rendered nugatory by a
contrary finding of the labor arbiter in a separate dispute for money claims between same parties.
It is absurd to suggest that the med-arbiter and Secretary of Labor cannot make their own
independent finding as to the sentence of such relationship and must have to rely and wait for such
a determination by the labor arbiter or NLRC in a separate proceeding. For then, given a situation
where there is no separate complaint filed with the labor arbiter, the med-arbiter and/or the Secretary
of Labor can never decide a certification election case or any labor-management dispute properly
brought before them as they have no authority to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Such a proposition is, to say the least, anomalous.
Correctly indeed, the Secretary of Labor denied the prayer in the manifestation of petitioner to await
the resolution of the NLRC as to the existence of such employer-employee relationship.
The Court reproduces with approval the findings and conclusions of the Secretary in the said
resolution dated December 15, 1989.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship between members of petitioning union and the company.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find for the appellant.
It has been well settled in jurisprudence that the factors to be considered in
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship are as follows: (a)
selection and engagement of the employees; (b) the payment of wages; (e) the
process [sic] of dismissal; and, (d) the employer's power to control the employee with
respect to the means and methods [with] which the work is to be accomplished.
On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), [sic] it is very
apparent from the records that the personnel of M.Y. San Biscuits are the one
responsible for hiring of employees. Assuming, it is the salesman that engages his
own driver, it could be inferred however that such authority emanates from the
respondent.
On the second factor (payment of wages), while the respondent tried to impress
upon us that the drivers/helpers are not in the payroll of the company and, therefore,
not receiving salaries from it, this at best is but an administrative arrangement in
order to save the respondent from the burden of keeping records and other indirect
cost.
On the third factor, (the power of dismissal), it is very clear that herein respondent is
the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring drivers. This alone
proves that it wields disciplinary authority over the drivers/helpers.
Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent
gives daily instructions to the drivers on how to go about their work is sufficient
indication that it exercises control over the movements of the drivers/helpers. The
drivers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report to the office and
what time they are supposed to return.
Viewed from the above circumstances, it is every clear that the herein respondent is
the real employer of the drivers/helpers. They are in truth and in fact the employees
of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on its salesmen as the ostensible
employer of the drivers/helpers was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive
drivers/helpers their right to self-organization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the Med-
Arbiter's Order dated 25 August 1989 vacated, and in lieu thereof, a new one is
entered calling for the conduct of a certification election among the drivers/helpers of
M.Y. San Biscuits with the following as choices:
1. Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); and,
2. No Union.
SO ORDERED.
10

On September 19, 1990, the NLRC promulgated its resolution reversing the decision of the labor
arbiter and finding the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
11
A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated November 16, 1990.
12
On
all counts, the petition must be struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order which the Court issued
on September 19, 1990 is hereby lifted, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104556 March 19, 1998
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIJO
PLANTATION INC., (HPI),respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen the bargaining agent of rank-and-file
employees of the Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at a certification
election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed by the company and three other unions against the
results of the election were denied by the Department of Labor and Employment in its resolution
dated February 14, 1991 but, on motion of the company (HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its resolution
and ordered another certification election to be held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner
NFL's motion for reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
dated August 29, 1991, December 26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the holding of a new
certification election to be conducted in place of the one held on August 20, 1989 and, for this
purpose, reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991 dismissing the election protests of
private respondent and the unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file employees
of the Hijo Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of "no union." However, on July 3, 1989, on
allegations that the company intervened in the election, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
nullified the results of the certification election and ordered a new one to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in
Davao City with the following results:
Total Votes cast 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) 39
RUST KILUSAN 5
National Federation of Labor (NFL) 876
Southern Philippines Federation of Labor 4
SANDIGAN 6
UFW 15
No Union 55
Invalid 13
The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN (TRUST-Kilusan), the United Lumber and
General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo Plantation, Inc.
sought the nullification of the results of the certification election on the ground that it was conducted
despite the pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union and ULGWP from the order, dated
August 17, 1989, of the Med-Arbiter denying their motion for intervention. On the other hand, HPI
claimed that it was not informed or properly represented at the pre-election conference. It alleged
that, if it was represented at all in the pre-election conference, its representative acted beyond his
authority and without its knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the certification election
was marred by massive fraud and irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913,
representing 54% of the rank-and-file workers of private respondent, were not able to vote, resulting
in a failure of election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio dela Serna directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun
D. Pura, to investigate the company's claim that 54% of the rank-and-file workers were not able to
vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9, 1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been disfranchised in the election of August 20, 1989
because of confusion caused by the announcement of the company that the election had been
postponed in view of the appeals of ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the order denying
their motions for intervention. In addition, the election was held on a Sunday which was non-working
day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of the election. It was possible that some
people could have voted for those who did not show up. The election was conducted in an open and
hot area. The secrecy of the ballot had been violated. Management representatives were not around
to identify the workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the representation officer, did not tally with the
41-page listings submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008 names which were
checked or encircled (indicating that they had voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they
did not vote), or a total of 1,792. but according to the representation officer the total votes cast in the
election was 1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven employees who claimed that they were not
able to vote and who were surprised to know that their names had been checked to indicate that
they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres complaining that it had not been informed of
the investigation conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its evidence. For this
reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for the
annulment of the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor Union manifested that it was joining
private respondent HPI's appeal, adopting as its own the documentary evidence presented by the
company, showing fraud in the election of August 20, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL
reiterated its contention that management had no legal personality to file an appeal because it was
not a party to the election but was only a bystander which did not even extend assistance in the
election. Petitioner denied that private respondent HPI was not represented in the pre-election
conference, because the truth was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the management
and he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the list of employees, and posted in the company
premises notices of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the workers voted in the election. It claimed that
out of 1,692 qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to cast their vote. It charged
management with resorting to all kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and make the "Non
Union" win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE upheld the August 20, 1989 certification election.
With respect to claim that election could not be held in view of the pendency of the appeals of the
ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the order of the Med-Arbiter denying their motions for
intervention, the DOLE said: 1
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12 November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a motion
for interventions. The same was however, denied for being filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as one of the
choices in the said election. After it has been so disqualified thru an order which has become final and executory, ALU filed a
second motion for intervention when a second balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly, said second motion is proforma and
intended to delay the proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was
correct and did not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even with the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not
rule on the motion as it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP. The latter withdrew as a party
to the election on September 1988 and its motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-
Arbiter on October motion for intervention filed before the conduct of a second balloting
where the choices has already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to participate in the election
through valid orders that have become final and executory even before the first certification
election was conducted. Consequently, they may not be allowed to disrupt the proceeding
through the filing of nuisance motions. Much less are they possessed of the legal standing to
question the results of the second election considering that they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-Arbiter that the certification election was marred
by massive fraud and irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted showing that the election was
held outside the company premises and private vehicles were used as makeshift precincts, the
DOLE found that this was because respondent company did not allow the use of its premises for the
purpose of holding the election, company guards were allegedly instructed not to allow parties,
voters and DOLE representation officers to enter the company premises, and notice was posted on
the door of the company that the election had been postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter that a majority of the rank-and-file workers
had been disfranchised in the August 20, 1989 election and that the secrecy of the ballot had been
violated, first, because the NFL was not given notice of the investigation nor the chance to present
its evidence to dispute this finding and, second, the Med Arbiter's report was not supported by the
minutes of the proceedings nor by any record of the interviews of the 315 workers. Moreover, it was
pointed out that the report did not state the names of the persons investigated, the questions asked
and the answers given. The DOLE held that the report was "totally baseless."
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a reiteration of the rule that the choice of the
exclusive bargaining representative is the sole concern of the workers. It said: "If indeed there were
irregularities committed during the election, the contending unions should have been the first to
complain considering that they are the ones which have interest that should be protected." 2
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to annul the election filed by the ULGWP,
TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU and the HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of private respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on August 29, 1991, reversed his resolution of
February 14, 1991. Petitioner NFL filed a motion for reconsideration but its motion was denied in an
order, dated December 26, 1991. Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
in another order dated February 17, 1992. Hence, this petition.
First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the sole concern of the employees and the
employer is a mere bystander. The only instance wherein the employer may actively participate is
when it files a petition for certification election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it is
requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is not the case here and so the DOLE
should not have given due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of the results of the
certification election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of Labor said he was reversing his earlier
resolution because "workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with their letter-appeal,
either made singly or collectively expressing their wish to have a new certification election
conducted" and that as a result "the firm position we held regarding the integrity of the electoral
exercise had been somewhat eroded by this recent declaration of the workers, now speaking in their
sovereign capacity."
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary considered in reversing its earlier rulings was not
the petition of the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent to his office denouncing
the irregularities committed during the August 20, 1989 certification election. The petition of private
respondent was simply the occasion for the employees to voice their protests against the election.
Private respondent HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5, 1989 the
affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees who claimed that they had been disfranchised,
as a result of which they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20, 1989 election. It was the
protests of employees which moved the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14,
1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest in the conduct of the election. Private
respondent is the employer. The manner in which the election was held could make the difference
between industrial strife and industrial harmony in the company. What an employer is prohibited
from doing is to interfere with the conduct of the certification election for the purpose of influencing
its outcome. But certainly an employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election is
clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest concerning the election should be registered and
entered into the minutes of the election proceedings before it can be considered. In addition, the
protest should be formalized by filing it within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that these requirements
are condition precedents in the filing of an appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot
prosper. It cites the following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-spot question. The Representation
officer may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the election. The
interested party may however, file a protest with the representation officer before the close of
the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall be contained in the minutes
of the proceedings.
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. Where the protest is formalized
before the med-arbiter within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the
med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working days from the date of its
formalization. If not formalized within the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed
dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the same manner and on the same
grounds as provided under Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent did not make any protest regarding the
alleged irregularities (e.g., massive disfranchisement of employees) during the election. Hence, the
appeal and motions for reconsideration of private respondent HPI should have been dismissed
summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of employees were not able to cast their votes
because they were not properly notified of the date. They could not therefore have filed their protests
within five (5) days. At all events, the Solicitor General states, that the protests were not filed within
five (5) days, is a mere technicality which should not be allowed to prevail over the workers'
welfare. 3 As this Court stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 4 it is essential that the employees must be accorded an
opportunity to freely and intelligently determine which labor organization shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case were denied this
opportunity. Not only were a substantial number of them disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and other irregularities
which put in question the integrity of the election. Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting the conduct of the election. The
Report of Med-Arbiter Pura who investigated these allegations found the allegations of fraud and irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election upon a showing of disfranchisement, lack of
secrecy in the voting and bribery. 5 We hold the same in this case. The workers' right to self-organization as enshrined in both
the Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered nugatory if their right to choose their collective bargaining representative were denied.
Indeed, the policy of the Labor Code favors the holding of a certification election as the most conclusive way of choosing the labor
organization to represent workers in a collective bargaining unit. 6 In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the holding of a
certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions, namely, the Association of Trade Union (ATU),
the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), as well as the representation officers of the DOLE affirmed the
regularity of the conduct of the election and they are now estopped from questioning the election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions really attest to the fact that we
cannot really identify all the voters who voted on that election except some workers who
were our supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation representatives. We also attest that the
polling precinct were not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was conducted outside of
the Company premises. The precincts were (sic) the election was held were located in a
passenger waiting shed infront of the canteen across the road; on the yellow pick-up; at the
back of a car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a waiting shed infront of the Guard
House across the road. Herein private respondents also observed during the election that
there were voters who dictated some voters the phrase "number 3" to those who were
casting their votes and those who were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the National
Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it expected workers who had been
aggrieved by the conduct of the election would file their protest since it was in their interests that
they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were written almost two years after the election
and they bear the same dates (May 7 and June 14, 1991); they are not verified; they do not contain
details or evidence of intelligent acts; and they do not explain why the writers failed to vote.
Petitioner contends that the letter-appeals were obtained through duress by the company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The records shows that as early as August 22 and 30,
1989, employees already wrote letters/affidavits/
manifestoes alleging irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of workers. 7 As the Solicitor
General says in his Comment, 8 these affidavits and manifestoes, which were attached as Annexes "A" to "CC" and Annexes "DD" to "DD-
33" to private respondent's Supplemental Petition of September 5, 1989 just 16 days after the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true
therefore that the employees slept on their rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June 14, 1991 bear these same dates because
they were prepared by private respondent HPI and employees were merely asked to sign them,
suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which petitioner has not proven by competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that technical rules of evidence are not binding in
labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of intelligent acts does not have merit. The
earlier letters 9of the workers already gave details of what they had witnessed during the election, namely the open balloting (with no
secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for polling precinct. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the irregularities of the certification
election. Similarly, the letters containing the signatures of those who were not able to vote are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were
not able to vote because they thought the election had been postponed, especially given the fact that the two unions had pending appeals at
the time from orders denying them the right to intervene in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the questioned orders of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97622 October 19, 1994
CATALINO ALGIRE and OTHER OFFICERS OF UNIVERSAL ROBINA TEXTILE MONTHLY
SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (URTMSEU), petitioners,
vs.
REGALADO DE MESA, et al., and HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.
C.A. Montano Law Office for petitioner.
Cabio and Ravanes Law Offices and Jaime D. Lauron for private respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the decision dated January 31, 1991 of the
Secretary of Labor which reversed on appeal the Order dated December 20, 1990 issued by Med-
arbiter Rolando S. dela Cruz declaring petitioners as the duly-elected officers of the Universal
Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees union (URTMSEU) as well as the order dated March 5,
1991 denying petitioner Catalino Algire's motion for reconsideration.
The case arose out of the election of the rightful officers to represent the union in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the management of Universal Robina Textile at its plant in Km.
50, Bo. San Cristobal, Calamba, Laguna.
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union, (URTMSEU), through private
respondent Regalado de Mesa, filed on September 4, 1990 a petition for the holding of an election of
union officers with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
Acting thereon, DOLE's med-arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz issued an Order dated October 19, 1990
directing that such an election be held.
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be conducted on
November 15, 1990 between petitioners (Catalino Algire, et al.) and private respondents (Regalado
de Mesa, et al.) under the supervision of DOLE through its duly appointed representation officer.
The official ballot contained the following pertinent instructions:
Nais kong pakatawan sa grupo ni:
LINO ALGIRE REGALADO
and DE MESA
his officers and his
officers
1. Mark Check (/) or cross (x) inside the box specified above who among the two
contending parties you desire to be represented for the purpose of collecting
bargaining.
2. This is a secret ballot. Don't write any other markings.
1

The result of the election were as follows:
Lino Algire group 133
Regalado de Mesa 133
Spoiled 6

Total votes cast 272
On November 19, 1990, Catalino Algire filed a Petition and/or Motion (RO 400-9009-AU-002), which
DOLE's Med Arbitration unit treated as a protest, to the effect that one of the ballots wherein one
voter placed two checks inside the box opposite the phrase "Lino Algire and his officers," hereinafter
referred to as the "questioned ballot," should not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a
valid vote in their favor. The group argued that the two checks made even clearer the intention of the
voter to exercise his political franchise in favor of Algire's group.
During the schedules hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope containing the
spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot contained two (2) checks in the box
opposite petitioner Algire's name and his officers.
On December 20, 1990, med-arbiter de la Cruz issued an order declaring the questioned ballot valid,
thereby counting the same in Algire's favor and accordingly certified petitioner's group as the union's
elected officers.
2

Regalado de Mesa, et al. appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of Labor in
Case No. OS-A-1-37-91 (RO 400-9009-AU-002). On January 31, 1991, the latter's office granted the
appeal and reversed the aforesaid Order. In its stead, it entered a new one ordering "the calling of
another election of officers of the Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union
(URTMSEU), with the same choices as in the election of
15 November, 1990, after the usual pre-election conference."
3

Director Maximo B. Lim of the Industrial Relations Division, Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE set
the hearing for another pre-election conference on March 22, 1991, reset to April 2, 1991, and finally
reset to April 5, 1991.
Catalino Algire's group filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. It was denied for lack of merit
and the decision sought to be reconsidered was sustained.
Algire, et al. filed this petition on the following issues:
(1) the Secretary of Labor erred in applying Sections 1 and 8 (6), Rule VI, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code to the herein case,
considering that the case is an intra-union activity, which act constitutes a grave
abuse in the exercise of authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
(2) the assailed decision and order are not supported by law and evidence.
with an ex-parte motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, alleging that the assailed
decision of the office of the Secretary of Labor as public respondent is by nature immediately
executory and the holding of an election at any time after April 5, 1991, would render the petition
moot and academic unless restrained by this Court.
On April 5, 1991, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of another election of
union officers pursuant to the January 31, 1991 decision.
4

There is no merit in the petition.
The contention of the petitioner is that a representation officer (referring to a person duly authorized
to conduct and supervise certification elections in accordance with Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code) can validly rule only on on-the-spot questions arising from
the conduct of the elections, but the determination of the validity of the questioned ballot is not within
his competence. Therefore, any ruling made by the representation officer concerning the validity of
the ballot is deemed an absolute nullity because such is the allegation it was done without or in
excess of his functions amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant, what was agreed
to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent
election, not a certification election.
It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a
certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of
majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate
and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.
5

The ruling of DOLE's representative in that election that the questioned ballot is spoiled is not based
on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such action by such officer but simply in
pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed in the written instructions contained in the ballot,
which is to prohibit unauthorized markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended
to identify the votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of the
contending parties.
If indeed petitioner's group had any opposition to the representation officer's ruling that the
questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably during the canvass of votes. Its
failure or inaction to assail such ballot's validity shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity
arising from said election. Moreover, petitioners even question at this stage the clear instruction to
mark a check or cross opposite the same of the candidate's group, arguing that such instruction was
not clear, as two checks "may be interpreted that a voter may vote for Lino Algire but not with (sic)
his officers or
vice-versa,"
6
notwithstanding the fact that a pre-election conference had already been held where no
such question was raised.
In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should best represent
them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be achieved through the
democratic process of an election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may not be
circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice once
and for all in a determination where anything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of
fraud and misrepresentation is minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or
maneuvering.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.