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DIGESTS FOR NOVEMBER 7, 2012

ART III - BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 4 Freedom of Expression and Assembly and Petition

Freedom of Expression

Near v. Minnesota (238 U.S. 697) (PABALAN)
Facts:
A complaint alleged that the defendants published and circulated editions of THE SATURDAY
PRESS(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and defamatory
articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota). The articles charged provides that a Jewish gangster
was in control of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers
and agencies were not energetically performing their duties. Most of the charges were directed against
the chief of police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with
participation in graft. The county attorney was charged with knowing the existing conditions and with
failure to take adequate measures to remedy them. The mayor was accused of inefficiency and
dereliction. One member of the grand jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special
grand jury and a special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in general, and, in
particular, to investigate an attempt to assassinate one Guilford, one of the original defendants, who, it
appears from the articles, was shot by gangsters after the first issue of the periodical had been
published. Now defendants challenged the Minnesota statute PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW OF 1925 a.k.a.
the "gag law" which provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical. The District Court ruled against defendants.
Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an infringement of the
freedom of the press.

Held:
Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, ruled that previous restraint of the press was
unconstitutional. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal which
tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the commission of crime is unavailing.

The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes
for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.' The statute not only
operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, but to put the publisher under an effective
censorship.

Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this,
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity.

The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its
abuse.' Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the
press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and
punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals.

Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an
invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. Nor can it be said that the constitutional freedom
from previous restraint is lost because charges are made of derelictions which constitute crimes.

The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this court
has said, on proof of truth.

Gonzales v. Comelec (27 SCRA 1[1992]) (RAMOS)
Facts:
On June 17, 1967 RA 4880 took effect, the said RA prohibits the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Specifically, the basic liberties of free speech, press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act
At the time of the filing the petition, Cabigao (petitioner) was an incumbent councilor in the 4
th

District of Manila and Nacionalista Pary official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila
(subsequently elected on Novembet 11, 1967)
Petitioner Gonzales is a private individual, registered voter in Manila City and a political
leader of his co-petitioner.
Further allegation was brought up which is the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or
mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political
matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state,
would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
Senator Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880
could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of
assembly and of association.
He justified its enactment under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and
degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in
politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: WON RA No. 4880 is unconstitutional

Held:
We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to protect vital interests.
Considering the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary, it is not always possible, even with
the utmost sympathy shown for the legislative choice of means to cure an admitted evil, that
the legislative judgment arrived at, with its possible curtailment of the preferred freedoms,
be accepted uncritically.
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There may be times, and this is one of them, with the majority, with all due reject to a
coordinate branch, unable to extend their approval to the aforesaid specific provisions of one
of the sections of the challenged statute. The necessary two-third vote, however, not
being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic Act No. 4880 cannot be
declared unconstitutional. Petition is dismissed.

National Press Club v. Comelec (207 SCRA 1 [1992]) (SASAKI)
FACTS:

Petitioners:
1. representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating
space and time for political advertisements;
2. two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for
provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
3. taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues
and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.


Petitioners argument:

Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression.

The prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and
singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election
period of 1992.

The prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of
media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space
of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates
and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.

Section 11(b), RA 6646:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of
election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it
shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work
as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis supplied)
BP 881:

Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That
in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine
or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space"
wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated,
free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all
candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television
time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all
radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (Emphasis
supplied)


ISSUE:
W/N section 11(b) of RA 6646 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes!

The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich
and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge
campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the
other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec
space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and
television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area
served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.

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It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special
importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in
particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which
the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these
rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech
and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the
most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not
unduly repressive or unreasonable.

Adiong v. Comelec (207 SCRA 712 [1992]) (SUNGA)

Pita v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 362 [1989]) (SUPAPO)
SYNOPSIS: All material readings believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent, among the
publications was the Pinoy playboy magazines, were seized and confiscated by policemen from dealers,
distributors, and newsstand along C.M. Recto, Manila in accordance with Anti-Smut Campaign initiated
by Manila Mayor Bagatsing. All materials seized were burned. Pita, publisher of said magazine,
questioned the legality of said seizure. Pita filed an injunction case seeking to enjoin and/or restrain
policemen from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene.
The RTC and CA dismissed the case. Thus, elevated the case to the SC. The SC held that the seizure
was unconstitutional as it was not supported by a lawful court order finding said materials to be
pornography and authorizing them to carry out search and seizure through search warrant. The petition
is granted. The decision of the respondent court is reversed and set aside.

DOCTRINES:
Press Freedom; Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall is the test in determining the existence of obscenity.

Same; If the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.

Same; There is no challenge on the right of the State in the legitimate exercise of police power to
suppress smut provided it is smut.

Same; Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression although not its protection;
Burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action lies on the
authorities.

Same; Clear and Present Danger Rule; There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger.

FACTS:
Leo PIta, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, rejecting his appeal from the decision of the RTC, dismissing his complaint for injunctive
relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the
Constitution, as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law.
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Manila Mayor R.D.
Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western
Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents
from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene,
and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press.
The defendant pointed out that in that anti- smut campaign conducted on December 1 and 3, 1983, the
materials confiscated belonged to the magazine stand owners and peddlers who voluntarily surrendered
their reading materials, and that the plaintiffs establishment was not raided.
On January 5,1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, raising the issue as to "whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can without a court
order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said
magazine is obscene or not".
The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upon the grounds, among other things, as follows: We
cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by appellant that seizure of allegedly obscene
publications or materials deserve close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee
protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and the protection afforded by the
constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art.IV). It must be equally
conceded, however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
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protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have
laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure and confiscation of said magazines were unconstitutional as it violates freedom of
speech and of the press.

HELD:
Yes.
The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to pronounce what
"obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs.
Kottinger,

the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows:
"whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test," so Kottinger further declares, "is that which
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. " Kottinger hastened to say,
however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the
case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it."
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn
nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used
not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,

the Court, following trends in the United States,
adopted the test: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."

Kalaw-Katigbak represented a
marked departure from Kottingerin the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant
theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases
are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-
Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and
as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed
to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem .
27
Apparently,
the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption
that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if
vague theories of what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe, "that this
development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recognizes that obscene
speech is speech nonetheless, although it is subject as in all speech to regulation in the interests
of [society as a whole] but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human sexuality should be
regarded and portrayed."
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police
power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one
insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences,
and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades
ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were
censored in the thirties yet their works are considered important literature today.

Goya's La Maja
desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said
earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem
rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not
its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of
the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action.

But, so
we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing,

"the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
that would justify adverse action ... lies on the. . . authorit[ies]."


"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such
clear and present danger."

"It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ...
authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may
require."


"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and
present danger test."
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so only we may
arrive at one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper perspective, that is, as a
genuine constitutional issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due process
and illegal search and seizure.
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the
presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the
existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State
action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice.
However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must
come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify
a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been
sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way
of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that ... freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public
morals." Neither do we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so confiscated
"pornographic"? That we have laws punishing the author, publisher and sellers of obscence
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publications is also fine, but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the
statute?
We make this resume.
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene", and
pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be
resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties
seized are indeed "obscene".
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It appearing, however, that the magazines subject of the search and
seizure have been destroyed, the Court declines to grant affirmative relief. To that extent, the case is
moot and academic.

U.S. v. Bustos (37 PHIL. 731 [1918]) (TABAG)
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga. They wanted to oust
him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him
guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice,
instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this
case arose.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel against Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.

Held:
Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.

During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.

In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the constant source
of liberty and democracy. It also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right
to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the
law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny
of the basest sort.

It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can
apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.

Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of
this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy
is the unfettered administration of justice.

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct having a duty
in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
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interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will
amount to proof of malice.

It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a
libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the
removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which
not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. v. Capulong (160 SCRA 861 [1988]) (VELASCO)
Facts:

Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions pty Ltd.,
envisioned sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as well as the other government agencies consulted. Fidel
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the
EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a
"docu-drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background.

On 21 December 1987, Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema
or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation." Petitioners
acceded to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script,
and proceeded to film the projected motion picture.

On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint with application for TRO and Wilt of Pretion with the
Regional Trial Court. The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private
respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. The
trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.

Petitioner flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending
that the mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and
that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner
also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been
completed.

The court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners ordering for the desistance of the
movie production and making of any reference to Enrile or his family and creating any fictitious character
in lieu of him.

A Petition for certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON there was a violation of freedom of expression.

Held: Yes.

Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion
pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression. Along with the
press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
information, education and entertainment. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned
and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of
motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for
availing of freedom of speech and of expression. To exclude commercially owned and operated media
from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the
drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.
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7

In connection with the respondent's contention on right of privacy: The right of privacy or "the right to be
let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly
put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public
interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the "clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of
the petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and
filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."

1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint
on the part of the respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The
respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and producing the entire proposed motion
picture. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy
that private respondent could lawfully assert.

2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government that
took place at EDSA in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly,
such subject matter is one of public interest and concern. It does not relate to the individual life and
certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not
principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile but it is compelled, if it is to be
historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events
of the change of government in February 1986.

3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be
entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in
character. The extent of that intrusion, as the Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may
be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical
account.

4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events that petitioners propose to film were taking
place, private respondent was a public figure. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple
private citizenship. He continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during
which his participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio
and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.

5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.


Lopez v. Court of Appeals (34 SCRA 116 [1970]) (VILLAFUERTE)
Summary: The pictures of a former mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, also a businessman and contractor,
was inadvertently published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the
authorities about the Babuyan Islands, claiming of murders there, so they could go and he could be
rescued. An erratum was published by the This Week magazine. The Supreme Court, quoting
Quisumbing v. Lopez, however, found for petitioner that the error was made inadvertently and without
malice, but still petitioner has been ordered to pay reduced damages, since the error in in this case could
have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily.
Facts: In January 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner
Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz. The story is about Fidel Cruz sending a distress signal to a
passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was not ignored
by an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit
containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the
people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955.
Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led
by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however,
Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term
employed by the other newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a
pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned
out to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick,
only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the January 29, 1956
issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in what
was known as the Calayan Hoax.
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.
Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of private respondent Fidel
G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of
respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila
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ISKOol of LAW
8
Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the
news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of petitioners, the following
correction was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were
rushing to meet: the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the
picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own
Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who
was connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our
profound regrets that such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction, petitioners
published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four
lines the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to
call the attention of the readers to such amends being made.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he
was awarded five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand pesos as moral damages,
and one thousand pesos for attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to respondent Court.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already announced at the opening of this opinion, that
while respondent Cruz is entitled to Prevail, the damages awarded him should be reduced.


Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner can invoke a liberal construction of the implications of press freedom,
owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not discovered until it was too late, and publishing a correction
as an earnest of its good faith.
2. Whether or not that petitioner should not be made to pay at all.

Held:
1. YES
The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff Lopez, citing a doctrine in the case Quisumbing v. Lopez which
reads, "So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions
on legal questions. To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." In the
language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned the opinion in the said case: "The Court of
Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news
item under Consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do
harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests
of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the
right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the
circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers
should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform
their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually
have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words."
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional
guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."
2. NO.
The error in in this case could have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine and not
a daily. However, petitioner is ordered to pay reduced damages considering the correction was made
promptly.


Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (170 SCRA 1 [1989]) (ATIENZA)
Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent, Raul
Gonzalez, from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The SC ruled that
since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been
superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by
the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included
statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been
approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to
be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court;" and (c) that in
several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the
Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." There were also
statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly
can get it while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers.

The SC resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt
of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court
has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of
contempt of court in facie curiae (in the face of court) and indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law. Respondent assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges
that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present
danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
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9
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression
Held: There was no violation of Freedom of Expression. The SC explains first that the respondent was
heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all defences, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court which he grounded on freedom of expression
The SC made it clear that it did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency." It was
simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." The SC further explains that the"clear and present
danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all
problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free
speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked,
absent proof of impending apocalypse. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted
method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts.
It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible
of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities
of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the 'balancing-of interests test. The principle requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test" we believe that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner
and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil"
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the
avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of
the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
"substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting
but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.

Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553 [1983]) (BUENAVENTURA)
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States
Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The
march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be
followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the
Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure
a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent
suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral
argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing
of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission
or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is
the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place
where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he
did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Danas, Jr. (137 SCRA 628 [1985]) (CAMERINO)
DAVID, et. al. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et. al., G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006 (DORIA)
Facts:

These 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
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10
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. And on the same day, she
issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided
in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and
after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017 through the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1021.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. Apparently, the basis for issuance of PP1017
was also due to the escape of some Magdalo members indicted in the Oakwood Mutiny; the
discovery of a document (Oplan Hackle I) which contains a detailed plan for bombings and attacks
including the assassination of GMA during the PMA Alumni Homecoming; and other plans against
the GMA administration. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
According to them, the Office of the President immediately announced the cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated
that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-
over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of
protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging
at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge
clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water
cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants.
That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala
Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which
Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles
and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized.

Petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly.

The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen also averred that PP 1017 is within the
presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.


Issue: WON PP1017 and GO No. 5 are violative of the Constitution and WON such issue has become
moot and academic.


Held: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of
the said PP. Hence, the SC took cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that
these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in
the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power
I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the
basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were
"turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the
20th Anniversary of People Power I.

G.R. No. 171396: Neither of the conditions for warrantless arrest justifies petitioner Davids arrest.
During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
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11
officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally. But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.

"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of
speech.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right
to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that right.

G.R. No. 171409: Cacho-Olivares, et al. presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of
the press. Their narration of facts, which the SG failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribunes offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials
for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25,
2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the
security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily
Tribune offices.

Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the
standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what
is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National
Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks
to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that
his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out
for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.

The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the
search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it
be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules
were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media.

BAYAN, et. al. vs. ERMITA, et. al., G.R. No. 169838. April 25, 2006 (EXCONDE)

Doctrine: Freedom of Expression
Sec. 4 of Art. III of the Constitution provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Petitioners come in three groups.
1
st
group: Bayan, et al., (G.R. No. 16983) allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Phils and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally/participated (on 6
Oct 2005) was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
2
nd
group: (26 individual petitioners) Jess del Prado, et al., (G.R. No. 169848) who allege
that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they led (26 Sep 2005) was
preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They asserted on 5 Oct 2005, a group they participated
in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under
an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest was likewise dispersed violently and many among them
were arrested and suffered injuries.
3
rd
group: Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., (G.R. No. 169881) they conducted peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens,
specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of "Calibrated
Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to implement it.
Respondents:
in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito
Atienza, Chief, of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region
Police Office (NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD)
Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.
in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his personal
capacity;Angelo Reyes, as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as
Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong, as Chief, MPD, and all other public officers and
private individuals acting under their control, supervision and instruction.
in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director General Arturo
Lomibao, the Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong.
Gist:
The right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by
the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly
assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies
without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
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Facts:
KMU, et al., claim that a rally on 4 Oct 2005, which KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
Mendiola bridge but police blocked them and forcibly dispersed them that caused injuries to several
members. And allege on 6 Oct 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled
along Espaa Avenue (UST) going towards Mendiola. Police officers blocked them and prevented them
from proceeding further. They were also forcibly dispersed, causing injuries, and some arrested.
All petitioners assail BP 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a),
as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no
rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.
A. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is a clear violation of the Constitution and other human
rights treaties (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
That B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger.
That BP 880 curtails the choice of venue and thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought.
That BP 880 is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Supposedly, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, BP
880 cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
B. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., argue that B.P. 880 is unconstitutional. Its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions.
it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right.
It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes
them and allows their dispersal.
It delegates powers to the Mayor (Atienza) without providing clear standards. The
2 standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave
danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for
lack of publication.
C. Petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly, therefore
B.P. No. 880 cannot put requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can
set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable:
(1) allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and
present danger is too comprehensive.
(2) the 5-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
Regarding CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order
supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No.
880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of
the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had
been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be
charged with violating BP 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the
time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test
for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to
content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less
intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for
communication of the information.
6

3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assemblys
time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade.
Nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program
content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept
of the "clear and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral
regulation has been recognized in Osmea v. Comelec.
7

4. Adiong v. Comelec
8
held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place
and manner of holding public assemblies. It also held that BP 880 passes the test for such
regulation, meaning these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to
support them.
5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
9
held that a local chief executive has the
authority to exercise police power to meet "the demands of the common good in terms of
traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor
is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15 of the law.
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13
6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test."
10

7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and
ordinances to protect public interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to
call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic enforcement of existing laws,
regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of
maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Atienza, submitted in his Comment that (G.R. No. 169838) should be dismissed on
the ground:
that RA 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.
880;
that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there
was a clamor to stop rallies, which disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other
people.
On 14 Feb 2006, the 3 petitions were ordered consolidated.
Issue:
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a)
and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? (no)
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? (no)
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint? (no)
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? (no)
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights? (No)
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR):
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?
(b) Is it void for lack of publication?
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October
4, 5 and 6, 2005?

Ratio:
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to
the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound
"clear and present danger" standard. (in Osmea v. Comelec,where the Court referred to it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.)
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for
redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:
No question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well
as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the
peoples exercise of these rights. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is
not absolute.
On the matter of CPR: The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR
should no longer be used as a legal term. As it only means nothing other than the maximum tolerance
policy set in BP 880. It was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a
misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the
affidavit executed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not
replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum tolerance policy embodied in that law.

Ruling:
1. petitions are GRANTED in part
2. Respondents / particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments,
are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with (Section 15 of
BP 88) the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in
every city and municipality of the country.

Safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to
designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no
such parks are so identified, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to
hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the
mayors office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.


2. Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in
lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID

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14
3. respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance.

4. The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition
The Government [And] For Other Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the
State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of
others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a
lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or
protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or
petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for
religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the
declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike
areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the
people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same.
(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound
system and similar changes.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. A written permit shall be required for any person
or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political
meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by
this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements. All applications for a permit shall comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and
place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section
8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in
whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the
scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of
the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
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15
accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four
hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which
is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be
no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers
of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public
assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include
but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the
public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the
permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly
interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the public assembly.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere
with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement
contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at
least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all
times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and
the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in
complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently
on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum
tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but
may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots
or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be
used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence,
or deliberate destruction of property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly
as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to
prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing
damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly
warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should
not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a
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16
warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a reasonable period of
time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of
this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly
shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a
permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer
without having first secured that written permit where a permit is required from the office
concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those set out
in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable
for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of
this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf;
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for
a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any
person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of
activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox,
bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by
the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Sec. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the
immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one
day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be
punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and
one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the
effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom
parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality. Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September 21,
2005, thus:
Malacaang Official
Manila, Philippines NEWS
Release No. 2 September 21, 2005
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17
STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the
political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy,
disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the
land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people
and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national
community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a
democratic society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.

Assembly and Petition

Primicias v. Fugoso (80 PHIL. 71 [1948]) (FORTES)

Reyes v. Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553 [1983]) (FRANCISCO)
Art. 3 Sec. 4 (Bill of Rights)
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redness of grievances.

Facts:
- Reyes sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2pm to 5pm, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the USA embassy.
- Once there (embassy), in an open space of public property, there would be a short program
to be held.
- The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.
Followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition.
- There as likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights
to free speech and assembly , all the necessary steps would be taken by it to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.
- However, the request was DENIED. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports
affirming the plans of subversive elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend.
- Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or
any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general
public may be ensured.
- An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that
there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
could justify the denial of a permit.
- However, Justice Aquino dissented that the rally id violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City
of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission
or chancery and for other purposes.

Issue:
Whether or not FREEDOM of EXPRESSION and the RIGHT to peaceably ASSEMBLE violated.

Held: YES.
- The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceably assembly carries with it the implication
that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public
places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can
be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial
Luneta has been used for purposes purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
- Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
- With regard to the ordinance, there was NO showing that there was violation and even if it
could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could
legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged.
- A summary of the application for permit for rally. The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time
to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to
the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present dangers test be the
standard for the decision reached. Notice is give to applicants for the denial.
If cant be understood, STOP!
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18


Malabanan v. Ramento (129 SCRA 359 [1984]) (GATCHALIAN)
The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free
speech is the grievance alleged by petitioners, students of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,
in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding. The nullification of the decision of respondent
Ramento affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta University Foundation finding
petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is sought in this petition.
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought and
were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such
permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger
of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they
marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area
covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely
critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created.
They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, through a memorandum they were held under preventive suspension
for their failure to explain. The validity thereof was challenged in the CFI and Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports. On October 20, respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty holding of an illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of
classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
On November 16, this court issued a resolution wherein it granted a TRO enjoining the decision made
on October 20 and allowing the students to enroll.
ISSUE:

WON on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an
infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. YES


HELD:
This Court accordingly rules that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty
imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that
specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the
classes and caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable
consequence could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated
in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed.
The petition must be granted and the decision of respondent Ramento nullified, a much lesser penalty
being appropriate.
In Reyes v. Bagatsing,
6
the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the
concept of freedom of expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing ... of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent."

The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private premises, property of respondent
University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this relevant excerpt: "The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required."
9
Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted.
There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent University as to a permit having
been granted for petitioners to hold a student assembly
What is the verdict on the complaint of petitioners that there was a disregard of their constitutional rights
to peaceable assembly and free speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to qualification in view of
their continuing their demonstration in a place other than that specified in the permit for a longer period
and their making use of megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of classes and the stoppage of
work by the non-academic personnel in the vicinity of such assembly.
Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. That there
would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that
they were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem They believed that such a
merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents If in the
course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Since the activity taking place
in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is
discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow
from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others."
In the case of US vs Apurado the principle to be followed is enunciated thus: "If instances of disorderly
conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising." 19 A careful reading of this decision is in order before private respondents attach, as they did
in their comments, a subversive character to the rally held by the students under the leadership of
petitioners.
It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that
specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
If cant be understood, STOP!
ISKOol of LAW
19
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of
respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.
m.
20
Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition,
even a censure-certainly not a suspension-could be the appropriate penalty. Private respondents could
and did take umbrage at the fact that in view of such infraction considering the places where and the
time when the demonstration took place-there was a disruption of the classes and stoppage of work of
the non-academic personnel. They would not be unjustified then if they did take a much more serious
view of the matter. Even then a one-year period of suspension is much too severe. While the discretion
of both respondent University and respondent Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of
fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. If the concept of proportionality between the offense connoted
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a
due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is the holding of this Court that a one-
week suspension would be punishment enough.
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing,
21
for this Court to lay
down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to
a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms
(violation in the permit granted) the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

Non v. Dames (185 SCRA 523 [1990]) (GUY)
Facts:
1. Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v.
Philippine school of BA. Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down
in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine Administration, et al.
2.Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not
allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.

3.Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission. trial court dismissed the petition
premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED
4.motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court. Petitioners' claim of lack of
due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny respondent's affirmative
defenses that "they were given all the chances to air their grievances on
5.The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students

6. Motion for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.

Issue: whether the doctrine laid down in alcazar et al .v Philippine school of BA be applied in the case at
bar?

Held. No, case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a school
refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to
readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to
student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who,
after leading and participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next
semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-
a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them.

Ruling:
Although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988;
Rollo, pp. 12-12-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students' rights and the school's
power to discipline them, to wit: Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to
education, and there is such denial when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the
exercise of their right to free speech and peaceable assembly and or subjected to disciplinary action
without abiding with the requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let
loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.

But the right of students is no license and not without limit .

The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights of free
speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides: Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They
enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their news and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While, therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students.
Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and
free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right
to the equal protection clause being disregarded.

The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.
It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and
the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV,
secs. 1-2, 4(1)]

If cant be understood, STOP!
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20
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling. "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. 137. When a student registers in a
school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary
courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses 137. When a student registers in a school, it
is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and
for the entire semester for collegiate courses

Paragraph 107 states: Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon
meeting its specific requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for
enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to
transfer.
This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of
1982." Section 9 of this act provides: SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights,
and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx

To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting from
their answer filed in
the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have incurred failing grades.
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating etc.
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment without just
cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.

Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George
(Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration whether the failures
were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the school.
Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not
these students are academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of
schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondent school's action as to
petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.

the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set
forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been
complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in
Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for
cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the schools rules and regulations duly promulgated and only
after due investigation shall have been conducted."

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become
moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have
been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and
participated in the mass actions

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to
allow the re-enrollment of petitioners,


PBM Employees Association v. PBM (51 SCRA 189 [1973]) (HAUTEA)
FACTS:
On March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacanang
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00
AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969
Likewise, the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management
Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike
Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the
2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO
LOCKOUT - NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed;
De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers
of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans
inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the following morning
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for
the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4,
1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the
first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.
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21
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA
because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against
the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm

ISSUE:
1. WON, the petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad-faith and hence violated the CBA (Collective
Bargaining Agreement) with private respondent Phil Blooming Mills Co.?

HELD:
1. NO. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of
their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so
that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for
itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the
local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened
the position of its laborers vis-a-vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more
emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitutionthe untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer
that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its
owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark realityabused, harassed and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-visthe local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human beingbroken in morale and
brutalized in spiritcan never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is
like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
Freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievancesover property
rights has been sustained. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is
as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.


DAVID, et. al. vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et. al., G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006 (KHONG
HUN)

BAYAN, et. al. vs. ERMITA, et. al., G.R. No. 169838. April 25, 2006 (LESAVA)
There are 3 groups assailing the validity of B.P. No. 880, The Public Assembly Act of 1985. Some of
them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.

The claims of the 3 groups assailing the validity of BP No. 880:

Bayan, et. al: their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause,
opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test.

26 individual petitioners: that in a peaceful mass action which was preempted was violently
dispersed by the police and they got injured, arrested and detained. Furthermore, when a group
they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim,
put the country under an undeclared martial rule, the protest was likewise dispersed violently and
many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
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22

They argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of
that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them
and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.

Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum
tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.

Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al: they are a group that conducts peaceful mass actions and that
their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right
to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated
Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it.

KMU, et al., further claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted
at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6,
2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa
Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.4 Three other rallyists were arrested.

They argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can
set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the
permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive.
Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even
before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates
the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.

The CPR is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang stating that:

In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the
political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally
policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of
the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.

The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the
national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting
of a democratic society.

The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.


Issue:
1. WON BP No. 880 is violative of the Freedom of Speech?
2. WON BP No. 880 prevents the right to assembly and petition?
3. WON CPR is constitutional?

Held:
1. NO. the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which
is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised
by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those
and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such
as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and
city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.

B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government.

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23
2. NO. B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,20 where
the Court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.

Contrary to petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. Public does
not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Not every expression of opinion is a public
assembly. The law refers to rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass
or concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only
to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right
to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

3. NO. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses.



Section 5 Freedom of Religion

Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 PHIL. 201 [1937]) (LIM)
SYNOPSIS: Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ
of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which
commemorated the 33
rd
International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila.
Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the
benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by
virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new
designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The governments goal was to
promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went
to the government and no to any church.

Petitioner: Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church
Respondent: Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts

FACTS:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced that he would issue postage stamps
commemorating the celebration of the 33
rd
International Eucharistic Congress organized by
the Roman Catholic Church in Manila.
Petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition to stop the issuance and sale of the remaining postage
stamps.
Petitioner alleges that this violates Sec. 23, subsection 3, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
1

(now Section 29, par. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) which prohibited the appropriation
of public funds for the benefit or support of any religion.
Basically, petitioner is alleging that it is a violation of the principle of separation of Church and
State.

ISSUE:
1. W/N a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy
2. W/N there was a violation of the Constitution

HELD/ RATIO:

PETITION DENIED

1. YES
Generally, a writ of prohibition is only issued on the performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. But it can be issued, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person
whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
2. NO
What is granted by the Constitution is not mere religious tolerance but religious
freedom. Even the Preamble of the Constitution manifests the religious nature of
Filipinos.
The Director of Posts issued the postage stamps pursuant to Act No. 4052
o Act No. 4052 appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of postage stamps
with new designs. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communication, is authorized to dispose of the funds as long as
it is deemed advantageous to the government.
There is no religious purpose for Act No. 4052. Even if the stamps featured the
International Eucharistic Congress, none of the funds raised would be used for the
benefit of the Catholic Church.
The final stamp design also showed a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila
(instead of the original design featuring a chalice). The main purpose of the stamp was
to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists. The resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Catholic Church was not the purpose of the Government.



NB: This is a fairly short case, full text reading strongly suggested.

Garces v. Estenzo (104 SCRA 510 [1981]) (MANALAYSAY)
WOODEN IMAGE

Nature: Constitutionality of 4 resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia (Ormoc) regarding the
acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast
day.

1
The case says Section 13 but this is a typographical error. Its really section 23.
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ISKOol of LAW
24

Facts:
1. Barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" or
fiesta every April 5 of the feast day of San Vicente Ferrer, patron saint of Valencia
2. The resolution designated the members of 9 committees who would take charge of the festivity. It
provided for:
a. The acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and
b. The construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects.
3. Funds for the 2 projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
4. Barangay council then passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the
practice in Eastern Leyte:
a. Councilman Cabatingan (Chairman of fiesta) would be the caretaker of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and image would remain in his residence for 1 year until the election of his
successor as chairman of the next feast day.
b. Image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's
feast day.
5. Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite duly ratified by the barangay general
assembly. 272 voters ratified.
6. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and
those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and
the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu for PHP400
7. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church so devotees could worship
the saint during the mass for the fiesta.
8. CONTROVERSY AROSE after the mass when the parish priest, Father Osmea refused to
return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church
because church funds were used for its acquisition.
9. Several days after the fiesta, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea
allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain Veloso, apparently in
connection with the disputed image.
a. That incident provoked captain to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc for grave
oral defamation.
b. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso on the grounds of
immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of law.
10. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the church. Because Father Osmea
did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored"
Resolution No. 6, the council enacted Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a
replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image. The barangay council passed
Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case.
11. The replevin case was filed in the city court against Father Osmea and Bishop Urgel. After the
barangay council had posted a cash bond of PHP800, Father Osmea turned over the image to the
council.
a. ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
b. Later, he and 3 others (Petitioner Garces - member of the Aglipayan Church, and 2 Catholic
laymen) filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two) a complaint in the CFI
praying for the annulment of the said resolutions.
12. LOWER COURT DISMISSED complaint and upheld the validity of the resolutions.

Issue:
Whether the parish priest or a layman (Brgy. Council) should have the custody of the patron saints
image. BRGY. COUNCIL
WON resolutions contravene constitution regarding the prohibition on respecting and using public
funds for a particular religion - NO

PETITIONERS 1
ST
ARGUMENT:
1. Petitioners appealed contending that the barangay council was not duly constituted because the
chairman of the kabataang barangay was not allowed to participate in its sessions.
2. Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A).
Presidential Decree No. 557 directed that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the
Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.
a. Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-
municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of
particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in
conformity with law"
b. The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least 6 months,
18 years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary
c. The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and 6 councilmen.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684 provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-
officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay
councilman.
3. In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay
council but he was not able to attend because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil,
Ormoc City.
HELD: Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions
void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

PETITIONERS SECOND ARGUMENT:
Resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).

HELD:
1. That contention is glaringly DEVOID of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private
funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
2. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated.
3. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for
the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
4. Barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
5. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order
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25
to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that
arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to
any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
6. The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore
that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and
Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the
church only once a year or during the fiesta.
7. We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion
annd the use of public money to favor any sect are not involved at all in this case remotely or
indirectly.
8. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if
the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing
contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente
Ferrer to be installed in his church.
13. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the BARANGAY COUNCIL.
Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the
image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.
14. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church that action
would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is private
property.
15. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image. Not every
governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.

DISPOSITIVE: Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay
resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed.

OTHER CITED CASES:
1. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000
pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President, issued in 1936 postage
stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the
Philippines. The design showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No
religious purpose was intended. Monsignor Aglipay, founder and head of the Philippine Independent
Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps. It was held that the
issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of religious character, was not designed
as a propaganda for the Catholics. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.
2. The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, where a religious
brotherhood, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in
honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the
funds which it held as trustee.

Board of Education v. Allen (392 U.S. 236 [1968]) (MERCADO)

American Bible Society v. City of Manila (101 PHIL. 386 [1957]) (MORA)
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines.

In the course of its ministry, the petitioners Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialects.

The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed petitioner that it was conducting the business of
general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529,
3028 and 3364, and required the petitioner to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and
license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45

American Bible Society protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that
petitioner deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding
the same.

To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises, on the
petitioner paid to the City of Manila under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned
amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question
the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were being collected, which was done on the
same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action.

When the case was set for hearing, petitioner proved, among other things, that it has been in existence
in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that
its contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was
never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible
Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of bible therein. Petitioner
further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for
as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial
remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in
the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit

CA certified the case to SC for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only
questions of law.

American Bible Society contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are
unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious
censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution
and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinances restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship

HELD:
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The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." (Taada and Fernando on the
Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297).
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual
cost of the same, but this cannot mean that petitioner was engaged in the business or occupation of
selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general
merchandise, cannot be applied to petitioner society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor's
permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated
therein, does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax
the exercise of religious practices. Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to
petitioner Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to the petitioner and the City of Manila is
powerless to license or tax the business of the petitioner society involved herein, for the reasons above
stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

SC reversed the decision appealed from, sentencing the City of Manila to return to the American Bible
Society the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.


Tolentino v. Sec. of finance (235 SCRA 630[1994]) (PABALAN)
FACTS:
RA 7716 (The E-VAT Law) seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on
the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services.
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716, one of which is its alleged
infringement of Right to Freedom of Religion.
PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted
to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory
taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions, which
are profit oriented i.e. PAL, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716.

Philippine Bible Society, Inc. (PBS) claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived
from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those
who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale.

ISSUE:
WON RA 7716 is a violation of the freedom of the press or religion

HELD:
NO. The ruling "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional" refers only to a tax on the the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties (purely for revenue purposes) and not a
licensce tax (for regulation) nor a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI cites Murdock v. Pennsylvania which stated that the fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is
immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly
does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First
Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.
Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom
of religion are in preferred position.

The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise
of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to
the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for
delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of
general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the
American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, NOT a license tax nor a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale
or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press
to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax
or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so
incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that
might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the
petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an
impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as
amended by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the
expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting
in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the
VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At
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27
any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the
event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

German v. Barangan (135 SCRA 514 [1985]) (RAMOS)
Facts:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the
ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang
grounds located in the same street.
Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street
with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives.
Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon
orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any
further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area.
At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and
worshipping at said church.
They said that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship,
but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very
residence and offices of the President of the Republic.
Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as
sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.
Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists,
and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation.
Because of the article written by JP Fenix entitled Mission Impossible, the foregoing
cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion
Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid,
still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as
violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators
crashed through the Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public
of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted.

Issue:
WON General Barangan violated petitioners freedom to worship and locomotion when he disallowed
them to worship and pray at St. Jude Chapel

Held:
NO. The intention of the petitioners were not really to perform an act of religious worship
but to conduct an anti- government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised
their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans.
Every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith.
Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the
President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting
business with Malacanang.
It is also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from
possible external attacks and disturbances.
Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth
functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action
would certainly disrupt.
Petition dismissed.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu (219 SCRA 256 [1993]) (SASAKI)
FACTS:

Petitioners, members of the Jehovahs Witnesses, were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by RA 1265 and by DECS Order No. 8 making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which
they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God"
They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols.
They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State.
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the
Constitution protect against official control


ISSUE:
W/N the expulsion constitutes a violation of freedom of religion.

HELD:

Yes!

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare
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28
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to
the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA
514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified.

Fonacier v. Court of Appeals (96 PHIL. 417 [1955]) (SUNGA)

Pamil v. Teleron (86 SCRA 413 [1978]) (SUPAPO)
SYNOPSIS: Fr. Gonzaga was proclaimed as mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Pamil, his rival, filed a
petition for his disqualification impugning his eligibility for being an ecclesiastic citing the prohibition
under Sec 2175 of the Admin. Code. Judge Teleron ruled in favor of Fr. Gonzaga. Although, majority of
the Supreme Court believed that such provision imposes a religious test on the exercise of a political
right, therefore, violates the 1935 Constitution (religious freedom) and should be held inoperative,
However, it was held constitutional as it lacked 1 vote. Thus, the petition was granted, the judgment was
reversed and Fr. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the position of mayor.

DOCTRINE: Provision of Revised Administrative Code barring ecclesiastics from being elected to public
office held constitutional; Minority votes of 5 members of the Supreme Court prevailed over insufficient 7
votes of members, as the requirement to declare a law un constitutional is 8 votes; Case at bar.

FACTS:
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed as municipal mayor of., Pamil, his opponent,
filed a petition for his disqualification based on Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there
be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public
works of the municipality." However, the suit did not prosper, as Judge Teleron sustained the right of
Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was
impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by
petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect.
Thus was the specific question raised.

ISSUE:
1. WON the ineligibility provision of the Administrative Code was impliedly repealed by the
Election Code.
2. WON Fr. Gonzaga is eligible to occupy the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque,
Bohol


HELD:
1. No. Majority of the Court believed that the provision was impliedly repealed but they lacked 1 vote
to declare it repealed (Under Rule 56 of Rules of Court, as a minimum, 8 votes are needed to
pronounce its unconstitutionality).
There is no clear-cut answer from this Tribunal. After a lengthy and protracted deliberation, the
Court is divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment
should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was
superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. Outside of the writer of this opinion, six other
Justices are of this mind They are Justices Teehankee, Muoz Palma Concepcion Jr., Santos,
Fernandez, and Guerrero. For them, the overriding principle of the supremacy of the Constitution
or, at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal.
4
The remaining five members of
this Court, Chief Justice Castro, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Aquino, on the other
hand, hold the position that such a prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for elective office is
not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the
Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the
challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as
ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its
application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer
of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no
choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent
Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other
members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for
certiorari must be granted.
The court sets forth the reasons why there are constitutional objections to the continuing
force and effectivity of Section 2175 as far as ecclesiastics are concerned:
1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now
under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights." The principle of the paramount character of the
fundamental law 6 thus comes into play. There are previous rulings to that effect. The ban
imposed by the Administrative Code cannot survive. So the writer of this opinion would hold.
2. This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: "All laws of the Philippine Islands
shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution,
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all
references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in
so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution."
3. It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of
the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case
were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as
it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude
them is to impose a religious test.
4. This is the first case then where this Court has to face squarely such an issue. As set forth at
the outset, it is not even necessary to annul the challenged Administrative Code provision. It
is merely declared inoperative by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly
found in the present Charter.
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29
5. Nonetheless, the above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it
binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must
be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application.
2. No. Since Sec. 2175 was declared constitutional, Fr. Gonzaga, as an ecclesiastic, cannot hold
municipal office.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and
set aside. Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the
municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect.

ESTRADA v ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 & June 22, 2006 (TABAG)
FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man
not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of
Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of
the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral
conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.


The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it
should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's
receipt of this Decision.

Section 6 Liberty of Abode and of Travel
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals (142 SCRA 149 [1986]) (VELASCO)
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Petitioner together with his co-
stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc. and Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition
relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC CAse No. 001826, was granted and a
management committee was organized and appointed. Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826,
the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake,
criminal charges for estafa were filed against the petitioner, as the company's president. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Instance Corporation
as surety.
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Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion for permission to leave the country, stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States for business transactions and opportunities.

The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The court
stated in their order that until the cases against petitioner were terminates, he is denied permission to
leave the country. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, but
was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: WON petitioner's constitutional right to travel was violated.

Held: No.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put
the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the accused were
allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.

The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in
their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation
of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely
derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the
grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, for he
would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution states: The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, the Court found no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country.

Marcos v. Manglapus {177 SCRA 668[1989]) (VILLAFUERTE)
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free
to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to
enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
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31
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Silverio v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 760 [1991]) (ATIENZA)
Facts

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities
Act in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of
the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure
Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based
primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled
for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the
country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court"

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence,
this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July
1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments
could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the
right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of
national security, public safety or public health."

Issue: WON petitioner was unlawfully denied of right to travel
HELD: No. SC affirmed CA

The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988),
the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due
to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had
invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued
against him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right
to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of
national security, public safety or public health."

The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by
reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having
been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody.
"Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the
Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par.]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the
Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision. Article
III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads:

"The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired."

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health" (Article IV, Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently,
to wit:

"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law."

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on
the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."

The SC did not agree with this interpretation.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on
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32
the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First
Edition, 1987, p. 263).

Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime (Marcos) when there was a Travel Processing Center (An agency,
not a Court), which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer
(Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.


Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]) (BUENAVENTURA)
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so
she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000.
Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be
allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she
would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted
before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.
Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he
every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of
action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent
power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all
times to the orders and process of the court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country
during the pendency of the case.

Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (247 SCRA 127 [1995]) (CAMERINO)

Section 7 Right to Information
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]) (DORIA)
Facts:

The Civil Service Commission denied Valentin L. Legaspis request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, employed as sanitarians in the Health Department
of Cebu City.

Legaspi issued this special civil action for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission to disclose
such information. He invokes that the fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is guaranteed under Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Solicitor General challenges Legaspis standing to sue on the ground that the petitioner does not
possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing
this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks. The SG contends that:

To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party
aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every
case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal
right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

The CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, this petition
is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, at most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had
allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject.

But it is clear is that Legaspi has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:

when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera).

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.


Issue: WON Legaspi has the legal right to access information on the civil service eligibilities of the employees.


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33
Held: YES. The CSC is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or
deny, the civil service eligibility of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Legaspi, being a citizen, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. The Court finds no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present
suit.

For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of
those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the
ultimate illusion.

In recognizing the people's right to be informed, the Constitution expressly mandate the duty of the State
and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government
research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

It is clear from the pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the
reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the
manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction
has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to particular
information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may
impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with
the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that
damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said
agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by
other persons shall be assured.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of mandamus in a proper case.

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern.

In determining whether or not particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The
Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the CSC has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the
civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions,
are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative.


Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. (170 SCRA 256 [1989]) (EXCONDE)
Doctrine: right to information
1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law

Facts:
Petitioner Valmonte as a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of Philippines, wrote a letter
dated 4 Jun 1986 addressed to respondent Belmonte (GSIS General Manager) requested to be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to
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34
secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The petitioner
specifically requested for the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan, or if not secure
the documents just to have access to them.
The Deputy General Counsel (Meynardo Tiro) of GSIS, through a reply letter on 17 Jun 1986, did not
allow the request. That there is a confidential relationship between the GSIS and their clients/customers;
that there would it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by
the courts
Apparently petitioner Valmonte have not received any reply, wrote another letter on 20 Jun 1986 saying
that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit. And that on 19 Jul
1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim
and regular Batasang Pambansa, including 10 opposition members, were granted housing loans by the
GSIS.
Respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, as the petitioners have
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager
are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the
GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted,
then petitioners have no cause of action.
Issue: 1. WON the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional
right to information
2. WON this case falls under the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
Held:
1. Petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and
hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data
relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies
and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental
power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied,
except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is
not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information.
For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by
the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-
in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public service. ** It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or
"public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with
the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover,
the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board.
The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
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35

2. Settled principles in administrative law -- before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law.

The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.
Ruling: the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent GM of GSIS is ORDERED to allow
petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former
Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and
manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato (203 SCRA 515 [1991]) (FORTES)

Section 8 Right to Form Associations
Social Security System v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686 [1989]) (FRANCISCO)
Art. 3, Sec. 8 (Bill of Rights)
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether govt employees may strike, they are
prohibited from striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1997 of the CSC
and as implied in E.O. 180.

Facts:
- June 11, 1987 the SS filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 09, 1987, the officers
and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS
bldg., preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor
Mgmt Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return
to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
- The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
- It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the unions demands,
which included:
o Implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA CBA on check-off of
union dues;
o Payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
o Conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six months or more of
service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS;
o Payment of the childrens allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts
discrimination and unfair labor practices.

Issue:
Whether or not employees of the SSS have the right to strike.

Held:
NO.
- The 1987 Constitution, in the Art. on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, CBA and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law, (Art 13,
Sec. 31). Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that the right of the people,
including those employed in the public or private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged, (Art. 3, Sec. 8).
- Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of govt employees
to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. The
right to form an organization does not carry with it the right to hold a strike.
- Considering that under the 1987 Constitution, the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Govt, including GOCCs with original
charters, [Art.9B, Sec.2(l)].
- E.O No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as govt employees
and that the SSS is one such govt-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under RA 1161, it employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
- Petitioners Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction dated 13
December 1988 is DENIED.

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36

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union (59 SCRA 54 [1974]) (GATCHALIAN)
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesiani Cristo", had been
in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA containing a
closed shop provision wherein membership in the Union is required for all permanent employees.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.
3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was
taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee
and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action
for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee.
1
The Court decided in Appellees favor. Thus the Union appealed directly to this
court. The Union contends that the RA 3350 is unconstitutional stating many reasons to support it (one
of it is because it infringes the fundamental right to form lawful associations).
The Union contends that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the
very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all
those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization"
4
, "prohibits all
the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of
their members thereto"
5
; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form
or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes
obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution.
On the other hand, Appellee, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form
lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given
substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations

ISSUE
WON the Act infringes the right to form associations? NO

HELD
Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such
religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears
nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary
implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act,
committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of
Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973,
provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. It can be safely said that whatever theory one
subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an
association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he
would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time.
20
It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
21
Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and
the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which
the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides
that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement,
before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes
to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an
exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
If cant be understood, STOP!
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37
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to
join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that
in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer
or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.

Central Negros Electric Corp. v. Sec of DOLE (201 SCRA 584 [1991]) (GUY)
Facts:

1. (CENECO) seeks to annul the order 1 issued by then Acting Secretary of Labor (laguesma)
June 6, 1990, declaring the projected certification election unnecessary and directing petitioner
CENECO to continue recognizing private respondent CENECO Union of Rational Employees (CURE) as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank-and-file employees of petitioner's electric
cooperative for purposes of collective bargaining.

2. It appears from the records that on August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing for a term of
three years retroactive to April 1,1987 and extending up to March 31, 1990.

3. CENECO denied CURE's request on the ground that, under applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form
or join a union.

4. Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA re negotiation, CURE members, in a general
assembly was agreed that "all union members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the
union members' membership from Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of the full
benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and
CURE However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on February 27, 1990 under
Resolution No. 90 "for the reason that the basis of withdrawal is not among the ground.

5. CENECO's refusal to re negotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a petition for direct recognition or for
certification election, supported by 282 or 72% of the 388 rank-and-file employees

6. CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there are legal constraints to the filing of the
certification election Med-Arbiter Felizardo T. Serapio issued an order, 6 granting the petition for
certification election which, in effect, was a denial of CENECO's motion to dismiss, and directing the
holding of a certification election between CURE and No Union.

7. CENECO appealed to the Department of Labor and Employment. present case the doctrine
enunciated in the BATANGAS case that employees of an electric cooperative who at the same
time are members of the electric cooperative are prohibited from forming or joining labor unions
Issue: whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative
are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a CBA

Held:
certiorari will not lie.
argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of this Court in the
BATANGAS case is without merit. referred to merely declared that employees who are at the same time
members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining
However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their
membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.

As discussed by the Solicitor General, Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of
CENECO provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with such
uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same section provides that upon
withdrawal, the member is merely required to surrender his membership certificate and he is to be
refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative. There appears to be
no other condition or requirement imposed upon a withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause
for petitioner's denial of the withdrawal from membership of its employees who are also members of the
Union.
It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from
membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done at any time and
for whatever reason.

In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot
be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right not
to join the same

The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the
cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member-employees is an
expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative.
The avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free
collective bargaining mandates that the employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of
collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration. said that where a union has filed a petition
for certification election, the mere fact that no opposition is made does not warrant a direct certification
Petitioner is therefore under threat of being held liable for refusing to negotiate with a union whose right
to
bargaining status has not been legally established equally important is that everyone be given a
democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned. The most effective way of determining which labor
organization can truly represent the working force is by certification election
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38
WHEREFORE, the questioned order for the direct certification of respondent CURE as the bargaining
representative of the employees of petitioner CENECO is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
med-arbiter is hereby ordered to conduct a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
CENECO with CURE and No Union as the choices.


In Re: Edillon (84 SCRA 554 [1978]) (HAUTEA)
FACTS:
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On
November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to
the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice.
The IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
. . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of
The delinquent members name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Editions comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required
to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondents pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule)
1
in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integratedand to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent members name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization.There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues.Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . .
The core of the respondents arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.


ISSUES & HELD:
1. WON, respondents contention that the court is without power to compel him to become a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines correct?

- NO. Respondents contention is incorrect. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
If cant be understood, STOP!
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39
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory programthe lawyers.
9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State

2. WON, the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void?

- The provision is VALID. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)which power the
respondent acknowledgesfrom requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration

3. WON, the enforcement of the penalty provision would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process?
- NO. It the penalty provision does not infringe on constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary
The following words of Justice Harlan are apposite: The objection would make every Governmental
exaction the material of a free speech issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties
were to thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet
been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities

Note: Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion