Political speech, symbolic speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press

and campaign donations.

“Speech” has been broadly defined by the courts to include not only verbal
expression, but also visual art, music, theater, dance, and other expressive conduct
and non-verbal forms of communication. However, First Amendment rights are
not absolute and have some exceptions. Unprotected speech includes:

 Incitement to illegal activity and/or imminent violence;

 defamation;
 obscenity;
 child pornography;
 threats and intimidation; and
 false advertising.

National Press Club vs Comelec

G.R. No. 102653, March 05, 1992

Facts: It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of

Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda
during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition
is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant
to election issues.

Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the

freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-
based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing
in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting
the right of voters to information and opinion.

The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as

unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646,
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to
the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:

x x x x x
x xxx

1. b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television

station, other mass media, or any person making use of the
mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space
or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as
such during the campaign period.”
Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is
valid/constitutional

Held: Yes.

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights

which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special
provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., “during
the election period.” It is difficult to overemphasize the special
importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the
purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by
which the people identify those who shall have governance over
them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy.
Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant
values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without
regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s
disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the
Constitution is the egalitarian demand that “the State
shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or

administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election
period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside
the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operations during election periods.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of
access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation,
however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26)
of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the
financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial
difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the
situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates
with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory
mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed
and may be expected to bring about or promote equal opportunity,
and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and
sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz)

But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it

constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination of ideas. In a word,
it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive
government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed
to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say
on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his
“Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored the
impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of
censor and at the same time good enough to perform its duties.
Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today, smugly
brandishing the threat of this miserable law.

One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of

censorship, as where private mail is screened during wartime to
prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified
matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to
take a famous example, a person is prohibited from shouting “Fire!”
in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster
the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a person’s right
to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule
applies whether the censorship be in the form of outright
prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like
the imposition of a tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed
maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the circulation of
books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the
reading tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.

I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v.

Sullivan that “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.” That
presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the
contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid
on its face because of its undisguised attempt at censorship. The
feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean
elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what
we have here is an illegal intent to suppress free speech by denying
access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for
the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of
these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element
of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the
Constitution.