CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY:

A Review of Themes, Concepts, and Pespectives

!athie" #ef$em
deflem@sc.edu
www.mathieudeflem.net
This edition, %an"a& '((() Latest evision, Septem*e +,,-)
This is Pat One on:))!a. /e*e and Emi$e #"0heim
C$ic0 hee to 1o to Pat Two on Simme$ and !ead)
!A2 /E3ER 4'56-7'(+,8:THE RATIO9ALI:ATIO9 O;
SOCIETY
Liteat"e
(1905) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(1910191!) Econom" and Societ"
(1915) #eli$ionsso%iolo$ie
A) !ethodo$o1ica$ Appoach
&e'er stressed the need for social theor" to 'rea( throu$h materialist and idealist
models of e)planation to indicate the "electi*e affinit"" of different social conditions.
+owe*er, his interests were not re*olutionar" oriented to pra)is (-ar)), nor scientificall"
directed at the esta'lishment of a science of societ" (.ur(heim), rather, his sociolo$" is
inspired '" the concrete political concerns of &e'er as a citi%en of /erman"0 his
attention $oes out to the wa"s in which /erman political life should 'e ordered with the
ad*ent of 'ureaucrac" and industrial capitalism and the decline of traditional world
*iews.
1. 1'2ecti*it" and 3alue4reedom
a) An Objective Sociology of Subjectivity
The differentiation of su'2ect and o'2ect (and the correspondin$ distinctions 'etween
social and natural sciences) does not mean that the social sciences, which necessaril"
deal with ideal phenomena, cannot 'e o'2ecti*e. Social sciences cannot scientificall"
esta'lish the ideals or normati*e principles which define what ou$ht to 'e. 5ut one can
distin$uish means and ends of action, and science can determine what the 'est means
are, $i*en that end. Sociolo$" can, then, also sa" that some ends are useless since
there are, and can 'e, no means to achie*e those $oals. 1r sociolo$" can also
determine and e)plicitl" state the a)ioms on which certain attitudes and statements
rest.
There is therefore no uni*ersal ethics. 6o sin$le set of ideals can 'e shown
scientificall" to 'e ri$ht or wron$. This is wh" there is reli$ion, it is directed towards
ultimate ends (Gesinnungsethik). 1n the other hand, sociolo$" can assist in an ethics
of responsi'ilit" (Verantwortungsethik), which see(s to find the rational calculus '"
which means are emplo"ed to ends, and the conse7uences the" actuall" ha*e,
re$ardless of (despite of) the intentions.
b) Causality and Ideal!y"es
Science see(s causes, 'ut it also rests on ideals which it cannot 2ustif" scientificall",
mainl" the selection of rele*ant facts out of realit". So we must (now the *alues that
$uide (nowled$e. This cannot la" in the formulation of laws8 the uni7ueness of historical
e*ents has to 'e e)plained (e.$. wh" is there capitalism onl" in the &est9). 6ote that
the natural sciences also see( to unra*el the uni7ueness of thin$s.
The identification of causes of effects necessaril" rests on certain assumptions, as a
minimum this in*ol*es the selection of e*ents, and the identification of the one factor or
set of factors, in a 'roader frame of factors (which is 'asicall" a stream of e*ents),
without which a certain effect would not ha*e 'een 'rou$ht a'out. This identification is
selecti*e, and in this sense, su'2ecti*e, 'ut an" such identification, then, must 'e
*erifia'le '" others (a sort of consensus theor" of truth).
:dealt"pes are specificall" constructed with the purpose of interpretin$ and e)plainin$ a
historical e*ent. :t is constructed '" a'stractin$ and com'inin$ a limited num'er of
elements which are seldom found, in purit", in realit". +owe*er, the idealt"pe is not an
ideal, it is, rather, an ideali%ation with a purpose0 the idealt"pe is not description nor
h"pothesis, 'ut it is a metrolo$ical de*ice that aids in descri'in$ and e)plainin$, it
ma(es realit" descri'a'le and e)plaina'le at all.
c) Value#reedo$
Scientists should 'e *aluefree (in the meanin$ indicated a'o*e), 'ut this does not
mean, accordin$ to &e'er, that scientists cannot ha*e and propa$ate *alues. The
scientist as educator must see( to speciali%e in (nowled$e and education, 'ut the
scientist can, not as scientist 'ut as %political animal&, outside the uni*ersit", e)press
political and moral 2ud$ments. The sphere of science and politics, then, must and can
'e (ept separate.
;. <nderstandin$ and E)planation
a) Inter"retative Sociology
&e'er was interested in the formulation of $eneral principles of social action, 'ut these
cannot 'e concei*ed as laws0 sociolo$" must see( to understand human action
inasmuch as it is (non)meanin$ful. +uman action is su'2ecti*e0 it is $uided '" the
moti*ations and intentions of the actors in*ol*ed. Sociolo$" see(s to understand those
moti*es and meanin$s from an emphatic attitude (Sinverstehen). This does not e)clude
e)planation0 sociolo$" understands human action, with reference to an idealt"pe or
with re$ard to a specific meanin$ of action, and there'" e)plains its course and
conse7uences. =lso, sociolo$" can identif" 'oth the meanin$ful and nonmeanin$ful
elements of action. The techni7ues to $rasp meanin$ must 'e replica'le, and *erifia'le
on the 'asis of the esta'lished standards of methodolo$". These techni7ues include a)
direct o'ser*ation of emoti*e action (e.$. an$er), and ') e)planator" understandin$ '"
identif"in$ an inter*enin$ moti*ational lin( 'etween meanin$ and action (e.$. chop
wood). The latter implies the identification of a particular moti*e which is alwa"s lin(ed
to a 'roader frame of %normati*it"&. This does not mean ps"cholo$ical reductionism (cf.
there are e)plaina'le structures within which meanin$ is $i*en).
b) Social 'elationshi"s
= social relationship is defined as a reciprocal interaction 'etween two or more
indi*iduals, which does not necessaril" mean that the meanin$s of all actors are
identical, 'ut that there must 'e meanin$ in*ol*ed in an" case on the part of the inter
actors (an orientation to).
&e'er distin$uishes four idealt"pical t"pes of orientation in social relationships0 1)
Purposi*e rational action is directed '" the successful calculation of means towards a
$i*e end8 ;) 3alue rational action is directed towards an ideal and is carried out for its
own sa(e8 >) =ffecti*e action is also carried out for its own sa(e, "et it lac(s a clear
ideal, and rests on an emoti*e state8 and !) Traditional action is carried out under the
influence of a custom or ha'it.

3) Potestantism, Capita$ism, and the /o$d Re$i1ions
1. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
a) !he (roble$
There is the statistical fact that in modern capitalist societies, the hi$hs(illed wor(ers
and the entrepreneurs are o*erwhelmin$l" Protestant. The connection 'etween
economic rationalit" in capitalism and Protestantism &e'er will trace in the character of
Protestant 'eliefs. This connection in itself is nothin$ special (-ar) saw Protestantism
as the ideolo$ical reflection of capitalism), 'ut &e'er su$$est an alternati*e
e)planation. +e will focus on cultural elements which, he will show, ha*e are a peculiar
independent factor in the formation of &estern capitalism, defined as, an this is crucial,
the rational capitalistic or$ani%ation of free la'or.
b) !he S"irit of Ca"italis$
The methodical conduct of life under capitalism is not 2ust a practice, it is also an ethic,
a con*iction which emphasi%es the dut" of the indi*idual to increase capital, the ma(in$
of mone" as a $oal in and '" itself. This conduct is specific to &estern capitalism (other
forms of capitalism ma" lac( it). This capitalist spirit $oes 'e"ond the traditionalistic
conception of the manipulation of nature to sustain one&s li*elihood.
6ote from the start that what &e'er is tal(in$ a'out is a *er" precise conception of
capitalism (it is not what -ar) meant '" it)0 "capitalism is identical with the pursuit of
profit, and fore*er renewed profit, '" means of continuous, rational, capitalistic
enterprise". Capitalist rational action &e'er descri'es as "one which rests on the
e)pectation of profit '" the utili%ation of opportunities for e)chan$e, that is on (formall")
peaceful chances of profit... The important fact is alwa"s that a calculation of capital in
terms of mone" is made". Capitalism for &e'er, then, is first and foremost the desire to
use the most rational, i.e. most efficient, means to accumulate wealth, a desire which
ser*es no other end than itself. 4or the ac7uisition of more and more mone", and at the
same time the a*oidance of pleasure, there is emplo"ed a *er" rational procedure. The
method is rational (in terms of efficienc"), and the $oal is irrational, namel" the
ac7uisition of mone" for an end (to ha*e it) which defies the main characteristic of
mone" (namel" a means of e)chan$e, i.e. to 'e used). 6ote that this method of
conduct, as inspired '" the Protestant ethos of Cal*inism, applies onl" to a limited
num'er of people for a short period of time, and onl" in the &est. :t is then, '" all
standards, not true that &e'er su$$ests that Protestantism led to capitalism, let alone
caused it.
c) )uther&s Conce"t of the Calling
The concept of the callin$ is a product of the #eformation. :t refers to the 2oinin$ of the
mundane affairs of life with an o*erarchin$ reli$ious influence (awa" from the ideal of
Catholic monastic isolation to the innerworldl" worship of the outerworldl" $od). 1ne
had to perform one&s duties in the world to ser*e $od. 5ut ?uther&s concept of the
callin$ was still traditionalistic since it implied an a'solute acceptance of the wa" thin$s
are. ?ater Protestant sects chan$ed this. Then four (idealt"pical) (inds of ascetic
Protestantism emer$ed0 Cal*inism, -ethodism, Pietism, and 5aptism.
d) Calvinis$
Cal*inism has the followin$ idea(l)s0 the uni*erse e)ists for $od, the moti*es of $od are
humanl" incomprehensi'le, and, most importantl", onl" a small num'er of people are
chosen to recei*e $race, i.e. the notion of predestination. The conse7uences of these
'eliefs for the 'elie*er were an unprecedented feelin$ of inner loneliness0 one could not
(now whether one was chosen, this is decisi*e, the crucial 'rea( from Catholicism (for
the thesis &e'er see(s to defend). Therefore, one had the dut" to con*ince oneself
that one was chosen, selfconfidence would 'e a si$n of wea(ened faith, and this self
confidence can 'est 'e secured '" an intensel" innerworldl" acti*it". 4or this reason,
la'or in the material world 'ecame the hi$hest positi*e ethical attitude0 the instrumental
spirit of capitalism is an unintended offshoot of Cal*inism.
e) Asceticis$ and the S"irit of Ca"italis$
The spirit of ascetic Protestantism $a*e 'irth to capitalist economic rationalism 'ecause
of its emphasis on the ascetic rational moti*es with a denouncement of pleasure.
Puritanism restricted pleasure, and at the same time 'ro(e with traditionalism, to see
the ac7uisition of wealth as directl" willed '" $od. Then, once capitalism is esta'lished,
this reli$ious core does not ha*e to 'e there an"more. The economic rational conduct
of life 'ecomes a power independent of reli$ion. The idea of the callin$ is a support for
capitalism that, in the end, it no lon$er needs. Then, the cloa( of the care for e)ternal
$oods has 'ecome an @iron ca$e.@
So &e'er concludes that the rationalit" of capitalism is connected with the irrationalit"
of a *alue commitment (a$ainst a nai*e historical materialism), 'ut &e'er does not
present a unified alternati*e theor". &e'er states that there is an electi*e affinit"
'etween certain sorts of Cal*inism and the ethics of capitalism. +e adds that it is
necessar" "to in*esti$ate how Protestant =sceticism was in turn influenced '" its
character '" the totalit" of social conditions, especiall" economic". = onesided
approach, materialist or idealist, is in an" case useless. =lso &e'er did not maintain
"such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that the spirit of capitalism... could onl" ha*e
arisen as the result of certain effects of the reformation, or e*en that capitalism as an
economic s"stem is the creation of the #eformation". :nstead &e'er ar$ues that the
Protestant ethic which holds that the ac7uisition of material $oods is $ood in itself, e*en
willed '" $od, has shaped the particular course capitalism has ta(en in the &est, and
that the ethic of Protestantism is coresponsi'le for the 7ualitati*e formation and
7uantitati*e e)pansion of the capitalist culture.
f) Addendu$* !he (rotestant Sects and the S"irit of Ca"italis$
:n this paper, &e'er tries to account for the fact that, while (in the <S=) state and
church are separated and the state authorities accordin$l" ne*er as( for a person&s
denomination, the 7uestion of reli$ious affiliation was alwa"s posed in social and
'usiness life. =dmission to a reli$ious con$re$ation was seen as a certificate of
'usiness morals, an a'solute $uarantee of the moral 7ualities of a $entleman,
especiall" of the 7ualities re7uired in 'usiness. This is 'ecause a sect, unli(e a church,
is a *oluntar" association of those who are reli$iousl" and morall" 7ualified to 'ecome
one of its mem'ers. Toda" the particular (ind of denomination is rather irrele*ant, 'ut it
is decisi*e that one is admitted to mem'ership '" 'allot, after an e)amination of moral
worth and an ethical pro'ation in the sense of *irtues which will $uarantee innerworldl"
asceticism and credit worthiness in 'usiness life. The methodical wa" of life in the sects
nowada"s appears in a comple) of *oluntar" associations0 one must 'elon$ to a clu' of
whate*er (ind. These clu's, which are a seculari%ed *ersion of their predecessors
(sects), share the formal 7ualities of 'ein$ *oluntar", e)clusi*e and 'ased upon an
e)amination of worthiness. 6ot onl" the ethic of Protestantism (see !he (rotestant
+thic), 'ut also the social premiums, means of discipline, and, in $eneral, the whole
or$ani%ation of Protestantism still find their deri*ati*es toda".
:n histor", three principles of protestant or$ani%ation are re*ealed. 1) 3oluntarism0 1nl"
7ualified persons are admitted to the ?ord&s Supper. The *oluntaristic nature of this
admission is demonstrated '" the fact that 'aptism is reser*ed for adults. This poses
the pro'lem of who is to decide who will and has to, and who cannot 'e admitted. ;)
So*erei$nt"0 1nl" the local sacral communit" can 2ud$e whether a mem'er is 7ualified.
The communit" stands 2ointl" 'efore $od. 1nl" charisma, not trainin$ or office (of
professional theolo$ians or spiritual authorit") is reco$ni%ed. >) -oral discipline0
E)ternall", e)pelled persons are 'o"cotted, while, internall" in the sects, 'rotherliness
and mutual aid secure the cohesi*eness of the $roup.
The modern functions of sectli(e or$ani%ations in the <S= follow the same pattern.
The discipline of the sects was *ested in the hands of la"men, it wor(ed throu$h the
necessit" to hold one&s own, and it 'red and selected 7ualities. This last element is
most important0 one has to ha*e certain 7ualities and constantl" has to pro*e this.
Therefore, this innerworldl" asceticism is a methodical, rational wa" of conduct. :t is
the foundation of modern indi*idualism since it le$itimates the economic indi*idualism
of modern capitalism.
;. The &orld #eli$ions
a) !he +cono$ic +thics of the ,orld 'eligions
&e'er&s sociolo$" of law is opposed to the or$anicist model of societ", there is more
than a onetoone relationship, much more interdependence 'etween different parts.
=lso, he is opposed to e*olutionar" theories that readil" assume ine*ita'le historical
patterns. &e'er is interested in findin$ the economic ethic of the reli$ions of the world,
i.e. the practical impulses for action found in the pra$matic conte)ts of reli$ion. The
economic ethic of a reli$ion does not en2o" a onetoone status with economic
or$ani%ation, 'ut it is important to note that the economic ethic is not 2ust a function of
economic or$ani%ation (contrar" to -ar)), nor of reli$ion. 6ote for instance how
reli$ious ethics has e*aluated sufferin$. Sufferin$ can 'e seen as a reflection of
possession '" a demon. Therefore, the ad*anta$ed feel 'lessed, the" are %the chosen
ones& that deser*e $race (as a le$itimation of ine7ualit"). The disad*anta$ed, on the
other hand, must 'e purified, e.$. '" ma$icians. Thus sacred *alues alwa"s include
worldl" matters (health, wealth, etc.). =nd, irrational *alues ha*e led to *er" rational
wa"s of life, and how this differentl" affects different social strata.
b) 'eligions of the ,orld and Ca"italis$
The distinct characteristic of reli$ion is the worship of di*ine entities, with priests, a cult,
and a s"stem of 'eliefs (ma$ical forces, on the other hand, are su'ordinated to human
needs '" the use of formulae, with ma$icians, cults, and a low de$ree of s"stematic
'eliefs). The prophet of reli$ion is an indi*idual 'earer of charisma who proclaims a
reli$ious doctrine, and is instrumental for chan$e8 prophets can (not necessaril") de
m"stif" the world or remo*e ma$ic (cf. disenchantment). The doctrine of the prophet
ma" 'e inconsistent, 'ut, more importantl", his practical orientation to the world $i*e
unit". :t is important to note that &e'er did not simpl" conduct e)postfacto
e)periments0 there e)ist in histor" different com'inations of material and ideal factors
which are decisi*e for the (non)formation of capitalism.
c) 'eligious 'ejections of the ,orld and !heir -irections
=sceticism and m"sticism as reli$ious re2ections of the world are ideal t"pes8 this
means the" are not historical formations, 'ut technical, methodolo$ical aids that ena'le
us to see to what e)tent historical phenomena appro)imate these constructions.
=sceticism0 -"sticism0
a'ne$ation as $odwilled action contemplati*e possession of the hol"
indi*idual as a tool of the di*ine indi*idual as a *essel of the di*ine
innerworldl" contemplati*e fli$ht from the world
(asceticist fli$ht from the world) (innerworldl" m"sticism)
to pro*e oneself throu$h action to pro*e oneself a$ainst the world
=sceticism mo*es in two directions0 it ne$ates the world, and simultaneousl" wants to
master it throu$h the powers of a'ne$ation, in different spheres of action0
1) The traditional communit"0 the reli$iosit" of the con$re$ation no lon$er appeals to
the communit" of *illa$ers, mem'ers of the si', $uilds and so on, 'ut, as reli$ion of
'rotherliness, to the relations amon$ the 'elie*ers. This leads to tensions 'etween the
order and uni*ersalist ethic demands of the 'rethren of the faith and the orders and
*alues of this world.
;) The economic sphere0 the reli$ions of sal*ation warn a$ainst the impersonal
mechanisms of the mone"mar(et. Therefore, asceticism routini%ed wor( in the world
into ser*in$ $od&s will, and m"sticism resorts to an o'2ectless de*otion for an"'od", not
for the person&s sa(e, 'ut for de*otion.
>) The political sphere0 to the powers of the state, claimin$ the monopol" of the
le$itimate use of force, puritanism reacts '" actin$ a$ainst the world with the means of
that world (*iolence). -"sticism, on the other hand, ta(es on a radical antipolitical
attitude0 it completel" withdraws from the pra$ma of *iolence. Tensions with the political
world are una*oida'le, 'ut compromises are alwa"s made. The rationali%ation of
politics and econom", leadin$ action to 'e more and more considered in terms of
meansends relations (purposi*e rationalit"), increase these tensions. :n the end, the
reli$ion of 'rotherliness could entirel" re2ect purposi*e rational action.
!) The esthetic sphere0 2ust li(e econom" and politics, the esthetic sphere is
rationali%ed into a separate social domain, claimin$ independence with re$ard to 'eaut"
and form. :n the reli$ions of 'rotherliness art is supposed to ha*e a meanin$ (in relation
to $od) and not 'e 2ust a thin$ of form. =$ain, this leads to tensions, 'ut alliances or
compromises are made.
5) The erotic sphere0 eroticism has 'een raised into the sphere of conscious en2o"ment,
ac7uirin$ a sensational character as a sal*ation from rationali%ation, an escape from
meansends directed relations. 1f course, a principled ethic of reli$ious 'rotherhood is
sharpl" opposed to this "'rutalit"" an denial of 'onda$e to $od.
A) The intellectual sphere0 the tension 'etween reli$ion and scientific (nowled$e is the
$reatest. Science has disenchanted the world into a causal mechanism (loss of
freedom) and pushed reli$ion awa" into the irrational realm. E*er" reli$ion, on the other
hand, in the end as(s for a sacrifice of the intellect8 in reli$ion the world is understood
'" *irtue of a charisma of illumination, not '" intellect. The scientification of the world
has also led to a loss of meanin$ (senselessness), and reli$ion, in turn, has 'ecome
e*er more otherworldl", more alienated from all structured forms of life, confinin$ itself
to the specific reli$ious essence.

C) State, 3"ea"cac&, and Law in the A1e of !odenit&
1. State and 5ureaucrac"
1ne of &e'er&s most famous contri'utions to sociolo$" is his approach to politics,
'ureaucrac" and the state. 4irst, note that political societies e)ercise their mi$ht o*er a
territor" '" the threat or use of force, and '" reference to some (ind of le$itimac".
Political le$itimac" can 'e of three (inds0 1) Traditional authorit" is 'ased on the 'elief
in the a$eold sanctit" of power8 ;) ?e$al domination is t"pical for the 'ureaucrac" of
the state (see 'elow)8 and >) charismatic domination is 'ased on the 'elief in the
e)traordinar" 7ualities of a person.
&hen a political societ" uses force in such a wa" that it results in a successful
monopol" o*er force, there is a state. &e'er defines the state as "a compulsor"
association which or$ani%es domination. :t has 'een successful in see(in$ to
monopoli%e the le$itimate use of ph"sical force as a means of domination within a
territor". The domination of the state implies that its su'ordinates 'elief in the le$itimac"
of their su'ordination.
To secure its le$itimate monopol" o*er force, the state has com'ined the material
means of or$ani%ation in the hands of its leaders, and it has "e)propriated all
autonomous functionaries of estates who formerl" controlled these means in their own
ri$hts. The state has ta(en their positions and now stands in top place". The crucial
elements in &e'er&s definition of the state, then, refer to 1) the le$itimate use of force,
;) the territorial 'oundaries which delineate the state&s domination, and >) the
appropriation of the means of control.
a) !he )egiti$acy of the State
4irst, &e'er contends that the modern state cannot 'e defined in terms of its ends, 'ut
onl" in terms of its means0 the state has ac7uired a monopol" o*er the use of force.
<nli(e the commonl" held *iew at &e'er&s time of *iewin$ the state as one of the
no'lest of man&s creations, the means of the state should in &e'er&s *iew 'e concei*ed
in terms of *iolence and coercion. The threat or use of ph"sical force is not the onl"
means of the state 'ut it is specific to the state. The appropriation of the means of
*iolence is necessar" for the formation of the state, 'ut it is not sufficient for its further
de*elopment. States also fulfill the followin$ functions0 the enactment of law
(le$islation), the protection of personal safet" and pu'lic order (police), the protection of
*ested ri$hts (administration of 2ustice), the culti*ation of cultural interests (in the
administration), and the or$ani%ed armed protection a$ainst outside attac( (the
militar").
b) !he !erritory of the State
Second, &e'er holds the *iew that the state has a monopol" of force within a $i*en
territor". The authorit" of the state is 'indin$ within a particular territorial area onl". =fter
ha*in$ $i*en his definition (see a'o*e), &e'er stresses0 "6ote that %territor"& is one of
the characteristics of the state (as it is of an" political formation). =n" (ind of political
association is therefore defined, ne)t to le$itimate force, as ha*in$ a territorial 'asis0
"&hene*er corporate $roups which ma(e use of force are also characteri%ed '" a claim
to territorial 2urisdiction..., the" must 'e re$arded '" definition to that e)tent as political
$roups". This does not mean, accordin$ to &e'er, that e*er" form of or$ani%ation with
territorial claims is a state8 the monopol" of force and its le$itimac" throu$h le$alit" are
2ust as necessar" conditions for there to 'e a state. +e draws a comparison with
churches0 "The pre*ailin$ hierocratic territorial and parochial or$ani%ation is in
accordance with the normal stri*in$ of a church after complete domination8... 5ut unli(e
the political corporate $roup, the church historicall" has not felt nearl" as much the
need for e)clusi*e territorial domination and this is especiall" true toda".
c) !he .ureaucracy of the State
=s a third element in &e'er&s definition of the state, he contends that the ri$ht to use
force is $i*en to other institutions onl" to the e)tent to which the state permits it. These
institutions are the 'ureaucracies in the sphere of pu'lic $o*ernment ("'ureaucratic
authorit"") and in the mar(eteconom" ("'ureaucratic mana$ement"). 5ureaucratic
authorit" is 'ound '" o'edience to the powerholder0 the means of power are separated
from the formall" autonomous powerholders to the 'ureaucratic apparatus of the state.
5ureaucracies are for &e'er one of the most important characteristics of modern,
rationali%ed societies. the" indicate the e)tent to which the world has 'ecome
%calcula'le& in terms of efficienc", the e)tent to which the pre*ious m"steries of the
world, as em'odied in traditionalistic ethical life, ha*e 'ecome disenchanted
(dem"stified).
?e$al le$itimac" rests on the *alidit" of impersonal norms which ha*e 'een consciousl"
esta'lished in the conte)t of purposi*e or *alue rationalit". This accounts for the
followin$ characteristics of 'ureaucracies0 1) the" are su'2ect to the principle of fi)ed
2urisdictional areas8 ;) 'ecause of their hierarch" the" are firml" ordered8 >) the modern
office is 'ased upon written documents (files)8 !) the pu'lic e7uipment of the official are
di*orced from his pri*ate propert", and the e)ecuti*e office is separated from the
household8 5) speciali%ed trainin$ is re7uired8 A) official acti*it" is a fulltime 2o'8 B) the
mana$ement of offices is $uided '" $eneral rules which can 'e learnt. 1nl" within
modern capitalist societies, do 'ureaucracies ta(e on this form, directl" affected '" the
di*ision of la'or0 'ureaucracies are speciali%ation and therefore efficient.
5ureaucracies perform administrati*e tas(s (mana$ement) to secure an efficient
functionin$ of state and mar(eteconom". ?i(e capitalist enterprises, 'ureaucracies also
concentrate the material means of mana$ement. :n the militar", for instance, war has
'ecome war of machines, and in the field of science, the 'ureaucrati%ation of institutes
and uni*ersities in*ol*es an increasin$ demand for material means of research and
education. 5ureaucracies are also 'ased on a le*elin$ of social differences0 the" create
mass democracies which le*el the $o*erned in opposition to the rulin$. The
'ureaucratic apparatus is sta'le, permanent, indispensa'le, and the machine is "easil"
made to wor( for an"'od" who (nows how to $ain control o*er it". The administrati*e
functions of 'ureaucracies are speciali%ed and 'ased on calcula'le rules0 'ureaucrac"
is dehumani%ed, and o'2ecti*e e)perts ta(e control. The political master ma" find
himself in the role of dilettante who stand opposite the e)pert.
Characteristic for modern 'ureaucracies is the discipline with which the" operate. The
discipline in the arm" and in monasteries is, accordin$ to &e'er, a central force in the
process of 'ureaucrati%ation. :ndeed, discipline emer$ed out of the techni7ues of the
or$ani%ation of warfare (not 2ust the technolo$ical means), and it was militar" discipline
that affected social and economic life. <nder these conditions, mainl" to satisf" the
needs of professional soldier", charismatic political power structures 'ecome routini%ed
and rational, transformin$ into le$alrational power under 'ureaucratic control. 6ote,
howe*er, that as a formal means of or$ani%ation, discipline can accompan" an" political
power structure, whether traditional, charismatic or le$alrational.
The notion of discipline refers to, first, an institutional form of or$ani%ation, which
$raduall" e)tends throu$hout societ". :t refers to the "consistentl" rationali%ed,
methodicall" trained and e)act e)ecution of the recei*ed order, in which all personal
criticism is unconditionall" suspended". .iscipline reduces the si$nificance of indi*idual
action, it is a matter purel" of formal routine and efficienc". The official&s position in a
'ureaucrac" is therefore characteri%ed '" a) the social esteem he en2o"s from the
$o*erned, ') the fact that he is appointed (not elected), c) that it is a lifelon$
appointment, d) that he reser*es re$ular salaries, and e) that he can ha*e a career with
fi)ed conditions for ad*ancement. Second, the spread of discipline throu$hout societ"
also transforms the indi*idual ps"cholo$"0 people ha*e de*eloped a passion for
'ureaucrati%ation. =t the same time, &e'er sees it important to "oppose this machiner"
in order to preser*e a *esti$e of humanit" from this fra$mentation of the soul". The idea
of democrac" is inherentl" am'i*alent towards 'ureaucracies since it opposes the
status of 'ureaucratic specialist and see(s to replace them '" the (2ust as ar'itrar")
influence of the $o*erned and their representati*es in political parties.
;. Class, Status, and Part"
a) Class
.iscipline is also an important mechanism in the power potentials of classes, status
$roups and parties. = class in &e'er terminolo$"&s are determined '" economic
interest in the possession of $oods (propert") and opportunities for income (sale of
la'or ser*ice), a definition for which &e'er is lar$el" inde'ted to -ar). +owe*er,
&e'er contends that class interests are not unidirectl" determined '" ownership0 class
stru$$les do not necessaril" ha*e to result from the ine7ualities in ownership. Class
consciousness must 'e mo'ili%ed under certain circumstances, which can 'e non
economic, such as the *isi'ilit" of the class enem", the menas of communication to
or$ani%e a $roup, and so on. The rele*ance of classes as classes, howe*er, is '"
definition solel" restricted to mar(et conditions.
b) Status
Status $roups are determined '" a social estimation of honor and presti$e0 unli(e
classes, status $roups do not necessaril" consist of economicall" pri*ile$ed people, 'ut
of s"m'olic 7ualities and a particular lifest"le, and, unli(e classes, the" are mostl"
conscious of their common position (e)ample0 professional or$ani%ations). The
potential of status $roups for political and communal action is clear from their
characteristic of social closure0 $roups tend to impro*e their lot '" restrictin$ access to
rewards and pri*ile$es to a small circle of chosen ones. Certain social or ph"sical
attri'utes are selected and function as criteria of eli$i'ilit". :t does not matter what these
criteria are as lon$ as the" lead to distin$uish insiders from outsiders. E)clusionar"
social closure thus ena'les status $roups to secure ad*anta$es and resources for itself.
c) (arty
Parties, finall", are e)clusi*el" related to power and domination. Parties stri*e to reali%e
planned chan$e in communal action (sometimes 'ased on class, on status, on 'oth, or
neither). Parties can reach "'e"ond the frontiers of politics... 5ut their aim is not
necessaril" the esta'lishment of new international political, i.e. territorial, dominion".
&hile discipline, class, status and part" are related to aspects of power, it is noteworth"
that &e'er does not discuss them in relation to state and 'ureaucrac". Classes, status
$roups and parties can stri*e for power and mo'ili%e political action, 'ut the"
ne*ertheless operate in the realm of ci*il societ" or the nation. The nation refers to a
$roup held to$ether '" sentiments of solidarit" in the face of other $roups. :t is not
identical with the people of a state 'ut ma" cross throu$h different states, or an" one
state can har'or different nations. = nation does not necessaril" share the same
lan$ua$e, reli$ion, race or common descent 'ut each of these or an" other cultural
*alues ma" 'e focussed on to define the nation. 6ations do tend to produce their own
state, 'ut are ne*ertheless in the first instance cultural entities.
>. The #ational State of ?aw
a) )egiti$acy and )aw
&e'er&s sociolo$" of law is intimatel" related to his notion of state and 'ureaucrac"
(note0 /iddens sa"s that le$itimac" is not necessaril" related to the state or to state
law8 'ut le$alrational le$itimac" is, as Parsons ri$htl" claims). The state not onl" has a
monopol" of force, it is also a political communit" that successfull" claims a le$itimate
monopol" of force. State domination is le$itimated '" le$alit", the 'elief in the rational
*alidit" of le$al rules. This rationalle$al le$itimation deri*es from the s"stemic
rationali%ation of law and constitutionalism, from 'ureaucracies and from doctrines of
so*erei$nt". &e'er is clearl" directed a$ainst materialist and idealist interpretations of
law. +e defines law in the followin$ wa"0 "=n order will 'e called law if it is e)ternall"
$uaranteed '" the pro'a'ilit" that coercion (ph"sical or ps"cholo$ical), to 'rin$ a'out
conformit" or a*en$e *iolation, will 'e applied '" a staff of people holdin$ themsel*es
speciall" read" for that purpose". The element of staff, the or$ani%ed coerci*e
apparatus includin$ "2ud$es, prosecutors, policemen, or sheriffs" is decisi*e (not
coercion itself). This does not mean that le$al le$itimac" is alwa"s tied up to the state,
and it does not alwa"s impl" adherence to law. The criminal, for instance, also
reco$ni%es the le$itimac" of law, namel" 'ecause he has to carefull" plan the e)ecution
of a crime, he is aware that it is a *iolation of law. The coerci*e apparatus does not
ha*e to 'e a political a$enc"8 there must simpl" 'e a 'od" that applies sanctions,
whether 'ound to the state or not.
b) !he 'ationality of /odern )aw
:n spite of the attention &e'er pa"s to the le$itimac" of law, which resides in the le$al
su'2ects, he interprets the law positi*isticall" as a set of relia'le techni7ues for
producin$ le$all" consistent answers. #ationali%ed law is formal, a'stract, e)emplif"in$
the disenchanted moderni%ed world. = sense of 2ustice ma" pla" a role in the
de*elopment of law, 'ut such an emotional factor "cannot 'e e)pressed e)cept in a few
*er" $eneral and purel" formal ma)ims". ?e$al formalism can 'e challen$ed '" social
law, 'ased on emotionall" colored ethical postulates li(e 2ustice or human di$nit", 'ut
this *alueirrationalism has e7uall" 'een opposed '" attempts to reesta'lish o'2ecti*e
standards of *alue and law as a technical tool. The le$alrational authorit" of the state&s
'ureaucracies is $o*erned '" procedures, '" a s"stem of laws, not of men, which
formall" re$ulates social affairs.
!. The #ationalit" of the Capitalist Econom"
&e'er considered the &estern t"pe of capitalist or$ani%ation as "the most fateful force
in our modern life". :ndeed, throu$hout his writin$s, &e'er discusses the influences of
the capitalist econom" on nearl" e*er" other sphere of modern societ". The rise of
'ureaucracies, for instance, &e'er e)plains partl" '" economic conditions. The mone"
mar(et is necessar" to pro*ide the income to maintain 'ureaucracies ('ased on a
s"stem of ta)ation) since 'ureaucracies cannot 'e deri*ed from pri*ate profits. 1ther
conditions of the e)pansion of 'ureaucracies are political. 5ureaucratic structures $row
lar$er and chan$e 7ualitati*el" with the e)pansion of the state0 "The increasin$ demand
of a societ", accustomed to a'solute pacification, for order and protection (%police&), in
all fields e)erts an especiall" perse*erin$ influence in the direction of 'ureaucrati%ation.
= stead" road leads from modifications of the 'lood feud, sacerdotall", or '" means of
ar'itration, to the present position of the policeman as %the representati*e of /od on
earth.&".
&e'er also mentions se*eral technical de*elopments that fa*or the rise of
'ureaucracies. The characteristicall" modern means of communication enter the picture
as pacema(ers of 'ureaucrati%ation8 pu'lic roads, tele$raph and so on must 'e pu'licl"
administered. These technical de*elopments are crucial for the possi'ilities of
'ureaucracies0 "The modern 1ccidental state can 'e administered the wa" it actuall" is
onl" 'ecause the state controls the tele$raph networ( and has the mails and railroads
at its disposal". Technolo$ical de*elopments in the modern means of communication
do not completel" determine the operation of
'ureaucracies, the" also respond to the
demand of the capitalist mar(et econom".
<nam'i$uit", (nowled$e of the files,
continuit" and unit" are all raised to the
optimum point0 "the e)traordinar" increase in
the speed '" which pu'lic announcements, as
well as economic and political facts are
transmitted, e)erts a stead" and sharp
pressure in the direction of speedin$ up the
tempo of administrati*e reaction towards
*arious situations".
6ote that &e'er does not concei*e the
interpla" of numerous, political, economic and
cultural factors as an ine*ita'le e*olutionar"
trend. The e)tension of mar(et capitalism he
*er" li(el" sees as dominant. =lso note that
the antinom" 'etween formal rationalit"
(conduct or$ani%ed accordin$ to calcula'le
principles) and su'stanti*e rationalit"
(calcula'le conduct applied to the furtherance
of certain $oals or *alue) cannot 'e resol*ed in modern capitalism.
The rise of modern rationali%ed law &e'er also attri'utes to economic and political
factors. #ational law is $uided '" $eneral rules to create sta'le, predicta'le and
patterned re$ularities in social actions and social institutions. #ationali%ed law is
e)ecuted in the 'ureaucratic apparatus of the state, 'ut it also ser*es the freemar(et
econom". Specificall", law pre*ents a war of all a$ainst all on the economic 'attlefield.
= rational freemar(et econom" is not possi'le without the le$al order of the state, 'ut
contractual freedom leads to the free use of resources without le$al restraints0 "The
mar(et is a relationship which transcends the 'oundaries of nei$h'orhood, (inship
$roup, or tri'e". ?aws lea*in$ e*er"thin$ free to the mar(et impl" "a relati*e reduction of
that (ind of coercion which results from the threat of mandator" and prohi'itor" norms".


.
E!ILE #<R=HEI! 4'5>57'('?8: THE SCIE9CE O; SOCIETY AS
!ORAL OR#ER
Liteat"e
(1C9>) The .i*ision of ?a'or in Societ"
(1C95) The #ules of Sociolo$ical -ethod
(1C9B) Suicide
(191;) The Elementar" 4orms of the #eli$ious ?ife
A) The R"$es of Socio$o1ica$ !ethod
1. Sociolo$" as the Stud" of Social 4acts
a) -efinition and Characteristics of Social #acts*
.efinition0 a social fact is (1) an" wa" of actin$, fi)ed or not, (;) capa'le of e)ertin$ an
e)ternal constraint o*er the indi*idual8 (>) it is $eneral and e)ists independent of its
indi*idual manifestations.
6ote the characteristics of a social fact0 1) Social facts are wa"s of 'ein$, includin$
(ideal) representations and (material) actions8;) The" ha*e a coerci*e power o*er the
indi*idual8 the" are accompanied '" sanctions, and there'" control the indi*idual8 this is
actuall" how we can identif" social facts (see two t"pes of law in di*ision of la'or), and
this is 'ecause0>) The" are e)ternal to the indi*idual8 the" are social8 societ" is their
su'stratum8the" cannot 'e reduced to its indi*idual manifestations, which are 'oth part
social and part ps"cholo$ical (sociops"cholo$ical)8 therefore, the" are not collecti*e
(shared '" e*er"one)8 societ" is a realit" sui $eneris.
b) !he Study of Social #acts*
.asic 'ule* Consider social facts as things*
.ur(heim first discusses social philosophies. These are unscientific 'ecause the"
su'stitute social realit" for a certain conception of that realit". 4rom this perspecti*e,
.ur(heim discards ComteDs and SpencerDs e*olutionar" schemas, since the" represent
their ideas of societ" rather than present the facts of social life. &hat we need, is a
clearcut, unam'i$uous, and scientificall" de*eloped concept of the social. 4or
instance, sociolo$" should stud" not an idea of ethical rules 'ut the ethical rules
themsel*es.Conse7uentl", .ur(heim concludes that social phenomena are thin$s and
that the" should 'e treated as such. Social facts, then, are seen to 'e thin$s that e)ist
outside of the will of people.Therefore, sociolo$" needs to 'e esta'lished as a ri$orous
discipline, with the followin$ principles0
Au0iliary 'ule 1* -iscard all "reconce"tions*
This calls for a *aluefree approach to the stud" of social facts.&hate*er moral,
political, or reli$ious concerns the sociolo$ist ma" ha*e, he cannot allow them into his
in*esti$ations.Ethical considerations an the li(e are themsel*es o'2ect for sociolo$ical
in7uir".
Au0iliary 'ule 2* -efine the subject $atter in ter$s of the co$$on e0ternal
characteristics of a grou" of "heno$ena3 and include all "heno$ena that
corres"ond to this definition*
This rule calls for a clearl" defined su'2ect matter in terms of its inherent characteristics.
This ensures that the topics of sociolo$ical in*esti$ation do not depend on the
sociolo$ist 'ut on the social facts..ur(heim ma(es the interestin$ comment that this
rule is often not o'ser*ed 'ecause man" concepts in sociolo$", e.$. the famil" or law,
are also commonsense notions. =nother *iolation of this rule is that not all rele*ant
phenomena are included in a stud"8 a selection is made, often in terms of assumin$
that what holds for our societ", is *alid uni*ersall".1ne should therefore start with the
o'ser*a'le conse7uences of the phenomenon under in*esti$ation to define it, that is,
same effects indicate one phenomenon (e.$. crime is classified '" punishment).
Au0iliary 'ule 4* Social facts are studied objectively when they are isolated
fro$ their individual $anifestations*
This follows from the 'asic rule, and from the fact that o'2ecti*it" is enhanced '" the
increasin$ sta'ilit" of a su'2ect matter. +ence, stud" social facts independent of their
indi*idual manifestations since the latter are too *aria'le.
c) Social #acts and (hysical !hings*
:n the preface to the ;nd edition of #ules, .ur(heim discusses some
misunderstandin$s of his method.4irst, he sa"s that social thin$s are thin$s li(e
ph"sical thin$s 'ut this does not mean that the" are ph"sical thin$s. Social facts are
thin$s in the sense that the" stand outside an idea, that the" can onl" 'e (nown '"
o'ser*ation, and that thus the" must 'e studied as nature is studied '" ph"sicists.
Second, societ" is, of course, made up out of indi*iduals, 'ut this does not mean that
we should stud" indi*idual consciousness, 'ecause the resultin$ s"nthesis of
indi*iduals comin$ to$ether is a realit" sui $eneris. The collecti*e representations lead
a life of their own, the" e)hi'it their own ps"che, and the" re*eal, as one and onl" one
of their characteristics, the fact that the" are constrainin$ or coerci*e.

;. The .istinction of the 6ormal from the Patholo$ical
Science cannot decide what is $ood or e*il for us, 'ecause it would 'e ideolo$ical, "et,
on the other hand, science must 2ustif" itself..ur(heim sees the solution to this pro'lem
in the fact that science should as( and in*esti$ate what is actuall", in a $i*en societ",
$ood or desira'le.Science is not e*il or $ood 'ut it can stud" e*il and $ood. +ere,
.ur(heim proceeds to do 2ust that.
Social facts are patholo$ical when the" disrupt the normal operations of social functions
in a certain societ". This, of course, can *ar" from societ" to societ". 6ote .ur(heimDs
functionalist ar$ument that the most widespread social forms are, in the lon$ run and in
the a$$re$ate, the ones that sur*i*e (normalit" is therefore more common). Therefore,
social facts can 'e patholo$ical at some time in de*elopment ('ut not in the lon$ run)
'ecause, and onl" when, the" were at one time normal.
Therefore, the followin$ rules appl" to distin$uishin$ normal from patholo$ical.
1) = social fact is normal for a specific social t"pe, at some specific time in its social
e*olution, when it occurs in the a*era$e societ" of that species8 this can 'e *erified '"0
;) demonstratin$ that the $eneral character of a phenomenon is related to the $eneral
conditions of collecti*e life8 and this is necessar"0
>) when the social t"pe under in*esti$ation has not "et completel" e*ol*ed.
=n e)ample is the demonstration of the normalit" of crime. Crime is normal 'ecause it
is o'ser*ed, in some form or another, in all societies.:t is not a demonstration of the
wic(ed nature of man, 'ut, on the contrar", a factor that shows the necessar"
inte$rati*e element in societ" (see 'elow).
>. -orpholo$", E)planation and Comparison
a) Social /or"hology* !he Constitution of Social !y"es
='o*e we indicated that .ur(heim distin$uishes different societies from one another
(e.$. what is normal in one societ" is not necessaril" normal in another). +ow does he
ma(e this distinction9 This is the tas( of social morpholo$".
.ur(heim proposes to first identif" the 'asic, crucial characteristics of societies, which
can 'e identified in a stud" of the simplest of societies (this is wh" he undertoo( the
stud" of =ustralian reli$ions). This indicates the rele*ance of ethno$raphies for
sociolo$". Therefore, he proposes to stud" the horde, i.e. a social formation which
cannot 'e split up into an" smaller social parts8 the horde consist of indi*iduals..ifferent
hordes lin(ed to$ether form a clan. 4rom here on, societies can 'e classified into social
t"pes, e.$. a simple replication of hordes or clans, a replication of these replications,
and so on (see .i*ision of ?a'or).
b) Sociological +0"lanation
The identification of social t"pes, on the 'asis of the purpose that certain 'asic social
facts fulfill, is insufficient to demonstrate where these facts came from. Therefore, loo(
for the historical causes that ha*e certain social facts as effects (*er" important0 this
shows that .ur(heim was not a mere functionalist8 two thin$s are needed0 identification
of facts 'ased on functions, and historical stud" of causesEE).
Therefore, to e)plain a fact, stud" its cause and its function separatel".1'*iousl",
followin$ from the 'asic rule, these functions and causes are, '" definition, social and
cannot 'e retrie*ed in the indi*idual ps"che, althou$h he admits that human nature
pla"s a part in social facts (as a (ind of distur'in$ factor, 'ut ne*er as a cause). The
rules to find function and cause are0 the cause of a social fact lies in antecedent social
facts, and the function of a social fact lies in the end it fulfills.:n other words, social
processes should 'e e)plained in terms of societ" itself (e.$. social *olume and
densit").
This also leads .ur(heim to su$$est that sociolo$" can e)plain what is, '" findin$ out
what has 'een, 'ut not to predict what will 'e (a$ainst -ar) and the
e*olutionists).-oreo*er, it indicates the special rele*ance of histor" to
sociolo$".Sociolo$" must 'e historical 'ut this should 'e concei*ed as a stud" of the
o'2ecti*e causes of social facts ('ased on principles of morpholo$"), i.e. as a
ps"cholo$" of the social (since societ" is a character of its own). Sociolo$" cannot 'e a
search for indi*idualsD inner states of mind, 'ecause introspection is onl" *alid for
indi*idual ps"cholo$", not for sociolo$". Therefore too, the method of political econom"
to stud" $oods in terms of the *alue the" ha*e for the participants in the economic
process is in*alid.
c) Sociological (roof by Co$"arison
Since there can 'e no e)periment in sociolo$", causes of social facts are in*esti$ated
'" the comparati*e method, i.e. comparin$ the cases where two social facts are
simultaneousl" a'sent or present, so we can disco*er the *ariations displa"ed in these
com'inations which pro*ides e*idence that one fact (cause) leads to another fact
(effect). This method is $uided '" the rule that one cause leads to one effect (an" one
effect must 'e caused '" one cause).
6ote that this rule, as .ur(heim admits, does not reall" pro*e causes, 'ut that it can
minimall" dispro*e causes. :ndeed, if someone states that = causes 5, 'ut we find a
case where there is 5 'ut not =, then the thesis is dispro*ed. Since social life is so
comple), it can alwa"s 'e that we ha*e omitted a rele*ant *aria'le. = parallelism of a
sufficient num'er of cases, howe*er, adds *alue to our inferences on causal lin(s. Then
we can deduce a thesis and test it inducti*el". This could lead us to esta'lish laws.
&hat is indispensa'le for sociolo$", then, is to e)plain social facts '" tracin$ its entire
de*elopment throu$hout all social species (i.e. across time and space).
:n sum, sociolo$" must ma(e up classifications, then sociolo$" must 'e historical to
identif" causes and effects, and finall", in 'ein$ historical, sociolo$" must 'e o'2ecti*e.
Conclusions*
1) Sociolo$" is not philosoph"0 sociolo$" is empirical and in*esti$ates causes8
;) The sociolo$ical method is o'2ecti*e8 social facts are thin$s and studied as such8
>) The sociolo$ical method is uni7ue to sociolo$" (not ps"hcolo$ical)0 social facts are
social.
!. Ps"cholo$" and Philosoph"
:t is not true, .ur(heim ar$ues, that he wants to destro" ps"cholo$" and philosoph".
4irst, sociolo$" 'e$ins with societ" to see how it affects human nature, the human
ps"che (sociolo$" of social facts leads to solid ps"cholo$"). Second, metaph"sical
7uestions will alwa"s e)ist, "et sociolo$" will force them to 'e as(ed in different form,
so sociolo$" informs philosophical in7uir".:n addition, sociolo$" can stud" philosophies
as social facts, so sociolo$" is also n e)tension of philosoph".

3) S"icide as a Socio$o1ica$ O*@ect
1. E)traSocial 4actors
4irst, .ur(heim rules out that suicide *aries with ps"chopathic states.:t cannot 'e that
people ha*e onl" one specific t"pe of mental illness that would lead them to commit
suicide. People cannot 'e temporaril" insane 'ecause the" lac( a moti*e to commit
suicide. There is no correlation 'etween insanit" (as measured, for instance, '" the
num'er of people in an as"lum) and the suicide rate. 4inall", there is no correlation
'etween alcoholism and suicide.
Second, .ur(heim dispro*es that suicide *aries with normal ps"cholo$ical states, such
as race or heredit", since there is considera'le *ariation in suicide rate within races.
Third, .ur(heim ar$ues that there is no relation 'etween suicide and climate or
seasonal temperature, 'ut he finds that the intensit" of life seems to ha*e an effect (a
social cause).
4inall", imitation, the mechanic reproduction of some'od" elseDs act, does not correlate
with the suicide rate, since, for instance, there are no concentrated %ones of suicides.
;. Social Causes and Social T"pes
The pre*ious in*esti$ation on nonsocial factors of suicide, '" elimination, shows that
suicide must depend on social causes. Such a sociolo$ical e)planation could start from
t"pes of suicide and then loo( for their causes.+owe*er, this is not possi'le 'ecause of
lac( of data. Therefore, we loo( for causes of suiciderates, on the premise that one
cause leads to one effect.+ow to loo( for these causes9 The le$al esta'lishment $i*es
immediate moti*es of suicides, 'ut this onl" e)plains indi*idual suicides, and not the
more $eneral states that la" 'ehind them.
a) +goistic Suicide
!hesis 1* Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration in religious society
#eli$ion affects suicide0 there is less suicide in Catholic countries, and more suicide in
Protestant countries. =lso, within an" sin$le nation this effect holds $ood.Fews
$enerall" commit e*en less suicide than Catholics. 6ote that 'oth the Catholic and
Protestant reli$ions prohi'it suicide. The essential difference, howe*er, 'etween
Catholicism and Protestantism is that Protestantism permits free in7uir" to a much
$reater e)tent, while Catholicism is or$ani%ed '" a hierarchical s"stem of authorit".
ProtestantismDs free in7uir" is itself the effect of a lac( of traditional 'eliefs and
practices, in short, it is a less stron$l" inte$rated church. 4or Fews, the $reat solidarit",
the need to li*e in $reater union, protects them from suicide.
This e)planation is confirmed0 1) of all protestant countries, En$land has a lower
suiciderate, 'ecause the =n$lican church is more stron$l" or$ani%ed8 ;) free in7uir"
stimulates a desire for learnin$, and, indeed, the more the cra*in$ for (nowled$e
de*elops, the more does suicide (this also e)plains wh" women commit less suicide8
and for Fews the thesis does not hold 'ecause their stri*e for (nowled$e has a different
ori$in, namel" to 'e 'etter armed for stru$$le in their unfa*ora'le position). 6ote that
(nowled$e in itself is not a source for e*il, and reli$ion in $eneral has a proph"lactic
effect upon suicide. 5ut the (lac( of) intense collecti*e life alon$ with it e)plains their
effect upon suicide.
!hesis 2* Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration in do$estic society
-arria$e reduces the dan$er of suicide. 1ther data show that0 too earl" marria$es
ha*e an a$$ra*atin$ influence on suicide, especiall" for men8 married persons of 'oth
se)es commit less suicide than unmarried persons8 the se) committin$ less suicide in
marria$e *aries from societ" to societ"8 widowhood leads to hi$her suiciderates.
The pri*ile$ed position of married persons, with re$ard to suicide, is not dependent on
matrimonial selection (e.$. 'ecause men and women are recruited to marria$e in the
same wa", 'ut married women commit more suicide).6ow, is it the con2u$al $roup
(hus'and and wife) or the famil" $roup (married with childrenE) that produces this effect.
.ata on families without children show that con2u$alit" onl" pla"s a moderate role. The
fact that widowers ha*e children ma(es the crisis throu$h which the" pass more
intense, and therefore their suiciderate is hi$her. .ifferences in suicide durin$
widowhood 'etween the se)es are e)plained '" the suicidal tendenc" of the se)es in
the state of marria$e (where men 'enefit more from marria$e, the" also suffer more
from widowhood, 'ut are also 'etter a'le to endure it).The effect of the famil" $roup is
further shown '" the fact that hi$her famil" densit" (more children) correlates with lower
suiciderates, 'ecause families with more children are more powerfull" inte$rated.
!hesis 4* Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration in "olitical society
Political societies also effect suiciderates0 re*olutions, wars, and other political crises
lead to a reduction of the num'er of suicides, 'ecause (and onl" when) such crises can
mo*e the masses, arousin$ collecti*e sentiments and national faith, and inte$rate
societ", at least temporaril", towards a sin$le end.
Conclusion0 Suicide *aries with the de$ree of social inte$ration
Somethin$ in reli$ion, the famil", and political life must 'e common to e)plain their
effect on suicide0 the" are all stron$l" inte$rated $roups.Social inte$ration refers to the
de$ree of 'ondin$ or attachment of indi*iduals to societ". :f $roups are wea(l"
inte$rated, the indi*idual is less dependent on them, the" are in a state of e$oism0
e$oistic suicide sprin$s from e)cessi*e indi*idualism.=n entire ran$e of ideas, feelin$s
and practices of ci*ili%ed adults are 'uilt and e)panded 'ecause of the demands of the
social en*ironment8 the" are social demands with a social purpose.5ut, as indi*iduals,
we must clin$ to them, and we can onl" do so to the e)tent to which we are inte$rated
within societ" itself.(&omen li*e more outside of communit" e)istence, this e)plains the
relati*el" lower suiciderates of widows as compared to widowers).
b) Altruistic Suicide
!hesis* Insufficient individuation leads to suicide5 every for$ of suicide
is the e0aggerated for$ of a virtue5 the e0tre$es are "athological
:n the lower, primiti*e societies, old men, women at their hus'andDs death, and ser*ants
at the death of their chief (ill themsel*es 'ecause it is their dut", it is compelled,
'ecause these indi*iduals are completel" a'sor'ed in the $roup, the" are *er" hi$hl"
inte$rated. :n this case, the e$o is not its own propert", this is a state of altruism.
=ltruistic suicide ma" 'e o'li$ator" (the pre*ious e)amples), optional, i.e. not formall"
re7uired, or considered a praiseworth" sacrifice (as in some, pantheistic reli$ions).:n all
these cases, the indi*idual strips himself of his personal 'ein$, in order to 'e en$ulfed
in somethin$ considered the true essence, a mental representation which sprin$s not
from the indi*idual, 'ut from societ".:n modern societ", altruistic suicide can 'e
o'ser*ed in the arm", not 'ecause of 'achelorhood, since the soldier is not isolated at
all, and also not from alcoholism, or not from dis$ust with the ser*ice.=ctuall", those
that are most inclined to a militar" career and 'est suited to the needs of the arm", are
the ones with hi$hest suiciderates (note that throu$hout these chapters, .ur(heim
refutes e)planations different from his owns, and he does so '" controllin$ *aria'les
when loo(in$ at statistical data). The $eneral loss of discipline in the arm" in recent
"ears is accompanied '" a $eneral decline in the suiciderate, a$ain, this pro*es the
thesis of altruism.
c) Ano$ic Suicide
!hesis* Suicide varies with the degree of social regulation
1) =cute anomic suicide0
Economic crises increase suiciderates, not 'ecause then life is more difficult, since
e*en fortunate crises ha*e this effect, 'ut 'ecause the" are distur'ances of the
collecti*e order. This can 'e e)plained '" the fact that man, unli(e animals, has needs
that are in principle infinite.:f there would 'e no limits set to these needs, this would
lead to perpetual unhappiness, and since man cannot limit the desires himself, a force
outside of him must do it, an authorit" he respects, and this is societ". Societ" is the
moral disciplinar" 'od" whose authorit" must not onl" depend on force 'ut also
accepted as 2ust. 6ow, when societ" is distur'ed '" crises, it is momentaril" incapa'le
of e)ercisin$ this moral influence8 societ" is then in a state of anomie, and this
produces anomic suicide.
;) Chronic anomic suicide0
=nomie is a re$ular factor in the world of trade and industr". Economic pro$ress e)ists
in freein$ relations from all (inds of re$ulation, the complete li'eration of desires.
=nomic suicide shares with e$oistic suicide that 'oth represent an insufficient presence
of societ" in the indi*idual, 'ut e$oism refers to a lac( of inte$ration (the attachment of
indi*iduals to societ"), anomie refers to a lac( of re$ulation (the control of 'asic human
passions).
E)planation0 The suicide of widowhood is a result of domestic anomie, and di*orce
shows this e*en more. Particularl", di*orce, especiall" where it is le$all" re$ulated,
leads to hi$her suiciderates amon$ hus'ands.This is e)plained '" the nature of
marria$e (con2u$al societ").4or men, marria$e offers a useful re$ulation of se)ual
desires and other passions, and di*orce is a sudden wea(enin$ of this re$ulation.4or
women, this is different0 women are more instincti*e creatures and mentall" less
de*eloped, so that an" re$ulation (marria$e) for them is a constraint without $reat
ad*anta$es, and di*orce frees them from this constraint. =nomic suicide 'ecause of
di*orce is thus wholl" to 'e attri'uted to men. GE)cessi*e re$ulation can also lead to
suicide, fatalistic suicide, 'ut this is *er" uncommonH.
d) Individual #or$s of the -ifferent !y"es of Suicide
6ow a morpholo$ical classification, on the 'asis of the aethiolo$ical one, can ma(e
sense, ta(in$ into account that onl" suicide as a collecti*e phenomenon can 'e
e)plained. E$oistic suicide refers to those t"pes that result from hi$hl" de*eloped
indi*idualism, from see(in$ the a'solute onl" in himIherself, 'ecause societ" is not
sufficientl" inte$rated.The decision to commit suicide under these circumstances can
'e sad or cheerful.=ltruistic suicide is the opposite, an acti*e suicide, with perfect
calmness. Entirel" different is anomic suicide out of a state of unre$ulated emotions or
the disappointment followin$ distur'ances in re$ulation.
These different social conditions can also affect the indi*idual simultaneousl" and
produce com'ined effects.E$oism and anomie ha*e some affinit", cf. the e$oist is
detached from societ" and thus it has no sufficient hold upon herIhim. =nomie can also
'e associated with altruism (e.$. the Fews after the fall of Ferusalem).4inall", e$oism
and altruism e*en can com'ine their influence, e.$. when people create an ima$inar"
o'2ect which the" attach themsel*es to (summar" ta'le, p.;9>).
>. The Social Element of Suicide
Suicide, then, is sociall" determined, independent of the indi*idual.The collecti*e
tendencies that are responsi'le for suicide ha*e a mind of their own8 the" are moral and
social. Social life, then, is e)ternal to the indi*idual. -urder and suicide, which seem
ali(e, are not in*aria'l" related (e.$. wars lead to less suicide, "et more murder8 anomie
and altruistic suicide, on the other hand, are related8 conse7uentl", murder is social too
and, since it has different causes, murder comes in different t"pes).
Since the indispensa'le conditions of life are useful, suicide is li(el" to occur. :ndeed,
social re$ulation and inte$ration are needed in an" societ", and whether societies place
hi$h *alue on the indi*idual or, on the contrar", constrain him hea*il", there is suicide
resultin$ from those social states (e*er" moralit" produces its t"pe of suicide).
+owe*er, the enormous increase in the num'er of suicides o*er the last centur" is due,
not to pro$ress, 'ut to the particular conditions under which pro$ress has actuall"
occurred.These conditions are patholo$ical ('asicall", a lac( of re$ulation, due to the
a'ruptness of the social chan$es, cf. .i*ision of la'or).Therefore, the current rate of
suicide is patholo$ical, not suicide as suchE
The solution to the pro'lem is not le$islation, education, politics or famil". The true
solution is the professional $roup, to create a moralit" close enou$h to the indi*idual
(see 'elow).

C) Re$i1ion, Societ& and =now$ed1e
1. #eli$ion as a Social 4act
.ur(heim studies reli$ion in its most simple form to deri*e the 'asics, to find the
uni*ersals of reli$ion '" trac(in$ its indispensa'le properties.This also leads him to a
theor" of the ori$in of reli$ion, and to postulate that reli$ion is at the 'asis of all human
thou$ht ('oth sacred and profane), e*en of all the cate$ories of human thou$ht (e.$.
space, time, causalit").=ll of this, it will 'e shown, is essentiall" social0 reli$ious
representations are collecti*e representations which e)press collecti*e realities. The
cate$ories of (nowled$e, 'ecause the" are of reli$ious ori$in, are therefore social too8
e.$. spatial representations are uni*ersal 'ecause the" are 'ased on the fact that
*alues are differentiall" attri'uted to different re$ions within an" $i*en ci*ili%ation. &ithin
that ci*ili%ation, therefore, these *alues must 'e uni*ersal, i.e. the" ori$inated within
that societ" (e.$. space is concei*ed the wa" a tri'al area is di*ided).Since societ" is a
realit" sui $eneris, it representations which e)press it, must 'e supraindi*idual, it
imposes itself upon the indi*idual mind.Conse7uentl", since these representations are
so constrainin$, ha*e such power o*er the indi*idual, societ" is responsi'le for the
necessit" of the cate$ories of thou$ht as a reflection of the moral necessit" of societ". :t
will 'e shown that all representations come from reli$ious representations as a social
realit" sui $eneris.
Therefore, reli$ion has to 'e defined as a social fact0 reli$ion is a unified s"stem of
'eliefs (states of opinion) and practices (modes of action) relati*e to sacred thin$s, i.e.
thin$s set apart and for'idden8 the 'eliefs and practices unite all those adhere to them
into a sin$le moral communit", i.e. the church.The 'eliefs refer to representations of the
sacred, 'ut at once the" identif" the relations 'etween different scared thin$s and
'etween the sacred and the profane. The practices are tied with the 'eliefs.#eli$ious
rites and 'eliefs, then, ha*e a special o'2ect, i.e. the" presuppose a classification of
thin$s into scared and profane, determined '" the attitudes people ha*e towards those
thin$s on the 'asis of their social realit".
.ur(heim proceeds, on the 'asis of this definition, to refute other conceptions of
reli$ion. =nimistic theories e)plain reli$ion '" reference to the worship of the soul which
would 'e the result of dreams, of an illusion, of fantas". This is nonsense since it is an
indi*idualistic interpretation, and 'ecause it cannot account for the fact that somethin$
which has sustained as lon$ as reli$ion it must ha*e ph"sical, concrete aspects.
?i(ewise, naturalistic theories pose that reli$ion comes from the fact that sacredness is
attri'uted to sensuous e)periences and the lan$ua$e '" which reference is made to
these phenomena. =$ain, this is nonsense since reli$ion is a$ain attri'uted to an
illusion, namel" the illusion of 2ust names.
;. Totemic 5eliefs
.ur(heim proposes to stud" totemic reli$ion amon$ =ustralian tri'es 'ecause it is a
*er" simple societ" and it will therefore e)hi'it the ori$inal form of reli$ion. The clan that
worships the totem is of central si$nificance0 the clan is a 'ond of (inship united '"
name (not 'iolo$"), and the totem of the clan is also the totem of the clan mem'ers.
=nother clan has another totem. Totems can 'e animals, *e$eta'les and e*en
ancestors.Clans are united '" 'onds of fraternit" in phratries8 these phratries also ha*e
a totem, and the" relate to the different totems of the clans in a relation of
su'ordination. Clan totems en2o" special status0 some persons ma" not touch the
totem, it is (ept in a special place, it $i*es men special powers, and its loss is a
disaster. 1ther thin$s can 'e scared 'ecause the" are in some wa" related to the
totem. 6ote that totems are worshipped, not 'ecause the person has some sensation of
it, 'ut 'ecause it fulfills the need of representin$ ideas which are formed of it. (later
.ur(heim will of course see( to e)plain what these ideas are). There is also a mar(ed
parallelism 'etween men and totems0 the prohi'itions re$ardin$ totems also appl" to
clan mem'ers (e.$. the" ha*e the same name).
Then .ur(heim proceeds to show that the totemic classifications form the 'asis for the
idea of social class. -en were first or$ani%ed as men, in clans and phratries, and
therefore the" were a'le to or$ani%e thin$s. The fundamental notions of the intellect are
the product of social factors. The notion of class is not an ideal 'ut a defined $roup of
interrelated thin$s. +uman classification is 'ased on social hierarch".
>. The 1ri$in of Totemic 5eliefs
=fter refutin$ a series of theories, .ur(heim asserts that totems ha*e an underl"in$
idea of force.The force of the totem, its s"m'olic 7ualities of sacredness, must indeed
ha*e a referent (s"m'ols refer to somethin$). There must 'e somethin$ unif"in$ in all
that is worshipped in these totemic reli$ions, and this unit" lies in what is s"m'oli%ed
and not in the s"m'ol. +ere .ur(heim ar$ues that totems are forceful o*er and a$ainst
the indi*idual 'ecause the" are an instance of the idea of force in $eneral. This force
deri*es from the stren$th of the clan, so that the totemic principle of force is in fact the
clan under an empiricall" concrete form0 if the totemDs s"m'ol is $od and societ", then
$od and societ" are identical.
:ndeed, followin$ from .ur(heimDs approach to sociolo$" in $eneral, it follows that the
realit" underl"in$ reli$ious thou$ht cannot 'e representations of the indi*idual or of the
material en*ironment. This e)ternal realit", .ur(heim will contend, is societ" itself.
Societ" alone is the moral authorit" which can e)ert such a powerful hold o*er
man.Therefore, $od or an" other sacred o'2ect is a s"m'olic representation of
societ".The ideas of reli$ious, then, are real in that the" e)press somethin$ real, a real
idea so to spea(, or what .ur(heim calls essential idealism.
6ote how the soul can 'e seen from this perspecti*e. The idea of the soul is uni*ersal
to reli$ion. The human 'od" shelters a soul8 'od" and soul are not the same, 'ut the"
are closel" related.The soul represents the sacred, it concerns moral ideas8 while the
'od" is in a sense profane, and represents the material world. The soul, .ur(heim
asserts, was created 'ecause it refers to somethin$ real, namel" the relation 'etween
indi*idual and societ" ('od" and soul).
1ther reli$ious ideas are also of social ori$in. The $od, for instance, is an ancestor who
$ained a prominent place. =ll reli$ious ideas of totem, souls, spirits, and $ods, deri*e
from the ori$inal form of the tri'e0 the tri'al unit" is e)pressed in the form of a $od, it
e)presses the tri'e conscious of itself.
!. #itual =ttitudes
+ere .ur(heim e)plains the ori$in of rituals in its most 'asic form.Cults are ne$ati*e or
positi*e.6e$ati*e cults prohi'it or interdict ('" means of ta'oo), in order to (eep
different sacred thin$s apart or to separate sacred from profane.These interdictions can
translate into the prohi'ition of contact with the scared, not spea(in$ out the scared,
and the territorial or temporal separation of sacred and profane. The positi*e cult
worships somethin$.:n rites, somethin$ is awa(ened, then it is sacrificed.
These acts produce feelin$s of well'ein$, which itself 'ecomes the 2ustification of the
rite. The ritual arouses sentiments, it affects the mental status of its participants.6ote
how the notion of causalit" is produced '" rituals. Causalit" is a social force, e)ternal to
the mind. Causalit" is the wor( of the $roup and not 2ust an intellectual construction8 it
deri*es from the efficaciousness of ritual manipulations.#ituals tie the indi*idual to the
$roup. #eli$ious rituals reaffirm the social $roup and stren$then the collecti*it". #ituals
of passa$e (e.$. 'urial) ha*e the same function0 when someone dies, the $roup is
wea(ened, so the collecti*e sentiments ha*e to renewed, reaffirmed. This also e)plains
the rise of ci*il reli$ion, e.$. the worship of 4atherland, #eason and ?i'ert" in the
4rench re*olution.
5. Conclusion
These simple reli$ions which .ur(heim studies, share essential elements with all
reli$ions. Specificall", the sentiments of the 'elie*ers, unanimousl" shared, cannot 'e
illusor", the" ha*e o'2ecti*e causes in a realit" sui $eneris, i.e. societ". Societ"
produces reli$ion, it can account for the sentiments in*ol*ed, it is e*en societ" who
ma(es the indi*idual. To do this, societ" must come in action, it must ma(e itself felt
and it does this in the assem'l" of 'elie*ers. 5" this form of common action, societ"
ta(es consciousness of itself. :t is the idea of societ" which is the soul of reli$ion8 and
throu$h reli$ion, all the fundamental cate$ories of thou$ht were formed.
:t could 'e o'2ected that this Jsociet"D at the ori$in of reli$ion is an ideal *ersion of
societ", that it is not real. 6o, it is real, 'ut an ideali%ation nonetheless8 the ideali%ation
itself stems from the intensit" of rituals, as a natural product of social life, i.e. as a
condensed or concentrated *ersion of that societ". The ideali%ed societ" is therefore
not outside the real societ" 'ut a part of it. The ideals of reli$ion are thus an e)pression
of the collecti*e life0 in the school of collecti*e life, the person has learned to ideali%e.
This is not to 'e confused with an historicalmaterialist ar$ument.
Concepts are collecti*e representations.The" deri*e their more specific nature (their
di*ersit") from the fact that clans and tri'es are differentiated, and, at the same time,
the" deri*e their uni*ersal nature from the fact that e*er" societ" is alwa"s part of a
lar$er whole. Therefore, it is alwa"s societ" which furnishes the most $eneral notions
with which it should 'e represented. Societ" is the consciousness of consciousness, it
is itself an indi*idualit", of a superior status.

#) The #ivision of La*o and the !oa$it& of Societ&
:n his re*iew of the wor(s of -ar) and .ur(heim, =le)ander outlines .ur(heimDs theor"
of modern societ" as formin$ a hierarch" of processes and institutions ran$in$ from the
particularism of indi*idual life to the uni*ersalism of culture. =t the most $eneral le*el,
culture refers to the co$niti*e, moral and aesthetic representations of collecti*e life that
inform the rest of societ". :t refers to what .ur(heim descri'ed as the @collecti*e
consciousness@, societ" as it thin(s of itself, the moralit" of societ" which re$ulates the
social institutions as well as economic life. 5eneath culture, the state and the law
represent this uni*ersal culture in a more particularistic wa" and or$ani%e the lower
le*els of the educational, occupational and domestic institutions.The indi*idual is at the
'ottom of the social hierarch". Some central elements emer$in$ out of this scheme are
.ur(heimDs notion of culture and moralit", state and politics, law and punishment, the
corporation or occupational $roup, and the characteristics of modern economic
life..ur(heimDs ideas on these issues ha*e under$one chan$es in the course of his
wor(8 'asicall" in The .i*ision of ?a'or he ar$ued for a materialist interpretation, while
in The Elementar" 4orms of the #eli$ious ?ife he $i*es an idealist account. This
presentation rests on his first ma2or e)cursion in The .i*ision of ?a'or in Societ", 'ut
when necessar" : will indicate if and how .ur(heimDs ideas ha*e de*eloped in his later
wor(s.
1. The Economic .i*ision of ?a'or and :ts Causes
The purpose of .ur(heimDs wor( on the di*ision of la'or is to construct a positi*istic
science of moralit" and disco*er how social solidarit" can 'e maintained despite the
$rowin$ autonom" of the indi*idual resultin$ out of the di*ision of la'or. Economic
forces ha*e lead not onl" to a functional differentiation of la'or 'ut also to differentiation
processes in all other domains of societ". .ur(heim ar$ues that this is the result of an
e*olution from mechanical to or$anic societies. -echanical societies are composed of
similar replicated parts (families, hordes, clans).The collecti*e conscience, defined as
@the totalit" of 'eliefs and sentiments common to the a*era$e mem'ers of a societ"@,
reflects this @solidarit" '" similarities@0 the collecti*e practices and 'eliefs of the $roup
are shared '" all of its mem'ers, and an" offense a$ainst the collecti*e consciousness
is percei*ed a threat to the entire social order. .ur(heim ar$ues that in the course of
histor" or$anic societ" made pro$ress in the proportion to which mechanical societ"
has re$ressed. 1r$anic societies are made up of functionall" different or$ans, each
performin$ a special role.The collecti*e consciousness of this social t"pe has a different
hold on the indi*idual0 the 'onds to tradition and famil" are loosened, 'ut the indi*idual
now has the social dut" to speciali%e and to concentrate his ran$e of acti*ities.The
collecti*e consciousness in modern societies still has a hold on indi*iduals, if onl" to
affirm their indi*idualit".
The causes of this e*olution to a societ" characteri%ed '" a functional di*ision of la'or
are twofold.4irst, @:t is 'ecause there occurs a drawin$ to$ether of indi*iduals who
were separated from one another, or at least the" draw more closel" to$ether than the"
had 'een.@. Then social relations 'ecome more numerous since @the" push out 'e"ond
their ori$inal 'oundaries on all sides@. .ur(heim calls this @drawin$ to$ether and the
acti*e e)chan$es that result from it@ d"namic or moral densit".Second, the social
*olume also increases, that is, the total num'er of mem'ers of societ" 'ecomes lar$er.
-ore dense and more *oluminous societies, .ur(heim ar$ues, necessitate the di*ision
of la'or 'ecause the stru$$le for e)istence 'ecomes more strenuous.=s people are
drawn to$ether this will increase competition amon$ them and when the" ha*e @ample
space at their disposal, the" will flee from one another. G1n the other handH :f the"
cannot $o 'e"ond set limits, the" will 'e$in to differentiate, 'ut in a wa" so that the"
'ecome still more dependent of one another@.Therefore, @the di*ision of la'or unites at
the same time it sets at odds8 it causes the acti*ities that it differentiates to con*er$e8 it
'rin$s closer that it separates@.
The secondar" factors that account for the de*elopment of the di*ision of la'or include,
first, the $reater independence of indi*iduals in relation to the $roup. This means that
the collecti*e consciousness 'ecomes pro$ressi*el" indeterminate as societies $et
lar$er0 @5ecause the" are spread o*er a much *aster area, the common consciousness
is itself forced to rise a'o*e all local di*ersities, to dominate more the space a*aila'le,
and conse7uentl" to 'ecome more a'stract@.This trend is for instance demonstrated '"
the chan$in$ nature of the notion of di*init". 1ri$inall", the o'2ects of reli$ious de*otion
are sacred 'ein$s who deri*ed their sacred character directl" from the o'2ect with which
the" were identified (sacred plants or animals). Then de*elops the notion of spirits
@who, whilst preferrin$ this or that location, ne*ertheless e)ist outside the particular
o'2ects to which the" are more especiall" attached...8 the" still e)ist in space@. &ith the
e*olution to pol"theism @the dwellin$place of the $ods 'ecomes more clearl" distinct
from that of man@, and, finall", the $od of Christianit" @$oes 'e"ond space8 +is Kin$dom
is no lon$er of this world@.
=nother secondar" factor in the e*olution to or$anic societies is the wea(enin$ of the
influence of tradition. This occurs 'ecause in modern societies @indi*iduals are no
lon$er restricted to their place of ori$in and free space is opened up, attractin$ them,
the" cannot fail to spread out o*er it@. Especiall" the $rowth of the town demonstrates
that @The more the $roup is spread out, althou$h densel" concentrated, the more the
collecti*e attention, dissipated o*er a wide area, 'ecomes incapa'le of followin$ the
mo*ements of each indi*idual, 'ecause attention does not 'ecome more intense as the
num'er of indi*iduals increases. :t must o*ersee too man" points at one time to 'e a'le
to concentrate on an" sin$le one. The sur*eillance is less careful, 'ecause there are
too man" people and thin$s to watch.There is therefore a $eneral decrease in social
control 'ecause the indi*idualDs @more fre7uent 2ourne"s, the more acti*e
communications that he e)chan$es, the affairs with which he 'usies himself outside his
own localit", etc., di*ert his $a%e from what is ta(in$ place around him.The center of his
life and concerns is no lon$er to 'e found wholl" in the place where he li*es@.
Therefore, @collecti*e sur*eillance is irre*oca'l" rela)ed, the common consciousness
loses its authorit"... :n short, for social control to 'e ri$orous and for the common
consciousness to 'e maintained, societ" must split up into moderatel" small
compartments that enclose completel" the indi*idual.5" contrast, 'oth social control
and the common consciousness $row wea(er as such di*isions fade@.
=lon$ with the di*ision of la'or, there is then a $eneral trend for social life to 'ecome
re$ulated in a different wa" (and not unre$ulated as some o'ser*ers had thou$ht).The
economic order itself does not lead to order or disorder, it is the collecti*e
consciousness that accompanies it which determines the cohesion of societ". The
moralities of mechanical and or$anic societies fulfill the function of 'indin$ the
indi*idual, offerin$ cohesion to the whole, al'eit in different wa"s which are themsel*es
the result of chan$ed conditions in social densit" and *olume.
;. Crime, ?aw and Punishment (:)
:n the .i*ision of ?a'or, .ur(heim concei*es law as a manifestation of the collecti*e
consciousness.+ence he uses as a measure for the de*elopment from mechanical to
or$anic societies the e*olution from repressi*e to restituti*e law. #epressi*e law is
characteristic for simple and ancient societies. ?aw is essentiall" reli$ious law and
infractions a$ainst it are immediatel" punished 'ecause the" threaten the e)istence of
the collecti*it" itself. Crimes that are not reli$ious are less se*erel" punished. The
moral 'eliefs and 2ustifications on which law and punishment are 'ased are specific 'ut
not e)plicitl" specified since e*er" mem'er of societ" (nows them (the collecti*e
consciousness is identical to the indi*idual consciousness).:n modern societies onl"
criminal law is still repressi*e0 it ser*es the unconscious function of stren$thenin$ social
solidarit". The nature of modern solidarit", howe*er, chan$ed and criminal law declined
in fa*or of restituti*e law. Punishment follows le$al *iolations in a restituti*e wa" so that
the relations 'etween indi*idual and societ" are restored.5ecause indi*iduals are more
and more differentiated from one another (the" ha*e different professions), le$al
re$ulations are more a'stract and $eneral so the" can still appl" to all different
indi*iduals and pro*ide the solidarit" necessar" for the cohesion of societ"0 @That alone
is rational that is uni*ersal. &hat defies the understandin$ is the particular and the
concrete@.
The $rowth of commercial law is an inde) of or$anic social solidarit"0 it indicates the
need to maintain relations 'etween differentiated parts (analo$ous to the speciali%ed
functions of the or$ans of the 'od"), which are 'ac(ed up '" societ".:n contract law, for
instance, e*er" contract @assumes that 'ehind the parties who 'ind eachother, societ"
is there, 7uite prepared to inter*ene and to enforce respect for an" underta(in$s
entered into@. :n or$anic societies it is therefore the state which 'ecomes the or$an of
priorit" to direct the other or$ans (li(e the 'rain). 3iolatin$ the rules of a contract
'etween indi*iduals is an offense a$ainst the state as the representati*e 'od" of
modern collecti*e conscience.
>. Political Societ" and State (:)
The e*olution of political life, under normal conditions, corresponds to the $rowin$
indeterminac" of the collecti*e consciousness in or$anic societies0 @the place of the
indi*idual is 'ecomin$ $reater and $o*ernmental power less a'solute@.The modern
state is more uni*ersal and less coerci*e and repressi*e, 'ut this does not mean that it
has 'ecome less in si%e. 1n the contrar", @the stateDs attri'utions 'ecome e*en more
numerous and di*erse as one approaches the hi$her t"pes of societ"@. The stateDs
functions thus $enerall" increase and speciali%e8 @=t the same time, it e)tends
pro$ressi*el" o*er the whole area of its territor" and e*er more densel" pac(ed,
comple) networ(, with 'ranches that are su'stituted for e)istin$ local 'odies or that
assimilate them@. =ccordin$ to .ur(heim, the state de*elops not as a counter'alance to
'ut '" mechanical necessit" out of the di*ision of la'or (p.;9A>0C).The $o*ernment
cannot re$ulate at an" moment all the conditions of economic life since it is @too $eneral
to ensure the cooperation of the social functions, if such cooperation is not reali%ed
spontaneousl"@.This @spontaneous consensus of its parts@ is still necessar" if societ" is
to 'e held to$ether and onl" the collecti*e consciousness can pro*ide this unit".
Therefore, the state @is not the 'rain that creates the unit" of the or$anism, 'ut it
e)presses it, settin$ its seal upon it, GwhileH the parts must 'e alread" solidl" lin(ed to
one another@.
!. Crime, ?aw and Punishment (::)
&e alread" saw that .ur(heim concei*es the law as fulfillin$ the function of maintainin$
solidarit" 'etween the component parts in societ", to secure the autonom" of different
indi*iduals while maintainin$ the relationships that hold them to$ether.:n a later wor(
.ur(heim modifies his *iew of law and outlines two laws of penal e*olution. The first
law stipulates that @the intensit" of punishment is $reater the more closel" societies
appro)imate to a less de*eloped t"pe and the more the central power assumes an
a'solute character@..ur(heim thus reaffirms what he earlier ar$ued in The .i*ision of
?a'or0 the collecti*e consciousness is stron$er in mechanical societies, more loosened
in or$anic societies. +e now e)plicitl" lin(s this e*olution with the reli$ious or secular
nature of law. :n primiti*e societies, the collecti*e consciousness is essentiall" reli$ious
and so are their laws. :n or$anic societies, the law is seculari%ed to refer to some
human interest, not an indi*iduall" held interest 'ut to man(ind in $eneral (analo$ous to
the de*elopment of the collecti*e consciousness). =n" offense is an offense a$ainst
another human and @cannot arouse the same indi$nation as on offense of man a$ainst
/od@. +owe*er, in the second part of the first law .ur(heim states that the nature of
political power also inter*enes in the de*elopment of the intensit" of punishment. The
law does not alwa"s @automaticall"@ represent the collecti*e consciousness8 it ma" 'e
@distorted@ '" the political re$ime that determines its contents.=n a'solutist $o*ernment
which faces no counter'alancin$ social forces, in particular, ma" create and enforce
laws which do not correspond to the collecti*e consciousness0 the laws ma" 'e
repressi*e, e*en in a differentiated societ" characteri%ed '" a di*ision of la'or.
+owe*er, .ur(heim asserted, this is not @a conse7uence of the fundamental nature of
societ", 'ut rather depends on uni7ue, transitor", and contin$ent factors@. The political
societ" to 'e normal, therefore, should alwa"s 'e in concord with the de*elopment of
the collecti*e consciousness.
The other @law of law@ refers to the fact that @depri*ations of li'ert", and of li'ert" alone,
*ar"in$ in time accordin$ to the seriousness of crime, tend to 'ecome more and more
the normal means of social control@. .ur(heim refers to the lac( of prisons in primiti*e
societies where, he ar$ues, imprisonment would not fulfill an" need since crimes
directl" threaten the collecti*it" and should therefore also 'e punished
collecti*el".&hen with the di*ision of la'or collecti*e responsi'ilit" $raduall" declines,
the indi*idual comes to the focus of attention and the depri*ation of his freedom is a
natural conse7uence.
5. The Social #e$ulation of Economic ?ife0 The Corporation
&ith his stud" of the di*ision of la'or .ur(heim wanted to show that the @cult of
indi*idualism@ and the persistence of collecti*e consciousness are not mutuall"
e)clusi*e, 'ut on the contrar" that the di*ision of la'or produces and necessitates a
different (ind of social solidarit". <nder e)ceptional circumstances, howe*er, .ur(heim
maintained that the di*ision of la'or often did not produce or$anic solidarit", 'ecause it
was produced under conditions of an a'sence of rules re$ulatin$ social relations
(anomie), or forced under conditions of economicmaterial ine7ualities. Economic life as
such is not normal or patholo$ical, .ur(heim contends, it is the (lac( of) its re$ulation
which should 'e dealt with. The inter*ention of the state .ur(heim saw in this re$ard
necessar" 'ut insufficient 'ecause the state is too far remo*ed from the concrete li*es
of people and the specific needs of their different professions (the state is too
$eneral).Therefore, .ur(heim proposed that a secondar" $roups placed 'etween the
indi*idual and the state should ta(e care of this function. +e 2ud$ed the corporation or
professional $roup to 'e ideal in this re$ard.
.ur(heim first discussed the professional $roup in some detail in his wor( Suicide. =s a
remed" to e$oistic and anomic suicide, he ar$ued that a restoration of manDs
attachment to, and re$ulation '", societ" is needed, and that this role should 'e ta(en
up '" the corporation. Political societ" is too far remo*ed from the indi*idual to affect
him, reli$ious societ" is $enerall" in decline (seculari%ation), and the famil"Ds duration is
too 'rief (it has 'ecome a nonentit"). The corporation, on the other hand, could fulfill
the function of in*estin$ societ" in the indi*idual, 'ecause it has a stron$ cohesion and
its influence on indi*iduals is @not intermittent, li(e that of political societ", 'ut it is
alwa"s in contact with them '" the constant e)ercise of the function of which it is the
or$an and in which the" colla'orate@. To ta(e up this function the corporation has to
'ecome a definite and reco$ni%ed or$an of pu'lic life @instead of remainin$ a pri*ate
$roup le$all" permitted, 'ut politicall" i$nored@.:t has to 'e mo*ed 'etween the state
and the indi*idual to form @a cluster of collecti*e forces outside the State, thou$h
su'2ect to its action, whose re$ulati*e influence can 'e e)erted with $reater *ariet"@.
The state remains important to fulfill the function of opposin$ @the need for or$anic
e7uili'rium to the particularism of each corporation@.
:n the preface to the second edition of The .i*ision of ?a'or and in the posthumousl"
pu'lished Professional Ethics and Ci*ic -orals further e)pands this idea. :n the
preface, he reasserts that a societ" @cannot 'e maintained unless, 'etween the state
and indi*iduals, a whole ran$e of secondar" $roups are interposed@.1f these secondar"
institutions onl" the corporation can JtameD the econom". The famil" can no lon$er ta(e
up this function since it has lost much of its inte$rati*e and re$ulator" force.
Corporations should ta(e o*er 'ecause the profession under conditions of the di*ision
of la'or determines our life more and more.Such corporations alread" e)ist since, li(e
other secondar" institutions, @as soon as a certain num'er of indi*iduals find the" hold
in common ideas, interests, sentiments and occupations which the rest of the
population does not share in, it is ine*ita'le that, under the influence of these
similarities, the" should 'e attracted to one another. The" will see( one another out,
enter into relationships and associate to$ether@.The e)istin$ corporations, howe*er,
should 'e reformed0 the" must set codes $uidin$ each of the professions (re$ulator")
and the" must 'e wellor$ani%ed $roups (inte$rati*e) constitutin$ a moral force upon
and not a ser*ant of the econom". Then, their acti*ities will not onl" 'e professional 'ut
also educational, pro*idin$ mutual assistance and friendship, and it will form the 'asic
political unit of the nation.The state will not 'e a'olished0 it remains necessar" to la"
down the $eneral principles for industrial le$islation.5ut the di*ersit" of the *arious
t"pes of industr" the state cannot see. +ere corporations, distinct and autonomous from
the state 'ut also in contact with it, can fulfill their role.
A. Political Societ" and State (::)
:n his wor( Professional Ethics and Ci*ic -orals, .ur(heim e)plicates the underl"in$
*iewpoint of his politicalsociolo$" in his discussions of the role of corporation.+e draws
a sharp distinction 'etween political societ" and state (which, as .ur(heim admits, he
did not alwa"s ma(e himself in his earlier wor().Political societ" refers to an opposition
'etween $o*ernin$ and $o*erned, in which the $o*erned must 'e a comin$ to$ether of
different secondar" social $roups (families, professions or classes), su'2ect to the same
authorit", and this authorit" @is not itself su'2ect to an" other permanentl" constituted
superior authorit"@.Territor" is not a definin$ characteristic of political societies, since
the @$eo$raphical e)pression@ of a nation is onl" a recent phenomenon, and @in the past
it was the num'er of citi%ens and not the territor" that was considered to 'e the primar"
element of the state.To anne) a state was not to anne) the countr", 'ut its inha'itants
and to incorporate them within the con7uerin$ state...8 where prime importance
attaches to national territor", it is of comparati*el" recent date.@.The recent identification
of state with territor" is the result of man" factors, one of them is perhaps @the relati*el"
$reater importance that the $eo$raphical 'ond has assumed since other social ties of a
more moral (ind ha*e lost their force.&e see the societ" of which we are mem'ers
more as a defined territor" 'ecause it is no lon$er percei*ed as essentiall" reli$ious, or
identified with its own uni7ue set of traditions or with the support of a particular
d"nast"@.
The political societ" for .ur(heim thus refers to a so*erei$n authorit".The state has a
more specific meanin$ to refer to the @particular $roup of officials entrusted with
representin$ this authorit"...8 the state is a speciali%ed a$enc" whose responsi'ilit" it is
to wor( out certain ideas which appl" to the collecti*it". These ideas are distin$uished
from the other collecti*e representations '" their more conscious and deli'erate
character@. =s said 'efore, .ur(heim does not want to a'olish the state and neither
does he fa*or an allencompassin$ authoritarian state..ur(heim does ac(nowled$e
that there is toda" nothin$ @in the realm of pu'lic life which cannot 'ecome su'2ect to
the action of the state...E*er" societ" is despotic, at least if nothin$ e)ternal inter*enes
to restrain its despotism@.The stateDs role, therefore, is not restricted to the re$ulation of
economic life alone0 @:t is not merel" a matter of increasin$ the e)chan$es of $oods and
ser*ices, 'ut of seein$ that the" are done '" rules that are more 2ust8 it is not simpl"
that e*er"one should ha*e access to rich supplies of food and drin(. #ather it is that
each one should 'e treated as he deser*es, each 'e freed from an un2ust and
humiliatin$ tutela$e, and that, in holdin$ to his fellows and his $roup, a man should not
sacrifice his indi*idualit"@..ur(heim also contends that the state cannot fulfill this
function '" itself0 if the state @is to 'e the li'erator of the indi*idual, it has itself need of
some counter'alance. :t must 'e restrained '" other collecti*e forces, that is, '" the
secondar" $roups... GwhichH are essential if the state is not to oppress the indi*idual0
the" are also necessar" if the state is not to 'e sufficientl" free of the indi*idual@.The
secondar" $roups thus form intermediate institutions that come in 'etween the
indi*idual and the state, and, 'ecause economic life has $ained so much importance,
the professional $roup .ur(heim considered 'est suited to fulfill this need. ?i(e the
state, the secondar" $roups fulfill not economic functions alone0 @Their usefulness is not
merel" to re$ulate and administer the interests under their super*ision. The" ha*e a
more $eneral role8 the" form one of the conditions essential to the emancipation of the
indi*idual@. Professional $roups would thus form the 'asis of political life0 @The idea is
alread" $ainin$ $round that the professional association is the true electoral unit@. Since
no less than all of societ" is affected '" a smooth functionin$ of political life, .ur(heim
would $o as far as to ma(e mem'ership in corporations compulsor"0 @...it is 'e"ond me
to understand the scruples that some feel in this case a$ainst an" su$$estion of
compulsion@.

3ac0 to the Top
Contin"e to Pat Two
3ac0 to P"*$ications)

CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY:
A Review of Themes, Concepts, and Pespectives 4Pat II8
!athie" #ef$em
deflem@sc.edu
www.mathieudeflem.net
<np"*$ished notes) This edition, %an"a& '((()
This is Pat Two on: Geo1 Simme$ and Geo1e H) !ead 4with Goffman and
3$"me8
C$ic0 hee to 1o to Pat One on /e*e and #"0heim
GEORG SI!!EL 4'5>57'('58: THE ;OR!S O; SOCIAL LI;E
A) Societ& and Socio$o1&
Sociolo$" is the stud" of societ", 'ut what is societ", and is it real9
The central point is that societ" nor indi*idual are real alone,
neither one is thin(a'le without the other. Simmel wants to
o*ercome the pro'lems of 'oth methodolo$ical indi*idualism,
stressin$ the primac" of the indi*idual, and holism or sociolo$ism,
emphasi%in$ the social. 6othin$ is real in the sense that it would
refer to a sin$le o'2ect, e.$. the indi*idual is not an o'2ect of
co$nition 'ut of e)perience, its intellectual (nowled$e is a
s"nthesis, an a'straction. These a'stractions are all real althou$h the" approach an
o'2ect from different distances, related to, and 2ustified '", their purposes. Sociolo$", as
a method, focuses on people inasmuch as the" form $roups and are determined '"
their interactions.
Societ", then, can 'e defined as a num'er of indi*iduals connected '" interaction.
These interactions can 'ecome cr"stalli%ed as permanent fields. These relationships, or
forms of sociation, are crucial 'ecause the" demonstrate that societ" is not a su'stance
'ut an e*ent, and 'ecause forms of sociation o*ercome the indi*idualIsocial dualism
(indi*iduals en$a$e with one another and thus constitute the social). Throu$h sociation,
particular phenomena are produced. These phenomena are of two (inds0 1) the
simultaneous influence of interactin$ indi*iduals, and ;) the succession of $enerations.
:n sum, societ" is defined as a) a num'er of indi*iduals connected '" interaction, and ')
the sum of these interactions, or the forms of relationship '" *irtue of which indi*iduals
are transformed into societ" in the first sense (Simmel is unclear a'out this, 'ut tends
more towards the latter definition).

3) Societ& and Individ"a$: Genea$, ;oma$, and Phi$osophica$ Socio$o1&
Simmel distin$uishes $eneral, formal and philosophical sociolo$". Sociolo$" is a point
of *iew, and these *arious (inds of sociolo$" indicate different *iewpoints.
1. /eneral Sociolo$"
the study of the whole of historical life insofar as it is societally for$ed
The facts of social life can 'e studied in terms of their historical materialit", their
contents, i.e. in terms of their de*elopment within and '" social $roups o*er time.
+istorical de*elopments can 'e percei*ed in different terms, 'ut the" all present a
particular frame of anal"sis from the o'2ecti*e, indi*idual (su'2ecti*e), andIor social
point of *iew. The social *iewpoint is o'*iousl" the one that concerns sociolo$", thou$h
the lin( with the other ones is una*oida'le. +ere appear the pro'lems of social
e*olution (e.$. .ur(heim0 from or$anic to mechanical solidarit"), $roup power, or the
*alue relations 'etween collecti*it" and indi*idualit".
;. 4ormal or Pure Sociolo$"
the study of the societal for$s the$selves
4ormal or pure sociolo$" a'stracts the mere element of sociation from social life, it
isolates the form from its different manifestations in historical contents (which were
traced throu$h $eneral sociolo$", e.$. the form of the di*ision of la'or in 19th centur"
capitalism). 4orm and content are relati*el" autonomous0 the forms of life must 'e
distinct from their content since $roups with different content (referrin$ to the relati*el"
*aria'le @what@ of social life) ma" e)hi'it similar or e*en identical forms, and the form
(referrin$ to the relati*el" sta'le @how@ of social action) of $roups can differ thou$h their
contents are the same. 5ehind e*er" social formation there are forces at wor( which
should 'e isolated from the content of their manifestation, and their anal"sis points to
the *alue of a'stract, pure or formal sociolo$". (Thus, the wide *ariet" of topics
discussed '" Simmel Gfashion, law, space, women, po*ert", secrec", the cit", art,
etceteraH is not surprisin$).
>. Philosophical Sociolo$"
the study of the e"iste$ology and $eta"hysics of society
Philosophical sociolo$" concerns two areas of research0 a) the fundamental concepts
and presuppositions of research, i.e. the epistemolo$" of the special social sciences
en$a$ed in the stud" of an" one particular manifestation of social life, and ') the
concepts and presuppositions of (nowled$e, the metaph"sics of the matters discussed
in the special social sciences. These are not empirical 7uestions of research or thou$ht,
'ut the" alwa"s underlie them. 6ote that Simmel here often confused ontolo$" and
intellectual histor".
E = 6ote on Sociation
Sociation is the crucial su'2ect matter of SimmelDs (formal) sociolo$". This concept
indicates0 that e*er"thin$ in social life is related, interacts with e*er"thin$ else
(&echselwir(un$)8 this order of interaction is d"namic, and societ" is e)perienced to
'e in flu) and transitor"8 concepts should 'e relational (e.$. form con onl" 'e
elucidated with reference to content). Societ", in pre*ious sociolo$ies (e.$. Spencer) is
a totalit" assumed to ha*e a particular pattern of e*olution. This is not so8 societ" is
constituted '" the totalit" of forms of interaction that ma(e people societal8 sociation
refers to the forms around which people cr"stalli%e their interests. SimmelDs o'2ect of
sociolo$" 'ecame societ" as sociation (words he came to use interchan$ea'l").
6ote the contrast with .ur(heim0 .ur(heim concei*ed societ" as a s"stem of acti*e
forces operatin$ upon indi*iduals8 for Simmel, societ" is seen as formal interactions
'etween indi*iduals. :n interaction, people occup" a role, their indi*idualit" is
constituted, and to$ether it forms a structure. :n addition, people are aware of this
process (the consciousness of sociation).
4orms of sociation can 'e di*ided in a) social processes0 the relati*el" sta'le and
simple confi$urations of social interaction (e.$. the secret societ")8 ') social t"pes0 the
t"pical characteristics of the persons en$a$ed in interaction (e.$. the stran$er)8 and c)
de*elopmental patterns0 the comple) and diachronic forms of interaction (ta(en from
?e*ine).

C) E.amp$es of Genea$, ;oma$, and Phi$osophica$ Socio$o1&
1. E)ample of /eneral Sociolo$"0 The Social and the :ndi*idual ?e*el
The indi*idual and the $roup le*el are different with re$ard to one fact0 this is the
possi'ilit" of separatin$ in the indi*idual the 7ualities '" which he forms the $roup, and
the 7ualities constitute his pri*ate nature, indi*idualit". The force of tradition (the old) is
e)plained '" the fact that it is most deepl" rooted in the indi*idual as $roup mem'er,
the appeal of the new is e)plained '" the same *aluation, namel" it is more *alued '"
the indi*idual as indi*idual. Therefore, 'oth similarities and differences 'etween
indi*iduals are si$nificant. +owe*er, in modern times, the *alues of indi*idualit" and the
new are rated hi$her. The mass com'ines therefore not all indi*iduals 'ut onl" those
parts of them which coincide 'etween all it mem'ers.
Conse7uentl", mass 'eha*ior is a (ind of lowest common denominator0 at the le*el of
intellect, the mass shows onl" one, simple idea, the indi*idual is allowed more creati*it"
in thou$ht. Therefore, what holds the mass to$ether must 'e what is shared '" all, e*en
the poorest (stupidest) of its mem'ers. =t the le*el of emotions, howe*er, the social is
stron$er than the indi*idual (e.$. mass e)citement, mass h"steria, and mass
enthusiasm). 6ote that the mass is not the a*era$e 'ut tends towards the lowest *alue
(counterforces pre*ent it from reachin$ the 'ottom), and that hi$her placed people
cannot alwa"s descend to lower le*els.
;. E)ample of 4ormal Sociolo$"0 Socia'ilit"
4ormal or pure sociolo$", as said 'efore, focuses on the societal forms. The content or
material of sociation refers to indi*idualDs interests and dri*es which mediate effects
upon others. These materials are not social 'ut when the" are transformed into forms of
interaction, the" are a factor of sociation. Sociation is the form in which indi*iduals
interact to satisf" their interests. Then the ori$inal interest that 'rou$ht the forms into
e)istence can 'e transformed into a new realit" (e.$. laws are created 'ecause of
certain interests, 'ut once created, it is no lon$er a means to an ends 'ut determines
itself how social life should 'e shaped, a sort of dialectical reification). So then, first, the
materials determine the forms of social life, and, then, the forms determine the
materials (dialectics).
The same process happens in societ", and the result is that forms $ain their own life,
freed from contents, e)istin$ for its own sa(e, and this is socia'ilit", i.e. the satisfactor"
feelin$ of 'ein$ sociated re$ardless of the material moti*ations, it is the pla"form of
sociation (note that in /erman socia'ilit" refers to 'oth association and co%iness).
Some characteristics of socia'ilit"0 tact, as a re$ulator" principle, limits all moti*es
other than the sociation itself since these would militate a$ainst interaction (e.$. status)8
discretion pre*ents indi*iduals from crossin$ the socia'ilit" thresholds, that is either
onl" holdin$ on to o'2ecti*e purposes or to oneDs su'2ecti*e aspects8 the democratic
nature of socia'ilit", as socia'ilit"Ds dri*e, is pla"ed to su$$est total e7ualit"8 socia'ilit"
is artificial 'ecause its s"mmetr" and 'alance are st"li%ed e)pressions8 this is
manifested in $ames, where societ" is pla"ed, in co7uetr", where'" the woman mo*es
'etween "es and no while the man appreciates this mo*ement in itself8 in socia'le
con*ersations, i.e. fascinatin$, noninstrumental tal(, in socia'le ethics, the wa"s in
which indi*idual and collecti*e are mer$ed8 the superficialit" of socia'ilit", finall",
e)emplifies the fact that it pla"s social life and "et remains related to it.
>. E)ample of Philosophical Sociolo$"0
:ndi*idual and Societ" in 1Cth and 19th Centur" 3iews of ?ife
The 'asic pro'lem of an" societ" is the conflict 'etween social forces and the
indi*idual, 'ecause, first, the social is inherent to e*er" indi*idual and, second, social
and indi*idual elements ma" collide in the indi*idual. The conflict 'etween societ",
stri*in$ to full" inte$rate the indi*idual, and the indi*idual, resistin$ this dri*e, is
insolu'le. This pro'lem should not 'e concei*ed as an e$oismaltruism dichotom"
(.ur(heim)0 the perfection of the indi*idual constitutes an o'2ecti*e *alue irrespecti*e of
its (in)si$nificance for other indi*iduals, e*en for the indi*idual himIherself. This
o'2ecti*e human *alue ma" e*en collide with societ" as a whole0 the (deeper) human
*alues ha*e a merel" accidental relation to the (actual) social *alues. ?i(ewise,
personal *alues are autonomous from their social entan$lements0 the attitude of
personal life can differ from the success of indi*idual action, in other words, e)istence is
7ualitati*el" different from its particular effects. This dou'le stru$$le of the indi*idual
with societ", not to transcend it in a more $eneral nor more indi*idual fashion, is the
'asis of the philosophies of indi*idual freedom.
:n the 1Cth Centur", the philosoph" of indi*idualism is well captured in the slo$an of the
4rench #e*olution0 @li'ert", e7ualit" and fraternit"@. The unaccepta'le social forms of
the =ncien #e$ime (1Cth centur" dictatorship) lead to the ideal of indi*idual li'ert" as
the @natural@ state of (wo)man. 5ut, of course, this would lead to e)ploitation '" the
pri*ile$ed, so that freedom would lead to ine7ualit" (unless economic e7ualit" is
achie*ed '" means of sociali%in$ the means of production, as is proposed in socialism).
Therefore, a third element is 'rou$ht in0 fraternit", which should 'alance freedom and
e7ualit". :n 1Cth centur" philosoph", freedom is seen as natural or lawli(e so that an"
particular indi*idual (and hisIher li'ert") is captured within the more $eneral pattern of
humanit" @as such@0 the antinom" 'etween freedom and e7ualit" is in the indi*idual
seen as $eneral humanit" (cf. Kant0 what the e$o concei*es is real8 cf. #ousseau0 'e
"ourself to 'e more than "ourself). The @pure@ (wo)man is manifested (more or less) in
e*er" indi*idual. Therefore, @act in such a wa" that the principles $uidin$ "our actions
can 'e *alid for e*er"'od"@ (KantDs cate$orical imperati*e).
:n the 19th Centur", the a'stract conception of indi*idualism in the 1Cth Centur" could
not 'e maintained, and split up in two wa"s0 a) e7ualit" without freedom *ersus ')
freedom without e7ualit". (a) :n socialism, e7ualit" comes first, 'ut for this to 'e
achie*ed without completel" destro"in$ freedom (of the entrepreneur for instance), the
e7ualit" of the proletariat must 'e seen as freedom. :n practice this cannot 'e
maintained0 ine7ualities will alwa"s remain (e.$. 'ecause there are more people
7ualified to ta(e up important positions than there are positions). Socialism is doomed
to fail. (') :ndi*idualism comes first, now also to distin$uish the indi*idual from all other
indi*iduals, either to reali%e that sIhe is li(e all others (weDre all the same), or to 'ear an
e)treme solitude (: am not "ou), the latter can e*en 'e thou$ht of as the ultimate, moral
$oal of (wo)man as the stri*e for complete uni7ueness. To$ether with the indi*idualism
of the 1Cth Centur" (free personalit"), this indi*idualism (of differentiated personalit")
manifested itself in the economic principles of, respecti*el", free competition and the
di*ision of la'or.

#) A"antitative Aspects of the Go"p
1. 1n the Si$nificance of 6um'ers for Social ?ife
/roups are 7uantitati*el" determined in two wa"s0 some de*elopments can onl" ta(e
place 'elow or a'o*e a particular num'er of elements, and some de*elopments are
imposed upon the $roup '" its 7uantitati*e modifications.
Small $roups0 onl" in small $roups does socialism stand a chance (otherwise,
differentiations are ine*ita'le). Sects too re7uire the cohesi*eness of small $roups, and
aristocracies need the @sur*e"a'ilit"@ of all elements in small $roups (the transition to
lar$er $roups means the e)tinction of small $roups, cf. state formation).
?ar$e $roups0 the" are alwa"s $uided '" simple ideas accessi'le to e*er"'od", thou$h
in realit" the" operate with $reat comple)it". Small $roups are more radical in the sense
that the" re7uire unreser*ed de*otion of e*er" mem'er8 lar$er $roups can allow some
hetero$eneit" of elements without the dan$er of 'rea(in$ up. =lso, as a correlate to the
facetoface cohesi*eness of small $roups, lar$e $roups resort to offices, laws,
representations and s"m'ols. 4or instance, compare custom and law0 custom is the
undifferentiated @normati*e as such@ and e*ol*es into 'oth moralit" and law. -oralit" is
what de*elops in the e$o (the indi*idualit" of the ideal @: ou$ht to@ which is part of the @:
am@)8 law is its correlate in societ" (the @we ou$ht to@ to which the indi*idual is
su'2ected). Custom stands in 'etween 'oth8 a 'reach of custom mo'ili%es the small
$roup, while le$al *iolations pro*o(e the whole societ". +owe*er, the law of societ"
does not ha*e to 'e as allencompassin$ as custom, 'ecause the lar$e $roup onl"
re7uires the law as far as it forms a unit", which is a matter of de$ree.
;. The Luantitati*e .etermination of /roup .i*isions and of Certain /roups
-o*in$ 'e"ond the smalllar$e $roup di*ision, some o'ser*ations can 'e made. :n
numerical e7ual su'di*isions, the num'er operates as a classificator" principle within a
whole. The su'di*isions are composed of related or supplementar" elements. The
numerical di*ision here constitutes the principle of classification. 6um'ers can also 'e
used to characteri%e a $roup within a lar$er $roup (e.$. the top ten). The num'er is the
s"m'ol for $roup di*ision, and its mem'ers are defined solel" on the 'asis of that
num'er. This di*ision '" num'ers onl" 'ecomes increasin$l" important in lar$e $roups,
where the indi*idual 'ecomes less important than the whole. The e)ample of the part"
further shows the rele*ance of the num'er. = part" is onl" a part" dependin$ on the
relationships 'etween host and $uests, 'etween $uests, and how these relations are
interpreted. 6ote that the more people come to$ether, the less the" can share an"
sophisticated thin$s, the" instead share at a lower le*el (food and drin(). /enerall", the
more people come to$ether, the more it will lead to somethin$ intrinsicall" different
(7uantit" shifts lead to 7ualitati*e chan$es). /roups ha*e their own responsi'ilities
which an indi*idual mem'er could not 'ear. 6um'ers also matter for the e)tended
famil", and so on.
>. The :solated :ndi*idual and the ."ad
-ore definite conclusions can 'e reached from loo(in$ at the simple structures, i.e.
one, two or three people. 4irst, isolation is not 2ust the indi*idual in solitude, 'ut it
implies the re2ection of societ" (often in a $roup). :t e)ist in the indi*idual 'ut it
e)presses a relation with the $roup. 4reedom, therefore, is not 'ein$ alone8 freedom is
drawn with respect to a $roup, as a matter of de$ree, and often dependent on a
personDs power. Second, the d"ad is the simplest form of sociation, 'etween two people
upon which it is entirel" dependent. The d"ad is tri*ial and intimate. The marria$e is a
desire for fusion and, once a child is 'orn, the illusion of that fusion. = third person
comin$ in destro"s the d"ad, and it 'ecomes a triad. Then superordination and
su'ordination completel" chan$e.
!. The Triad
Triads consist of three people or three parties (consistin$ of more than three people).
The role of the third is crucial, 'ecause the third can mediate (*er'all" or '" $esture)
'etween the other two since he stand a'o*e the conflictin$ interests or is e7uall"
concerned with 'oth interests. The third can also ar'itrate, i.e. ma(e a final decision.
6ote that Simmel feels that @if one wants to understand the real we' of human
societ"..., the most important thin$ is to sharpen oneDs e"e for such 'e$innin$s and
transitions@. The third can also 'e a tertius $audens, i.e. someone who profits from the
other twoDs interactions, e.$. chec(in$ them out. =n e)ample is a 'u"er and two or more
producers. of course, as soon as the other two mer$e (form a trust), the third looses its
ad*anta$e. The third can also create conflicts 'etween the two others and prohi'it them
from unitin$ and so 'ecomin$ stron$er (the di*ide and rule principle).

E) S"peodination and S"*odination
:ntroduction
These are the (e" ideas of SimmelDs anal"sis of superordination and su'ordination0
1) .omination is a form of interaction. E*en in the most e)treme forms of su'ordination,
there is some personal freedom. These are therefore societal forms.
;) =uthorit" denotes authoritati*e 'eha*ior that can 'ecome o'2ecti*e or supra
indi*idual, as well as the fact that the supraindi*idual power ma" *est a person with
authorit". Presti$e is indi*idual and has no supraindi*idual o'2ecti*it".
>) The leader and the led are intertwined in sociation '" means of reciprocit"8 the" do
not e)clude each other, on the contrar", the" impl" one another.
!) :nteraction is important for the idea of law. There can 'e no reciprocit" 'etween ruler
and ruled when the ruler is chosen on the 'asis of a mutual contract 'etween the ruled.
:n this case there is no reciprocit". There must 'e confrontation to ha*e interaction, and
therefore @the t"rann" of a $roup o*er its own mem'ers is worse than that of a prince
o*er his su'2ects@ (relate to informalism in social control, cf. there is no third with which
a reciprocal relationship is esta'lished).
1. Su'ordination under an :ndi*idual
Superordination can 'e e)erted '" an indi*idual, a $roup, or an o'2ecti*e, social or
ideal, force. Su'ordination of a $roup under an indi*idual results in a unification, a close
'ondin$ of the $roup (around or a$ainst the leader). E)amples0 sects ha*e a stron$
cohesion 'ased on their relationship to $od. The leader, which can 'e a pluralit" of
leaders, is the cause of cohesion.
&hen $roups ha*e a common enem", their cohesion is e*en stron$er (see ?ewis
Coser). 1ften $roup d"namics show 'oth the need for, and the anta$onism toward,
leadership0 o'edience and opposition are two sides of one human attitude. +owe*er,
su'ordination under one leader can also lead to $roup conflicts. This is a threshold
phenomenon0 anta$onisms 'etween $roups sta'ili%es their relationships up to a certain
point (e.$. dominated $roups ha*e a tendenc" to come to$ether, and this can intensif"
$roup conflicts). /roup conflicts, howe*er, are more easil" remo*ed when these $roups
ha*e a common leader, a hi$her power which the" share.
?e*ellin$ of the $roup, i.e. the a'olition or none)istence of differences 'etween its
mem'ers, maintains the power of the leader (the despot rules '" *irtue of e7ualit").
:ndi*idual mem'ers of a $roup put onl" a little part of their personalit" in the $roup ('"
*irtue of their decomposition of personalit"), and how smaller this input, how easier it is
for the ruler to rule. /radation can also lead to unification, namel" when the $roup
mem'ers are or$ani%ed li(e a p"ramid, with the ruler on top.. /radation occurs 'ottom
up or top down. =n o*erturn of power actuall" often preser*es the structures of
superordination (e.$. 4rench re*olution).
;. Su'ordination under a Pluralit"
The relationships 'etween a pluralit" of leaders and their su'ordinates are une*en
dependin$ on the structures of their relations. :ndi*idual needs are usuall" not ta(en
into account, while an appeal to o'2ecti*e conditions (e.$. law) is often effecti*e under a
pluralit" of leaders. -asses are lower in intellect, the" are suscepti'le to irrational,
spontaneous actions.
The su'ordination under a pluralit" ma" 'e total, and the indi*idual is confronted '"
different demands (the tension is insolu'le). The su'ordination under a pluralit" is
relati*e when the indi*idual can switch from one to the other. The pluralit" of
superordinates can also 'e stratified, so that a middle power stands 'etween the upper
power and the su'ordinates (hostile to 'oth).
= special case of su'ordination is the out*otin$ of a minorit". =s a mem'er of a
communit", the indi*idual who 2oins in the *ote su'mits to the su'ordination to the
ma2orit", as a conse7uence of social mem'ership. 1ut*otin$ does not threaten the
whole when there is this sense of supraindi*idualit", 'ut when it is missin$, unanimit"
'ecomes imperati*e for the continuation of the whole. Simmel notes that the su'2ection
to ma2orit" can 'e irrational in the sense that the ma2orit" can 'e wron$ (it is a
su'2ection 'ased on do$ma). 6ote how there is dissent (the will of the minorit") 'ut it
does not wea(en the $roup8 out*otin$ reflects the dualism 'etween a personDs $roup
mem'ership and his personal indi*idualit".
>. Su'ordination under a Principle
This is the dominant modern principle of su'ordination0 people su'2ect to an o'2ecti*e
law, not to leaders. :t is depersonified su'ordination. Su'ordination '" principle can
also ta(e the form of a concrete o'2ect (e.$. the land). These relationships translate in
the indi*idualDs consciousness0 the $roup wants what the indi*idual wants
(sociali%ation), 'ut the power of o'li$ation stems from the superpersonal *alidit", an
o'2ecti*e realit" (reification). =ctuall", societ" stand 'etween indi*idual and o'2ecti*it",
societ" is $eneral. The o'2ecti*it" arises out of societ", its $eneralit". :n the end, 2ustice,
for instance, appears as an o'2ecti*e relationship, it transcend the indi*idual as well as
the social. =ctuall", the power of the superordinate can also 'ecome o'2ecti*e, e.$. the
will of the Kin$ 'ecomes law, and then he must himself su'2ect to that o'2ecti*it". 5oth
superordinates and su'ordinates stand under an o'2ecti*e force (e.$. the force of the
contract).
!. Superordination, Su'ordination, .omination and 4reedom
There can 'e $roups which ha*e no su'ordinates, and the $roup itself is superordinate
(e.$. *isa*is a former enem", there is no interaction "et there is superordination).
There is actuall" a fundamental will to su'stitute superordination for freedom, this is
done either '" wantin$ to destro" the sociolo$ical form of superordination, or '"
see(in$ 'enefits within that form, i.e. lower start clim'in$ up to the hi$her (the latter
instance seems more common to Simmel, and $oes completel" a$ainst -ar)).
4reedom and domination are dialecticall" related8 differences amon$ men are natural
(a$ainst socialism and anarchism). 4or Simmel, superordination and su'ordination
should 'e reciprocal o*er time8 people are dependent on eachother *isa*is an
o'2ectified from of domination (e.$. the prince ac7uires a $eneral character8 the position
in a di*ision of la'or is o'2ecti*e, and it is separated from the person). Coercion is
important 'ecause of its form8 it (eeps people to$ether (formal functionalit" of
coercion), it is an irreplacea'le support. The structures of superordination, to Simmel,
seem mostl" 2ust 'ecause more people are 7ualified to ta(e up the hi$hest positions,
hence the 'est ta(e them. The p"ramidal structure of classification is a solution to the
discrepanc" 'etween 7ualifications and the limitations on the satisf"in$ of those
7ualifications (compare to .ur(heim who sa"s that norms limit peopleDs passions, while
Simmel sa"s itDs the forms that do this).

;) The Secet and the Secet Societ&
1. Knowled$e, Truth and 4alsehood
Knowled$e in si$nificant in interaction, first, 'ecause one has to (now who one deal
with. This (nowled$e is a standpoint dependin$ on the interaction, the positions weDre
in, and this (nowled$e in turn affects the relationship. :n our (nowled$e of realit", we
can ma(e errors. the (nowled$e of o'2ects differs from that of people 'ecause people
can choose to lie, i.e. conceal the truth a'out them. People select the rele*ant
fra$ments of their thou$hts to 'e re*ealed. These are not lies0 a lie is a purposeful
deception. ?ar$e, modern societies are fundamentall" 'ased on the truthfulness of its
actors, 'ut a certain amount of l"in$ is not entirel" ne$ati*e. This indicates the
rele*ance of trust or confidence0 not e*er"thin$ can 'e (nown, so it must 'e assumed
that the" will do this or that.
.ifferent $roups can 'e distin$uished 'ased on the reciprocit" of (nowled$e 'etween
their mem'ers. :n interest $roups, this reciprocal (nowled$e is not important, 'ecause,
and as lon$ as, mem'ers perform towards the interest that 'inds them. Se*eral social
forms can 'e classified accordin$ to the amount of (nowled$e in*ol*ed8 e.$.
ac7uaintance0 merel" the otherDs e)istence is ac(nowled$ed8 discretion0 respect for the
otherDs secret8 friendship and lo*e0 a stri*e for total intimac" ('ut usuall" one focuses on
one or the other aspect of the person)8 marria$e0 modern marria$es are directed '"
lo*e and se), 'ut there is an amount of discretion in*ol*ed otherwise there would 'e
nothin$ left to disco*er.
;. Secrec" and the Secret Societ"
The secret, as the hidin$ of realities, is one of manDs $reatest achie*ements, it creates
a second world and thus enlar$es social life. People are fascinated '" secrec" (: (now
somethin$ "ou donDt (now) as well as '" 'etra"al (: will tell "ou somethin$ "ou donDt
(now). 6ote that in modern societ", more is (nown of $eneral affairs and hardl"
an"thin$ of personal thin$s. 6ote on adornment that it is twofold, namel" $i*in$ another
person 2o" and a wish to 'e en2o"ed, a wish for the 2o" to flow 'ac( (it is t"picall" a
propert" of women8 men ha*e weapons).
The secret societ" (i.e. the $roupDs e)istence is a secret, or the mem'ership in a (nown
$roup is a secret) has the purpose of protection throu$h confidence. The $roup can
conceal itself, i.e. its e)istence is a secret, 'ecause it is 2ust formed or 'ecause it is
threatened in its e)istence. The confidence amon$ its mem'ers is essential, the" must
preser*e the secret, 'ut this situation is unsta'le. Silence is a necessar" techni7ue to
(eep a secret, while written communication is opposed to all secrec" (e.$. letters).
Secrec" can 'e the purpose of a social formation (e.$. the secret societ"), and sociation
pre*ents people from disclosin$ the secret since it counter'alances the isolation which
results from (eepin$ a secret. Secret societies are hierarchical (di*ision of la'or),
'ecause the" are 'uilt (the" do not $row) purposel" in this fashion. Therefore, secret
societies ha*e specific rituals, which must 'e carried out and which must 'e $uarded as
a secret8 it claims the indi*idual, ma(es him mem'er of the secret societ". Secret
societies also ha*e a de$ree of freedom which is missin$ in societ" at lar$e8 the secret
societ" compensates for this lac( of freedom in $eneral societ". Compared to sociation
in $eneral, secret societies are separate, formal, and conscious8 the" ha*e complicated
s"stems of si$ns which secure inner cohesion and seclusion from the outside8 its
mem'ers feel superior, and are initiated to materiall" and formall" esta'lish their
seclusion from societ"8 the" are e$oistic in terms of the secret societ" and hostile
towards the $eneral societ"8 secret societies ha*e *er" stron$ 'onds, the" e)clude
inner conflicts, and the" are centrali%ed ('lind o'edience to the leaders)8 the mem'ers
are deindi*iduali%ed, e7ual, anon"mous, and 'ecause the" essentiall" refuse the
unif"in$ attempt of $o*ernment in societ" at lar$e, the" appear as dan$erous.

G) Some C"$t"a$ St"dies of !odenit&
1. 4aithfulness and /ratitude
4aithfulness is a mode of conduct, a ps"chic state of the indi*idual, and it is necessar"
for the e)istence of societ". :t ensures that relationships are maintained 'e"ond the
purposes that ori$inated them. 4aithfulness is not directed towards a person, it is
directed at the relationship8 it sta'ili%es the fluctuations in relationships and mediates
tensions (it secures the interactionsD formal sta'ilit"). This ma(es $ratitude and
faithfulness sociolo$ical matters0 the" sustain sociation. Specificall", $ratitude ensures
the reciprocit" of relations, a means of inner coercion '" a'sence of e)ternal coercion.
;. -asses and The Stran$er
-asses are ne$ati*e, the" prohi'it 'ecause it unifies them more easil". The
o'ser*ance of norms is not that important, 'ut the *iolation of a norm can 'e an
impetus for e)clusion from the $roup.
= stran$er is not part of a $roup, and can therefore 'e more o'2ecti*e, 'ecause of the
peculiar distance and nearness *isa*is the $roup. The stran$er sta"s uni7ue, no
matter how much the" interact with the $roup, the" ne*er interact in the $roup.
!. The -etropolis and -ental ?ife
The cit" affects peopleDs ps"chic li*es 'ecause of the intensification of ner*ous
stimulations, it calls for punctualit", calcula'ilit" and e)actness. This dominance
of the intellect is related to the mone" econom", since 'oth are unresponsi*e to
the indi*idualit" of persons. 1'2ecti*e culture at the same time calls for a personal
su'2ecti*it", cf. the 'lase attitude. =ll 7ualities are reduced to 7uantities, all relations are
characteri%ed '" distrust and indifference. 5ut it also allows for freedom, since the
a'ilit" to control each and e*er" person is wea(ened8 the o'2ecti*e spirit ta(es o*er
from the su'2ecti*e spirit. People are o*erwhelmed '" o'2ecti*e culture, 'ut at the same
time this ma(es them want to 'e uni7ue, it stimulates their need to see( indi*idualit".
6ot the $eneral human attitude secures the indi*idualDs freedom (see a'o*e, 1Cth
centur"), 'ut the indi*idualDs uni7ueness and independence.
Liteat"e
(1900) The Philosoph" of -one"
(190C) So%iolo$ie
(191B) :ndi*idual and Societ"
See also0 -athieu .eflem. ;00>. The Sociolo$" of the Sociolo$" of -one"0 Simmel and
the Contemporar" 5attle of the Classics. 6ournal of Classical Sociology >(1).
5ac(
.
GEORGE HER3ERT !EA#, I9C: ;RO! PRAG!ATIS! TO
I9TERACTIO9IS! A9# !ICRO7STR<CT<RALIS!

GEORGE HER3ERT !EA# 4'56B7'(B'8:
!I9#, SEL;, SOCIETY
:ntroduction
-eadDs wor( directl" responded to Coole", 'ut -eadDs anal"sis has 'een more
influential for later interactionist de*elopments. Charles +orton Coole" was the first to
emphasi%e the social constitution of the self, the fact that the self is not intrinsicall"
'iolo$ical (for instance with reference to se)), 'ut that 'iolo$ical conditions ha*e to
'ecome rele*ant for the constitution of the self in a societ". Coole" defines the self as
@a somewhat definiti*e ima$ination of how oneDs self... appears in a particular mind@
(7u$an 8ature and Social Order, 190;).
=ccordin$ to Coole", the self is the capacit" to see oursel*es as we see other o'2ects,
as if we are loo(in$ into a mirror to find oursel*es and see oursel*es as others see us.
This process of the loo(in$$lass self can 'e 'ro(en down into three components0 first,
we ima$ine how we appear to others8 second, we ima$ine othersD 2ud$ment of that
appearance8 and, third, we de*elop a selffeelin$ as the result of our ima$inin$ othersD
2ud$ments. The self, then, is first and foremost the result of a social process8 there is no
self without societ" (hence, most attention $oes to the social influences on the self).
-eadDs anal"sis of the self departs from Coole"Ds in two wa"s0 a) -ead pa"s more
attention to the process of how the self is constituted (throu$h mind, co$nition and
lan$ua$e), and ') in the course of this e)planation, -ead pa"s e7ual attention to the
acti*e J:D and the passi*e JmeD side of the self (while Coole"Ds self is lar$el" me). =lso,
-ead, unli(e some of his interactionist successors, was hea*il" influenced '"
ps"cholo$ical 'eha*iorism8 he sou$ht to appl" 'eha*iorism to an anal"sis of
consciousness, mind and self.

1. -ind
-eadDs anal"sis of mind, self, and societ" 'asicall" presents an outline of how social
action is possi'le and what is so special a'out human (as compared to animal) action
(/ind3 Self 9 Society, 19>!). This re7uires a few words of e)planations on how he
concei*es mind and action.
4irst, consider an act. =ccordin$ to -ead, an" act entails four sta$es0 1) impulse0 a
reaction to a stimulation in terms of the e)istin$ en*ironment (:Dm hun$r")8 ;)
perception0 the incomin$ stimuli create mental ima$es which permit to differentiate
amon$ the dimensions of an impulse (: see a do$ and a chic(en)8 >) manipulation0
appropriate action is considered in response to the percei*ed stimulus (the chic(en
loo(s 7uite tast")8 and !) action is ta(en (: eat the chic(en).
6ow, second, the human mind is accordin$ to -ead characteri%ed '" some uni7ue
features0 the human mind is capa'le of usin$ s"m'ols to denote o'2ects, to rehearse
different t"pes of action, and to ima$inaril" select the most appropriate line of action
(the latter two are made possi'le '" *irtue of the s"m'ols). This mindful use of
s"m'ols is called ima$inate rehearsal, and this process is a necessar" condition for the
de*elopment of self and societ". :ndeed, 'ecause of the mindDs capacit" to use
si$nificant s"m'ols, as a 'asis for true communication, humans can transcend the
simple pattern of action 'ased on $estures. /estures are used in an" act in*ol*in$ two
or more people (or animals), 'ut onl" throu$h the human mind can the" ac7uire
meanin$s which 'ecome common or shared amon$ indi*iduals in the course of their
interactions with others. These are si$nificant s"m'ols, and the" ma(e up the essence
of human communication throu$h lan$ua$e. Thin(in$, then, can 'e defined as an
internal con*ersation, and, since lan$ua$e is a social product, human thou$ht or
consciousness (and s"m'olic interaction) are possi'le onl" throu$h the use of
si$nificant s"m'ols (consciousness is social). Then, the mind can enter the important
phase of 'ein$ a'le to ta(e the role of the other and constitute, throu$h the
interpretation of s"m'ols, 'oth self and societ".
;. Self
Since communication is essential to the de*elopment of the self, it follows that -eadDs
concept of the self is essentiall" a social self0 @one has to 'e a mem'er of a communit"
to 'e a self@. The self de*elops out of a con*ersation0 '" usin$ s"m'ols, one can tal( to
oneDs self as if one tal(s to someone else. These s"m'ols should arouse in oneself
what it arouses in others (shared meanin$s). This is achie*ed throu$h social
interaction, i.e. in the course of life (from child to adulthood). ?i(ewise, consciousness is
social, it is a characteristic of the en*ironment to which one 'elon$s, it is not lod$ed in
the 'rain.
Two sta$es can 'e distin$uished in the de*elopment of self0 1) pla", when the specific
perspecti*es of a limited num'er of others is ta(en, and $ame, when se*eral othersD
particular perspecti*es lead to the formation of multiple selfima$es, and ;) the
$enerali%ed other, when the o*erall, $eneral perspecti*e of the communit" of others
(social norms, $roup) is assumed. The perspecti*es of others on oneself is then
cr"stalli%ed into a more or less coherent and sta'le conception of the self. Thus, in the
form of the $enerali%ed other as the co$niti*e reco$nition of the attitudes of the
communit", the communit" e)erts control o*er its mem'ers. The $enerali%ed other is
not a part of the self8 it is a capacit" of the self to ma(e si$ns uni*ersal.
The social determination of the self is not to den" su'2ecti*it" or indi*idualism. +ere fits
in -eadDs important distinction 'etween J:D and JmeD. 4irst, the process of the formation
of the self is not to 'e concei*ed mechanisticall"0 the indi*idual mind, the human
capacit" to ta(e the role of the other throu$h s"m'olic communication, is co$niti*el"
in*ol*ed in the process to the self. Second, the self entails 'oth the : and the me. This
can 'e clarified '" reference to memor"0 what the : does now is remem'ered the ne)t
moment as the me.
-ore important is the definition of : and me '" reference to the social dimensions of the
self. The me, the self as o'2ect, is the or$ani%ed set of attitudes of others which oneself
has assumed, it is the definite or$ani%ation of the communit" in oneDs own attitudes, as
a moral, not a mechanistic, necessit"8 the me is con*entional. The :, the self as su'2ect,
is how one reacts to these attitudes8 it is uncertain, it $i*es the sense of freedom and
initiati*e8 the : represents no*elt" in action. The self therefore is concei*ed as a social
process consistin$ of these two phases.
&hile the self is sociall" constructed, this does not mean, accordin$ to -ead, that the
indi*idual cannot affect the social communit". 1n the one hand, -ead emphasi%es that
when one is en$rossed in action, there is no sense of the self. 1ne has to 'e more
reflecti*e in li$ht of others to @ha*e@ a self (sociall" constructed). There cannot 'e a self
without societ". 1n the other hand, howe*er, -ead also asserts that the indi*idual @is
not onl" a citi%en, a mem'er of the communit", 'ut he is one who reacts to this
communit" and in his reaction to it... chan$es it@. The relati*e importance of : and me
depend on the situation, and @The fact that all sel*es are constituted '" or in terms of
the social process... is not in the least incompati'le with, or destructi*e of, the fact that
e*er" indi*idual self has its own peculiar indi*idualit", its own uni7ue pattern8 'ecause
each indi*idual self within that process, while it reflects in its or$ani%ed structure the
'eha*ior patterns of that process as a whole, does so from its own particular standpoint
within that process@. The result of the :Ds relati*e powers o*er the me do not onl" result
in a chan$in$ self (adaptation to the situation), 'ut can also affect the social
en*ironment (e.$. the $enius).
>. Societ"
4or the formation of the self, -ead asserts, interaction with others is crucial. Societ",
then, is defined '" -ead as the or$ani%ed set of interactions amon$ di*erse indi*iduals
(interaction 'etween sel*es and others). =ll indi*iduals in a societ" occup" particular
roles, and each of their roles is defined in relation to the role of others (roles come in
pairs, e.$. father and child). Social interaction relies then on the a'ilit" of indi*iduals to
(now the roles of others, i.e. the capacit" of @ta(in$ the role of the other@, and, in the
course of these interactions, as mentioned 'efore, the self can also ac7uire the
capacit" to ta(e the role of the $enerali%ed other. <nder the super*ision of the
$enerali%ed other, the : and the me can then ne$otiate0 the : tries out different *ersions
of the me. The $enerali%ed other also ena'les two parties in a con*ersation to
understand one another, to share meanin$s, and to put themsel*es in the place of the
other. The uni*ersal nature of si$ns, the fact that a si$n does not refer to an"thin$ in
particular, emer$es from the $enerali%ed other, i.e. the a'ilit" of people to pro2ect
themsel*es emphaticall" into the position of the other.
:n sum, the self and societ" are in -eadDs *iew mutuall" constituti*e0 societ" is in flu)
and amena'le to chan$e 'ecause it is constructed out of the ad2usti*e interactions
amon$ indi*iduals, and, at the same time, societ" influences the formation of the self
*ia the mind process of ta(in$ the role of the $enerali%ed other. 5asicall", -ead ar$ues
that societ" shapes the self, and that the self affects societ", a simple 'ut profound
o'ser*ation for the times. The person @must 'ecome sociali%ed to 'ecome himself.@
!. 6ote0 -ead on Social Control
-ead writes0 @Social control, as operatin$ in terms of selfcriticism, e)erts itself so
intimatel" and e)tensi*el" o*er indi*idual 'eha*ior or conduct... G'ecause the indi*idual
ta(esH the attitude of other indi*iduals, and the attitudes of the or$ani%ed social $roup of
which he and the" are mem'ers, toward himself......8 and thus, throu$h selfcriticism,
social control o*er indi*idual 'eha*ior or conduct operates '" *irtue of the social ori$in
and 'asis of such criticism. That is to sa", selfcriticism is essentiall" social criticism,
and 'eha*ior controlled '" selfcriticism is essentiall" 'eha*ior controlled sociall".
+ence social control, so far from tendin$ to crush out the indi*idual or to o'literate his
selfconscious indi*idualit", is, on the contrar", actuall" constituti*e of and ine)trica'l"
associated with that indi*idualit"@.
!eadCs Chi$den, I:
HER3ERT 3L<!ER A9# SY!3OLIC I9TERACTIO9IS!
:ntroduction
5lumer
e)pands on
-ead and
was
instrumental
in 'rin$in$ his
philosoph"
into sociolo$".
5lumer was
attac(in$ the
macro
emphasis in
functionalism0
he contested
the realit" of structures, social facts and norms (a$ainst sociolo$ism). 5asicall", 5lumer
assumes that sociocultural phenomena deri*e their realit" onl" from the concrete
situations in which realit" is ne$otiated (not superimposed). The interpreti*e 'eha*ior of
people in interaction is real, not the macro structure. Social life is made up of JreallifeD
e*er"da" encounters.
Some $eneral assumptions on person and societ" appl" to most interactionist anal"ses0
1) human 'ein$s are $ifted with thou$ht8 ;) thou$ht is shaped '" social interaction8 >)
throu$h social interaction, meanin$s and s"m'ols are learnt8 !) meanin$s and s"m'ols
can 'e chan$ed on the 'asis of an interpretation of the situation8 5) people can assess
ad*anta$es and disad*anta$ed of their actions8 and A) since action and interaction
ma(e up $roups and societies, the indi*idual, personal action, 'eha*ior, and the li(e,
are to 'e e)amined. There is an emphasis on meanin$, a$enc", the indi*idualDs
capacit" in shapin$ hisIher world (acti*e self).
1. :nteraction and -eanin$
5lumer essentiall" focuses on the indi*idual in social situations. +e stresses the : side
of the self, i.e. the capacit" of indi*iduals to ne$otiate in their interactions and to thus
freel" create societ" (some sa" that 5lumer didnDt do 2ustice to -ead since he onl" too(
o*er the : side of his theor"). #oles are not simpl" pre$i*en in societ" and then ta(en
up (learnt) '" indi*iduals8 roles ha*e to 'e made. This situational process in*ol*es three
'asic processes0
1) +uman 'ein$s act on the 'asis of the meanin$s that thin$s ha*e for them. These
meanin$s are not $i*en in those thin$s themsel*es, instead the" ha*e to 'e defined. :n
interaction, the indi*idual actor can 'e confronted with three o'2ects0 1) ph"sical o'2ects
(thin$s)8 ;) social o'2ects (people), and >) a'stract o'2ects (ideas). 5lumer contends
that none of these o'2ects has a pre$i*en meanin$ @out there@0 the" ha*e to 'e defined
'" each actor, and can thus 'e different for each too. :t is throu$h interaction, that
certain meanin$s 'ecome esta'lished. Therefore0
;) The meanin$s of o'2ects are social0 the" are constructed on the 'asis of the wa"s in
which other persons act toward the person with re$ard to those o'2ects. =nd as a
result0
>) -eanin$s are fle)i'le0 the" are formed out of a process of interpretation in
interaction. Societ" is fluid, d"namic, since people constantl" $i*e meanin$ and 'ase
their actions upon those meanin$s. 5lumer thus refutes realism, i.e. attri'utin$ meanin$
to 'ein$ intrinsic to an o'2ect, as well as nominalism, i.e. ascri'in$ meanin$ to the
indi*idual ps"che.
+ow are meanin$s constructed in interaction9 The interaction determines meanin$ on
the 'asis of 1) a co$niti*e interpretation, and ;) a practical handlin$ of an o'2ect on the
'asis of that interpretation. Then 5lumer asserts that s"m'ols pla" an important role in
this meanin$$i*in$ process (note that 5lumer also mentions nons"m'olic interaction
which does not re7uire an" mental processes). S"m'ols, specificall" lin$uistic s"m'ols,
allow for 1) a cate$ori%ation of o'2ects8 ;) a selection of rele*ant o'2ects8 and >) the
formation of thou$ht, which itself ena'les the a*oidance of ris( 'eha*ior and the
a'stract conception of thin$s and people (interaction is the process '" which thou$ht is
at once de*eloped and e)pressed).
;. The :nteractin$ Self
Since s"m'olic interaction also allows for the formation of thou$ht, the self is (as -ead
su$$ested) the result of a social process. 5lumer defines the self as the capacit" @that a
human 'ein$ can 'e an o'2ect of his own action... he acts toward himself and $uides
himself in his actions toward others on the 'asis of the o'2ect he is to himself@. This
process in*ol*es, first, a selection of the o'2ects considered rele*ant for the indi*idual,
and, second, an appropriate handlin$ of the meanin$s of those o'2ects. +ere it shows
that 5lumer, unli(e -ead, stresses the : side of the self. This : is sociall" constructed in
the sense that it results from the definition of the situation, 'ut it is entirel" acti*e.
People can chan$e societ", the" pla" roles without a pree)istin$ script and can
construct new social forms8 the emphasis is on role ma(in$ rather than role ta(in$.
>. Social 1r$ani%ation
5lumer writes0 @+uman societ" is to 'e seen as consistin$ of actin$ people, and the life
of societ" is to 'e seen as consistin$ of their actions@. 5lumer reali%es that there is what
he calls 2oint action, 'ut he e)plains this with reference to a process of emer$ence, i.e.
lar$escale structures emer$e from microprocesses of interaction. &hile 2oint actions
do ha*e a life of their own, the" are not e)ternal to the actors in*ol*ed since the" are
created '" them. The re$ularit" of social life 5lumer e)plains in terms of repetiti*e
definitions, or '" statin$ that these re$ularities remain relati*el" unimportant,
'ac($round framewor(s0 people ha*e to do somethin$ with institutions 'efore the" can
function.

!eadCs Chi$den, II:
ERDI9G GO;;!A9 A9# THE #RA!AT<RGY O; THE SEL;
:ntroduction
#elati*e to 5lumer, /offman is less onesided (less
definitionofthesituation or meanin$ oriented) 'ecause he
also emphasi%es the structural characteristics of action
situations. 5ased on Collins, /offmanDs wor( is more
inde'ted to .ur(heim than to -ead.
.ur(heimDs fundamental sociolo$ical 7uestion was0 what
holds societ" to$ether, how is social order possi'le9
.ur(heim finds that contractual theories are inade7uate,
since the" cannot account for the precontractual element,
while coerci*e theories cannot account for the rise of the or$ani%ation of $roups (which
ma(e coercion possi'le at all). There ha*e to 'e precontractual norms that indi*iduals
in a societ" share and hold as true. .ur(heim studied the mechanisms '" which these
norms are li*ed, how the" are materiall" produced and reproduced. +is wor( on reli$ion
is in this re$ard the protot"pical e)ample0 reli$ion is not 2ust a set or s"stem of 'eliefs, it
is also action. =ll reli$ions ha*e in common that the" di*ide sacred from secular, and
accompan"in$ this, there are wa"s of 'eha*in$, actin$ towards the sacred and secular.
This is ritual0 the prescri'ed wa"s to 'eha*e towards the sacred (and, '" implication,
the secular). 6either ritual (as 'eha*ior), nor reli$ious moralit" (as ideas, rules) are
naturall" $i*en0 the" ha*e to 'e constructed in and '" societ". .urin$ a specific ritual,
the $roup is most consciousl" and most acti*el" aware of itself as a $roup8 the $roup is
reall" the $roup when it cele'rates itself. The $roupDs cohesi*eness, e)emplified '" the
ph"sical assem'l" and the focus on a s"m'ol (person, animal, o'2ect), is there'"
secured, the $roup is renewed, and the indi*idual, as indi*idual and as $roup mem'er,
is stren$thened '" participatin$ in the $roup ritual (ritual as ener$"producin$ machine).
Particularl" the power of s"m'ols is rele*ant.
1. :nteraction #ituals0 Sta$e and Performance
/offman applies the .ur(heimian theor" of rituals to interpersonal relations, the
ceremonies of e*er"da" interaction ((resentation of Self, 195A). :n comparison to
.ur(heim, this entails a shift from the macro to the micro le*el of anal"sis. E*er"da"
relationships also 'rin$ people to$ether, al'eit for a short time onl", and the" also ha*e
their s"m'ols, their rules which should not 'e 'ro(en and their sanctions when rules are
'ro(en (e.$. the e*er"da" soft punishments for *iolations on politeness). These
e*er"da" rituals, thou$h mild and temporar", per*ade throu$hout societ". 1ther rituals
of the e*er"da" ma" 'e intense "et pri*ate (e.$. lo*e).
/offmanDs $eneral approach sees life as a theater, in*ol*in$ a sta$e, the performance,
and the performers (actor and audience), 'ut /offman admits the @o'*ious
inade7uacies@ of this model. The sta$e of the performance includes0 1) the material
world, and ;) the social world of others and sel*es. This dramatur$" of the e*er"da" is
a ritual8 it creates a shared realit" which is not necessaril" fleetin$. The ritual of
interaction creates and manipulates s"m'ols with moral force8 the" are produced and
reproduced 'ut contain an element of coercion.
The mechanisms of e*er"da" interaction as ritual can 'e descri'ed in terms of the
frontsta$e'ac(sta$e model. This model clarifies the conditions of e*er"da" interactions
as well as the conflicts that ma" arise and the maneu*ers to a*oid or handle them.
4rontsta$e and 'ac(sta$e are the re$ions where interaction ta(es place0
The performance ta(es place in the frontsta$e, where different props are used, ma(in$
possi'le a specific t"pe of interaction and creatin$ a specific picture of the self. The
frontsta$e is $enerall" fi)ed and defines the situation. :t consists of the settin$, i.e. the
ph"sical scene, and the personal front, i.e. the items of e)pressi*e e7uipment that the
audience e)pects of the performer. The personal front is di*ided into appearance, i.e.
the items that re*eal the actorDs social status, and manner, i.e. the role which the
performer e)pects to pla".
:n the 'ac(sta$e, the preparations for the frontsta$e performance are made, the
$ar'a$e of performances is there ta(en care of, actors prepare and rehearse their
roles, and the" can meet there 'efore and after the performance. 6ote that an" ph"sical
space can *ar" 'etween frontsta$e and 'ac(sta$e (e.$. the camera is rollin$). (There is
also a third %one0 the outside which is neither front nor 'ac().
+ow does this relate to stratification in societ", to a hi$her le*el of sociolo$ical
anal"sis9 /offman does ac(nowled$e the structurall" predetermined aspects of the
di*ision 'etween frontsta$e and 'ac(sta$e0 there are institutionali%ed sta$es which are
alread" there when we enter the scene. People therefore can often merel" select fronts
rather than create them. 6e*ertheless, most of /offmanDs (earl") wor( focuses on what
$oes on and happens at a sta$e with particular attention to the structurin$ capacities of
the actors. E)ample0 wor(ers pretend to wor( *er" hard when the 'oss is there, the"
are in the frontsta$e8 when the 'oss lea*es, the wor(place 'ecomes 'ac(sta$e and
the" can critici%e the 'oss, etc. 1rder$i*in$ and orderta(in$, then, are ritual
performances8 'oth sides (now the roles the" ha*e to pla", and in the shared
performance the" create realit" (the" create the sacred realit" of the $roup, the
or$ani%ation, the team). :t seems, then, that /offman would ar$ue that these interaction
rituals in an" case matter in the functionin$ of lar$escale or$ani%ations and institutions.
;. The Self in Sta$ed :nteraction
Pu'lic and pri*ate life are sustained '" the ritual performances of the e*er"da". :n this
interaction process the self is created and manipulated. The self mo*es 'etween
frontsta$e and 'ac(sta$e. This re*eals the tensions and d"namics 'etween -eadDs :
and me, the @discrepanc" 'etween our alltoohuman sel*es and our sociali%ed sel*es@.
1n the frontsta$e of pu'licit", the self uses more props and wor(s harder on the ri$ht
presentation of self than in the 'ac(sta$e of pri*ac". E*en in the most informal settin$s,
/offman ar$ues, there is a ritual structure, which is more, $oes much further, than the
meetin$ itself. =n informal con*ersation, for instance, still 'uilds its own cult, a shared
realit", with its own pressures, its sacred o'2ects, and moralit" (and, of course, some
rituals wor( 'etter than others, last lon$er, are more structural or formal). :n the
'ac(sta$e, as su$$ested, the frontsta$e performances are prepared, and this space is
therefore in a wa" more @authentic@, more pri*ate and less social. 6e*ertheless, sa"s
/offman, e*en in these most intimate moments and spaces of social life, some ritualit"
remains (there are no lonel" actors).
The self from /offmanDs perspecti*e is not so much pri*ate 'ut pu'lic8 it is 'uilt in
interaction. The self is first and foremost a pu'lic realit"8 the interactions of e*er"da" life
are rituals which create a collecti*e realit" that centers around the worship of the self
(:ntercation #ituals, 19AB). People present their sel*es in a particular wa", and in
interaction, these definitions of the self are upheld and reinforced, e.$. people are
polite to protect their own as well as othersD definitions of sel*es. /offman calls this
facewor(, i.e. not $ettin$ into disa$reements 'ut co*erin$ up differences. This in*ol*es
deference, e)pressed towards others, and demeanor, for the self as seen '" others. =n
interaction ritual is an e)chan$e 'etween rituall" enacted sel*es0 each person ma(es
deference to others (respect for others) and $ets in return deference (e)pressi*eness of
self) to uphold oneDs own demeanor (cf. re$ard for each personDs self as a sacred
o'2ect). 6ote that the presentation of self in the frontsta$e, created in the 'ac(sta$e,
can 'e manipulati*e (a$ainst -ead). People present a line, a face, and this face, while
it is often unrealistic and unreal, should alwa"s 'e consistent.
=n interestin$ notion deri*in$ from this anal"sis is that there are numerous sel*es. The
self can 'e simpl" defined as0 @the code that ma(es sense out of almost all the
indi*idualDs acti*ities and pro*ides a 'asis for or$ani%in$ them@, 'ut this code can differ
from situation to situation. The fact that people ha*e different roles to pla" and different
sel*es to present, and the fact that the audience has different e)pectations and thus
creates different sel*es, can lead to pro'lems (tensions 'etween different sel*es), a
d"namic shift 'etween roles, or a multiple presentation of sel*es (as well as copin$
mechanisms to deal with these discrepancies). <nder normal circumstances, howe*er,
it turns out that people are 7uite capa'le of handlin$ these multiple, fluctuatin$,
situational sel*es. The multiplicit" of sel*es is also clear from a consideration of role
distance and sti$ma.
#oledistance refers to the de$ree to which people separate themsel*es from the role
the" pla" (while the"Dre pla"in$ it). People pla" roles in a dou'le fashion0 the" enact the
role and distance themsel*es from it (e.$. 'ored children on a merr"$oround). #ole
distance is a function of social status0 people in low status roles are more defensi*e in
their roledistance (ashamed of their role).
Sti$ma (as a (ind of coerced roledistance) results from the $ap 'etween what a person
ou$ht to 'e, the *irtual social identit", and what a person is, the actual social identit".
Since such $aps are una*oida'le, 'asicall" e*er"'od" is sti$mati%ed. Sti$mas can 'e
a) discredited0 the person (nows that the audience (nows the $ap (so the sti$ma
tension has to 'e handled), or ') discredita'le0 the audience cannot (now the $ap (so
the information on the $ap has to 'e concealed). =$ain this emphasi%es the point that,
for /offman, there is no real self, onl" a multiplicit" of sel*es, all of which are real to us
(m" sel*es as m"self), and which are d"namic0 these sel*es are not predetermined
fractures 'ut emer$e in the course of action.
-ost of /offmanDs attention $oes to the different techni7ues and processes that are
in*ol*ed with the constitution of the self in interaction. :n The Presentation of Self, for
instance, /offman discusses some of these techni7ues. This includes the use of props
to present oneDs self, the control of the audience, and impression mana$ement. The
techni7ues of impression mana$ement include0 the concealment of the secret
pleasures of pre*ious performances, the concealment of errors, concealment of the
process of the performance (onl" showin$ the endproduct), concealment of dirt"wor(,
and m"stification, i.e. performers create a social distance so that the audience cannot
7uestion the actor. These techni7ues can 'e seen as means of selfcontrol, that is,
dramatur$ical discipline to handle or a*oid em'arrassment. 6ote that the audience is
also in*ol*ed in efforts to co*er up this @fa(eness@ of the performance. <suall", all
performers ha*e an interest in maintainin$ the totalit", coherence and smoothness of
the performance.
&rites /offman, @the self is in part a ceremonial thin$, a sacred o'2ect, which must 'e
treated with proper ritual care@. Social interaction in modern societ" (and onl" in modern
societ") re7uires us to act as if we ha*e a self, 'ut it is a m"th8 the self is the (real)
ideolo$" of the modern e*er"da". /offman ar$ues that -eadDs me is actuall" a pluralit"
of meDs since people 'elon$ to different $roups and are e)posed to man" different
situations (see the analo$" with .ur(heimDs theor" on the powers and ener$ies of
rituals the self as unreal realit"). +owe*er, for .ur(heim it was societ" that was sacred
(and cele'rated in rituals), while for /offman it is the self which is the sacred product of
interaction 'etween actor and audience, as an effect from a performance.
>. 4rame =nal"sis
@.efinin$ situations as real certainl" has conse7uences, 'ut these ma" contri'ute *er"
mar$inall" to the e*ents in pro$ress@. &ith his wor( #ra$e Analysis (19B!), it 'ecame
clear that /offman does not a$ree with an a'solute definition of the situation approach0
societ" is e)ternal and prior to the indi*idual. This appears a structuralfunctionalist a
priori, and indeed to /offman @social situations... constitute a realit" sui $eneris@. 5ut
/offman refers to the microstructure, i.e. the strains and possi'ilities of the
microscopic world of facetoface interactions. =t the same time, $i*en these structures,
/offman contends that e*er" indi*idual uses different definitions of a situation. Since
situations are often not created and since the adherence to rules is often a fact,
/offman tries to find out what these 'asic framewor(s are within which action ta(es
place.
+ow does /offman concei*e these frames of action9 There are in fact different frames,
some of which are more encompassin$, more fundamental than others0 1) primar"
framewor(s0 the natural world of thin$s and 'odies, and the social world of other
people8 ;) transformations0 within the primar" framewor(s different transformations can
occur, e.$. ma(e'elie*e, contests and ceremonials. 6ow these transformations can $o
on and on, la"er upon la"er, and "et people rarel" ha*e trou'le with this (ind of multiple
realit".
These transformations a$ain demonstrate the multiple nature of the self. 4rame
anal"sis anal"ticall" dissol*es the self into different la"ers of situational orientations.
Transformations include fa'rications and deceptions, i.e. the introduction of false 'eliefs
a'out what is actuall" $oin$ on. 4rame 'rea(s can occur (e.$. interruption of a
weddin$), which can 'e i$nored, or repaired, or can lead to the complete disruption of a
frame.
?i(ewise, con*ersational anal"sis, from /offmanDs perspecti*e, cannot 'e limited to 2ust
spea(er and hearer. = con*ersation is alwa"s part of a lar$er frame of interaction, a
'roader social 'asis which needs to 'e anal"%ed since it ma(es the con*ersation
possi'le at all. This 'asis to which con*ersations refer consists of0 1) the ph"sical world0
the spea(er sa"s @this@ and points to a phenomenon (cf. this is not a ph"sical
reductionist *iew, 'ut /offman holds that an" mental le*el is alwa"s anchored in this
fundamental ph"sical frame)8 ;) social ecolo$"0 the spea(er tal(s in front of the 'odies
of people and refers to them (e.$. '" correctin$ a mista(e to hide em'arrassment)8 the
social situation is alwa"s the center of attention, the reference point e*en when we are
alone8 >) the institutional settin$0 these determine formal settin$s of con*ersations and
determine the limited (pro$rammed) nature of turnta(in$ possi'ilities.
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