Gorgias' "Encomium to Helen" and the Defense of Rhetoric

Author(s): John Poulakos

Source: Rhetorica, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 1-16
Published by: University of California Press
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John
Poulakos
Gorgias7
Encomium to Helen
and the Defense of Rhetoric
rom the time of Isocrates1 to the
present, Gorgias'
Encomium
to Helen has
puzzled, intrigued,
or
disappointed
its readers.
Of the
many readings
it has
received,
those
by
Croiset,2
van
Hook,3 Untersteiner,4
Segal,5 Vers?nyi,6
Guthrie,7
Kennedy,8
and Rob
1
Although
Isocrates
praises Gorgias
for
having
written of
Helen,
he faults him
for not
observing
the distinction between encomium and the
apologia: "(pr|G? (lev yap
?yKCouiov yeypacp?vai rcepi auTTJ?, xuyx?ve?
?'
?7ioA,oyia eipr|K(?? im?p
xr?v ?Keivn
7C87cpay|X6vc?v.
?cra 8' ouk ?k tc?v ai)T?>v l?ec?v ou??
rcepi
xcbv auxr?v
?pycov
?
Xoyo?,
?Xk? rc?v TODvavxiov'
?rco^oye?aoai \i?v y?p TtpoofjKei rcepi
x v ??iice?v
aixiav
6%ovtc?v,
?Tcaive?v ?e
to??
en'
?yaG?)
tivi
?iacp?povxa?/'
Helen 14-15. From
what we know about
Gorgias,
it does not seem
likely
that he was unaware of the
difference between the two
genres.
Thus,
Isocrates'
explanation
that
Gorgias "jcepi
etaxOev" is difficult to
accept.
2
A. Croiset characterizes the Encomium to Helen as "un des
plus
anciens et des
plus
curieux monuments de la
prose grecque
savante." See "Essai de restitution d' un
passage
de Y
?loge
d' H?l?ne attribu? ?
Gorgias"
in
Melanges
Graux
(1888), p.
128.
3
Larue van Hook calls it "an
epideictic,
or
display, composition,"
and "a brilliant
tour de
force."
Isocrates,
vol.
3,
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press, 1961), p.
54.
4
Mario Untersteiner states: "The defense of Helen
...
represents
in the structural
framework of the
myth
the dramatic
process
of
knowing."
See The
Sophists,
trans.
Kathleen Freeman
(New
York:
Philosophical Library,
1954), p.
102.
5
Charles
Segal regards
it as "a
mythological showpiece
of rhetoric" and "an
epideictic
encomium." See
"Gorgias
and the
Psychology
of the
Logos,"
Harvard Studies
in Classical
Philology,
66
(1962), p.
100.
6
Laszlo
Vers?nyi argues
that "it is
certainly
not a serious work as far as its
ostensible
purpose
is concerned." He also adds: "There is another
aspect,
however,
under which this defense or
eulogy
is
by
no means a
playful
exercise: most of Helens
Encomium deals with the nature and
power
of
logos."
See Socratic
Humanism, (New
Haven: Yale
University
Press, 1963), p.
44.
7
W.K.C. Guthrie sees in it "a school exercise in
rhetoric,
sophistic
in
every
sense."
?
The International
Society
for The
History
of Rhetoric.
Rhetorica,
Vol.
1,
No 2
(Autumn, 1983).
1
2 RHETORICA
inson9 stand out as the most
representative.
But
despite
the
positive
contributions made
by
these and other
authors,
the reader of the
Helen is still faced with at least two crucial
questions.
First,
is this
work an encomium or an
apologia?
If it is an
encomium,
how can we
explain
that so much of it is devoted to the defense of Helen?
If,
on
the other
hand,
it is an
apologia, why
does its author call it an
encomium?
Second,
how
seriously
are we to take this work? If it is a
serious
piece,
what are we to make of
Gorgias'
disclosure that the
speech
is a trifle? If it is a
trifle,
does it deserve even a second
thought?
The above
questions persist partly
because the various
interpreta
tions of the Helen have resulted from
readings
too literal to
provide
satisfactory
answers. While these
interpretations
are
helpful
to the
literary
historian or the classical
philologist, they
offer little or no
insight
to the student of rhetoric.
By focusing
on either the historical
dimension or the formalistic
aspects
of the
preserved
texts,10
they
leave out of account the most crucial rhetorical
issue,
the issue of
purpose. Why
did
Gorgias
write this work? What is the central
question
the Encomium to Helen is
seeking
to answer? What is the
major challenge
to which
Gorgias
is
responding?
Whom is he
challenging
in turn? To be
sure,
these
question
raise a host of issues
the examination of which is
beyond
the
scope
of this
essay;
however,
they
are
significant
because,
if
permitted
to
guide
our
reading, they
disallow
yet
another
interpretation gravitating
toward either histori
cal or formalistic
preferences. Assuming
that an author's
purpose
is a
function of the author himself and his cultural
environment,
both of
He also
says
that "These declamations
might
be
simply
rhetorical exercises on
mythical
themes,
designed
to show
how,
with skill and
effrontery,
the most
uncompromising
case could be defended." See The
Sophists, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1971), p.
50 and 42
respectively.
8
George Kennedy
states:
"Gorgias' speech
for Helen shows all the wildness of his
jingling style,
but it is also a masterful illustration of the
apagogic
method."
Later,
he
adds: "It is
playful
in
mood,
but it also has a serious
purpose
in
demonstrating
a
method of
logical proof."
See The Art
of
Persuasion in
Greece, (Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press, 1963), p.
169 and 168
respectively.
9
John
Robinson sees the Helen as "a
display piece"
and "an occasion for
showing
by example
'the
incantatory power
which
by
its
witchery
enchants,
persuades,
and
changes
the souls of men/
"
See "On
Gorgias"
in Edward N. Lee et al.
eds.,
Exegesis
and
Argument,
(New
York: Humanities
Press, 1973), p.
53.
10
For a discussion of the two best
manuscripts
of the Encomium to
Helen,
see
Douglas
MacDowell,
"Gorgias,
Alkidamas,
and the
Cripps
and Palatine
Manuscripts,"
Classical
Quarterly,
55
(1961), pp.
113-124.
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 3
which are reflected in the
text,
the Helen must be
approached
both in
historical and textual terms. In what
follows,
I will
argue
that an
analogical reading
of the Helen is warranted and can
help
us answer
satisfactorily
some of the above raised
questions.11
Generally, speaking,
the available
interpretations
of the Helen
may
be classed into two
categories:
the "model" and the
"pretext."
The first looks at the work as a model
speech,
the kind
Gorgias'
students were
supposedly expected
to memorize and recite. This view
is
apparently
informed
by
Aristotle's
testimony likening
the
practice
t?v
rcepi xo?? ?puraico?? ^oyou? uiaGapvouvxcov
to that of
Gorgias
(On
Sophistical Refutations
183b-184a).
But Aristotle does not
give
us a
complete
account of
Gorgias'
instructional
practices;
nor does he
say
that memorization and recitation were the
only
methods
Gorgias
endorsed.
12
As
such,
Aristotle's remarks do not establish that the
Helen was a model
speech; they merely suggest
a
possibility.
But even
as a
possibility,
the "model"
interpretation
is difficult to
accept.
Assuming
that the
speech
indeed ends the
way
the available texts
indicate,
the last clause
(e?oi)A,T]0T)V
...
Tia?yviov)
means that one of
Gorgias'
"model" conclusions endorsed the use of the
very
unrhetori
cal
"?ji?v
??
7ca?yviov" (21).
But even the
beginner
rhetor
knows,
if
only commonsensically,
that one does not close a
speech
with a
comment that
might
be
interpreted by
one's listeners as
telling
them
"You've been had." Were it
not, then,
for the last
clause,
the "model"
interpretation might
have been more
plausible.
Some of the advo
cates of this
interpretation argue
that the Helen shows
by example
the
use of "a method of
logical proofs
and illustrates that "even
something
unbelievable is demonstrable when one has the skill."14
But the
apagogic
method of
proof
is as useful or as effective as the
particular arguments
used
allow;
and of the four
arguments Gorgias
employs, only
one
(Helen
is not
blameworthy
for her actions because
she was overcome
by physical
force)
has
merit;
the rest are
quite
weak and
unconvincing.
Had
Gorgias
wanted to illustrate how to
argue apagogically,
he could have chosen
stronger,
more
ingenious
11
Untersteiner holds the same view but for different reasons. See The
Sophists
(note
4
above), p.
123;
also n.
106,
p.
131.
12
For a discussion of the various instructional methods
employed by
the
Sophists,
see G.B.
Kerferd,
The
Sophistic
Movement,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1981), pp.
28-34.
13
Kennedy, p.
169.
14
Vers?nyi, p.
47.
4 RHETORICA
arguments;15
and had he wanted to demonstrate
something
unbeliev
able,
his claim would have been that Helen did not
elope
with Paris
to
Troy.
The second
category
of
interpretations regards
the Helen as a
"pretext"
for
Gorgias'
real
purpose. Vers?nyi,
for
example, points
out
that "There is no reason to
suppose
that
Gorgias
cared much whether
Helen was vindicated or
not,
and Helen is
obviously merely
a
pretext
for his
argument."16 Vers?nyi's point
is well taken but it fails to
establish
why Gorgias
needs a
pretext
to
argue
that
logos "might
have
nothing
to do with
knowledge,
intellect, reason,
but move in an
altogether
different realm."17 The same can be said about alternative
purposes suggested by
other commentators
supporting
this view: if
Gorgias
wanted "to
glorify
his own
art,"18
or discuss "certain
general
ideas that are
deserving
of
attention,"19
or conduct "an
epistemologi
cal
inquiry,"20
he could have done so without a
pretext?just
as he
did in the
nepi
xoG
UT| ovxo? f\ rcepi cpuaecoc.
As will
appear
below,
the
reading
I am
proposing
favors the
"pretext" interpretation
but
offers a need for it.
An
analogical reading
of the Helen is
justified
on both historical
and textual
grounds.
First,
the
speech
was written at a
time21
during
which
mythological
constructs were still an
important part
of the
cultural consciousness of the Greeks.
Mythical
themes seem to have
provided
the
poets,
the
playwrights,
the
Sophists,
and the
philoso
phers
with the fertile soil in which
they
could
plant
the seeds of their
message;22
in
turn,
mythological examples
must have made the works
of the
intelligentsia
of that
period
more
palpable
to the
general
public.
Second,
Gorgias
is well known for his
affinity
for
metaphori
cal
expression
and
figurative language
(DK A2).
That Helen
may
have served as the
personification
of rhetoric is not
unlikely
if one ac
15
Consider,
for
example, Gorgias'
use of the
apagogic
method in his
Defense of
Palamedes.
16
Vers?nyi, p.
44.
17
Ibid., p.
45.
18
Thomas
Duncan,
"Gorgias'
Theories of
Art,"
The Classical
Journal,
33
(1938), p.
405.
19
Robinson,
p.
53.
20
Untersteiner,
p.
117.
2i
Segal, p.
100.
22
Werner
Jaeger,
Paideia: The Ideals
of
Greek
Culture,
vol.
I,
trans. Gilbert
Highet
(New
York: Oxford
University
Press, 1970), p.
374.
Gorgias7
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 5
cepts
the evidence from
Gnomologium
Vaticanum
according
to which
Gorgias
alluded to a similar
analogy
between
Penelope
and
philoso
phy
(DK B29);23
and his
reported
belief that ?
?naxf\caq ?ncaioxepo?
xo?
|xf) ?7caxf|aavxo?
(DK B23)24
lends additional
support
to the
Helen-rhetoric
analogy?we normally
do
expect
one's works to
reflect one's beliefs.
Gorgias'
choice of Helen to
personify
rhetoric is
particularly apt
if one takes into account the common characteristics
the two share: both are
attractive,
both are
unfaithful,
and both have
a bad
reputation.
When
Gorgias
arrived in
Athens,
the
general
attitude toward
rhetoric was ambivalent. On the one
hand,
rhetorical education was
highly
desirable;
on the
other,
formal attacks
against
it were well
under
way?Aristophanes'
The
Banqueters
was shown for the first
time the same
year Gorgias
arrived. That rhetoric was made
especial
ly
attractive
during
the
Sophistic
era is
generally accepted.
For his
part, Gorgias
is said to have held that rhetoric is the
queen
of all the
arts and
"?rc?oac x?? ?uvqiei? ai)M,a?ouaa ?cp' a?xf| exei" (Gorgias
456a).
In
response
to this and other
enticing
claims,
ambitious
upper
class
youths aspiring
to become
political
leaders of the future were
flocking
to rhetorical schools
seeking
to
acquire
the
enabling
skill of
81)
^?yeiv. Gradually,
rhetorical
ability
was
coming
to be
perceived
both as a
prerequisite
to the
practice
of effective
statesmanship
and a
means of
acquiring power,
fame, wealth,
and intellectual wisdom.
Just
as
Helen,
ia?0eov
K?Xkoq
embodied,
noXk?
a?jiaxa auvfiyayev
?v?p
v 87ci
jieya?xn? ji?ya cppovo?xcov
(4),
rhetoric was now attract
ing many
men,
all in
anticipation
of
great accomplishments.
The
promises
of the teachers of
rhetoric,
the attractiveness of the art of
discourse,
and the
aspirations
of the would be rhetors
aside, what,
in
more
descriptive
terms,
were the aims of rhetorical education?
Gorgias' example suggests
an
affinity
for
?uvajiiv (ppaGXiKT)v (DK
A2)
and an aversion to x? e ?,a xe Kai
TtoX?aKi? eipr|U?va (DK A24).
Rhetoric did not
require
exact
knowledge
of a
recognized subject
or
inquiry
into dated and much discussed
issues; rather,
it involved the
development
of the
ability
to
speak according
to the elastic criteria of
kairos and to
prepon.25
The observance of these criteria
meant,
among
23
Of course, both
cpi?oaoipia
and
pT|xopiKf|
are feminine nouns.
24
For an
insightful
discussion of
Gorgias'
notion of arc?rn see Thomas Rosen
meyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylus,
and
Apate,"
American
Journal
of Philology,
76, (1955), pp.
225-260.
25
For a discussion of Kairos see W.
S?ss, Ethos,
Studien zur alteren
griechischen
6
RHETORICA
other
things,
that faithfulness to a fixed
philosophical
stand or
loyalty
to a
permanent ideological position
had to
be,
at
best,
a
secondary
concern. In the
public
domain,
where
uncertainty, contingency,
and
fluctuation
reign supreme, supporting
a
position
one
day
and
attacking
it the next was to be
expected
from a rhetor. But the
unfaithfulness of rhetoric extended
beyond ideology.
In the
eyes
of
people
like
Aristophanes,
rhetorical education was not a form of
social innovation but an instance of cultural iconoclasm
threatening
to
uproot
traditional institutions and values.
By particularizing
and
subjectivizing
the
world,
rhetoric was
essentially weakening
those
bonding
forces that hold a culture
together, thereby leading
to its
utter
disintegration.
Just
as Helen had
betrayed
her husband and her
country,
rhetoric was now
betraying
the
founding
traditions of the
past.
For their
respective betrayals
Helen and rhetoric had
acquired
a
bad
reputation.
Apparently, Gorgias
is interested in
helping xf|v K(XK(?)?
?xko?oi)
oav
(2).
But as Robinson has
remarked,
"Gorgias
does not care in the
least whether Helen is
guilty
or innocent."26 The
same, however,
cannot be said about
Gorgias'
attitude toward his techn?. Rhetoric was
under fire from
many groups:
the
aristocrats,
whose
privileged
position
in the State was
being
undermined
by
an
upcoming
generation
of
"logocrats;"
the
conservatives,
who saw its destructive
influence on the culture and its
corrupting
effects on the
young;
the
oligarchically
minded,
who must have been
dismayed
to witness
increased instances of
democratization;
the
poor,
who,
like
Socrates,
could not afford
"fifty
drachmai lectures"
(Cratylus
384b)
or the
higher
fees for rhetorical
instruction;
the
envious,
who must have
resented the
Sophists' popularity;27
and
finally
Socrates,
the
champi
on of dialectic. Faced with this state of
affairs,
Gorgias
could have
hardly
remained
indifferent?every
time the
reputation
of one's art
and
profession
are at
stake,
one
naturally
comes to their defense.
Rhetorik,
Leipzig
1910, p.
17 ff. For a discussion of to
prepon
see M.
Pohlenz,
Nachrichten der
k?niglichen Gesellschaft
der
Wissenschaften, G?ttingen
1933,
p.
53
ff;
also
Jaeger (note
22
above), p.
165 f? Untersteiner discusses both notions in The
Sophists
(note
4
above), pp.
195-199.
26
Robinson,
p.
53.
27
At least for
Nietzsche,
Plato heads the list of the envious. On this
matter,
Samuel
Ijsseling
writes: "Nietzsche asks: 'How should one understand Plato's battle
against
rhetoric?' and he answers: 'He was envious of their influence.'
(Werke, III, p.
337.)"
See Rhetoric and
Philosophy
in
Conflict,
(The
Hague:
Martinus
Nijhoff,
1976), p.
107.
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 7
But if
Gorgias
wishes to defend
rhetoric,
why
conceal his
purpose? Why
not entitle his work
'Yrc?p pT|TOpiKT|? ?rcoAoy?a
and
write a treatise in
support
of rhetoric? Once
again,
we must
attempt
a
historical
explanation. Gorgias
must have been aware of the Athenian
practices
of
intolerance;
frequent
banishments and
condemnations,
the
burning
of books in
public,
and excommunications
by
exile must
have dictated that he
approach
his task
indirectly.28
Artists have
traditionally
found that the use of
allegory
satisfies well the demands
of indirection: and
just
as a comic
playwright
can mask his intention
with
frogs, wasps,
or birds for artistic
purposes,
a
rhetor
may
artfully29
avoid
being explicit
for
political
reasons.30 A delicate and
potentially explosive
issue must be handled
carefully
and
cautiously.
I submit that this is
precisely why Gorgias
entitles his work
Encomium to Helen and calls it a
Tcaiyviov.
After
all,
what
danger
can
there be in a work whose author finds diversion in
praising
a
mythical figure? Gorgias'
discourse must have seemed
perfectly
harmless and
non-threatening
to the forces of the
establishment,
which tend to take
things literally, anyway.
Thus,
Gorgias'
wish to
defend rhetoric without
antagonizing
a
powerful
status
quo,
and
thereby endangering
himself,
is fulfilled.
Thus
far,
I have
argued
that there are historical
grounds justify
ing
the claim that
Gorgias
wishes to defend rhetoric. To show that he
indeed does so in the
Helen,
I will now turn to the text. For the
purposes
of
analysis,
the
speech may
be divided into two sections: the
first, (6)-(7),
is more
argumentative
while the
second, (8)-(19),
is more
descriptive
and
explanatory
in nature. Each section advances two
arguments
and is
accordingly
divided into two
parts?(6)
and
(7)
for
the first and
(8)-(14)
and
(15)-(19)
for the second. Before
discussing
each,
a few words about
Gorgias'
statement of
purpose
are in order.
Early
in the
speech, Gorgias
announces that he wants
xi|V [lev
Kaic?)?
(XKOUouaav rca?aai
xf|? aixia?, xo??
8?
|i?|i(po|i?voi)?
...
jca?aai
xf|? ?jiaGia?
(2).
Of the two
things
he wants to
accomplish,
28
On this
point,
E.R. Dodds observes that "the evidence we have is more than
enough
to
prove
that the Great
Age
of Greek
Enlightenment
was
also,
like our own
time,
an
Age
of Persecution?banishment of
scholars,
bunkering
of
thought,
and even
(if
we can believe the tradition about
Protagoras) burning
of books." The Greeks and the
Irrational,
(Berkeley: University
of California
Press, 1951), pp.
189-190.
29
Gorgias' phrase "x?^vn ypcKpei?,
ouk
?XnOeict
Xex^&K'
(13)
mav be
helpful
here.
30
Regarding
the
sophistical practice
of
concealing
one's work "to
escape malice,"
see
Protagoras
316c-317c.
8 RHETORICA
the second is more
complicated
because it involves
1)
exposing xo??
|i6|X(po|i8VOU?
as
\|/6U?O|X6VOD?
and
2)
putting
forth the truth
(?ei?a?
x?Xr|06?).
Read in
conjunction
with his
concluding
remarks,
Gorgias'
statement of
purpose
becomes more
sharply
focused: at issue are the
injustice
of blame
(ji(b(iOD ??iK?a)
and the
ignorance
of
opinion
(8o?r|? ?jxaoia) (21).
The two issues seem to be
casually
linked: the
latter has caused the former. Because the accusers hold uninformed
opinions, they
blame
unjustly;
that
is,
their accusations lack a factual
basis.
Explaining
the truth of the
matter,
which
Gorgias promises
to
do,
will
hopefully
have one of two
positive
results: it
may
inform
xo?? |i8|X(po|x?voD? thereby keeping
them from
making
unfounded
allegations,
or,
what is more
realistic,
it
may
inoculate the
public
thereby keeping
them from
believing
the accusers. In either
case,
the
present injustice
will be arrested.
However,
as
Gorgias points
out,
the
story
of Helen
(her
beauty,
her
origins,
her
actions, etc.)
is well known to most
people
(oi)K
a8r\kov
oi)??
?AAyo??)
(3).
Reference to their
familiarity
with some of
the factual
aspects
of the
story
is also made in
(4),
where
Gorgias
promises
to refrain from
X?yeiv xoi?
eiS?cuv a ?aaai. This means that
his notion of
x<xXr)9??
in the context of the
speech
cannot be about
what is
essentially
common
knowledge.
Nor can
x??T|0??
be
equated
with
praising
Helen,
or
arguing
that she is innocent of the
charges
against her?just
as
arguing
the
opposite
is not
necessarily
a matter of
lying.
What, then,
are Helen's accusers
lying
about?
Gorgias
does not
say.
Nor does he make
any
statements
revealing
the truth of the
matter.
Thus,
when
reading
his
concluding
remark,
?v?jieiva xcp
v?jLicp
?v
808UT|v
8V
?p%f|
xo?
X?jox) (21),
one is struck with his
inconsistency;
he neither
proves xo?? |i8jii(pojLi8VOU? \|/ei)8o|i8VOi)?
nor shows
xaXr)9??;31
he
merely
cites four reasons
why
Helen is not
guilty.
As I will show
below,
this
seeming anomaly disappears
if the
text is read
analogically,
as a defense of rhetoric.
Gorgias' argument
in
(6)
unfolds
on two levels. His reference to
the
gods
raises the issue of
origins
and makes a case for the need to
examine that which is
prior
to or
stronger
than Helen.
Thus,
he
may
be taken to be
saying
that rhetoric is not
blameworthy
because it is
something
that comes from the
gods. They
are the ones
who,
in their
superior
wisdom
(Ge??
8'
?v6pd)7COU Kpe?aaov
...
aocp?q),
decided to
31
Kerferd makes the same
point
and adds that "This has led to the
suggestion
that
for
Gorgias
the sole
way
in which
persuasion operates upon opinion
is
by deception."
p.
80.
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 9
give
man this
gift, presumably
to
help
him facilitate his communal
life. This view is in line with the
poetic
tradition,
the Platonic version
of
Protagoras' mythical
account of the rise of human civilization
(Protagoras
320c
ff),
and Isocrates' later
eulogy
of
logos
(Nicocles 5-9).
On the second
level,
Gorgias argues
that
responsibility
for what
Helen did must be
placed
not on Helen but on those who used her.
Helen is not
guilty
because she was
literally
used
by
the
gods
as an
instrument for their
purposes (Helen
herself
argues
this
point
in the
Trojan
Women
919-950).
Similarly, responsibility
for what rhetoric
does must be
placed
not on the art itself but on those who use
it,
its
practitioners. By
not
challenging
Helen's actions or their
contemptibi
lity, Gorgias acknowledges implicitly
that,
when
misused,
rhetoric
often
yields
results that are indeed
reprehensible.
However,
he insists
that in such cases
?i;ioc
aixi?aGai ?
aixi?)|ievo?.
On both levels of
the
argument
the conclusion is that rhetoric is not
reproachable.
Viewed
historically,
this
argument (preserved
in Plato's
Gorgias
457a-c,
Isocrates' Nicocles
1-9,
and Aristotle's Rhetoric 1355b
1-5)
is
significant
because it marks the
ending
of the
poeticoreligious
and
the
beginning
of the rationalistic tradition in Greece. As
Hegel
has
observed,
the
Sophists
were
among
the first to
challenge
the value of
strict adherence to a set of moral
principles designed
to
legislate
and
guide
individual behavior.32
Accordingly, they argued
that even
religious
laws are not to be
obeyed unquestionably
but to be
subjected
to critical
scrutiny.
In
effect,
the
Sophists urged
that the
individual create his own
religion.
The
dangers
of this doctrine of
religious
relativism
notwithstanding,
one of its
positive
notes was the
conscious effort to transfer
responsibility
for one's actions from the
abstractly religious
to the
concretely personal
level. If
accurate,
this
account stands in fundamental
opposition
to all four variations of
Gorgias'
central
argument,
i.e.,
Helen did not act of her own free will.
An
overly religious
attitude,
one which sees all events in the human
sphere
as
figured
in or caused
by
an
all-encompassing
divine
plan
which human will cannot
frustrate,
would have to
forgive
Helen. But
the
spirit
of the
early
rationalism of the late fifth
century
seems less
prepared
to
accept
the
argument
that human misdeeds are the result
of divine orders.
Hecuba,
for
example, rejects
Helen's
argument
(I
was used
by
the
gods)
and
assigns
all
responsibility
to her
(Trojan
32
For a more extensive treatment of this
point,
see G.E
Hegel,
Lectures in the
History of Philosophy,
vol.
IV,
trans. E.S. Haldane
(New
York: The Humanities
Press,
1963), pp.
357-358.
10 RHETORICA
Women
969-1032).
If we
regard Gorgias
as a
major exponent
of the So
phistic
movement,
and if we
accept
his
reputed
attitude
"|Lif|
x?
et?o?
?Xk?
xf|v ?o?av
eiai
noXkoiq yv?puiov xr)? yuvauc?c"
(DK B22),
we
would have to conclude that
he, too,
contrary
to his stand in the
Helen,
would have condemned her.
Clearly,
this
opposition
between
the historical and the textual accounts lends
support
to the view that
Gorgias, although talking
about
Helen,
is
really referring
to rhetoric.
Further
support
for this view is
provided
as we turn to
yet
another historical note. As the older tradition was
yielding
to the
newer,
a
profound change
in the
form,
the
sources,
and the carriers of
the word was
taking place.
Obscure
prophetic
riddles were
being
replaced by persuasive arguments,33
the
temples by
the
agora,
and
the
poets
and
rhapsodes by
the rhetors. Unlike
anonymous
oracular
sayings, speech, although
not
entirely stripped
of its
magical powers,
was now
becoming
tied to rational human
agents, fully responsible
and accountable for their utterances and their
consequences.
In this
vein,
it is instructive to recall that after the Sicilian
expedition
the
Athenians turned
against
the rhetors who had
persuaded
them to
undertake what turned out to be a disastrous adventure.
Thus,
when
Gorgias argues
that Helen should not be held accountable he is
confronting
the accusers of rhetoric with two
responses (one
for each
of the aforementioned
traditions):
to the
poetically
and
religiously
inclined he
says
that rhetoric is a
gift
of divine
origin;
to the new
wave of rationalists that their blame is
misplaced?it
is not the art but
its misusers that must be censured.
In the
following argument, Gorgias points
out that
just
as Helen
could not have defended herself
against
her abductor's
force,
rhetoric
next to
physical
violence is
helpless.
In so
doing,
he
singles
out for
blame the abusers of rhetoric
who,
by violating
her,
act
illegally
(?vojico?)
and
unjustly (?S?KC??).
This section has
strong
overtones of
a
political critique designed
to
expose
the use of
?ia by
the State.
Influential rhetors have
always
been a class to be reckoned with
by
33
The
following excerpt
from
Euripides'
Helen illustrates the
point (the
messen
ger
is
speaking
to
Menelaus)
753-757:
xi
?f|xa navxeD?ueOa; xo??
Geo?ai
%p?|
O?ovxa?
aixe?v
?yaG?, ?xavxeiac
?' ??v'
?iou y?p ?Xki?q ???eap rj?p?Ori
xo?e,
icouSei? ?7c?,ooxr|G' ?u7c6poiaiv ?py??
?)v*
yvaixT]
?'
?piaxT) uavxi? f\
%'
eu?ooXia.
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 11
those in
power.
As
Thrasymachus' fragment
of The Constitution
illustrates,
rhetors are formidable
challengers
of the ill-advised
poli
cies and
corrupt practices
of the
ruling
class.34
History
has shown that
the more tolerant rulers
respond
to rhetorical attacks
by issuing
explanations
or counterattacks. But should their rhetoric fail and the
challenge persist, they
become less tolerant and resort to various
forms of force in order to silence the voices of
opposition.
When this
happens,
rhetoric
suffers,
justice
becomes the
justice
of the
stronger,
and the unwritten law
dictating
that communal differences be settled
through
discourse is violated.
Branding outspoken political oppo
nents "the enemies of the
State,"
arresting
them
illegally,
and
exiling
them are all
examples
of what
Gorgias
would call
?ap?apa
67U%ei
prpaxa
Kai
X?yco
Kai
v?|icp
Kai
epyco.
But no
example
better
illustrates the
point
than the measure of the
Thirty Tyrants
that
outlawed rhetorical instruction
altogether (Xenophon's
Memorabilia
I,
2.31).35
Unlike
rhetoric,
which for
Gorgias
"rc?vxa
y?p ?)(p' a?xf|
8o?A,a ?Y
6K?VXC0V,
?Xk' ou ?i?
?iac
rcoio?xo"
(Philebus 58a),
bia is not
interested in
securing people's agreement
to what is
being pro
posed;36
rather,
it
ignores
the
laws,
eliminates
dissent,
and
imposes
its
violent will.
Thus
far,
Gorgias
has
argued
that the bad
reputation
of rhetoric is
due to her accusers' failure to
distinguish
between the art herself and
her misusers and abusers.
Following
the same
argumentative
strate
gy,
he next
attempts yet
another shift in the direction of blame: it
must be directed
against logos
(? ji?v
o?)V
rce?aac (b? ?vayKaaa?
??iKe?)
and
away
from rhetoric
(?)
??
cb? ?vayKaoOe?aa
xco
?oyco
|i?xr|v
(XKO?ei
KaK(??)
(12).
This
argument,
however,
is overshad
34
DK 85 Bl.
35
Regarding
this measure,
Stanley
Wilcox has remarked: "Of course
Xenophon
explains
the law as
resulting
from Critias'
personal grudge against
Socrates,
but the
oligarchical
rulers of Athens needed no such
general
law to cloak their hatred of an in
dividual.
Rather,
they shrewdly
discerned that trained
speakers
meant men
capable
of
arousing
the
people,
an aroused
people
meant a revival of a democratic
party,
and a
democratic
party organized
and united
by
effective
speakers might
mean the end of
their
oligarchical power. Recognizing
that
oratory
is the life-blood of
democracy, they
shut off the flow at the
source, the schools of rhetoric/' 'The
Scope
of
Early
Rhetorical
Instruction/'
Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology,
53
(1942), p.
155.
36
In the
Palamedes,
Gorgias
stresses that the other's consent is an essential
prerequisite
to
persuasion.
This can be inferred from the defendant's
argument
that he
could not have
persuaded
the barbarians because
they
would not have wanted to be
persuaded (ofcxe
y?p
?Keivoi
7CEia9r)vai ?ouXoivx' ?v) (14).
12
RHETORICA
owed as
Gorgias
turns to an
analytical
discussion of the nature of
logos
and its effects on the human
psyche.37 Along
with this
discussion,
he offers a rather technical account of the various
processes
and
components
that make
up
the
complex phenomenon
of
rhetorical
peitho
(i.e., doxa,
terpsis, pistis, apate).
In this
section,
(8)-(14),
Gorgias gives
an "official" version of
what rhetoric
is,
"a kind of formal
profession
of the aims and
methods of his
art,
a kind of advertisement like the
87i?yyeA|ia
of
Protagoras."38 By giving
what he must have
regarded
as a correct
account of the basic
parts
of the rhetorical act
(rhetor,
logos,
listeners)
and their
interaction,
Gorgias
does his
duty (kz^ox
xe x? S?ov
?p0?)?)
(2)
as a
professional
rhetorician and fulfills his initial
promise
to show
xa?r)0??.
And
although
he does
not,
strictly speaking, prove
the
accusers of rhetoric
liars,
he renders their familiar claims
(rhetoric
is a
method of
winning
false
arguments
and
supporting unjust
causes,
it
teaches how to turn the old into the new and vice
versa,
it
disregards
the truth and concentrates on
probability,
etc.)
at least
questionable.
Gorgias' analysis
continues in the next
section,
(15)-(19),
where
the discussion focuses on the affective
power
of the iconic and formal
aspects
of visual
perception (odxco? encova?
xa>v
?poji?vcov Tcpay
jx?xcov ?| o\|/i? 6v?ypa\|/6V
?v xa)
(ppov?)|iaxi) (17).
Having explained
that the
plastic
arts create
naturally epcoxa
Kai 7t?0ov
(18),
he
argues
that Helen was unable to defend
against
what she felt when she saw
Alexander's
body.
The merit of this
argument
aside,
Gorgias
has
completed
his discussion
by pointing
out that
persuasion
is a matter
of both sound and
sight.
As
Segal
has
remarked,
"It is
Gorgias'
achievement to have
perceived
and formulated as a techne that the
formal structure of the
logos
(in
qualities
such as
metron)
evokes
emotional
forces,
and to have
generalized
this formulation
(at
least in
terms of the
effects,
if not of formal
analysis)
to include both the
linguistic
and the visual arts."39
Assuming
that rhetorical discourse is
purposeful,
that it consti
tutes a
response
to a
challenge
and is itself a
challenge inviting
responses,
I have
attempted
to show that from an
analogical point
of
view the central issue in the Encomium to Helen is the tarnished
37
The most
comprehensive
treatment of this
discussion,
as well as that of the
(15)-(19) section,
is
provided by Segal
(note
5
above). Segal's
treatment is so
thorough
that it makes
any original
observations
very
difficult.
38
Ibid., p.
102.
39
Ibid., p.
133.
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 13
reputation
(?UGK?eia)
of rhetoric.
Gorgias
indicates that this
dyskleia
has been caused
by
amathia and is an
example
of adikia. Consistent
with his surface
argument
(Helen's
accusers must examine the
possible
causes of her action before
assigning
blame),
he attacks the
cause of the
problem,
not its effects.
Thus,
his defense takes the form
of an educational mission.
First,
Gorgias
asks his audience to consider
the divine
origin
and human
practice
of
rhetoric,
and to
accept
that
some
people
use it
improperly.
Second,
he invites a
comparison
of
rhetoric and bia as two
ways
of
settling
human differences.40
Third,
he discusses
logos
as the rhetorical medium whose nature admits of
artistic
manipulation by
the learned rhetor. Because
logos
in its
various manifestations
(prose, poetry,
incantation)
affects
people
psychologically,
and because
people's
actions are determined to a
large
extent
psychologically,
the
study
of rhetoric is the
study
of the
linguistic
influence of human action. In connection with his third
point, Gorgias'
fourth line of defense is an allusion to
people's
susceptibility
to the contents of their visual
perceptions.
Like
sound,
sights
can affect
people's thoughts
and actions
profoundly.
In this
sense,
rhetoric includes the
study
of
creating persuasive images.
Gorgias'
defense of rhetoric shifts the focus of the issue as defined
by
the enemies of rhetoric.
Essentially,
he does not want to
play
their
game.
And
although
he would have refused to
accept
that rhetoric is
bad,
he does not
attempt
to refute their
charges
and establish that she
is
good?in
this
regard,
Isocrates is
right:
he does not
praise
in the
spirit
of an encomium.41 But it does not
appear
that
Gorgias
is
interested in
praising
rhetoric?at least not
explicitly;42
rather,
he
wants to inform a misinformed
public by setting
the record
straight.
In so
doing,
he lifts the issue of rhetoric out of the
sphere
of ethics
and
places
it in that of
theory.43
The accusers of rhetoric are
saying
that rhetoric is bad because
they
know that some
people
are
using
eloquence
for evil
purposes successfully.
But have
they sought
to
40
Gorgias
alludes to the same distinction in the Palamedes when he has the
defendant ask:
"Tteiaa? f\ ?iaaajievoc;"
(14).
41
See note 1 above.
42
Yet,
he seems to hint that rhetoric is
praiseworthy
when he
implies
that the
?fiapx?a
of the accusers of rhetoric falls into the
category
of
p.?|i(p6a9ai
x? ?Tcaivex?
(1).
43
As
Segal
has
pointed
out,
Gorgias'
comments are "not to be construed as a
sign
of a
systematic metaphysics."
Rather,
they
must be seen as "relevant to a
theory
of
communication and
persuasion." p.
102.
14 RHETORICA
discover what is
prior
to the effects
they disapprove
of?
Gorgias
seems to think that
they
have
not?just
as
they
have not
thought
about the causes of Helen's actions. For
Gorgias,
the debate whether
rhetoric is
good
or bad is beside the
point;
and the
point,
at least in
the
Helen,
is the nature of rhetoric: What is it? What can it do? How
does it do what it claims it can do? What must a rhetor know in order
to be effective?
Having
answered these
questions
(some
more com
pletely
than
others),
Gorgias
seems to conclude that
blaming
the art
(rhetoric),
its medium
(logos),
or
people's psychological responses
to
linguistic
creations is as absurd as
blaming
medicine,
drugs,
or
people's physiological
reactions to medicinal treatment.
Gorgias,
then,
defends rhetoric not
by demonstrating
its
goodness
or discuss
ing
its
technological aspects
but
by defining
it,
clarifying
its func
tions,
and
explaining
its
workings.
From a less
analytical perspective,
the Helen-rhetoric
analogy
helps explain why
rhetoric in its earliest
years
became the
object
of
celebration and
condemnation,
and
why
to this
day
it oscillates from
admiration to accusation. As
Aphrodite's protegee,
Helen
represents
the
unsurpassed beauty
Paris
preferred
over the offers of dominion
over Asia and
victory
in war. Paris' choice did not
surprise
Isocrates,
for whom
beauty
"aeuvcbxaxov Kai xuxicbxaxov Kai Gei?xaxov x v
?vxoov ?ax?v"
(Helen 54).
Similarly, Gorgias
is not
surprised by
Helen's
response
to Paris' handsome
figure:
"ei o?v x? xoi)
'A^ec^?v
?pou
a
jiaxi
x?
xf|? 'E?,8vr]? ?jijia f|a9?v 7ipo9i)u?av
Kai
?jiiAAav
?pcoxo? xf| \|A)%f| Ttap?ScoKe,
x?
Gauuuax?v;" (19).
But in the
eyes
of
Helen's accusers the issue is her deed and its evil
consequences,
not
her
person
or her
beauty?even they
would
grant
that she is real and
beautiful.
Hecuba,
for
example,
tells Menelaus at one
point
in
Euripides' Trojan
Women:
aiv?) ae, Mev??a',
ei
Kxeve?? ?ajiapxa af)v
?p?v
Se
xf|v8e, (pe?ye, ?if)
a'
'?kr\
k?B?u
aipe? y?p ?v?pt?v ?p.uax', ??aipe? tio?si?,
7C?jI7?pT|ai
8'
O?KOU?
'
C??'
6%6l KT|Xr|uaxa
?yd)
viv oi?a Kai ero
%oi TcercovGoxe?.
(890-894)
Clearly,
one's
regard
for Helen
depends
on what one chooses to
focus on. Her
reality,
her
appearance,
and her deed are all focal
points;
but each calls for
metaphysical,
aesthetical,
and ethical
considerations
respectively. Ideally,
of course, the
true,
the
beautiful,
and the
good ought
to coexist in the same
person.
In
actuality,
however,
they
are in conflict more often than not. That is
why beauty
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 15
(appearance), despite
its immense
appeal,
has
always
been
suspect
to
those who look
beyond
it
(reality). Gorgias
must have been aware of
this
conflict,
which he
attempts
to resolve
by saying
that "x?
p,?v
eivai
?(pav?? ji?| xd%?v
xo?
?oKe?v,
x? ?? SoKe?v
?aGev?? jxi) xux?v
xo? e?vai"
(DK B26).
By analogy, Gorgias'
Helen
suggests
that the
possibilities
and
limitations of an art are a function of its medium as
known,
manipulated,
and
applied by
the artist. In the case of the art of
discourse,
this means that what rhetoric can or cannot do
depends
on
1)
the rhetor's
knowledge
of the material he is
working
with, 2)
his
artistic
ability
to
shape
the material into an
appealing (persuasive)
form,
and
3)
his
disposition
to use it
properly.
This threefold
conceptualization suggests
that rhetoric can be
approached
three
different
ways
and evaluated on the basis of three
corresponding
criteria:
logically
(truth),
formally (beauty),
and
ethically (goodness).
Gorgias
seems to allude to this
tripartite approach
at the
beginning
of
his
speech: "Kogjio?
...
?,oyco
5?
?A,?|6eia, a?jxaxi
Se
KakXoq,
rcp?y|iaxi
??
?pexi)."
But because
truth,
beauty,
and
goodness
seldom
coincide in
rhetoric,
the
missing
element can
always
become the
grounds
for critical remarks. As
such,
it is not
surprising
that Plato at
tacked the teachers of rhetoric for
neglecting
the ethics of
persua
sion.44 Nor is it
surprising
that later
on Aristotle accused them of
disregarding
rhetorical
logic (enthymemes)
and
dealing
with the
"non-essentials" of the art
(o?
??
rcepi ji?v ?0DUT||iax(?v
ou??v
^?youaiv, ?rcep
?axi a
jxa xt|? maxeco?, nepi
?? x?>v
?^co
xo?
7ipay|iaxo?
x? 7t^e?oxa
7tpay|iaxe?ovxai)
(Rhetoric
A
1.3).
Gorgias'
response
to Plato's and Aristotle's criticism
might very
well be that
while
beauty may
not be worthier than
goodness
or
reason,
it is more
primordial
than either.
Further,
beauty
is not hostile to ethical or
rational
discourse;
in
fact,
it can aid their cause. But if
they
lack in
beauty, they
often
prove impotent. Finally,
the fact that
beauty may
be used to conceal unethical or irrational discourse does not constitute
an
argument against beauty.
In this
essay,
I have
argued
that
Gorgias'
Encomium to Helen
may
be read as a defense of rhetoric. This
reading
is consistent with and
supported by
both our
picture
of the Greek culture
during
the latter
part
of the fifth
century
B.C. and the
preserved
texts of the Helen.
44
Plato also attacked rhetoric
by denying
it the status of art
(ouk
?cm
x?^vn,
?Xk'
?p,rceipia
Kai
xpi?f]) Gorgias
463b.
16 RHETORICA
Further,
it is in line with our
sketchy portrait
of
Gorgias
as a
professional
rhetorician. Whether the Helen-rhetoric
analogy
even
crossed his mind
may
not be all that
important.
What is more
important
is that
by tending
to the
story
of Helen we can infer
Gorgias'
view of rhetoric.
Thus,
the contribution of the
reading
I have
proposed
is twofold:
first,
it
helps
us resolve some issues other
readings
have been unable to
address,
and
second,
it offers us a
glimpse
of the state of the art of discourse before it succumbed to the
forces of
systemization.