Gorgias' "Encomium to Helen" and the Defense of Rhetoric
Author(s): John Poulakos
Source: Rhetorica, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 1-16 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20135003 Accessed: 31/07/2009 13:30 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucal. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Rhetorica. http://www.jstor.org John Poulakos Gorgias7 Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric rom the time of Isocrates1 to the present, Gorgias' Encomium to Helen has puzzled, intrigued, or disappointed its readers. Of the many readings it has received, those by Croiset,2 van Hook,3 Untersteiner,4 Segal,5 Vers?nyi,6 Guthrie,7 Kennedy,8 and Rob 1 Although Isocrates praises Gorgias for having written of Helen, he faults him for not observing the distinction between encomium and the apologia: "(pr|G? (lev yap ?yKCouiov yeypacp?vai rcepi auTTJ?, xuyx?ve? ?' ?7ioA,oyia eipr|K(?? im?p xr?v ?Keivn 7C87cpay|X6vc?v. ?cra 8' ouk ?k tc?v ai)T?>v l?ec?v ou?? rcepi xcbv auxr?v ?pycov ? Xoyo?, ?Xk? rc?v TODvavxiov' ?rco^oye?aoai \i?v y?p TtpoofjKei rcepi x v ??iice?v aixiav 6%ovtc?v, ?Tcaive?v ?e to?? en' ?yaG?) tivi ?iacp?povxa?/' Helen 14-15. From what we know about Gorgias, it does not seem likely that he was unaware of the difference between the two genres. Thus, Isocrates' explanation that Gorgias "jcepi etaxOev" is difficult to accept. 2 A. Croiset characterizes the Encomium to Helen as "un des plus anciens et des plus curieux monuments de la prose grecque savante." See "Essai de restitution d' un passage de Y ?loge d' H?l?ne attribu? ? Gorgias" in Melanges Graux (1888), p. 128. 3 Larue van Hook calls it "an epideictic, or display, composition," and "a brilliant tour de force." Isocrates, vol. 3, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 54. 4 Mario Untersteiner states: "The defense of Helen ... represents in the structural framework of the myth the dramatic process of knowing." See The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 102. 5 Charles Segal regards it as "a mythological showpiece of rhetoric" and "an epideictic encomium." See "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 66 (1962), p. 100. 6 Laszlo Vers?nyi argues that "it is certainly not a serious work as far as its ostensible purpose is concerned." He also adds: "There is another aspect, however, under which this defense or eulogy is by no means a playful exercise: most of Helens Encomium deals with the nature and power of logos." See Socratic Humanism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 44. 7 W.K.C. Guthrie sees in it "a school exercise in rhetoric, sophistic in every sense." ? The International Society for The History of Rhetoric. Rhetorica, Vol. 1, No 2 (Autumn, 1983). 1 2 RHETORICA inson9 stand out as the most representative. But despite the positive contributions made by these and other authors, the reader of the Helen is still faced with at least two crucial questions. First, is this work an encomium or an apologia? If it is an encomium, how can we explain that so much of it is devoted to the defense of Helen? If, on the other hand, it is an apologia, why does its author call it an encomium? Second, how seriously are we to take this work? If it is a serious piece, what are we to make of Gorgias' disclosure that the speech is a trifle? If it is a trifle, does it deserve even a second thought? The above questions persist partly because the various interpreta tions of the Helen have resulted from readings too literal to provide satisfactory answers. While these interpretations are helpful to the literary historian or the classical philologist, they offer little or no insight to the student of rhetoric. By focusing on either the historical dimension or the formalistic aspects of the preserved texts,10 they leave out of account the most crucial rhetorical issue, the issue of purpose. Why did Gorgias write this work? What is the central question the Encomium to Helen is seeking to answer? What is the major challenge to which Gorgias is responding? Whom is he challenging in turn? To be sure, these question raise a host of issues the examination of which is beyond the scope of this essay; however, they are significant because, if permitted to guide our reading, they disallow yet another interpretation gravitating toward either histori cal or formalistic preferences. Assuming that an author's purpose is a function of the author himself and his cultural environment, both of He also says that "These declamations might be simply rhetorical exercises on mythical themes, designed to show how, with skill and effrontery, the most uncompromising case could be defended." See The Sophists, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 50 and 42 respectively. 8 George Kennedy states: "Gorgias' speech for Helen shows all the wildness of his jingling style, but it is also a masterful illustration of the apagogic method." Later, he adds: "It is playful in mood, but it also has a serious purpose in demonstrating a method of logical proof." See The Art of Persuasion in Greece, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 169 and 168 respectively. 9 John Robinson sees the Helen as "a display piece" and "an occasion for showing by example 'the incantatory power which by its witchery enchants, persuades, and changes the souls of men/ " See "On Gorgias" in Edward N. Lee et al. eds., Exegesis and Argument, (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 53. 10 For a discussion of the two best manuscripts of the Encomium to Helen, see Douglas MacDowell, "Gorgias, Alkidamas, and the Cripps and Palatine Manuscripts," Classical Quarterly, 55 (1961), pp. 113-124. Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 3 which are reflected in the text, the Helen must be approached both in historical and textual terms. In what follows, I will argue that an analogical reading of the Helen is warranted and can help us answer satisfactorily some of the above raised questions.11 Generally, speaking, the available interpretations of the Helen may be classed into two categories: the "model" and the "pretext." The first looks at the work as a model speech, the kind Gorgias' students were supposedly expected to memorize and recite. This view is apparently informed by Aristotle's testimony likening the practice t?v rcepi xo?? ?puraico?? ^oyou? uiaGapvouvxcov to that of Gorgias (On Sophistical Refutations 183b-184a). But Aristotle does not give us a complete account of Gorgias' instructional practices; nor does he say that memorization and recitation were the only methods Gorgias endorsed. 12 As such, Aristotle's remarks do not establish that the Helen was a model speech; they merely suggest a possibility. But even as a possibility, the "model" interpretation is difficult to accept. Assuming that the speech indeed ends the way the available texts indicate, the last clause (e?oi)A,T]0T)V ... Tia?yviov) means that one of Gorgias' "model" conclusions endorsed the use of the very unrhetori cal "?ji?v ?? 7ca?yviov" (21). But even the beginner rhetor knows, if only commonsensically, that one does not close a speech with a comment that might be interpreted by one's listeners as telling them "You've been had." Were it not, then, for the last clause, the "model" interpretation might have been more plausible. Some of the advo cates of this interpretation argue that the Helen shows by example the use of "a method of logical proofs and illustrates that "even something unbelievable is demonstrable when one has the skill."14 But the apagogic method of proof is as useful or as effective as the particular arguments used allow; and of the four arguments Gorgias employs, only one (Helen is not blameworthy for her actions because she was overcome by physical force) has merit; the rest are quite weak and unconvincing. Had Gorgias wanted to illustrate how to argue apagogically, he could have chosen stronger, more ingenious 11 Untersteiner holds the same view but for different reasons. See The Sophists (note 4 above), p. 123; also n. 106, p. 131. 12 For a discussion of the various instructional methods employed by the Sophists, see G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 28-34. 13 Kennedy, p. 169. 14 Vers?nyi, p. 47. 4 RHETORICA arguments;15 and had he wanted to demonstrate something unbeliev able, his claim would have been that Helen did not elope with Paris to Troy. The second category of interpretations regards the Helen as a "pretext" for Gorgias' real purpose. Vers?nyi, for example, points out that "There is no reason to suppose that Gorgias cared much whether Helen was vindicated or not, and Helen is obviously merely a pretext for his argument."16 Vers?nyi's point is well taken but it fails to establish why Gorgias needs a pretext to argue that logos "might have nothing to do with knowledge, intellect, reason, but move in an altogether different realm."17 The same can be said about alternative purposes suggested by other commentators supporting this view: if Gorgias wanted "to glorify his own art,"18 or discuss "certain general ideas that are deserving of attention,"19 or conduct "an epistemologi cal inquiry,"20 he could have done so without a pretext?just as he did in the nepi xoG UT| ovxo? f\ rcepi cpuaecoc. As will appear below, the reading I am proposing favors the "pretext" interpretation but offers a need for it. An analogical reading of the Helen is justified on both historical and textual grounds. First, the speech was written at a time21 during which mythological constructs were still an important part of the cultural consciousness of the Greeks. Mythical themes seem to have provided the poets, the playwrights, the Sophists, and the philoso phers with the fertile soil in which they could plant the seeds of their message;22 in turn, mythological examples must have made the works of the intelligentsia of that period more palpable to the general public. Second, Gorgias is well known for his affinity for metaphori cal expression and figurative language (DK A2). That Helen may have served as the personification of rhetoric is not unlikely if one ac 15 Consider, for example, Gorgias' use of the apagogic method in his Defense of Palamedes. 16 Vers?nyi, p. 44. 17 Ibid., p. 45. 18 Thomas Duncan, "Gorgias' Theories of Art," The Classical Journal, 33 (1938), p. 405. 19 Robinson, p. 53. 20 Untersteiner, p. 117. 2i Segal, p. 100. 22 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. I, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 374. Gorgias7 Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 5 cepts the evidence from Gnomologium Vaticanum according to which Gorgias alluded to a similar analogy between Penelope and philoso phy (DK B29);23 and his reported belief that ? ?naxf\caq ?ncaioxepo? xo? |xf) ?7caxf|aavxo? (DK B23)24 lends additional support to the Helen-rhetoric analogy?we normally do expect one's works to reflect one's beliefs. Gorgias' choice of Helen to personify rhetoric is particularly apt if one takes into account the common characteristics the two share: both are attractive, both are unfaithful, and both have a bad reputation. When Gorgias arrived in Athens, the general attitude toward rhetoric was ambivalent. On the one hand, rhetorical education was highly desirable; on the other, formal attacks against it were well under way?Aristophanes' The Banqueters was shown for the first time the same year Gorgias arrived. That rhetoric was made especial ly attractive during the Sophistic era is generally accepted. For his part, Gorgias is said to have held that rhetoric is the queen of all the arts and "?rc?oac x?? ?uvqiei? ai)M,a?ouaa ?cp' a?xf| exei" (Gorgias 456a). In response to this and other enticing claims, ambitious upper class youths aspiring to become political leaders of the future were flocking to rhetorical schools seeking to acquire the enabling skill of 81) ^?yeiv. Gradually, rhetorical ability was coming to be perceived both as a prerequisite to the practice of effective statesmanship and a means of acquiring power, fame, wealth, and intellectual wisdom. Just as Helen, ia?0eov K?Xkoq embodied, noXk? a?jiaxa auvfiyayev ?v?p v 87ci jieya?xn? ji?ya cppovo?xcov (4), rhetoric was now attract ing many men, all in anticipation of great accomplishments. The promises of the teachers of rhetoric, the attractiveness of the art of discourse, and the aspirations of the would be rhetors aside, what, in more descriptive terms, were the aims of rhetorical education? Gorgias' example suggests an affinity for ?uvajiiv (ppaGXiKT)v (DK A2) and an aversion to x? e ?,a xe Kai TtoX?aKi? eipr|U?va (DK A24). Rhetoric did not require exact knowledge of a recognized subject or inquiry into dated and much discussed issues; rather, it involved the development of the ability to speak according to the elastic criteria of kairos and to prepon.25 The observance of these criteria meant, among 23 Of course, both cpi?oaoipia and pT|xopiKf| are feminine nouns. 24 For an insightful discussion of Gorgias' notion of arc?rn see Thomas Rosen meyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylus, and Apate," American Journal of Philology, 76, (1955), pp. 225-260. 25 For a discussion of Kairos see W. S?ss, Ethos, Studien zur alteren griechischen 6 RHETORICA other things, that faithfulness to a fixed philosophical stand or loyalty to a permanent ideological position had to be, at best, a secondary concern. In the public domain, where uncertainty, contingency, and fluctuation reign supreme, supporting a position one day and attacking it the next was to be expected from a rhetor. But the unfaithfulness of rhetoric extended beyond ideology. In the eyes of people like Aristophanes, rhetorical education was not a form of social innovation but an instance of cultural iconoclasm threatening to uproot traditional institutions and values. By particularizing and subjectivizing the world, rhetoric was essentially weakening those bonding forces that hold a culture together, thereby leading to its utter disintegration. Just as Helen had betrayed her husband and her country, rhetoric was now betraying the founding traditions of the past. For their respective betrayals Helen and rhetoric had acquired a bad reputation. Apparently, Gorgias is interested in helping xf|v K(XK(?)? ?xko?oi) oav (2). But as Robinson has remarked, "Gorgias does not care in the least whether Helen is guilty or innocent."26 The same, however, cannot be said about Gorgias' attitude toward his techn?. Rhetoric was under fire from many groups: the aristocrats, whose privileged position in the State was being undermined by an upcoming generation of "logocrats;" the conservatives, who saw its destructive influence on the culture and its corrupting effects on the young; the oligarchically minded, who must have been dismayed to witness increased instances of democratization; the poor, who, like Socrates, could not afford "fifty drachmai lectures" (Cratylus 384b) or the higher fees for rhetorical instruction; the envious, who must have resented the Sophists' popularity;27 and finally Socrates, the champi on of dialectic. Faced with this state of affairs, Gorgias could have hardly remained indifferent?every time the reputation of one's art and profession are at stake, one naturally comes to their defense. Rhetorik, Leipzig 1910, p. 17 ff. For a discussion of to prepon see M. Pohlenz, Nachrichten der k?niglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, G?ttingen 1933, p. 53 ff; also Jaeger (note 22 above), p. 165 f? Untersteiner discusses both notions in The Sophists (note 4 above), pp. 195-199. 26 Robinson, p. 53. 27 At least for Nietzsche, Plato heads the list of the envious. On this matter, Samuel Ijsseling writes: "Nietzsche asks: 'How should one understand Plato's battle against rhetoric?' and he answers: 'He was envious of their influence.' (Werke, III, p. 337.)" See Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 107. Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 7 But if Gorgias wishes to defend rhetoric, why conceal his purpose? Why not entitle his work 'Yrc?p pT|TOpiKT|? ?rcoAoy?a and write a treatise in support of rhetoric? Once again, we must attempt a historical explanation. Gorgias must have been aware of the Athenian practices of intolerance; frequent banishments and condemnations, the burning of books in public, and excommunications by exile must have dictated that he approach his task indirectly.28 Artists have traditionally found that the use of allegory satisfies well the demands of indirection: and just as a comic playwright can mask his intention with frogs, wasps, or birds for artistic purposes, a rhetor may artfully29 avoid being explicit for political reasons.30 A delicate and potentially explosive issue must be handled carefully and cautiously. I submit that this is precisely why Gorgias entitles his work Encomium to Helen and calls it a Tcaiyviov. After all, what danger can there be in a work whose author finds diversion in praising a mythical figure? Gorgias' discourse must have seemed perfectly harmless and non-threatening to the forces of the establishment, which tend to take things literally, anyway. Thus, Gorgias' wish to defend rhetoric without antagonizing a powerful status quo, and thereby endangering himself, is fulfilled. Thus far, I have argued that there are historical grounds justify ing the claim that Gorgias wishes to defend rhetoric. To show that he indeed does so in the Helen, I will now turn to the text. For the purposes of analysis, the speech may be divided into two sections: the first, (6)-(7), is more argumentative while the second, (8)-(19), is more descriptive and explanatory in nature. Each section advances two arguments and is accordingly divided into two parts?(6) and (7) for the first and (8)-(14) and (15)-(19) for the second. Before discussing each, a few words about Gorgias' statement of purpose are in order. Early in the speech, Gorgias announces that he wants xi|V [lev Kaic?)? (XKOUouaav rca?aai xf|? aixia?, xo?? 8? |i?|i(po|i?voi)? ... jca?aai xf|? ?jiaGia? (2). Of the two things he wants to accomplish, 28 On this point, E.R. Dodds observes that "the evidence we have is more than enough to prove that the Great Age of Greek Enlightenment was also, like our own time, an Age of Persecution?banishment of scholars, bunkering of thought, and even (if we can believe the tradition about Protagoras) burning of books." The Greeks and the Irrational, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp. 189-190. 29 Gorgias' phrase "x?^vn ypcKpei?, ouk ?XnOeict Xex^&K' (13) mav be helpful here. 30 Regarding the sophistical practice of concealing one's work "to escape malice," see Protagoras 316c-317c. 8 RHETORICA the second is more complicated because it involves 1) exposing xo?? |i6|X(po|i8VOU? as \|/6U?O|X6VOD? and 2) putting forth the truth (?ei?a? x?Xr|06?). Read in conjunction with his concluding remarks, Gorgias' statement of purpose becomes more sharply focused: at issue are the injustice of blame (ji(b(iOD ??iK?a) and the ignorance of opinion (8o?r|? ?jxaoia) (21). The two issues seem to be casually linked: the latter has caused the former. Because the accusers hold uninformed opinions, they blame unjustly; that is, their accusations lack a factual basis. Explaining the truth of the matter, which Gorgias promises to do, will hopefully have one of two positive results: it may inform xo?? |i8|X(po|x?voD? thereby keeping them from making unfounded allegations, or, what is more realistic, it may inoculate the public thereby keeping them from believing the accusers. In either case, the present injustice will be arrested. However, as Gorgias points out, the story of Helen (her beauty, her origins, her actions, etc.) is well known to most people (oi)K a8r\kov oi)?? ?AAyo??) (3). Reference to their familiarity with some of the factual aspects of the story is also made in (4), where Gorgias promises to refrain from X?yeiv xoi? eiS?cuv a ?aaai. This means that his notion of x<xXr)9?? in the context of the speech cannot be about what is essentially common knowledge. Nor can x??T|0?? be equated with praising Helen, or arguing that she is innocent of the charges against her?just as arguing the opposite is not necessarily a matter of lying. What, then, are Helen's accusers lying about? Gorgias does not say. Nor does he make any statements revealing the truth of the matter. Thus, when reading his concluding remark, ?v?jieiva xcp v?jLicp ?v 808UT|v 8V ?p%f| xo? X?jox) (21), one is struck with his inconsistency; he neither proves xo?? |i8jii(pojLi8VOU? \|/ei)8o|i8VOi)? nor shows xaXr)9??;31 he merely cites four reasons why Helen is not guilty. As I will show below, this seeming anomaly disappears if the text is read analogically, as a defense of rhetoric. Gorgias' argument in (6) unfolds on two levels. His reference to the gods raises the issue of origins and makes a case for the need to examine that which is prior to or stronger than Helen. Thus, he may be taken to be saying that rhetoric is not blameworthy because it is something that comes from the gods. They are the ones who, in their superior wisdom (Ge?? 8' ?v6pd)7COU Kpe?aaov ... aocp?q), decided to 31 Kerferd makes the same point and adds that "This has led to the suggestion that for Gorgias the sole way in which persuasion operates upon opinion is by deception." p. 80. Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 9 give man this gift, presumably to help him facilitate his communal life. This view is in line with the poetic tradition, the Platonic version of Protagoras' mythical account of the rise of human civilization (Protagoras 320c ff), and Isocrates' later eulogy of logos (Nicocles 5-9). On the second level, Gorgias argues that responsibility for what Helen did must be placed not on Helen but on those who used her. Helen is not guilty because she was literally used by the gods as an instrument for their purposes (Helen herself argues this point in the Trojan Women 919-950). Similarly, responsibility for what rhetoric does must be placed not on the art itself but on those who use it, its practitioners. By not challenging Helen's actions or their contemptibi lity, Gorgias acknowledges implicitly that, when misused, rhetoric often yields results that are indeed reprehensible. However, he insists that in such cases ?i;ioc aixi?aGai ? aixi?)|ievo?. On both levels of the argument the conclusion is that rhetoric is not reproachable. Viewed historically, this argument (preserved in Plato's Gorgias 457a-c, Isocrates' Nicocles 1-9, and Aristotle's Rhetoric 1355b 1-5) is significant because it marks the ending of the poeticoreligious and the beginning of the rationalistic tradition in Greece. As Hegel has observed, the Sophists were among the first to challenge the value of strict adherence to a set of moral principles designed to legislate and guide individual behavior.32 Accordingly, they argued that even religious laws are not to be obeyed unquestionably but to be subjected to critical scrutiny. In effect, the Sophists urged that the individual create his own religion. The dangers of this doctrine of religious relativism notwithstanding, one of its positive notes was the conscious effort to transfer responsibility for one's actions from the abstractly religious to the concretely personal level. If accurate, this account stands in fundamental opposition to all four variations of Gorgias' central argument, i.e., Helen did not act of her own free will. An overly religious attitude, one which sees all events in the human sphere as figured in or caused by an all-encompassing divine plan which human will cannot frustrate, would have to forgive Helen. But the spirit of the early rationalism of the late fifth century seems less prepared to accept the argument that human misdeeds are the result of divine orders. Hecuba, for example, rejects Helen's argument (I was used by the gods) and assigns all responsibility to her (Trojan 32 For a more extensive treatment of this point, see G.E Hegel, Lectures in the History of Philosophy, vol. IV, trans. E.S. Haldane (New York: The Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 357-358. 10 RHETORICA Women 969-1032). If we regard Gorgias as a major exponent of the So phistic movement, and if we accept his reputed attitude "|Lif| x? et?o? ?Xk? xf|v ?o?av eiai noXkoiq yv?puiov xr)? yuvauc?c" (DK B22), we would have to conclude that he, too, contrary to his stand in the Helen, would have condemned her. Clearly, this opposition between the historical and the textual accounts lends support to the view that Gorgias, although talking about Helen, is really referring to rhetoric. Further support for this view is provided as we turn to yet another historical note. As the older tradition was yielding to the newer, a profound change in the form, the sources, and the carriers of the word was taking place. Obscure prophetic riddles were being replaced by persuasive arguments,33 the temples by the agora, and the poets and rhapsodes by the rhetors. Unlike anonymous oracular sayings, speech, although not entirely stripped of its magical powers, was now becoming tied to rational human agents, fully responsible and accountable for their utterances and their consequences. In this vein, it is instructive to recall that after the Sicilian expedition the Athenians turned against the rhetors who had persuaded them to undertake what turned out to be a disastrous adventure. Thus, when Gorgias argues that Helen should not be held accountable he is confronting the accusers of rhetoric with two responses (one for each of the aforementioned traditions): to the poetically and religiously inclined he says that rhetoric is a gift of divine origin; to the new wave of rationalists that their blame is misplaced?it is not the art but its misusers that must be censured. In the following argument, Gorgias points out that just as Helen could not have defended herself against her abductor's force, rhetoric next to physical violence is helpless. In so doing, he singles out for blame the abusers of rhetoric who, by violating her, act illegally (?vojico?) and unjustly (?S?KC??). This section has strong overtones of a political critique designed to expose the use of ?ia by the State. Influential rhetors have always been a class to be reckoned with by 33 The following excerpt from Euripides' Helen illustrates the point (the messen ger is speaking to Menelaus) 753-757: xi ?f|xa navxeD?ueOa; xo?? Geo?ai %p?| O?ovxa? aixe?v ?yaG?, ?xavxeiac ?' ??v' ?iou y?p ?Xki?q ???eap rj?p?Ori xo?e, icouSei? ?7c?,ooxr|G' ?u7c6poiaiv ?py?? ?)v* yvaixT] ?' ?piaxT) uavxi? f\ %' eu?ooXia. Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 11 those in power. As Thrasymachus' fragment of The Constitution illustrates, rhetors are formidable challengers of the ill-advised poli cies and corrupt practices of the ruling class.34 History has shown that the more tolerant rulers respond to rhetorical attacks by issuing explanations or counterattacks. But should their rhetoric fail and the challenge persist, they become less tolerant and resort to various forms of force in order to silence the voices of opposition. When this happens, rhetoric suffers, justice becomes the justice of the stronger, and the unwritten law dictating that communal differences be settled through discourse is violated. Branding outspoken political oppo nents "the enemies of the State," arresting them illegally, and exiling them are all examples of what Gorgias would call ?ap?apa 67U%ei prpaxa Kai X?yco Kai v?|icp Kai epyco. But no example better illustrates the point than the measure of the Thirty Tyrants that outlawed rhetorical instruction altogether (Xenophon's Memorabilia I, 2.31).35 Unlike rhetoric, which for Gorgias "rc?vxa y?p ?)(p' a?xf| 8o?A,a ?Y 6K?VXC0V, ?Xk' ou ?i? ?iac rcoio?xo" (Philebus 58a), bia is not interested in securing people's agreement to what is being pro posed;36 rather, it ignores the laws, eliminates dissent, and imposes its violent will. Thus far, Gorgias has argued that the bad reputation of rhetoric is due to her accusers' failure to distinguish between the art herself and her misusers and abusers. Following the same argumentative strate gy, he next attempts yet another shift in the direction of blame: it must be directed against logos (? ji?v o?)V rce?aac (b? ?vayKaaa? ??iKe?) and away from rhetoric (?) ?? cb? ?vayKaoOe?aa xco ?oyco |i?xr|v (XKO?ei KaK(??) (12). This argument, however, is overshad 34 DK 85 Bl. 35 Regarding this measure, Stanley Wilcox has remarked: "Of course Xenophon explains the law as resulting from Critias' personal grudge against Socrates, but the oligarchical rulers of Athens needed no such general law to cloak their hatred of an in dividual. Rather, they shrewdly discerned that trained speakers meant men capable of arousing the people, an aroused people meant a revival of a democratic party, and a democratic party organized and united by effective speakers might mean the end of their oligarchical power. Recognizing that oratory is the life-blood of democracy, they shut off the flow at the source, the schools of rhetoric/' 'The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction/' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 53 (1942), p. 155. 36 In the Palamedes, Gorgias stresses that the other's consent is an essential prerequisite to persuasion. This can be inferred from the defendant's argument that he could not have persuaded the barbarians because they would not have wanted to be persuaded (ofcxe y?p ?Keivoi 7CEia9r)vai ?ouXoivx' ?v) (14). 12 RHETORICA owed as Gorgias turns to an analytical discussion of the nature of logos and its effects on the human psyche.37 Along with this discussion, he offers a rather technical account of the various processes and components that make up the complex phenomenon of rhetorical peitho (i.e., doxa, terpsis, pistis, apate). In this section, (8)-(14), Gorgias gives an "official" version of what rhetoric is, "a kind of formal profession of the aims and methods of his art, a kind of advertisement like the 87i?yyeA|ia of Protagoras."38 By giving what he must have regarded as a correct account of the basic parts of the rhetorical act (rhetor, logos, listeners) and their interaction, Gorgias does his duty (kz^ox xe x? S?ov ?p0?)?) (2) as a professional rhetorician and fulfills his initial promise to show xa?r)0??. And although he does not, strictly speaking, prove the accusers of rhetoric liars, he renders their familiar claims (rhetoric is a method of winning false arguments and supporting unjust causes, it teaches how to turn the old into the new and vice versa, it disregards the truth and concentrates on probability, etc.) at least questionable. Gorgias' analysis continues in the next section, (15)-(19), where the discussion focuses on the affective power of the iconic and formal aspects of visual perception (odxco? encova? xa>v ?poji?vcov Tcpay jx?xcov ?| o\|/i? 6v?ypa\|/6V ?v xa) (ppov?)|iaxi) (17). Having explained that the plastic arts create naturally epcoxa Kai 7t?0ov (18), he argues that Helen was unable to defend against what she felt when she saw Alexander's body. The merit of this argument aside, Gorgias has completed his discussion by pointing out that persuasion is a matter of both sound and sight. As Segal has remarked, "It is Gorgias' achievement to have perceived and formulated as a techne that the formal structure of the logos (in qualities such as metron) evokes emotional forces, and to have generalized this formulation (at least in terms of the effects, if not of formal analysis) to include both the linguistic and the visual arts."39 Assuming that rhetorical discourse is purposeful, that it consti tutes a response to a challenge and is itself a challenge inviting responses, I have attempted to show that from an analogical point of view the central issue in the Encomium to Helen is the tarnished 37 The most comprehensive treatment of this discussion, as well as that of the (15)-(19) section, is provided by Segal (note 5 above). Segal's treatment is so thorough that it makes any original observations very difficult. 38 Ibid., p. 102. 39 Ibid., p. 133. Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 13 reputation (?UGK?eia) of rhetoric. Gorgias indicates that this dyskleia has been caused by amathia and is an example of adikia. Consistent with his surface argument (Helen's accusers must examine the possible causes of her action before assigning blame), he attacks the cause of the problem, not its effects. Thus, his defense takes the form of an educational mission. First, Gorgias asks his audience to consider the divine origin and human practice of rhetoric, and to accept that some people use it improperly. Second, he invites a comparison of rhetoric and bia as two ways of settling human differences.40 Third, he discusses logos as the rhetorical medium whose nature admits of artistic manipulation by the learned rhetor. Because logos in its various manifestations (prose, poetry, incantation) affects people psychologically, and because people's actions are determined to a large extent psychologically, the study of rhetoric is the study of the linguistic influence of human action. In connection with his third point, Gorgias' fourth line of defense is an allusion to people's susceptibility to the contents of their visual perceptions. Like sound, sights can affect people's thoughts and actions profoundly. In this sense, rhetoric includes the study of creating persuasive images. Gorgias' defense of rhetoric shifts the focus of the issue as defined by the enemies of rhetoric. Essentially, he does not want to play their game. And although he would have refused to accept that rhetoric is bad, he does not attempt to refute their charges and establish that she is good?in this regard, Isocrates is right: he does not praise in the spirit of an encomium.41 But it does not appear that Gorgias is interested in praising rhetoric?at least not explicitly;42 rather, he wants to inform a misinformed public by setting the record straight. In so doing, he lifts the issue of rhetoric out of the sphere of ethics and places it in that of theory.43 The accusers of rhetoric are saying that rhetoric is bad because they know that some people are using eloquence for evil purposes successfully. But have they sought to 40 Gorgias alludes to the same distinction in the Palamedes when he has the defendant ask: "Tteiaa? f\ ?iaaajievoc;" (14). 41 See note 1 above. 42 Yet, he seems to hint that rhetoric is praiseworthy when he implies that the ?fiapx?a of the accusers of rhetoric falls into the category of p.?|i(p6a9ai x? ?Tcaivex? (1). 43 As Segal has pointed out, Gorgias' comments are "not to be construed as a sign of a systematic metaphysics." Rather, they must be seen as "relevant to a theory of communication and persuasion." p. 102. 14 RHETORICA discover what is prior to the effects they disapprove of? Gorgias seems to think that they have not?just as they have not thought about the causes of Helen's actions. For Gorgias, the debate whether rhetoric is good or bad is beside the point; and the point, at least in the Helen, is the nature of rhetoric: What is it? What can it do? How does it do what it claims it can do? What must a rhetor know in order to be effective? Having answered these questions (some more com pletely than others), Gorgias seems to conclude that blaming the art (rhetoric), its medium (logos), or people's psychological responses to linguistic creations is as absurd as blaming medicine, drugs, or people's physiological reactions to medicinal treatment. Gorgias, then, defends rhetoric not by demonstrating its goodness or discuss ing its technological aspects but by defining it, clarifying its func tions, and explaining its workings. From a less analytical perspective, the Helen-rhetoric analogy helps explain why rhetoric in its earliest years became the object of celebration and condemnation, and why to this day it oscillates from admiration to accusation. As Aphrodite's protegee, Helen represents the unsurpassed beauty Paris preferred over the offers of dominion over Asia and victory in war. Paris' choice did not surprise Isocrates, for whom beauty "aeuvcbxaxov Kai xuxicbxaxov Kai Gei?xaxov x v ?vxoov ?ax?v" (Helen 54). Similarly, Gorgias is not surprised by Helen's response to Paris' handsome figure: "ei o?v x? xoi) 'A^ec^?v ?pou a jiaxi x? xf|? 'E?,8vr]? ?jijia f|a9?v 7ipo9i)u?av Kai ?jiiAAav ?pcoxo? xf| \|A)%f| Ttap?ScoKe, x? Gauuuax?v;" (19). But in the eyes of Helen's accusers the issue is her deed and its evil consequences, not her person or her beauty?even they would grant that she is real and beautiful. Hecuba, for example, tells Menelaus at one point in Euripides' Trojan Women: aiv?) ae, Mev??a', ei Kxeve?? ?ajiapxa af)v ?p?v Se xf|v8e, (pe?ye, ?if) a' '?kr\ k?B?u aipe? y?p ?v?pt?v ?p.uax', ??aipe? tio?si?, 7C?jI7?pT|ai 8' O?KOU? ' C??' 6%6l KT|Xr|uaxa ?yd) viv oi?a Kai ero %oi TcercovGoxe?. (890-894) Clearly, one's regard for Helen depends on what one chooses to focus on. Her reality, her appearance, and her deed are all focal points; but each calls for metaphysical, aesthetical, and ethical considerations respectively. Ideally, of course, the true, the beautiful, and the good ought to coexist in the same person. In actuality, however, they are in conflict more often than not. That is why beauty Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric 15 (appearance), despite its immense appeal, has always been suspect to those who look beyond it (reality). Gorgias must have been aware of this conflict, which he attempts to resolve by saying that "x? p,?v eivai ?(pav?? ji?| xd%?v xo? ?oKe?v, x? ?? SoKe?v ?aGev?? jxi) xux?v xo? e?vai" (DK B26). By analogy, Gorgias' Helen suggests that the possibilities and limitations of an art are a function of its medium as known, manipulated, and applied by the artist. In the case of the art of discourse, this means that what rhetoric can or cannot do depends on 1) the rhetor's knowledge of the material he is working with, 2) his artistic ability to shape the material into an appealing (persuasive) form, and 3) his disposition to use it properly. This threefold conceptualization suggests that rhetoric can be approached three different ways and evaluated on the basis of three corresponding criteria: logically (truth), formally (beauty), and ethically (goodness). Gorgias seems to allude to this tripartite approach at the beginning of his speech: "Kogjio? ... ?,oyco 5? ?A,?|6eia, a?jxaxi Se KakXoq, rcp?y|iaxi ?? ?pexi)." But because truth, beauty, and goodness seldom coincide in rhetoric, the missing element can always become the grounds for critical remarks. As such, it is not surprising that Plato at tacked the teachers of rhetoric for neglecting the ethics of persua sion.44 Nor is it surprising that later on Aristotle accused them of disregarding rhetorical logic (enthymemes) and dealing with the "non-essentials" of the art (o? ?? rcepi ji?v ?0DUT||iax(?v ou??v ^?youaiv, ?rcep ?axi a jxa xt|? maxeco?, nepi ?? x?>v ?^co xo? 7ipay|iaxo? x? 7t^e?oxa 7tpay|iaxe?ovxai) (Rhetoric A 1.3). Gorgias' response to Plato's and Aristotle's criticism might very well be that while beauty may not be worthier than goodness or reason, it is more primordial than either. Further, beauty is not hostile to ethical or rational discourse; in fact, it can aid their cause. But if they lack in beauty, they often prove impotent. Finally, the fact that beauty may be used to conceal unethical or irrational discourse does not constitute an argument against beauty. In this essay, I have argued that Gorgias' Encomium to Helen may be read as a defense of rhetoric. This reading is consistent with and supported by both our picture of the Greek culture during the latter part of the fifth century B.C. and the preserved texts of the Helen. 44 Plato also attacked rhetoric by denying it the status of art (ouk ?cm x?^vn, ?Xk' ?p,rceipia Kai xpi?f]) Gorgias 463b. 16 RHETORICA Further, it is in line with our sketchy portrait of Gorgias as a professional rhetorician. Whether the Helen-rhetoric analogy even crossed his mind may not be all that important. What is more important is that by tending to the story of Helen we can infer Gorgias' view of rhetoric. Thus, the contribution of the reading I have proposed is twofold: first, it helps us resolve some issues other readings have been unable to address, and second, it offers us a glimpse of the state of the art of discourse before it succumbed to the forces of systemization.