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Hegel's Concept of Freedom

G. H. R. Parkinson

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures / Volume 5 / March 1971, pp 174 - 195

DOI: 10.1017/S008044360000145X, Published online: 08 January 2010

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 12
HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF
FREEDOM

G. H. R. Parkinson

T H E concept of freedom is one which Hegel thought of very great

importance; indeed, he believed that it is the central concept in
human history. 'Mind is free', he wrote, 'and to actualise this, its
essence - to achieve this excellence - is the endeavour of the world-
mind in world-history' (VG, p. 73). : Those who already have an
interest in Hegel will doubtless be interested in his views on a topic
which he thought so important; on the other hand, the many
philosophers who are either indifferent to or hostile to Hegel may
point out that it does not follow that, because the subject of freedom
interested Hegel, his views about this subject are of general interest.
It will be the aim of this paper to show that they are of general
interest; in the meantime, it may be recalled that Isaiah Berlin has
argued {Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, 1969, p. 144) that Hegel's
1
Abbreviations:
A =Asthetik, ed. Bassenges (Frankfurt am Main, n.d.)
TL*=Encyclopadie der philosophise/ten Wissenschaften, ed. Lasson, 4th ed. (Leipzig,
I93O).
GPE = Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophic: Vol. I, Einleitung, ed. Hoff-
meister (Leipzig, 1940).
FG=PhdnomenologiedesGeistes, ed.Hoffmeister,6thed. (Hamburg, 1952).
Phil. Rel. = Vorlesungen uber die Philosophic der Religion, ed. Lasson (Leipzig, 1925-7).
W. = Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts, ed. Hoffmeister, 4th ed. (Hamburg,
1955). References to the Zusaze are to the 3rd ed. of Lasson (Leipzig, 1930).
V G = J D I V Vemunft in der Geschichte (vol. 1 of Vorlesungen uber die Philosophic der Ges-
chichte),ed.Hoffineister, 5thed. (Hamburg, 1955).
WL = WissenschqftderLogik, ed. Lasson (Leipzig, 1923).
To secure consistency in the rendering of Hegel's technical terms, I have made
my own translations. I have profited greatly from previous translations, notably
W. Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, 1894), and T. M. Knox, Hegel's
Philosophy of Right (Oxford, 1952).
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 175
concept of freedom is one of a type, called by him the concept of
positive freedom, which is 'at the heart of many of the nationalist,
communist, authoritarian and totalitarian creeds of our day'. It
will surely be worth while to see to what extent this is true of Hegel,
and to what extent Hegel's views about freedom are true.
As Hegel's philosophy is notoriously obscure, some time must be
spent in trying to make clear just what his views about freedom were.
But before this is attempted, mention must be made of a difficulty
which faces the expositor of Hegel's views on any topic. It is a diffi-
culty which springs from his views about the nature of philosophy,
and indeed about the nature of thought in general. 'The true',
Hegel said, 'is the whole' (PG, p. 21; cf. PG, pp. 12, 23); we cannot,
he claims, grasp the truth about anything until our knowledge is
such that it takes in everything - and 'taking in everything' implies
knowledge of a metaphysical type, involving such concepts as those
of a self-thinking idea, or absolute mind (cf. E. pars. 574, 577).
It would seem, then, that anyone who is to understand what Hegel
thinks about any topic must grasp the Hegelian system as a whole.
This is clearly too big a task for a single paper; however, this does
not mean that a discussion which does not try to take in the whole
is quite without value. Hegel's metaphysical doctrines are not a set
of supposedly self-evident truths which can be grasped in isolation,
and from which consequences can then be deduced. Rather, Hegel
would say that we are to reach these doctrines through a knowledge
of the parts, a knowledge whose inadequacy forces itself on us, and
makes us seek to remedy this by finding views which are more com-
plete and more coherent. One need not hesitate, then, to approach
Hegel through a particular topic. It will be found, however, that
in the case of the concept of freedom the path branches out in many
directions, and that some of these lead into metaphysical territory.
In other words, Hegel's views on freedom cannot be wholly separated
from his metaphysics1 - which is not to say that these views are wholly
without interest to anyone who does not accept that metaphysics.
Hegel's concept of freedom can perhaps best be regarded as the
answer to a problem - the problem of how a man can be free in a
universe which is governed by necessary laws. This problem was
generated for Hegel by one of his basic metaphysical ideas, the idea
that the universe is to be regarded as mind, and its processes as
following the laws of logic - laws which, though not those of formal
logic, are still necessary laws. The philosopher who does not accept
1
More specifically, it will be necessary to talk about the dialectic when the
structure of the Philosophy of Right is discussed; later, reference will be made to
Hegel's views about the self-estrangement of mind, and about the world-mind.
176 G. H. R. Parkinson
Hegel's metaphysics may be tempted to say that he can safely leave
Hegel and the Hegelians to struggle with difficulties which are
peculiarly their own. However, the matter cannot be settled as
simply as that, for the problem met Hegel (as it has met many others)
in forms which are not metaphysical. These forms of the problem
are very familiar, and need only a brief description. One such form
is generated by a view about the natural sciences, which may be
called the thesis of physical determinism. Sciences such as physics and
chemistry, it is pointed out, claim to explain events in terms of
causal laws; that is, they explain them as the effects of causes. It is
then argued that such explanations can in principle be given of any
event- or at any rate (bearing in mind the theories of quantum
physics) of any macroscopic event. Human actions, it is argued,
are such events. But an effect follows from its cause with necessity,
which implies that every human action is necessitated, i.e. that no
such action is free. Another form of the problem springs from a view
about history, which may be called the thesis of historical determin-
ism. The historical determinist takes a less detailed, a less minute
view of human acts than the physical determinist; the film in his
camera, one might say, is less fine-grained. The historical determinist
does not assert that every human act is determined; as far as he is
concerned, this may or may not be true. What interest him are those
sections of human activity that concern the historian - the great
events, the major social changes. These, he claims, are caused, and
indeed necessitated; they are the effects of vast impersonal forces, in
the face of which the individual is powerless. Some have claimed
the status of a science for such theories; others have said that these
theories, so far from being scientific, are non-empirical. Those who
take the latter view might dispute the statement that the problem of
freedom posed by historical determinism is a non-metaphysical form
of the problem. The issue, however, seems merely to be one of
definition. If'metaphysical' is taken as a synonym for 'non-empirical'
it follows that if historical determinism is non-empirical, it is also
metaphysical. On the other hand, to accept determinism of this
kind is not necessarily to accept one of the classical metaphysical
theories, such as monism or idealism, though it is compatible with
the acceptance of such a theory. This is what was in mind when it
was said earlier that this form of the problem of freedom is not a
metaphysical form.
In sum, the problems just mentioned are problems that meet
people who do not accept Hegel's metaphysics, understanding by
this his thesis that the universe is essentially mind, and that its
processes are governed by the laws of a non-formal logic. The point
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 177
is that Hegel saw these problems, and tried to meet them. He dis-
cusses the problem raised by the natural sciences when he considers
teleology in The Science of Logic (WL, n pp. 383-90). Here he deals
with the question whether it is possible to give, in physical or chem-
ical terms, an adequate account of a human being as someone who
has aims, who strives for ends. As to historical determinism, the
two best-known forms of this are the theories of history put forward
by Hegel himself and by Marx, who claimed to be standing Hegel
on his head, or rather turning him the right way up. In Hegel, the
theory takes the form of the assertion that the chief agents in
history are not individuals, but this or that 'mind of a people'
(Volksgeist).1 In the face of the Volksgeist, which (VG, p. 59) con-
stitutes the laws, customs and religion of a people, the individual is
powerless, and indeed seems to have no existence in his own right.
Individuals, says Hegel (VG, p. 60), 'vanish in the face of the
universally substantial' (sc. the Volksgeist) 'and the latter fashions
for itself its own individuals, which it needs for its end. But the
individuals do not prevent from happening that which must happen'.
It now has to be asked, in the light of all this, what Hegel thinks
about human freedom. His reply to the thesis of physical deter-
minism need not be discussed at length, since it merely pushes the
problem into another region. It will be recalled that Hegel discusses
this thesis in the light of the question whether explanation in terms
of ends can be reduced to explanation in mechanical terms. In his
answer, Hegel does not deny that mechanical explanations can in
principle be given of all human acts. He does, however, deny that
this is the whole story. Human acts, he seems to say, are to be
explained both in mechanical terms and in terms of ends, but he
adds that the latter type of explanation is more complete and more
coherent.2 It is not necessary to inquire what Hegel means by this,

1
It is well known that 'Volk' and 'Geist' are terms which do not have a single
equivalent in English. 'Geist' is often translated as 'spirit', and the theological
overtones of this term are sometimes appropriate. (E.g. VG, p. 58: the old religions
call God 'Geist'), But when Hegel discusses the 'Philosophic des Geistes', he is for
much of the time concerned with what would be called 'the philosophy of mind'.
As to 'Volk', this is usually rendered as 'nation' by Wallace and Knox in their
translations. But Hegel also uses the term 'die Nation' (e.g. PR, par. 181; E, par.
549, Lasson ed. p. 459; VG, p. 64), and it seems appropriate that this should have
a separate English equivalent. It must be allowed, however, that Hegel regards
the terms 'Volk' and 'Nation' as closely related. Thus he says (VG, p. 64), 'Die
VSUter... sind Nationen'.
1
This seems to be the force of his assertion (WL, n p. 390) that the end {Zteeck)
a the 'truth' of both mechanism and chemism (i.e. explanation in chemical terms),
but that mechanical causality (which here includes chemism also) still appears
in the end relation, though as subordinate to it and 'sublated' (aufgehoben).
G2 R.A.R.
178 G. H. R. Parkinson
or with what justice he says it. It is clear that, even if one grants
what Hegel asserts, the historical determinist is still not answered.
For he will say that the ends of human actions (or at any rate, some
of the ends) are determined, determined by factors of a non-
mechanical kind. It is necessary, therefore, to pass on to Hegel's
account of human freedom in its relation to historical determinism.1
The works that are most relevant here are the Philosophy of Right
and Part III ('The Philosophy of Mind') of the Encyclopaedia, two
works whose interconnections are noted by Hegel himself.2 At this
stage it is necessary to say something about Hegel's method of
argument, his dialectic, as it is displayed in the Philosophy of Right,
because it may seem that this work is arranged in a remarkably
perverse way. The book begins with an account of what Hegel calls
'abstract right', and it ends with a discussion of family, civil society
and the state. The upshot of this is that Hegel talks about rights
between individuals, such as rights relating to property and to
contract (pars. 41 ff.), long before he considers civil society and the
state. But there can surely be no such rights without a state, or at
any rate a society of some kind. Again, he discusses crime and punish-
ment (pars 90 ff.) before he discusses the state, and in particular the
administration of justice (pars. 209 ff.).3 There may seem to be a
case, if not for standing Hegel on his head, at least for turning him
the right way round. In fact, however, Hegel's line of argument
is perfectly logical. His concern in the Philosophy of Right as a whole
is to expound the nature of Recht, of right or law; this involves him
in a discussion of the adequacy of views which are other than his
own, since he believes that he will reach a correct view only through
a consideration of incorrect views. This being so, he would say that
of course rights of property and contract do not exist in a social
vacuum. He is concerned, however, with certain views; for example,
the view that the concept of right or law can be grasped by abstract
reasoning, and does not spring out of social life. It is Hegel's thesis
that such a view breaks down, and he tries to show how it can be
replaced by other and better views. It must be stressed, however,
that the views which he criticises are not, according to him, merely
1
It should be added that Hegel's account of mechanism and chemism contains
a hint of his solution of this further problem, in that he says that teleology involves
self-determination [Selbstbestimmung), which is wholly removed from the external
determination of mechanism (WL, 11 p. 387; cf. E, par. 203).
2
Each work refers to the other for supplementation: see PR, par. 4 and E, par.
487.
3
For arguments of this type, see G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, and
ed. (London, 1948) p. 530; G. Lasson, Introduction to his edition of the Philosophy
of Right, pp. xlii ff.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 179
wrong views; they contain elements of the truth. Consequently, the
earlier parts of the Philosophy of Right may be said to expound the
logical presuppositions of what follows, in the sense that they des-
cribe concepts which are components (or, as Hegel prefers to say,
'moments' or aspects) of the complete and adequate concept of
right.1
After this excursus on Hegel's method, it is now possible to
approach his views on freedom. The problems that arise here are
often referred to as some of the problems that concern 'free will'.
Hegel has much to say about the will, and this requires careful
examination. The first point to be made is that there is a sense in
which Hegel has no theory of the will. Many philosophers who have
theorised about the will have spoken as if it were some kind of
intermediary between thought and action; they tend to regard
thinking as theorising, and believe that for thought to be translated
into action there must be some kind of inner thrust or drive which
thought can activate. The confusions present in this view have been
thoroughly explored by modern philosophers; here it need only be
noted that this view is not Hegel's. For him, will is 'practical mind
in general' (PR, par. 4); it is wrong, he says, to regard thinking as
one special faculty, distinct from will as another. 2 To talk about will,
then, is to talk about the reason as practical; in other words, to
talk of willed action is to talk of planned action. This is probably
1
Hegel is careful to say (PR, par. 32, and Zusatz 19) that his order of present-
ation is logical and not temporal. He points out that the concept of the family
presupposes a number of concepts dealt with earlier in the Philosophy of Right,
e.g. that of property, but he says that it is not the case that private property came
first in time, followed by the family. However, his way of making this point is
confused, and appears to be mistaken. He seems to suggest (end of PR, par. 3a;
cf. Knox translation, p. 318) that in certain societies there could be families, but no
private property. But it is hard to see how there could be such families, if private
property is a necessary condition of the family. Hegel might reply that these are
not genuine families, just as he says that there are certain institutions, commonly
called 'states', which are by his definition imperfect states ('urwollkommenen Staaten';
PR, Zus. 154 to par. 260). But this concedes the point, namely that there can,
strictly speaking, be no family before there is private property. If Hegel is to
distinguish between a temporal and a logical order, he will have to say that although
the concept of private property is logically prior to that of the family, the family
and private property are simultaneous as institutions. Only when that organisation
which consists of parents and children has property of its own is it possible to speak
of a 'family' in Hegel's sense.
1
PR, par. 5. Cf. E, par. 445, where Hegel says that it is wrong to suppose that
there could be will without intelligence, or intelligence without will. The latter
remark might be taken to mean that all thinking—even theorising—is purposive;
in the Philosophy of Right, however, (Zus. 4 to par. 4) Hegel explains the remark
that one cannot think without a will by saying that in so far as we think, we are
active.
180 G. H. R. Parkinson
why Hegel says (PR, Zus. 10 to par. n ) that an animal has no
will.
Hegel says of the will, defined in this way, that it is free (PR, par. 4).
His argument for this thesis in the Philosophy of Right is complex and
difficult; not only are the individual moves in the argument hard
to grasp, but even the general plan of campaign seems at first sight
unlikely to achieve its end. Hegel's thesis is that the will is free in so
far as there is in it a unity of form and content (PR, par. 21) - a
view which seems very remote from what most people have meant
by freedom. In fact, however, there is a connection between Hegel's
views and those of others; Hegel is only putting, in his own way, the
thesis that the free man is the rational man. By this is meant not just
the man who reasons, whether well or badly - as has been seen,
Hegel asserts that all willing is reasoning of a kind - but the man of
right reason, the man who reasons properly. Such is the general
plan of Hegel's argument, which must now be discussed in detail.
Hegel asserts that willing involves (a) the pure thought of oneself,
which is absolutely abstract, absolutely universal, by which he may
mean that this thought is free of all content (PR, par. 5). Here he
seems to have in mind something like Kant's 'transcendental unity
of apperception', the 'I think' which can accompany all my repre-
sentations.1 (b) Willing also involves a content; this content may
either be given by nature, or produced out of the concept of mind
(PR, par. 6). Content of the former sort - that given by nature -
consists of impulses, desires, inclinations (Triebe, Begierden, Neigungen,
PR, par. 11).2 Through these, says Hegel, the will finds itself
determined by 'nature', by which he may mean that in so far as a
man is determined in this way, he is a proper object of study for the
natural sciences. One may ask here, what is meant by calling these
the content of the will ? An impulse, for example, is not the content of
my will in the sense that it is an object of my will, something at which
I aim. 3 But Hegel's point is perhaps that when a man acts rationally
he is not without impulses - indeed, Hegel calls impulse and passion
the very life-blood (Lebendigkeit) of the subject (E, par. 475). So it
seems that the impulses, etc., as 'content' resemble Aristotle's matter,
which is organised by form.
1
Critique ofPure Reason, B 131. A connection with Kant is suggested by the remark
(PR, par. 15 ad fin.) that for Kant freedom is connected with the formal element
in willing, and is indeed nothing but formal self-activity.
2
Cf. E, par. 475, which refers to impulse and passion {Leidenschaft).
3
Hegel distinguishes (e.g. PR, par. 7) between object (Gegenstand), end {ZwecK)
and content (Inhalt). Perhaps he means that when I will something (e.g. to drink a
glass of water) the object of my will is the drinking of the water, the end is to alle-
viate thirst, and the content is the desire to drink.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 181
To speak of the impulses is to speak of one type of content of the
will - that which is 'given by nature'. The other type, which is
obscurely said to be 'produced out of the concept of mind', will be
discussed later; it plays an important part in Hegel's account of
freedom. His account in the Philosophy of Right is complicated by the
fact that he does not proceed immediately to an account of what he
believes freedom to be; instead, in his usual dialectical manner, he
works through views about freedom which he believes to be false,
or at any rate not wholly true. The framework of his discussion is
provided by a distinction between the will which is free 'in itself'
(an sick) and the will which is free both in itself and for itself (fur sich)
(PR, par. 21); only the latter type of will, it is implied, is truly free.1
The will which is free 'in itself is also called by Hegel the 'imme-
diate' or 'natural' will (PR, par. 11). Here it should be remembered
that Hegel does not think of the will as a special kind of faculty; to
speak of the 'natural' will is to speak of rational activity of a certain
type. According to Hegel, the will in question is rational activity
of a very low grade. Willing of this kind, freedom of this kind, is
(according to him) what people have in mind when they say that
freedom is the ability to do as we please (PR, par. 15); Hegel calls
it 'arbitrariness' (Willkiir: PR, par. 15; E, par. 478). He seems to
mean that a 'free' man of this kind is a man who acts by whim,
according to impulse. Such a man differs from the animals (who, it
will be recalled, have no will) in that he can say ' / want this', ' /
prefer this to that'. A man, as Hegel puts it, stands above his im-
pulses and can determine and posit them as his own (PR, Zus. 10
par. 11). Such a man, however, does not act in accordance with any
general principle; e.g. he does not say 'I will do this because it will
make me happy'. This, as will be seen later, is willing of a different,
and higher type.
Of the will as arbitrariness, Hegel says:
(a) It is not the will in its truth; rather, it is the will as contra-
diction (PR, par. 15). The impulses (PR, par. 17) get in each
other's way, and the satisfaction of one impulse demands the
suppression of another. At this stage, the decision between them is
left to the contingent decision of the will (cf. E, par. 478).
1
It is no doubt for this reason, among others, that Knox and Wallace translate
'an sich' as 'implicitly' (e.g. PR, par. 11; E, par. 476), and Knox renders 'der an
und fur sick seiende WilW as 'the will whose potentialities have become fully explicit'
(PR, par. 22). Hegel himself draws a connection between 'Ansichsein' and potency,
dunamis, and between 'Fiirsichsein' and act, entelecheia, when he discusses develop-
ment in GPE, pp. ioiff. He insists, however, that 'Fiirsichsein' means more than
the making explicit of potentialities; it also involves self-awareness (op. cit.,
p. 108; WL, 1 p. 148).
182 G. H. R. Parkinson
(b) Those philosophers who maintained that arbitrariness is
freedom were wrong (PR, par. 15). The determinists, says Hegel,
are right in saying that the content of such a will - the various im-
pulses - comes to it from outside; that, in other words, its content
does not belong to its self-determining activity as such. The only
element of free self-determination present in arbitrariness is the
formal element, by which Hegel must mean the pure thought of
oneself mentioned above. This is of great value as indicating what
Hegel thinks real freedom to be. To be free, it is clearly implied,
is not to be undetermined, it is to be self-determined.
Hegel does not proceed immediately from freedom as arbitrariness
to genuine freedom. He recognises an intermediate stage (PR, par.
20; E, par. 478) in which the agent reflects on his impulses, and
compares them and their consequences with a totality of satisfaction,
namely, happiness. Hegel does not at first make clear whose happi-
ness is involved - the agent's alone, or that of others as well - but
later in the Philosophy of Right (par. 125) he expressly considers the
happiness of all, and it may be assumed that the same is in mind
earlier in the work. Hegel says that in this way, reflection invests its
material with abstract universality (PR, par. 20). He clearly regards
this as an advance over the arbitrary will. In the case of happiness,
he says, thought already has power over the natural force of the
impulses,1 in that it requires happiness in a whole (PR, Zus. 15 to
par. 20). But there is still no unity of form and content, for the content
of this universal is only universal pleasure; this involves the singular
and particular, so that one must have recourse to impulse. That is
(E, par. 479), it is subjective feeling and pleasure that must decide
what happiness if. From this there follow (though Hegel does not
make this explicit) the defects that have already been pointed out
in the case of the will as arbitrariness - namely, contradiction and
lack of self-determination. People who aim at the happiness of all
will tend to find that the contents of their aims - impulses, pleasures -
are in conflict, since one man's idea of happiness need not be
another's; again, to decide anything on impulse is to be determined
from outside and not by oneself.
Mention has already been made of Hegel's doctrine that the true
is the whole. Although, according to Hegel, no view which is
incomplete can be true, there are grades of incompleteness in views,
which therefore may be said to approximate more or less closely
1
The importance of the inhibition of impulses is stressed in VG, p. 57. Here,
Hegel says that a man is independent, 'not because a movement begins in him,
but because he can inhibit (hemmen) the movement, and so break his immediacy
and his belonging to nature {Natiirlichkeit)'.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 183
to the truth. For any incomplete view there is another view which is
its 'sublation' {Aufhebung), i.e. which retains what was solid in the
first view but cancels what was unsound in it. Hegel is apt to say of
a view which is the sublation of another that it is the 'truth' of that
other.1 Now, the truth of the abstract universality which is involved
in happiness is, says Hegel, 'self-determining universality' (PR, par.
21). This is the genuine will; this is freedom. Hegel's language here
is very condensed, and his thought is in consequence the more
difficult to follow. He explains what he means by calling the will a
'self-determining universality' by saying that the will has universality
in the shape of itself as infinite form, as its content, object and aim.
In consequence, he says, the will is not only free in itself, it is also
free for itself. In trying to expound this, a beginning may be made
with the word 'infinite'. By 'infinite', or infinite in the true sense,
Hegel does not mean 'going on without end'. (This would be
what he calls bad infinity: e.g. WL, i, p. 131.) Rather, the infinite is
something which returns to itself; Hegel notes (PR, Zus. 17 to par.
22) that infinity has correctly been represented by the figure of a
circle. In the present context, he seems to be saying that genuine
will, the will as free, is in some way reflexive; it wills itself. This makes
it clear how he can say that such a will is free for itself; it is also
clear how, in this case, there is that unity of form and content which
was lacking in the case of happiness. But all this seems to be highly
formal, a mere juggling with words; it is not easy to see just how the
will has itself as content. The problem may be put in this way.
Hegel has said that the will, as form, has itself as object; yet he has
also said that the pure thought of oneself (which one might think to
be the will as form) is absolutely abstract (cf. PR, par. 5, quoted
earlier). How, then, can the absolutely abstract be its own content?
For as absolutely abstract, it is surely wholly without content.
Hegel would reply (cf. PR, par. 24) that when he speaks of the
will as universal, he is not thinking of the universal as a common
character, nor is he thinking of it as the abstract universality which
stands outside the individual. (In the latter case, he may be referring
to universals which have no precise instances - much as Plato said
that there is an idea of the circle, but no genuine circles present
to the senses.) Rather, he is thinking of the concrete universal, and he
adds that the universal of which he speaks - the universal which is in
and for itself - is that which is generally called 'the rational' (das
Verniinftige).
At this point, it is necessary to make some reference to Hegel's
1
Compare his remarks on teleology cited earlier, to the effect that the end is the
' truth' of both mechanism and chemism.
184 G. H. R. Parkinson
metaphysics. His use of the term 'rational' implies his sense of the
term 'reason', the metaphysical kind of thinking which is superior to
'understanding' (Verstand; referred to in PR, par. 24), a more abstract
type of thought. Further, it is clear that Hegel has in mind one
special, and basic, part of his metaphysics: his ideas about the self-
estrangement of mind, and its eventual return to itself. That this is
so is clear from his assertion (PR, par. 22) that the will has as its
object itself, and therefore the object is not for it a something other,
a barrier.1 Rather, the will has returned to itself in the object.2
One might perhaps be tempted to count Hegel's views about self-
estrangement - his idea that it is an advance in knowledge when one
realises that the object of knowledge is not foreign to one, but is
itself the creation of thought - as belonging to his theory of know-
ledge rather than to his theory of the will. However, Hegel would
not have his doctrines compartmentalised in this way. He would
say that one must not draw a sharp line between reason as practical
and reason as theorising: free will, according to him, is the unity
of the two (E, par. 481). It seems to be his view, in short, that
the rational or real will3 is that of the man who knows that the
objects of his will are themselves forms of mind, and not alien to
it. This is how he can say that freedom is self-knowledge (A, 1
p. 347), or, that man is free only when he knows himself (GPE,
p. 106).
It might appear that Hegel is merely dressing up in new clothes
the thesis that the free man is the rational man - a thesis defended
by many before him, such as Spinoza, Leibniz and the Stoics. This,
however, is not so; Hegel has something new to say. But to see
what this is it is necessary to take into account another part of his
philosophy of mind. So far, attention has been concentrated on
what Hegel calls the philosophy of 'subjective mind', which is
roughly his philosophical psychology. It is now time to consider
the philosophy of 'objective mind', where Hegel deals with the
1
Gf. Phil. Rel., m p. 36, and GPE, p. 110.
2
Hegel often says that to be free is to be 'bei sich': e.g. PR, par. 23; VG, p. 55;
GPE, pp. 110, 229, 233; E, par. 23; PG, p. 152. He may mean that to be free is to
be independent (thus, in VG, p. 55 he contrasts being 'bei sich' with being depen-
dent, abhdngig); but there may also be some implication of being 'at home', of
having returned to oneself from previous self-estrangement. It is interesting that
Marx, in his 1844 Manuscripts, equates 'bei sich' and 'zu House', when he says,
'Der Arbeiter fiihlt sich daher erst ausser der Arbeit bei sich und in der Arbeit
ausser sich. Zu Hause ist er, wenn er nicht arbeitet, und wenn er arbeitet, ist er
nicht zuHaus'. (Marx/Engels, Werke, Dietz ed., Berlin, 1968: Erganzungsband, pt.
1. p. 514).
* On the freedom of the rational will, cf. E, par. 469; VG, p. 144; A, 1. pp. 104 ff.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 185
human mind as it is manifested in the context of social institutions;
in other words his moral philosophy, his philosophy of the state and
of law, and his philosophy of history.1
It has already been mentioned that the various parts of Hegel's
philosophy of mind are not arranged according to a temporal order
in what they describe; in the philosophy of subjective mind, which
is expounded first, Hegel is presupposing the existence of societies.
But it would be wrong to suppose that the philosophy of objective
mind merely describes a social background which is presupposed
earlier; rather, Hegel takes his argument a step further. The essence
of this argument is that the idea of freedom is genuine (wahrhqfi)
only as the state (PR, par. 57). One should note Hegel's language
here: he does not say that real freedom is possible only in the state,
but says that to talk of real freedom is to talk of the state. It now has
to be asked what this means. In the first place, one need not suppose
Hegel to say of freedom (as Plato is thought to have said about
happiness) that it is predicable only of the state as a whole, and not
of this or that member of the state. He makes clear (PR, par. 257)
that the self-awareness of the individual has its 'substantial freedom'
in the state. His point is that freedom is predicable of people only
as active members of a society. Mention has already been made of
Stoic views on freedom, and Hegel's point can be made by contrast-
ing his views with those of the Stoic. The Stoic claimed to be free
in so far as he was rational. He also knew that he was a member of
a society - the state to whose laws he was subject - and he knew that
he could not live, or could live only with great difficulty, outside a
society of this type. However, he regarded this fact as external to his
freedom, and so might remain aloof from political life (indeed, if he
were a slave, he might have no choice in this matter). For Hegel,
this would not be genuine freedom; for him, to be free is to play an
active part in the state in which one lives. In this respect, the mature
Hegel preserves the ideals of the classical Greek polls, which he
admired as a young man.2
To explain fully why Hegel should say this would involve a

1
The philosophy of subjective mind is contained in Section 1 of Part H I of the
Encyclopaedia, and in much of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right. The
philosophy of objective mind is discussed in Section 2 of Part III of the Encyclo-
paedia, and in the bulk of the Philosophy of Right. There will be no occasion in this
paper to discuss in detail the third and culminating part of the Hegelian philo-
sophy of mind, the philosophy of absolute mind, which concerns art, religion and
philosophy.
2
See, e.g., J . Hyppolite, Introduction a la Philosophic de I'histoire de Hegel (Paris,
1948) P- 35-
 186 G. H. R. Parkinson
discussion of his ethics, which cannot be attempted here.1 Roughly,
Hegel's argument is that only in a state does one find a moral code
which is expressed in universal propositions, and which therefore
has the mark of rationality, but which - unlike, say, Kant's moral
philosophy - is concrete, and gives guidance as to what ought to be
done in particular situations. (This, incidentally, shows more clearly
what Hegel means by that universality of the content of the will
which was mentioned earlier). Hegel insists, however, that this is
not all that there is to freedom. His point may be brought out by
comparing his views (as he himself does) with Plato's views on the
state. Consider a member of the lowest class in the ideal state
described in Plato's Republic. Such a man follows blindly the laws
laid down by the guardians; these are rational laws, and the man
may therefore be said to be acting rationally, or at any rate as a
rational man would. But the point is that he merely follows the
laws; he cannot be said to accept them as morally binding on him.
Hegel puts this by saying that Plato fails to make room for 'subjective
freedom' (E, par. 552; PR, par. 185); the citizens of his ideal state
merely have 'substantial freedom' (VG, p. 243). Subjective freedom
(E, par. 503) implies a personal knowledge of the distinction between
good and evil; to say that a man is subjectively free is to say that
ethical and religious propositions are not to claim authority over him
simply as external laws and precepts. Rather, assent is to be given to
them in the man's heart, feeling or conscience.
It is not difficult to see why Hegel should stress the importance
of subjective freedom. Freedom, for him, means self-determination,
means independence. But a member of the lowest class in Plato's
Republic cannot be called independent; he is dependent for his views
on a body of men who are alien to him, the guardians. Not that
Hegel thinks that subjective freedom is enough by itself. He insists
that such freedom is one 'moment', one aspect of the idea of the
rational will (PR, par. 258; Hoffmeister ed., p. 210). If it is stressed
to the exclusion of all else, the result is a one-sided view of ethics,
a view which exalts the individual conscience at the expense of the
laws and customs of society.2
1
On this issue, the reader may be referred to W. H. Walsh's lucid essay, Hegelian
Ethics (London, 1969).
2
It is perhaps in the context of subjective freedom that one is to understand
Hegel's remark that in the state (or more exactly, in the mind of a people, the
Volhgeist) 'the absolute ought is no less an is' (E, par. 514). Popper has declared
the coniusion of 'ought' with 'is', the attempt to transcend the dualism of facts
and standards, to be one of Hegel's major errors (The Open Society and its Enemies,
5th ed., London, 1966, n. p. 394). It does not seem likely, however, that this con-
fusion is present here. Hegel seems to be saying (Walsh, op. cit., p. 38) that a
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 187
This exposition of Hegel's views is now almost complete. One
major point remains, which can be introduced by way of a possible
criticism of what has so far been said. Hegel has said that man is
free in the state, or better, that he is free as a citizen. To link this
doctrine with what follows, it must be noted that Hegel is thinking
primarily of the nation-state; he says that not every Folk or Nation
is a state, but that the 'substantial aim' of a Volk is to be a state
(E, par. 549; Lasson ed., p. 459). Now, a nation-state is clearly
something limited; it is not the whole of human society, and it
finds itself, if not hostile to, at least different from other nation-
states. Consequently, it is hard to see how the members of such a
state can think in absolutely universal terms; it is hard to see how
they can be called independent, and how, therefore, they can be
called free. Hegel would agree that these comments are sound as
far as they go. He admits that the mind of this or that people is
limited (E, par. 548), and that its independence is of a subordinate
kind (ein Untergeordnetes). But although the mind of a particular
people can perish (by which he presumably means that its ways of
thought become outmoded, are superseded) yet it is a link in the
chain of the progress of the world-mind, a stage in its development
(E, par. 549, p. 457; E, par. 550; VG, p. 73), and this universal
mind cannot perish (VG, p. 60). Or, as he says elsewhere (PR, par.
352), the minds of peoples 'have their truth' in the absolute univers-
ality of the world-mind. So Hegel tends to ascribe freedom to the
self-knowledge of the universal or world-mind. It is, he says (E,
pars. 548-9), the movement of universal or world-history which is
the road to the liberation of the mental substance; it is (E, par.
552, p. 462) the mind of world-history which grasps its concrete
universality and raises itself to the knowledge of the absolute mind,
as the eternally actual truth, in which reason is free 'for itself.
Such, then, is the way in which Hegel solves his problem about
the relation between freedom and necessity. Freedom, in his view,
does not exclude necessity; rather, the mind is free in its necessity
(GPE, p. 116). I am free in so far as I am rational, free in so far as
I am self-determined; and self-determination seems (in the last
analysis) to be the self-determination of the world-mind.
It is now time to make some comments about all this. Hegel's
views about freedom can be, and have been, subjected to severe
criticism. In general terms, it may be said that:

genuine morality is 'internal rather than foreign' to the persons it embraces;

or, as Hegel puts it in the Encyclopaedia, in the state 'self-conscious freedom has be-
come nature' (E, par. 513).
188 G. H. R. Parkinson
(a) his argument is not self-consistent;
(b) even if self-consistent, it misses its mark;
(c) it contains serious distortions, in that it emphasises some fac-
tors at the expense of others;
(if) it rests on a false assumption, which has led historically to
doctrines which cannot, without perversity, be said to be
consistent with human freedom.

(a) It has already been seen that Hegel sometimes says that man
is free as a member of a state; at other times, he finds the state
insufficiently universal, and says that the world-mind is that which
is free. An objector may point out that it is hard to see how both
these assertions can be true. Hegel would doubtless reply that both
are true; the first, he might say, is less true than the second, but to
advance the second without doing justice to the first would lead to
undue abstraction, and so to falsity. In trying to develop this, one
may make a beginning by bringing down to earth the notion of a
'world-mind'. There is no reason to believe that this is the mind of
some individual, named 'the world'. It is true that Hegel says
(VG, p. 60) that the world-mind is the mind of the world ('Der
Weltgeist ist der Geist der Welt'), but it is important to see this in its
context. The whole passage runs, 'The world-mind is the mind of
the world, as it explicates itself in human consciousness'. That is,
to talk of the world-mind is also to talk about the minds of human
beings. Hegel's point is (VG, p. 61) that it is wrong to suppose that
a man's self-awareness contains nothing but the particular empirical
existence of the individual. In so far as mind is aware of itself, it is
free, which means that it has transcended (aufgehoben) its temporal
and limited existence and is related to pure essence. One may sum
up by saying that to talk of the world-mind is to talk of thinking
which is not restricted (e.g.) by the fact that the thinker is a member
of a particular state; it is to talk of thinking, not in French terms or
in German terms, etc., but in universal terms.
It may be objected that if this is what Hegel means, it is not clear
why he should put so much stress on the state when he talks about
freedom. In answering this, a comparison with Stoicism may again
prove helpful. The Stoic claimed that his city was the whole world,
and not (say) Athens or Rome. Hegel, however, would deny that
the Stoic is the kind of thinker to whom he refers when he speaks
of the world-mind. It has already been seen that he argues that the
Stoic's freedom is not real freedom. The Stoic's principles of conduct
lack concreteness (cf. PR, par. 209); he can operate only with
abstractions. Only in the state does one find principles of conduct
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 189
that are both universal and concrete. In short, it seems to be Hegel's
view that the free man must as it were surpass the state; he must
work through it, he must go beyond it. He gets his principles of
conduct from the state in which he lives, but if he always thinks as
a member of this state then his thinking is not universal and he is
not free. There seems to be no inconsistency here.
(b) The second objection was that Hegel's argument does not
hit its mark, by which is meant that, even if one supposes that it
proves what it sets out to prove, the freedom it establishes is no
more than a bogus freedom. This point is forcefully made by Georg
Lukacs, in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (Berlin, 1923) pp. 161 f.
Lukacs begins by stating the argument discussed above, saying that
the mind of a people only seems to be the subject of history, but
that really it is the world-mind which acts through, and beyond, a
people. He then argues that this means that the freedom which
appears to have been achieved is no freedom - it is merely reflection
on the laws which move one, the kind of reflection which, Spinoza
says, a moving stone might have if it had consciousness.1 The point
seems to be that, according to Hegel, it is the world-mind which is
the real agent in history, and that Hegel is saying that we are free
in so far as we are conscious of this - and this is no freedom.
The question is, whether Lukacs' is the right way of looking at
the Hegelian world-mind, the right model or analogy to use. Does
Hegel think that we as individuals (and indeed whole peoples) are
caught up in it, subjected to it, in the same way that a falling stone is
subject to the laws of gravity, or, to use another analogy, a floating
stick is carried along by a current in a stream? The answer surely
is that he does not. In each of the analogies suggested, that which
determines (e.g. the current) is wholly other than that which is
determined (the stick). The world-mind, however, is not something
wholly outside me, pushing me about; rather, in so far as I think,
in so far as I really think, I am a part of it. In this connection it is
worth noting that Hegel quotes with approval Meister Eckhart's
remark that God would not exist if I did not exist (Phil. Rel., 1
P- 257)-
(c) When it was said earlier that Hegel's views about freedom may
be held to be distorted, in that they stress some factors at the ex-
pense of others, two objections were in mind:
(i) Hegel stresses society at the expense of the individual.
(ii) He stress one form of society - the state - at the expense of
other forms.
1
The reference is to Spinoza, Ep. 58, to Schuller. Cf. The Correspondence of
Spinoza, trans. A. Wolf (London, 1928) p . 295.
i go G. H. R. Parkinson
(i) The first of these objections is related to what was said in
(a) about the world-mind. The argument runs as follows. Hegel
has said that a man is free only in the state, in that it is from the
state that he gets principles of conduct that are both universal and
concrete. But what of the man who is at odds with the moral code
of the state in which he lives? Is he ipso facto wrong? It would be odd
indeed if Hegel were to say that no man can ever be morally in
advance of the majority of his contemporaries; that, e.g., Socrates
was wrong and the Athenians who condemned him were right.
Nor, indeed, is this his view. He clearly thinks that Socrates, with
his stress on the inner life, on conscience, represented an advance
in thought.1 It seems to follow from this that it is not Hegel's view
that a man is free only as a member of a state, in the sense that it is
only from the state that he gets principles of conduct that are
universal and concrete; the free man, it now appears, may some-
times be at variance with the state. Perhaps the solution to the
apparent contradiction is as suggested in (a) - the free man works
through the state, but is not bounded by it.
There are passages in Hegel which seem to be inconsistent with
this. He says, for example, that the Volksgeist is 'like a necessity'. The
individual is brought up in its atmosphere; he knows of no other,
and cannot go above it (VG, pp. 59-60; cf. p. 95). This may suggest
that Hegel held the view which Popper (op. cit., 11 p. 208) has
called 'sociological determinism', understanding by this the thesis
that a man's actions and aims are determined by the society in
which he lives. But it is clear from the argument of the last para-
graph that this cannot be what Hegel meant. Either, then, the
passages just quoted must be discounted as mere rhetoric, which is
hardly satisfactory, or it must be supposed that Hegel is making a
rather different point. Perhaps what he means is that although a man
may be a moral innovator, there are certain limits on the ideas that
he can produce. The thought of Socrates, for example, remained
and had to remain within the context of the Greek city-state; he
could not produce ideas which presuppose (e.g.) a nation-state.
It should be stressed that, although Hegel seems to have rejected
sociological determinism, this does not mean that his historical
determinism was in any way hesitant. Writing about Socrates,
he says that his principle of the inner life was produced necessarily
in his epoch (ist in seinen Tagen notwendig erzeugt warden), though
time was needed for it to reach the self-awareness of all (PR, Zus.
166 to par. 274). Hegel means that the change in ideas to which
1
See, e.g., VG, p. 71; also Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. Haldane and
Simson (London, 1892-5) 1 p. 409.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 191
Socrates was the first to give expression was not a contingent matter.
Changes of this kind, which constitute a genuine advance in thought,
occur in response to a breakdown, a contradiction, in the ideas they
supersede. Now, it seems to be Hegel's view that such changes
occur necessarily at certain stages of human history, and that this is
why Socrates had to advance his new principle of the inner life
when he did.1
(ii) The second objection, to the effect that Hegel's argument
distorts the facts, can be dealt with more briefly: not because it is
less important, but because the issues raised are too big to be dealt
with here. The objection was that Hegel stresses one form of society
at the expanse of others. Man, he says, is free in the state; it is in
(or perhaps through) the state that he achieves the independence,
the self-knowledge, in which freedom consists. To this it is objected
that it can be said with equal, or greater, justice that a man is free
in some other social institution - a church, say, or a social class. All
that can be said here is that Hegel is not unprepared for such
objections. In his view, the state is a whole which includes social
classes; as to a church, Hegel regards the relations between church
and state as very close.2 It is obvious, however, that a full discussion
of this point would involve a discussion of Hegel's theory of the state,
and this cannot be attempted here.
(d) The last of the objections listed earlier was that Hegel's
views about freedom rest on a false assumption, which has led to
people giving the name 'freedom' to what clearly is not. This
argument is brought by Berlin when, in his 'Two Concepts of
Liberty',3 he argues against the ideal of what he calls 'positive
freedom', one of whose exponents he declares Hegel to be. It may
be helpful to begin by giving a reminder of what Berlin means by
1
It is not one of the aims of this paper to criticise Hegel's historical determinism;
rather, the aim is to see how Hegel reconciles it with his view that human beings
(or at any rate, some human beings) are free. It may be noted, however, that
Hegel does not succeed in showing why changes occur, and must occur, when they
do; all that he does is show how, in his view, new ideas remedy logical defects
in old ones. Marx, of course, gave his answer to this problem, and it is interesting
to note in passing that Hegel would reject the thesis that the ideas put forward
by moralists and philosophers, etc., are determined by economic factors. He says
that there is only one mind, one principle which is manifested in the politics, philo-
sophy, religion, art, ethics, trade and industry of a period; these various forms are
only branches of one main stem — 'the substantial mind of a period, of a people,
of an age' (GPE, p. 148).
2
In E, par. 552, he says that religion is the basis of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit)
and of the state, and that it has been a monstrous error of his era to try to see these
inseparables as separable from one another.
3
First published, Oxford, 1958; reprinted in Four Essays on Liberty.
iga G. H. R. Parkinson
this term. He says {Four Essays on Liberty, p. 131) that the positive
sense of the word 'free' is related to the view that a man is free
when he is his own master, when his life and his decisions depend
on himself, and not on external forces of any kind. This tallies with
ordinary usage (cf. one of the definitions of freedom in the Oxford
English Dictionary: 'freedom'='power of self-determination'),
and seems quite harmless. However, the idea of being one's own
master also appears in a more sophisticated form. The man who is
his own master is, by definition, not subject to external forces.
Now, these external forces come to be thought of as a man's own
passions, and self-mastery is regarded as the mastery which the
self - the real self, the rational self - exercises over the passions.
Two main routes have been thought to lead to self-mastery of this
kind. One is to 'retreat to the inner citadel'; to contract one's lines
of defence, and abandon those desires which one is unable to satisfy.
This is the way of the Stoic, and it has already been seen that it is
not Hegel's. The other way (op. cit., p. 134) is to identify oneself
with a specific principle or ideal. This, according to Berlin, is
Hegel's way, and indeed that of many others. It may be asked how
one 'identifies oneself with a principle', and why this should be
counted as freedom. An example which Berlin gives (p. 141) is
helpful here. Suppose that a pianist is playing from a score, and that
he has grasped the pattern of the music and has made the composer's
ends his own. It would be absurd to say that such a person is merely
obeying external laws; for by understanding the score he has identi-
fied it with himself, and has turned it into an element in a free
activity. The same applies to necessary laws, and the knowledge of
them (p. 144). In so far as I understand these laws I make them my
own, I assimilate them into my substance, and so I am properly
called free.
Before going any further with Berlin's argument, it will be useful
to determine the extent to which the views described are those of
Hegel. It seems clear that there is an important difference. The 'free
man' described by Berlin identifies himself with a principle which is
outside him; the pianist, for example, plays from and assimilates
someone else's score. But this is not true of Hegel's free man. As a
member of a state, he does not merely assimilate the rules, the laws,
laid down by others. If this were so, no one could ever advance beyond
the laws of his society, and it has been seen that Hegel thinks that
this is possible. Further, Hegel would say that to be a member of a
state, as he understands it, is not to accept someone else's decisions
as one's own; it is to be in a situation where it is possible to speak of
our decisions, of what we think rational. There is a passage in the
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 193
Phenomenology which, although it is general in scope and does not
refer to the state as such, is perhaps relevant here. In this passage
(PG, p. 140) Hegel speaks of mind, the absolute substance, as
something which 'in the perfect freedom and independence of its
opposite, i.e. the various self-awarenesses which are "for themselves",
constitutes their unity: an / which is a we, and a we which is
an/'.
However, this does not give a complete answer to Berlin's
criticisms of Hegel, as will be seen when his argument is taken up
again. Whether or not Hegel argues as Berlin has just said, there
is no doubt that he thinks that to be free is to be rational. This idea
may seem innocent, and even praiseworthy; Berlin, however,
claims that it has had dire consequences. What these are can be
seen as soon as one considers the relation between one man's free
(rational) activity and that of others. According to the adherents
of positive freedom, rational solutions to problems cannot conflict,
for two truths cannot be logically incompatible (Berlin, op. cit.,
p. 145). It must therefore be possible for there to be a rational social
order, each member of which is a free, rational man. Now, ration-
ality is not something that we are born with, in the sense that we
are born with a birthmark or with blue eyes; rationality is something
that we acquire through education (using this term in a broad
sense, to include informal as well as formal education). But while
a person is being educated, he cannot understand the purposes of
his education, and so he has to be made to obey the laws which
will later make him rational. In this way, says Berlin (p. 152), the
ideal of positive freedom has led to 'an authoritarian state, obedient
to the directives of an elite of Platonic guardians'.
This is clearly a serious objection to Hegel's views about freedom.
It cannot be met simply by pointing to the fact that Hegel rejected
a Platonic elitism, and indeed any constitution in which there is
freedom for only a few.1 For it might be replied that in this respect
Hegel was better than his principles; that he had failed to follow
to the end the logic of his own argument. If Hegel is to be defended,
one must look more closely at Berlin's argument. According to
Berlin, the way to the authoritarian state lies through the assump-
tion (made, he says, by Hegel, and by all adherents of the ideal of
positive freedom) that there is one, and only one, true solution to
any problem (op. cit., pp. 145, 152). This leads to the view (p. 154)
that 'all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the
clash of reason with the irrational or the insufficiently rational.. .
«This is why he came to reject the ideals of the classical Greek polls: see, e.g.,
E, par. 48a; GPE, pp. 63,144,245.
194 & H- & Parkin son
and that such clashes are, in principle, avoidable, and for wholly
rational beings impossible'.
This does not seem to be Hegel's view. He does not hold that all
conflict is due to the clash of reason with the imperfectly rational,
or that it is in principle avoidable. For him, conflict is between the
imperfectly rational and the less imperfectly rational; such conflict
is the very essence of the dialectic, and is not avoidable. (On the
subject of tragedy, it may be remarked in passing that for Hegel
the truest tragedy is that which depicts the conflict of good with
good. Each of the conflicting parties - e.g. Antigone and Creon, to
cite from the tragedy which Hegel regarded as a paradigm 1 - fails
to recognise the truth inherent in the other's position.) To this it
may be replied that Hegel does speak of a final return of mind to
itself; this will be a condition of perfect rationality, and in it,
conflict will cease. The question is, whether Hegel thought that this
condition had been reached in his own time. If he did, he was
clearly at fault; the point is, however, that there is nothing in his
philosophy to compel such a view. He could consistently have said
(and sometimes seems to think) that his philosophy was not perfect,
but was merely the best available; in the same way, he seems to
think that none of the institutions called 'states' in or before his own
time was really worthy of the name, though one of them was the
closest approximation to the real state.2 Indeed, one may go so far
as to wonder whether, for Hegel, perfect freedom is predicable of any
human being or human institution, or whether it is his view that
freedom is really predicable only of the Absolute (which he also calls
God), and that strictly speaking men can only be called more or
less free.
To view Hegel in this way is to take sides on a major question of
interpretation. Roughly, it is to side with the 'left' Hegelians as
against the 'right' Hegelians, in laying stress on Hegel's idea that
the categories develop over time, and are not fixed and eternal.
It is to take, as containing the real Hegel, the Phenomenology3 and the
political philosophy, and is to say that the appearance of finality
presented by such works as the Science of Logic is misleading. But
whichever view was really Hegel's, it is surely by regarding the
dialectic as open-ended, and not as a closed sytem of eternal concepts,
1
A, ii p. 568.
2
Hegel is often accused of idealising the Prussian constitution; but he clearly
did not think that this constitution was perfect. See, e.g., T. M. Knox, 'Hegel and
Prussianism' in Philosophy (1940) pp. 51-63, 313-4; Ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt,
2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1962) pp. 249 f.
3 Or rather, the bulk of it - the last chapter providing an exception.
 Hegel's Concept of Freedom 195
that Berlin's attack can most easily be countered. It has been the
argument of the last few paragraphs that the dialectic can plausibly
be taken in this 'open-ended' way - a way which makes it possible
to say, without paradox or outrage of any kind, that the free life is
the rational life.