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between 1923 and 1963, the copyright term is 28 years. This book was published in 1951, and the original copyright expired in 1979. A search of the US Copyright Office records indicates that an application for copyright renewal was not filed or processed during the period 1978-1980, and this work is now in the public domain.
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This electronic version, including any and all images added to the original, is offered to the public domain with no limitations upon its use. CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 3 The longer I coach, the more I work with boys, the more clearly I understand that the seemingly small incidents - often chance happenings - are largely responsible for those decisions that shape an individual's career. In my own case, it took a great team, and the master coach of them all, Knute Rockne, to convince me that football was for me, that coaching was a profession requiring the same kind of intense study and lifelong devotion demanded of teachers, lawyers and even of doctors.
No, I never played for Rockne. I played against him, or against his 1924 team that included the celebrated Four Horsemen, Elmer Layden, Harry Stuhldreher, Jim Crowley and Don Miller. It happened in Palmer Stadium on a sunny October twenty-fifth and never before in my life had I spent such a frustrating, disappointing afternoon. We were beaten, 12-0, and the final score could have been 28-0, or possibly higher. The score didn't bother me - it was the way in which Rockne's men handled us, particularly me.
The 1924 Princeton team was a better-than-average Princeton team. We had beaten Navy, we later turned back Harvard, 34-0 and lost to a sound Yale team, 10-0. Yet against Notre name I felt as if we were being toyed with. I was backing up the line and I don't believe I made a clean tackle all afternoon. There would come Layden, or Miller, or someone. I would get set to drop the ball carrier in his tracks and someone would give me a nudge, just enough to throw me off balance, just enough pressure to make me miss. I played the whole game that way, giving a completely lackluster performance.
We were walking up the chute to the dressing-rooms after the game and I actually felt ready for another two hours of contact. I wasn't tired, nor was I beaten down physically as I generally was after a big game. Others walking with me agreed. As we pieced together our individual reactions to our defeat, we began to see that we had met something new, something we had never anticipated. We, and I am writing this in retrospect, had been subjected to our first lesson in what might be called the science of football.
These Rockne-inspired thoughts stayed with me for a long, long time. I completed my studies at Princeton the following June and jumped directly to the New York Yankees for a summer try-out, which, if it proved nothing else, proved to me that I wanted no part of professional baseball and undoubtedly demonstrated to the Yankee powers-that-were that one Charles Caldwell was far from a polished ballplayer. Instead of staying with the minor league club to which I had been demoted, I rusticated for a period on a Georgia peach farm, CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 4 wrestling with agrarian problems and with my own ideas about the future.
There was no getting around it. I had been sold - hook, line, and sinker by Rockne and his kind of football. I wanted to coach and, more important at the time, I wanted to learn everything I could about coaching a sport in which there were apparently a hundred and one opportunities to advance new thoughts, to develop partially explored theories and to blend the traditional with the unorthodox. Just as football was entering the so-called modern era, I was an eager green pea, willing to try and yet not entirely sure that I had the qualifications for any kind of a coaching assignment.
As I did so many times before his death in 1933, I turned for advice to one of the finest men I have ever known, Bill Roper, my coach at Princeton and the person who still symbolizes for me all of the ideals and fine qualities that we like to associate with intercollegiate athletics. Bill, then one of the country's veteran coaches, with nearly a quarter-century of experience behind him, was nearing the end of his long reign at Princeton and, was one of the first to sense that football in the middle 1920's was undergoing tremendous changes, none of which he endorsed.
Bill, you may recall, was a lawyer, a city councilman in Philadelphia and an insurance man - all in addition to being a wonderfully inspirational coach. He didn't have any particular system, insisted that football was ninety percent fight and will always be remembered for popularizing the slogan coined by Johnny Poe: "A team that won't be beaten can't be beaten. Nonetheless, he clearly saw, possibly after the 1924 game with Notre Dame, that the football he had known and loved was not the same game that was being taught by perfectionists like Rockne.
There chanced to be an opening on the Princeton staff and he offered me an assistant's job, with the warning that I was thinking of a precarious way of making a living. Later he told me, after I had worked with the freshmen for a season, that coaching would require more and more time and, if I was going to be a successful coach, I would have to concentrate upon coaching to the exclusion of everything else. I have since often wondered whether or not he was disappointed when I agreed with him wholeheartedly.
For three years, 1925, 1926 and 1927, I was a "seasonal coach," a phenomenon that has almost disappeared from the coaching scene in view of the ever- increasing complexities of the sport. I reported to Bill early in the fall, lived CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 5 football for three months and then headed for Georgia where, with my father, I struggled in the peach business. It wasn't the best of possible starts because of my necessarily divided interests, but at least I had taken a long step and fortunately was working with a staff and for an institution with whose objectives and methods I was familiar.
My beginning or formative seasons as a coach were literally worth their weight in gold. My primary duty was with the freshman backs, many of whom had had little more than a smattering of football fundamentals in secondary school. It meant lots of pick-and-shovel work and gave me a chance to experiment with teaching techniques. In fact, those early years at Princeton were much like post- graduate courses in education, for I certainly learned more about the dos and don't's of coaching than my backfield candidates did about the fine points of football.
For one thing, it soon became apparent that a coach, like any teacher, must know and have the feel of the college institution which he serves. If he doesn't understand just how the curriculum operates, what challenges his players are facing in other phases of university life, and the balance effected between athletics and the primary purposes of higher education, he is in for trouble. From my standpoint, football players are first college undergraduates and then football players. Consequently, coaching methods, or perhaps the philosophy of coaching, must be part of the total educational process.
During my three-season apprenticeship with the Princeton freshmen, several of us - Bill Roper, Al Wittmer, Stan Keck and myself - used to talk long and loud about the advisability or inadvisability of installing a standardized system starting with freshman fall and carrying right through the full varsity cycle. I was in the minority in that I wanted to systematize in the broad sense and adjust only within a given framework to the material and problems at hand. The others advocated more flexibility, varying coaching principles from fall to fall and making allowances for a coach's prerogative to improvise.
In working day to day with the freshman, I was impressed the urgency of stretching every hour to the limit, of making minutes count. We had approximately ten hours of practice-time a week and it seemed only logical to correlate freshman training with the varsity program, so that the transition from freshman to varsity competition would be similar to graduating from an elementary to a more advanced subject. I was interested in dovetailing the varsity and freshman curricula rather than running the risk of having them CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 6 overlap and duplicate one another in time-consuming details.
To strengthen my point, I then argued - and still do that personnel shortages created by graduation and other causes beyond your control mold your approach to a freshman squad. The fundamentals of any given system remain constant, but you must have physically qualified, trained manpower to make the system click. The varsity coaching staff knows what it will need most the following year and the freshman coaches must bend every effort toward developing replacements, even if it means wholesale shifting of personnel, from position to position, until you have your real football players in the slots there they can help most.
While I was inching ahead, debating the merits and disadvantages of coaching systems with my colleagues in the Osborn Club House, Bill started using me more and more on scouting assignments. The famous non-scouting agreement he and T.A.D. Jones at Yale had drawn up in 1926 did not then extend to other rivals and l found myself in a new role as a diagnostician. Princeton and Ohio State were to meet in the Tigers' next-to-last game in 1927 and Mid-Western football suddenly became one of my primary concerns.
These excursions into the Middle West were eye opening, inasmuch as each of the trips on Princeton's behalf connoted a lot more than just another glimpse of a team we were to defeat, 20-0. Ohio, under J.W.Wilce, was an interesting team to watch; but, more important, in scouting the Buckeyes, I was brought into contact with representatives of Bob Zuppke at Illinois, Tad Wieman at Michigan, Doc Spears (father of Yale's 1951 captain) at Minnesota, Dick Hanley at Northwestern and, of course, the one and only Rockne. To a certain degree we compared notes and inevitably got around to the question of East vs. Middle West, a question no one has yet succeeded in answering to the satisfaction of one and all.
Although none of the men l have just mentioned had any appreciable influence upon my interpretations of football, it was a mighty healthy development to hash through and to think together about our widely divergent points of view. One or two were still intrigued with Wally Steffens' spinner plays, others were talking about varieties of backfield shifts and still others were blueprinting the future of razzle-dazzle that was to win recognition under Andy Kerr, Francis Schmidt, Lou Little, Ray Morrison and many others. What counted was the fact that we were all thinking about football and turning our backs on the old idea of bruising man-to-man combat. CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 7
At the close of the 1927 season l again went to Bill Roper and told him I wanted to move on, that I felt prepared to stand on my own feet, if any institution thought it advisable to entrust its football hopes to a man aged twenty-five. My years at Princeton, combined with four summers of camp- work, had been a thoroughly satisfying period and more than anything else I wanted to continue my work with boys. Football at the intercollegiate level was my first love. Nonetheless, if circumstances had dictated otherwise, l would have welcomed a chance to serve as a coach, or teacher-coach, in any type of school.
Thanks to the luck of the draw, and of course to Bill Roper's help, I emerged as the number one man in a field of thirty-five applicants for a year-round job at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, the college I look upon as my second alma As I now think back to the crucial year of 1928, I am still amazed by the almost overwhelming confidence l had in myself and in my knowledge of coaching. At Princeton l had argued vociferously for a system, and here I was on my own with two assistant coaches and a veteran dominated varsity squad.
My first four years at Williams came remarkably close to spoiling me is a college football coach. In an institution of some eight hundred undergraduates, all of whom had met a four-year Latin Requirement in gaining their places in the student body, we proceeded to roll up twenty-five victories and three ties in a total of thirty-two games, and in the process annexed four straight Little Three championships (Amherst, Wesleyan and Williams). We started out cautiously, used both Single Wing and Double Wing and began experimenting with men-in-motion and some of my own wrinkles.
We roared through the 1928 season, losing only to Columbia. Up to the varsity in the fall of 1929 came the members of the Class of 1932, one of the top athletic classes in Williams history and comparable to the equally great Princeton Class of 1951. The squad was just as eager as the coach and we were off to the races. Satisfied with the squad's mastery of basic football, I broadened the base of operations and built up a repertory of plays, and variations of plays, that would have been a credit to any one of the country's front-rank football powers. Everything went our way through the 1931 season and at the moment I didn't realize that nothing is more dangerous, or more meeting, than temporary success in football.
CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 8 In those early golden years in the Berkshires I stepped far beyond the confines of football. In 1929 l assumed direction of basketball, a sport I had played as a Princeton underclassman and as a member of the championship Montclair A. C. team in the winkers of 1926 and 1927. Two years later I added baseball to my portfolio. Nothing could have pleased me more than the three-sports status. One season flowed into the next and mine were the rewards of close associations with boys throughout the college year. The tough part of the arrangement was that it sliced deeply into the weeks and months I should have been devoting to the study and analysis of football.
Captain Bill Fowle and his 1932 classmates moved on and in the fall of 1932 the opposition lowered the boom. Somehow or other we managed to squeeze by Rochester, 6-0, but lost the other seven games, including a 31-7 setback at Amherst's hands and a 13-6 loss to Wesleyan. This undistinguished record, my first unsuccessful campaign as a head coach, was attributable to what I would call coaching oversight. We were short of material; at the same time, we were attempting the impossible by overburdening a thinly manned team with too much football. In academic terms, we had been spoiled by a succession of honors classes and had failed to pitch the contents of our courses to an average group of students.
The 1932 season, my low point to date from the point of view of winning percentages, demonstrated conclusively that in the coaching profession there can be no substitute for paying unremitting attention to what is happening in football, not only in your own league or section but in all parts of the nation. It was obvious that we at Williams were in for a couple of building years and that I couldn't afford to bypass any opportunity to swap ideas with other coaches. I started haunting the off-season clinics in New England, the Middle West, wherever school or college coaches might be gathering for workshop sessions.
Evolving a systems or a doctrine, of football is at best an incredibly tedious undertaking. I have frequently been asked, Why do you believe that? or What led you to modify those principles? or Why is Method A more effective than Method Z? In giving detailed answers to such questions, I have found that I can't say I started doing this or that at a specific time for a specific reason. More often a departure from normal is the result of cooperative thinking and research. For instance, the germ of an idea might originate with me. I apply it in one way, pass along the thought at a clinic and someone else comes up with another application. By combining the two different interpretations of the same basic thought we contribute together to the CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 9 storehouse of football knowledge.
As I moved from clinic to clinic, first as a student and later as an instructor, I was frankly searching for thoughts I could integrate with my own theories of offensive and defensive football. I listened to hundreds of speakers, sifted through their presentations and tried to pinpoint their lines of reasoning. Gus Dorais, one of the first of the great passers and a meticulous student of football, gave me several new slants on the passing attack he was then using at the University of Detroit. Noble Kizer, head coach at Purdue from 1930 though 1936, and Arthur Sampson, a staunch advocate of the Single Wing since his coaching days at Tufts, bolstered some of my convictions about Single Wing blocking. Fred Brice at Maine shared his original thoughts about modifying backfield assignments in the Single Wing.
In 1933, when we were two years away from another sound Williams unit, we participated in a practical clinic - possibly laboratory period would be a better phrase - and engaged Fritz Crisler's championship Princeton team in Palmer Stadium. For ten minutes our outgunned squad made a gallant stand but then the dam broke and the Tigers' Power, in the persons of Garry LeVan, Homer Spofford, Pepper Constable and Paul Pauk, swept through our defenses. The game, aside from the 45-0 score, was a significant one for me, in that it was my just experience with Crisler's highly deceptive shifting attack, elements of which have been incorporated in the modern Single Wing.
ln the early l930's George Munger and I established our mutually beneficial Single Wing partnership at a distance. We were old friends and had been closely associated in summer-camp work. George took over the coaching reins at Episcopal Academy, Philadelphia, and began tinkering with some of the plans we had concocted during the summer. I would do the same thing at Williams and then feed suggestions to George. The following summer we would check our bearings to see just what we had succeeded in accomplishing. When he was named head coach at the University of Pennsylvania, we continued the practice, with George getting the worse part of the bargain because he was solely concerned with football and I was running a three-sports program.
Up until 1934 I considered myself very much of a traditionalist in the sense that we were ironing out and modifying standard formations. We had our once-or- twice-a-game passes and running plays and took the normal gambles in preparing for the annual Little Three games or superior opponents. Probably CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 10 because of my faith in solid football, and my distrust of gridiron gimmicks, I have never in my salad years of coaching organized game strategy around the unorthodox. Offensively we were operating from the Single Wing employing Minnesota variations to disguise our formations. Defensively we were investigating the possibilities of more fluid line play.
Amherst in 1934 fielded a magnificent team, a squad in which our scouts could find few flaws. There was little hope of meeting Lloyd Jordan's team on even terms, unless somehow or other we could throw it off balance and conceivably score before it regained its poise. We knew that the Amherst guards were light, so we re-rigged our attack, supplanted our regular guards with two large tackles and concentrated on moving the ball behind four big tackles.
We needed every football player we could muster, if we weren't going to lose our scalps, and the guards became the key men in our defensive alignments. We taught the linemen six different looping defenses - the first time, I believe, that such tactics had been used on such an intensive scale. When the Amherst linemen couldn't get to the men were supposed to take out and their attack began to sputter, in would go the husky shock troops who led out plunging backs to a pair of touchdowns, an eventual 14-0 victory, and my first major upset of an opponent.
I am not turning back the clock to chortle, nor to make it look as if I were out - masterminding the opposition - but to emphasize that nine times out of ten widely ballyhooed upsets are not flukes. They represent carefully calculated risks on the part of the weaker teams and they can only be brought about by squads that have enough determination, ability and balance to follow rehearsed scripts and to capitalize upon breaks when they occur. Conversely, before gambling upon the unusual, you must have an imaginative, flexible system which can absorb the new, or the unfamiliar, and make the added elements appear to be nothing more than variations of your normal game procedures.
The 1935 season, the culmination of four rugged years of work, was one of the most thoroughly satisfying periods of my life. We had dropped into the depths and had fought our way back to success with the strongest combination I was to develop in seventeen years in Williamstown. The test of all I had learned came early in the fall and once more in Palmer stadium we squared off against an undefeated Princeton array. Chances for a triumph over the Tigers were remote. We were stepping out of our football class, as we did once a year CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 11 during my tenure at Williams. Yet I was sure that we had built so solidly that we could hold our own in any company.
Princeton's explosive backs - with LeVan and Constable in the starting backfield-meant that our special preparations for the contest were largely defensive. We scrambled our defenses, stressing the looping and splits we had found so effective the preceding November against Amherst. We had brought in the shifting huddle and beyond that had left our attack alone. It was 7-7 at the half, with a 56-yard scoring run in the third quarter accounting for the Tigers' 14-7 win. We played a deliberate, defensive game, punting eleven times to Princeton's four. We hit on our one scoring opportunity, completed six out of eleven passes and had a goal-ward-bound halfback, one of the three starting backs to play the entire game, hauled down from behind on the Princeton 20-yard line - by Bill Roper, Jr., Princeton end and son of my former coach.
Following the eminently successful 1935 campaign - our only loss that fall was to Princeton - we experienced the normal ups and dawns that are part of any coach's life and produced a fair share of victories in our own circles. My thinking underwent no radical alterations, as I sought to inject more and more versatility in our offense, stressing the running pass, an almost unstoppable attacking instrument when it is properly executed; testing the merits of spread formations; and dipping back into the dim distant past to resurrect the wedge play of turtle-neck sweater fame.
In 1937 and 1938 Dick Harlow, a brilliant teacher and strategist, whose superbly coached clubs returned the Crimson of Harvard to the heights in the late 1930's, opened my eyes to the potentialities of the spinning offense. I had only dabbled with the possibilities up to that time, while Dick had so perfected his deceptive running attack that in one game his championship 1937 team threw exactly one pass in romping to a one-sided victory. Dick gave me all sorts of help and advice, and in 1939, with Williams' football fortunes on the ebb, we went all-out the spinning series of plays that were to be our bread- and-butter in 1940, 1941 and 1942. It took a full year to acquire the necessary polish and finesse, but in my last twenty-four games as head coach at Williams the record read twenty wins, three defeats (Amherst, Army and Princeton) and a tie.
No one in the field of education could ever forget the puzzling uncertainties of the early years of World War II, when all of our hopes, thoughts and energies CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 12 were subordinated to the war effort. One undergraduate put it this way: No one is perfectly sure he should be here studying- no one is sure how long he will be here. That was how my last Williams football squad (1942) felt and its members gave every game everything they had as they prepared them selves for the near future and the heavy responsibilities of war service. The fact that we were playing at all was infinitely more important than the final scores. Even the long- sought victory over Princeton, 19-7, seemed insignificant at the time and I wouldn't have believed it, if someone had then told me that six members of the 1942 Princeton team would be playing for me at Princeton in 1946 and 1947.
At the close of the 1942 season Williams found it advisable to suspend football for the duration and, like everyone else, I wanted to have a share in winning the war. I knocked on all of the right doors, talked persuasively to admirals and corporals, but couldn't talk away defective eyesight. I remained on at Williams, coaching informal baseball and basketball teams and working in the physical training division of the Navy's V-5 and V-12 programs. In the fall of 1943, another milestone in my education as a coach, I obtained a leave of absence from Williams to serve as line coach at Yale under Howard Odell.
The three months in New Haven were extremely worthwhile. The T, the oldest of the basic offensive formations, to which present-day coaches led by Clark Shaughnessy had added men-in-motion and flankers, was exploding all over the place in all of its glory. Howie was using it at Yale and so were all of the teams Yale was playing. Delighted with the prospect of studying and dissecting a formation I had never considered, I went to work in much the same way a scientist would examine a specimen under a microscope. I couldn't believe that T was sounding the death knell of the Single Wing, nor could I understand why T was becoming such a fad.
Certainly the T is no easier to teach, although in drilling the Yale linemen I did decide that a young squad, with limited manpower and a lack of football savvy, can assimilate the elements of the T more easily than it can the fundamentals of the Single Wing. It should be remembered that defense is largely a matter of habit and that during the war years the T, with its almost infinite number of play combinations, had upset the balance between offense and defense. Existing defensive practices and theories tended to break down in the face of the new threat and only gradually did players and coaches begin getting the feel of this revamped formation.
In 1944, after any hopes of re-establishing football at Williams as part of the CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 13 naval training program had gone glimmering, I did some scouting for Earl Blaik and followed the Navy team the Cadets were to defeat, 23-7, in Baltimore for Army's first win over the Midshipmen since 1938. My respect for the T in its various forms continued to grow, but an old Single Winger dies hard. I was struck by the feasibility of retaining the Single Wing and strengthening its assets, much as double blocking on key plays, with T trimmings, including flankers, men-in-motion, split ends and the other attachments customarily associated with the T.
Late the same fall, just twenty years after I had played my last game as a Princeton senior, I was invited to return to Princeton as head coach of football and baseball. The appointment was effective February 1, 1945, at the conclusion of the Williams basketball season, and I found it hard to believe that some time in the foreseeable future - the war permitting - I would be exchanging Little Three competition for the so-called Big Three round robin. Williams and Williams athletics had been a vital part of my life for seventeen long years; but I simply couldn't resist the challenge presented by what I looked upon as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
In the athletic sense Princeton in 1945 was not the University I had known in the 1920's, nor the Princeton of Crisler and Wieman in the l930's and early 1940's. The campus under the pressure of war had become a training installation for the Armed Forces and in the space of three years some twenty thousand men - Army, Navy and Marines - had passed through en route to specialized duty in all parts of the world. Princeton had won one football game in 1943. An informal Navy-Marine team had represented the University in 1944, defeating Muhlenberg and losing to Swarthmore and the Atlantic City Naval Air Station. Football, as it had been played at Princeton before the war, had disappeared from the scene.
With the University working overtime on the Princeton Program for Servicemen and hoping to return to a normal program of athletics in the fall of 1945, time was once more of the essence. The question of organizing a staff - the heaviest responsibility shouldered by any head coach - came first. Then, as we were welding the staff into an operating partnership, came the short-range problems of readying a squad for a seven-game schedule.
From the outset it was obvious that what we did for the 1945 season would have little, if any, bearing upon our Coaching preparations for the long pull. The Single Wing remained our stock in trade, but we were starting from scratch CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 14 with a wonderfully spirited squad that was handicapped by an almost total lack of football experience. Under the circumstances it was necessary to temporize, and the stay selected to string along with the T for one season.
That scrappy 1945 team, the first and only T squad I have directed, set Princeton squarely on the comeback trail with its 14-6 win over Cornell. The game itself, on a boggy field at Ithaca, was a magnificent team accomplishment which did more to rekindle Princeton spirit than anything I ever could have done. The squad's buses rolled back to the campus Sunday evening to be greeted by most of the student body. The band was crashing out Princeton songs in the flickering light of a torchlight procession and for the first time I could make myself believe that war was really over, that it might not take too long to re-establish a football tradition which had been weakened by the demands of war.
By the opening of the 1946 season most of the former Princeton football players - men like Dick West and Frank Perantoni - were back in the University and we lost little time in reverting to the Single Wing. In turning our backs on what we gained with the T, we voluntarily - according to pre-cut pattern - entered upon one, two, or possibly three years of uncertainty with the understanding that we were laying the brickwork for the years ahead. However, the type of personnel available in 1946 dictated an immediate departure from the spinning series deception I had learned to count upon in my last Falls at Williams.
Our 1946 fullbacks were big, punishing runners. They were more than satisfactory in applying straight ahead power, but they didn't possess all of the attributes required of a spinning fullback, one of the toughest individual jobs in football. The spin, dependent upon polished execution and split-second timing in lending deception to an attack, was supplanted by the buck lateral, a simpler, equally effective form of chicanery previously exploited by Bernie Bierman at Minnesota and modified by Crisler in his years at Princeton and Michigan.
We got off to what I thought was a flying start in the first four games in 1946, throwing back Brown and Rutgers, losing to Harvard by the margin of a point- after-touchdown and bowing to a superior Cornell team, 14-7. That brought an us up to the Pennsylvania encounter on Franklin Field and I could only pray that we could give a creditable showing against a team rated among the first three in the land. An hour before the kickoff my fingers were still crossed, in the hope that a lacing from Pennsylvania wouldn't sap the faith the squad was CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 15 showing in the things we were trying to teach.
In accordance with the scouting reports, we had revised our defenses, weakening the middle, throwing strength to the flanks to check Pennsylvania's galloping halfbacks and shuffling our linebackers. We had intensified our offensive drills and had carried them a step beyond what had already been installed. What eventually took place in the presence of seventy-two thousand persons is now history. The two teams came up to halftime all even, 14-14, and Princeton won the game in the final minute of play on Ken Keuffel's 19-yard field goal. Reports of the victory naturally stressed the dramatic aspects of the upset and underplayed the developments I liked most, such as the fact that Pennsylvania in the first twelve minutes of the second half had the ball just four times, that we controlled the game in its closing stages by marching with the ball.
One of my favorite newspaper clippings contains these Paragraphs which appeared the Monday following the triumph over Pennsylvania:
Princeton worked from the Single Wing but also with a man-in-motion, with a flanker, with two close-up backs so near the line as to present L and Z formations - and not only with the center spinning the ball directly to the fullback, but sometimes handing it directly to the operator closest to him. Seldom in the second half did Princeton call a play which did not find three men handling the ball.
In this way, the Tigers combined all of the deception of the T with the power of the Single Wing, and to this they added the refinement of the mousetrap. Outweighed by an average of 25 pounds to a man on the line, they had to do something; so they'd voluntarily open up like the Spider inviting the Fly - and then knock down low-charging guards and tackles from the side, with the ball carrier sprinting through the resultant gap.
How I wish all the above were true - then and now! The Pennsylvania game, in which we had befuddled experienced observers as well as the opposition, was the turning point, although it was followed by successive losses to Virginia, Yale and Dartmouth. Princeton had demonstrated conclusively, through sheer determination, that it was able to hold its own with the best the Ivy Group had to over and the coaching staff in turn had proved to the players that the system was intrinsically sound. Red Smith, of the New York Herald Tribune, expressed it cogently the following October in writing, They weep no more at Princeton. CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 16
In winning the Big Three championship in 1947, and successfully defending that title in 1948 and 1949, we made no basic changes in the Princeton offense. While we were marking time insofar as innovations were concerned, we were polishing the small things, constantly accentuating the possibilities afforded by the buck lateral and steaming out the wrinkles in such present-day musts as line quarterbacking.
In 1948 the sideline quarterbacks refused to listen. The preceding fall our freshman team, the Class of 1951, had romped through a championship season, Princeton's first undefeated freshman team since 1934. Word went around the circuit to the effect that Princeton is loaded - watch out for those sophomores. Up went the ballyhoo balloon that was to be punctured by three straight losses in the first three games in 1948. We on the scene - and I, for one, don't agree with the blackly pessimistic school of coaches - did our best to keep the facts in the proper perspective. We gave out the cold dope and insisted we were in the midst of a building year. I remember telling Frank Graham of the New York Journal-American, who was kind enough to recall my remarks two years later, that by 1950 we may have a real football team.
I have no aspirations to be known as a prophet, but in 1948 l did have enough faith in our way of football, and in our green sophomores, to project a timetable coinciding with the Class of 195l's four-year cycle. None of us were conjuring up visions of an undefeated season in 1950, for in modern football, a sport in which anything can happen, an all-winning record calls for a combination of ability, luck, freedom from injuries and a number of intangibles, including perseverance and the quality of the leadership furnished by the squad's upperclassmen.
The 1950 team, dominated by the Class of 1951 and my first undefeated squad, was the culmination of everything I had been striving for ever since I began making the rounds of the clinics in the 1930's. I wouldn't hesitate to call it a dream Single Wing team, although oldtimers - even men who had been out of football for as little as five or six years - wouldn't have recognized any part of its attacking formations except the original alignment just after the team came out of the huddle. In rolling up 349 points in nine games, seven of which it sewed up in the first period by grabbing the ball and marching for scores, it became the personification of the modern Single Wing.
Counting freshman year, it had taken the seniors four full beats to reach the CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 17 heights and in that period they absorbed more football than any group of men I have ever coached. From game to game, the 1950 season was my easiest year of football, for the majority of the players had become accustomed to the system in their underclass years and were ready for the advanced Single Wing course, including the long-gainers, the candy plays, advocated by adherents of the T.
Our success in 1950 dramatically illustrated how the popularity of the T has helped the few of us who have stuck with the Single Wing. We see the T week after week in a variety of forms, but in most cases we are the only Single Wing club our opponents face in a nine-game season. A T team, that has been battling T rivals for a month or so, has to give up at least several days of practice to its preparations for a solid Single Wing, if its members, particularly inside linemen, are not to be completely confused by the power and trap- designs of the Single Wing.
The development of the 1950 team again drove home the point that there are no short cuts in coaching. Ready-made football players, meaning those natural athletes capable of standing the gaff of college football upon graduation from secondary school, come along all too seldom. Only eight of our 1950 lettermen were potential college regulars when they entered Princeton. Six of out 1950 stand-bys had spent one or more seasons with the junior varsity, and a regular guard, after failing to make his freshman squad, had been a jayvee for one season and a fourth-stringer on the varsity before he developed into an offensive starter in September of his senior year.
Men, like that slightly built guard, who refuse to give up on themselves and keep plugging away until they make the grade, explain why coaches go right on coaching and why few of us look upon the number of wins and losses as the true index of our success. Now and then you come up with a team like the 1950 Princeton team, but after the thrills of success have faded and you drop back to normalcy, it is the men, not the scores, you remember.
In coming down through the years, tracing the step-by-step Evolution of the Caldwell version of the Single Wing, I am afraid I may have sounded egotistical. Gone are the days when the head coach constituted a one- man staff and worried as much about the minutiae of football as he did about the so-called big picture. Nothing could be farther from the impression I would like to create, inasmuch as coaching today is a staff proposition, out and out, and no head coach can be a bit better than his staff. In my opinion there CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 18 isn't a man in the profession who can fulfill his coaching mission to the best of his ability without the full-time help of other coaches, of specialists possessing a searching knowledge of the science of football.
The rapid advance of the sport, with the still-growing emphasis upon individual techniques and both team and individual specialization, has created a variety of teaching problems that are directly related to the time factor. With only a limited number of hours at your disposal, say a maximum of two hours a day at the height of the season, you squeeze as much as you can out of every available minute in the same way a teacher organizes a laboratory course in natural science. Daily practice-schedules are laid out ahead of time and the basic element in the football curriculum is the group-work conducted by the assistant coaches.
The football staff in the l950's is reminiscent of a military general staff and a head coach worries as much about the unity and morale of his staff as he does about the physical and mental condition of his squad. The head coach, following through the military analogy, is a combination of the chief of staff and commanding general; his assistants are the staff section chiefs, who are consulted every step of the way. Only rarely do I make command decisions alone, because I have found that it is sounder procedure to act upon and abide by staff decisions. When it is difficult to reconcile conflicting thoughts in open discussion, I of course step in and we move on from there as a staff.
Our varsity staff - partnership would be an equally descriptive term - is a smaller and perhaps more compactly organized unit than the staffs at many major institutions. Not until 1949, with our switchover to the two-platoon system within the limitations imposed by manpower, did we add a fifth man to the staff. Up to that point we had retained the traditional compartmentalization, consisting of the head, or team coach, and coaches in charge of ends, linemen and backs. The fifth man, sometimes referred to as assistant line coach or center coach, was essentially a defensive coach, charged with implementing the defensive strategy conceived by the staff as a whole.
The use we make of motion pictures, teaching aids we couldn't do without, illustrates how we operate as a staff. On the Sundays and Mondays following games, we generally spend fifteen to twenty hours with the game films, grading every man on every play, offensive or defensive, in which he participated. The backfield coach charts the performances of his group, the line and defensive coaches grade the linemen, the end coach the ends. After the marks have been CHAPTER I THE HUMAN EQUATION
Page 19 posted and the individual breakdowns analyzed, the group coaches meet with their squads and then sit down with each man, explaining shortcomings and offering any criticism in private rather than in the presence of others. The quarterbacks, both offensive and defensive, are my responsibility during the grading-sessions.
The following week's work is planned Monday morning, on the basis of what we have seen in the films and after the scout, normally a member of the varsity staff, has presented the salient facts about next Saturday's opponent. Copies of practice-schedules for recent years are close at hand and we refer to them frequently in blocking out the work-hours ahead. Each member of the staff has an opportunity to state just what he feels his group should concentrate upon and is urged to make suggestions about the routine for the entire squad.
During the season, the members of the staff will devote an average of five hours a day to staff meetings. Military staffs have their situation rooms and we have our strategy room, which is off-limits for everyone except staff members and the junior varsity and freshman coaches. There we assemble after breakfast, after lunch and in the evenings. Our get-togethers may start out as semi-formal around-the-table conferences but they soon break up into a series of individual discussions. I set the pitch for the sessions, outlining with the aid of films and the inevitable chalk-talk the general objectives and team problems.
Once the main points have been covered, the staff turns to details. I may be at the blackboard with the backfield coach, possibly checking spacing or trying to devise methods of improving our timing on a particular play. The defensive coach will be briefing the junior varsity coach on the type of offense he would like to have the jayvees use the following day. The line and end coaches will be off in one corner, running and rerunning game films in the hope that they will be able to pinpoint why so-and-so couldn't adjust to a new situation, or why a sure-gainer was stopped at the line of scrimmage.
While there may be nothing unique about our work-sessions, they are mentioned at some length to show that present-day coaching is cooperation multiplied to the nth degree, that a head coach in talking and writing technical football is first of all the spokesman for a battery of coaches. The following chapters on the what and how of the modern Single Wing are the result of thousands of hours of staff-teaching and staff-coaching and are presented as the work and cumulative experiences of the members of the staff. CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 20 FUNDAMENTALS
In presenting the Princeton offense, we start with the fundamentals that are taught to linemen and backs alike. Some players have an instinctive grasp of them, others have to be carefully drilled. Actually, in teaching fundamentals, our approach is to make blocking, in the basic sense, a reflex. It should become an acquired habit, requiring no mental effort. Reaching this goal calls for slow, sound building.
Princeton's offense has become noted for the decisiveness of its blocking, both team and individual. A block cannot be thrown without first getting in position, so lesson number ones the proper stance.
STANCE
Modern defensive shifting, forcing as it does the last-second switching of blocking assignments, calls for a stance which allows a blocking lineman to pull to either side or to go straight ahead. His feet should be planted straight ahead and parallel, spaced about shoulder width, one foot three or four inches back, according to individual preference. He should ease down from the hips, back straight, eyes ahead, putting down the hand on the same side as the back foot. It should be done naturally, without reaching and with a little weight on the knuckles. From this position he can go in any direction.
In lining up, players should align their feet with the next man to avoid bows in the line. See Diagram 1.
PREVENTING BOWED LINES
DIAGRAM 1
Backs should use the same fundamental stance except that not all of them use the three point one. The wingback does, but he is not always squared with the line of scrimmage. In some cases he can be cheated around, either out or in. All other backs place their feet the same but do not put a hand down. They stand with hands on knees, heads up and body weight evenly distributed, providing the opportunity for movement straight ahead or laterally. CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 21
SHOULDER USE
In our offensive charge we are not interested solely in stunning the defense with the initial impact, and we therefore try to teach a step charge as opposed to a lunge or uncoil. We want the blocker to step off on the charge, holding his feet and sustaining the block above everything else. This ability to sustain a block is all important, which is our reason for preferring the step charge.
Learning the use of the shoulder should come first in all blocking, including the step charge method. Once this is a reflex action, the remaining blocking techniques become routine. Since the use of the shoulder is also a fundamental in tackling, learning how to use it serves a double purpose.
Let us consider first a shoulder block using the left shoulder against a defensive man head-on, or on the left shoulder of the blocker. From the proper stance, the first movement is a feint to the left with the head, while stepping into the man with left leg and shoulder. Then, bringing the head back to the right and dipping the shoulder to aim at a point just above the opponent's thigh, the blocker lifts and starts to drive. A helpful gimmick for maintaining contact is to keep trying to step on the defender's toes. The blocker's arms come up to a thrust, forming a solid blocking wall to stop a spin out or slide, and his neck and shoulder keep the contact while his legs move at top speed, driving up under the body. He should try to work around, keeping his body between the defensive man and the ball or direction of the hole.
This should all be done as a form of reflex, with the left foot and left leg under the left shoulder at the time of contact to give added lift and drive when needed most. Thorough drilling should make this a process that does not have to be thought through. The blocker's head is up at all times.
The procedure is reversed for the right shoulder block, and again the important thing is to get the right leg close under the shoulder for the start of the drive.
CROSS-BODY BLOCK
The cross-body block is essentially a natural development from the shoulder block and should be taught as such. All blocking, actually, should be taught as stemming from the basic principle of getting the shoulder in first, with the leg under the shoulder. CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 22
The need for the cross-body block comes when the defensive tactics of the opponent cause the blocker to convert from his original shoulder block to a side-body block. In the shoulder block, we pointed out that the blocker's body should always be between the defender and the point of attack. The fundamental shoulder block achieves this purpose unless the defensive player retreats.
If the blocker has made proper contact for starting a shoulder block and the defender starts to retreat, sliding laterally to the play, the blocker must be prepared to switch to a cross-body block. Again we use the left shoulder as an example. To slip into a cross-body block, he comes up fast with his legs and extends his left arm out and beyond the opponent's left leg, trying to reach the ground with his hand, while bringing his left leg up between the defender's legs. This builds an effective wall across the opponent's legs with the side of the body.
This should take the defender off his feet, and it is important to maintain the wall by crabbing forward on all fours until this is achieved.
The same principles apply when this block is thrown on the run. The shoulder should go in first, followed immediately by a slide on by into the cross-body. By driving the shoulder in first, the blocker avoids that often-seen situation of a man hitting the ground far short of his target. Proper use of the shoulder fundamental soon develops effective cross-body blocking for both close-in work and openfield technique.
REVERSE CROSS-BODY BLOCK
The reverse cross-body uses another of our fundamental blocking principles: the taking advantage of a position or angle held on an opponent. The situation calling for this block finds the blocker having lateral position on a defender who is moving directly or obliquely toward our own goal line in pursuit of the ball carrier. See Diagram 2 for the positions involved.
This is called a reverse cross-body because the blocker reverses his position by throwing his head in the direction of his own goal. This is effective as it brings the heaviest part of the body into play for striking the blow. The technique is as follows:
CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 23 POSITIONS FOR REVERSE CROSS BODY
DIAGRAM 2
When the opponent's right side is exposed, the blocker approaches with his own left side, getting as close in as possible before throwing the block. With his head pointing toward his own goal, the blocker makes his final take-off from his left foot in close, dipping his left shoulder into the opponent's mid-section. On the next step with his right leg, the blocker throws his hips onto the defender's exposed leg, putting his left leg in behind it and rolling his body up and in until the opponent's exposed leg collapses under the weight of the drive. The secret of the power in this block is in holding the rolling of the body until close enough to reach the opponent with good drive. If the block is thrown from too far out, the power of the drive is expended too early, allowing the man to side-step or dodge. We will further discuss this block in later sections.
PEELBACK BLOCKING
Although this type of blocking is certainly not a novel idea, we do feel that we are unique at Princeton in teaching it as a fundamental theory. The team as a whole becomes "peelback" conscious, and it becomes the rule rather than the exception to have two or more blocks by any individual on one play.
Stated simply, "to peel back" means to block behind the runner, and it has an important purpose. The slower linemen and those with speed who are not in a position to get ahead of the runner can contribute a block by taking men who are chasing the ball carrier. This allows the ball carrier to make better use of fakes and maneuvers in avoiding tacklers ahead of him, in the assurance that pursuing tacklers will be "peeled off" his back. The time given him to make these maneuvers, when he might otherwise be overtaken, is an important factor in springing him loose for the whole distance. Peelback blocking can be extemporaneous or it can be assigned, as will be shown later in play assignments. Perhaps its best aspect is the way it makes the team look for the impromptu block that can be the key to a touchdown after the runner seemed cornered. The actual technique calls for either a long body block or a shoulder block. The CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 24 relative speeds of the blocker and tackier determine the point of inception. If the tackier is moving faster, the blocker should hit low, aiming for a point just above the shoe tops. Since the tackier seldom sees the blocker in this case this is usually sufficient to cut him down. If the blocker is moving faster, he can aim higher, usually for the top of the thighs at the opponent's point of bend. When the defender is merely standing around, a good shoulder block to the midsection will do the trick.
We use films of peelback blocking to point out the advantages of this operation. They have been effective in impressing the team, so that we sometimes have a single peelback blocker cutting off two or three tacklers. In the films, we stress cases where the lack of peelback blocking prevented a runner from going farther, pointing out the spots where the blocks could have been thrown. Then we show pictures of long runs clearly made possible by peelback blocking. The teaching points are clear and simple, and the peelback has taken its place as a basic fundamental of a blocking offense.
PASS PROTECTION BLOCKING
Protecting the passer is the vital element in a successful passing attack. The soundness of the protection for the passer stems from the design of the blocking assignments for this purpose and the teaching of the technique to carry them through. At the moment we are only concerned with the theory of the individual's technique. Assignment patterns will come later.
We tell the individual blocker the point from which the pass will be thrown, and we give him limiting areas from which his opponent must be kept. He must first get between the opponent and this area. Since this usually involves dropping back, it is imperative for all linemen to move backward on balance and low, legs moving, while waiting to make shoulder contact. Both arms are brought up to form a wall with the shoulders to help in preventing penetration.
Once again the position of the blocker and the speed of the opponent determine the type of block. If the defensive player comes in slowly on a straight line over the blocker toward the passer, the blocker should try to hold ground and steer the man away from the limited area. If the opponent is moving fast, a low cut-block will take advantage of his momentum. When he is coming in fast from an outside angle, he is set up for the reverse cross-body block previously described.
CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 25 On some pass plays the ball is thrown quickly and there is no need to protect an area. However, the opponents must be cut down so that their hands are not in the way of the pass. In this case, all blockers immediately throw hard, low blocks in an attempt to clear the opponents' hands out of the path of the ball. In general, once basic blocking fundamentals are mastered, pass protection is a matter of selecting the best block for a situation. The important point is to get the blocker in proper position and on balance ready to execute the proper block.
POWER BLOCKING
Power blocking is the proper and simultaneous application of individual blocks on one opponent by two or more men. In order to get the best results from power blocking, we consider the following factors: the position of the defensive men, the requirements of our plays and the type of defense encountered. Here are the methods and procedures (see Diagram 3):
Two on One Power Block
Since all power blocks or double teams use two men on one defender, this is a somewhat ambiguous term. It is actually the title we give to the block familiar to most football people as the straight power block from Single Wing. It comes when the defender is lined up in the seam between two offensive men, putting him on the inside shoulder of each blocker, and is used on a play requiring the defender to be moved backward and out of his original position, but not to open a hole. Good against any method of defensive play, it is particularly successful against a high playing type of defense.
This double team calls for simultaneous shoulder blocks by the two offensive men. On the starting signal, both of them step in to the defender with their inside foot, attempting to get a shoulder block, with their heads on each side of the defender, pinning him with their shoulders. They must have their legs under their shoulders and keep their bodies together, both in the shoulders and trunk, so that their drive will be in a straight line, forcing the defender back. If both men slant in from an outside position, the defender can split the seam between them or stall them with a minimum defensive charge, taking advantage of the weaker mechanical force applied. As already pointed out, this block works best against a man playing high, since the blockers can get in to his mid- section with their shoulders. It is still effective against most types of defensive charge if the blockers concentrate on staying low and keeping their bodies CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 26 together. As an assigned block, the two-on-one is not used much, but it accomplishes the same result as most of the other power blocks. It is a good block for using in practice to develop drive and power in the offensive line.
Shoot Block
This is the best double block we can get in our Single Wing formation. In it, both blockers have blocking, or flanking, position on the defender, who is lined up on the outside shoulder of either of the two men. Let's take here a defensive man lined up to the left side of the offensive pair. The method of applying the block can change to good advantage if the defender is using a known charge, either hard or soft.
The assumed method is always that used against a hard charger. The blocker on the left takes a lateral step of about twelve inches with his left foot, pivots to the left and throws both hands to the ground directly along the line of scrimmage. This is to place the heaviest part of the body, the trunk, across the path of the opponent's charge. The blocker must keep fairly low, with his left leg well up in support of his shoulder so that the opponent's drive does not spin him around. His purpose is to delay the defensive man long enough for his blocking partner to make contact and apply the power. The maneuver above is called the post block.
The other blocker, the one who applies the power, is called the shoot blocker. His first move is a step about half way to the defender with his right foot, then a drive along the line of scrimmage with his next step, bringing his left foot and left shoulder in to bear on the exposed side of the defender, in accordance with the fundamental principle of having the leg under the shoulder. This also prevents the defender from sliding off into the slot between the blockers. The purpose of the shoot block is to obtain a lateral opening, and as the shoot blocker gets contact and begins to move the defender laterally, the post blocker comes up and joins him in a two-on-one block, driving along the line of scrimmage.
If the opponent is a known soft charger, the post blocker's first movement is to step right into him with the right foot and right shoulder. The shoot blocker steps with his left foot in this case, in order to reach the sliding defensive man more quickly. While the shoot blocker is driving to get into position to make a lateral opening, the post tries to keep the slot between him and the shoot blocker closed. Against this type of defense play, not as much lateral movement CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 27 is obtained. Instead, the defender is moved back and to the side. The post blocker must remember not to drive too hard until the shoot blocker has made contact and applied power.
These are the two methods of double teaming a defender on the outside shoulder of one of the blockers. The steps and blocking roles are reversed, of course, if the defender is on the right shoulder. The positions obtained in this type of block give the opportunity for a perfect power block, making an excellent opening for plays developed from this phase of blocking.
Power Block
The block we specifically call a power block is the same as the shoot block, except the defensive man is lined up head-on either one of the blockers assigned to double team him, instead of on the outside shoulder. Here the blocking angles obtained are not as advantageous, but the shoot blocker still has an excellent blocking position.
Taking the case of a defender head-on the man on the left, we find that man, the post blocker, preventing penetration. He steps in with his right foot in a one step charge and hits and lifts with his right shoulder, the objective being to take away the opponent's charge and straighten him up. This keeps the opponent close to the shoot blocker, who steps in with his left foot and gets his left shoulder and leg in at the same time. He pivots on his left foot, driving around with his right, applying power along the line of scrimmage to move the opponent laterally. Timing is the key to the success of this block. The shoot blocker must come in with the full power of his leg and shoulder in a lateral drive at the instant the post blocker has checked the defensive charge. The only variation in technique in meeting a hard charge or a soft charge with this block is a somewhat lower block against a hard charger.
Post and Lead Block
In this situation, the defender is in the slot or seam between the two blockers assigned to move him laterally. We have already shown how a plain two-on-one block can be used to move a defender in this position straight back. It is harder to move him laterally, but it can be done if the following procedure is carried out. The block is actually an initial impact and a brief struggle, with the two blockers finally prevailing, and moving the defender laterally. It takes a little time to effect a lateral opening. CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 28
The blocker on the right is the lead blocker when the defender is to be driven to the left. The lead man takes his first step with his left foot, moving six inches to the right to get a better blocking position. As he does this, the post blocker takes a step laterally and slightly back with his right foot to put himself directly in front of the opponent's charge. The post blocker must drop very low as he steps over, bracing himself to stop penetration. The lead blocker now pivots on his left foot and drives hard along the line of scrimmage with his left shoulder and left leg. The initial contact with the defender's charge is made by the post blocker who must be low and coming up, in order to lift the defender and halt the charge. The post fights to keep the seam closed, waiting to pick up and drive until the lead blocker has moved the defender far enough so that the post's drive will be a help in lateral movement. It is obvious that moving the opponent laterally takes time. This block seems awkward at first and requires a great deal of work, but it is the best means of achieving a lateral opening when the defender is playing in the slot.
DIAGRAM 3
Wedge Blocking
The wedge block uses the three-on-one principle. Three offensive blockers should be able to move one opponent either laterally or back. This block is listed here under fundamentals, but it will be discussed in detail in the section on the Wedge Play.
CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 29 Special Blocks
Not all double team blocks fall into the categories we have given above. For instance, the end and wingback on the strongside of the formation work together on the defensive tackle. The end and shortside guard of the formation work together on the other defensive tackle. Two backs may work together on defensive ends. Since these blocks are not fundamental in aspect and cannot be taught as such, and since time will not allow the teaching of these blocks to all men, their techniques will be taken up in discussing the plays in which these blocks are used.
PULLING TECHNIQUE
"Pulling" is the term given to lateral movement by all offensive players; linemen, centers, ends and backs. Its success in operation involves many factors but, as in blocking, we build from a fundamental base. We mentioned that the basic stance, which was described at the beginning of this chapter, allowed for individual movement in any direction, and the same stance applies here. The individual's primary concern in pulling is with the speed and direction of the pull, governed by the timing of the particular play being called. Speed of the initial getaway is all important to avoid any entanglements at the start. The two major methods of pulling are the cross-over type and the lead step type. We prefer to use the lead step type of pulling, with particular stress on certain important details that are often neglected.
Let's take a pull to the right. The player is in the three point stance, either hand down, body up, eyes straight ahead. On the starting signal he steps with his right foot to a spot six inches back and to the right of its original position, planting his foot to point in the exact direction he wants to travel. For a run parallel to the scrimmage line, the foot would turn ninety degrees. The angle would be more, for a deeper pull, less for one slanting toward the line. In taking the step, the head, shoulders and trunk swing simultaneously over the right leg without raising the body, while the left leg pivots on the toes merely by raising the heel. We emphasize that this step does not have to be made far out to the right, but at least in that direction to avoid lost motion. The player is now in a modified sprinter's start and ready to move in the direction established by the aim of the right foot, with the left leg up on the toe and ready to drive the body forward. Doing this all at once allows the right foot more freedom in opening the angle, to be followed by a quick getaway. CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 30
We stress the importance of maintaining the original crouch during the step and pivot to avoid the waste motion of first raising and then turning. The getaway is made at maximum speed while still low, and we like the pulling man to run as low as possible. The body will rise automatically once the running starts, but it is a gradual rise that does not affect the speed greatly. We work on building up running speed in a low position, but the getaway speed and direction, more than the running speed are the keys to successful pulling. By becoming adept at the pivot and getaway, some linemen who lack natural speed have been able to play regularly ahead of faster men.
Running the course comes next. Balance is very important, as the puller may be called on to throw a block at any time or to make changes in course necessary to carry out his assignment. Short, driving steps help maintain balance; and the proper use of body weight to reach the objective on balance and in the shortest possible time must be learned. Running steps should not be squared and no square turns should be made.
We have our men think of running in a circle, which would be a circle around to the left in pulling to the right. As the player runs this circle, he can shorten its perimeter by leaning his weight to the inside and driving to the inside with each step of his right foot. Leaning farther to the inside and driving harder will reduce the perimeter accordingly. Thus, in running the course, the player must plot a run that will get him around the turning point with maximum speed. Most pulls through the line to linebackers, to go farther downfleld, or to get outside position on defensive linemen, are in some form of gradual curve. This curve varies with individuals and their body balance, but it runs fairly uniformly throughout.
Pulling assignments fall under three general categories: Trapping Pulls; Pulls through the Line to Block on Linebackers; and Pulls to Act as Personal Interferer.
Trapping Pulls
A trapping pull calls for a block from the inside on a defensive lineman who has been exposed by moving offensive men away from him. The trapping pull is combined with a power block, based on a four man unit. See Diagram 4.
CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 31
Diagram 4
The trapper makes his initial movement as described earlier but places his right foot short of ninety degrees. He aims it on a line through the original position of the post blocker and runs on this line to get blocking position with his right shoulder. He takes short steps so that he can change his direction at any time to gain his blocking position.
The success of his assignment is governed by his position, therefore, his original direction takes him to the worst position in which he could find the defender, that of no penetration. When the defender has not penetrated, the trapper uses a shoulder block. In fact, he uses the shoulder block except in cases of deep penetration, in which case he would come back sharply on his trapping curve and throw a reverse cross-body block. He is prepared, by using short running steps for proper balance, to change his course, depending on the penetration of the man to be trapped. Speed, agility and the ability to run a course are important in performing trap blocking.
Pulls Through the Line to Block on Linebackers
This assignment is usually connected with both a trapping pull and a power block on a given play. The puller in this case is the second man in the opening, following the trapper, and will therefore be lined up farther removed from the power block. He makes his initial movement with a lateral step at an angle greater than ninety degrees and will then run a curve that takes him over the spot where the post blocker lined up. Balance is important so that he can be prepared to block the linebacker, using a cross-body block for the man on the inside, a shoulder block for the man directly in the hole, or a reverse cross-body for the man coming up on the outside. See Diagram 5.
His course is a gradual curve that allows him to clear the men on the line of CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 32 scrimmage and get into the opening to time with the ball carrier for the most effective blocking. The distances may vary on this type of pull, since the trapper may be a backfield blocker not a lineman. Where the distance is short, and curve of the pull is sharpened, this is Probably the most difficult type of pulling to accomplish, since speed, balance and the course of pull must be combined with good timing and good blocking ability.
PULLING FOR LINEBACKERS
DIAGRAM 5
Pulls to Act as Personal Interferer
This type of pull is governed not by distance from the opening, but by timing with the ball carrier. In most cases, it involves outside plays where there is some delay in getting the ball carrier and the interferer started downfield. The pulling lineman takes his lateral step at an angle greater than ninety degrees and runs a deeper curve behind the line of scrimmage. The direction of the pull is determined by the position point at which he starts to lead the ball carrier. Accordingly, his course will be deeper and his curve sharper. Speed in this pull is necessary for getting away quickly. Success in blocking does not depend simply on the fundamental ability to throw an openfield block, but a good deal on the back's ability to use the interferer by setting up the block. The burden is on the pulling lineman to get in position with enough speed to lead the ball carrier, and the back must know how to use the blocker who is now in position to block for him.
NUMBERING PERSONNEL
Modern football has changed our methods of referring to offensive personnel. The old nomenclature of all positions becomes involved and inadequate under our signal system when considering all the variables in assignments caused by changing defenses. Our offensive players are designated by numbers 1 to 10 and X for center: #1 to #4 are backs, #5 and #6 ends, #7 and #10 guards and CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 33 #8 and #9 tackles. These numbers assigned to ends and backs are helpful in establishing the signal system. Diagram 6 shows how our linemen are numbered across the formation both right and left.
In the coach's ideal dream formation, all men are of equal and outstanding ability. Since this is in the realm of daydreams, we must take a more realistic view. First we consider the -attack in general, then the basic fundamentals to make it go. It is very important to fit the available material into the proper positions, based on knowledge of the requirements of that position and the individual's fundamental abilities. Actually this work is mainly the function of our freshman coaching staff. The position requirements to be considered for successful slotting of personnel by fundamental abilities are as follows:
BACKS
The backs are numbered: #1wingback, #2quarterback and blocking back, #3fullback, #4tailback. Fitting a backfield candidate into the proper position is sometimes the most difficult selection job of all. In varying degrees we have to consider his speed and his ability to carry the ball, pass and block. Perfection would have all backs proficient at all positions, but in practice, recognizing the hairline differences for positions enables us to get a well- balanced back-field.
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Page 34
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Page 35 In theory, #1 should be the fastest man in the backfield, since most of his ball carrying is done on reverses to the shortside of the formation. Along with this, he should know how to use blockers in an openfield and to run with a personal interferer. He is often used as a pass receiver as he is in position to get downfield early on pass patterns. His blocking assignments, which will be covered in the play sections, are generally summed up in a double block with #6 end on the tackle, a reverse cross-body block on the far linebacker, and downfield blocks, requiring him to carry a fair amount of weight. Passing ability comes in handy on reverse passes but is not of primary importance for this position.
#2 is the quarterback and blocking back. Blocking is his most important function and he should have enough size to help him in it. Most of his blocks are individual ones, with trapping the most important assignment, followed by pass protection blocking and downfield blocking. He should be the third fastest man among the backs as he must lead outside plays to both sides and get into the running pass pattern. His ball carrying is similar to the fullback's. The buck lateral sequence has opened new fields for #2 backs. If he can pass, the passing series from the buck lateral becomes an added offensive threat similar to the passing role of a T formation quarterback. In the buck lateral, #2 should be adept at ball handling and faking. Finally, as a quarterback he must develop leadership, poise and ability in calling plays and handling the team in tough situations. Playing this position requires a great deal of football ability, but it will be largely unrecognized in the eyes of the spectators, who watch only the ball carrier.
#3 is the fullback. Theoretically, the slowest backfield candidate can play this position, but his ball carrying assignment is still a valuable one, requiring different characteristics. He should have sustained drive in lieu of breakaway speed. Having both is desirable, but often a person with breakaway speed cannot control it and therefore does not make a successful fullback. On most plays in which the fullback carries, he does not start fast but should fold in on the power blocks. At times, the opening will not appear and since most of the interior plays are aimed at larger defenders, he should possess sustained drive to bull his way through. His blocking assignments are those of pass protection blocks and openfield blocks. Passing ability is desirable but not necessary. The position of fullback in our offense can probably be learned more quickly than the others, but to play it well and to become an outstanding member of the offensive team requires much attention to detail of execution.
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Page 36 #4 is the tailback and key ball carrier in the Single Wing formation. The triple- threat backrun, pass, kickis just as valuable in this position as the name implies. In speed the #4 back is not as fast as #1 but the desirable difference is very small. Blocking ability can be at a minimum, since an intelligent offense does not integrate the #4 back in the blocking, but takes advantage of the threat he offers by using him in fakes when he has no ball carrying or passing assignment. Passing and running ability are of tremendous importance, probably in that order. There are no primary passing requirements, since ability to throw the quick pop pass, the standard protection pass, the jump pass and the running pass can all be utilized. What is required is a tremendous amount of poise and relaxation, since he has to pass under pressure, both from inrushing opponents and when the receivers are covered by the defensive secondary. The ability to pick out receivers and complete passes under these conditions is a remarkable one and a key element in success as a tailback. If tailback ball carrying is stressed, breakaway speed is desired. His plays are designed as long gainers and should go if he uses his blockers properly. His ability to carry out fakes when not involved in the play is also important.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that slotting backfield candidates from a knowledge of their fundamental abilities is not so easy. The intangible qualities that make good backs do not show up early and many of them have to be developed. However, if a boy demonstrates at least some of the fundamentals required for a backfield position, he has a fair chance to succeed if placed in the best position to utilize his abilities.
ENDS
The ends of the formation are #5, or shortside end, and #6, or longside end. In general, end candidates should conform to certain characteristics usually identified with this position. These are more facts of physical make-up than such intangible elements as those described for the backs.
The ends should be the fastest offensive group after the backs, since they are ball carriers upon receiving the passes. Speed is essential if they are to outrun the opposing backs in the secondary. In the matter of relative speed, #5 should be faster than #6. This is based on the nature of their blocking assignments rather than on their roles in the pass patterns of our offense.
Pass catching ability combines inherent and induced traits. Some players are born with pass catching ability, possessing the co-ordination of hand and eye CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 37 important for snaring the ball. Large strong hands are valuable, but not as important as the ability to co-ordinate what the eyes see into action to be taken. Others may have the physical make-up of a good receiver but need training in acquiring proper coordination. Such talented boys can be taught pass receiving.
Height in an end candidate is important, but not required. Naturally, taller players have an advantage in going up for the ball as in basketball, but lack of height alone should not exclude a candidate from the end squad.
The ends are split into two different types of blockers. #6 should be better at the fundamental blocks. He is required to execute individual blocks as well as power blocks. In general, he blocks from a close position. Because we expect #6 to be more proficient at blocking, his comparative pass catching ability can be the lesser of the two.
#5 is the pass receiver and downfield blocker, assignments that follow naturally, as his position allows an early start downfield away from the concentration of strength. His openfield blocks are mostly on linebackers and the defensive secondary, but his power blocks from the split position require a special technique. Because we use speed and pass catching ability in this position in preference to blocking ability, this end is an important operative in our passing plans.
The positions are equally valuable, and the relative importance placed on the blocking and pass catching requirements of each is close enough so that the positions could be interchangeable. The special fundamental requirements are indicated, however, so that end candidates can be fitted into the position enabling them to give their best performance.
LINEMEN
Most of the fundamental material we have covered so far is the basic groundwork for developing linemen. To find the most suitable spot for a line candidate, we put them through all the fundamentals until the individual characteristics and abilities become apparent. A player adept at individual blocks is usually a good power blocker too, but a boy can be a good power blocker without being proficient at individual blocking. Speed is considered both in straight-away running and in quick movements for taking position and pulling.
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Page 38 #7 should be the fastest offensive lineman, and we usually select a player of the guard type in this spot. He must lead reverses for the wingback, the fastest man in the backfield, and be a personal interferer. In general this position calls for individual blocking responsibility both in the open field and on the line of scrimmage. A good individual blocker usually makes a good post blocker, which #7 must be. On pass protection he usually draws the big defensive tackles, so he must have sound procedure there. To sum up, speed and individual blocking ability are the key requirements, with weight helpful but not a necessity.
#8 can be an offensive lineman, normally a good-sized tackle, faster than #9 and ideally as fast as #7 and #10, but not as a definite requirement. This is a key position in the offensive line, calling for intelligence and ruggedness of character as well as blocking proficiency. He is the apex of wedge blocking and an important shoot blocker, jobs in which weight and drive are important. He has important cross-checking assignments and must be a good individual blocker. He pulls as a personal interferer to block the linebacker. These qualities of speed and agility are hard to find in big tackles, so that selecting a boy for the #8 position should be carefully considered.
#9 is usually the spot for the big, slow tackle, but "slow" is used as a comparative term. #9 need not be as fast as #7, #8 or #10. He is a trapper, power blocker, apex for wedges and key pass protection blocker against the smaller, more agile defensive guards. He should be able to get away quickly and get in position to trap, but size is most important, as he is assigned to trap defensive tackles on both sides. He should be big enough, with enough sustained drive, to hit these tackles hard and stop their charge even if he is not able to move them. Working with #8 and the center, he applies power blocks in both directions where his weight is counted on to take effect. We can make the wedge successful when #9 has the drive to lift opposing linemen and move them. In individual blocking he has some cross-checking assignments, usually removed from the play opening, but this is the least important element for success in this position.
#10 calls for a good all-around lineman. Intelligence, speed, individual blocking ability and all types of pull, power and pass protection blocks are required. His assignments run the gamut of the fundamentals we have covered. The section on plays and assignments will show this in greater detail. Of primary importance, however, in looking for a player to fill #10 are speed and pulling ability. He uses all types of pulls, especially trapping pulls and for blocking CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 39 linebackers. If he can execute individual blocks while pulling he has a good chance of succeeding as a #10 guard. Constant concentration on fundamentals and strategy of line play are required in this position.
CENTER
In our Single Wing offense, center is a diverse job, not bound by any set of requirements. We have had successful offensive centers of many different physical make-ups. We have lately had a problem in finding boys for the center position. In 1949, our four man varsity center squad consisted of four converted fullbacks. Their only other common denominator was a desire to succeed as a center, as their physical characteristics varied greatly.
The center must be especially well grounded in blocking fundamentals. His blocking duties range far and wide. In some cases, he is essential to the success of the play but for the most part he is given an average assignment. He should be well drilled in protecting the passer, pulling and trapping, shoulder blocking for check blocks, post blocking, power blocking and openfield blocking. Of prime importance are his duties as a post blocker and pass protector, since these are key assignments. His power blocking is a secondary consideration, since we do not ask him to power-block unless he has the necessary blocking position. Unlike some Single Wing systems, we ask our center to block effectively even when the play is designed to the longside, as this will help in a constant wearing down of the shortside defenders.
The crux of the problem in developing a Single Wing center lies in making him into a good passing center without detracting from his blocking abilities. The best ball passers are the ones who can relax and concentrate on the pass until they have made it, and then switch immediately from the relaxed position to their various blocking assignments.
Stance has been previously discussed for linemen and backs, but the stance of the center is entirely different. Getting the ball ready to be passed is the first point. For righthanders the laces should be on the lower right side one eighth of a turn from the ground. For left-handers, this is reversed. Our stance is designed for right formation and right-handers, since left-handers will do equally as well using the same stance in right formation. The right leg should be forward and the left leg back. The feet are spread wider than a normal stance, and the knees are out over the feet so that the body rests on a horizontal plane between the legs, allowing maximum vision and arm room. Until our centers CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 40 become accustomed to the stance, in early season they knock their knees out with their elbows each time to get the proper spread. About half the ball is under the head. The center's right hand goes on the front right quarter of the ball, fingers down, resting on the laces. The left hand is on the opposite quarter of the ball, more toward the middle, resting lightly. The hands should be placed on the ball without changing its position on the ground.
The mechanics of passing from center are fairly easy to learn, but "feel" and the proper application of the mechanics are slow to develop. The right arm is the passing arm, while the left merely guides the ball. The spiral is made by rolling the ball off the finger tips of the right hand, while the left hand gives it direction, right, left, up or down, by application of pressure. The impetus for the pass comes solely from the hands so that the center can make a quick transition from his relaxed status to blocking position. Since most of our passes are soft spirals with a light touch, the ball is released quickly from the hands, cutting down the time needed for switching to blocking. There is no need to look at the pass all the way into the back's hands. The center can do little about a fumble anyway, and he will have delayed until the defense is upon him, taking away his effectiveness as a blocker.
The long pass for a punt must travel low and fast. Here the center adjusts to the longer pass by using both hands, gripping the ball more firmly and developing a wrist snap. His body must remain low to keep the pass low, since raising the body brings up the arms and raises the point of release. We place emphasis on pushing down the thumbs as the ball leaves the hands to keep it low and true.
The specific assignments and teaching points for the center will be covered in the section on plays. There is no change from the procedure of other linemen in the center's approach to fundamental blocks. He simply must learn to operate from his peculiar position making his pass first and his block second. His success is measured by the extent to which he is able to combine these functions. Much has been written on the importance of the Single Wing center, and we can merely add that we know how valuable he can be, pointing to the excellent records so many of them have been able to achieve.
SIGNAL SYSTEM
The signal system in any offense is the file plan for ready reference to plays. As a file plan it must be clear, concise and comprehensive. We are familiar with the CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 41 various methods of setting up signal systems, but none of them satisfies the complete needs of our Single Wing. We have therefore developed the following system, which we feel is best suited to our method of calling plays.
We have already discussed the numbering of offensive personnel to facilitate reference to positions. The openings in the defense are given a different set of numbers, depending on whether a six, seven or five man defensive spacing is being used. See Diagram 7.
Numbers 2, 4, 6 and 8 are assigned for plays going to the longside of the formation, and numbers 1, 3, 5 and 7, for plays going to the shortside of the formation. As the diagram shows, 1 and 2 are plays outside of the ends; 3 and 4 between end and tackle; 5 and 6 between tackle and guard; and 7 and 8 between the defensive guards. For all even numbered plays, excepting end runs, the power or double block is applied from the longside of the offensive formation. For all odd-numbered plays, excepting end runs, the power or double block is applied from the shortside of the formation. This explains the obvious question on plays numbered 7 and 8 both being between the guards against a six man line with normal spacing. On a play numbered 8, the defensive right guard is power-blocked from right formation and on a play numbered 7, the defensive left guard is power-blocked from right formation. A seven man defense finds all the numbers used for openings, while a five doubles up the off-tackle and inside-tackle openings. When the offense is run from left formation, the defensive openings are kept in the same relation to the formation.
In the Single Wing the only backs in position to receive a direct pass from center are #3 and #4. Thus, our play numbering is derived from a combination of the back receiving the ball and the opening in the defensive line; for example Play 42 or Play 38. All plays that are direct hitters, with no delayed handling of the ball, are numbered either m the 30's or 40's. However, if the back receiving the ball CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 42
DIAGRAM 7 CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 43
DIAGRAM 8 CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 44 has a different maneuver, the name for it precedes the series number to be given; "buck" for the buck lateral maneuver, "spin" for the plays with the full spin maneuver. The fullback half spin maneuver is more easily designated by using the series number of 60. Diagram 8 shows a complete development of the numbers for the plays.
This, then, is the sequence of information transmitted to the team by the quarterback's calling of the signal for a running play. The quarterback gives the maneuver a name, the number of the back who is to receive the ball, the play opening and the starting signal, e.g., 42 on 2; Buck 38 on 3.
The calling of passes differs slightly. For example, we give numbers in the 70's to a passing series. The quarterback then calls 70 pass, followed by the receiver and pattern of the receiver. Diagram 8 also contains this information. Since these passes are thrown by the #4 back, who originally handles the ball, the team is aware that 70 pass starts with a direct pass from center to the #4 back. Pass courses are designated by a word signal based on the pass areas shown in Diagram 9A. These areas are worded in relation to the defensive backfield and the signal of the receiver's course automatically tells the other receivers which area they are to clear for the intended receiver. Diagram 9B, shows that cross and drag apply to the receiver going to the opposite side from his starting position. The elements of pass patterns will be described in the discussion of the passing game.
Modern football requires additional information that must be imparted with a minimum of confusion, such as the calling of flankers and men-in-motion. When we first used these we had our quarterback refer to the personnel by names and the flankers' positions by words. The same was true for the men-in- motion calls. In order to standardize the calling of flankers and men-in-motion, Diagram 10 was put into use.
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Page 45
DIAGRAM 9 CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 46 Calling flankers is done by giving the number of the back to be used as a flanker. This number can be followed by a letter or not. The letter X means that the back is a flanker on the shortside of the formation. No letter means that the back is a flanker on the longside of the formation. The position of the flanker must also be called, which is done simply by saying the number (and letter X if necessary), or by saying, "Wide." Flanker positions are defined as first a flanking position on the defensive end, and secondly, a flanking position wide enough so that there is no flanking threat on the end. Using this concise form for calling flankers, one or more flankers can be called with a minimum of confusion. Flanker positions are assumed directly from the huddle.
"Man-in-motion" is called by giving the back's number, followed by the letter A, for motion to the longside of the formation and the letter B, for motion to the shortside of the formation. The distance that any motion will cover from the formation is governed by the starting signal given for the play.
Flanker and motion signals are given in that order by the quarterback, preceding the calling of the play or pass, e.g., 3X Wide 46 on 3; 2 Wide 43 on 4; 3A 44 on 4; IB Buck 38 on 4.
Starting signals are given following the play or pass and are based on the following cadence: SIGNALSReady, Hike 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.
The quarterback can give his starting signal on any underlined portion cadence. It is a well-known fact that starting is important to the success of an attack. Precise calling from this signal system helps to keep the players' minds on the proper starting signal and in this way helps to achieve satisfactory team maneuvers.
To sum up, the quarterback, in calling the plays from the huddle, uses the following sequence:
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Page 47
DIAGRAM 10 CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 48
For Runs 1Flanker or Flankers 2Man-in-Motion 3Maneuver 4Series Play 5Starting Signal
For Passes 1Flanker or Flankers 2Man-in-Motion 3Maneuver 4Series 5Pass 6Receiver and Course 7Starting Signal
QUARTERBACKING IN THE LINE
This does not refer to a form of gridiron back-seat driving. Quarterbacking in the line, a comparatively new method of expediting plays and assignments, has significantly become a basic element in Princeton's Single Wing attack. Its importance has been clearly demonstrated to us in recent seasons and we feel that a review of the development of line quarterbacking should make a valuable introduction to the explanation of the theories on which it is based.
The game of football has had distinct periods in which the pendulum has swung from offense to defense and from one type of formation to another. Prior to 1940, the swing was in favor of the defense against the Single Wing. A natural result was the offensive swing to the T formation and its use of quick openers, flankers and men-in-motion. The success enjoyed by the T formation is history. Still, those of us who kept faith in the Single Wing believed that new elements could be added to our formation to combat the defensive advantages. From this thinking, one development was the use of flankers and men-in- motion in the Single Wing. This was helpful in giving new problems to the defense.
The Single Wing quarterback still had the burden of calling plays according to the strategy of the game, with the added responsibility of checking the play if the defense encountered was of a type that would prevent success of the particular play called. If new ideas were to be added, some of the burden of quarterbacking had to be shifted.
We decided to take the responsibility for checkoffs away from the quarterback, in favor of adjusting the plays to run against the various defensive spacings encountered. In this manner, we would at least be able to run the play with some chance of gaining ground, rather than risking the loss of ground by CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 49 running the play against an impossible situation, and we would save the delays involved in checkoffs.
Borrowing a prevalent idea, we analyzed the formation to see if we could utilize supplemental quarterbacks in the line, who could make local adjustments in blocking. After studying various standard defenses, we selected #6, #8 and #10 as our offensive line quarterbacks. Diagram 11 shows the breakdown of a normal six man line defense, with the quarterbacking responsibilities for each of our line quarterbacks and the call given for the particular spacing. #6 is quarterback for plays in his area. He calls the blocking for #1, #7, #2 and #8. #8 is quarterback for plays in his area, calling the blocking for #9 and #7. #10 is the quarterback for plays in his area, calling the blocking for #5, X and #9. The apparent overlapping of calls is explained below. We feel that by the use of quarterbacking in the line, even when we are not meeting true spacing, we block the way the line quarterback calls the spacing, which gives us blocking intensity at the mouth of the hole.
Diagram 11 also shows the spacing and calls for the other standard defenses encountered. The emphasis is on calling the spacing that the line quarterback actually sees in his area. Treating it as a local situation, we can achieve a quicker recognition of the type of defense encountered, and the players are able to make quick adjustments for the various assignments. Each play opening in the defensive line is designed against all standard defenses. The assignments for CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
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DIAGRAM 11 CHAPTER II BASIC ELEMENTS
Page 51 each spacing give the blockers the best possible chance to make their blocks.
The calling is done by saying the word-signal given for the various spacings. All three line quarterbacks call on every play with equal and standard emphasis. They are committed to calling the spacing that they see in their area. However, in some cases the interior linemen are concerned with outer spacing and they then listen to the outer calls. The reverse is true for outer linemen and interior plays, explaining the overlapping responsibilities listed above. Thus, there can be no giveaway on the ultimate direction of the play, since all three line quarterbacks are calling, and all men seem concerned only with the problem in their immediate vicinity. In addition, security is established since the call is concerned with spacing only and one call will result in several different and sometimes opposite sets of blocks against identical spacing.
Calling is accomplished in the signal cadence. As the team quarterback says, "Signals," the line quarterbacks call the spacing in their area simultaneously, by word signal, with no break in the general cadence.
The application of this operation to specific plays will be covered in the section on standard plays. This development has made a significant contribution toward lifting the burden from the team quarterback. In addition, it has contributed to better offensive execution. It has given us intensity in blocking on the mouth of the opening and no uncertainty as to assignments, eliminating many costly mistakes.
CHOOSING THE CYCLE
Single Wing teams should enter the season with the straight series of plays which start on direct passes to the tailback and fullback. All plays to the tailback should be designed to hit every defensive hole, either on a carry by the tailback, or on a reverse to the wingback. The straight plays carried by the fullback should be quick hitters, aimed between the defensive guards, particularly if the defensive guards have a tendency to line up in the seams between blockers. Since this area is the most vulnerable to direct attack by the fullback, plays inside the defensive tackles should be of the veer type; those which threaten straight ahead for two steps, before slanting outside the guard's position. The veer by the fullback will make it easier for the blockers to drive the guard toward the center and will also prevent a defensive linebacker from meeting the ball carrier head-on at the mouth of the hole.
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Page 52 The head coach must make a decision on the use of the various delayed and deceptive cycles which have become standard in the modern Single Wing attack.
Most popular of the deceptive maneuvers in the backfield have been the spinning fullback series with # 8 faking to #4 or #1, either on a full or half spin, and, of course, the buck lateral sequence. Other spinning cycles which have been used to advantage are: #4 spinning to #3; also #4 spinning to #3 and #1 plus the full spin of #3 to #2.
To date, no teams have combined the full or half spins with the buck lateral maneuvers, but considerable research has evolved. The results offer distinct possibilities for a blending of these deceptive cycles. The idea of spinning to hide the ball from certain defensive men started in the early 1920's when many coaches were using the Double or Triple Wing attacks. Here again the threat of delayed inside plays prevents the use of outside strength around the ends. End around plays, either from the spin or buck lateral series, are excellent if used to supplement the normal plays in these cycles.
With the tailback straight series, the buck lateral and one of the spin series incorporated in this book, some information about the choice of the latter cycle should be helpful to the coach who has neither the material nor the time to develop the details of both these cycles.
SPIN SERIES Advantages 1. Blends well with the straight series. Change of pace attack, very strong on traps on both tackle and guard positions, the latter also being vulnerable in reverse traps. 2. Has delayed power off the tackles, being particularly strong off the shortside tackle with the wingback carrying. 3. Presents an excellent spin passing attack with particular pressure on the linebackers who must support the tackles. Disadvantages 1. Requires an outstanding fullback who must have excellent balance and ability to pick up speed after a full or half spin. 2. Weak on plays around both ends.
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Page 53 BUCK LATERAL SERIES Advantages 1. Blends perfectly with the fullback straight series. 2. Requires less all-around ability at the fullback position. The big hard hitter is an asset here. 3. Gives an excellent outside play, which is extremely dangerous to packed defenses. 4. Offers a great passing attack, particularly if your blocking back can be developed into a spot passer. The threat of the wide play sets up the wide passing attack to that side. The threat of the buck causes the linebackers to be vulnerable for passes behind them. Disadvantages 1. Poor faking wastes two men in the backfield. 2. Execution of plays to the shortside more difficult to teach than those to the longside. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 54 The previous chapter dealt with setting up the implements of the Single Wing attack. Now, with the fundamentals established, we can take up the planned procedure for advancing the ball.
The first question that comes to mind in this problem is the relative importance of running and passing. Our object is always control of the game, both defensively and offensively. Possession of the ball is therefore of prime importance, with the ultimate goal of scoring enough to win. We have found that scoring is a natural consequence of control of the ball. This has been especially evident in games in which we did not outman our opponents. How, then, to balance running and passing in building the attack?
Based on game statistics, seasonal statistics and our record of never having been held scoreless from 1945 through the 1950 season, our preference is to put more stress on the running attack. We feel that passing plays are successful only as a check on the running game. We loosen the defense with pass plays, and we do score with them, but the importance of stressing the running game was dramatically demonstrated to us in the final game of our undefeated 1950 season. Already in possession of our fourth consecutive Big Three Championship, to complete the season unbeaten we found ourselves faced with the problem of meeting Dartmouth during the famous hurricane of November 25, 1950, under conditions that made playing almost impossible, and passing absolutely impossible.
The Indians naturally took full advantage of the situation by using a seemingly insurmountable eight man line with two linebackers. However, with only the running attack to fall back on, we did control the ball, the offense did prevail, and the team proved itself of true championship caliber. In addition to all else accomplished by that game, it was dramatic proof to us of the theories presented here.
In discussing the running attack in this and the following chapter, we must remain within practical limits if the plays are to be covered in detail. We will follow the outline from Chapter II, the section on our signal system (Diagram 8) and the section on choosing the cycle, covering the straight tailback series for all openings, and the best two plays for the same opening from the three other series. This will give three plays across the defense in detail, using the plays from the buck lateral, full spin and half spin cycles that have, for the most part, had greatest success in the particular opening. We have tried to pick plays that can be adjusted, with a minimum of teaching, to run against any defense. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 55
In developing the cycle, it is important to remember that individual plays do not stand by themselves. Even though we would not expect all the cycles to be used, we are interested in showing the tie-in of the related blocking, demonstrating the pliability of this offense.
Each section will start with an examination of the problems in selecting plays to hit particular openings in the defense, followed by discussion of the blocking, the blocking adjustments to meet changing defenses, and the ball handling maneuvers of these plays. The discussion will cover the technique and assignment details of each position, and we will conclude with coaching tips. All openings will be discussed in right formation only, remembering that left formation exactly reverses the thought and procedure. We would not think of starting a season without left formation, and the advantages of fitting personnel into numbered positions (Chapter II, Section: Numbering Personnel) are apparent here. Individual assignments do not change, the only adjustment being to reverse the technique to work in the opposite direction. Left formation makes the defense's problems doubly difficult, and in some cases left formation will make a play more successful than it would have been in right. For instance, a defensive guard, playing soft, may be difficult to trap. By reversing the formation, we can hit him with power, and a soft charge is certainly not the defense against a power block. If there are teaching limitations, we would recommend reducing the number of cycles to be learned, rather than dispensing with left formation.
We believe that these running plays are good ones since each, with the adjustments possible, becomes a sound one with a chance of success. They all contribute to that vital factor, control of the ballbarring of course, those elements of human mischance all coaches must suffer through, fumbles, bad passes from center and missed signals. Perhaps the details will seem too copious, but these details make the difference in the success of blocking, and of handling the ball. When the player is conscious of the details of the task before him, he is putting his intelligence to work. This appeal to and use of the individual's intelligence in all positions is a contributing factor to the success of modern offensive football.
Single Wing, unbalanced line, lends itself to power between the guards and off- tackle. However, if the defense is playing in a way to prevent normal inside plays from being successful, the obvious solution is to run the ends. Naturally, the way the defensive ends are playing will largely determine the type of play CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 56 used to go outside them. The direct support they are receiving from the linebacker, halfback and, of course, by the defensive tackle beside the end, are other important factors. The position on the field, both horizontally and laterally and the amount of yardage to be gained in respect to the down must be considered. The quarterbacking of outside plays must be carefully analyzed because it involves considering a play which may gain or lose big yardage per try.
The selection of the type of Single Wing play to use outside, has been narrowed somewhat because of the general type of end play prevalent since the ascendancy of the T formation.
In the early part of the 1940's, when defensive ends were responsible for a certain amount of the territory beside the tackle next to them, end play was more penetrating, designed to meet power. The pitchout from the T has made ends so outside conscious that we very seldom meet the old type of crashing end, whose duty it was to pile up the packed interference. As a result, the old type "hook end run," wingback hooking end, has been less useful in the outside attack. The in-and-out end run, which is designed to run either side of the defensive end, has become more effective. In many cases, the defensive end keys on the wingback on his side. On the hook end run, the wingback's duty is to block the close or crashing end. When the end keys on the wingback it causes an immediate widening of the end from his original defensive position, thereby defeating the plan of running around him. As a result, the type of play to use in the around end attack should be designed to succeed against a reactionary kind of end play. By that, we mean an end who protects his outside to the best of his ability without giving himself up on direct smashes into the backfield. It is impossible to know ahead of time whether the ends have inside or outside responsibilty when the quarterback selects an end run play. Therefore, the end run, or reverse around end, must be designed to run either side of the end. The blockers and ball carriers must practice this as a separate unit, because blocking on such a play must become a matter of recognition, rather than a called type of blocking. The basic principle is to contain the defense and to prevent it from using team defense methods to come to the aid of an overpowered end, and then to direct blocking at the end's inside or outside support.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
Consider first the straight series end run, Play 42, against the most favorable CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 57 defensive alignment, an undershifted six man line.
From the straight series, the problem is to get an outside position on the defensive end since all the draw of the play and movement of the backfield is to the outside. This is done by trying to simulate the appearance of an off- tackle play, which play will be shown later. # 1 goes through for an outside block on the longside linebacker, tending to the outside, in order to cut this linebacker off from the outside. #2 and #3 run right at the end as if to take him out, with #2 much more active in faking a block on the end. #2 slides off to the inside without taking the end and continues laterally to knock the halfback to the outside with a reverse body block. #3 works for outside position on the end and runs quickly, under control, so that he can react to take the end on out instead, if the end continues to widen. #6 hook-blocks the tackle with a sustained shoulder to side-body block. One man who gives this play a lot of trouble is the far linebacker coming across. #7 goes through with depth so that he can block back on the far linebacker. #8 has a man head-on him and blocks with a left shoulder block. Because of the control element by #4 and #3, #9 and X (the center) must block effectively back to the shortside to keep the defenders there from overtaking the play. #9 steps in to take the defensive guard with a left shoulder block while X pivots and blocks back on the shortside defensive tackle or end, whichever one is chasing the play. This is an important detail pivot to learn and is described at length in the discussion on techniques. #10 with no man head-on him can escape downfield easily and travels laterally just behind the defensive linebackers to knock the safety man across the play. #5 must escape the defensive tackle's charge and then proceed downfield to get inside position on the far halfback.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 58
DIAGRAM 12
#4 starts out with controlled speed as if to run off-tackle. He fakes in at the normal point to run off-tackle, in order to set up #3's block on the end. After the fake he circles the end while looking for #2 to block the halfback out. He cuts inside this block and between the block by #10 and #5 on the defensive safety and far halfback.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 59
DIAGRAM 13
Running the play against a normal defense does not change the character of the play. It has basically the same blocking assignments for the point of attack. However, #8 must change assignments to let #7 take his guard, and #8 will go through to block the far linebacker. This is done to insure that one man will get through to block the linebacker. The quick draw of the play may bring the guard over, and #7 would then be unable to get through. The remaining assignments are the same, excepting the pivot technique of the X. The play is equally good against a six normal if #6 can get outside blocking position on the defensive tackle.
Obviously, when the defense is a six overshift it is a poor time to use the end run, but it can be run with adjustments in blocking. #2 and #3 continue to combine on the end and CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 60
DIAGRAM 14
halfback. #2 can expect his halfback to come up more on the inside because the end is playing wide anyhow. #1 changes assignment with #6 and gets an outside block on the tackle. #6 goes through to get the linebacker and must be sure to aim wide enough for outside position. #7 and #8 go the same as they did against the six normal defense, although #7's assignment is more difficult with the guard moved over a half unit. #9 has the same problem as #7, but no change in assignment throughout. X blocks the shortside tackle on a specific assignment since this tackle is the closest opponent. #5 and #10 change assignments, since #5 can make a quicker escape. #10 folds in behind #5 and gets position downfield on the halfback.
Running against a five requires a good understanding of the play by #1, #6, #2, #3 and #4. They are the ones most
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 61
DIAGRAM 15
affected by the necessary assignment changes. #6 goes through as he does against the six overshift but blocks the middle linebacker. # 1 goes through inside the end and linebacker to cut flat and block the halfback to the outside. #3 continues to take the end, but #2 must be alert to take the linebacker where he can. The assignments across the rest of the line are standard as versus the six overshift.
Next we study the outside play which fits into the buck lateral sequence, Buck 32. This play, if properly executed, offers great possibilities for gaining ground against a packed defense. Most outside longside plays are developed from the play that is designed versus a six undershift defense, so let us consider that first.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 62
DIAGRAM 16
The assignments here are not varied much from one defense to the other, except for changes in technique. #1 always blocks to the inside on the linebacker, cutting his outside leg. #6 has a pulling and hooking job on the defensive end. As has been mentioned, this will be optional, taking him to the inside if he can, but riding the end outside in the case of an outside-conscious end. #7 blocks the guard to protect the exchange between #3 and #2, while #8 pulls a deep course to become a personal interferer to the halfback. #8 should get in front of #4 at the moment he receives the lateral as protection against an end who drives directly up the field. #9 blocks first on the defensive guard to protect the exchange and then continues downfield to get a peel-back position. X is first concerned with getting off a good pass and then escapes around the guard for a peel back block. #10 and #5 have the same responsibilities as in Play 42, previously described against all defenses. #10 goes for the safety while #5 takes the halfback. #3 uses a buck lateral maneuver and hands the ball off to #2. #3 fakes bucking after making the exchange, and then, if not hindered, will block back to the shortside. He should try to make this look like a carry by himself up the middle. Then he cuts off any defensive man who threatens as a chaser in team defense. #2 executes an eight turn (see page 153, Diagram 56) and receives the ball from the fullback. #2 then uses a CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 63 hop and skip to obtain balance off his right foot to toss a long, low underhand spiral to the tailback. #4 starts quickly to gain speed and depth, before slackening speed on his fourth step to get on balance for receiving the lateral. He then turns the end with #8 as a personal interferer.
The defensive tackle is not blocked but is usually checked
DIAGRAM 17
by either #2 after his pitchout, or by X or #9 peeling back.
Running the play against a six normal, does not require any changes in assignments but only local changes in technique for #7 and #9.
In running the play against the other standard defenses, we try to keep the assignments somewhat the same. Where men are pulling as personal interferers, such as #6 and #8, with a complex ball handling assignment, there will be greater success if the men are used to working with each other. Let us look at the line assignments for a six over and a five-three.
The changes are that #9 and #7 must take a regular blocking assignment to protect the exchange and to prevent early lateral movement by the defense. #5 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 64 and #10 effect the same switch as earlier described in their responsibility for the defensive safety and halfback. X finds it easy to escape to peel back and should get an excellent opportunity to block the unblocked man. Whereas versus the six under and six normal the tackle was not blocked, here the linebacker is not blocked. X may be able to get him if #3 makes a good threat of a buck. # 1 must change to block the tackle versus the six overshift or go through to block the halfback to the outside against a five.
The outside play from the spin series, Spin 32, is not as effective as either the direct play for the tailback outside or the pitchout from the buck lateral sequence. In the spin, #3 gives to #4, who goes outside the end, usually after an in-and-out course that threatens the off-tackle run. #2 now hooks the end as #4 circles the end's position. Many Single Wing teams have achieved signal success on this type of play by pulling the three men on the longside of the formation to lead the ball carrier on a delayed play around the end. This maneuver is particularly effective against a defensive line which is pitching in to stop power, or a line that has a soft charge. The three running linemen form a wall
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 65
DIAGRAM 18 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 66
which screens the ball carrier, with all interferers blocking to the inside to spring the back loose around the end.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1-42
Listens to #6's call on the spacing and adjusts his angle, depending upon the draw of the play. For example, when the ball is shown immediately, as on an outside play, he may expect a different defensive reaction by the linebacker from the reaction to the delayed outside play. The draw here is wide, hence #1 must strive for the position in which the linebacker will be at the time #1 reaches the linebacker's territory. This adjustment is not quite so large when the wing blocks the tackle on the overshift situation, because the tackle here is not affected by the draw as much as the linebacker. Besides, the block is thrown earlier on the tackle, as #1 usually finds him on the line of scrimmage. The call by #6 is particularly important to #1 when the defense is a five, as he now has an entirely different angle block on the halfback, which is again determined by the speed of the arrival of the ball carrier outside the end.
#1 - Buck 32, Spin 32
Expects to find the man to be blocked held by the delay of the play. In all cases uses a cut-block to prevent lateral movement.
#2-42
Runs directly at the end, anticipating a close charge on undershift spacing and a wide charge on the overshift. In any event, he fakes his off-tackle block as close to the end as possible, before ducking inside the end. He continues downfield parallel to the scrimmage line, headed for the halfback, in order to pick up the ball carrier as he circles the end. If the halfback reacts quickly to the play, #2 will find the halfback about on the line of scrimmage. A reverse body block, head toward line of scrimmage, is the most effective block. It should be thrown as close to the ball carrier as possible. If the defensive halfback delays in meeting the play, #2 now assumes the role of a personal interferer as he picks up the ball carrier. This is definitely true when #2 finds an end who defends laterally at the inception of the play, for now #2 can be certain that the half will reinforce the end on the inside. #2's block becomes a shoulder block, going CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 67 into a cross-body block as #4 fakes the tackier into position.
When the defensive end crashes to the inside to close the off-tackle hole, #2 can hook him on his outside. When #2 takes #3's original assignment this way, it causes a switch in men to be taken by #3. However, the adjustment is a simple one, in that #3 now has plenty of time to block the halfback, since the halfback will be delayed in reaching the line of scrimmage.
#2 - Buck 32
#2 performs an eight turn (covered later in detail on the eight trap, see page 153) holding his arms close to his body, elbows tight, forming a pocket to receive the ball from #3, before tossing the long, underhand spiral to #4. A cut-off block on any available victim is in order after the pitch.
#2 - Spin 32
Head-fakes the off-tackle block, before hooking the end's , outside leg.
#3-42
#3 runs directly at the end's outside, timing his arrival to coincide with #2's inside block fake. He should throw his outside cut-block when the end is looking at #2, if possible. The time of this block will vary because of team defensive calls, the width of the field, or because of his individual characteristics. #3 must now be ready to block the end out with a right shoulder block, evolving into a cross-body block, to protect #4's inside cut. #3 must adjust to switch assignments with #2 in case the end crashes inside, so that if #2 hooks the end, he can then be ready to take the halfback.
#3-Buck 32
Sets up four and one-half yards behind #9 to receive the ball from X. He extends the ball with two hands, but actually gives with his right hand, parallel to the line of scrimmage, so that after #2 receives the ball in the formed pocket, the pitchout can be delivered quickly. #3 fakes the center drive after giving the ball to #2, blocking behind the ball carrier if he is able to clear the line of scrimmage.
#3 Spin 32 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 68
Executes an eight spin (see page 155, Diagram 57) placing the ball on #4's right hip with his left hand as he turns. He simulates possession by covering with both arms and fakes a carry on the eight trap.
#4-42
Sets his left foot on line with the ball at four and one-half yards. He runs a veer inside course upon receiving the ball, cutting outside the end at the moment #3 throws the outside block, then turns upheld as soon as possible to start gaining ground, and to take advantage of #2's outside block on the halfback. If the end protects laterally, #4 continues right at the end until #3 makes contact. This will protect against an end who slacks back to the inside. #4 also follows the same technique when #3 has to meet an end who stands on the line of scrimmage. #4 cuts only after contact by #3. After #3's block, #4 uses #2 as a personal interferer on the halfback or he may use #3 for this purpose if the end should crash inside so that #2 hooks him. #4's course downfield is usually inside the block of #5 or #10 on the safety, depending on the spacing on the shortside.
#4 - Buck 32
In all cases, #4 uses #8 as his personal interferer on the halfback. The inside, outside blocking adjustment on the end is not so variable here because of the draw of the play to the center. #4 runs at top speed for four steps before facing #2 in a controlled position to receive the toss from #2. The controlled pace is necessary because #4 can then adjust slightly to a possible inaccurate throw-out by #2.
#4 - Spin 32
Lines up on #3, uses the same steps as when faking receipt of the ball from #3. Forms a pocket on his outside hip for #3 to plant the ball. He must run in a controlled course toward the off-tackle hole before cutting wide just as #2 hooks the end. A fast feed and fake into the line by #3 will help the play considerably.
#6-42
#6's line quarterbacking is done on these outside plays for # 1 and himself. In CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 69 general, # 1 will have better position on the linebacker, providing that the defensive tackle is not so wide that #6 has little chance to hook him from the inside. However, if that tackle does take the six overshift spacing, #6 will make the "seven" call and block on the linebacker, following the same technique described for # 1 on this play. If a five-three is encountered the call is important and thus #6's skill in recognizing the spacing will help to adjust this outside play. When blocking the defensive tackle against the six undershift he starts with a sustained shoulder block evolving to side-body block when necessary. #6 should anticipate an outside slide by the tackle and be prepared to use his legs to get outside position. When the tackle is to his outside #6 steps first with almost a pulling step with his outside foot, to come in with his left leg and left shoulder as he gets hooking position.
#6-Buck 32
#6's call on Buck 32 governs #l's blocking but #6 will pull on all calls to hook the end to the inside. This is the expected design of the play and in order to get this position he must pay attention to the details of his pull. #6 steps first with a pulling step, at an angle of greater than ninety degrees, to run on a sharp curve planning to meet the defensive end at a point about four yards outside of #6's position in the lineup, and with an anticipated penetration of about one and one-half yards. On making contact #6 uses a shoulder block to cross-body on the run. In many cases the end will immediately react to the outside so #6 takes him out and #8 and #4 will proceed inside his block on the defensive end.
#7-42
On this play, #7 shares responsibility with #8 on the far linebacker and listens to his call. On a six undershift call,
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 70
DIAGRAM 19
no one is in front of him and #7 goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker. He should be careful to get his position first on this linebacker, and then use either a shoulder, a reverse, or a cross-body block, depending on the angle with which the linebacker approaches him. If #7 goes straight ahead through the line, he will be assured of good position, as the far linebacker must come quite a way, and this movement takes time.
On the six normal, six overshift and five man line calls, #7 cross-checks the guard in his vicinity, and #8 goes through for the cut-off block on the far linebacker. #7 must stay with this cross-check on the above calls in order to give the tailback a good chance to fake movement into the off-tackle hole before swinging out around the end.
#7-Buck 32
In order to protect the ball handling in the backfield, #7 checks the strongside guard on all calls. The position of that guard will range from head-on #8 to the slot between #7 and #6, depending on the defense used, but #7 is responsible for him at all times.
#8-42
Shares responsibility with #7 for the far linebacker. #8 will go through for the cut-off block on this linebacker on the six normal, six overshift, and five man line calls. The same details apply to #8 on this cut-off block as for #7 on this assignment. However, #8 is closer to the far linebacker and will therefore not have as much time to get set for the block as #7 will have.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 71 #8 - Buck 32
#8 pulls to the strongside as a personal interferer for the ball carrier on all calls. This pull is a deep one, in order to clear the block on the defensive end. #8 should reach a depth of five yards on this pull. Since #2 is using the eight turn on this play, the way will be clear for #8 to aim for this depth early on his first step. As soon as he clears the defensive end, he should turn downfield immediately, headed for the halfback. The tendency for #8 is to keep running wide on this play, but he should strive to turn downfield and start gaining ground as soon as possible. If the end fades toward the sidelines and will not let the play develop outside him, #8 must turn to the inside, and the play will go inside the end. When this is done, as he turns, #8 should look first for a block to his inside, rather than concentrating on the defensive half. Only if there is no opponent threatening the play from the inside does #8 continue on for the halfback. This turning in, and the switch to an inside blocking responsibility for #8 takes a lot of work. Its satisfactory development will be slow, but it is vital against today's changing defenses. #8 may suspect that he will have to turn inside the end on a six overshift call.
#9 - 42, Buck 32
Assignments on both plays are generally the same. #9 has a check blocking assignment on the defensive guard. This is a shoulder blocking job throughout, but #9 can expect, because of the great draw to the outside of the plays, that he will probably have to shift to a cross-body from the shoulder block. On the Buck 32 play, #9 can expect to release from the shoulder block sooner, and, if possible, to head downfield for a peelback block. This is predicated on the threat of #3 to the inside. If #9 finds the guards straying outside, however, he should expect to stay with his blocking assignment in any event.
Center 42
The pass from X for 42 is a one-step lead pass to the tailback about waist high. Should bear in mind the speed of the different tailbacks and vary this lead according to starting ability. X must block effectively to the shortside on this play to keep that tackle and end from chasing the play, and to keep that side occupied. When a "five" spacing is called by the line quarterback, X steps directly at the tackle to stop penetration. When the guard is head-on, X steps into the guard with his right foot and pivots out to block the tackle. On a normal spacing and with no pulling linemen on his left, X can drop his left foot CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 72 and open pivot to pick out his block.
Center Buck 32
This is a buck maneuver pass to the outside of the fullback, also about waist high. X does not have a specific blocking assignment other than to peel back. In going for position to peel back, he should not go downfield very far and should turn to his right, enabling him to see his peelback opportunities. In most cases he will be looking for any of the linemen who turn to go into team defense. When there is no one on him, the X can expect to get over and get in position to peel back on the unblocked linebacker. He should travel slightly deeper and move laterally. This peelback blocking is effective, and, by proper use of his position, X can do an outstanding job to aid in cutting off the team defense maneuvers. The.X should not be anxious to get a block near the ball carrier, but should take the first block he can in order to keep the defensive line contained.
#10 and #5 42, Buck 32
The principle established on these two plays for #5 and #10 is their responsibility for blocking the defensive safety and right halfback. In general, the man with the best opportunity to escape downfield for a block is the one who will take the safety. Against the six normal, six undershift and seven man line, this will be #10's assignment (see Diagram 11 for seven man line), while #5 will take the safety in running against the overshift or five man line. The technique for this is to start with the inside foot and to go across very shallow. This shallow course should be just behind the block being thrown on the defensive linebackers, to avoid being picked off by a fellow offensive player's block. It is expected that the safety will come up to support his halfback and, thus, with proper timing, #5 or #10 should be able to block him across the face of the ball carrier with a reverse cross-body block. Care should be taken not to throw the block until the safety has committed for the ball carrier. If the safety retreats, #5 or #10 should be prepared for a turn downfield with the ball carrier, and then to block the safety either way.
In blocking the halfback, #5 and #10 should start laterally, with the same principle in mind but turning sooner to get blocking position back to the halfback. Ordinarily, the halfback will move over on an arc to replace the safety. When the ball carrier breaks inside the block on the safety, this halfback will then be forced to head in one of two directions. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 73
DIAGRAM 20
#5 or #10 should have come over enough so that he can move to block the halfback making a direct move for the ball carrier, or to continue on downfield and to get a long openfield block if the defensive man chooses the safe course. #5 should work on escaping when a tackle is playing directly on him. This can be done by driving the right or left shoulder and arm directly at the man and raising up. This will break the tackle's hands off #5's shoulder and allow #5 to proceed on downfield. It can also be done by stepping around to the outside and turning back in quickly to head downfield.
#10 should remember when he is going for the halfback to let #5 have priority. He should follow along the same course as #5 but not interfere with #5's opportunity to get down-field for the safety.
COACHING POINTS
This play will be more effective with a fast runner at the tailback position because the cut-blocks may not be sustained against good defensive men. #2's block on the halfback is the block that requires the most practice. This is not the type of play that is effective against a five man defensive line especially a five which employs the ends to cover wide.
OFF-TACKLE PLAYS, 4 OPENINGS
The off-tackle play is to the Single Wing what the dive-tackle play is to 4:he T. With its unbalanced line and its backs well over to the longside, Single Wing is designed to deliver its most effective blow at the longside defensive tackle. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 74 Defensive strategy against Single Wing has always been conditioned by this factor, just as T has taught defenses never to ignore the devastating quickness with which its halfbacks can pick up straight ahead yardage on handoffs. Because this opening is so much a fundamental part of the Single Wing attack, it is advisable to exploit it in more than one way, even though different assignments and adjustments may add to the teaching burden. Single Wing operates off-tackle primarily from three series; the straight tailback series, the spin series and the buck lateral series. Let us discuss first the tailback off-tackle which, for years, has been the mark of the Single Wing formation. This is the play made famous by the Pittsburgh power drives off-tackle under Jock Sutherland in the early 1930's. Because we never know what type of defensive alignment may face us, the play is no longer run with exactly the same assignments of twenty years ago, but potentially we still consider it Single Wing's most powerful play.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
Because the end and wingback are the key blockers on the mouth of the hole, we prefer to run this play, 44, against a six undershift as that gives the wingback the best blocking angle on the defensive tackle.
DIAGRAM 21 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 75
On the undershift, #8 will generally knock the linebacker out, and the ball carrier will cut inside this block to pick up #5's downfield block on the safety man. #10 does not pull through the hole as he often used to do, but instead executes what we call a "seal block" to cover any leakage by the guard, opposite X through the hole left by #9, who goes through to cut off the far linebacker. This seal block has been very successful for us, and we feel a better job has been done in handling the linebackers when #9 goes through for the cut-off type block. By putting only one blocker through the hole ahead of the ball carrier, we have been able to hit the hole faster than we used to, an important improvement when slanting and other evasive maneuvers by the defense make it difficult for linemen to hold their blocks. #3 runs right at the end, cutting either side of #2's block, depending on the end's reaction, and goes downfield for the halfback. #4 takes a lead step with the right foot, one crossover step, and cuts on his third step. He should work to time this cut as closely as possible with #2's contact with the end. End play has changed a great deal since the early 1940's, particularly against Single Wing, and the timing of the ball carrier's cut on #2's block is often unnecessary. The ends have become so outside conscious that they protect their outside almost exclusively. It is no longer necessary to put two men on them, even when running this play on the goal line. Movement toward the ends almost invariably widens them now, as a result of their experience against the T, which hits outside in a hurry. That you no longer have to double-team the defensive end to prevent his smashing the off-tackle play is one of the big changes in thought for the modern Single Wing. The threat of #3's hooking the end from the outside is enough to set up #2's block. In fact, sending #3 in motion that way, or setting him out as a flanker, will accomplish the same thing.
Against the six normal defense, the same assignments are used as against the six undershift. #8, in pulling around the power block, now attempts to block the linebacker in instead of knocking him out as in the six undershift. The ball carrier breaks outside of this block and tries to pick up #3 as a blocker on the defensive halfback.
Details on some of the above blocks change, but with the exception of #8's job, all other assignments remain the same here as for the six undershift. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 76
DIAGRAM 22 We are forced to adjust this play, however, against the five man line or the six overshift. Let's take the six overshift first. When the tackle moves out to a position head-on #1, as he does on the six overshift, the blocking advantage that # 1 has had disappears. # 1 no longer has a flanking position on the tackle, and, with the tackle charging straight on him, simply cannot drive that man inside. Moreover, anything #6 does in the way of contacting the tackle in an effort to help out #l's block will only result in driving the tackle wider. Therefore, we adjust the play up front as shown in Diagram 23.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 77
DIAGRAM 23
Having lost the double teaming advantage on the wide tackle, we adjust and power-block the next man inside, in this case, the guard, with #6 and #7 working together on him. #2, instead of faking the end out, now traps the tackle, who is playing head-on #1. #2's block will be made easier if #1 executes a good driving fake at that tackle from the outside before breaking off, to perform his adjusted assignment, in which he prevents the end from dropping back into the play after the ball carrier is seen cutting into the hole. #3 has the same job of running directly at the end to threaten him with the outside hook block. In this case, #3 can continue outside the end as #4's cut is away from the longside defensive halfback. In the middle of the line, X now goes through for the cut-off block, while #9 and #10 check-block on the line of scrimmage. #8 now adjusts his pull considerably and cuts close around the power block to knock the linebacker to the outside whenever possible. #4 takes his key from the position of the defensive guards, knowing that #6 and #7 are power- blocking together. He therefore shortens up his lateral steps, using lots of action, to allow him to cut short over the power block on the guard. His downfield cut, here, is away from the halfback on the longside, and he attempts to pick up #5's block on the safety and go for what he can get. Against the five man line alignment we adjust again. As far as the line goes, the assignments remain the same for the six overshift. However, #1 has an important change. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 78
DIAGRAM 24
#1 now goes through to cut off the middle linebacker, using a reverse cross- body block if that man is moving into the hole, a straight shoulder block if he is standing still, or a cross-body block if he is drifting back.
#2 takes the end man on the five man line using a right shoulder block. #8 uses the same close pull around the power block as in the six overshift call, but he can now be sure that he will block the outside linebacker out. Again we stress that the ball carrier should run right over the power block, because the outside linebacker may have a deal on with his end on inside responsibility, and our play may well turn out to be a straight trap on outside linebacker. #8's angle as he drives in close on the power block allows him to handle even a linebacker who is coming in to close the off-tackle hole.
These are the adjustments on our tailback off-tackle play, 44. We will cover the details in a moment. Now take a look at Spin 34 and the buck lateral off-tackle play, Buck 34. These two plays are alike in that they both threaten to hit into the middle at the start of the ball handling. For this reason, these two plays are not adjusted up front to run inside a wide, overshifted tackle, as is the case on Play 44. Against the six overshift, both Spin 34 and Buck 34 are de- CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 79
DIAGRAM 25
signed to run outside the tackle anyway, in spite of the fact that #1 no longer has a flanking position on him. This has to be done because the inside tackle hole is too close for #2 or #4 to get into it effectively from the position of their ball handling maneuvers on the spin and buck lateral series. It is better to run both plays against the six undershift or six normal, because, in the final analysis, the flanking position of #1 is pretty important.
It is apparent that Spin 34, against both the six undershift and six normal has practically the same assignments as Play 44. The only difference is that #10 now pulls all the way around the power block on the defensive tackle and leads the ball carrier down to the defensive halfback. #10 has time for this long pull because of the double ball handling in the backfield, and because it is important to give the faking time to affect the defensive players. #9 no longer
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Page 80
DIAGRAM 26
goes through for the shortside linebacker. He must now stay in the line and protect the ball handling by making sure that the defensive guard does not break through to spoil the play. The shortside linebacker is kept out of the play by #3's fake into the line at the conclusion of his spin to #4.
On Buck 34 against the six undershift and six normal, with #2 now carrying the ball, there is no change in assignments against these two types of six. Because #2 is now carrying the ball it becomes necessary to put someone else on blocking the longside defensive end. This can be done with #8, as it is not necessary for a blocker to get to the long-side linebacker too quickly. We want to give that linebacker a chance to react to the inside as the buck threaj by #3 takes effect. #8 pulls for the defensive end then, and #10 pulls for the longside linebacker. The length of #10's pull gives #2 time to do his ball handling and faking chores and still follow #10 closely through the hole. #7 and #9 must check-block the guards in order to protect the ball exchange. X
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Page 81
DIAGRAM 27
makes his regular block back against pursuit from the short-side. #2 uses the buck lateral eight turn (see page 153) so that his turn does not carry him wide of the hole. #10's pull is a shallow one, no deeper than a yard and a half. He generally finds the linebacker inside, so that his block allows the ball carrier to escape to the outside. If the defensive halfback is not held by #4's outside faking, there is a chance for #2 to lateral the ball out to #4 as the halfback comes in to tackle him. #1 and #6, of course, are taking their regular double team block on the tackle.
As stated earlier, no adjustments are made against the six overshift on Buck 34 and Spin 34, as we feel the tackle will be coming in hard when the fullback handles the ball.
You will notice that #3 is shown blocking the far linebacker on these two plays. Of course, he will very often not get through the line to do this, but we feel that his fake will have as much effect in holding the far linebacker out of the play as an actual block. Sometimes a good fake by #3 on
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Page 82
DIAGRAM 28 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 83
DIAGRAM 29
Buck 34 will hold both linebackers inside to such an extent that #10 will be able to lead #2 on downfield to the halfback, particularly after we have been CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 84 pounding inside with guard and tackle traps off the buck series.
Against the five man line, we adjust these plays much as we do the regular off- tackle as to the blocking on the mouth of the hole and on the linebacker. #6 and #7 now power the tackle, and #1 goes through for the middle linebacker, just as they do on 44, the straight tailback off-tackle play. #10 can now anticipate a short pull. Against the five man line, #2, on Buck 34, must be careful not to travel too far laterally, as the hole is very close. This is the most difficult adjustment on this play against the five man line.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1 - 44, Buck 34, Spin 34
On all calls in which #1 works with #6 to double-team the defensive tackle, #1 should be sure that the foot on the side of the shoulder he blocks with is directly under that shoulder at the moment of initial contact. On a six normal, with the tackle in the seam between the #6 and # 1, # 1 should step first with his inside foot, because his contact with the tackle will come on the first step.
Against a six undershift with the tackle head-on #6 and thus a bit farther away from #1, #1 should step first with the outside foot, as he will contact the tackle with his second step. Again, it is important to have that leg up under his shoulder as he hits.
Against the five man line, #1 goes through for the middle line backer on all three off-tackle ball handlings. On this assignment, #1 should use a reverse cross-body block on his opponent most of the time, as his man will be moving forward into the hole. He may use a shoulder or cross-body block if the linebacker is merely standing or drifting laterally. Against the six overshift on regular 44, #1 influences the tackle and then takes the end out. With the tackle head-on him, #1 should take a hard first step with the inside foot, as this is the leg # 1 would step with if he actually were going to attempt to take the tackle in. After this one step, and a fling of the inside elbow toward the tackle, #1 pivots off that inside foot and blocks the end with a reverse cross-body or right shoulder block.
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Page 85
DIAGRAM 30
#1 does not attempt to drive the end anywhere. He merely stops the end from dropping back into team defense. On Buck 34 and Spin 34 against the six overshift, #1 steps first with the inside foot, as he will contact the tackle immediately. #6 helps out there as best he can, and the inside draw of the play is counted on to help take that wide defensive tackle to the inside. Against this defense, #6 and #1 actually take the tackle any way he wants to go. Often the play does run inside of their block, but remember that these plays, Buck 34 and Spin 34, are used primarily to check a defensive tackle who is driving hard to the inside and is hurting the traps on the guard and tackle.
#2 - 44, Spin 34
#2 always uses a shoulder block (right shoulder in right formation, vice versa for left). #2 listens to the call of #6 to know whether to take the end out, as he does against a six normal, six undershift and five man line, or whether to trap the tackle, as on 44 against the six overshift. He can take a pretty good key, and anticipate the call, by observing the position of the guard almost directly in front of him in the vicinity of #7. However, #6's call is final and governs #2's assignment at all times. The important detail for #2 in taking the end is that his lead step and placement of the left foot is always a bit toward the line of scrimmage, in order to better his blocking angle on the opponent, and to prepare him to meet the opponent at the toughest possible angle. In this, #2 is governed by the regular trapping details that apply to linemen.
#2 - Buck 34
The most important details of this play belong to #2. Without very hard work on #2's steps here, he will have trouble getting into the hole at all, and will be so far behind his interferer, #10, that he will be useless. First, #2 must take the eight turn which is explained in the discussion of the eight hole. Then, after accepting the ball from #3, he must be careful that in turning to run into the CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 86 hole he does not allow himself to move in a curve and thus carry too wide.
DIAGRAM 31
The foot placement for #2 is: (a) an eight turn to accept the ball from the fullback; (b) after accepting the ball, a lead step with the left foot at least parallel to the line of scrimmage, and ideally even a bit toward the scrimmage line; and (c) a long cross-over step with the right foot directly on to the tail of #10 and on into the hole.
Originally, we tried having #2 fake a pitchout to #4 before turning into the hole, but it became apparent that this took too much time, putting him too far behind #10 in the hole for ideal timing. Therefore, #2 no longer fakes to #4 at all, although #4 is still careful to fake receiving the pitchout each time with his hands. It is felt that the timing on the play is more important than the fake to the tailback, which delayed #2 and also tended to carry him wide of the hole.
DIAGRAM 32
#3-44
#3 takes his alignment from #4, parallel with him and one yard from him. On the starting signal, #3 drives directly to the outside for the end. If the end widens, #3 cuts inside of #2's block on him and continues for the halfback. If the end does not widen, #3 goes outside him and immediately turns downfield for the halfback. #3 will always be able to get an effective block on the CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 87 halfback when he cuts inside the end, but seldom will his block be effective when he has to go outside the end.
#3 - Spin 34
#3 sets the alignment, three yards deep, directly behind #9. He uses his eight spin, and after giving the ball to #4, fakes into the eight hole between the defensive guards. If he gets past the line of scrimmage, #3 should attempt to cut off the shortside linebacker with a cross-body block. If his faking is good, #3 will be tackled at the line of scrimmage by this shortside linebacker.
#3 - Buck 34
#3 sets alignment on this play for himself and #4 by lining up four and one- half yards deep, directly behind #9. He accepts the ball from X on his right hip, takes a lateral step with the outside foot, and drives up inside of #2, giving him the ball with both hands. After the ball exchange, #3 must fold his arms back quickly and continue into the line, faking possession of the ball. If he is able to get through the line of scrimmage, #3 should attempt to cut off the shortside linebacker with a cross-body block.
#4-44
On 44, the tailback sets the alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and one-half yards deep, with the left foot in line with the ball. His first step is a short lead, or balance step, then a cross-over step and he cuts on the third step to get up into< the hole on #8's tail. These three steps are not taken laterally. If they were, #4 would be hopelessly behind #8 and unable to use him as a blocker. The steps are taken almost directly at the defensive end's normal alignment position. These are exactly the first three steps that #4 takes on Play 42, when he is running around the longside end. In this way, they contribute an outside threat, while still permitting #4 to get into the hole in a hurry, right behind #8's pull.
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Page 88
DIAGRAM 33
#4 Spin 34
#4 takes the regular spin series alignment with #3, toe lined with #3's instep and four feet from him. #4 takes his regular spin series steps on the fake with #3 (page 156, Diagram 58). He accepts the ball from #3 who should give it across #4's body into the pocket formed by #4's right hip, right elbow and forearm. #4 holds the ball on his right hip (in right formation) with the right hand and forearm, covering it with the left hand. The left shoulder is dipped to help conceal the ball held on the right hip. On the second step after the exchange, #4 cuts into the hole close behind #10. Actually, this is not so much a sharp cut as it is a curved course, designed to enter the hole as quickly as possible after taking the proper time to effect a deceptive exchange with #3.
DIAGRAM 34 CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 89
#4 - Buck 34
#4 takes his alignment on #3, parallel with him and one yard from him. On the snap of the ball, #4 starts hard with a lead step to go outside around the longside end. On the fourth step, he fakes receiving the pitchout from #2 and continues hard around the end, turning downfield as soon as he can. If the halfback is not held by his fake, but commits quickly to the inside to tackle the ball carrier, #4 should be prepared for a lateral from #2. #4 never gets a good block on the halfback here, but he should consider his job well done if his fake is good enough to keep that halfback out there with him until #2 has a chance to get through the hole and under way.
#6-44
Working with #1 on the defensive tackle, #6 is expected to set the tackle up for # 1 and to act as a post on this two-on-one block. #6 should step with his outside foot first at all times as he hits with this outside shoulder, and it is important that the leg be under that shoulder when he hits. #6 should hit hard, attempting to drive his shoulder right to the mid-section of the defensive tackle, but his follow-through should be controlled, as he does not want to drive the tackle around #l's block. #6 should concentrate first on stopping the man, preventing any penetration; and should then work to keep the slot between himself and #1 from being broken open by the defender. When #6 has to adjust on 44 to become the power blocker with #7 on the guard to his inside, he follows the details explained in our earlier section on power blocking.
#7-44
#7 cross-checks the longside guard on six normal and six undershift calls. On the five man line and six overshift calls, he and #6 double-team the guard in his vicinity.
#7 - Buck 34, Spin 34
#7 cross-checks the longside guard on all calls except the five man line. On this latter call he double-teams the first man inside #6 with #6.
#8-44
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 90 #8 is the pulling lineman on all calls and is responsible for leading the ball carrier through the hole and blocking the longside linebacker. The length and depth of his pull will vary depending on the defense faced. However, he can anticipate his pull by the alignment of the guard in his area. He should know that, with a man in the slot between himself and #7 on a six normal call, he can expect his longest pull around the power block of #6 and #1 on the defensive tackle. With a man head-on #7, he can expect to use a very short pull around the power block of #6 and #7 on the calls for the six overshift or five man line. With a man head-on himself and a six undershift call, #8 should anticipate a somewhat shorter pull than on the six normal, and should anticipate blocking the wide linebacker out. We do not tell #8 that he has to block the linebacker either in or out. We ask him to run on the power block, close to, the inside edge of the hole, and to take that linebacker whichever way is easiest for him. In other words, he should utilize whatever blocking angle, or advantage, he may have at the moment of contact. In general, he can expect to block the linebacker out on a six undershift, out on a five man line, out on a six overshift, and in on the six normal call. #8's shortest pull is on the six overshift and five man line calls, in which he takes a very short one-step pull around the power block of #6 and #7. At no time does #8 pull deeper than two yards from the line of scrimmage, because it is important to get into the hole in a hurry before looping or sliding linemen can break down the power blocks.
#8 - Spin 34
Essentially the same details apply here for #8 as on Play 44. Spin 34, however, is not adjusted to run inside the six overshift tackle as in Play 44. Therefore, #8's longest pull on this play will be on the six overshift call, when he goes around the power block of #1 and #6 on the wide tackle. Except for expecting to block the linebacker on this call, #8's details are the same as on Play 44.
#8 - Buck 34
On Buck 34, #8 takes the job of #2 in blocking the defensive end out. This block is primarily a trapping pull and #8 should observe the details that govern good trapping. He must start for the toughest possible spot in which he could find that end, which would be, if the end drove hard to the inside, directly along the line of scrimmage. #8 does not have to drive the end anywhere to effect an opening. However, he should hold the end, stop his inside charge if he has one, and prevent him from dropping back into the play to make a tackle after a four or five yard gain. CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 91
If #8 observes the rules of good trapping, he should be able to get an inside- out blocking position on the defensive end that will prevent his falling back into the play. This block is a shoulder block by #8 and just as he approaches contact, a dip of the shoulders to get in under the end's hands will help. #8 takes the end with this type block on all calls on Buck 34.
#9-44
#9 goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker on all calls except when there is a man head-on him; that is in the five man line call by #8. To effect this cut-off, #9 must remember that the linebacker will be drawn immediately to the longside of the formation by the backfield maneuvers, which show plainly where the ball carrier is going. Therefore, #9 must not expect that linebacker to stand still. He must run an interception course, head for where the linebacker is going to be, not for where he is.
Against the six undershift, it is relatively easy for #9 to get through. However, against the six normal defense, it is important that #9 protect himself against being thrown off balance by the guard in the slot between #9 and X. This he can do by stepping to the guard with his inside foot and throwing a hard elbow against him before bouncing off to head for his interception point on the linebacker.
DIAGRAM 35
If #9 does not do this he is always being thrown off stride and out of balance by a shove from this guard. When the guard is head-on #9, #9 should cross- check him, and X will go through for the cut-off on the linebacker, as indicated earlier.
#9 - Buck 34, Spin 34
Because the ball handling in the backfield must be protected, #9 should cross- CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 92 check the guard in the vicinity of X on all calls.
Center 44
On Play 44, the pass from X is to #4, waist high with a one-step lead. In the six undershift, X has a man head-on him, with the tackle farther to the outside. X must hold his ground for #10 to pull around him. He therefore steps up first with his right foot, into the man head-on him. Then he pivots on his left foot and takes his block on the shortside tackle, using either a shoulder, reverse cross-body, or cross-body block. Against the five man line or six overshift, he goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker, with the same details applying as described for #9.
Center Buck 34, Spin 34
The pass for Buck 34 is a regular buck series pass to the right hip of #3, while Spin 34 is passed to the left knee of #3. X's assignments against the six undershift or six normal are the same for these two plays as on 44. However, against a five or six overshift, he takes the shortside tackle alone. Since there is no one head-on him, X steps right at the close tackle with the foot nearest him, in order to be prepared for a crashing charge. If the tackle does not crash, X can follow up with a reverse cross-body block. These X details essentially hold true for all plays to the longside.
#10-44
On a six undershift or a six normal #10 is a seal blocker. He pulls hard around X, and covers the gap left by #9, who has gone through for the linebacker. If no one is slipping through here, #10 should be careful not to run on over into the hole that is being developed. Instead, he should cut into the line in the area where #8 originally took his stance.
On a five or a six overshift call, #10 check-blocks the short-side tackle, who is on his outside shoulder.
#10-Buck 34
On all calls, #10 pulls to take the longside linebacker. His course on this play should be a shallow one, no deeper than a yard and a half from the line of scrimmage. He crosses in front of #3 and turns into the hole as close as CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 93 possible to the power block. As this play is run primarily as a check on the buck series plays in which the fullback "keeps," #10 should expect to find the strongside linebacker inside him as he "rounds the Horn." Therefore, he should look to his inside as he comes through the hole and block first to the inside. If no one threatens from the inside, he continues downfield on course for the defensive halfback. If #10 runs this shallow course, he will never have any difficulty in blocking a linebacker who has committed to the outside. However, it is very hard to throw a strong block back to the inside against the centrifugal force of this shallow pull, so he must concentrate on the inside block first. If no inside block is necessary, #10 must keep driving, and his course alone will permit the ball carrier to use him as a blocker against a wide linebacker, a linebacker running in, an end falling back into team defense away from #8's block, or a halfback coming in fast to plug the hole.
DIAGRAM 36
#10 -Spin 34
#10 pulls for the longside defensive halfback on all calls on Spin 34. This pull should be three yards deep, and again #10 should attempt to run a close course over the power block. He should attempt to take the halfback with an openfield block in whatever direction is easiest for him, and it is the ball carrier's responsibility to use #10 on this block.
CHAPTER III THE OUTSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 94 #5 - 44, Spin 34
#5 is a downfield blocker on the safety man on all calls. He should go for where the safety man is going to be when the play develops, not for where he lines up. This will bring #5 well over toward the hole. He should attempt to get between the safety man and the ball carrier as the latter's downfield cut should be between the blocks on the longside halfback and safety.
#5 -Buck 34
On all calls, #5 attempts to knock the safety man across the face of the play, as #2 tries to cut away from the longside defensive halfback on whom there is no blocker.
COACHING POINTS
Remember that Buck 34 is not a strong play by itself. This play is used to check Buck 38 and Buck 36, and, if thought of in those terms, will serve well.
In calling for a six overshift adjustment, #6 should be guided primarily by the position of the guard opposite #7. Because of the draw of 44, which shows immediately as a longside running play, #7 cannot be expected to cross-check a man head-on him successfully, and #6 should realize this. He should call the defense as a six overshift and double-team with #7 whenever that guard is head-on, even though the defensive tackle is in the slot between #6 and #1 as on a six normal.
The calls of the line quarterback always take precedence over the spacing. If #6 is continually faced with six over-shift spacing, but the wide tackle is crashing sharply inside, #6 may use the six normal or six undershift call. When he does so on Play 44, #1 must help him on that tackle. This is to take advantage of a tackle who lines up in one defense, but charges to another. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 95 TACKLE TRAP, 6 OPENINGS
This opening should be thought of as a companion to the off-tackle play. It is simple with today's emphasis on changing defenses for a team to take away the effectiveness of the off-tackle play completely by playing a straight six overshift, with the defensive tackle head-on the wingback and charging hard into him. The tackle is a bigger man than the wing-back and it is almost impossible for the wingback to take that tackle in, as the tackle charges on him and reacts with him to meet the play. Anything the offensive end does in an effort to help the wingback drive the tackle in, only helps to drive him out, and the off-tackle play is impossible. In this situation we do, therefore, have an opening that takes advantage of the defensive tackle's wide alignment by running inside of him. It will help if this play looks a lot like the off-tackle play at its inception. Moreover, this type opening will help to keep the tackle at home, and it will relieve the pressure on the outside runs and the running pass.
The defensive tackles, against Single Wing, occupy a very strategic spot. They are generally considered to be pretty much the kingpins of any defense, and are chosen for size and general aggressiveness. Against Single Wing, they are not quite as closely flanked by the offense as are the guards. Moreover, they are farther removed from the inception point of all plays and thus have more time to make their weight and strength tell. We feel that this opening must be worked on, as it will help all the rest of the running and passing plays if the defensive tackles can be slowed up a bit by the trap threat and made to realize that their own strength and aggressiveness may sometimes rebound to hurt them.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
We prefer, then, to run this opening with the opponents in a six overshift or, at least, in that spacing in the immediate area o the hole. Also, we have found this opening to be particularly effective when adjusted against five man line spacing on the longside. The play may be run with a variety of ball handlings in the backfield, which we will discuss in a
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 96
DIAGRAM 37
moment. Consider first the actual blocking assignments and adjustments up front:
In the above spacing, with the defensive tackle playing on #1, to stop the off- tackle play, we have the power block set up in good position for #6 and #7. Regardless of the ball handling maneuvers in the backfield, we want the ball carrier to run right over the power block. #6 and #7 should move their opponent laterally. #9 may run into a defensive tackle who has an excellent trap reaction, but #9 should be able to stop the tackle by running a good trap course for the toughest possible angle. We do not expect #9 to move the tackle; we do expect him to stop the tackle. #8 has an important cross-check here, and #10 should run a close pull right over the power block in order to get a good inside-out blocking angle on the longside linebacker. X is responsible for cutting off the shortside tackle in case he is keying on #10 and trying to run behind his own line of scrimmage like this: CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 97
DIAGRAM 38
X should step at the tackle directly with the leg closest to the tackle to be ready to handle both cases. If the tackle comes across the line of scrimmage hard, trying to catch the play from the rear, X merely shunts him deep enough so that he cannot catch the ball carrier, as diagrammed.
#5 is a downfield blocker and #1 cuts off the far linebacker as indicated. In this connection it is important to remember that the longside linebacker on a six overshift will sometimes play behind the man to be powered, or even inside him a bit. If this happens, # 10 will be unable to get him, as the linebacker can step in behind #10's course and stop the play. However, we have a rule for # 1 that he blocks the first linebacker beyond the man to be powered.
DIAGRAM 39
In this case, there would be no one on the far linebacker but in all probability he would be picked off by #l's block on the longside linebacker. If this happened, #10 would run his regular course, taking either the defensive halfback or the overshifted longside end, who sometimes folds back as indicated to gum the play up.
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Page 98
DIAGRAM 40
Against a five man line, it is not too different except that we now consider the end man on the defensive line to be the tackle and trap him with #9. #1 follows his rule of taking the first linebacker playing beyond the man to be powered, in this case, the middle linebacker in the five-three. #6 and #7 have their power block, which is the toughest for them, but the rest of the linemen do exactly the same assignments as if running against a six overshift.
Against a six normal, with the linemen playing in the slots, we have the ideal shoot block angles that we want for #6 and #7. They should really move that guard! The rest of the men have the same jobs as they do against the six overshift or the five. #8's cross-check is somewhat more difficult, as he has another half unit to go in order to get contact with his man. However, X's responsibility for the shortside tackle is not quite so urgent now as the tackle is not so near him, and we expect X to help #8 by sustaining some of the shock of the guard's charge before sliding off to check the tackle.
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Page 99
DIAGRAM 41
On the six undershift, #6 and #7 cannot double team the guard as he is too far away for #6 to get a piece of him. Moreover, if #6 charges over toward that guard, he will invariably pull the defensive tackle, who is playing right on him, directly inside into #9's attempted trap. The angles are gone for our power and trap four-man unit of #6, #7, #8 and #9. If we are determined to run the six hole against the six undershift alignment, which is, of course, crying for the regular off-tackle play to be run, we will adjust it this way:
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Page 100
DIAGRAM 42
#6 will only hurt the play if he goes inside the tackle. Therefore, we attempt to influence the tight tackle into moving wider and making an easier trap for #9, by pulling #6 hard and wide to the outside as he does on some types of end runs. We lose the double team block on the guard, and #7 must do the best he can with a shoulder block, knowing that he is on his own and that he will get no help from #6. #8 has a long cross-check and must have help from X. #9 has his shortest trap and must be prepared for early contact. X steps to the guard head-on him with his right foot here and braces against his charge. He need not worry much about the shortside tackle, who will have widened to take care of the shortside runs and will be very late on anything to the longside. #10 also has his shortest pull on this alignment. At any rate, the above adjustments permit us to run the play with a chance of its going, instead of having to check it off every time we run into an unexpected six under-shift.
This opening may be run from the spin series, Spin 36. It may also be run from the direct pass to the tailback series, 46, and from the buck lateral series, Buck 36' There are no changes as far as opening the hole goes for these three different types of ball handling. Only #2, #3 and #4 must learn something new. See Diagram 43.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 101
#1 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46
Takes his regular alignment one yard outside and one yard back from #6. On the five man line, the six normal and the six undershift, he has no trouble crossing behind the defensive tackle to block the first linebacker beyond the opponent being powered by #6 and #7. #1 tries to get to this man as quickly as possible, for the draw of the play will pull the linebacker rapidly to the longside of our formation. #l's block is always a reverse cross-body, in order to get the heavy part of his body in front of a linebacker who is driving in toward the hole to make the tackle. Sometimes, particularly against a six normal, #1 will have a problem getting by the near linebacker as he goes across for the far one. We tell him to use his judgment on this, always keeping in mind that it is better for the draw of the play to go behind a close linebacker to prevent attracting his attention to the inside. Against a fairly deep linebacker on the longside, it
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 102
DIAGRAM 43
will be necessary for #1 to cross in front of him ninety per cent of the time in order to get a blocking angle on the far backer-up. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 103 This angle of approach is important for the #l's block. He should never run a deep, curved course or he will fail to get his man. #1 will never get his block on the far linebacker on a course like this:
DIAGRAM 44
He should drive over the heels of the defensive tackle on a six normal:
DIAGRAM 45
On a six undershift and a five man line, his course is easier, because the tackle is farther in and # 1 is not tempted to run a deep curved course.
On a six overshift, # 1 has the tackle head-on him and must escape this man in order to get over to the linebacker. In our experience, if #1 just tries to run by outside the tackle, he will be shoved hard and his own momentum will ruin his course. We have had good success by having #1 "throw" to hands and knees outside the tackle, going very low to escape the tackle's hands. From hands and knees, it is easy to come back in a charging position and on a course to apply a good block on the far linebacker. Also, the low drive at the start often makes the tackle think he is being hooked by #1, as on a sweep, and he widens a bit, thus helping #9's trap. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 104
It is on the six overshift that #1 must keep in mind his rule about taking the first linebacker beyond the man to be power blocked. Often he will take the longside linebacker, as that man sometimes plays inside of or behind the long- side defensive guard on this six overshift.
#2 - Buck 36
#2 uses what we call the "six turn" in order to travel a bit wider and permit #3 to get into the hole. His first step is a six-inch drop step with his outside foot. He then executes a one hundred and eighty degree backward pivot on this foot, ending up with his back to the line of scrimmage. The little drop step is used to give #9 and #10 plenty of room to get through between #2 and the line of scrimmage.
#2 then takes the fake from #3, reaching out both hands and then pulling them in quickly to the body. By pivoting backward on that outside foot, #2 has placed himself in an ideal position to hide the ball exchange, or lack of it, from the defensive tackle, the linebacker, and the halfback on the longside. These are the men we are primarily interested in fooling. After taking the fake from #3, #2 fakes pitching the ball out wide to #4. This is done with a lead step with the outside foot, a skip and a full extension of both arms toward #4. He must then follow his fake wide himself, being careful not to look back to see how the play is faring. He should make it look exactly like the end run from this series and a poor fake by him will mar the deception.
DIAGRAM 46
#2 - Spin 36, 46
#2's assignment on both these ball handlings is to block the longside defensive CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 105 end to the outside. It is not necessary for him to drive the end anywhere, but it is important for him to prevent that end from falling back into team defense. In order to have the best blocking angle for this, #2 should run close to the line of scrimmage and take the end with a right shoulder block (in right formation, of course). In addition to providing a good angle on the end, #2's course across the face of the tackle will help to draw the tackle wide and set him up for #9's trap.
#3 -Buck 36
#3 sets the backfield alignment for himself and #4. He lines up at four and one-half yards deep, directly behind #9. #3 starts with a lateral lead step to the longside of the formation. There is no hurry on this as #9 and #10 must cross in front of him. He can take plenty of time to make a good fake to #2. After the lateral step he starts toward the scrimmage line and holds the ball out with two hands to #2, quickly draws it back, veers a bit to the longside of the formation, and follows #10 into the hole. His key is the position of the defensive guards, and he must know which man is to be power blocked. Knowing this, he can concentrate on running close to the power block rather than on the outside edge of the hole near the trap. #3 should expect # 10 to block the linebacker out at all times. After getting by this block, he should try to utilize #5's block on the safety. If the defensive half on the longside is not held by the wide fake of #2 and #4, the ball carrier should be able to take advantage of the possibility of a lateral to #4.
#3-46
Sets his alignment on #4, parallel and one yard from him. On this play #3 should drive directly for the outside leg of the defensive end as though to hook him on a sweep. At the last moment he passes the end up, going outside him, and then cuts downfield for a block on the halfback. Most of the time he will be unable to get a block on this halfback, but should be prepared for a lateral from #4 if the halfback goes in fast to make the tackle on the mouth of the hole.
#3 Spin 36
The fullback again sets the alignment for himself and #4. This time it is three yards deep directly behind #9 and down in a three point stance. It is important that he be no deeper than three yards as this allows him to take plenty of time CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 106 on
DIAGRAM 47
his spin fake to #4 and still get into the hole in a hurry. We have two types of spin for #3, the six spin and the eight spin.
Talking in terms of right formation, #3's first step on the six spin is a short balanced step with the left foot directly toward the ball. His weight should be over this foot so that his spin can be made on it. He reaches out to accept the ball from X and immediately pulls it in to his body with both hands. He then holds it against his body with the right hand, elbow tight to hip, and gives his left hand into #4's stomach. His spin is one hundred and eighty degrees on the ball of the left foot, and he then pivots off the right foot to continue the spin on course for his hole. His drive off the right foot governs the placement of the third step which is the one that sets him on course for his hole. Note that the third step on the six spin, while forward, is a lateral one toward the six hole. #3 must get some lateral travel out of this spin in order to get into the inside tackle hole quickly and at a good angle.
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Page 107
DIAGRAM 48
Holding the ball in close to his body with his right arm, #3 allows his left to follow through briefly with #4's course to further the impression of having given the ball. Then #3's left arm is brought back to cover the ball as he completes the spin and drives into the hole, still low and with the ball held close to the body and covered with both arms.
#4 - Buck 36
Lines up parallel to #3 and one yard from him. He should run to the longside at top speed and make a good fake at receiving the pitchout from #2. His course should be exactly like the end run from the buck series. He should cut down-field immediately upon getting outside the defensive end, and be prepared for a lateral from #3 if the halfback goes in close and fast to tackle the ball carrier.
#4-46
Sets alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and one-half yards behind #10. #4 lines up farther to the short-side on this play so that he may use exactly the same steps in getting into the six hole that he does in running the four hole. He takes a short lead step, a cross-over and a third step, and then CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 108 cuts off this outside foot into the hole. If these steps are properly executed, he should be right on #10's tail going through the hole. These three steps should be taken directly toward the sideline, while moving laterally. He must run close to the power block and should expect #10 to block the linebacker out. His downfield course will be right to the safety man to use #5's block.
#4 - Spin 36
#4 lines up toe even with #3's instep and four feet from him in a three point stance. His steps for the spin fake with #3 are indicated in Diagram 49.
His right forearm is held on the right hip with the elbow tight to the body. As #3 places his left hand in #4's stomach, #4 should bring his own left arm over the top of #3's hand and grasp his own right wrist close in against his body. The left elbow should also be kept close to the body to help conceal possession, or non-possession, of the ball. Reaching across the body with the left arm causes the left shoulder to dip a bit, also aiding the deception. #4 should maintain his fake all the way outside the end. After the first four steps he should straighten up, pump with the left arm and look down-field in an effort to draw the defensive halfback wide.
DIAGRAM 49
#6 and #7 - Buck 36, Spin 36,46
These men double-team together on the power block as covered earlier, except CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 109 in the case of the six undershift, when #6 influences and #7 takes the guard alone.
#8-Buck. 36, Spin 36, 46
Always cross-checks the first man inside of the position head-on himself. In the case of a man head-on #9, his job is relatively simple. It gets a bit harder when a man is head-on X, or in the slot between X and #9.
In all cases, he steps first with his inside foot in order to clear the way for a good close trapping pull by #9. Also, this step will generally place his left leg well under his left shoulder when he hits his man.
#9 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46
Takes regular trapping pull as described earlier. He may suspect a longer pull where there is a man head-on him, as this is generally either the five, his longest pull, or the six overshift, his next longest. If the guard is head-on X, #9 should suspect the six undershift and be prepared for quick contact on his pull.
Center Buck 36, Spin 36, 46
Three different passes to make, all of them light spirals. Buck 36 is passed on a line to #3's far knee, waist high. Spin 36 is passed to #3's near knee, riding up into his stomach. 46 is passed to #4 waist high, with a one-step lead to the longside. His blocks are regular cut-off blocks on the shortside tackle. On a six normal and a six undershift, he should be prepared to help out #8's cross- check by stepping to the guard with his right foot, preventing immediate penetration by the guard. Otherwise this defensive guard might beat #8's cross- check and pick off #10, the running lineman. We do considerable work on this little detail in order to help #8's check-block against these two defenses.
#10 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46
Should be able to suspect from the spacing in his area whether his pull will be a close or relatively long one. It is important that #10's pull be no deeper than a yard and one-half from the scrimmage line, and he should run on the inside edge of the hole, over the power block, in order to get the best inside-out angle on the linebacker. Any deviation from a straight inside-out blocking course calls for either a low cross-body or a low reverse cross-body as our #10's are CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 110 smaller than most linebackers.
#10 should know that his shortest and closest pull is against the six undershift or a six normal. His longest will be against a five man line. The difference will not be great, but anticipation will help his adjustments here so that he will always be cutting close over the power block. If #10 finds no linebacker on the hole, he should look to his outside for an end folding back, or for the defensive halfback. Above all, he should keep driving on this play, as the ball carrier will be right on his tail.
#5 - Buck 36, Spin 36, 46
As a downfield blocker on the safety man against all defenses, he should come over to the opening in order to pick up the ball carrier and get position on the safety man, who will be heading there to stop the play.
COACHING POINTS
This play is a good one when the opponents are slanting, looping or running linebackers through the line. There is a definite blocking advantage with #6 and #7 double-teaming the guard. They should be able to hold this man from getting the lateral movement he needs in the looping or slanting defense. #9 should remember that his rule is to trap the first man beyond the power block, whether tackle or linebacker. The six undershift call should not be used against slants. Even when the defensive tackle is head-on him, #6 should always double-team with #7. #10 may get all the way down onto the defensive halfback on this play, as we have done-occasionally when the linebacker ran through.
Of course, if the opponents loop to the shortside, the play is hurt. It should, however, be repeated, as sooner or later the opponents will be caught in the wrong slant and the play will break for a long gain.
#3 should always know which guard is to be powered, so that he can run over the inside edge of the hole. He can see both guards plainly from his position with hands on knees by just looking straight ahead.
In order to get #2 and #4 to put on a perfect fake on Buck 36 (and the play is no good without a perfect fake), they should hold out a certain number of fingers when they extend their arms in the faking maneuver. Each boy should CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 111
DIAGRAM 50
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 112 tell the other how many fingers were extended. This will make sure that their eyes are looking where they should, and not back at the ball carrier. If the defensive linebacker, halfback and end are not pulled a bit wide the fault is generally in the poor faking of #2 and #4. This can be easily checked in the movies.
GUARD TRAP, 8 OPENINGS
It is in the area of the defensive guard that the Single Wing applies its greatest pressure. These guards are in an extremely vulnerable position. They are closely flanked from both sides by men on the line of scrimmage who have both a blocking angle and a starting advantage as they know the starting signal and can anticipate. The blockers will get to the defensive guards quickly, from both sides, and in overwhelming numbers. The defensive guards must hit hard to meet this concentration of power, but they must also be prepared to meet traps from both sides in both left and right formation. These are the first men to be broken down in most defenses and it is their breakdown that helps to set up many of the other plays off Single Wing.
Our longside guard trap play, the eight hole, may be run from a variety of ball handling in the backfield such as the full spin by the fullback to the tailback, the buck lateral maneuver, the straight tailback series, or some sort of fake pass and run. The play is designed in every case to utilize our power blocking thought of two men against one, in order to get a lateral opening along the defensive line; to hold the man to be trapped with a single trapper; and to use deception or draw to pull one linebacker at least a step or two in the wrong direction. Without deception, without hiding the ball, this play will lose about seventy per cent of its effectiveness, as we must split the linebackers in order to slip the ball carrier by for an appreciable gain. This play is not a short gainer, slugged out against tough opposition. It is designed as a long gainer utilizing deception and finesse in addition to straight power.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
Let us look first at the hole opening against a six normal defense, with the opponents in the slots between the offensive men:
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Page 113
DIAGRAM 51
A look at this diagram will show that it is very important to hide the ball on the fake from the longside tackle and linebacker. The tackle may not be blocked, and the linebacker must be held for a step at least by the outside threat, in order to give #7 time to get to him. If the longside linebacker sees the ball all through the fake, he will move right in to make the tackle on the mouth of the opening, and #7 will never get to him at all. If the deception, the faking between #3 and #2, and between #2 and #4, is good, there is an excellent chance for a long gainer. If those fakes are
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Page 114
DIAGRAM 52
poor there will be a head-butting contest between #3 and the longside linebacker, not necessarily a winning formula! The key blocks here are the CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 115 power block and the trap on the line of scrimmage by #8, #9 and #10, and the block on the far linebacker on #6. These should work every time, and the power block should move that guard, as #8 and #9 have the perfect shoot- blocking angle. #3's course must be directly over the power block, as this is where we should expect our opening. The downfield blocking by #1 and #5 calls for a cut by the ball carrier to the shortside of the formation, away from the halfback, to take advantage of the downfield blocking pattern.
Against the six overshift and the five man line, the blocking requires very little adjustment. It does have different details but little major adjustment.
As you can see in Diagram 52, there are no actual changes of assignment from those that were used against the six normal defense. The power block by #8 and #9 is effected in a slightly different way (see page 51), and #10 can suspect from the spacing on his side that his trapping pull will be a bit longer than it was against the six normal defense. #7 will need more help from the fakers in the backfield in order to get position on his linebacker on the six overshift. Against the five, however, his position is already assured for his responsibility of cutting off the outside linebacker. #6 has an easy block on the six overshift, as his linebacker is farther to the shortside. This linebacker is not such an immediate threat to the hole opening as on the five man line, where #6 must get to that middle linebacker in a hurry and drive him across the mouth of the hole.
When run against the six undershift we are forced to adjust to a considerable extent. In Diagram 53 we see that it has become necessary for #6 and #7 to switch assignments. With the defensive tackle playing head-on him, #6 can no longer get across to cut off the far linebacker. #7's course is clear, however, and he can get there quicker than #6 anyway. #6 escapes outside the tackle, staying very low and, aided by #l's fake on the linebacker and the rest of the faking in the backfield, should be able to get inside position on the linebacker. This is particularly so, because the linebacker on the six undershift has a good bit of outside responsibility. #8 can no longer help #9 to double-team the guard opposite X
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Page 116
DIAGRAM 53
because he will close the hole. If he drives over to his inside he will pull the guard, who is head-on him, right into #10's attempted trap. It is better if he "pours out" of there on a deep pull, thus making the threat of the pitchout to #4 around the end look more dangerous. This threat should hold both the defensive tackle and the linebacker on the longside. If the tackle is not affected by #6 going outside him, by #8 pulling across deep in front of him, and by #2 and #4 faking outside, he is then in a dangerous position for this play, and it will be necessary for #8 to slide behind #7 to pick off that inside-conscious tackle.
We leave this up to our #8, after explaining the problem to him and asking him to consider himself personally responsible for keeping that tackle out of the picture by either method. #9 knows that on this spacing he loses his double team with #8 and must do the job himself with a driving shoulder block.
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Page 117
DIAGRAM 54
However, #9 knows that X is going to step in to that guard, brace and accept some of the responsibility for preventing immediate penetration, before X slides off to block his shortside tackle. Often, on this six undershift, the short- side tackle is so far away and occupied on the shortside, that X is able to devote almost all his attention to this guard. Thus, we do not entirely lose our double team. #10 can tell easily that this spacing will give him his toughest trapping chore. He must get in there very close to #9's power block and dig that longside guard out of there, particularly if the guard is unaffected by the influence in front of him. #8 and #2 driving hard to the outside, however, should have some effect on this longside guard. We hope to get him to take a false step to his outside, but #10 should never count on this and should be prepared for a tough trapping assignment.
This opening can be exploited from the buck lateral series, the spin series and the straight tailback series.
The only men who must learn additional assignments here in order to utilize these three different ball handlings in the
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Page 118
DIAGRAM 55
backfield are #2, #3 and #4. All blocking remains the same for the linemen CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 119 and #1. With the blocking adjustments up front for the eight opening all learned we get these three different methods of hitting it with a minimum of additional details, Diagram 55.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
His assignment remains the same on all: to cut off the defensive safety with an openfield block. His timing on it can be improved, and he can help the play at the same time, by faking an outside hook block on the man in front of him, whether it be a tackle or linebacker. The time thus used will allow the ball carrier to be closer to # 1 when he throws his downfield block on the safety, and this relationship always helps the block.
#2-Buck 38
#2 uses what we call the eight turn on this play, which is designed to allow the fullback to get into the hole as directly as possible. #2 drops his inside foot (in right formation, the left foot), about six inches, and takes a forward half pivot on this foot. This brings him a half unit nearer the center of the line and the six-inch drop step allows #10 to clear him easily on his trapping pull. The eight turn also permits #8 to take a deep pull on the six undershift alignment without tangling with #2.
DIAGRAM 56
This is a drop step and a forward pivot on the left foot ending with both feet parallel, back to the line of scrimmage, looking at the fullback, and prepared to take the fake from him. #2's hands should go out to the fullback and then be quickly withdrawn, in this case without the ball. Then #2's fake to the tailback should be carried through with a lead step with the left foot, and a skipping motion as the arms are fully extended toward #4 on the fake pitchout. This CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 120 fake should be followed all the way by #2 as he runs wide to the outside faking the pitchout sweep. #2 must follow his fake religiously, never looking back to see how the play is going, as this will ruin the deception's effect on the defensive halfback, linebacker, end and tackle on that side. The practice of counting the fingers extended on the fake by #4, which we mentioned in the discussion of the longside tackle trap opening, is no exaggeration of the importance of maintaining this fake all the way.
#2 - Spin 38 and 48
#2's assignment is to block the longside defensive tackle out. He should move close to the line of scrimmage to get the best angle on this tackle.
#3 - Buck 38
His key comes from the position of the guard, and he knows immediately where the double team power block will be applied. He is thus prepared to run over that power block. He will take a six-inch lateral lead step with his outside foot after taking the pass from X. There is no hurry here. On all buck series plays, #3 has plenty of time to-make a good fake. As he starts toward #2, he should extend the bah with both hands to #2, withdraw it quickly and drive over the power block, just off the tail of $10, who is coming over for his trap. He enters the hole between the guards a bit straighter on this opening than when he veers for the inside tackle hole. Indeed he may even veer a bit to the inside, depending on the result of the double team by #8 and #9. #3's downfield cut is to the short side of the formation to take advantage of #l's block on the defensive safety. This cut should not be started until #3 has gotten well by the blocks on the linebacker.
#3 - Spin 38
#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep directly behind #9 and down in a three point stance. On this play #3 must use the eight spin instead of the six spin as he now needs no lateral traveling on the spin at all.
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Page 121
DIAGRAM 57
The details on the first two steps here are the same as the six spin, Diagram 48. #3 steps directly toward the ball, a short six-inch downstep with his left foot (in right formation). His weight is over that foot in order to spin on it effectively. His spin is approximately one hundred and eighty degrees and he must stay down low. For the third step, which must put him on course for the eight hole, his weight is transferred to the right foot and he pivots on it far enough around to place the left foot on a straight line for the guard to be power-blocked. The handling of the ball by #3 and the faking to #4 are the same here as on Spin 36. After getting past the blocks on the linebackers, #3's downfield cut is again to the shortside of the formation to utilize the downfield blocking pattern.
#3-48
On this play, #3 lines up on #4, one yard away and parallel to him. He should try to make this play look like the sweep by running hard to the outside, faking a hook block on the defensive end and continuing downfield. He must run hard as his movement and that of #2 should hold the longside linebacker long enough for #7 to get position on him.
#4 - Buck 38 CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 122
The same details on accepting and carrying through the outside fake with #2 apply here as on the strongside tackle trap play.
#4 - Spin 38
The same details apply here on alignment and faking with #3 as on Spin 36. In this case, however, #4
DIAGRAM 58
should drop back and fake a pass. He may fake this pass on step number one, three or five as indicated in Diagram 58.
#4-48
#4 sets the alignment for himself and #3 at four yards deep, behind #10, in an upright stance. He takes a hard lead step to the longside of the formation and cuts off that foot into the hole over the power block. He should put a lot of CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 123 "action" into this lead step and actually face the sidelines on it before cutting into the hole. There is no lead pass by X to #4 here, as we do not want to interfere with #4's effort to put a lot of "action" into his first step. He should make this first step look like an off-tackle run or sweep to the longside. #4's downfield cut is again to the shortside of the formation to utilize the downfield blocks of #1 and #5.
#6-Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
On all defenses except the six undershift, #6 should take the shortest possible course for the interception point on the far linebacker. He must realize that this linebacker is not held by the fake at all and will be coming over fast and be moving up into the hole. For this reason, #6 must go across as shallow as possible, not in a bowed or deeply curved course. He must not deviate from a direct line to the point where that linebacker is going to be when the play breaks. "Don't go for where the man is, but for where he is going to be," is a good rule for all blockers. #6's block should be a reverse cross-body to get the heavy part of his body across the path of the linebacker's drive, which, in the case of a good linebacker, is across the field and up into the hole. If he tries to cross-body the linebacker, only his legs, the light part of his body, will get across the opponent's course, and the linebacker will neither be stopped nor cut down. Therefore, we insist on a reverse cross-body block here. #6 should also be prepared for a longside linebacker who, on a six over-shift, has a tendency to play inside the guard to be trapped.
DIAGRAM 59 CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 124
In this case it will be impossible for #7 to get position on such a close linebacker, so we adjust automatically as indicated in Diagram 59. #6 takes the linebacker across the face of the hole, #7 goes on down for the halfback and we ignore the shortside linebacker. #6 has this rule when he goes across for the cut-off on the far linebacker: "Block the first linebacker beyond the man to be trapped." This is a lot like #l's rule on the six hole opening, page 131, though here the dividing line is in the area of the man to be trapped, rather than the man to be powered.
On the six undershift, when #6 switches assignments with #7, he must escape the charge of the defensive tackle playing head-on him. To do this effectively, we have found that #6 should throw himself out and on all fours, trying to get outside of and beyond the defensive tackle. From his hands and knees he can recover to get the block on the long-side linebacker. In this way, being low, he escapes the tackle's hands and is not upset or thrown off balance, or course, by contact with the defensive tackle. #1 can help to hold the linebacker so that #6 can get inside position on him by faking an outside block on that linebacker. This is an important detail against the six undershift defense and will make #6's block possible.
#7 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48 Against the six normal and the six overshift, #7 must be sure to go straight ahead for position on his linebacker, after allowing #6 to cut across in front of him. #7 takes a six-inch lead step with his outside foot at an angle of forty-five degrees back from the scrimmage line. This step just allows him to clear the tail of #6, who is driving across sharply in front of him. His next move must be straight ahead, to try for inside position on the linebacker. Remember that the backer-up will be coming hard toward the play as soon as he sees the ball. #7 should remember here that same important rule: "Go for where he is going to be, not for where he is." Against the five man line, #7 can allow himself a bit more of a slide to the outside, as his block here is on the outside linebacker, giving him a better angle at the start.
On the six undershift, #7 switches assignments with #6 and now goes on a flat course right over the heels of the defensive longside guard to throw a reverse cross-body block on the far linebacker.
#8 and #9-Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 125 These two men apply the power block together on the guard in the vicinity of the X against all defenses except the six undershift. On the six undershift, #8 influences the guard head-on him by pulling to the longside. His job is to keep the defensive longside tackle from getting his nose into the play. If #8 cannot accomplish this with a wide deep pull around the end, then he must simply pull right over the tail of #7 and actually block that tackle with (in right formation) a right shoulder block. Needless to say, it is pleasanter to fool those big tackles than to block them, and most of the boys prefer the wide outside pull.
Center Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
The passes to #3 for Buck 38 and Spin 38 are exactly the same as for Buck 36 and Spin 36; light spiral passes to far and near knees. The pass for 48, is a direct, light pass to the longside waist of #4.
X then makes a regular cut-off block to the shortside as covered earlier. On the six undershift, X should step hard to the guard head-on him with his strongside foot and brace against this guard's charge. This is done to help #9's single block on this guard, as #8 is pulling on the six undershift.
#10 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
This man does the trapping against all defenses. He should be able to tell from the spacing in his area whether his trapping pull will be a long or a short one. The five man line and six overshift are his longest pulls, and the six undershift spacing calls for his shortest pull. #10 should think in terms of trapping the next man beyond the power block in order to be ready for linebackers running through. He must always observe the fundamentals of good trapping, as explained earlier.
#5 - Buck 38, Spin 38, 48
A downfield block on the near halfback on all defenses. He should run a course for the spot where that halfback will be when the block occurs, and should come over a bit toward the- hole, in order to pick up the ball carrier and make his openfield block close to him.
THE WEDGE PLAY
We are one of the few Single Wing teams really stressing wedge type blocking, CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 126 and we use it a great deal. We would use it as part of our offense, even if it, of itself, did not work out too well, because it teaches as nothing else does, the important elements of sustaining blocks and carrying through on an offensive charge. It takes us four or five weeks to get a really good wedge charge organized. In the learning process, we work on the ability to sustain, follow
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY VARSITY FOOTBALL COACHING STAFF L. to R.: F. C. Cappon, Michigan '24; J. R. Stiegman, Williams '44; C. W. Caldwell, Jr., Princeton '25; R. W. Colman, Jr., Williams '37; J. A. Timm, Illinois '30.
In the following pictures the author's team is identified by the traditional Princeton uniform of black jersey with orange-striped sleeves.
PHOTO BY ALAN W. RICHARDS
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 127
Running the Buck Lateral Series Pitchout, in left formation. Note that the #2 back, jersey #23, has received the exchange from the #3 back. The linemen pulling out of the line to form the interference are #6, jersey #89, and #8 directly behind, jersey #65. The eventual ball carrier on this play is the tailback moving into position for the pitchout on the far right of the picture. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950.
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Page 128
The Longside Off Tackle play, with a #3 back flanker and in left formation, is adjusted against a Six Overshift defense. Note the excellent technique of #2 as he uses the shoulder block to trap the rirfit defensive tackle jersey #72. #6 and #7, jersey #86 and #61 are also moving the defensive guard with a fine power block. Princeton vs. Dartmouth, 1949.
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Page 129
The Longside Off Tackle play, with the #3 back leading, and the blocking once again adjusted against a Six Overshift defense, is run in right formation. Note the excellent technique for the power block on Cornell's #77. The tailback is cutting for the opening on his right foot in proper execution of that part of the maneuver. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950. PHOTO BY NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE
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Page 130
Running the Buck Lateral Series Longside Tackle Trap, in right formation. This picture clearly shows the team assignments in the execution of this maneuver. The ball carrier, #3 faking to #2 is about to enter the opening led by #10, jersey #66. Princeton vs. Pennsylvania, 1948. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 131
BUCK 32 THE SINGLE WING PITCHOUT
The set of the #2, #3, and #4 backs in relation to the center is shown at the start of the play.
As pass from center is made to #3, #2 starts his "Eight Turn" and #4 starts wide to be in position for the pitch-out.
#3 has received the ball and starts directly for #2.
#2 completes his turn and is ready to receive the ball from #3 who makes a two-handed forward handoff.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 132 The exchange has been completed. #1 comes into the picture as he proceeds through the line to block on the linebacker.
#3 fakes carrying the ball as #2 brings his feet together to start his hop, skip and pitchout to #4.
The start of the pitch-out to #4 is shown as #2 prepares to make the underhand spiral toss.
The ball spirals to #4. The tailback will then proceed to carry around the strongside defensive end with his personal interferer leading him.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 133
BUCK 38 THE L0NGSIDE GUARD TRAP
Backfield in position to start the play.
#2 starts his "Eight Turn."
#3 starts directly for #2.
Note how the ball is concealed from the longside guard and linebacker.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 134 #3 actually extends the ball to #2 with both hands.
#1 in this picture is taking the block of #6.
#3 keeps to drive over the power block on the guard.
At the completion, #2 and #4 are faking the pitchout.
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Page 135
BUCK 34 THE QUARTERBACK KEEP PLAY
Backfield in position to start the play.
#3 receives the pass from center.
#1 is blocking on the longside defensive tackle.
#2 completes the "Eight Turn" and receives the ball.
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Page 136
#2 pivots to carry off tackle.
Note how the correct footwork by #2 gets him into the opening.
As #2 carries, #4 has faked the pitchout and is in position for a lateral.
#2 making a lateral pass to #4.
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Page 137
BUCK 35 THE REVERSE TACKLE TRAP
Backfield in position to start the play.
#2 takes an "Eight Turn."
#3 hands off to #2 as #1 comes around in position to receive the exchange.
Note how the ball is concealed from the shortside linebacker and tackle.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 138 The center is holding the position of the power block.
#1 completes the exchange to run into the opening.
#3, #2 and #4 start on their respective fakes.
Faking being carried out as #1 runs the opening.
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Page 139
BUCK 35 CLOSEUP VIEW OF BALLHANDLING
#2 completes the "Eight Turn" as #3 heads directly toward him.
#3 puts the ball in the pocket formed by #2's hands.
# 1 is proceeding toward the exchange point.
#2 prepares to make the exchange turning toward #1.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 140 #1 forms pocket with his hands to receive the ball from #2.
#2 turns his body as the exchange is made.
Exchange completed, # 1 ducks inside-shoulder to hide the ball.
#1 drives for the opening as #3 and #2 carry out faking.
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Page 141
PASSING FROM THE BUCK LATERAL SERIES
#4 PASSING
#3 hands to #2 with the Buck threat.
#2 makes pitch back to #4.
#2 prepares to block as #4 gets ready to pass.
Ballhandling completed, #4 ready to make the pass.
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 142 #2 PASSING
#3 makes handoff to #2 with the Buck threat.
#2 fakes pitchout as he comes back to pass.
#4 gets ready to block after faking the pitch-out.
#2 in position to pass.
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Page 143
The author's team is shown running the Wedge play, in an excellent picture. The defense is using a 71 alignment. The apex of the wedge has powered the guard a full three yards as the fullback drives up to make the gain, and the vital first down. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1948.
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Page 144
The fullback drives through a large gap in the defense created by the Shortside Guard Trap run from left formation. #3 half spins to #1 and then carries as the power block by #8 and #9, and the trap by #2 take effect. The fake pulls the linebacker well out of position Cornell jersey #58as #6 prepares to throw his block. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1948. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 145
Princeton uses a combination end and fullback flanker as the Single Wing Shortside Reverse Off Tackle is run in right formation. #5 and #10 use the special high-low technique for blocking the shortside defensive tackle. Note the effort in the check block by #9 at the far right of the picture. Also note the fake is still being carried out by #4, jersey #42. Princeton vs. Colgate, 1947. PHOTO BY GERHARD F. SIMMEL CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 146
With th combination end and fullback flanker, Princeton runs the Single Wing Shortside Reverse End Run in right formation. The basic elements of this maneuver are clearly shown. #1 has just received the ball in exchange from #4 as the X, jersey #51, #2, jersey #23 and #7, jersey #61, form the pulling interference for the play. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 147
In another excellent photograph, the tailback, jersey #42 is shown as he cuts inside the longside defensive on the Single Wing Straight Series Fake Reverse and Keep play. #99 and the team carrying out the faking pull the five Cornell defenders, at the top of the picture, completely out of position. Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950. PHOTO BY NEWARK NEWS CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 148
A pass is thrown in left formation. #93 is the intended receiver as he goes in-motion behind a flanking end. The team shows the proper execution of their pass protection assignments. Princeton vs. Dartmouth, 1948. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 149
The Off Tackle Jump Pass to the #5 end, jersey #85, is shown about to be completed for a twelve-yard gain. #42 has released the ball as he drives up into the line then jumps to throw. Princeton vs. Yale, 1950. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 150
The #2 back, jersey #23, is well clear as he receives a scoring pass on the opponent's one- yard line. This is the successful completion of the Straight Series Running Pass maneuver. #42 was the passer. Princeton vs. Yale, 1950. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 151
Princeton scores! The tailback, jersey #42, moves into the end zone from left formation on a Straight Series End Run. Attention must be called to the excellent block thrown on the defensive safety by the #3 back, slightly ahead of the ball carrier. Princeton vs. Yale, 1950.
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Page 152
With the fullback in motion to the shortside (3B motion) a pass is thrown to the #5 end. #5 moves into the clear to receive the pass as he gets in behind the defensive halfback, jersey #45, who moves up to cover the man-in-motion. Princeton vs. Colgate, 1947.
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Page 153
The #2 back, jersey #25, is passing from the Buck Lateral Passing Series. #2 throws out to the tailback in position as a flanker behind a flanking end. The play is run from right formation. Princeton vs. Pennsylvania, 1947.
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Page 154
The Reverse Pass is about to be thrown. The tailback hands the ball off to #1, jersey #96, who fakes a reverse and then pulls up short to throw. The ends' courses are described in the Passing chapter-41 Pass Princeton vs. Cornell, 1950. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 155
#3 cuts between the blocks on the linebackers to break into the clear. This is the Longside Guard Trap, run from the Buck Lateral Series in right formation. The power block, the trap by #10, the block on the far linebacker by #6, and the block on the linebacker by #7, jersey #67 are all excellent. Princeton vs. Pennsylvania, 1947.
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Page 156
This picture shows a deep reverse with the fullback out as a flanker ready to block the defensive right end. #42 is preparing to feed the ball to #44, the wingback, who is following the blocking back #25, his personal interferer. Princeton vs. Rutgers, 1947. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 157
A happy locker-room scene, emblematic of victory1950. PHOTO BY ALAN W. RICHARDS
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 158 through, and keep the legs driving, all of which are needed for effective power blocking.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
The wedge may be likened in some respects to the snow-plow. The maximum amount of drive must be delivered at the apex of the wedge to effect the initial breakthrough. Every bit of power developed at the apex is used solely to drive straight ahead. On either side of the apex, power is used in two ways; to contribute to the straight ahead thrust of the apex and, at the same time, to prevent infiltration from the sides. The apex of the wedge, in order to obtain maximum power, is designed to take advantage of the opportunity to put three offensive men against one defensive man. We try to assign three men definitely on one, and with this ratio we should be able to get the wedge under way at this most crucial point. The rest of the team folds in toward the apex and blocks space rather than assigned men. This is because it is impossible to tell at the start, exactly how the wedge will develop in terms of opening up the defense. A gap may appear straight ahead at the apex, but more often it shows to one side or the other. Sometimes no gap opens, and the ball carrier then dives for his yardage. Ideally, if there were no opposition, the wedge would look something like this at the conclusion of the folding-in process:
DIAGRAM 60
On the above diagram, #9 is the apex of the wedge. With changing defenses it is not always the same man who forms the apex, but we have found it possible to limit it to either #8 or #9 at the apex, depending on which has a man head- on him.
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Page 159
DIAGRAM 61
In Diagram 61, for a six undershift, #8 is the apex of the wedge and all other men fold in on their charge toward that apex. In this case, #7, #8 and #9 are the three men whose charge is centered on the guard opposite #8. In the same diagram, for the six overshift, we find a guard head-on #9, so #8 and #9 and X become the three men against one, with #9 now the apex. A glance at the five man line shows that here again #9 is the apex, just as he is against the six overshift. The six normal, with the defensive men in the slots, is handled a bit differently. Here we work a straight two-on-one charge against both guards, #9 and X working together on one, and #7 and #8 the other. Our whole thought on the wedge is so concentrated on developing straight ahead power that we do not attempt to split the guards on this double team. We just drive them straight back, or indeed, any way they wish to go as long as it is backward. Again, on this maneuver, the rest of the line folds in.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
The Three Man Apex
Let us assume that #9 is the apex. He drives his head directly for the breastbone of the man opposite him and attempts to keep going straight ahead at all costs. If the man rolls off #9's head or shoulder, #9 does not follow or veer from his straight ahead course. Often a rolling lineman will roll right down the entire outer perimeter of the wedge, but #9 attempts only to continue a straight ahead drive. If the man submarines in front of him, #9 continues right on over him. #9 must really get off fast, as his start is crucial to the success of the play. CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 160
#8
#8 is assigned with #9 and X to the opponent head-on #9. He drives forward with the foot nearest #9 at about a forty-five degree angle in, attempting to lay his head directly behind #9's shoulder and his own shoulder in solid contact with #9's hip. If the opponent head-on #9 pivots or slides off #9 to #8's side, #8 will contact the opponent first with his head and secondly with his off shoulder.
Center
Same as #8, but with the added burden of a soft pass to #3. This is a direct pass to #3 just above the knees. Against the six normal defensive alignment, as noted earlier, #9 and X work on the man in the slot between them, while #8 and #7 double team the opponent playing in the slot between them. Here our two-on-one unit is trying only to drive the opponent straight back.
#6, #7, #10
These men use the same fold-in technique as #8, except that they will have to converge farther because the men inside them are also converging. However, being on the perimeter of the wedge, they generally meet less immediate opposition than the men on the apex and thus will often advance farther. They should be prepared to keep driving when they do not meet immediate opposition, so that they may cut off linebackers who, of course, will be driving in to stop the play.
#1 and #5
These two men have a definite responsibility, namely to cut off the defensive tackles. In order to do this, it is often advisable for them to line up a bit tighter against certain defenses, where the tackle may be playing tight or hard to the inside. #1 and #5 always drive hard to their inside, prepared to cut off the tackles at the toughest possible angle. They are responsible for preventing anyone from breaking down the wedge on the perimeter between themselves and the next man inside them.
#2
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 161 This job is a vital one. Against all defenses except the six normal, #2 drives in over the tail of #9. This is done because the area between #9 and X is a zone of weakness. X must "pass the ball and thus is often a fraction of a second late in his charge. Therefore, #2 acts as a sort of reinforcer here in order to pick off any opponent who might succeed in breaking down X's charge. On the six normal, in which the guards are playing in the seams, #2 drives straight between them, helping either to break the hole open, or blocking a linebacker if the defensive guards are already licked by our two-against-one setup on the mouth of the hole.
#3
The ball carrier lines up four and one-half yards deep, directly behind #9. He must understand the principle that establishes either #8 or #9 as the apex, because his initial drive is directed to that spot. It is easy for #3 to take his key from the area directly in front of #8 and #9. He knows that a man in front of #9 makes #9 the apex regardless of all other spacing. If there is no man head- on #9 and one head-on #8, then #8 becomes the apex. If there is no man head-on either #8 or #9, then #3 drives for the slot between #8 and #9. It is important that #3 should start rather slowly, instead of belting up for the apex man at top speed. If his first two steps are taken "under control," he is able to take advantage of any sudden gap which may open up right or left as the wedge develops. If no hole appears, he still has enough room left from four and one- half yards deep, to pick up speed and hit with maximum power. Moreover, the slower start allows the apex to move the opposing line back a bit. This is important where inches are a factor on the goal line, as the fullback should take off and dive for his yardage over the top of the apex when no gap opens for him.
#4
He should fake an outside run or a pass. On the goal line this fake has little if any effect, but in midfield on an early down it does. On the goal line, #4 may regard his assignment with real affection, as he is often the only player on the field not engulfed in the pile of bodies, still on his feet!
COACHING POINTS
Stress that a man head-on #9 takes precedence over any other spacing. In this case, #9 will always be the apex man, even though there might be another man CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 162 head-on #8. If a man is in the slot between #8 and #9, then he is double- teamed by those two men and driven straight back on a special call that we use here.
DIAGRAM 62
CHAPTER IV THE INSIDE RUNNING ATTACK TO THE LONGSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 163 We give #3 plenty of work on diving over the top when no gap opens on the wedge, as on the goal line. We also stress that any wedge resulting in a score is "the line's touchdown."
DIAGRAM 63
#1 and #5 should work on cutting off the defensive tackles, as these men sometimes can catch #3 almost from the rear, since he lines up four and one- half yards deep and starts "under control." This is a very important detail and should be a low, chopping block if the tackles really converge toward the ball carrier.
Do not be discouraged if it takes a long time to get a wedge charge that is really effective. No time spent on this is wasted, as the stress on sustaining the charge is fundamental to any good offensive blocking.
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 164 GUARD TRAP, 7 OPENINGS
Single Wing has often had trouble in the vicinity of the offensive center (X). Here the T formation has an advantage, as its X is able to snap the ball with his head up, merely handing the ball back by feel and not responsible for varied types of passes. The Single Wing X must keep his head down until he has actually released the ball and is thus in a poorer position to be an effective blocker. His stance is dictated by a responsibility for putting the ball in play accurately, rather than for effective blocking. Therefore, an aggressive, active guard in the vicinity of X has created a problem for Single Wing, in that he can always get the jump on X. This guard can slip past cross-checks to bother running linemen and the backs on both longside plays and reverses on which there is multiple handling of the ball, and consequent delay behind the line of scrimmage. Therefore, we feel that it is essential to carry this seven hole opening, which is designed primarily to slow down this particular defensive guard. Our X is allowed to ask for this play at any time that the opposing guard is giving him CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 165
DIAGRAM 64
trouble. By means of an effective trap on this guard, we can slow him down or be satisfied to gain ground on this guard trap play.
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 166 BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
This play is run with the same assignments against both the six normal and six undershift. It is probably a bit better against the six undershift, as in that defense the guard is head-on X and charging directly on him to take advantage of his weak offensive blocking position. The power blocking here is by #8 and #9, and the trapping is done by #2. #10, of course, crosses in front of #6 as they go for the two linebackers. On all ball handling maneuvers in the back- field, the primary threat on this opening is a wide reverse to the shortside. Therefore, #10's man is the key block as this linebacker is generally drawn immediately to the hole and must be cut off quickly before he gets there. The shortside linebacker is often drawn so wide by the fake of the reverse
DIAGRAM 65
that #6's block is a comparatively easy one. His course, however, is not easy, and it takes quite a bit of practice for #6 to run in close by the power block of #8 and #9, to get the best possible angle for his block on this linebacker. Against the six overshift and a five man line, we need to adjust this play, as the guard is now found head-on #9 instead of on X. Therefore, we adjust to trap a different man (Diagram 65).
On the six overshift and the five man line, we trap the shortside tackle, who is generally charging hard in an effort to catch the longside plays from the rear, CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 167 and to protect himself from the block by #5 on our reverses. Notice that on our downfield blocking we have no one on the shortside defensive halfback and the safety, but always someone cutting off the longside defensive half. We hope, by the threat of a wide reverse in the backfield ball handling, to draw the safety and the shortside half up to protect the shortside flank.
DIAGRAM 66
This play is a must to fit in with the reverses, as it helps to keep that shortside linebacker at home until he actually sees the ball.
On this seven hole opening, we feel that it is important to use #2 as the trapper. Therefore, we do not attempt to use the buck series on the hole. We use a one half spin by #3 to #1 which we call Play 67. We use the straight tailback series with #4 faking to # 1 on the deep reverse, but "keeping" himself and cutting into this opening.
We also use the spin series to hit this hole with #3 spinning to both #4 and # 1 and doing the ball carrying himself, Spin 37.
On the three diagrammed ball handlings, Diagram 67, all assignments and CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 168 adjustments up front remain the same. Only #1, #3 and #4 have to learn any new details, so, essentially, by learning one of the above plays we get the other two for very little additional coaching.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS #1-67
We have found that this play times a bit better if we start the #1 a step early. Thus, #3 does not have to delay his half spin to wait for # 1 to make a good fake and is able to get into the hole very quickly. Each wingback will have to work out for himself the timing problem involved in getting to #3 at the right moment to insure a smooth fake. There are no two wingbacks whose speed or sense of anticipation are exactly the same. The coach should work with each wingback to solve this problem on an individual basis. Each wingback should have a starting point in the signal cadence worked out for himself and should stick to it. If the boy understands the problem and is sold on the importance of faking and timing by the coach, he will take pride in doing a good job on this detail. In discussing the faking by #1, we shall consider ourselves in right formation. For left
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 169
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 170 DIAGRAM 67
formation the details are simply the reverse. As #1 approaches #3, he should reach out with both hands to accept the fake, with his right hand uppermost. As he takes the fake, # 1 must pull the right arm down and across his body, at the same time lowering the right shoulder. The left forearm should be placed on the hip, parallel to the ground, and the right hand should grasp the left wrist. This position should be held for four steps. Then the right hand releases and is used to "pump," as #1 picks up speed. If #1 looks downfield at this time, a real impression of legitimate ball carrying will be obtained. The faking should never be considered adequate until #1 manages to get himself tackled out on the shortside flank.
#1-47
The same faking principles for #1 apply here as in Play 67. In this play, however, #1 does not anticipate the starting signal but takes the regular start.
#1 - Spin 37
On this play, #1 should anticipate the starting signal just a little bit, in order not to hold up #3 too long in his spin. All other details of faking are the same as in Play 67.
#2 - 67, 47, Spin 37
#2 is the trapper on all three types of ball handling for the seven hole. He must observe all the details of good trapping just as any lineman would. He must know whether #9 is the power blocker (as in a six undershift or a six normal), or whether X is doing the power job (as in the five, or six overshift). His key will be the position of the guard in X's vicinity. If this guard is head-on #9, #2 knows that his own trap will be on the shortside tackle, requiring a drive in across the tail of X for the toughest possible angle on that tackle. If there is no one head-on #9, #2 knows that his trap is on the next man to the shortside of #9, and that #9 is the power blocker on the mouth of the hole. Of course, #2 also listens to #8's call here and blocks accordingly. Knowing his own key, however, gives him an added second of anticipation.
#3-67
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 171 Sets the alignment on this play for himself and #4 by taking a position four yards deep, with his left foot in line with the ball. In right formation, #3 should take a three- or four-inch balance step forward with his right foot. The ball is taken from X on this right knee just as the balance step is taken. The next step with the left foot is taken directly for the defensive guard being powered. The body and hips are turned hard to the right.
DIAGRAM 68
In this half spin, the feet should not be pivoted off line. The hips pivot ninety degrees, while the shoulders twist about one hundred and eighty degrees. The knees should be well bent, so that the center of gravity is low. If the ball is held on the right hip, it will be well concealed from the shortside tackle, guard and linebacker, the important defenders to affect by the fake. #3 must let his head turn with his shoulders so that he actually looks at # 1 while faking to him. At this moment, #3 cannot see what has happened at the hole, and his footwork alone must carry him out of his fake and start him over the power block. As #3 turns back and starts to drive into the line of scrimmage, he should draw the ball in with his right hand close to the body and cover it with the left. #3's key here is the position of the defensive guards. The first man to the longside of the slot between #9 and X will be powered by two men. This is the block over which #3 must run. #3, after getting by the linebackers, should run right to the safety man, trying either to dodge or overpower this man.
#3-47
#3 takes his alignment on #4, parallel and one yard from him. He should run wide to the longside on the snap of the ball and fake a hook block on the longside end. #3 should go after the end's outside leg, hard, as this will affect the end, the safety man, the linebacker and the halfback on that side. CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 172
#3 - Spin 37
#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep behind #9 and down in a three point stance. His key here is the same as explained in Play 67. #3 uses the same steps in faking to #4 as on Spin 38, page 155. However, on this play #3 must be careful not to complete his spin until #1 is by him. Again, on this play as on Spin 38, #3 should give the left hand to #4 when faking to him. He must then switch the ball from the right arm to the left arm, holding it in close against his body, and give the right hand to the wingback, who is faking the reverse.
#4-67
#4 takes his alignment on #3, parallel and one yard from him. On the starting signal, #4 drives hard for the shortside end and should actually throw a block on the end's outside leg, in order to affect the halfback on that side.
#4-47
#4 sets alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four yards deep with the right foot in line with the ball (in right formation). He starts with a lead step to the right and on a course for the slot between #1 and #6. He takes a short lead step, a cross-over, and on the third step fakes a backward two hand feed to #1, who is crossing behind him on the regular deep reverse course.
DIAGRAM 69
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 173 #4 should extend the ball all the way toward #1 with two hands while taking his three steps. At the last moment, on that third step, #4 pulls the ball back sharply into his body and cuts into the hole. There is no hurry for #4 on this three-step course, as he wants to be on balance for a sharp cutback into the hole. #1 runs hard, #4 moves under control. This difference in their speeds makes it look more as though #1 were going to be the eventual ball carrier. #4's cut after completing the fake to #1 should be right over the power block. He runs right for the safety man after getting through the hole and cuts either way on the safety.
#4 - Spin 37
#4 sets himself toe in line with #3's instep and four feet from him. #4 uses the same faking details with #3 as on Spin 36.
#6 - 67, 47, Spin 37
His shortest course on the pull for the far linebacker will be on a six normal call. His longest course will be on a six overshift or a five man line call. The biggest fault that turns up here is that #6 often fails to run his course close over the power block. If #6 stays close to the power block his angle for blocking the linebacker will be perfect. He may use either a shoulder or a cross- body block on this play. If he finds no linebacker there, #6 should continue downfield to cut off the shortside defensive halfback.
#7 - 67, 47, Spin 37
Should always step forward first with the foot nearest to #6 to permit #6 to pull close behind him. On a six under-shift, he may take a regular cross-check block on the tackle head-on #6. On the six overshift, the six normal and the five man line, he should take a balance step with the foot nearest #6, bring up the other foot, and wait for his man to commit himself. In this way, #7 is prepared to cut off a chasing tackle with a reverse cross-body block, a smashing tackle with a shoulder block, or a tackle running back into team defense with a long cross-body block. See Diagram 70.
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 174
DIAGRAM 70
#8 - 67, 47, Spin 37
He is the post for #9 on a power block against the long-side guard on six normal and six undershift call. On six over or five man line calls, #8 check- blocks alone on the first man to his outside.
#9-67,47, Spin 37
On six normal and six undershift calls, #9 power-blocks to the longside with #8 on the guard. On a five man line call, he "posts" the guard who is head-on him for the power block by X.
Center 67, 47, Spin 37
For Play 67, the pass is to right hip of #3. The pass for Play 47, is a one-step lead pass, waist high, to #4. For Spin 37, the pass is to the left knee of #3. On the six normal and six undershift call, X takes a lead step with his left foot (in right formation) to the shortside and continues laterally for a block on the shortside tackle. His block here is not as important as clearing the area so that the defensive guard can penetrate to be trapped by #2. On the five man line call, X power-blocks the guard head-on #9 with #9. In right formation he steps half way to the guard with his left foot and brings his right foot up under the hitting shoulder. This differs from the normal details on power blocking, as X must compensate for his stance.
#10 - 67, 47, Spin 37
On the six normal and six undershift calls, #10 goes across for the longside CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 175 linebacker. It is important that he go close over the heels of the guard being trapped in order to get the best blocking angle. #10 should use a reverse cross- body block, here. On the five man line call, he should slide outside the defensive tackle who is to be trapped, making sure that he allows #5 to cut across in front first. #10 then swings over to block the longside halfback. He must be careful not to go deeper than four yards beyond the line of scrimmage, or he will be too deep to intercept that halfback. The draw of the play pulls this halfback over very rapidly.
#5 - 67, 47, Spin 37
On a six normal or six undershift call, #5 takes the same assignment as #10 takes on the five man line call: the cutoff on the longside halfback. He should try to avoid crossing in front of the linebacker on his side, as this motion might hurt the draw of the play and pull the linebacker into the middle, where we do not want him.
On the five man line call, #5 and #10 switch assignments and #5 goes across right over the heels of the man being trapped to block the middle linebacker. He should also use a reverse cross-body block on this assignment.
COACHING POINTS
It is a good idea to allow the #2 backs to participate in trapping drills with the linemen whenever possible. This means that the #2 backs will get plenty of work on their trapping and can learn from the boys who are doing it all the time.
For ball carriers, this diagram can be used to give them the picture of the hole opening:
DIAGRAM 71 CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 176
The inception point of the play is the slot between #9 and X. A man playing at that point will be trapped. If no man is at the inception point, the first man to the right of that point will be power-blocked, and the first man to the left will be trapped.
TACKLE TRAP, 5 OPENINGS
When Single Wing hits back to the shortside with reverses it must be remembered that the time element is important. With the unbalanced line and the backs well over to the longside, the ball carriers are necessarily a bit slow in reaching the shortside openings. Therefore, it is important to utilize double blocking here whenever possible, in order to hold and sustain the blocks for the longer time element involved.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
In discussing methods of running the inside-tackle hole on the shortside, we shall have to follow a slightly different procedure, as the blocking adjustments up front for the linemen are not the same for the three different backfield maneuvers. Identical adjustments may be used for hitting the five hole off the reverse from #4 to #1, Play 45, and for the spin and give to #1 by #3, Spin 35. A different set of assignments are necessary, however, in running Buck 35, the buck lateral reverse inside the shortside tackle.
In Diagrams 72 and 73, the assignments for 45 and Spin 35 are shown against a six normal defense. The interesting and slightly different element here is in the power blocking on the inside edge of the hole. Because the draw of the play on both ball handlings is to the right, the longside linebacker should not be an immediate threat at the mouth of the hole. Therefore, it has proved possible to have #10 check on the effectiveness of the power block by X and #9 before sliding off for a cut-off block. If necessary, #10 actually helps. This has worked out well when the defensive
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 177
DIAGRAM 72
guard is slant charging to the shortside. In this case, #10 would devote his full attention to this guard and become the power blocker with X. #9 always posts for X's power block and is careful not to charge off against the guard. If the guard slants to the shortside, #9 will have time to pick up #10's cut-off block on the longside linebacker. CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 178
DIAGRAM 74
Also, the assignment of #5 is perhaps a bit different. His job is to prevent the shortside defensive end from dropping back into team defense to pick off the ball carrier as the latter breaks outside of #7's block on the linebacker. There is no hurry for #5 on this assignment so he should be able to make a good sustained fake at blocking the tackle in, thus setting up #2's trap on him. #6 can elbow the longside tackle hard, to prevent his catching the play from the rear, and still get across for the far halfback, as the play is a delayed one. Against a six undershift the assignments up front are exactly the same with the exception of the power block. Here #10 and X work together as the double teaming unit, and #9 is assigned to the cut-off block on the longside linebacker, Diagram 75.
#9 should protect himself from being knocked off stride by a slanting longside guard by stepping with the right foot to this guard before sliding through for the longside linebacker, as indicated. #7 must remember that the initial draw on both 45 and Spin 35 is to the longside of the formation. Therefore, he should expect that shortside linebacker to be pulled at least a step or two toward the longside. #7 should be prepared to find his man on the inside edge of the hole and to use a long cross-body block that will allow the ball carrier to escape to the outside. This is the toughest spot in which to find that linebacker, as it calls for #7 to throw a block back to the inside against the centrifugal force of the course he is running. #6 has a tougher job disengaging himself from the tackle head-on him, but it can be done if he steps into the tackle hard with the right foot then immediately away with the left, into the area vacated by #7. CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 179
DIAGRAM 75
Against a six overshift and a five man line, adjustments are made to run outside of the tackle instead of inside him. On both these defenses the shortside tackle is so close to # 10 and the guard is farther over, head-on #9. This would make it almost impossible for #1, the ball carrier, to turn into the hole sharply enough to run over the power block. There-
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 180
DIAGRAM 76
fore, we adjust to power block the shortside tackle with two men, and we trap the end.
The six overshift and the five man line are treated exactly the same as far as adjustments are concerned. On the five, the longside linebacker is ignored as he will be late in getting to the play and is liable to be cut off by X's block on the CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 181 middle linebacker. #5 and #10, because of the split between them, execute the double team power block on the tackle differently from any other two linemen. They use a "high-low" block, with #10 hitting low and #5 blocking high in an effort to topple that tackle to the inside. Details for #10 and #5 will come a bit later in this section.
Buck 35, as mentioned earlier, is run with a different set of assignments. On this play, there is no adjustment to run outside the tackle against the six overshift and five man line defenses. The shortside tackle is trapped regardless of where he plays. There are assignment changes, but the hole itself is not adjusted. The hole is always made inside the shortside tackle. Let us look at the opening first against a six normal and a six undershift, as we prefer to run it against these two defenses.
There are some assignments on this play which are a bit unusual. For instance, X is used as the power man on the double team with #9, even when the guard to be powered is head-on him. This assignment, of course, would be impossible except for the great draw exerted on that guard by the ball handling pattern in the backfield. #10 fakes a pull to the longside in order to add to the draw in that direction. If the shortside linebacker is keying on #10, as he often does in the six undershift, this quick fake by #10 will help to draw that linebacker toward the longside. #10 will block this linebacker by driving him over toward the longside. He must be careful not to step back as he starts his fake pull, or he will interfere with a good trapping pull by #8. This is just a pivot fake by #10; the feet are not shifted at all. #7
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Page 182
DIAGRAM 77
cross-checks toward the hole, which is essentially unsound, but again the tremendous draw of the backfield maneuvers makes it possible. The six overshift and five man line assignments are shown in Diagram 78.
The power block by X and #9 is a bit more orthodox in appearance. #10 and #5 switch assignments, with #10 faking a pass protection stand-up block on the tackle in order to bring the tackle across the line of scrimmage for #8's CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 183 trap. #5 allows the draw of the play to pull the linebacker in front of him over towards the longside and then blocks the linebacker that way. There is plenty of time on this, as the play is a slow hitter. The middle linebacker on the five man line is ignored, since the draw of the play will pull him out of the picture.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1 45 and Spin 35
# 1 starts on the snap of the ball with a lead step and runs a slightly bowed course, enabling him to hit the hole at about a forty-five degree angle. The bow in his course is very slight, because #4 or #3 brings the ball up toward the line of scrimmage and hands it forward to #1. It is important for. #1 to get into the hole as quickly as possible, and he should be right on the tail of #7 all the way, within arm's length of #7. The wingback takes his key from the position of the defensive tackle on his side. If the tackle is in a six overshift or a five man line alignment, #1 suspects that his course will be a longer one, because in these cases the play is adjusted on the shortside to run outside the defensive tackle. If the longside tackle is playing in a six normal or a six undershift alignment, # 1 should suspect that his course will be a shorter one, and that he must run into the hole inside the shortside tackle. The calls by #6 will give him the spacing on his side of the line, and, although he cannot be sure that the shortside alignment will be consistent with that in
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 184
DIAGRAM 78
his vicinity, he can suspect the type of course he will have to run. After getting by #7's block on the linebacker, #1 will do well to cut back on the safety man as there is no blocker assigned to this defender.
#7 - Buck 35 CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 185
On this play, # 1 takes a drop step with his inside foot and drops that hand to the ground momentarily. This is done to keep him low and hide him from the shortside defenders. At the same time, this one-step delay allows the ball to be exchanged effectively between #3 and #2, and also, by dropping back a step, # 1 improves the angle of his approach to the hole.
#2 - 45, Spin 35
On the six normal and the six undershift calls, #2 traps the shortside tackle. On the six overshift and the five man line calls he traps the shortside defensive end. On all traps he observes the fundamentals of good trapping, treated earlier. #2 may take a key by observing the position of the guard in the vicinity of X, as it is this man's position which will govern the call by #10 in the play area. If that defensive guard is head-on #9, then #2 can be sure that he will trap the defensive shortside end. If the guard is in the slot between #9 and X, or head-on X, #2 can be sure that he will trap the shortside tackle.
#2 - Buck 35
#2 executes the eight turn (page 153), and, as he hands the ball to #1 with his right hand (in right formation), he continues the execution of his steps on Buck 34 (page 117, Diagrams 31, 32). This movement by #2 toward the long-side off-tackle hole while handing off to #1, aids the draw of the play still further. The continuation of motion to the longside by #2 has a decided effect on the shortside linebacker and is therefore very important. It may be said, then, that the details of #2's movements on this play are the same as on Buck 34, with the added burden of handing the ball off to the #1.
#3-45
#3 sets himself on #4, parallel and one yard from him. On all calls he runs hard to the longside of the formation, faking an outside hook block on the longside defensive end.
#3 Spin 35
#3 sets the alignment for himself and #4 by lining up three yards deep, directly behind #9. He uses the steps of the six spin (page 140, Diagram 48), in order to travel laterally to the longside of the formation. The lateral travel is necessary CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 186 to allow a forward handoff to #1, and also, to permit #1 to get possession of the ball in time to get a good angle into the hole.
#3 gives the left hand to #4 first, then gives the ball with his left hand to #1. The ball should be held at all times close to the body with elbows tight to the sides, both to hide the ball and to insure safe handling of it. After the forward hand to the wingback, #3 picks off the chasing end or tackle. If there are no chasers, he continues into the inside tackle hole, faking possession of the ball.
DIAGRAM 79
#3 - Buck 35
#3 sets alignment for himself and #4 by lining up at four and one-half yards deep, directly behind #9. He then accepts pass from X on his right hip, takes a lateral lead step with the right foot, and drives up inside of #2, handing the ball forward to #2 with both hands. After the ball exchange, #3 pulls both hands back quickly and continues into the line between the guards, faking possession of the ball.
#4 -45
#4 sets the alignment for himself and #3 by lining up four and one-half yards deep with his right foot in line with the ball. He starts to the longside of the formation with a lead step, aiming for the slot between #1 and #6. His steps are exactly like those he takes on Play 47, page 177, but in this case he hands the ball forward with his left hand to #1, who is coming across to hit the five hole. After the exchange of the ball, #4 blocks any opponent who is chasing the play, or, if no one is chasing, he continues into the off-tackle hole, faking CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 187 possession of the ball.
#4 - Spin 35, Buck 35
#4 fakes the end run from both these ball handlings. He should work hard at the faking, as this is a comparatively easy assignment.
#6-45, Spin 35, Buck 35
On all three plays into the five hole, #6 is assigned to the shortside halfback. On the six normal and six undershift calls, he must check the defensive tackle briefly, before going across for his halfback. This is to prevent that tackle from catching the play from the rear. On the six normal, this is easy. On the six undershift, with the defensive tackle head-on him, the problem for #6 is to escape the tackle's charge.
He should step hard into the tackle with his outside foot and then step over with his inside foot into the area vacated by #7. In this way he can check the tackle's charge and still be able to slide through for the far halfback. On a six over-shift or five man line call, #6 can go immediately without checking anyone. His course for the far halfback must be a flat one, never over four yards deep.
#7 _ 45; spin 35
#7 pulls for the shortside linebacker on all calls on these two plays. He may expect the draw of both 45 and Spin 35 to have some effect in pulling the shortside linebacker a step or two toward the longside of the formation. Therefore, #7 should be prepared to block to his inside as he comes through the hole. His pull is a flat one, not over two yards deep, as it is important to get into the hole quickly. #7 may expect his longest pull on a six overshift or a five man line call by #6, because the hole will be adjusted on these to run outside the shortside tackle. On the six normal and six undershift calls, #7's pull is a short one, just about over the position of X, who is involved in the power block on both calls. #7 must remember that, because of the flat course of # 1 on this opening, the ball carrier will be right on his tail. #7, therefore, must not hesitate in the hole. He must run his course at top speed, and, if no linebacker is in his immediate vicinity, he must continue right on downfield for the halfback or safety man.
CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 188 #7 - Buck 35
#7 cross-checks the longside guard on all calls on this play. If the guard is inside him, as on the six normal and six undershift spacings, #7 uses a reverse cross-body block, driving his shoulders and the trunk of his body across in front of the guard and then crabbing on all fours to get position between the man and the hole.
#8 - 45, Spin 35
#8 cross-checks the longside guard against all defenses on these plays. It is important that he step first with the foot nearest #7 on these cross-checks, in order to clear the way for #7's pull.
#8 - Buck 35
On this play, #8 pulls to trap the shortside tackle on all calls. Against a six normal and a six undershift, his pull is a normal trapping pull. On the six overshift and the five man line calls, however, #8 must realize that the unusual draw of the backfield maneuvers will often pull the close shortside tackle in so much that it will be impossible to trap him. The fake of the pass protection block by #10 will often bring the tackle across so that #8 may trap him, but sometimes the tackle will smash along the line of scrimmage to the inside. In this latter case, #8 must be prepared to turn into the hole and work on the tackle, to insure his continued inside commitment. In other words, #8 prevents the tackle's recovery as the play develops.
DIAGRAM 80
This assignment looks impossible, but it has proved itself over several seasons. The draw of the play is, of course, the factor that makes it possible. CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 189
#9-45, Spin 35
On the six normal, six overshift and five man line calls, #9 works with X to double-team the guard in their vicinity. #9 acts as the post for X's power on this block. He must be careful not to drive off too hard or he might drive the defensive guard around X's block. Because X is a little late in charging, #9, on the six normal call, must simply hold his position and prevent the defensive guard from penetrating. He must not step off on the guard at all; just take a lateral step, slightly backward, with the foot nearest X and brace himself. After X has made contact on his charge, #9 should work to keep the slot between himself and X closed and should only start to drive when he is sure that he will contribute to moving that guard laterally along the line of scrimmage. In case the defensive guard slants to the short-side, #9 must remember that #10 will then pick up the block with X, and #9 can slide through for the far linebacker. On the six undershift call, this is the man that #9 will get, protecting himself first against a slant by the guard head-on #8.
#9 - Buck 35
On all calls, #9 works with X on the guard in the area between head-on X to head-on #9 inclusive. Where #9 is post-blocking for X's power block, the same details apply as mentioned earlier for #9 on 45 and Spin 35. However, on the six undershift, X and #9 still take that guard, despite the fact that he is head-on X. This block can only be successful because of the draw of the play. #9 is careful on this call again not to step off on the guard. He must brace and allow the draw of the play to entice the guard into directing his charge onto himself instead of X. Then X can pick up and together with #9 move that guard laterally. #9's main concern is to keep the slot between himself and X closed, and to entice the defensive guard into slicing inside, toward what appears to be the heart of the play.
Center 45, Spin 35
The pass for 45 is made with a one-step lead to #4, while Spin 35 calls for a pass direct to the left knee of #3.
On the six overshift, six normal and five man line calls, X double-teams with #9 to drive the guard to the right. On the six normal call, with the guard in the slot, X steps first with the foot nearest to that guard, because he will make CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 190 contact on the first step. With the guard head-on #9, as on the six overshift or five man line calls, X should step first with the foot away from the guard, since that step will improve his blocking angle and allow the near foot to be under the shoulder when contact is made on the second step. On the six undershift call, when the defensive guard is head-on him, X works with #10 to double- team the guard. In this situation he steps into the guard with the foot nearest #10, makes contact with the shoulder nearest to #10, and attempts to keep the seam closed while allowing # 10 to apply the drive that effects lateral opening.
Center Buck 35
The pass to #3 is waist high and to the right. On this play, X double-teams the guard with #9 on all calls. The same details apply for his block on the six normal, six over-shift and five man line calls as on Play 45. On the six undershift, however, with the defensive guard head-on him, X puts the principles of the lead and post block to use. He steps in first with his right foot and slides his head and shoulders to the left. As the guard makes contact with X's right shoulder, X works around and starts to drive back to the right, letting the guard go straight for #3 and driving him that way with #9.
#10 - 45, Spin 35
On the six undershift, #10 power-blocks the guard head-on X with X, observing the details of good power blocking covered earlier. On the six overshift and five man line spac-ings, he goes through for a cut-off block on the far linebacker. His course for this block should be directly over the heels of the guard head-on #9. A reverse cross-body block is used on the linebacker. On the six normal call, #10 must check on the guard in the seam between X and #9 in case that guard is slanting toward the shortside. This is done because X is weakened in his offensive blocking by the responsibility of passing the ball. #10 does this by stepping first with die outside foot toward that guard, and then bringing up his inside foot, prepared to block with the inside shoulder. If the defensive guard is not slanting toward him, #10 drives off this inside foot to block the far linebacker. There is plenty of time for #10 to check on this block, because the far linebacker is held for a couple of steps by the faking in the offensive backfield. On the six overshift and the five man line calls, #10 and #5 power-block the tackle, who is lined up tight on #10's outside shoulder. #10 steps into the tackle with his outside foot, making contact with his outside shoulder at the belt line. #10's job is to prevent penetration by the tackle and to straighten him up, so that large area is exposed to #5's block, and also to keep CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 191 the slot between himself and #5 closed. #10 does not follow through on his contact until #5's power block has actually turned the tackle to the inside. Then #10 may pick up and contribute to moving the tackle farther to the inside.
#10 - Buck 35
On the six normal and six undershift calls, #10 fakes a pull to the longside, in order to help the draw of the play and to allow time for that draw to pull the shortside linebacker over toward the longside of the formation. #10 then goes through to block the linebacker to the inside. The fake pull must be simply a body twist rather than an actual step to the longside. If #10 actually steps back and toward the longside he will interfere with the trapping pull of #8. On the six overshift and five man line calls, #10 steps back, raises up, and fakes a pass protection block on the tackle in order to bring him across. #10 then breaks off before the tackle can tie him up and takes the shortside end with a shoulder block or a reverse cross-body, depending on how far the end has come across the line of scrimmage. #10's sole object on this block is to prevent the end from dropping back into the play behind the defensive line of scrimmage.
#5 - 45, Spin 35
On the six normal and six undershift alignments, #5 influences the tackle by stepping to him with the inside foot and threatening an outside block on him. He then pivots on this foot and prevents the end from dropping back into the play, using either a reverse cross-body or a shoulder block, depending on how far the end has penetrated. On the six overshift and five man line calls, #5 power-blocks the tackle to the inside with #10. #5 steps first with the inside foot if he is close to the tackle and can contact him on that first step. Otherwise he steps first with the outside foot. The block is a straight shoulder block, delivered fairly high, above the opponent's hip, to take advantage of #10's low effort on the inside.
#5 - Buck 35
On the six normal and six undershift spacings, #5 influences the defensive tackle and blocks the shortside end, as described for 45 and Spin 35. On the six overshift and the five man line calls, #5 blocks the shortside linebacker. He should delay on the line of scrimmage on the six overshift call until the draw of the play pulls the linebacker to the longside, then block him that way with a shoulder or reverse cross-body block. On the five man line spacing, if the CHAPTER V THE INSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 192 linebacker is outside him, #5 goes right after the man with a shoulder or cross- body block to keep him outside. If the linebacker is head-on him, or inside, #5 delays and takes him late, across the face of the play, as described for the six over-shift.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 193 OFF-TACKLE REVERSES, 3 OPENINGS
We now come to the three opening. The Princeton Single Wing has a reverse off the shortside tackle from the straight tailback series and the spin series. The play for this hole from the buck lateral series is not quite as strong as the others because the wingback (#1) cannot get into this hole at a good angle when the quarterback (#2) is handing him the ball. For a third method of hitting this hole we shall discuss the play from the fullback half spin to #1, which has already been mentioned in discussion of the seven hole. The key factor in running off-tackle to the shortside is the position of the shortside tackle. If he is playing inside #5, it is practical to block him inside, because #5 holds a blocking advantage on him. If the tackle lines up wide, so that #5 no longer has a blocking advantage on him, the play must be adjusted to run inside tackle. As pointed out in the previous discussion of the five hole, all reverses from Single Wing take time to reach the point of attack. For this reason, double blocking on the mouth of the hole is essential so that the block can be sustained for the added time interval.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 194
DIAGRAM 81 CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 195
DIAGRAM 82
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
The assignments and adjustments on Play 43 and Spin 33 are the same up front. The assignments are a bit different on the fullback half spin, Play 63. Let us look first at 43 and Spin 33.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 196
DIAGRAM 83
Play 43 is a forward handoff by #4 to #1. Spin 33 is a backward handoff, this time by #3 as he comes out of his spin fake to #4. On both these ball handlings, the initial draw of the play is to the longside of the formation. For this reason, #7, the pulling lineman who leads through the hole, may expect to find the shortside linebacker on the inside edge of the hole. For this reason also, #2 is allowed the option of going around outside the shortside end, if that defender, influenced by the initial draw, charges hard to the inside. #2 should always run a course, particularly for the first few steps, that will look like his course on a play through the one hole, on which he hooks the end in. This is done to help #9's trap, because the deeper motion by #2 should
keep the end from crashing so tightly to the inside that #9 cannot handle him. The block on the shortside tackle by #5 and #10 is a high-low double team effort, designed to topple the tackle to the inside. X and #8 should block the guards as cross-checkers.
Against the six overshift and the five man line spacings the assignments are essentially the same, except that X now does the trapping job on the shortside end. This is shown in Diagram 82. Against the five-three defense, as shown in Diagram 83, #2 will expect to take the outside linebacker on the shortside, and #7 will still expect his block to develop on the inside edge of the hole. If #2 CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 197 cannot run inside the end, it is generally because the linebacker is covering outside to allow the end to crash to the inside. In this case, #2 by continuing outside the end, will so affect the linebacker that the latter will be unable to recover.
Against the six undershift spacing on the shortside, it is necessary to adjust 43 and Spin 33 to run inside the tackle
DIAGRAM 84
instead of outside. When the tackle lines up head-on #5, as he does on the six undershift, #5 no longer has a blocking advantage on him, and the double team opportunity is lost. Any effort by #10 to help on the block will only drive the tackle wider. Therefore, the hole is adjusted to run inside the shortside tackle. Play 63 differs from 43 and Spin 33 in that the draw of the initial backfield movements is toward the shortside. For this reason it is much easier to block the shortside end out, because the threat of the deep reverse prevents his closing hard to the inside. This always allows #2 to go inside the end against a six normal, six overshift, or a five man line defense. CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 198
DIAGRAM 85
#7 also leads through the hole and always blocks to the inside, since the longside linebacker will come over very fast on the play. #2 blocks on the outside edge of the hole as he goes through, in order to take care of the shortside linebacker, who will be drawn wide by the movement to that side. #4 fakes an outside block on the end, as indicated, and continues for the defensive halfback. Against a six overshift, the only change is between X and #9. This is shown in Diagram 86.
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Page 199
DIAGRAM 86
Here, the X does the blocking of the shortside end and #9 check-blocks the guard. Against a five man line with three linebackers, the adjustments will remain exactly the same, with #7 turning to the inside as he goes through the hole to block the middle linebacker. #2, blocking on the outside edge of the hole, will take care of the shortside linebacker. The outside linebacker on the longside has no assigned blocker, because he cannot reach the hole in time to hurt the play. Play 63 is adjusted up front against a six undershift spacing like 43 and Spin 33. The shortside tackle is trapped, as he is too wide to be powered in, and the guard opposite X is
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 200
DIAGRAM 88
double-teamed. There is a change in assignment, however, for #5. Because of the draw of the play, #7 must continue to block to the inside against the longside linebacker, who will be pulled to the hole immediately. Therefore, #5 must block the shortside linebacker, after faking a block on that tackle. #5 has plenty of time on this play to allow the linebacker to commit himself. #5 may block him either in or out, depending on the man's reaction.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 201 TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1-43
# 1 takes a drop step with the inside foot, and his course is parallel to the line of scrimmage. There is no necessity for him to go back to accept the ball from #4. The latter will bring the ball up toward the scrimmage line and will hand it forward. #1 should be right on the tail of #7 as he enters the hole. If this timing is not working, it is probably because #4 is not handing the ball to #1 close enough to the line of scrimmage. The position of the longside defensive tackle is #l's key to his course. Six normal spacing by this tackle indicates #l's longest course. Six overshift or five spacing will be his intermediate course, and a six undershift alignment will tell #1 that his course is a close one, right over the power block of X and #10. His downfield cut after getting by the linebacker should be to the sidelines in order to utilize #2 as a blocker on the halfback.
#1 - Spin 33
Same course for #1 as on 43, except that he now accepts the ball from #3 on a backward handoff. #3 is responsible for moving well up toward the line of scrimmage to keep the exchange from forcing #1 so deep that he is not on the tail of #7 going through the hole. The same keys on defensive linemen as on Play 43, will be available to #1 to anticipate the length of his course.
#1-63
On all calls on this play, #1 starts in motion on a course for the near foot of #3. He must work out the timing for himself so that he will arrive at the moment of the fake by #3. It is important that #3 should not have to delay his fake to wait for #1. Each wingback must establish a starting point in the signal cadence that will get him to #3 on time. The fake by # 1 must be carried out all the way around the shortside end.
#2-43, Spin 33
On the six normal and six overshift calls, #2 must start his course fairly deep toward the shortside. This is done to give the shortside end a picture somewhat like the deep reverse to his side, and to make that man widen so that the block on him by #9 or X is made easier. If the end widens, #2 can cut sharply inside CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 202 him and continue downfield for the halfback. If the end is unaffected by the initial depth of #2's course, and closes hard to the inside, #2 continues outside the end, immediately turning downfield for the halfback. On the five man line call, #2 will block the outside linebacker out after turning inside of X's block on the end. On the six undershift call, #2 has a definite change of assignment. On this call he runs a flat trapping course across the face of the tackle on the shortside who is to be trapped, and blocks the end out. His key can be taken from the position of the defensive guard in the vicinity of #8.
#2-63
On all calls, #2 turns into the hole and blocks the shortside linebacker out. Because the draw of this play is to the short-side, #2 does not experience any trouble in getting into the hole and will usually find the linebacker on that side committed to the outside. Again, #2 can take an early key from the guard in the vicinity of #8. If this defender is lined up head-on #8, #2 suspects his course will be a close one inside #9's trap on the shortside tackle. #2 should start a fairly deep course each time so that he and #7 enter the hole almost shoulder to shoulder at all times.
#3-43
#3 starts wide to the longside on all calls. He throws an outside hook block on the defensive end, in order to hold the longside linebacker and halfback on that side.
#3 - Spin 33
Sets alignment for himself and #4 at three yards deep directly behind #9 and down in a three point stance. He executes the six spin on this play, making sure to travel well up toward the line of scrimmage. At the same time, the six spin insures that he will also travel laterally toward #1. He hands the ball back to #1 on his third step with the right hand (in right formation, which we are always talking here), and then picks off the longside tackle, who may be chasing the play. This technique differs only in the backward hand-off from that shown in Diagram 79.
#3-63
#3 sets alignment for himself and #4 at three and one-half yards, with his left CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 203 foot in line with the ball. The technique of his half spin to #1 is the same as on Play 67, page 175, Diagram 68. However, after coming out of the half spin, he must pick up #7 and slide laterally toward the hole. This hole will vary, depending on the defense faced. #3 may take a key from the position of the defensive guard in the vicinity of X. If the guard is in the slot between the X and #9, #3 can expect a six normal call, which gives his longest course to the shortside. If the defensive guard is head-on X, #3 should anticipate a six undershift call, with his hole opening up almost straight ahead, since this guard will be power-blocked by #10 and X.
#4-43
Sets alignment for himself and #3 at four yards deep directly behind #10. Starts laterally, and up toward the line of scrimmage, with a short lead step. He will hand the ball forward with the inside hand on his third step and then break wide around #3's block on the end, faking possession of the ball.
#4 Spin 33
#4 fakes receiving the ball from #3 on the spin and then carries out the fake around the longside defensive end.
#4-63
#4 runs right at the shortside defensive end and fakes an outside hook block on him. As soon as he clears the end #4 turns downfield for the defensive halfback. He uses an open-field block on this man, taking him in or out, depending on the man's position at the moment of contact. The fake block on the end is a duck of the head and shoulders just at the approach. The effect of the fake can be improved if #4 will throw both arms forward toward the end's outside leg on the duck of his head and shoulders.
#6-43, Spin 33
On a six normal or six undershift call, #6 must check the tackle briefly before going downfield for his block on the safety. This can be done by stepping hard into the tackle with the foot nearest him and jarring him off balance with the shoulder and elbow closest to him. #6 has only to slow the tackle down one step to have done a good job. He then cuts sharply across the field for the point where the safety man will be as the play develops. On a six overshift or a CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 204 five man line call, #6 may go immediately for his downfield block, since the tackle is too wide to hurt this play, particularly with the initial draw being to the longside of the formation.
#6-63
Because the draw on this play is to the shortside, #6 must check the tackle as described above on all calls except the five man line. With # 1 leaving early, the tackle might well catch #3 from the rear unless #6 checks him solidly before going downfield for the safety man,
#7 - 43, Spin 33
On all calls #7 pulls around the power block on the short-side and blocks the shortside linebacker. Because of the draw of the play, he may expect to block that linebacker to the inside almost all the time. His pull will vary in depth depending on the call. His deepest pull, about two yards, will be on the six normal call, and he must be prepared to turn into the adjusted hole very quickly. On all these pulls he may take the linebacker the easiest way. It is up to the ball carrier to use #7 properly as a blocker, but #7 should understand that the draw of the play will almost always pull the shortside linebacker to the inside edge of the hole. His block should be a cross-body block at all times, unless the linebacker is right in the middle of the hole. In this case, #7 uses a straight shoulder block.
#7-63
On this play, #7 always blocks on the inside edge of the hole, taking the longside linebacker, who is pulled immediately to the hole by the draw of the play. His pulls are the same as to depth and length on this play as on 43 and Spin 33. The only difference is that #7 always blocks to the inside as he comes through the hole.
#8 - 43, Spin 33, 63
On all calls on the three hole plays, #8 check-blocks in the line on the first man in the area from head-on himself to the longside.
#9 - 43, Spin 33, 63
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 205 On all three hole plays, #9 check-blocks the guard head-on him on the six overshift and five man line calls. On the six normal he pulls to trap the shortside end, and on the six undershift he pulls to trap the shortside tackle. #9 must be ready for a short trapping pull and early contact with his man on the six undershift call. The six normal call tells him that his trapping pull will be longer, since he blocks the end on this defense. At all times, #9 is guided by the details that apply to good trapping, as described earlier.
Center 43, Spin 33, 63
The passes to #4 and #3 for 43, Spin 33 and 63, follow the same pattern previously described for these series. Actually giving #4 a one step lead on 43 makes this pass go directly back from center. The assignments of X for all three plays are standardized from play to play. However, each defensive charge causes an adjustment in blocking for X. The off-tackle reverse is designed against the six normal defense. This is probably the most difficult assignment given to X. He cross-checks on the guard on his right shoulder. His main problem is to prevent penetration by that guard, so the technique is to throw his body across the opening, using a reverse cross-body block. This is similar to the technique of the post for a shoot block. If the defensive guard is not a hard charger, then X steps in with his right shoulder to take the man with a shoulder cross-check. If the guard moves to an overshift and "five" is the call, X pulls to trap the end. This pull conforms to the basic technique of a trapping pull. His assignment, when "under" is called and the guard is over him, is to post the guard for #10's power block. X should work hard to prevent initial penetration by the guard, as the act of passing the ball will prevent X from doing his job quickly.
#10 -43, Spin 33, 63
On all three hole plays, #10 double-teams the shortside tackle with #5 on the six normal, six overshift and the five man line calls. On the six normal alignment the block by #10 and #5 is a high-low effort, designed to topple the defensive tackle to the inside. #10 shoots out low and goes to all fours, attempting to contact the tackle with the hip nearest to him. #10's hip, thigh and leg should be in a position to prevent penetration to the inside by the tackle, and his hands should go to the ground inside and behind the tackle. The intent is to trap the tackle's inside leg. As soon as contact has been established, #10 should work on all fours to get the trunk of his body across the tackle to the inside so that #5's drive will topple the tackle over him. CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 206
On the six overshift and the five man line, #10 and #5 work together on the tackle, but here the technique is a bit different. Because the tackle is now close to him, #10 steps immediately into the tackle with the foot nearest him and drives the shoulder into the pit of the stomach. He stops the tackle's penetration first and then works to keep the slot between #5 and himself closed. He does not follow through on his initial contact, but merely tries to set up the tackle for #5's power block. #10 should not pick up and drive until the force of #5's block has moved the tackle. Then #10's drive will contribute to moving the man laterally along the line of scrimmage rather than straight back. On the six undershift call the hole is adjusted to run inside the shortside defensive tackle who is too wide to allow #10 and #5 to block him in. Therefore, #10 power blocks with X on the guard.
#5 - 43, Spin 33, 63
#5 has the same assignments. On the six normal, six overshift and the five man line, he power-blocks the defensive tackle with the help of #10. This is a straight shoulder block for #5, who applies the power on this double team. His first step must be taken with the thought of having the foot under the blocking shoulder at the moment of contact. Thus, if the tackle is close to him, as on a six normal, #5 would step with the foot nearest him, because contact will be made on the first step. If the tackle is farther away to the inside, as on a six overshift, #5 should step with his outside foot first, as contact will be made on the second step. On the six undershift call, #5 should fake an outside block on the tackle to influence him into a wide charge. #5 must actually contact the tackle on this fake, since he has plenty of time before breaking off to go downfield for the halfback. The reverse play is a late hitter, and #5 should work on the time element involved to keep him from going downfield too soon. His block on the halfback should occur close to the ball carrier to be effective. He may block the halfback in or out, whichever is easier at the time. It is up to the ball carrier to use this block effectively.
END RUN REVERSES, 1 OPENINGS
The general principles for running the attack outside of the ends remain the same. In essence, we attempt to cut off the main body of the defense, isolating the problem in the outer defense. However, the play changes to a certain extent in attempting to run around the end defending the shortside of the formation. Plays directed at this end usually are delayed, arriving at the line of scrimmage CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 207 later. This is due to the longer distance required for the pulling linemen to form interference in front of the ball carrier, compared with running to the overbalanced side. Successful plays that hit late must, in addition, block the defensive line at a later position, because linemen who are blocked early on delayed plays may recover in time to make the tackle.
In applying this principle for the inside reverses, because of the delay, we have attempted to standardize the assignments for all maneuvers. An attempt at standardization has also been made in the adjustments for the varying defenses. In this manner, the linemen will be better prepared to contribute to the sealing- off effect on the main body of the defense.
Wide reverse plays naturally get best results when run against the overshifted six man line. Let us therefore take the blocking against this type of spacing for all the reverses as focal point of the discussion.
BLOCKING ADJUSTMENTS AND MANEUVERS
#5 takes the linebacker in, using a body block to cut the outside leg of the linebacker. #10 must stand the tackle up and then work to contain the tackle from the outside, making him escape, if at all, to the inside. X pulls, as in the off-tackle opening, to threaten the end from the inside. Having done this, he takes a position as the first important member of the cut-off wall, ready to second-block the first defensive man to arrive in his area. #9 and #8 have shoulder blocking assignments to check the guard, before they release to join X in the cut-off wall. #6 is assigned to the safety as a downfield blocker. Having isolated the defensive team from the defensive end and right defensive halfback, we now find that key blocks on the end and halfback are the individual problems of #2 and #7. #2 approaches the end at an angle to take the end in. If X's threat has been well made, #2 should be able to take that end in. #7 pulls seven yards deep on a course to go around #2's block. When he clears the end he can anticipate outside support for the blocked end by the halfback, which means that #7 should be prepared to block the halfback out.
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Page 208
DIAGRAM 89
The changes for running this play against a five-three defense are nominal. However, the changes are not called changes but rather recognition problems. #5, who was assigned to take the linebacker in, finds he will not be able to do so because of the outside position of this linebacker. Seeing this, #5 will disregard the linebacker and proceed laterally to block the defensive halfback out. #7 is assigned to the halfback, but, since he is a personal interferer, he is prepared to take the first block needed for success of the play. The far linebacker will be up quickly on the outside so we expect #7 to block him out. When teams consistently play a five, #7 will be able to anticipate blocking earlier on the play.
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Page 209
DIAGRAM 90
We must adjust the blocking a good deal to run against the six undershift and six normal. #5 takes over the position block in the cut-off wall, taking an inside course in the six undershift to draw the tackle in. #10 takes the block on the linebacker with the same technique used by #5 against the six overshift. X becomes a check blocker, using a shoulder block and then he becomes a secondary cut-off blocker. #9 pulls, just as he does for a shortside off-tackle opening, but hooks the outside leg of the tackle in the same way that #2 blocks the end. #6 elbows the tackle before going downfield as before. The play is adjusted in this manner to continue to give the appearance and threat of an off- tackle play, before breaking wide.
#2 and #7, however, can expect a different reaction by the
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Page 210
DIAGRAM 91
end and halfback. Should the defensive end react wide, #2 will block him out. #7's course is deep enough so that he can see the end reacting and being taken wide. #7 will change his course to run inside the end and also will anticipate inside support of the end by the halfback. He can expect then to take the halfback in. This type of reaction and change of blocking is interchangeable at all times, no matter what the defense. With the type of end play encountered today, this may be true when the end is playing in an overshifted spacing. CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 211 Conversely, with the changing defenses, the end may be reacting inside even with this spacing, and the play will run outside. In other words, there is not much that is static in plays designed to go around the ends, except for the containing of the main body of the defense.
The choice of cycle for running the play does not bring any requirements for changing the blocking. Running the play from a specific series contributes to standardizing the reactions of the defense and thus necessitates local changes in technique. Each series has a different draw, and different men are being fooled by the fakes. An understanding of these elements helps the man on offense to anticipate defensive reactions and to be prepared to accomplish the local change in technique required for his position. This play around the end can be run from three different maneuvers, all of them allowing the wingback to carry the ball around the shortside end. See Diagram 92.
From the straight series we use Play 41. #4 receives the direct pass and uses a forward handoff to exchange the ball with #1. #3 in this case, starts to the right and goes directly at the end. By throwing an outside block on the end, he helps to hold the linebacker and tackle on that side. #4 completes the fake by putting his left hand on his right hip as he circles the end behind #3's block. #1 takes a deep course to use #7 as his personal interferer. The draw of this
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 212
DIAGRAM 92
play is all to the longside, so all blockers can expect inside reactions from the defense.
Running from the half spin, by the fullback, the play is 61. #4 is added to the CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 213 cut-off wall in an attempt to draw the linebacker and tackle in. #3 hands off to #1, who leaves his lining-up position on an early count, and then blocks the longside tackle to complete his fake. The expectancy on this maneuver is that the end will widen and the play will run inside, with the halfback being drawn up on the inside. Early draw on this play is all to the shortside, and all blocks should be so compensated, but this is offset by the gain in speed of attack before reaching the hole.
Using the full spin cycle, or Spin 31, #3 fakes to #4 and gives to #1. #3 fakes the left hand to #4 and travels laterally toward #1. As he turns, he gives the ball to #1, who must time his course properly to get behind #3's spinning position. This spin will hold the linebackers and force the end to react deep. The advantage gained is that the linebacker and halfback will be held momentarily and thus delay their arrival at the play.
TECHNIQUES AND DETAILS
#1-41
Lines up in his usual position one yard deep, one yard away from his end, facing in at a forty-five degree angle. His course on the starting signal is directly at the right shoulder of the #3 back, to receive an outside feed from the #4. The step is a lead and cross-over, keeping low and receiving the ball on his outside hip in a pocket formed there by placing his arms on this side as he prepares to get the ball from #4.
As # 1 takes his offensive stance, he soon learns that a tackle playing directly in front of him in an overshifted position, combined with a play number which starts with the draw toward this tackle should in all probability result in a successful outside-in block on the other end by #2. #1 has this in mind as he receives the ball from #4, but he watches the decision of #7, his personal interferer, as to his course either side of the end. #1 knows that an outside course around the end should bring the defensive halfback up on the blocked end's outside. He should be ready to set up #7's block by faking a farther outside course by use of eyes, hips and body sway. #1 should not take the inside cut until #7 has made contact on his block.
#1 - Spin 31
The details of course and techniques correspond to a large degree to those in CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 214 the 41 play. The difference being in obtaining the ball from #3. #1 goes behind the feeder to receive the ball from #3 as #3 turns to start his off-tackle course.
#1-61
Takes the ball from #3 as he goes behind him. The draw of the play here, at times, will change #l's course to an inside cut even on an overshifted defense. In this case, #1 should allow #7, his personal interferer to make the decision. If the end is blocked out, # 1 should anticipate an out-side-in block on the halfback, reversing the setup technique used when #7 is blocking the halfback out. #1 can slant a fraction of a second earlier on this play if he finds the defensive end always wide. This would result in a definite cut inside the end. The ball carrier continues on his deep course but can still time his cut on #7, despite now being a step farther away from his personal interferer.
#2-41
#2's responsibility is to block the end either in or out on all one hole plays. He takes a straight course to a position outside the course of a normal defensive end, whom he should meet on his sixth step. #2 can tell on his fourth step if he must change his block to take the end out rather than in. #2 also knows, from the draw or backfield maneuver, that his highest percentage of successful blocks to flank the end would occur on this play.
#2 - Spin 31
The draw is somewhat the same, therefore #2 should expect to block the end in, except on the undershifted defenses.
#2-61
This play starts toward the shortside of the formation. In many cases, the blocking back can anticipate a wide end, especially against the undershifted six, or the five end with outside responsibility.
It must be remembered that other factors such as position on the field, call of the play in the down sequence, and the individual play of the defensive end, all have a bearing on #2's anticipation of which way he can take the end.
#3-41 CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 215
Runs laterally toward the longside end to screen the exchange of the ball between #4 and #1. #3 should just miss #1 and continue his course to throw an outside block on the end.
#3 - Spin 31
Position three yards behind #9. Receives the ball passed to his left knee, executes a six spin, faking to #4 with his left hand, and turns as if he were carrying off the six trap. He then feeds the ball to #1 with his right hand, allowing the hand to follow #Ts course as he hides the hand behind his back.
#3-61
Position, four and one-half yards behind #9. He receives the ball from X, executes a half spin toward #1, by stepping forward with his right foot, turning body so that #1 can take the ball from him. He then fakes into line to screen off the chasing tackle. If the #3 back prefers the drop step with his right foot for the half spin, he must line up so that #1 is not forced too deep into the backfield.
#4-41
Takes a position four and one-half yards behind #10. Accepts the ball from X on his second step as he runs exactly parallel to the line of scrimmage. Feeds the ball to # 1 with his left hand, allowing hand to follow course of #1. We prefer to fake a keep on his feed by having #4 grasp his right hand on his right hip after giving the ball to #1. Some coaches prefer to have #4 hide the left hand behind the back as he continues to fake the keep.
#4 - Spin 31
Steps forward as he pivots, to fake receiving the ball from #3. Ducks his left shoulder, grasping his right hand on his right hip as he continues fake beyond the end.
#4-61
Against six overshifted and six normal defenses #4 takes a course directly at the end to be blocked, veering to the inside to become a part of the cut-off CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 216 wall. On undershifted six, #4 blocks the defensive right tackle's outside leg to prevent lateral movement in support of the end.
#7-41
On this play, #7 pulls on all calls and is the personal inter-ferer for the ball carrier all the way to the shortside defensive halfback. Because the draw of the initial ball handling is toward the longside of the formation, #7 should expect to go outside the defensive end on every defense except the six undershift. The depth of his pull should be six yards from the line of scrimmage when he rounds the defensive end. The initial steps of his pull are directed for a point six yards behind the line of scrimmage and opposite the position of the shortside defensive end. As soon as #7 gets outside the end he must turn downfield for his block on the halfback. He should block this halfback either in or out, whichever is easiest for him at the moment of impact. It is up to the ball carrier to use #7's block on the half. In fact #1 should set the block up for #7 and then cut on that block.
Against a five man line, #7 should be prepared for an early block while he rounds the end or the linebacker who has come up fast on the outside. This shortside linebacker sometimes lines up outside his end on a five-three defense so that #5 is unable to get to him. In this case, #5 will continue for the defensive halfback and leave the linebacker for #7.
On the six undershift, the defensive end will sometimes play so wide on the shortside that #2 will have to block him out, and #7 will have to turn inside this block in order to get his halfback. When this happens, the ball carrier will follow #7 inside the end and again #7 blocks the halfback the easiest way, with an openfield block.
#7 - Spin 31
Here again the initial maneuvers in the backfield create a draw to the longside of the formation. #7's pulls on all calls
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 217
DIAGRAM 93
are the same as for Play 41, except that at the start he will have to travel a bit laterally to avoid hitting the spinning fullback. This is accomplished by moving laterally instead of back on the first two steps of #7's pull. He then swings back off his right foot for his depth.
#7-61
On this play the initial draw is to the shortside. Therefore, #7 should expect to have to cut inside the shortside defensive end more often than he will be able to get outside him. For this reason, he does not have to pull as deep as on 41 and Spin 31. Otherwise the details are the same on this play as on 41. Against a very wide linebacker on five-three defense, however, because of the play's draw, #7 can expect to block the man out, rather than in as on 41 and Spin 31.
#5 - 41, Spin 31, 61
On this outside play #5 has three basic changes in assignments: taking the linebacker in, taking the halfback out, and blocking in the cut-off. As described, his assignments and techniques for these blocks will vary with the maneuvers used. When blocking the linebacker in, #5 should be able to anticipate movement of the linebacker. On the 40 series, this linebacker should take a step or two with the draw, so #5 goes straight through and takes a position facing laterally toward that linebacker. When the opponent reacts back with the play, #5 can then take him with a reverse cross-body if there is penetration toward the ball carrier, or take him with a shoulder block if he comes straight across. Lastly, #5 can go for a side body if the linebacker moves laterally, retreating from his original position. Taking the linebacker on the 61 and Spin CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 218 31, #5 must go right at him, cutting his outside leg while anticipating lateral outside movement by that linebacker.
The six overshift and the five can be alike, in that the linebacker will be too wide for #5 to take him. Then #5 goes through and turns laterally just behind this linebacker to knock the halfback to the outside with a downfield block. When blocking in the cut-off, #5 should get no deeper than five yards from the line of scrimmage and no farther out than three yards for his position. Against the six undershift, he should make an effort to go inside, to draw the defensive tackle in with him. On Spin 31, versus the six undershift and six normal, #5 can fake a quick pass before proceeding to the position as per his assignment.
#10 - 41, Spin 31, 61
The most difficult job for #10 is to hook the tackle on his five call. #10 should step first with his left foot just as if pulling and then bring his right leg and shoulder in on the outside of the tackle. #10 must remember to work hard and keep driving for the outside position before attempting to get the cross-body on the tackle's outside leg. In blocking the linebacker against the six normal and six undershift #10 should follow much the same detail as #5 does in his block on the linebacker. If #10 finds the linebacker is too wide here for him to get, he can make the five call and send the end on the linebacker.
Center 41, Spin 31, 61
The passes from X for this play are somewhat less varied than most plays. X's pass for 41 is a one-step lead, and because of the #4's position, this pass is directly straight back. 61 is a direct pass to the right hip of a stationary #3, and the spin to #3's left knee. X's assignment to block in the seal-off wall is not too difficult. However, it does require that he make a fake at the end from the inside and then block back to the inside. When encountering a five-three consistently, X should be alert for the middle linebacker. In all cases, however, he should be more interested in blocking back to the runner than in trying to proceed farther down-field.
Against the six undershift and six normal, X must check the guard who is head- on him or on his shoulder. This requires a quick transition from passing the ball to blocking and an effort to keep the legs moving to maintain contact on this block, always working around to the short side of that guard.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 219 #9-41, Spin 31, 61
This tackle has done considerable check blocking, and blocking for the one hole on a six overshift or five is nothing but a shoulder check block. However, if #9 can make this guard release and go around his longside, then #9 can go downfield to add to the containing wall. This release is governed by the type of defensive guard encountered also. If the guard consistently submarines, #9 would only worry about stopping his penetration and can release quickly. However, against a fast, sliding guard, #9 must make every effort to stay with him. In pulling to block the tackle in, #9 has essentially the same problem as #10 did. #9 should be in no hurry to leave his feet until he is satisfied that he has adequate outside position to get good contact. #9 should remember to get in close with the right shoulder and leg before throwing for a cross-body on the outside leg.
#8 - 41, Spin 31, 61
In all defenses, #8 check-blocks the defensive guard. In this check blocking he is governed by the same elements just given for #9. #8 should remember always to step into the guard on a six normal and a six overshift with the foot nearest #7. This will clear #7's first pulling step and also get #8 in position to stop penetration by the guard, who might stop the play before it really got started with a good, fast charge.
#6 - 41, Spin 31, 61
The assignment for #6 is always to take the safety man. #6, however, has a secondary responsibility on the six normal and six undershift calls. He should belt the tackle effectively to keep him from starting right off with the play. Against a normal six, #6 steps right at the tackle with the right leg and right shoulder before proceeding downfield raising up as he hits in order to knock the tackle off balance. Versus a six undershift, #6 should step at the inside foot of this tackle with the same leg and shoulder, repeating the process. In going for the man downfield, #6 must remember to move laterally just behind the defensive linebacker in order to meet the safety where he will be. If the safety reacts quickly and to the outside, #6 can expect to block him out. When the safety delays getting over, #6 should get down-field blocking position on him from the inside in the same manner as #5 and #10 on the two hole plays.
CHAPTER VI THE OUTSIDE ATTACK TO THE SHORTSIDE OF THE FORMATION
Page 220 COACHING POINTS
The time spent on the shortside outside play from Single Wing is probably more important than any other single play. Considerable practice must be utilized to: 1. Aid the blocking back to recognize his problem of taking the end either way. 2. Help #7 learn by practice the course and block he executes as he cuts either side of the end.
Fortunately, this can be learned in a drill which employs only the men involved in blocking the end and defensive halfback. Continued practice will perfect these blocks, as well as the course of the ball carrier in recognizing his cuts both at the line of scrimmage and downfield. CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 221 GENERAL TECHNIQUES
The use of the passing attack in Single Wing varies somewhat in theory from the popular conception of this weapon as employed in other formations. Granted that the pass is a dangerous offensive threat, given much leeway for potential success under the present rules, we must remember that we are seeking balance in the overall attack, with the pass as an integral part, rather than the major weapon. The decision on how much the pass should be emphasized depends upon the ability and experience of the personnel involved. These variables differ from year to year. Generally speaking, it is our thought that a well-executed passing attack against a balanced defense should net approximately one half the yardage gained by the running attack.
In supplementing the running attack in the above manner, the patterns used must, of necessity, look like the basic running plays. The number of such pass plays would vary with the number of cycles chosen in the formation. In addition, the passing attack should carry one pass which will take advantage of each defender who might be out of position. For deep halfbacks, quick passes in front of these positions should be used. For a close safety, a pass behind him. For close linebackers in abnormal spacing, quick touch football passes into the exposed areas.
In designing a passing attack which does not use the threat of a running play to open up the areas, the principle of employing certain patterns that have proven successful against specific defensive alignments must be stressed. The same thought holds true against teams which have a typed plan for defending against passes. For example, cross passes which require switching are best against man- for-man defenses. Hook passes are most successful against straight zones. The hook pass is probably the surest and easiest way to advance the ball against all types of pass defenses, especially where the defenders retreat too deeply in order to prevent the receivers from running behind them.
PASSING TECHNIQUES
The art of throwing a football correctly has been developed to a high degree, particularly since the pass has assumed a more important position in the general offensive scheme. No longer does a passer palm the ball or deliver it with the decided side-arm twist used in the early days. The proper method employed by a number of great passers is as follows:
CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 222 Holding the Ball
Grasp the ball with the tips of the fingers, allowing for a space between the palm and ball. The touch of the delivery comes from the tips of the fingers. In teaching this to youngsters, have them pick up a ball from the ground with just the finger tips, with the back of the hand above the ball. With the hand in this position, allow the ball to drop an inch or two but retrieve it at once before it hits the ground by re-grasping the ball with the tips of the fingers. This drill will not only strengthen the fingers but will impart a certain touch which is highly important.
Size of hand helps in holding the ball but it is not absolutely necessary to have a large hand to be able to deliver the ball properly. In placing the hand on top of the ball, slide the fingers toward the end of it until the hand can grasp the ball comfortably. The smaller the hand, the nearer the ball will be held toward its narrow end.
The position of the fingers should not be across the long axis but as nearly parallel as possible. The proper grip will find the index finger parallel to the stitching, almost at the very end of the ball. The index finger is slightly spread from the rest of the hand, as the passer approximates the position of the split index and middle finger grip used to throw a baseball overhand. As a further check, the ball should point back toward the elbow of the hand that is on top of the ball.
PASSING POSITION
Raise the arm directly upward, ball just above the ear with the elbow close to the body. This is the proper place from which the ball should be delivered on all passes thrown when the passer is upright in his cup protection. The left hand is placed on the side of the ball to help the passer balance the ball in this position. The left hand can now be used to check the ball if the passer uses a fake pass to decoy defenders, opening other receivers.
The feet should be placed so that a balanced step off the back foot will allow the body to follow through with the forward step. The step is part of the throw but is not absolutely necessary on short passes, as use of the arm as described above can deliver the ball without the step.
RELEASING THE BALL CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
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With the ball in correct position for delivery we are now concerned with the actual throw. The previously detailed method of grasping the ball helps eliminate the side twist, fatal for the passer who wants the ball to travel a true course. The two fingers behind the ball should direct a force through the ball in a straight line, the arm following the line of flight. Actually, as the hand turns normally the fingers should point toward the target after releasing the ball. Care must be taken to have the front part of the ball high at the time of release. A slight downward pull upon delivery will insure a soft pass, causing the forward point of the ball to stay high during flight. Improper delivery can be spotted by the finish of the throw. It is important to stress continually that the force applied should always be in back of the ball, never across the long axis. The speed of the pass is determined by wrist snap. In applying the snap, the passer must make a mental note to keep the proper pressure on the finger tips. Failure to remember this point will cause loss of control of the ball.
Passes thrown into the center area of the defensive back-field should be thrown fairly hard about number high. This is true on hook passes and other types where the receiver can turn his body to face the passer. All other passes should be delivered according to the length and direction of that particular pass. The deep, or behind the defender, pass should be thrown well ahead of the receiver, allowing a run-under catch. In all cases, the passer should remember to overthrow rather than underthrow. In all passing, the passer must know what effect the prevailing wind conditions will have on his passing game. This factor changes from Saturday to Saturday and may change during the course of the game.
WHEN TO THROW
The mistake most common to all inexperienced passers, is to throw too late. The timing must be such that the ball and receiver arrive at the open spot simultaneously. A free receiver will draw the attention of the defenders so that he will be immediately covered. A late throw will end in a failure, or even an interception. If passes allowing a choice are used in the attack, the passer should know the order of choice; primary receiver, secondary receivers, etc. All passes should have an outlet receiver, usually a blocker, to prevent large yardage losses in instances when the defense covers the regular pattern.
The passer must know the protection cup for each pass. He should decoy the rushers to the outside of the protective cup, the advance inside his blockers as CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 224 he throws. He should be ready at all times to run with the ball if the defense drops linemen into the secondary, or if the linemen, in rushing the pass, overrush or allow gaps between them.
The passer must remember that the ball belongs equally to the receiver and defender once it has left his possession. He must do everything in his power to prevent an interception.
RECEIVER TECHNIQUE
The debate as to whether the receiver makes the passer, or vice versa, had never ended.
Superior receivers can disrupt most defenses, particularly if they have speed, height and natural catching ability. The potential downfield receiver must disguise his intention when ready to go out for the pass. He must be prepared for a defensive holdup, a "chug" by the linebacker as he takes off on his course, particularly if the pass is called on a so-called "passing" down.
Speed, change of pace, feints, fakes and running on balance are prerequisites for a talented receiver. On long passes, which must be thrown well ahead of the receiver, the receiver must be able to judge the ball in flight and extend his arms at the proper time but still have relaxed hands. If the pass is underthrown, he must come back toward the ball, with his body between the throw and the defender, to prevent interception. He must now catch the ball as far as possible with his hands toward the flight of the ball, rather than allow it to settle, as he does on the passes which are caught away from the defenders.
On hook reception, the receiver must catch the ball with his body between the ball and defender. As he catches the ball, he must be ready to protect the ball and himself from the shock of a head-on tackle. In all cases, the pass catcher should remember to catch the ball before he runs with it; Hundreds of passes, every year, are dropped because of the eagerness of the receiver to make the long run.
THE RUNNING PASS, 42 PASS
This pass is one of the most effective used by the Single Wing attack. Its effectiveness varies with the potency of the outside attack to the longside of the formation. The CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 225
DIAGRAM 94
pressure of the end run threat overextends the defense, making the running pass a lethal weapon.
Diagram 94 shows the protection of the running pass against all defenses except a seven man line, in which case we have X block the man in his area. Since the passing cup is well overbalanced to the longside of the formation, all protectors must endeavor to get in front of the passer, between the passer and rusher. The men who block immediately on the scrimmage line should cut- block early. The others should block late, or act as auxiliaries if their normally assigned men do not rush.
PROTECTION
#3
Uses the same block on the end as he does on the outside running play, a low outside cut-block trying to give the passer more freedom for choice of receiver, or the option of running if the receivers are covered.
#7 CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
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Uses block suited to the individual in that territory. A straight shoulder block easing into a cross-body block should be effective.
#8
Pulls on a deep course so that he can get outside position on the tackle, no matter what defensive spacing has been taken by the tackle. #8 can suspect depth of pull by the spacing in front of him. He cuts the tackle down from an outside position.
#9
Same block as #7, but on the guard head-on him or over X.
Center
Steps back with his left pivot to cut off the shortside tackle, or any rusher who lines up in or shoots the gap to his left and in the area of #10.
#10
Takes his deep pull to arrive at the outer edge of the passing cup, where he cuts off the end if that man chases, or may act as an additional protector.
If a seven man line is encountered, or if a rusher lines up in the area between X and #10, the #10 will call seven spacing, which will quarterback the blocking for X to take the man on his left shoulder and next man to #10's left. The shortside defensive end will be ignored.
Five Man Line Protection #7
His man is on his outside shoulder, so he takes him, working to get outside position.
#8
Will pull for his end as normally assigned but will find himself as" an auxiliary blocker. He should get in position in front of the passer to lend strength to the CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 227 protection or to lead the play downfield should the passer elect to run with the ball.
PATTERNS
#1
Is the primary receiver against the undershifted line, #1 runs at a forty-five degree angle, full speed and looks over his right shoulder just as soon as he is free. The quick draw of the play causes the defensive halfback to start to protect the flank. As the safety has difficulty in reaching the
DIAGRAM 95
territory through which #1 angles, this deep defender has an almost impossible assignment to cover #1.
#6
If the halfback drops to cover #1, #6, the secondary receiver, who takes a course inside the undershifted tackle to keep from taking him laterally, now runs a course so that he can escape the defensive linebacker. He normally arrives about eight yards deep in the flat area.
#2
If the linebacker should drop to cover #6, #2, who fakes the end, takes a flat CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 228 course no deeper than one yard beyond the line of scrimmage. He should now be open for the outlet pass. Some teams cover #2 with the end on that side. If this occurs, we instruct the #4 to run with the ball, either to gain ground, or to stretch the defensive zones so that eventually a receiver will be free.
#5
Angles at the safety away from the defending half on his side if the safety tries to cover #1. The side draw of the play isolates the defensive right half making him a personal defender for the #5 end. This affords #5 an excellent opportunity to use personal fakes and feints against the right halfback on personal passes.
#4
Starts at full speed toward the flank faking the outside run, and fixes the ball as he watches the progress of the deep man. His throw is made on the run. The ball is aimed almost directly at the receiver. A normal lead will cause a continual overthrow of the receiver. If the deep man is covered, #4 looks for the intermediate receiver at the eight yard depth. If this man is covered the #2 should be open for the outlet pass.
In Diagram 96, #6 and #1 must change courses, because
DIAGRAM 96 CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 229
part of the success of the play comes from the speed at which the deep receiver reaches his pass receiving area.
DIAGRAM 97
Diagram 97, shows additional patterns off the tailback wide pass that have proven successful, mostly thrown to the short end as a personal receiver. When a personal pass for the #5 end is called from the second pattern, the protectors will know that the pass is to be thrown much sooner than when stressing the outside pattern, hence the passer will pull up to throw, necessitating a protection cup closer to #4's original starting position.
THE REVERSE PASS, 41 PASS
PROTECTION
#2
Runs the normal course used on the deep reverse. His block is the low cut- block for the purpose of knocking the end off his feet or making him stumble.
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Page 230
DIAGRAM 98
#7
Acts again as personal interferer for the passer. #7 now becomes an auxiliary blocker who, as an added protector, can block the end or tackle who escapes from #2 and #10 respectively, or the linebacker who crosses the line of scrimmage. #7 must be prepared to lead the passer downfield if #2 knocks the end down, and when the defense fades to cover the potential receivers.
#8
Uses shoulder block, which after contact, can slip into a cross-body, on the man to his right in the area in front of #7.
#9
CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 231 Executes a shoulder pass protection block on the man in front of him, then cuts low, trying to topple this guard sliding to the play.
#10
Must first work to get outside position for his pass protection blocking. From that position he endeavors to stay in front of the tackle for his block.
Center
Delays pull until #7 and #2 have chance to clear. Drops straight back to cut- off chasing linemen from the longside. Usually protects against the tackle away from the play.
Versus the six undershift, #9 and X switch assignments so that X takes the guard and #9 takes the drop-pull to block back on the long side.
PATTERNS
#5
Fakes the running play course, allowing the defensive right half to commit against the run. On the forward movement of this defensive man, #5 cuts behind and away from the safety man. If the half should fade with #5, the latter continues on his deep course, veering to the outside, endeavoring to turn the defensive halfback around, preventing his lending support if the pass is thrown to #6.
#6
Eludes a possible holdup by an undershifted tackle and runs a preliminary course which corresponds to that on the running play, i.e., toward the safety for five yards before he parallels the line of scrimmage. The preliminary course will allow the end to get behind the linebacker, provided the play looks like the run. #6 continues on this parallel course as an outlet receiver in case #5 is not clear. CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 232
DIAGRAM 99
#4
Uses the same method of delivering the ball to # 1 as used on the. running play, with a forward handoff. #4 fakes a keep, then continues on a "blooper" course around end into defensive left half territory.
#3
Blocks end. After the block, he remains in that area as an outlet receiver if the defensive linemen and linebacker chase the passer.
#1
Fakes run until point P before he shows pass. He looks for the deep pass first. If #5 is uncovered he throws to the outside to prevent the safety from making a last minute save.
If the halfback retreats to cover the end, #6 should be free. If the linebacker fades into the area traversed by #6, then #1 should adjust to a run, led by #7. CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 233 Receivers #4 and #3 are used on call, when from the past experience, the defense fails to cover them or their area.
BUCK LATERAL SERIES RUNNING PASS, BUCK 32 PASS
PROTECTION
The technique, assignments and adjustment of protection on this pass are similar to those used in the running pass for #7, #8, #9, X and #10. However, the draw of the play and the area from which the pass is thrown create a different problem for #1, #2 and #8.
DIAGRAM 100
#1
He now uses an on-balance screen block to protect the passer from the end on this side. #1 throws his body low only after the end has definitely chosen to rush. The block may become a reverse cross-body if the end recognizes the play as a pass.
#2
CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 234 After #2 pitches the ball back to #4 he becomes an added blocker, protecting the area in front of #4, checking on all preliminary blocks by the linemen and #1.
#5
Has a slight change in technique from that of the running pass. Since the passer is deeper, #8 can start off with his original pull, as in Buck 32 run. When he reaches the deepest part of this pull, he comes up on balance to protect the passer. He should block the tackle, since that man is unblocked, but his position will allow him to take the first man to threaten the passer.
PATTERNS
#6
Straight down the field through the safety's position be-
DIAGRAM 101 CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 235
fore turning to look over right shoulder. If the pass is thrown to #6, he would receive the ball twenty to twenty-five yards downfield.
#5
Same course as used for his downfield block on the safety. This pattern allows #5 to become almost a personal pass receiver, in that he should look for the pass any time between the R's as marked on his course in Diagram 101.
#3
Drives into line, if possible he takes a sharp right or left veer parallel to line of scrimmage, depending upon the reaction of the defenses to the threat of the run. #3 can be an outlet receiver if he veers right, a nuisance receiver if he veers left against defense caught covering wide against the run.
#4
Checks first to see if #6 is free deep. If #6 is covered, then #4 looks for #5 crossing over. He throws to #5 at any time the latter is free.
SPIN PASSES
The area behind the linebackers is most vulnerable to the spin passing attack. This is true because of the tremendous pressure exerted on these defensive men by: a. Hiding the ball during the exchange, or fake exchange; b. The threat of cross blocking on these men during the preliminary ball handling.
As a result of factor (a) the linebackers have a tendency to be held in position momentarily. Factor (b) makes them play closer to the line of scrimmage. The three potential receivers, the ends and #1, arrive in the areas of the three deep defensive men before the linebackers can recognize the pass. This gives a chance to use a personal passing attack, with all the known fakes and feints used by receivers to escape a man-to-man pass defender. Elimination of linebackers from the pass defense, whether the defense as a team maneuver is using a zone, man-to-man or combination, forces the three deep men into man-to-man coverage. CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 236
PROTECTION
We have shown that all plays are adjusted to be run against any defense. We can also adjust all our pass protection blocking for any defense encountered. When a number of passing patterns are thrown from one maneuver we can standardize the assignments for that passing cycle. Diagram 102, shows the pass protection against the standard defenses and the passing triangle area from which the defense should be kept. Protection can be used for the spin passes against all defenses.
#2
Is not used in the pass pattern and so is assigned to the end in all defenses. He sets himself on the outside of either #7 or #8'-s block on the tackle, to obtain an inside position on the end. He must insure that the end will have to go outside or straight over his position. If the end elects to drive straight ahead, #2 will keep on balance in front of the end until he can steer him wide of the passer's position. If the end goes to the outside #2 can cut him down with a reverse cross-body. #2 should remember to let the end commit first and not go out after him.
#7
Will take the guard head-on himself against the six over-shift or the seven, and the tackle on his outside against a five man defense. He gets his assignment by listening to
CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 237
DIAGRAM 102
#8's call. Versus the six undershirt and the six normal, #7 should protect on a line between the tackle and the passer, to steer that tackle away from the passing triangle.
CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 238 #8
Is calling the blocking for #7 and himself. On all calls except the six normal and six undershift #8 will pull to take the tackle. In doing so, he should pull quickly to get outside #7 and inside #2, so that there is no breakdown in the protection. #8 also trys to get an inside-out position by staying close to #7's outside leg. Versus a five-three, #8 can suspect he will become the auxiliary, because, with a man on #9, the next man over should be head-on #7 in a six overshift. When this man is on #7's outside shoulder, #8 can suspect a five. As an auxiliary, #8 can help whichever of #7 or #2 is having more trouble, or definitely look for the end, when #2 is used as an outlet receiver.
#9
Since #9 makes his adjustments and switches with X, #10 will quarterback for all three on passes. #9 takes the guard in his vicinity on all calls. He must first drop back between the guard and the passer. Then he can steer that guard to either side, away from the passing triangle. #9 has a special recognition assignment on a seven call when there is no man in his vicinity.
DIAGRAM 103
#9 will drop back first to protect his area. If no one comes in over his area, he then slides out to take the end, using the same technique as X uses on the end.
Center
Drops out on all calls for the end. In doing this, he must work like #2 and #8. X should first hustle to get outside of #10 and assume his position. After reaching this position he should be ready for three types of end play. If the end charges over him and hard, X uses a reverse cross-body to cut him down. If the end charges over him and slides in deep, X steers him outside with a shoulder CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 239 block. If the end charges over him and slides inside, X endeavors to stay in front of him along the line of scrimmage until the end starts further penetration. In most cases, the end will be stumbled by the block of #10 and #9, and X can drop back to give auxiliary help to the protection. Diagram 104 shows this.
Versus the seven call, X blocks with the general pass protection technique for all linemen.
DIAGRAM 104
#10
Is always assigned to the tackle. #10 always takes a position on a line between the tackle and the passer. He will try to steer the tackle outside when he can. However, if the tackle goes to the inside, #10 should try to cut him down with a cross-body. Since the tackle will usually be larger than a #10, this cut-block will serve to get the tackle's hands down to enable the passer to throw.
PATTERNS
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Page 240
DIAGRAM 105
#1 and #5
Are decoys to take the defensive halfbacks wide.
#3
Feeds to #4, on the eight spin maneuver, faking directly toward the defensive X position as if he retained the ball.
#6
Delays a half count, runs seven yards half way between the safety and X, and just inside the X position. If the safety closes fast to cover or if X retreats, #6 cuts away from his course to be in a position to receive the ball over his right shoulder. The personal pass feints or double feints are adaptable here against a safety man who rushes hard to defend against a receiver in the original area.
#4
Receives ball from #3 on his third step. He should be ready to deliver ball on a spot pass to spot designated A. If receiver is covered #4 fakes pass and drops two steps, to throw to #6 at spot B. After #5's change of course, #4 decides if and when #5 should receive the pass. #4 always can run with the ball if the linebacker drops to cover #5, provided the defensive end tries to penetrate to the inside when #1 employs his screen block. Here again, #4 must make the CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 241 play resemble the running play if the defense is to be drawn into a position hampering the normal coverage against passes. #4 is coached to run his regular running course even to the point of approaching the line of scrimmage before delivering the ball.
Another design can be thrown to #1 slightly deeper but with #3 faking at the defensive linebacker to hold him, so
DIAGRAM 106
that #1 can cut behind his defensive position. This pattern, with decoys #5 and #6 widening the two deep men has proven effective as a scoring pass against the 6-3-2 defense. Diagram 106.
The 5 cross pattern as shown in Diagram 107.
#6 and #2
Decoy safety and half to widen area for #5 to cross-over behind fullback.
#3
Uses six spin faking at the defensive fullback after delivering ball, to keep the fullback from retreating to the area behind him.
#4 CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 242
Delivers ball ahead of #5. Throws off his right foot on what should be his fifth step.
DIAGRAM 107
The same backfield ball handling can be used on another effective pass pattern outlined above, wherein #1 drives deep through the half's position. #6 delays and fakes a short course straight ahead before he cuts on his second step into the area vacated by the halfback.
POSITION PASSES
Position passes are the simplest to recognize and the easiest to teach, because of the obvious fact that a receiver has an exposed area which is vulnerable to his direct course. Generally, the areas directly behind the scrimmage line, which are the responsibility of the linebackers, are the hardest to cover, because the receiver is able to step across the line to be open for a quick pass. If the areas are covered by the maximum number of linebackers (three or four), a fake run or plunge toward the line will expose certain spots that open up when the linebackers move to defend against the run. The new development of the fake run-and-jump pass near the scrimmage line has placed a terrific burden on the secondary defenders. Such a pass must be used sparingly and in the proper situation, due to the possible loss of ball by interception. The gain from such a pass is small. Several completions would be necessary to offset an interception. CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 243 Let us examine the areas which are normally open when the defense is using the standard defenses against the unbalanced Single Wing formation. As stated, these openings occur from either the actual section on the field or the number and position of the linebackers used in a specific defense.
Against the overshifted seven man line, our #5 now will be open for a pass from #4 either in the flat area when the defensive halfback is deep, or straight ahead for a catch of the ball on the inside. The single linebacker cannot cover the exposed area if the pass is thrown quickly.
#1 would likewise be open on a jump pass from #3 provided the threat of the buck held the linebacker until # 1 could evade the defensive tackle and enter the exposed area straight ahead of him. Offensive linemen must use the regular power charge against the man in front of them to prevent the defense from raising their hands.
DIAGRAM 108
The use of many combinations of straight ahead quick passes that can be used to advantage to keep the spacing of the linebackers near normal. For example, the #6 would be wide open when the defenses in an overshifted six with a linebacker also overshifted from his normal inside position. Single Wing passing attacks should always carry such passes as emergency measures, against CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 244 seven, eight and even nine man defensive lines when they are used, either as regular defenses or as surprises.
PASSING DRILLS
We use two drills which we feel are important for the development of the passer. One is a squad drill which has been of twofold benefit. The passer has a chance to throw many passes. The squad likes the pre-game drill as a warm-up.
DIAGRAM 109
A dozen footballs for the present-day large squads is sufficient. The centers hand the ball to the passer, who throws to receivers cutting across his position. The receivers cut just as soon as the passer has the ball. The passer must throw as quickly as possible. This develops speed in throwing the ball.
After a thorough warm-up of the arm the passer now has the option of faking the throw against his hand. This fake changes the course of the receiver, and also allows the passer to change his balance step as he prepares to throw the longer pass. Various spacing of the receivers and their different courses can be utilized for the above drill to correspond with the maneuvers employed in the CHAPTER VII The Passing Attack
Page 245 regular pass patterns. This drill develops passing technique, while giving adequate opportunity for coaching on the proper delivery.
Another drill, valuable for choice passes, can be set up with two receivers centering in an area covered by one defender. The defender should vary his coverage by definitely following one receiver or the other, then use a straight defense, playing the ball. Increasing the number of receivers and defenders will teach the passer to throw to the open man.
Eventually, the passer will be ready for a drill which we have found valuable. Line up two teams without the guards and tackles, in other words, seven men on each side. Throw the regular pass patterns against the defensive team, employing their ends as rushers. Occasionally use a running play, particularly the outside plays, to keep the defense honest. The drill teaches catching the ball under pressure, as well as delivering the ball at the proper time. The rushing defensive ends help to teach the passer the position of his protecting cup and the normal amount of time allotted for throwing. CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 246 Before discussing the technicalities of a modern quarterback's duties, may I extend to him my greatest salute of respect. His problems and responsibilities are more important than those of any man in any other position. The quarterback has always been the coach on the field since the day he was given this authority. He controls the movements of ten other men, directing their offensive destinies for the entire time his team has the ball, and in addition must be proficient in all his own personal assignments.
The current stress on defense, which presents a changing problem from one series of downs to the next, or even within one series, would drive an individual without the determination a quarterback must have to frustrated and haphazard decisions. There was a day when a quarterback could presume a somewhat standard defensive alignment and spacing, depending upon the formation from which he normally started his offense. All that peace of mind is a thing of the past. No longer can he anticipate the usual defenses. He must be mentally prepared to expect the abnormal and be ready to take advantage of opportunities presented by the new theory of team defensive stratagems.
What explanation can be offered for this new evolution in defense? Could the fact that there is probably more competition for top positions in football coaching than any other comparable profession have a bearing on this new approach toward defense? Could the study of slow-motion films by eager progressive coaches for practically twelve months of the year be a contributing factor? Isn't it safe to assume that defensively minded coaches are going to use the new medium of television as an additional scouting help to further the development of the defense?
Past history of defensive football has proven that the defense, generally favored by the rules, usually has the last say. The offensive team must have at least seven men on the scrimmage line. The defense is allowed much greater freedom in the absence of restrictions as to the numerical alignment or position of the men who have the duty to stop the legally restricted offense. The defense has full use of the arms and hands to ward off potential blockers. Add to the above the recognized fact that defense is easier to teach and that most linemen have an innate desire to play defense and our offensive quarterback's problems are plainly evident.
Fortunately for football in particular and the spectator in general, football was rescued from being overbalanced in favor of the defense by the legalizing and subsequent development of the forward pass. The two forces were about equal CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 247 until a further ruling allowed the ball to be handed forward behind the line of scrimmage to a teammate or to be thrown forward to a teammate at any distance behind the line of scrimmage. These two rules have swung the balance of power to the offense. The emphasis on defensive play has not lessened, however, and new methods of teaching defense by platoon instruction presents a genuine challenge to the offense, directed by our hero, the quarterback.
What characteristics should the coach seek in selecting his field general? Since the team must have complete confidence in the decisions of the signal caller, we suggest that the one outstanding characteristic should be his command of the squad's all-around respect for his judgment on and off the field, for his knowledge of the game, and for the manner in which he meets perplexing problems.
We like to have our quarterback in the backfield if possible, but playing a certain position on the team is not essential for being picked as the field general. Generally, the backfield man has a clearer conception of the overall picture in football but many teams have been quarterbacked to success by linemen. It is possible to improve and mold an individual who has the innate intelligence and desire to call signals.
It must be remembered that it is the coach's duty to sell the quarterback to the squad for the quarterback must in turn sell the coach's ideas to them. The quarterback must know more theoretical football than any other teammate. He must obtain this information from the head coach, who cannot teach the entire squad the many variables from which the quarterback must map his campaign. More teams have been ruined by more than one quarterback than for any other reasonthe old story of too many cooks and the broth.
The team play caller should have complete authority and be backed to the limit. Many coaches, to their sorrow, have tried to run the attack from the bench by various means. The recent free-substitution rule gave the coach complete control over selection of each play if he wanted it. Frankly, I feel that coaches on the bench and spotters in the press box are able to advise, but in the final analysis only the quarterback can make the correct decision at the crucial moment. Failure here must be blamed on the coach who has not trained his representative to meet the emergency.
One of the most important requirements of any quarterback is the ability to command, once he has been given that authority. Personal bearing as he gives CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 248 plays and his enunciation of signals in the huddle and during the starting cadence are essential to the preliminary success of any play. Simplicity of play numbers or descriptive words are helpful aids.
THE STARTING SIGNAL
Since voice and cadence are of primary importance in team starting, voice control can be improved by continual practice and stress of the details involved. The starting signal must resemble a bark. The sound should come from deep within the throat rather than from the nasal passages. Sharp staccato bursts, evenly spaced, impart confidence, as well as superior team movement on the starting signal. A metronome is helpful in teaching the original cadence. Once the cadence has been established, all quarterbacks who call the starting signal must have similar beats. In early season practice, having all men count together is helpful. A regular track-starter's gun, blank shells of course, can be used to advantage to impress on the team, listening for the starting signal, the exact moment they should move as the ball is passed.
We do not concur with the thought that passing the ball a fraction of a second before the starting signal is of advantage. The defensive lines move after the offense moves, not on the snap of the ball. Therefore the secret of good team starting comes from all men moving at once. The advantage given by knowing the starting signal can be utilized by using more than one starting signal, provided a team can perfect more than one.
GAME STRATEGY
The quarterback must have a general knowledge of the theory behind offensive play. Coaches differ radically in their approach to this difficult subject, mainly because of the varied opinions as to how to use the three offensive phases of football: the kicking, running and passing games.
Teams have won championships by stressing one of the above three, but very few have won without a plan for the correlation of their use.
Strong defensive teams with a great kicking game have literally kicked the opponents across their own goal line. Such an endowed team needs only a limited running and passing attack to win.
CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 249 Great teams, stressing the running attack, have won championships by kicking and passing to complement the runs. Their offensive plan is to control the ball by making first downs. The possession of the ball for long periods prevents the opposition from presenting its full attack, because it is forced to try for quick scores.
Teams emphasizing the forward pass as the major weapon stress passing anywhere and under all conditions. Their running attack is used mainly to keep the defense off balance so they can pass.
The conclusion is that football games can be won by all three methods. The coach, therefore, must decide how he wants his team to use the components of the offense, and he must school his quarterback to his way of thinking.
Once the offensive plan for a particular team has been established, the education of the field general can be initiated. The type of formation used can lend emphasis to a certain phase of the offense but, generally speaking, plays within the formation are the important factor.
We have already established our offensive theory as that of a team that prefers to run rather than pass against a balanced defense. When speaking of balanced defense, we mean one which is deployed to defend equally against all phases of the offense. We must be prepared to take advantage of a defense that is overbalanced to stop one phase, by immediately shifting to another phase of the attack.
Our Single Wing quarterback must know the strength and weakness of his formation. He must know the reasoning behind the design and use of each play and the amount by which personnel influence the success of certain plays through their special abilities or shortcomings. In learning about his own personnel he must have a thorough knowledge of their various abilities and when these can be exploited, both for linemen and backs.
The quarterback should know which of his plays are best against the standard defenses usually used against his formation. He should know the exact play to call to take advantage of any variation which might occur in these standard alignments. As shown in the chapter on plays, each play needs a certain defensive situation to bring its greatest success. If our quarterback can anticipate certain defenses on certain situations, running, passing or kicking, the correct choice of play becomes academic. CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 250
Before the start of the game our quarterback must know just how the weather (wind, rain and sun) affects his choice of plays in all three phases as the game progresses. Time and score are additional factors which enter into the picture. The quarterback must know when to gamble and when to be conservative. He must be governed by the following axiom: "Score the safest way while retaining possession of the ball, but you must score to win." The size of the score should never enter into his overall strategy, one point victories are just as important as the larger scores. The quarterback will learn that an offensive play for the whole game, properly adhered to, will be more successful provided events during the game do not change the estimated situation radically. However, he must be prepared to shift his strategy in the event that first or second quarter scores by the opponents leave him at a disadvantage.
PRE-GAME PREPARATION
Modern scouting methods have been instrumental in eliminating what was once the surprise element of abnormal defenses. In their defensive planning, most teams reflect the general scheme of the opponent's coaching staff. The defensive strategy employed from year to year will vary only according to the opponent's changes of personnel and to the pre-game guesswork as to the relative strength of the two teams.
The offensive quarterback can be sure of this general information about his own team: he will know that by one method or another the opposing defensive quarterback will endeavor to stop his most successful plays to date, even to overbalancing the defense to accomplish the job. The offensive quarterback must be alerted to abnormal or unusual defenses which are used to upset his team at the start of the game or the second half. He must be fully cognizant of these problems, with such a thorough knowledge of his attacking weapons that he can immediately take advantage of the surprise element. These defenses occur most frequently when the opponents feel they need to gamble, rather than remain orthodox in their alignment and spacing. A strong running team should expect its previously most successful running plays to be stopped, but, because of this, should have new avenues for advancing the ball, either by other running plays or by exploiting exposed passing areas.
Many coaches use horizontal or vertical offensive zones for the entire field as a guide for green quarterbacks. These are helpful, but a strict adherence to them will find the designated plays always running against the defense which is the CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 251 most difficult to solve. Also the old rulcj of passing, running and kicking on certain downs in certain parts of the field have become outmoded by the advantage given the defense. However, flagrant disregard of some of the more basic principles has lost more games than it has won.
The offensive quarterback must know the expected gain of each play in the circumstance under which it is called. This knowledge, gained from the history the play has established over a certain period, is invaluable for selecting plays for what we call "crucial downs." Crucial downs are those which demand a kick on the following down because of failure to make the first down in two or three tries. The plays called must vary, because the defense will be overbalanced to stop the crucial down play if the same one has been repeated often in the identical situation.
The offensive quarterback must anticipate the thinking of the defensive quarterback who is deploying his echelons to stop the offense. Our field general must select just enough cross-up plays to keep the defensive quarterback off balance in calling his defenses. The signal caller should never allow his selection of plays to be typed.
When the quarterback obtains the ball for the first series of downs and the defense is somewhat near normal in five, six or seven spacing, he should select one of his basic plays from the cycle which he has chosen to establish. The play's proven history should be such that, at the conclusion of the play, the situation, as to down and yardage remaining can be met by the selection of another safe yardage play. Our Single Wing generates power over the tackles and guards. A selection of plays over this area, while not designed to break away for long runs, should produce (against equal opposition) enough yardage so that the quarterback can plan his selections for the entire march. He should use basic plays, testing the defense here and there, as a boxer would start a contest. The plans should call for feinting at certain sectors to establish an opening for the big play.
A long march of successive first downs usually ends in failure when a quarterback tries to take his team seventy or eighty yards against equal opposition. The field general must plan for the big gainer, either a run or a pass, somewhere on the march, in order to have his team take him through the zone of most intense resistance, the last ten yards from the goal.
CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 252 Use of a cycle of plays from a certain formation is essential. As explained, a cycle should contain as many plays as possible, to test, find out and then take advantage of the weaknesses of the defense. Generally a quarterback should stay with one cycle while he establishes the various plays in it. To start with, he can experiment with the cycles for a while, because they are designed to lend variety to the attack through the draw of the various plays within a cycle and by doing so will create a change of pace for his attack. He should use this experimentation to establish the cycle he feels will be most successful. Once the cycle is chosen, we feel that a stress on plays in that cycle will bring a larger measure of success than a hit-or-miss selection from the three or four cycles each team might carry.
USE OF MEN-IN-MOTION
Use of backfield men-in-motion before the play starts was used in earlier decades, went out of favor for a time and has recently been redeveloped in all formations. The theory of changing the strength of the formation by having the backs run to either side of it puts an additional burden on the defensive team to adjust to meet the changed alignments. It is a well-known fact that, by the time the ball is passed with the man-in-motion having reached varying distances from the original starting point, the defense has had to make some sort of adjustment. The need for coverage of the man-in-motion by different defensive men at different times, whether by an end, linebacker or halfback, gives numerous opportunities to the offense for decoying the defenders into a more desirable position for blocking on running plays. The use of men-in-motion to stretch the defensive base aids in increasing the efficiency of both the running and passing attack, particularly when the passes are defended by men using a basic zone. The zone becomes so spread out that a zone team can be forced into man-for-man coverage. The opportunity presented here of using your best pass receiver against the poorest pass defender is one which should not be ignored. An effective passing attack, one-man-against-one, is now presented with the odds favoring the offense.
USE OF FLANKERS
The placing of men in flanking position on tackles, ends or in wide positions has been used for years to harry certain defensive men, either on the line of scrimmage or in the defensive backfield. The opportunities for using flankers are numerous in the Single Wing attack. Flankers are more reliable than men- in-motion, because of the tendency of the defense to cover flankers by the CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 253 same adjustment each time. If the quarterback will delay the starting signal to allow the defensive adjustment, the spread of the defense becomes clear to all, allowing complete exploitation of the new defensive alignment. The adjustment becomes apparent at the start of the play, because the flanker takes his position directly from the huddle. The Single Wing with the wingback up in normal position, already presents a flanking problem to the defensive tackle. Additional flankers can be used on either tackle or either end. This widens the defensive line and it also gives the identical advantage enjoyed by teams which attack from split lines.
The combination of the use of flankers and men-in-motion presents an intriguing opportunity to disrupt the team defensive pattern and is limited only by the experience of the attacking unit. The problems of the defense increase when such men are deployed both to the long and short sides of the unbalanced formation, together with running the formation from both the right and left alignments. The option of running plays toward the flanker, then away from the flanker, eventually creates a defensive mistake in meeting strength. This eventuality favors a team that can handle the change in blocking assignments.
A simple example of how the quarterback can use the flanker attack to help a basic play can be illustrated by referring to Diagram 21. Here we have the off- tackle play as designed against the undershifted defensive tackle opposite the longside of the formation. The tackle is vulnerable to the power block of #1 and #6. This defense, being undershifted, usually compensates for this alignment by placing the linebacker outside the tackle, with outside defensive responsibility. The linebacker may even cover outside his own end if the team defensive scheme is to have the defensive end cover the off-tackle hole.
The offensive fullback, #3, stationed behind the center of the line does not have a position from which he can threaten the end from the outside at the start of the play. He must run a course to threaten the end from the outside, setting up #2's single block. Improper timing in the execution of this maneuver will present a difficult job for our #2 back if the defensive end ignores the threat of this outside block. It can be seen that #3's additional assignment after faking the end is to take the defensive right halfback.
Now note the improvement of the formation for this play if #3 takes his normal flanking position, two yards outside the normal defensive position of the end and one yard off the line of scrimmage (to preserve the pass eligibility CHAPTER VIII The Field General
Page 254 of his own end). Now the defensive end has a far greater problem than that presented by having #3 line up in his normal position. A further variation can be obtained by cross-flanking the shortside end. This would widen the defensive half on that side and at the same time give the flanker a better blocking angle on his regular assignment: the safety man.
It must be remembered that the men who are used as flankers and in motion must be a real threat before the defensive team will adjust to meet the changed formation. This means that passes must be used for these men to get across the fact that they are more than a decoy.
Every play has one or more men who can be utilized to change the solid alignment of the formation. If all were used for each play the quarterback would have so many details to remember that he would find himself lost when trying to disrupt the defense. However, it now becomes evident that the more variations a quarterback can use, the less, both in variation and number, he will be bothered by myriad defenses. And, of course, as we pointed out in Chapter II, one of the burdens of the quarterback, checking a play that seems doomed to failure by the defensive alignment, has been removed by the system of line quarterbacking described. True, this has added to the details he must learn personally, since he is affected by the signals given in the line, but we feel that removing this formerly great cause of confusion and frustration has helped keep his head clear and his command of the situation firm.
And as we mentioned at the start of this discussion, he needs all the help he can get in this most demanding, vital and, withal, rewarding job on a Single Wing team. More power to him. CHAPTER IX Conclusion
Page 255
And there we have the basic plays of the Princeton Single Wing offense. To sum it up, here are the major points, remembering, of course, the wealth of detail we have outlined:
Emphasis and re-emphasis on fundamentals. Without sound, solid blocking, this offense is shackled. Copious attention must be given to the details of every motion of every player in acquiring these fundamentals.
Line quarterbacking. The addition of this factor makes a world of difference in the success of our attack. It ends the situation which found certain plays in a game absolutely wasted because they had to be run off with no chance of success. A great burden has also been removed from the play-calling quarterback.
Control of the ball. We certainly intend to score, but we plan to do it by control of the ball over long periods of time. For this reason, we favor the running game, with the passing attack an important adjunct to keep the defense loose and honest. Control of the ball prevents the opponents from making full use of their planned offense.
Adaptability. The basic Single Wing is an old system, but it does not have to be old-fashioned. Combined with the opportunities it gives for raw power, by the use of flankers, men-in-motion and the various cycles of plays possible, it becomes a varied, fluid attack, able to keep up with the most advanced thinking in modern football.
To some, the abundance of detail, the hard work required, may make it seem like too complicated a system, and, of course, as every coach knows, material has to be there to make the system work. I have found great satisfaction in working with material of all kinds with this system, however. Material, after all, is a word standing for boys and young men. When players #2, #9, etc., in the paperwork planning come alive before you on the field as flesh and blood youngsters, with all of the factors of their individual personality, their intelligence and their spirit entering the picture, coaching becomes a doubly fascinating challenge.
This Single Wing offense of ours gives great satisfaction to a coach, and, I believe, to the players because of the sense of participation it gives all of them. CHAPTER IX Conclusion
Page 256 Every man in the offensive pattern must put his intelligence to work on every play. The day of that cartoonist's delight, the "big, dumb lineman," has certainly ended as far as we are concerned. Line quarterbacking, both in the calling and in the carrying out of assignment, is a lightning-like exercise in human chess. Some of the most profound football thinkers it has been my privilege to coach have been guardsnot the great hulking type the public often associates with this position, but wiry, rugged little 175-pounders, honor men in English, history or philosophy. They became great students of the game by analyzing all the possibilities in their offensive assignments.
Modern football, with its emphasis on specialists, has aided boys like this who would have been too small to earn a full-time berth in the old days. There is now a chance for perfection in each position that has developed the game into a stimulating challenge for this type of boy as well as for the "natural" football player of size and ability, and for the coaches who work with them. With our present-day schedules of all major games, each one prepared for and planned out like a battle campaign, there is plenty of room for this specialized perfection.
To a coach, looking back over the years to high school football just after World War I, to the inspirational qualities of the game under Bill Roper and the eye- opening experience of playing Knute Rockne's great team, it has been a long road. I have been asked, "Is it worth it?"
I can only say that it certainly has been. The hard work, the disappointments, the inevitable criticism are all balanced out by the memories of constant association with American kids in the years of their awakening manhood, of the exchange of thoughts, ideas and knowledge (and victories and defeats!) with the many fine men who have made coaching their lifework, of such unforgettable thrills as the first Little Three Championship at Williams, the Princeton- Williams game of 1942, the upset of Penn in 1946, the first Big Three title in 1947, the Cornell game of 1950 and the winding up of that season undefeated under the dramatic circumstances of the Dartmouth "hurricane" game. Even with all this, if I didn't feel that football had an important role to play in American education, it would not have been worth it, but I am firmly convinced that the game is an important adjunct to education.
There are some who ask, "How can a football player keep up with his studies? Doesn't playing football keep a boy from gaining the education he supposedly went to college to get?" CHAPTER IX Conclusion
Page 257
In answer to this, I would like to quote a few facts. Many of our players gain honors in their studies, and post-World War II teams at Princeton have consistently averaged as high as or higher than the whole student body in marks. On the 1949 team, nine out of the ten graduating lettermen went on to graduate studies in law, medicine, engineering and business administration. It seems to have been the rule rather than the exception for the captain to be an honor student,, and we have had men on the team standing as high as the first five out of their class. It is not unusual, for example, to find the whole right side of the line made up of honor students.
This does not mean that you have to be an honor man to play modern football. Many average students, and poor ones too, play the game, but I have found that football, if anything, tends to help their studies. The players realize that they have to keep up their marks to remain eligible, so they plan their study program to fit in with athletics. Often, this teaches them how to get the full value out of an hour of study better than unrestricted leisure time would. The mental exercise, the physical release and the emotional satisfaction they obtain from being part of the intense group effort that is a football squad give them a perspective that helps in planning their other activities well. It is an interesting fact that as many as two-thirds of the squad in some years, and a general average of about half the squad, actually improves its academic standing during the football season.
Obviously, education comes first, as these facts should show, but without football something vital would be missing from the educational scene. The classroom is concerned with the intellectual side of life, but the football field, where the intellect, too, is more and more coming into play, teaches other important lessons in mental, physical and emotional well-being.
The blend of physical contact, strategy, psychology, will-to-win and self- discipline is a combination that appeals to something basic in our American way of life. If it were not there, football would not have risen from its modest beginnings in that Rutgers-Princeton game of 1869 to its present position of great appeal for thousands of coaches and players and the millions of spectators who share its stimulation from the sidelines. GLOSSARY
Page 258 OFFENSIVE REFERENCES
Right Formationan unbalanced Single Wing lineup with the offensive line and backfield overbalanced to their right. Left Formationan unbalanced Single Wing lineup with the offensive line and backfield overbalanced to their left. Longsiderefers to the overbalanced side of the formation. Shortsiderefers to the opposite and thus underbalanced side of the formation. Straight Seriesa backfield maneuver which moves the ball carrier directly toward a longside opening or involves a reverse in moving toward a shortside opening. Buck Laterala backfield maneuver which establishes the threat of a buck into the line at the same time as the threat of an exchange and resulting pitchout or pass is established by the quarterback. Full Spina backfield maneuver which attempts to hide the ball by spinning two backfield men toward each" other. Eight Turnthe quarterback's pivot in the buck lateral for an eight opening. Described in Chapter IV. Eight Spinthe full spin maneuver used in the spin series by the fullback for an eight opening. Described in Chapter IV. Six Turnthe quarterback's pivot in the buck lateral for a six opening. Described in Chapter IV. Six Spinthe full spin maneuver used in the spin series by the fullback for a six opening. Described in Chapter IV.
ACTIONthis is considered apart from the act of moving. It involves the faking of strenuous movement designed to make the defense think the ultimate destination is outside.
ADJUSTMENTS AND ADJUSTthe automatic changing of blocking assignments necessitated by changing defenses and expedited by the calls of the line quarterbacks.
APEX OF WEDGEthe man to whom all wedge blocking converges.
BALANCE STEPa step taken in place to improve the original stance for the act of spinning or delaying.
BLOCKING ANGLEthe advantage enjoyed by the offensive player who has lateral position on the defender. GLOSSARY
Page 259
BLOOPER COURSErefers to a pass course in which a receiver runs laterally behind the line of scrimmage and turns downfield on a curve just outside the defensive end. The ball is received as the turn is completed and the receiver heads down-field.
CALLSthe word signal given by the line quarterbacks that establish spacing and assign blocking.
CHECKto stop the movement of a defensive player momentarily.
CHECK OFFaction taken by the offensive quarterback to change plays at the line of scrimmage from those called in the huddle.
CHECKOFFSany such plays called by the quarterback.
CLOSE-INrefers to blocking men in the immediate vicinity of the offensive and defensive lines.
CONTROL ELEMENTthe sense imparted with certain play maneuvers.
CONTROL OF THE GAMEgeneralship that gives the offense the advantage by retaining possession of the ball.
CRABBING FORWARD ON ALL FOURSan offensive player's movement in a position with both hands and both feet on the ground.
CROSS-CHECKINGsingle blocking on defensive linemen removed from the play opening.
CROSS PASSESpass patterns in which receivers cross over from their original position.
CROSS-UP PLAYSstandard plays called in unexpected situations.
CUT-BLOCKSblocks designed to take a defender from his feet.
CUT-DOWNto take a defender off his feet.
CUT-OFF BLOCKa block on a defender in the secondary somewhat removed from the play opening. GLOSSARY
Page 260
CYCLESa number of plays run from one series. Such plays complement each other and place a balanced burden on the defense.
DEPTHdistances behind the offensive line.
DOWNFIELDthe offensive team is considered to be running downhill.
DOWNFIELD BLOCKINGblocking done in the area of the defensive secondary.
DOWNFIELD CUTa planned change of direction by the ball carrier after gaining sufficient ground to reach the blocks thrown downfield.
DRAW OF THE PLAYthe natural pull of the defense resulting from the offensive maneuver.
FAKESoffensive techniques and maneuvers, team and individual, which draw the defense into a desired position.
FEELthe ability or sense that makes it possible for the center to make accurate and easy-to-handle passes.
FLANKERSbackfield men lined up in positions outside the defensive ends.
FLANKING POSITIONthis is defined for a back in Chapter II. It also refers to the outside blocking angle enjoyed by #1 and #5 on the defensive tackles.
FOLD INthe ball carrier aims his course directly over the power block.
FOLDING IN PROCESSrefers to wedge blocking in which all men drive inward and forward to the apex of the wedge.
FORWARD HANDOFFrefers to a ball exchanged between backs wherein the back who gives the ball is further removed in depth from the line of scrimmage than the back who receives the ball.
HANDOFFthe exchange of the ball on a play where the man hitting straight ahead takes the ball from the quarterback for a quick opening play.
GLOSSARY
Page 261 HEAD BUTTINGresults from improper execution of the play or technique. The ball carrier meets up with a defender who has a straight and unhindered path toward him.
HIGH-LOW BLOCKa special technique of blocking on the defensive shortside tackle used by #5 and #10. Described in Chapter VI.
HOLEthe designed opening created in the defensive line. Refers specifically to the gap created in and on the line of scrimmage.
HOOK BLOCKa block designed to tie up the defender's outside leg preventing movement to the outside.
HOOK END RUNan end run from the straight series predicated on the ability of the wingback to hook-block the defensive longside end.
HOOK PASSESpasses thrown to receivers who proceed downfield a short distance and then turn to face the passer to receive the ball.
INFLUENCErelates to the movement of the offensive power blocker in pulling to the outside when the man to be trapped lines up directly over his position. Also refers to the effect this has on the defender lined up in this position.
INITIAL DRAWthe first reaction of the defense toward plays that start in one direction and finish going in another.
INSIDE DRAWthe natural draw of plays that create a strong impression of running over the center area of the defensive line.
JUMP PASSa pass thrown by the back who starts toward the line of scrimmage as on a running play but who then leaps into the air to throw the pass before reaching the line of scrimmage.
KEEPthe ball carrier retains possession of the ball to run the opening after faking an exchange.
KEY ONoffensive backfield men observe the positions of the defensive guards for the ultimate opening for the play.
GLOSSARY
Page 262 LATERALa pass thrown across the field either underhand or overhand which travels laterally or toward the offensive team's goal line.
LEADrefers to the distance the center must pass the ball ahead of the ball carrier to compensate for his running start.
LEAD THE BALL CARRIERa blocker leads when he is running ahead of a ball carrier and in position to block for him.
LINE OF SCRIMMAGEthe area around a line drawn through the ball and parallel to the goal lines in which the offensive and defensive lines take their positions.
MANEUVERthe action of the backfield taken to advance the ball through the opening in the defensive line.
MEN-IN-MOTIONbackfield men running laterally or somewhat toward their own goal line at the time the ball is put in play.
MOUTH OF THE HOLEthe immediate area of the power block or key block on which the play is based.
MOUTH OF THE OPENINGthe immediate area of the power block or key block on which the play is based.
OPENINGthe blocking assignments in total for one play.
OPENFIELDconsidered to be the area outside of and downfield from the defensive line.
PASSING CUPthe protective wall formed by the blockers in the pass protection assignment.
PASSING DOWNa down on which the offense can be expected to use a pass.
PASS PATTERNthe planned courses of receivers for any pass.
PASSING TRIANGLE AREAsynonymous with the passing cup and is the area that the pass protectors endeavor to clear for the passer.
GLOSSARY
Page 263 PEELBACKstated simply, to block behind the runner.
PEELED OFFa prospective tackier is blocked by a peelback block.
PERSONAL PASSa pass thrown to a receiver who designates his personal fakes and ultimate destination.
PITCHOUTthe lateral pass made from an interior position to a back attempting to run an outside play.
PIVOTthe actual technique of offensive players in turning or spinning on the ball of one foot.
POURS OUTthis is the figurative description of "influence."
POWER BLOCKINGthe proper and simultaneous application of individual blocks on one opponent by two or more men.
PULLINGthe term given to lateral movement by all offensive players.
PUMPthe action taken by the arms in faking possession of the . ball.
QUICK POP PASSa pass thrown to a receiver as he steps into an exposed area behind the defensive line.
REVERSEa play starting in one direction and ending up going in the opposite direction.
ROUNDS THE HORNa pulling lineman who expects to block back to the inside after running around the power block is said to be "rounding the Horn."
SCREEN THE EXCHANGEthe action of running between the defender and the offensive exchange of the ball.
SEAL BLOCKthe blocker here is not assigned specific blocking responsibility other than to cover behind the offensive line and to take the necessary block.
SEAL-OFF WALLthe figurative wall formed by players given seal blocking assignments on outside plays.
GLOSSARY
Page 264 SEAMthe area between two offensive players lined in the original formation.
SERIESthe name given to the combination of offensive maneuver and blocking for advancing the ball.
SLOTsynonymous with "seam."
SLOTTING OF PERSONNELthe placing of players in the offensive positions.
SPOT PASSa pass thrown to a predetermined position by a passer who is not always in view of his receiver. In such cases he is involved in spins or fakes in the backfield maneuver for that pass.
TAIL OFa ball carrier running one yard to the rear of a personal interferer.
UNDER CONTROLball carriers and blockers proceed at a speed wherein they can make expected adjustments in course.
VEERthe ball carrier's action in sliding laterally behind the line of scrimmage, after first driving forward.
DEFENSIVE REFERENCES
Defensive Alignments are given in the following descriptive order: 1. Number of men on line of scrimmage 2. Spacing of men on line of scrimmage; if not given, this is a standard spacing 3. Number of linebackers; if not given, this is understood to be two linebackers 4. Deep secondary; if not given, this is understood to be a two-one setup 6-3-2 Defensea defensive alignment with six men on the line of scrimmage, three linebackers and two men in the deep defensive secondary.
ABNORMAL SPACINGany deviation from the normal defensive spacings as described in Chapter II.
GLOSSARY
Page 265 BACKER-UPa defender in the close secondary lined up just behind the defensive linemen. This is a synonym for "linebacker."
CHASERdefensive lineman who runs behind the line of scrimmage in pursuit of plays directed away from his territory.
CHUG BY LINEBACKERdefensive block on a receiver proceeding downfield in the pass pattern.
CLOSE LINEBACKERSlinebackers playing closer to the line of scrimmage than is considered to be normal for their position.
CLOSE SAFETYdefensive safety man who plays closer to the line of scrimmage than is considered to be normal for his position.
CRASHING CHARGEdefensive movement across the line of scrimmage aimed sharply and forcefully to the inside.
DEEP HALFBACKSdefensive halfbacks lined up farther removed from the line of scrimmage than is considered to be normal for their position.
DEFENSIVE SECONDARYdefensive players not stationed on the line of scrimmage. This refers to the linebackers, halfbacks and the safety man.
FAR LINEBACKERthe linebacker farthest removed from the offensive point of reference. The offensive point of reference may be either an offensive player or an offensive opening.
HALF UNITeach offensive player is considered to occupy one unit of position. A half unit would be half of this distance.
HARD CHARGERdefensive lineman who moves toward the offensive line with a forceful charge.
HEAD-ONa defensive position taken directly in front of an offensive player.
HOLDUPdefensive technique designed to prevent offensive receivers from proceeding downfield in the pass patterns.
GLOSSARY
Page 266 INSIDE-CONSCIOUSusually refers to defensive ends and tackles who have a tendency to play to the inside of the formation from their original position.
KEY ONthe defensive man watches the play of a certain offensive man or men and bases his reaction on the movement of the offensive player or players.
KINGPINS OF ANY DEFENSEthe defensive tackles.
LINEBACKERsynonym for "backer-up."
LONGSIDE ENDdefensive player lined up at the end position opposite the longside of the formation.
LONGSIDE GUARDdefensive player lined up at the guard position opposite the longside of the formation.
LONGSIDE HALFBACKdefensive player lined up in the halfback position opposite the longside of the formation.
LONGSIDE LINEBACKERdefensive player lined up in the linebacker position opposite the longside of the formation.
LOOPINGdefensive lineman moves laterally before proceeding across the line of scrimmage.
MAN-TO-MANrefers to a type of pass defense in which the defensive secondary are assigned to cover specific offensive men in the pass patterns.
MIDDLE LINEBACKERrefers to a five-three or six-three defense. The middle linebacker is in the center of the three.
NEAR HALFBACKdefensive halfback closest to the offensive point of reference. The offensive point of reference may be either an offensive player or an offensive opening.
NEAR LINEBACKERdefensive linebacker closest to the offensive point of reference.
GLOSSARY
Page 267 OUTSIDE-CONSCIOUSusually refers to defensive ends and tackles who have a tendency to play to the outside of the formation and their original position.
OUTSIDE-LINEBACKERrefers to a five-three or six-three defense. A linebacker on the outside of the three and closest to the offensive point of reference.
PENETRATIONdistance that defensive linemen proceed across the line of scrimmage into the offensive backfield area.
PITCHING INrefers to defensive linemen who are submarining or otherwise charging in low and hard, sacrificing their lateral strength.
RUNNING LINEBACKERS THROUGHdefensive maneuvers which involve charging a linebacker through the line of scrimmage so that this act changes the structure of the defense.
SEAMwhere defenders line up in a position between offensive players, the area between offensive players is called a seam.
SHORTSIDE LINEBACKERdefensive player lined up in the linebacker position opposite the shortside of the formation.
SHORTSIDE ENDdefensive player lined up in the end position opposite the shortside of the formation.
SHORTSIDE HALFBACKdefensive player lined up in the halfback position opposite the shortside of the formation.
SHORTSIDE TACKLEdefensive player lined up in the tackle position opposite the shortside of the formation.
SLANTINGdefensive linemen charging at a forty-five degree angle to either side and moving toward the offensive line.
SLIDEthe technique of defensive linemen who do not charge across the line of scrimmage but move laterally to the play.
SOFT CHARGERdefensive lineman who does not move across the line of scrimmage with force, difficult to trap. GLOSSARY
Page 268
SPACINGrefers to the alignment taken by defensive players along the line of scrimmage.
SPIN OUTdefensive lineman's technique in reacting to blocks. Spins toward the block and around the head and shoulder of the blocker.
SUBMARINEdefensive player going under the offensive players and coming up in position to tackle.
TEAM DEFENSEa plan for stopping the offense, wherein defensive players proceed on planned courses to other areas to help on plays not directed in their area.
ZONErefers to pass defense in which the def ,nsive secondary are responsible only for assigned areas.