A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 6.

2+3 (1994) d i f f e r e n c e s:
J UDI TH BUTLER
Against Proper Objects. I ntr oduction
1
Aset of par adoxes has emer ged wi thi n r ecent debates i n
femi ni st and queer theor y that compl i cates any effor t to stage a si mpl e
stand off between the two domai ns. Wi thi n queer studi es gener al l y, a meth-
odol ogi cal di sti ncti on has been offered whi ch woul d di sti ngui sh theori es of
sexual i ty from theori es of gender and, further, al l ocate the theoreti cal i nves-
ti gati on of sexual i ty to queer studi es, and the anal ysi s of gender to femi ni sm.
Consi der the i ntroducti on to The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader i n whi ch an
anal ogy (xv) wi th womens studi es i s offered as a way of understandi ng the
range of i ssues pertai ni ng to l esbi an and gay studi es. Ci ti ng a 1975 essay
wri tten by femi ni st hi stori an Joan Kel l y-Gadol , the edi tors wri te that wo-
mens hi story i s not meant to be addi ti ve . . . rather, womens hi story seeks to
establ i sh the central i ty of gender as a fundamental category of hi stori cal
anal ysi s and understandi nga category central , i n other words, to each of
those previ ousl y exi sti ng sub-departments of hi story (xv). Appl audi ng the
femi ni st effort to make gender i nto a central category of anal ysi s, the
edi tors seek to make the same ki nd of cl ai m for the objects of research proper
to l esbi an and gay studi es: Lesbi an/gay studi es does for sex and sexuality
approxi matel y what womens studi es does for gender (xv).
J UDI TH BUTLER
2 Against Proper Objects
Against Methodology
I n l ayi ng out the proper domai n for femi ni st anal ysi s, the edi -
tors of The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader formul ate the methodol ogi cal
domai n of womens studi es as that whi ch i ncl udes any research that treats
gender (whether femal e or mal e) as a central category of anal ysi s. The
parentheti cal reference to femal e or mal e suggests that these terms are
i nterchangeabl e wi th the noti on of gender, al though conventi onal formul a-
ti ons of the sex/gender di sti ncti on associ ated sex wi th femal e or mal eor
wi th the probl emati c of a conti nuum between themand gender wi th the
soci al categori es of men and women. Thi s bri ef and parentheti cal suggesti on
that gender mi ght be understood as equi val ent to femal e or mal e thus
appears to rest on a conati on of sex wi th gender.
Si gni cantl y, though femal e or mal e appear i n thi s formul ati on
of femi ni sm, the term sex does not; gender appears to be reduced to sex i n
thi s sentence at the same ti me that the term sex remai ns merel y i mpl i ed.
One mi ght thi nk thi s i s a smal l poi nt. Note, however, that the term sex does
become expl i ci t i n the next sentence, but onl y as one of the two proper
objects of l esbi an and gay studi es: sex and sexual i ty. I n thi s second context,
sex appears to mean sexual desi re and practi ce, but al so the Foucaul ti an
sense of sex as a regi me of i denti ty or a cti onal i deal by whi ch sex as
anatomy, sensati on, acts, and practi ce are arbi trari l y uni ed.
2
I f, as appears
l i kel y, the Foucaul ti an meani ng of sex i s i mpl i ed by i ts menti on i n thi s
context, then sex woul d i ncl ude the matter of femal e or mal e menti oned
above. Thus, the edi tors l ead us through anal ogy from a femi ni sm i n whi ch
gender and sex are conated to a noti on of l esbi an and gay studi es i n whi ch
sex encompasses and exceeds the purvi ew of femi ni sm: sex i n thi s sec-
ond i nstance woul d i ncl ude not onl y questi ons of i denti ty and attri bute (femal e
or mal e), but di scourses of sensati on, acts, and sexual practi ce as wel l .
To the extent that the anal ogy works through reference to a
term sex whi ch commonl y concerns both femi ni sm and l esbi an/gay
studi es, that commonal i ty must be deni edthrough el i si on or through the
semanti c spl i tti ng and redi stri buti on of i ts consti tuti ve parts. Whereas sex
i n the el i ded sense attri buted to femi ni sm wi l l mean onl y i denti ty and at-
tri bute, sex i n the expl i ci t and l esbi an/gay sense wi l l i ncl ude and super-
sede the femi ni st sense: i denti ty, attri bute, sensati on, pl easures, acts, and
practi ces. Thus sex i n the sense depl oyed by l esbi an and gay studi es i s
understood to i ncl ude the putati ve femi ni st bi nary (femal e or mal e), but al so
to i mpl y the second proper object of l esbi an and gay studi es: sexual i ty.
d i f f e r e n c e s 3
I bel abor the structure of thi s anal ogy because the terms that the
anal ogy seeks to compare are not as separate as they may at rst appear. And
i f the terms are separated i n arbi trary or i l l egi bl e ways (as i n the case of
gender [femal e or mal e] ) i t i s because such a separati on, however fal si fy-
i ng or arbi trary, assi sts i n maki ng the methodol ogi cal cl ai m that i s supposed
to ground l esbi an and gay studi es as an autonomous enterpri se.
As the anal ogy i s now set up, femi ni sm i s gured as concerned
not onl y wi th one aspect of sex putati ve anatomi cal i denti tybut wi th no
aspects of sexual i ty. I s thi s a descri pti on of femi ni st practi ce, one whi ch
fol l ows femi ni sms own sel f-restri cti on of i ts own methodol ogi cal concerns
to that of gender (reduced to sex i n i ts bi ol ogi cal formul ati ons)? Where
woul d the femi ni st tradi ti ons i n favor of enhanci ng sexual freedom t i n such
a scheme, much l ess those that anal yze the i nterrel ati on of gender and
sexual i ty? Or i s i t that, whenever femi ni sm engages i n such cl ai ms i t can now
be sai d no l onger to be femi ni sm, but rather to bel ong to the methodol ogy of
l esbi an and gay studi es? Perhaps the restri cti on of femi ni sm to gender,
construed as bi ol ogi cal bi nary, i s nothi ng other than a prescri bed restri cti on
of femi ni st practi ce to terms i l l egi bl e to femi ni st cri ti ci sm performed i n the
servi ce of augmenti ng cl ai ms made by l esbi an and gay studi es for method-
ol ogi cal autonomy?
Even i f we accept Foucaul ts proposal to consi der sex as a
cti onal uni ty, a specul ati ve i deal , whi ch compounds the semanti c senses of
sex as i denti ty, sensati on, and practi ce, to name a few, are we to accept
Foucaul ts presumpti on that sex i s as monol i thi c and uni ed a category as
i t seems? Does sex not gai n that appearance of a monol i thi c uni ty, a
specul ati ve i deal , to the extent that i t covers over sexual di fference or,
rather, assi mi l ates sexual di fference to the category of sex ? I n so far as
l esbi an and gay studi es rel i es on this noti on of sex, then i t appears to take as
one of i ts grounds, i ts foundi ng methodol ogi cal cl ai ms, a refusal of sexual
di fference i n the theoreti cal consti tuti on of sex as a proper object of study.
The terms of the anal ogy suggest as much once we consi der that
the theoreti cal di sti ncti on between femi ni st and l esbi an/gay studi es effects a
refusal of the rst term, gender, through an assi mi l ati on of i ts el i ded sense,
sex, to the second set of terms: sex and sexual i ty. I ndeed, onl y by reduc-
i ng femi ni sm to gender, then i mpl i ci tl y conati ng gender wi th sex, i .e.
femal e or mal e, and then expl i ci tl y decl ari ng sex to be one of i ts two
proper objects, can l esbi an and gay studi es establ i sh i tsel f as the proper
successor to femi ni sm. Thi s pl ace, however, i s establ i shed i n part through
assi mi l ati ng sexual di fference to sex i n such a way that sexual di fference
4 Against Proper Objects
i tsel f i s refused through the trajectory of the subl ati on. Sexual di fference,
i rreduci bl e to gender or to the putati ve bi ol ogi cal di sjuncti on of femal e or
mal e, i s rhetori cal l y refused through the substi tuti on by whi ch a uni tary
sex i s i nstal l ed as the proper object of i nqui ry.
The appropri ati on of thi s vi ew by l esbi an and gay studi es sug-
gests that the anal ogy whi ch opens the di scussi on of proper objects i s hardl y
beni gn, and that the ground i s establ i shed through a refusal , perhaps a
repudi ati on, of the si gni cance of sexual di fference. The di sti ncti on between
the two domai ns works i n at l east two ways. The second term (gay and
l esbi an studi es) i s di sti ngui shed from the rst (femi ni st studi es) through a
separati on of the kinds of objects they pursue. To the extent, however, that
the second pursues a ki nd of object ( sex ) that both refuses and i ncl udes the
object of the rst ( femal e or mal e ), that di sti ncti on becomes the rhetori cal
means by whi ch a repudi ati on i s performed. The repudi ati on begi ns wi th the
reducti on of gender to sexa cari cature of femi ni st theoreti cal work of the
l ast twenty yearswhi ch then stages the possi bi l i ty of an assi mi l ati on of that
cari catured versi on of femi ni sm to the putati vel y more expansi ve terrai n of
l esbi an and gay studi es. That assi mi l ati on takes pl ace through el i si on, but
al so as a chi asmi c effect. Consi dered as anal ogy, the terms are di screte;
consi dered as an hi stori cal account encoded i n the terms of anal ogy, l esbi an
and gay studi es i mproves upon the terms of femi ni sm; consi dered as chi asm,
the anal ogy breaks down, and the terms whi ch appear to be paral l el (gender
and sex/sexual i ty) or the same ( sex i n the el i ded sense and sex i n the
expl i ci t sense) are nei ther, and the narrati ve of supersessi on l oses i ts pl au-
si bi l i ty.
I f the sex whi ch femi ni sm i s sai d to study consti tutes one di -
mensi on of the mul ti -di mensi onal sex that l esbi an and gay research i s sai d
to study, then the i mpl i ci t argument i s that l esbi an and gay studi es does
preci sel y what femi ni sm i s sai d to do, but does i t i n a more expansi ve and
compl ex way. Thi s di sti ncti on between sex as anatomi cal i denti ty and sex
as regi me or practi ce wi l l become qui te cruci al to the formul ati on of l esbi an/
gay studi es as the anal ysi s of sex and sexual i ty, for the ambi gui ty of sex as act
and i denti ty wi l l be spl i t i nto uni vocal di mensi ons i n order to make the cl ai m
that the ki nd of sex that one is and the ki nd of sex that one does bel ong to two
separate ki nds of anal ysi s: femi ni st and l esbi an/gay, respecti vel y.
And yet, sex carri es di fferent val ences i n each context for whi ch
the above framework cannot gi ve an adequate account. The terms of the
anal ogy are fal si fyi ng to the extent that the object of femi ni sm cannot be
reduced to gender (femal e or mal e), and the sex whereof l esbi an and gay
d i f f e r e n c e s 5
studi es speaksto the extent that it denes itself against feminismi s consti -
tuted through a repudi ati on of sexual di fference, a move whi ch many l esbi an
and gay schol ars woul d surel y refuse, i ncl udi ng no doubt the edi tors of the
vol ume i n questi on. I ndeed, what i s at i ssue i s cl earl y not a questi on of what
the edi tors of the vol ume i ntend, gi ven that al l three have made strong
contri buti ons to femi ni st schol arshi p, but rather wi th a set of pol i ti cal and
hi stori cal i mpl i cati ons of the anal ogy between femi ni sm and l esbi an/gay
studi es whi ch have been di fcul t to di scern for many of us who work wi thi n
and between these domai ns of study.
3
The probl em here i s not just the fai rl y obvi ous one that there i s
l i ttl e, i f any, femi ni st research that woul d make use of the oxymoron, gender
(mal e or femal e) as a methodol ogi cal poi nt of departure. Even Joan Kel l y-
Gadol s ci ted arti cl e construes the noti on of sex as a ful l y soci al category
and, though publ i shed i n 1975, a year after the publ i cati on of Gayl e Rubi ns
The Trafc i n Women, i t does not pursue the i mpl i cati ons of the sex/
gender di sti ncti on as i s done i n the subsequent work of Sherry Ortner,
Harri et Whi tehead, Moi ra Gaetens, Evel yn Fox Kel l er, and Joan W. Scott.
4
Perhaps more sal i ent here i s that gender has denoted not a set of attri butes
or i denti ti es, but a framework of di fferenti al anal ysi s and a pri mary way of
si gni fyi ng rel ati onshi ps of power (Scott, Gender 44). Femi ni st efforts to
refuse the reducti on of gender to a di sjuncti ve and bi ol ogi cal bi nari sm have
been qui te central to several di sci pl i nes for several decades: a) the work on
the bi ol ogi cal sci ences of Ruth Hubbard, Anne Fausto-Sterl i ng, Moni que
Wi tti g, Donna Haraway, Hel en Longi no to name but a few; b) the massi ve
l i terature wi thi n femi ni sm that not onl y expl ores the l i nks among gender,
race, and sexual i ty, but shows how gender i s produced through these
overl appi ng arti cul ati ons of power. Thi s schol arshi p i n the el ds of Thi rd
Worl d and postcol oni al femi ni sm has cal l ed i nto questi on i n di fferent ways
not onl y the excl usi ve focus of femi ni sm on gender, but the central i ty of
raci al and cl ass formati ons i n the consti tuti on of gender i tsel f. Femi ni sts
posi ng these ki nds of questi ons i ncl ude Norma Al arcn, Cherr e Moraga,
Chandra Mohanty, Val eri e Smi th, Hortense Spi l l ers, Gayatri Chakravorty
Spi vak, among scores of others.
Al though the probl ems associ ated wi th the sex/gender di sti nc-
ti on are many, i t seems cl ear that the more general questi on of the rel ati on
of the bi ol ogi cal and the cul tural whi ch i ncl udes schol arl y reecti on on the
producti on of the very di sti ncti on between the two categori eshas com-
manded femi ni st i ntel l ectual attenti on from the begi nni ng of the Second
Wave. That there are competi ng femi ni st vi ews on how that tensi on ought to
6 Against Proper Objects
be formul ated i s cl ear, but few, i f any, femi ni st texts proceed wi th a si mpl e
parentheti cal conati on of the two. I n fact, what i s i nci si ve and val uabl e i n
femi ni st work i s preci sel y the ki nd of thi nki ng that cal l s i nto questi on the
settl ed grounds of anal ysi s. And even the recourse to sexual di fference
wi thi n femi ni st theory i s at i ts most producti ve when i t i s taken not as a
ground, foundati on, or methodol ogy, but as a question posed but not re-
sol ved.
What separates the putati ve object of femi ni smgender, con-
strued as sexfrom the putati ve object of l esbi an and gay studi essex,
construed as sexual i tyi s a chi asmi c confusi on i n whi ch the consti tuti ve
ambi gui ty of sex i s deni ed i n order to make arbi trary terri tori al cl ai ms. And
though the l anguage of the edi tori al i ntroducti on to the vol ume appears to
appreci ate the femi ni st precedent, thi s i s an i deal i zati on whi ch i s perhaps
not wi thout i ts aggressi on. I ndeed, l esbi an and gay studi es i n thi s form
cannot arti cul ate i ts own proper object outsi de the terms of thi s anal ogy
wi th femi ni sm, an anal ogy that rel egates femi ni sm to an anal ysi s of gender
reduced to a bi ol ogi cal frame and evacuated of al l sexual i ty. I n thi s sense, the
very formul ati on of l esbi an and gay studi es depends upon the evacuati on of
a sexual di scourse from femi ni sm. And what passes as a beni gn, even re-
spectful , anal ogy wi th femi ni sm i s the means by whi ch the el ds are sepa-
rated, where that separati on requi res the desexual i zati on of the femi ni st
project and the appropri ati on of sexual i ty as the proper object of l esbi an/
gay studi es.
The i nsti tuti on of the pr oper object takes pl ace, as usual ,
through a mundane sort of vi ol ence. I ndeed, we mi ght read moments of
methodol ogi cal foundi ng as per vasi vel y anti -hi stor i cal acts, begi nni ngs
whi ch fabri cate thei r l egi ti mati ng hi stori es through a retroacti ve narrati ve,
buryi ng compl i ci ty and di vi si on i n and through the funereal gure of the
ground.
The use of the anal ogy between femi ni st and l esbi an/gay al so
presumes that the probl em of precedent mi ght be adequatel y addressed
through recourse to a bi nary frame. Lesbi an and gay studi es wi l l be deri ved
from femi ni sm, and yet, the edi tors argue, there wi l l conti nue to be i mpor-
tant communi cati on between the two domai ns.
5
But what consti tutes these
domai ns as sequenti al and di sti nct, framed by anal ogy and i ts bi nary pre-
sumpti on? How i s i t that thi s frami ng of l esbi an/gay i n rel ati on to femi ni sm
forecl oses the el d of soci al di fferences from whi ch both projects emerge? I n
parti cul ar, terms such as race and cl ass are rul ed out from havi ng a
consti tuti ve hi story i n determi ni ng the parameters of ei ther el d. Whether
d i f f e r e n c e s 7
the posi ti on i s for or agai nst the central i ty of gender to sexual i ty, i t i s gender
and sexual i ty al one that remai n the common objects of contenti on. The
presumpti on i s that they can be compared and contrasted, but that the bi nary
frame presumed and i nsti tuted through the anal ogy i s i tsel f sel f-evi dentl y
proper.
Against the Anti-Por nogr aphy Par adigm
The anti -pornography movement through the 80s and, more re-
centl y, the assi mi l ati on of femi ni st pol i ti cs to the di scourse on vi cti mi zati on,
have succeeded i n renderi ng popul ar a vi ew of femi ni sm i n whi ch posi ti ons
of gender are stri ctl y correl ated wi th posi ti ons of domi nati on or subordi na-
ti on wi thi n sexual i ty. Femi ni st posi ti ons such as Cathari ne MacKi nnons
offer an anal ysi s of sexual rel ati ons as structured by rel ati ons of coerced
subordi nati on, and argue that acts of sexual domi nati on consti tute the soci al
meani ng of bei ng a man, as the condi ti on of coerced subordi nati on consti -
tutes the soci al meani ng of bei ng a woman. Such a ri gi d determi ni sm
assi mi l ates any account of sexual i ty to ri gi d and determi ni ng posi ti ons of
domi nati on and subordi nati on, and assi mi l ates those posi ti ons to the soci al
gender of man and woman. But that determi ni sti c account has come under
conti nuous cri ti ci sm from femi ni sts not onl y for an untenabl e account of
femal e sexual i ty as coerced subordi nati on, but for the total i zi ng vi ew of
heterosexual i ty as wel l one i n whi ch al l power rel ati ons are reduced to
rel ati ons of domi nati onand for the fai l ure to di sti ngui sh the presence of
coerced domi nati on i n sexual i ty from pl easurabl e and wanted dynami cs of
power. The Barnard Conference i n 1983 enti tl ed The Schol ar and the Femi -
ni st I X publ i cal l y staged the debate between femi ni sts who woul d el evate
thei r readi ngs of pornographi c vi cti mi zati on to the model for al l gender
rel ati ons, and those who drew on strong femi ni st tradi ti ons of promoti ng
sexual freedom for women to counter the pornography paradi gm for thi nk-
i ng sexual i ty. These l atter femi ni sts consi stentl y refused the assi mi l ati on of
al l sexual i ty to coerci ve model s of domi nati on, and refused as wel l the
assi mi l ati on of model s of domi nati on to soci al l y xed posi ti ons of gender
wi thi n a total i zi ng map of patri archal domi nati on.
The femi ni st tradi ti on i n favor of sexual freedom,
6
wi th strong
ti es to radi cal sexual theory and acti vi sm, has been cl earl y voi ced by numer-
ous schol ars, some of whom, such as El l en Duboi s and Judi th Wal kowi tz,
have expl i ci tl y argued for the hi stori cal l i nks between a progressi ve sexual
pol i ti cs and femi ni st ai ms.
7
Thi s tradi ti on has conti nued i n the wri ti ngs of
8 Against Proper Objects
Dorothy Al l i son, bel l hooks, Cherr e Moraga, Joan Nestl e, Esther Newton,
Sarah Schul man, and others. Central to Carol e Vances reformul ati on of thi s
posi ti on i s a consi derati on of both the pl easure and the danger of womens
sexual freedom, where danger carri es both the anti -eroti c threat of coerced
sexual i ty, as i n rape, battery, and the mundane mascul i ni st ri tual s of i nti mi -
dati on, and the hi ghl y eroti c promi se of transgressi ng tradi ti onal restri cti ons
on womens sexual i ty. Thi s purposeful l y ambi guous agenda thus offered and
conti nues to offer an i mportant al ternati ve to the anti -pornography frame-
work i n whi ch every i nstance of the sexual ambi gui ty of power i s qui ckl y
resol ved i nto uni vocal posi ti ons of coerci ve domi nati on.
Si gni cantl y, thi s very femi ni st tradi ti on i n whi ch both pl easure
and danger govern the di scourse on sexual i ty i s el i ded i n the arti cul ati on of
l esbi an/gay from femi ni st i n the foundi ng methodol ogy of queer studi es.
Those radi cal sexual posi ti ons wi thi n femi ni sm offered an al ternati ve to the
MacKi nnon framework and made i t possi bl e for many women to remai n
femi ni sts i n spi te of the ri si ng popul ari ty of the femi ni st framework of femal e
vi cti mi zati on. To restri ct the proper object of femi ni sm to gender, and to
appropri ate sexual i ty as the proper object of l esbi an/gay studi es, i s ei ther to
deny thi s i mportant femi ni st contri buti on to the very sexual di scourse i n
whi ch l esbi an and gay studi es emerged or to argue, i mpl i ci tl y, that the
femi ni st contri buti ons to thi nki ng sexual i ty cul mi nate i n the supersessi on of
femi ni sm by l esbi an and gay studi es.
The appropri ati on of Gayl e Rubi ns i nuenti al essay, Thi nki ng
Sex (1983), as a foundi ng pi ece i n gay and l esbi an studi es i s especi al l y
i mportant i n understandi ng the way i n whi ch thi s act of methodol ogi cal
foundi ng depends uponand enactsa restri cti on of the scope of femi ni st
schol arshi p and acti vi sm. I mportant to underscore i s the above menti oned
femi ni st context i n whi ch Rubi ns essay was publ i shed, and the cri ti ci sms of
some femi ni st paradi gms she offered. Rubi n cl earl y argued that femi ni sm
ought not to be the onl y or the pri mary theoreti cal model for understandi ng
sexual i ty, but her cal l was not for a l esbi an/gay theoreti cal frame, but for an
anal ysi s that mi ght account for the regul ati on of a wi de range of sexual
mi nori ti es.
8
Whereas the edi tors of The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader are
ri ght to cl ai m i n the i ntroducti on to thei r repri nti ng of Thi nki ng Sex that
[femi ni sm] does not and cannot provi de by i tsel f a ful l expl anati on for the
oppressi on of sexual mi nori ti es, they do not suppl y any grounds for the
cl ai m that l esbi an and gay studi es can provi de by i tsel f a more appropri ate
framework for the anal ysi s of sexual mi nori ti es. A cl ose readi ng of Rubi ns
d i f f e r e n c e s 9
essay suggests i ndeed that i t woul d be as much a mi stake to hand over the
thi nki ng of sexual i ty to femi ni smas i ts proper objectas i t woul d be to
hand i t over to l esbi an and gay studi esas i ts proper object.
I n the nal two pages of the essay, Rubi n effects a number of
controversi al moves whi ch have set the stage for conceptual i zi ng gender and
sexual i ty as two separabl e domai ns of anal ysi s. She opposes reducti ve mono-
causal accounts i n whi ch ei ther al l of sexual i ty i s attri butabl e to gender or al l
of gender i s construed as the causal effect of regi mes of sexual i ty. I f sexual
rel ati ons cannot be reduced to gender posi ti ons, whi ch seems true enough,
i t does not fol l ow that an anal ysi s of sexual rel ati ons apart from an anal ysi s
of gender rel ati ons i s possi bl e. Thei r i nterrel ati on may have a necessi ty that
i s nei ther causal nor xed for al l ti me. I ndeed, i n the pl ace of a methodol ogi -
cal separati on of l esbi an/gay and femi ni st studi es, i t may be that non-reduc-
ti ve and non-causal accounts of the rel ati on of gender and sexual i ty are i n
order. The separati on of the two domai ns by Rubi n i s meant to contest those
femi ni st efforts whi ch treat sexual i ty as a deri vati on of gender (308).
Understood thi s way, the separati on of the two domai ns i s to be context-
ual i zed wi thi n the effort to di spute those femi ni st frameworks whi ch seek to
establ i sh sexual i ty, and sexual domi nati on i n parti cul ar, as the scene by
whi ch gender posi ti ons are i nstal l ed and consol i dated al ong an axi s of domi -
nati on and submi ssi on.
Rubi ns cri ti que of the causal reducti on of sexual i ty to gender i n
Thi nki ng Sex si gnal l ed an i mportant departure from her earl i er work.
Whereas i n The Trafc i n Women: Towards a Pol i ti cal Economy of Sex,
gender was construed as the i nstrument and effect of sexual regi mes, i n
Thi nki ng Sex Rubi n refers to sexual i ty as an autonomous (309) domai n.
Thi s separati on of gender and sexual i ty suggests that femi ni sm, consi dered
as an anal ysi s of gender, i s not necessari l y the most appropri ate di scourse for
consi deri ng the ki nds of power rel ati ons wi thi n whi ch sexual i ty i s formed
and regul ated. Rubi n refers to the fusi on of two di fferent meani ngs of sex
whereby to be a sex i mpl i es havi ng sex i n a gi ven way, that i s, that sexual i ty
i s reduci bl e to sexual i ntercourse and that i t i s a functi on of the rel ati ons
between women and men (307). Where and when a femi ni st anal ysi s ac-
cepts thi s cul tural presumpti on, femi ni sm acti vel y recapi tul ates heterosexi st
hegemony. For exampl e, MacKi nnons vi ew of femi ni sm i s one whi ch makes
free use of the copul a i n whi ch causal rel ati ons are el l i pti cal l y asserted
through the postul ati on of equi val ences, i .e. wi thi n the structures of mal e
domi nance, concei ved excl usi vel y as heterosexual , sex i s gender i s sexual
posi ti onal i ty. Al though MacKi nnon seeks to expl ai n thi s hegemony, the terms
10 Against Proper Objects
by whi ch the expl anati on proceeds tend to freeze the rel ati ons descri bed,
thus recapi tul ati ng the very cul tural presumpti on of a heterosexual l y framed
scene of sexual domi nati on. But when and where feminism refuses to derive
gender from sex or from sexuality, feminism appears to be part of the very
critical practice that contests the heterosexual matrix, pursuing the specic
social organization of each of these relations as well as their capacity for social
transformation.
Si gni cantl y, Rubi n si tuates her own posi ti on hi stori cal l y. She
begi ns the argument by cl ai mi ng qui te cl earl y that a ri ch di scussi on [on
sexual i ty] i s evi dence that the femi ni st movement wi l l al ways be a source of
i nteresti ng thought about sex, and then proceeds to questi on whether femi -
ni sm i s or ought to be the pri vi l eged si te of a theory of sexual i ty. Thi s
sentence i s then fol l owed by another i n whi ch femi ni sm i s gi ven deni ti on:
Femi ni sm i s the theory of gender oppressi on, and then, i t does not fol l ow
that a theory of gender oppressi on, that i s, an anal ysi s of oppressi on on the
basi s of gender, wi l l offer up an adequate theory of sexual oppressi on,
oppressi on on the basi s of sexual practi ce (307).
Toward the end of thi s short theoreti cal concl usi on of the Thi nk-
i ng Sex essay, Rubi n returns to femi ni sm i n a gestural way, suggesti ng that
i n the l ong run, femi ni sms cri ti que of gender hi erarchy must be i ncorpo-
rated i nto a radi cal theory of sex, and the cri ti que of sexual oppressi on shoul d
enri ch femi ni sm. But an autonomous theory and pol i ti cs speci c to sexual i ty
must be devel oped (309). Hence, for Rubi n, a separate account of sexual
oppressi on, one whi ch accounts for sexual mi nori ti es, i ncl udi ng queers,
sadomasochi sts, transvesti tes, i nter-generati onal partners, and prosti tutes i s
an hi stori cal necessi ty i n 1983. The contemporary appropri ati on of thi s
posi ti on for foundi ng l esbi an and gay studi es thus reduces the expansi ve
category of sexual mi nori ti es to the representati on of one group of members
on the l i st.
Accordi ng to the l ogi c of Rubi ns argument, i t woul d be as wrong
to cl ai m that gender can onl y or best be understood i n the context of cl ass (as
some Marxi sts have argued) as i t woul d be to cl ai m that sexual i ty can onl y or
best be understood i n the context of gender (as some femi ni sts have argued).
By extensi on, i t woul d be equal l y fal l aci ous to cl ai m that sexual i ty i s onl y or
best understood i n the context of l esbi an and gay studi es. I ndeed, accordi ng
to Rubi ns l ogi c, sexual i ty i s no more l i kel y to recei ve a thorough anal ysi s
under the rubri c of l esbi an and gay studi es than i t i s under that of femi ni st
studi es. Not onl y do central noti ons l i ke the raci al i zati on of sexual i ty get
dropped or domesti cated as i nstances of ei ther femi ni sm or l esbi an and
d i f f e r e n c e s 11
gay studi es, but the noti on of sexual mi nori ti es, whi ch i ncl ude sex workers,
transsexual s, and cross-generati onal partners, cannot be adequatel y ap-
proached through a framework of l esbi an and gay studi es. One need onl y
consi der the absurdi ty of the cl ai m that the hi story and pol i ti cs of prosti tuti on
i s best served wi thi n the framework of l esbi an and gay studi es. Si mi l arl y, the
i mpor tant di ssonance between tr anssexual i ty and homosexual i ty i s l ost
when and i f the cl ai m i s made that the anal ysi s of transsexual i ty i s best
served wi thi n the frame of l esbi an and gay studi es. I ndeed, to the extent that
l esbi an and gay studi es refuses the domai n of gender, i t di squal i es i tsel f
from the anal ysi s of transgendered sexual i ty al together. And though i t i s
cl ear that l esbi an and gay studi es may have some i nteresti ng perspecti ves to
contri bute to the anal ysi s of heterosexual i ty, i t woul d be qui te a l eap to cl ai m
that heterosexual i ty ought now to become the excl usi ve or proper object of
l esbi an and gay studi es. Yet, al l of these i mprobabl e cl ai ms are i nvi ted by the
methodol ogi cal announcement that sex and sexual i ty consti tute the proper
object of i nqui ry for l esbi an and gay studi es and, by i mpl i cati on, not the
proper object for other ki nds of i nqui ry.
Rubi ns essay cal l ed for pol i ti cal attenti on to be pai d to sexual
mi nori ti es who are not al ways women, and who consti tute a cl ass of sexual
actors whose behavi or i s categori zed and regul ated by the state i n i nvasi ve
and pathol ogi zi ng ways. The expansi ve and coal i ti onal sense of sexual
mi nori ti es cannot be rendered i nterchangeabl e wi th l esbi an and gay, and
i t remai ns an open questi on whether queer can achi eve these same goal s
of i ncl usi veness.
Has The Long Run Ar r ived?
I t i s i mportant to appreci ate the way i n whi ch Rubi ns revi si on of
the earl y essay i s si mul taneous wi th her effort to separate a theory and
pol i ti cs of sexual i ty from one of femi ni sm. I n some ways, i t i s the gure of
MacKi nnon agai nst whom Rubi ns own posi ti on i s arti cul ated. I t i s, after al l ,
MacKi nnon who i n Rubi ns terms attempt[s] to subsume sexual i ty under
femi ni st thought. She does thi s by argui ng that genders are the di rect
consequence of the soci al consti tuti on of sexual i ty. I n MacKi nnons terms,
the mol di ng, di recti on, and expressi on of sexual i ty organi zes soci ety i nto
two sexes, women and men ( Trafc 182).
As i mportant as i t i s to oppose the theory and pol i ti cs of Mac-
Ki nnons versi on of gender oppressi on, Rubi ns tacti c of separati ng sexual i ty
from the sphere of femi ni st cri ti que has taken on i mpl i cati ons that coul d not
12 Against Proper Objects
have been foreseen when the essay was wri tten. Wi th the recent medi a
success of anti -pornography femi ni sts, and the veri tabl e i denti cati on of
femi ni sm wi th a MacKi nnon-styl e agenda, femi ni sm has become i denti ed
wi th state-al l i ed regul atory power over sexual i ty. Thi s shi ft i n publ i c di s-
course has backgrounded those feminist posi ti ons strongl y opposed to Mac-
Ki nnons theory and pol i ti cs, i ncl udi ng Rubi ns own.
9
As a resul t, those
femi ni st posi ti ons whi ch have i nsi sted on strong al l i ances wi th sexual mi -
nori ti es and whi ch are skepti cal of the consol i dati on of the regul atory power
of the state have become barel y l egi bl e as femi ni st. A further expropri ati on
of the tradi ti on of sexual freedom from the domai n of femi ni sm has taken
pl ace, then, through the odd twi st by whi ch femi ni sm i s sai d no l onger to
have sexual i ty as one of i ts objects of i nqui ry.
Rubi ns own essay, however, works al ong sl i ghtl y di fferent l i nes.
I n Thi nki ng Sex, Rubi n seeks recourse to Foucaul t to put i nto questi on the
very rel ati on between ki nshi p rel ati ons and gender that had been at the
center of The Trafc i n Women. She wri tes,
It appeared to me at that time that gender and desire were
systematically intertwined in such social formations. This may
or may not be an accurate assessment of the relationship be-
tween sex and gender in tribal organizations. But it is surely not
an adequate formulation for sexuality in Western industrial
societies. As Foucault has pointed out, a system of sexuality has
emerged out of earlier kinship forms and has acquired signi-
cant autonomy. (307)
I n The History of Sexuality Foucaul t cl ai ms that from the 18th
century onward, there i s a new apparatus superi mposed on the system of
ki nshi p, the emergence of and depl oyment of sexual i ty.
10
He then proceeds
to make a di sti ncti on whi ch seems to have central i mportance for Rubi n i n
Thi nki ng Sex : wi th respect to ki nshi p, he argues, what i s perti nent i s the
l i nk between partners and deni te statutes, and i n sexual i ty, what i s perti -
nent i s the sensati ons of the body, the qual i ty of pl easures, and the nature of
i mpressi ons (106). Whereas ki nshi p appears to be regul ated by juri di cal
stri ctures pertai ni ng to persons and thei r appropri ate soci al functi ons, sexu-
al i ty takes i mpressi ons and sensati ons as the el d to be regul ated.
Rubi ns own essay i n whi ch thi s ci tati on appears i s pri mari l y
concerned wi th juri di cal efforts i n the earl y 1980s to restri ct sexual acts and
practi ces, to narrow the noti on of juri di cal consent, and to bani sh sexual
acti vi ty from publ i c spaces. I n support of the cl ai m that sexual i ty consti tutes
d i f f e r e n c e s 13
a new domai n of regul ati on, and that sexual oppressi on i s di sti nct from
gender oppressi on, she offers an hi stori cal argument that sexual i ty i s no
l onger formed or constrai ned by ki nshi p. The presumpti on here i s that
gender oppressi on can be understood through the regul ati on of ki nshi p, and
that ki nshi p no l onger operates as i t once di d to i nstal l and perpetuate gender
rel ati ons through the regul ati on of sexual i ty wi thi n speci c constrai nts of
ki nshi p, that i s, through the worki ngs of sancti on and prohi bi ti on. Ki nshi p
formed the focus of Rubi ns Trafc essay, and the effect of the hi stori cal
di sti ncti on that she makes here between ki nshi p and sexual i ty i s to cl ai m
that the l atter essay supersedes the former.
But is this supersession possible? Is the historical and analytic
distinction between kinship and sexuality nally tenable? Rubi ns focus i n
Trafc on ki nshi p as a way of regul ati ng sexual i ty i mpl i ed that i n the
absence of expl i ci t rul es and i nsti tuti ons, ki nshi p survi ves psychi cal l y as the
force of prohi bi ti on and gui l t i n sexual l i fe. Hence, the femi ni st justi cati on
for the turn to psychoanal ysi s was grounded preci sel y i n thi s requi rement to
read the traces of ki nshi p i n psychi c l i fe. The putati vel y hi stori cal shi ft from
ki nshi p to sexual i ty, associ ated wi th the methodol ogi cal shi ft from gender to
sexual i ty, necessi tates a turn from psychoanal ysi s to Foucaul t. But can the
l atter term (of any of these pai rs) be ful l y or meani ngful l y separated from the
for mer ?
11
The argument i n Thi nki ng Sex that posi ts the anachroni sm of
ki nshi p i s supported by a Foucaul ti an hi stori ography i n whi ch state-spon-
sored efforts at popul ati on control and the hei ghtened medi cal i zati on of
sexual i ty are gured as repl aci ng ki nshi p as the organi zi ng structure of
sexual i ty. Thi s new depl oyment, argues Foucaul t, proceeds through di agno-
si s and normal i zati on rather than through taboos and sancti ons. And yet, the
l i mi ti ng presumpti on of a European hi story constrai ns the pl ausi bi l i ty of the
narrati on of such a shi ft. How do the geopol i ti cal constrai nts of that hi story
restri ct the general i zabi l i ty of the argument i n whose servi ce i t i s i nvoked?
And even i f certai n forms of ki nshi p wi thi n certai n European contexts l ose
the power to organi ze sexual i ty uni l ateral l y, and publ i c di scourses on sexu-
al i ty become more central , are there recongured forms of ki nshi p that resul t
from thi s very shi ft and whi ch exert an organi zati onal force on sexual i ty?
I n fol l owi ng Foucaul ts scheme, Rubi n severs the newer depl oy-
ment of sexual i ty from the ol der regi me of ki nshi p, droppi ng the psychoana-
l yti c anal ysi s offered i n Trafc and offeri ng i n i ts pl ace a regi me-theory of
sexual i ty, whi ch woul d i ncl ude psychoanal ysi s i tsel f as one of i ts regul atory
modes. The credi bi l i ty of thi s argument rests on the proposi ti on that the
14 Against Proper Objects
modern, medi cal i zed regi me by whi ch sensati on and pl easure are normal -
i zed i s not i n the servi ce of fami l y val ues or a gi ven normati ve vi ew of
ki nshi p rel ati ons. That i t i s someti mes i n preci sel y that servi ce suggests that
whereas i t woul d be a mi stake to argue that ki nshi p rel ati ons uni forml y
govern the regul ati on of sexual i ty, i t woul d be equal l y mi staken to cl ai m
thei r radi cal separabi l i ty. I n fact, the anal ysi s of sexual mi nori ti es, offered as
a separate cl ass, requi res to be thought i n rel ati on to an anal ysi s of normati ve
ki nshi p. Consi der the vari ous juri di cal efforts to control i nter-generati onal
sexual i ty i n whi ch the gure of the sexual l y endangered chi l d i s al most
al ways posi ti oned outsi de the home, thus vei l i ng the sexual abuse of chi l dren
wi thi n the home i n the servi ce of an i deal i zed vi ew of the fami l y as a
desexual i zed safe haven for chi l dren. Consi der as wel l the prohi bi ti ons on
publ i c sex whi ch redraw the publ i c/pri vate di sti ncti on, and repri vati ze sex-
ual rel ati ons, where noti ons of pri vacy appl y al most excl usi vel y to the
state-sancti oned forms of heterosexual conjugal i ty (cf. Bowers v. Hardwi ck).
Consi der as wel l the sequestrati on of HI V posi ti ve prosti tutes and gay men,
and the constructi on of both venues for sexual i ty as causal l yrather than
condi ti onal l yl i nked to the di sease; the moral i zi ng agai nst those at ri sk for
AI DS by vi rtue of thei r sexual practi ces di rectl y supports the i deol ogi cal
cti on of marri age and the fami l y as the normal i zed and pri vi l eged domai n
of sexual i ty.
We mi ght read the desi re for a sexual i ty beyond ki nshi p as a si gn
of a certai n utopi an strai n i n sexual thi nki ng whi ch i s bound to fai l , and
whi ch requi res that our concepti ons of ki nshi p remai n frozen i n thei r most
hi ghl y normati ve and oppressi ve modes. Those who i magi ne themsel ves to
be beyond ki nshi p wi l l neverthel ess nd terms to descri be those support-
i ng soci al arrangements whi ch consti tute ki nshi p. Ki nshi p i n thi s sense i s not
to be i denti ed wi th any of i ts posi ti ve forms, but rather as a si te of redeni -
ti on whi ch can move beyond patri l i neal i ty, compul sory heterosexual i ty, and
the symbol i c overdetermi nati on of bi ol ogy. Exampl es of the convergence of
queer and ki nshi p concerns i ncl ude the buddy system set up by Gay Mens
Heal th Cri si s and other AI DS servi ce organi zati ons to ful l l the soci al and
medi cal support needs of i ts pati ents; l aws l egi ti mati ng l esbi an and gay
parenti ng and adopti on; l egal cl ai ms of guardi anshi p; the ri ghts to make
medi cal deci si ons for i ncapaci tated l overs; the ri ght to recei ve and di spose of
the body of a deceased l over, to recei ve property, to execute the wi l l . And i n
l esbi an and gay human ri ghts work, i t i s common to nd that l esbi an and gay
ri ghts are not recogni zed as human ri ghts preci sel y because l esbi ans and
gay men, al ong wi th other sexual mi nori ti es, are not percei ved as sufci entl y
d i f f e r e n c e s 15
human gi ven thei r estrangement or opposi ti on to the normati ve ki nshi p
congurati ons by whi ch the human becomes recogni zabl e.
The effort to thi nk sexual i ty outsi de of i ts rel ati on to ki nshi p i s,
thus, not the same as thi nki ng sexual i ty apart from reproducti on, for repro-
ducti ve rel ati ons consti tute onl y one di mensi on of ki nshi p rel ati ons. To
cl ai m that the two domai ns ought to be thought i n rel ati on to one another i s
not to cl ai m that sexual i ty ought to remai n restri cted wi thi n the terms of
ki nshi p; on the contrary, i t i s onl y to cl ai m that the attempt to contai n
sexual i ty wi thi n the domai n of l egi ti mate ki nshi p i s supported by moral i zi ng
and pathol ogi zi ng di scourses and i nsti tuti ons. I t i s that compl i ci tyand the
ri sks of breaki ng wi th that compl i ci tythat requi res us to understand the
two domai ns i n rel ati on to each other.
Apart from these expl i ci t demands and di fcul ti es of ki nshi p, and
thei r cl ear rel ati on to the regul ati on of sexual l i fe, there i s perhaps a l ess
tangi bl e desi re to be di scerned i n the theoreti cal effort to separate the
anal ysi s of sexual i ty from the study of ki nshi p, namel y, the desi re to desi re
beyond the psyche, beyond the traces of ki nshi p that psyches bear. These
i ncl ude the formati ve and consequenti al marki ngs of cul tural l y speci c
fami l i al organi zati ons, powerful and shapi ng experi ences of sexual prohi bi -
ti on, degradati on, exci tati on, and betrayal .
Pol i ti cal l y, the costs are too great to choose between femi ni sm, on
the one hand, and radi cal sexual theory, on the other. I ndeed, i t may be
preci sel y the ti me to take part i n what Rubi n i n 1984 foresaw as the necessi ty,
i n the l ong run, for femi ni sm to offer a cri ti que of gender hi erarchy that
mi ght be i ncorporated i nto a radi cal theory of sex, and for radi cal sexual
theory to chal l enge and enri ch femi ni sm. Both sets of movements mi ght al so
strengthen the femi ni st effort to di spl ace MacKi nnons structural l y stati c
account of gender, i ts pro-censorshi p posi ti on, and i ts fal si fyi ng cul tural
general i zati ons about the eternal l y vi cti mi zed posi ti on of women.
12
The Tr ouble with Gender
A characteri zati on of femi ni sm as an excl usi ve focus on gender
thus mi srepresents the recent hi story of femi ni sm i n several si gni cant
ways: 1) the hi story of radi cal femi ni st sexual pol i ti cs i s erased from the
proper characteri zati on of femi ni sm; 2) the vari ous anti -raci st posi ti ons
devel oped wi thi n femi ni st frameworks for whi ch gender i s no more central
than race, or for whi ch gender i s no more central than col oni al posi ti onal i ty
or cl assthe domai ns of soci al i st femi ni sm, postcol oni al femi ni sm, Thi rd
16 Against Proper Objects
Worl d femi ni smare no l onger part of the central or proper focus of femi -
ni sm; 3) the MacKi nnon account of gender and sexual i ty i s taken as paradi g-
mati c of femi ni sm, and the strong femi ni st opposi ti on to her work i s excl uded
from the parameters of femi ni sm; 4) gender i s reduced to sex (and some-
ti mes to sex-assi gnment), rendered xed or gi ven, and the contested hi s-
tory of the sex/gender di sti ncti on i s di spl aced from vi ew; 5) the normati ve
operati on of gender i n the regul ati on of sexual i ty i s deni ed. The resul t i s that
the sexual contestati on of gender norms i s no l onger an object of anal ysi s
wi thi n ei ther frame, as i t crosses the very domai ns of anal ysi s that thi s
methodol ogi cal cl ai m for l esbi an and gay studi es strai ns to keep apart.
Fi nal l y, the si gni cant di fferences between femi ni sts who make
use of the category of gender, and those who work wi thi n the framework of
sexual di fference i s erased from vi ew by thi s si mpl i sti c formul ati on of femi -
ni sm. I n Rosi Brai dotti s femi ni st theoreti cal work, sexual di fference can be
reduced nei ther to a bi ol ogi cal di fference nor to a soci ol ogi cal noti on of
gender. I n her vi ew, the sex-gender di sti ncti on makes l i ttl e sense wi thi n the
framework of sexual di fference. Whereas for her sexual di fference has a
di scursi ve l i fe, i t i s i rreduci bl e to di scourse. Al ong wi th El i zabeth Grosz,
Brai dotti seeks to rethi nk corporeal i ty i n semi oti c and symbol i c terms that
arti cul ate sexual di fference i n ways that defy bi ol ogi sm and cul tural i sm at
once. I ndeed, wi thi n such theori es the noti on of sexual di fference i s i rreduc-
i bl e to gender, and both of those noti ons are i rreduci bl e to sex or sex-
assi gnment. I n fact, those who work wi thi n the framework of sexual di ffer-
ence argue agai nst gender on the grounds that i t presupposes a noti on of
cul tural constructi on i n whi ch the subject i s taken as a gi ven, and gender
then acqui res a suppl ementary meani ng or rol e. Some woul d argue that such
a vi ew can recogni ze nei ther the way i n whi ch the worki ngs of sexual
di fference i n l anguage establ i sh the subject nor the mascul i ni ty of that
subjectand the excl usi on of the femi ni ne from subject formati on that that
subject requi res. Others woul d cl ai m that there may wel l be a femi ni ne
subject, but that an understandi ng of the formati on of the subject i s sti l l an
effect of sexual di fference. Gender theory mi sunderstands the ways i n whi ch
that asymmetri cal rel ati on between the sexes i s i nstal l ed through the pri -
mary worki ngs of l anguage, whi ch presuppose the producti on of the uncon-
sci ous. The turn to gender, for those who emerge from a Lacani an or post-
Lacani an tr adi ti on, si gnal s a paper i ng over of thi s mor e fundamental
structuri ng of l anguage, i ntel l i gi bi l i ty, and the producti on of the subject
al ong the axi s of a spl i t whi ch al so produces the unconsci ous.
d i f f e r e n c e s 17
I n some contemporary European contexts, the turn to gender and
gender studi es i s expl i ci tl y taken to be a turn away from a femi ni st anal ysi s
whi ch i nsi sts on the fundamental or persi stent character of thi s sexual
asymmetry. Accordi ng to Brai dotti , some versi ons of the gender studi es
model consi der the cul tural constructi on of femi ni ni ty and mascul i ni ty as
homol ogous ki nds of constructi ons, whi ch suggests that the study of gender
di rectl y contradi cts the pol i ti cal i mpetus of femi ni st anal ysi sto mark the
consti tuti ve asymmetry of sexed posi ti ons by whi ch l anguage and the uncon-
sci ous emerge.
Oddly, then, within the U.S., feminism is under criticism from
lesbian and gay studies for its ostensibly exclusive emphasis on gender, where-
as in some European contexts, the turn to gender is understood as an anti-
feminist move and a deradicalization of the feminist political agenda. Para-
doxically, this construal of feminism as exclusively focused on gender not only
denies the history of U.S. feminist claims for radical sexual freedom, but also
denies the emergence of a feminism specic to women of color in the U.S. who
have sought to complicate the feminist framework to take account of relations
of power that help to constitute and yet exceed gender, including race and
racialization, as well as geopolitical positionality in colonial and postcolonial
contexts. Whereas the turn to gender was for some U.S. feminists, then, a way
to move beyond sexual difference as a framework which appeared to give
priority to masculine and feminine at the expense of other kinds of differ-
ences, relations, institutions, and contexts, gender has become, in some Euro-
pean contexts, a sign of a politically defused feminism, a framework which
assumes the symmetrical positioning of men and women along with the ho-
mologous means of their construction.
Wi thi n the course of several months I have heard femi ni st schol -
ars i n the U.S. worry that gender has been destroyed through the recent
cri ti ci sms of femi ni sms presumpti ve heterosexual i ty. On the other hand, I
have heard femi ni sts who work wi thi n structural i st and poststructural i st
accounts of sexual di fference l ament the reducti on of a psychoanal yti cal l y
compl i cated noti on of sexual di fference to an apparentl y soci ol ogi cal noti on
of gender. Death to gender! recentl y remarked a femi ni st fri end objecti ng
to the repl acement of a femi ni st perspecti ve on sexual di fference by a theory
of the cul tural or soci al constructi on of gender. From what femi ni st posi ti on
does thi s cal l for the destructi on of gender come, and from what concerns
does the femi ni st worry over i ts di ssol uti on emerge? I s i t too al i ve or too
mori bund, and i s i t the sel fsame gender?
18 Against Proper Objects
A femi ni st anal ysi s that takes sexual di fference as a poi nt of
departure tends to ask how i t i s that mascul i ne and femi ni ne are consti tuted
di fferenti al l y, and to i nsi st that thi s di fferenti al i s non-di al ecti cal and a-
symmetri cal i n character. The recourse to a symbol i c domai n i s one i n whi ch
those posi ti onal i ti es are establ i shed and whi ch, i n turn, set the parameters
for noti ons of the soci al . The anal ysi s of gender, on the other hand, tends
toward a soci ol ogi sm, negl ecti ng the symbol i c or psychoanal yti c account by
whi ch mascul i ne and femi ni ne are establ i shed i n l anguage pri or to any gi ven
soci al congurati on. Recourse to sexual di fference, then, tends to be con-
cerned wi th the status of the asymmetri cal rel ati on or, i n Lacani an terms,
non-rel ati on between the sexes as wel l as the separabi l i ty of the symbol i c
and soci al domai ns whereby the symbol i c i s understood to precede and
orchestrate the parameters of the soci al .
Whereas some cul tural constructi oni sts mi ght cl ai m that gender
i s equi val ent to i ts constructi on, those who work wi thi nand i n a produc-
ti vel y cri ti cal rel ati on tothe Lacani an frame of sexual di fference woul d
i nsi st on the radi cal incommensurability of the femi ni ne wi th any of i ts gi ven
arti cul ati ons. I ri garay, for i nstance, mai ntai ns that the femi ni ne i s necessar-
i l y redoubl ed, that i t exi sts rst as a si gni er wi thi n a mascul i ni st economy,
but then i t exi sts outsi de that economy (where nothi ng may exi st), as
preci sel y what that economy must repudi ate i n order to si mul ate i ts own
representati on of the femi ni ne as the femi ni ne i tsel f. Thi s l ays the ground-
work for Naomi Schors i nsi stence that recourse to the femi ni ne i nvol ves a
doubl e mi mesi s (48). Gender theory, according to this framework, would
misidentify the construction of the feminine within a masculinist economy with
the feminine itself, thereby effecti ng a compl i ci ty wi th the soci al l y gi ven
modes of mascul i ne and femi ni ne, and forfei ti ng the cri ti cal di stance re-
qui red for a femi ni st contestati on of these constructi ons.
13
When I ri garay cl ai ms that the femi ni ne i s al ways el sewhere, she
i s marki ng out a space for the femi ni ne that exceeds and dees any of i ts
gi ven or posi ti ve arti cul ati ons. Thi s becomes a necessi ty on the presumpti on
that the exi sti ng el d of ar ti cul abi l i ty i s gover ned and constr ai ned by
phal l ogocentri sm. Thus, when Gayatri Chakravorty Spi vak argues that the
femi ni ne i s produced and erased at the same ti me, she means that the effect
of that very di scursi ve producti on (wi thi n mascul i ni sm) accompl i shes the
repudi ati on and refusal of the femi ni ne. Thi s second reference to the femi -
ni ne resi sts representati on because representati on i s predi cated on the re-
si stance and repudi ati on of the femi ni ne. Somethi ng si mi l ar i s argued by
Druci l l a Cornel l when she i nsi sts that the femi ni ne has no pl ace i n real i ty
d i f f e r e n c e s 19
(1620). The femi ni ne marks that l i mi t of representabi l i ty whi ch woul d undo
the presupposi ti ons of representati on i tsel f (and i n Cornel l s work i s thus
associ ated wi th the subl i me). For each of these vi ews, the cul tural construc-
ti on of women consti tutes the effacement of women, and those who take
the constructi on of women to be the truth of women cl ose the cri ti cal gap
that i t i s femi ni sms task to keep open.
From thi s perspecti ve on the i ncommensurabi l i ty of the femi -
ni ne or woman wi th any l i vi ng bei ng, a set of cri ti cal questi ons emerge
that take i ssue wi th gender theory and i ts tendency to conate the symbol i c
and the soci al : what i s the system or, l ess ri gi dl y, the el d of representati on
i n whi ch femi ni sm seeks to make i ts cl ai ms, and how do we understand the
persi stent fai l ure of representi ng women wi thi n that el d as marki ng the
l i mi t of representabi l i ty as such? I f the representati ons that do exi st are
normati ve phantasms, then how are we to reverse or contest the force of
those representati ons? I n what manner of doubl e-speak must femi ni sm
proceed, when i t i s understood as the unrepresentabl e i n i ts paradoxi cal
effort to represent i tsel f?
14
A symbol i c status i s often attri buted to thi s foundi ng scene by
whi ch the femi ni ne i s repudi ated and assumes i ts ambi guous status as the
l i mi t of representabi l i ty. To be more preci se, thi s repudi ati on or exi l e i s
understood as what enabl es and structures the arti cul ati on of the symbol i c
i tsel f. The symbol i c i s understood as a el d of normati vi ty that exceeds and
structures the domai n of the soci al l y gi ven. And yet, how are we to thi nk the
rel ati on between the symbol i c and the soci al ? I s thi s structure of femi ni ne
repudi ati on not reenforced by the very theory whi ch cl ai ms that the structure
i s somehow pri or to any gi ven soci al organi zati on, and as such resi sts soci al
transformati on? The heterosexual pathos of the foundi ng scene of psycho-
anal ysi s i s reenforced preci sel y by those descri pti ons i n whi ch the phal l us
emerges as pri mary si gni er and the femi ni ne as the al ways al ready repudi -
ated. The cl ai m that mascul i ne and femi ni ne are forever consti tuted i n thi s
parti cul ar asymmetry appears to reconsol i date the cul tural presumpti on of
heterosexi st hegemony.
I f, then, what i s cal l ed the symbol i c encodes a soci al l y sed-
i mented heterosexual pathos, how ought the rel ati on between the soci al and
the symbol i c to be recongured? I f the symbol i c i s subject to rearti cul ati on
under the pressure of soci al arrangements, how mi ght that be descri bed, and
wi l l such descri pti ons troubl e any effort to draw a cl ear di sti ncti on between
the soci al and the symbol i c? Has the soci al wi thi n postmarxi smbecome
equated wi th the descri pti vel y gi ven, and how mi ght i deal i ty (possi bi l i ty,
20 Against Proper Objects
transformabi l i ty) be rei ntroduced i nto femi ni st accounts of the soci al ? Such
a project woul d refuse the si mpl e conati on of the domai n of the soci al wi th
what i s soci al l y gi ven or al ready consti tuted, and reformul ate a Marxi an
account of soci al transformati on outsi de of i mpl ausi bl e hi stori cal tel eol o-
gi es. To the extent that vi ews of soci al transformati on have rel i ed on such
tel eol ogi cal accounts of hi story, i t seems i mperati ve to separate the questi on
of transformati on from tel eol ogy. Otherwi se, the si te of pol i ti cal expectati on
becomes preci sel y the i ncommensurabi l i ty between a symbol i c and a soci al
domai n, one i n whi ch the symbol i c now encodes preci sel y the i deal i ty evacu-
ated, after Marxi sm, from the domai n of the soci al .
Fi nal l y, how woul d a troubl i ng of the di sti ncti on between the
symbol i c and the soci al di ffuse the current tensi on between the frameworks
of sexual di fference and gender? I n other words, i f gender desi gnates a
cul tural or soci al sphere of acqui red and vari abl e meani ngs, then how i s thi s
sphere to be thought i n dynami c rel ati on to rei gni ng schemes of sexual
normati vi ty?
I n my vi ew, the hetero-pathos that pervades the l egacy of Lacan-
i an psychoanal ysi s and some of i ts femi ni st reformul ati ons can be countered
onl y by renderi ng the symbol i c i ncreasi ngl y dynami c, that i s, by consi deri ng
the condi ti ons and l i mi ts of representati on and representabi l i ty as open to
si gni cant rearti cul ati ons and transformati ons under the pressure of soci al
practi ces of vari ous ki nds. On the other hand, i t seems cl ear that the method-
ol ogi cal separati on of questi ons of sexual i ty from questi ons ei ther of sexual
di fference or of gender wi thi n l esbi an and gay studi es rei ntroduces the
probl em of the femi ni neand femi ni smas the si te of the unrepresentabl e.
I f gender i s sai d to bel ong to femi ni sm, and sexual i ty i n the hands of l esbi an
and gay studi es i s concei ved as l i berated from gender, then the sexual i ty that
i s l i berated from femi ni sm wi l l be one whi ch suspends the reference to
mascul i ne and femi ni ne, reenforci ng the refusal to mark that di fference,
whi ch i s the conventi onal way i n whi ch the mascul i ne has achi eved the
status of the sex whi ch i s one. Such a l i berati on dovetai l s wi th mai n-
stream conservati sm and wi th mal e domi nance i n i ts many and vari ous
forms, thus to a l arge extent cal l i ng i nto questi on the assumed symmetry of
l esbi an and gay a symmetry grounded i n the separati on of l esbi an from
femi ni st, of sex from sexual di fference, a ground consti tuted through the
enactment and coveri ng of a spl i t.
I n a recent arti cl e i n the Village Voice, Ri chard Gol dstei n warns
agai nst the anti -femi ni sm accompanyi ng the ri se of gay conservati ves to
power posi ti ons wi thi n the queer movement.
d i f f e r e n c e s 21
The biggest blunder of gay conservatives is to ignore the most
important alliance gay people can make. That is the bond between
queers and feminists. Its no surprise that the gay right overlooks
this possibility. Their frat is not just male, but masculinist. Though
theyd never be caught in leather, gayocons worship the sexual
hierarchy that afrms male power. (28)
I t i s no surpri se, then, that the gayocon sensi bi l i ty has arri ved i n queer
studi es, where methodol ogi cal di sti ncti ons perform the academi c versi on of
breaki ng coal i ti on.
Al though my own abbrevi ated formul ati ons of these debates are
surel y contestabl e, they are offered here as provocati ons for further contes-
tati on among femi ni st schol ars of vari ous persuasi ons who are open to a
consi der ati on of how heter osexual pr esumpti on str uctur es some of the
foundi ng scenes of femi ni st i nqui ry, but al so to queer schol ars who seek to
sustai n connecti ons to a more expansi ve concepti on of cri ti que and who are
suspi ci ous of the amnesi as supporti ng the progressi ve hi stori cal cl ai ms of
the avant-garde. I woul d i nsi st that both femi ni st and queer studi es need to
move beyond and agai nst those methodol ogi cal demands whi ch force sepa-
rati ons i n the i nterests of canoni zati on and provi si onal i nsti tuti onal l egi ti ma-
ti on. For the anal ysi s of raci al i zati on and cl ass i s at l east equal l y i mportant i n
the thi nki ng of sexual i ty as ei ther gender or homosexual i ty, and these l ast
two are not separabl e from more compl ex and compl i ci tous formati ons of
power. I ndeed, i t i s that compl exi ty and compl i ci ty that cal l to be thought
most urgentl y, whi ch means thi nki ng agai nst the i nsti tuti onal separati sms
whi ch work effecti vel y to keep thought narrow, sectari an, and sel f-servi ng.
The cri ti que of the conservati ve force of i nsti tuti onal i zati on ought to be kept
al i ve as a cruci al mode of sel f-i nterrogati on i n the rush to acqui re new
l egi ti macy. Perhaps the ti me has arri ved to encourage the ki nds of conversa-
ti ons that resi st the urge to stake terri tori al cl ai ms through the reducti on or
cari cature of the posi ti ons from whi ch they are di fferenti ated. The grounds
of autonomy ar e pr eci sel y these si tes of di ffer enti ati on, whi ch ar e not
grounds i n any conventi onal sense. These are ri fted grounds, a seri es of
consti tuti ng di fferenti ati ons whi ch at once contest the cl ai m to autonomy
and offer i n i ts pl ace a more expansi ve, mobi l e mappi ng of power. There i s
more to l earn from upsetti ng such grounds, reversi ng the excl usi ons by
whi ch they are i nstated, and resi sti ng the i nsti tuti onal domesti cati on of
queer thi nki ng. For normal i zi ng the queer woul d be, after al l , i ts sad ni sh.
I have pursued two i ntervi ews i n an effort to provoke a remappi ng
22 Against Proper Objects
of the terms of debate, and to encourage a ki nd of i ntel l ectual trespass whi ch
val ues the expansi ve possi bi l i ti es of such confrontati ons over the retreat i nto
i ntel l ectual terri tory.
JUDI TH BUTL ER i s Pr ofessor of Rhetor i c and Compar ati ve Li ter atur e at the Uni ver si ty of Cal i for -
ni a, Ber kel ey. Her r ecent books ar e Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
(New Yor k: Routl edge, 1990) and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New
Yor k: Routl edge, 1993). She al so co-edi ted, wi th Joan W. Scott, Feminists Theorize the Political
(New Yor k: Routl edge, 1992).
Notes 1 Thr oughout thi s essay I dr aw upon
Bi ddy Mar ti ns conceptual i zati on of
the pr obl emati c r el ati on between
gender and sexual i ty i n contempo-
r ar y femi ni st and queer studi es.
Not onl y i n conver sati on, but i n her
wr i tten wor k as wel l , she has i n-
si sted on theor y as a movi ng
between what have become, for
some, pol ar i zed or separ ate posi -
ti ons. She deftl y ar gues i n Sexual -
i ty wi thout Gender s and Other
Queer Utopi as agai nst cer tai n
tr ends wi thi n contempor ar y theor y
on the constr ucti on of soci al i denti -
ti es. Bodi es, she wr i tes, ought not
to be descr i bed as si mpl e effects of
di scour se or as the mal l eabl e sur -
face of soci al i nscr i pti on, but con-
si der ed i n a mor e compl ex and
i nti mate r el ati on wi th psychi c
r eal i ty. She cl ai ms as wel l that
ther e ar e pr obl ems wi th theor i es
that tend to for egr ound gender at
the expense of sexual i ty and r ace,
sexual i ty at the expense of gender
and r ace, and r ace at the expense
of sexual i ty and gender . Her anal y-
si s offer s a set of tr enchant cr i -
ti ques whi ch show that cer tai n
pol i ti cal agendas ar e ser ved
thr ough the for egr oundi ng of one
deter mi nant of the body over oth-
er s, but al so that those ver y theo-
r i es ar e weakened by thei r fai l ur e
to br oach the compl ex i nter r el a-
ti ons of these ter ms.
2 Foucaul t hi msel f ar gues agai nst
the use of sex as cti ti ous uni ty . . .
[and] causal pr i nci pl e : [T]he
noti on of sex made i t possi bl e to
gr oup together , i n an ar ti ci al
uni ty, anatomi cal el ements, bi o-
l ogi cal functi ons, conducts, sensa-
ti ons, and pl easur es, and i t enabl ed
one to make use of thi s cti ti ous
uni ty as a causal pr i nci pl e, an
omni pr esent meani ng: sex was
thus abl e to functi on as a uni que
si gni er and as a uni ver sal si gni -
ed (History 154).
3 My ar gument her e i s wi th the
i mpl i ci t r easoni ng wher eby a
gr oundi ng of l esbi an and gay stud-
i es takes pl ace, a for m of ar gumen-
tati on whi ch has been r ei ter ated i n
a var i ety of contexts, and whi ch the
edi tor s of the vol ume ci te i mpl i ci tl y
fr om those sour ces. I n fact, I woul d
ar gue that much of the schol ar shi p
of Abel ove, Bar al e, and Hal per i n
have i mpor tant femi ni st di men-
si ons, and that they have mar ked
sever al essays i n the vol ume they
edi ted as contr i buti ng to a di al ogue
between femi ni sm and queer stud-
i es. I ndeed, I thi nk i t woul d be a
mi stake, nal l y uni nter esti ng and
unpr oducti ve, to hol d any of these
author sor any other sr espon-
si bl e for the anal ogy i n questi on.
The anal ogy i s much mor e i mpor -
tant as a theor eti cal devel opment
wi th cul tur al cur r ency that exceeds
the par ti cul ar ar ti cul ati ons i t r e-
cei ves i n the wor ks of speci c
author s.
4 The edi tor s ci te both the l ate Joan
Kel l y-Gadol and Joan W. Scott as
exampl es of femi ni sts who have
made gender i nto a centr al focus
d i f f e r e n c e s 23
for womens hi stor y. Yet both of
these wr i ter s have i nsi sted that the
tur n to gender opens up the ques-
ti on of how a monol i thi c hi stor y
mi ght be r etol d i n whi ch the pr e-
sumpti on of symmetr y between
men and women i s contested.
I nter esti ngl y, the fr amewor k for
l esbi an and gay studi es that i s
founded thr ough thi s anal ogy wi th
thei r wor k assumes a symmetr y
that thei r wor k contests.
5 The edi tor s wr i te Lesbi an/gay
studi es does for sex and sexuality
appr oxi matel y what womens
studi es does for gender . That does
not mean that sexual i ty and gender
must be str i ctl y par ti ti oned. On the
contr ar y, the pr obl em of how to
under stand the connecti ons be-
tween sexual i ty and gender conti n-
ues to fur ni sh an i l l umi nati ng topi c
of di scussi on i n both womens
studi es and l esbi an/gay studi es;
hence, the degr ee of over l ap or of
di sti nctness between the el ds of
l esbi an/gay studi es and womens
studi es i s a matter of l i vel y debate
and ongoi ng negoti ati on (xvxvi ).
6 The femi ni st tr adi ti on of sexual
fr eedom appear s most r ecentl y to
be i denti ed wi th a str ong defense
of ci vi l l i ber ti es and, on occasi on,
an afl i ati on wi th ci vi l l i ber tar i an-
i sm. But ni neteenth centur y soci al -
i st tr adi ti ons of sexual fr eedom
wer e centr al l y concer ned wi th a
cr i ti que of the fami l y and wi th
state i nsti tuti ons. A contempor ar y
ar ti cul ati on of a femi ni st theor y of
fr eedom needs to be devel oped i n
r el ati on to a cr i ti que of i ndi vi dual -
i sm, of centr al i zed state power i n
i ts r egul ator y di mensi ons, and the
i nter r el ati on between the two.
7 The vol umes Pleasure and Danger
edi ted by Car ol e S. Vance and
Powers of Desire: The Politics of
Sexuality edi ted by Ann Sni tow,
Chr i sti ne Stansel l , and Shar on
Thompson wer e centr al l y i mpor -
tant i n wagi ng thi s cr i ti que of the
anti -por nogr aphy par adi gm.
8 I n Epistemology of the Closet, Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwi ck makes use of
Rubi ns di sti ncti on between gender
and sexual i ty to ar gue that sexual -
i ty has a ki nd of ambi gui ty that
gender does not. Sedgwi ck cl ai ms
that vi r tual l y al l peopl e ar e
publ i cal l y and unal ter abl y assi gned
to one or the other gender , and
fr om bi r th. . . . On the other hand,
sexual or i entati on, wi th i ts far
gr eater potenti al for r ear r ange-
ment, ambi gui ty, and r epr esenta-
ti onal doubl eness . . . offer (s) the
apter deconstr ucti ve object (34).
Sedgwi ck thus i denti es the ques-
ti on of gender wi th the questi on of
sex-assi gnment, and then appear s
to make the pr esumpti on that the
assi gnment of sex wor ks a
pr esumpti on that psychoanal yti c
theor y, whi ch r etai ns an emphasi s
on unconsci ous fantasy, woul d cal l
i nto questi on. Even i f one wer e to
accept the r educti on of gender
wi th i ts compl ex soci al var i abi l i ty
to the noti on of sex-assi gnment (a
pr e-femi ni st constr ual of gen-
der ), i t seems that assi gnment
mi ght be r econsi der ed i n ter ms of
the compl ex dynami c of soci al
i nter pel l ati on, wher eby bei ng
cal l ed a gi r l i s si mpl y not enough
to make i t so. The pr obl em of
assumi ng an assi gnment can be
under stood onl y thr ough a consi d-
er ati on of psychi c r esi stance and
ambi val ence pr oper to a theor y of
i denti cati on, pr ocesses whi ch
col l ecti vel y cal l i nto questi on the
efcacy of assi gnment both as a
soci al per for mati ve and as the
basi s for a theor y of gender .
For an extended anal y-
si s of Sedgwi cks account of gen-
der , see Bi ddy Mar ti ns excel l ent
essay, Sexual i ti es Wi thout Gen-
der s and Other Queer Utopi as.
Mar ti n consi der s those passages i n
whi ch Sedgwi ck under stands femi -
ni sm to be excl usi vel y concer ned
wi th the questi on of who i s to
have contr ol of womens (bi ol ogi -
cal l y) di sti ncti ve r epr oducti ve
capabi l i ty (Epistemology 28). Such
24 Against Proper Objects
a r estr i cti on of femi ni st wor k to
thi s par ti cul ar questi on
mi scontr ues the r ange of femi ni st
engagements wi th questi ons of
r epr oducti on, but al so wi th non-
r epr oducti ve sexual i ty. I f we con-
si der those femi ni st questi ons not
as who contr ol s womens r epr o-
ducti ve capaci ti es, but r ather , as
whether women may l ay cl ai m to
sexual fr eedom outsi de the domai n
of r epr oducti on, then the questi on
of sexuality pr oves as centr al to the
femi ni st pr oject as the questi on of
gender.
By separ ati ng sexual i ty
fr om gender i n thi s way, Sedgwi ck
al so r estr i cts the scope of Rubi ns
coal i ti onal under standi ng of
sexual mi nor i ti es. Wher eas
Rubi n saw the tur n to sexual i ty as
a way to pr ovi de a fr amewor k
whi ch woul d i ncl ude and l i nk
queer s, tr ansgender ed peopl e,
cr oss-gener ati onal par tner s, pr osti -
tutes, Sedgwi ck under stands sexu-
al i ty as the pr oper domai n of l es-
bi an and gay studi es or , r ather , of
an anti homophobi c i nqui r y (15).
By separ ati ng the noti on of gender
fr om sexual i ty, Sedgwi ck nar r ows
the noti on of sexual mi nor i ti es
offer ed by Rubi n, di stanci ng queer
studi es fr om the consi der ati on of
tr ansgender ed per sons,
tr ansgender ed sexual i ti es,
tr anssexual i ty, tr ansvesti sm, cr oss-
dr essi ng, and cr oss-gender ed
i denti cati on. Al though Sedgwi ck
appear s to defend thi s method-
ol ogi cal separ ati on, her own r ead-
i ngs often make r i ch and br i l l i ant
use of the pr obl emati c of cr oss-
gender ed i denti cati on and cr oss-
sexual i denti cati on. See, for i n-
stance, Whi te Gl asses i n
Tendencies.
Fi nal l y, i t seems that we
mi ght accept the i r r educi bi l i ty of
sexual i ty to gender or gender to
sexual i ty, but sti l l i nsi st on the
necessi ty of thei r i nter r el ati onshi p.
I f gender i s mor e than a sti g-
mata, a tag that one wear s, but
i s, r ather , a nor mati ve i nsti tuti on
whi ch seeks to r egul ate those
expr essi ons of sexual i ty that con-
test the nor mati ve boundar i es of
gender , then gender i s one of the
nor mati ve means by whi ch the
r egul ati on of sexual i ty takes pl ace.
The thr eat of homosexual i ty thus
takes the for m of a thr eat to estab-
l i shed mascul i ni ty or establ i shed
femi ni ni ty, al though we know that
those thr eats can r ever se thei r
di r ecti on, enabl i ng pr eci sel y the
occasi ons for the pr ol i fer ati on of
what i s to be pr ohi bi ted.
9 See the wor k of Wendy Br own,
Car ol Cl over , Dr uci l l a Cor nel l , Li sa
Duggan, bel l hooks, Nan Hunter ,
Mol l y Ladd-Tayl or , Anne
McCl i ntock, Mandy Mer ck, Car ol e
Vance, and Li nda Wi l l i ams, to
name a few.
10 For a ful l er el abor ati on, see my
Sexual I nver si ons.
11 Ter esa de Laur eti ss r ecent The
Practice of Love cr osses femi ni st
wi th gay and l esbi an studi es i n
such a way that sexual i ty i s not
r educi bl e to gender and nei ther i s
Foucaul t ful l y i ncompati bl e wi th
psychoanal ysi s.
12 See Chandr a Mohantys Under
Wester n Eyes not for a cr i ti que of
MacKi nnon per se, but for the
col oni al i st consequences of the
uni ver sal i zati on of womens subor -
di nati on i mpl i ed by wester n ver -
si ons of femi ni sm whi ch di sassoci -
ate gender oppr essi on fr om r aci al ,
cul tur al , and geopol i ti cal speci ci -
ti es.
13 I n my own wor k I have tr i ed to
establ i sh that i ncommensur abi l i ty
wi thi n gender theor y by i nsi sti ng
on the i ncommensur abi l i ty be-
tween gender nor ms and any l i ved
effor t to appr oxi mate i ts ter ms. I n
thi s sense, I have i mpor ted a
Lacani an scheme i nto gender
theor y, al though I have sought to
r etai n somethi ng of the tr ansfor -
mati ve possi bi l i ti es associ ated wi th
d i f f e r e n c e s 25
doxes to Offer: French Feminists
17891944, i n whi ch she char ts
both the i mpossi bi l i ty and neces-
si ty of womens cl ai ms to ci ti zen-
shi p i n the Fr ench Revol uti on and
i ts after math.
gender as a soci al categor y, thus
di stanci ng mysel f fr om a Lacani an
noti on of the symbol i c.
14 Thi s appear s to be a centr al con-
cer n of Joan W. Scotts for thcomi ng
book Women Who Have Only Para-
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