STATUTORY CASES

Case Title: G.R. No. L-19650 (September 29, 1966)

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The
Postmaster General
1) Facts
The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar, parying that judgment be rendered declaring
its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public.
In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest? which calls for participants to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specifed period.? The contest is open to all motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivres?. There is neither a fee or consideration
required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon
request at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where
accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.
Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the
contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives to the postal authorities for
advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal
authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983
of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information
concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no
consideration involved in the part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster
General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest
was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex)
and all its representatives?. This leads to Caltexs fling of this petition for
declaratory relief.
The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and
the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution or said rules by
the mails?. The respondent then appealed.
2) Issue(s)
a) Whether or not the petition states a sufcient cause of action for
declaratory relief?
b) Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest?
violates the Postal Law?
3) Ruling
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufcient cause of
action for declaratory relief, and that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest as
described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is afrmed. No costs.
4) Ratio
Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions.
Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory
relief should be fled by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract
or other written instrument, and whose rights are afected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.
Requisites for Declaratory Relief:
- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination
* The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous
distribution of property by chance?. It does not qualify as a lottery due to
the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute a
(1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not required
to do anything or purchase anything from Caltex in order to participate in
the contest. The true test for having consideration is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether
those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the
distribution of the prize.?
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1
on leave
Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor fled with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga
City), a petition for direct certifcation as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao
manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood).
On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the frm before the same ofce
for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union
issued a notice of strike against the frm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice;
nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien
management personnel without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May
1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood fled a complaint with the trial court against
the ofcers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of
private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. The union fled a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa
227 (Labor Code, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The
motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held: The frst and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by
the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by
law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words
that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial
tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue
should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore,
since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree
1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3)
Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of
workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations;
Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it
can only mean, that a court of frst instance judge then, a regional trial
court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred
on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied a strike.
The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullifed and
set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the
writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in
his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further
action on the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of
dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5
August 1982.
Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by
Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel in Aritao,
Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. On 23 May 1989, Aritao CENROs
Jovito Layugan issued an order of confscation of the truck. Its owner, De
Guzman, failed to submit the required explanation within the reglementary
period set by Layugan. On 22 June 1989, DENR Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan sustained the Alitao CENROs action of confscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277. De Guzman fled for
reconsideration but was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution,
however, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was fled by De Guzman and
company against Layugan and Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2),
contending that the only the court is authorized to confscate and forfeit
conveyances used in the transporting illegal forest products, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 68. De Guzman further contended that the
seizure is illegal, as she did not use the truck in the commission of the
crime (of qualifed theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, punishable under Section 68), as allegedly admitted by the Regional
Executive Director, releasing her from criminal liability. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to De Guzman. The
petitioners fled a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal one. Hence, the petition.
Issues:
Whether construction admits that the authority to confscate or to
forfeit conveyances belongs to the courts
Whether the truck was used in the commission of an ofense under
Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order
277
Held: The construction that conveyances are subject of confscation by the
courts exclusively (pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2) unduly restricts the
clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of
Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are not mentioned nor
included in the former provision. In the construction of statutes, it must be
read in such a way as to give efect to the purpose projected in the statute.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure
the benefts intended. In the case at bar, the phrase to dispose of the same
is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Further, when the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. The language of
the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase shall be
guilty of qualifed theft as defned and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
meant that the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing
forest products without authority constitutes a distinct ofense independent
now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the 16
October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA, made permanent
the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993, and directed the
DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of frearm and
ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section
878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further
amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of frearm on ground of
being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27
November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused
of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to
two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualifed as such of
the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of frearm
Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any
frearm, detached parts of frearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
frearms, parts of frearms, or ammunition except when such frearms are in
possession of such public ofcials and public servants for use in the
performance of their ofcial duties; as those frearms and ammunitions
which are regularly and lawfully issued to ofcers, soldiers, sailors or
marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the frst and fundamental
duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made
for a secret agent.
Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the
case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision
conficts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent
was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the
accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufciently put him within the category
of a peace ofcer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the
conviction must stand.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed judgment.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring
Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy fled a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein fled an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualifed to adopt under Article
335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fction
cannot adopt.
Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualifed to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant,
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned,
to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defned meaning in
law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the efect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and afrmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
wthout pronouncement as to costs.
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was fled by the registered voters of the
barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which
was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner fled before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner
contends that no recall can take place within one year preceding a regular
local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the frst
Monday of May 1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK
election as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a
regular local election in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation
of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-
literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfll its purpose and defeat
the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter
that killeth but in the spirit that vivifeth. In the present case, Paragraph (b)
of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local ofcial may be subject of a recall election.
The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular
election, as this would render inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code. It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the ofce held by the local elective ofcial sought to be
recalled will be contested and be flled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having become
moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay
ofce concerned were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining
Order issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made
permanent.
Floresca v. Philex Mining
GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others
dissenting
Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining
Corporations mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under
the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee
report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with
adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to fle a complaint for
damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex fled a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial
accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no
jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are
compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the
WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as
the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the
event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the
CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the
Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the
dismissal before the Supreme Court.
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the
resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an
injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmens Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e.
(1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs action is exclusively
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmens Compensation Act, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or
his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the
workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the
employer or of his other employees, or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured
employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae
are diverse.
The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is
selective, i.e. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of
remedies, but that they cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the
Workmens Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held
that the petitioners who had received the benefts under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court, as the choice of the frst remedy was based on
ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifes the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice, but that upon the success of such bids before the lower
court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should
be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be
selective, is guilty of judicial legislation.
Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the
Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives efect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and later by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New
Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs. Licera: that
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdictions legal system. It argues that the
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into efect. Yet,
the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the
New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufciency of the
laws. Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances,
the court do and must legislate to fll in the gaps in the law; because the
mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is fnite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result
Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in
Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering
his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his
dishonesty on matters involving his fnances. Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987,
Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City.
Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-
fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel fled a verifed petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her
own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist
of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeals and afrmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conficting personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on
personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-
destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confne the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and signifcance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difculty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable diferences and
conficting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintif; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identifed, alleged in the complaint, sufciently
proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the
incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and
wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fscal and
the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was
issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the benefciary designated as Ana
M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad
Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was fled against Mapalad Aisporna,
Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section
189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the
soliciting insurance without securing the certifcate of authority from the
ofce of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called
by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August
1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fne
of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was
afrmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present
recourse was fled on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Ofce of
the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that
Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or
intent of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in fxing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the frst
paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent
or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without frst procuring a certifcate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner; while the second paragraph defnes who is an insurance
agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes
the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate courts ruling that
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189
but under its frst paragraph is a reversible error, as the defnition of
insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section
189, which is any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent
within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or
indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna
may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the
accused of the crime charged, with costs de ofcio.
China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part
Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban fled a complaint against B &
B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of
sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure
to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20
January 1970.
To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit
of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. However,
Tan Kim Liong, the banks cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any
information relative to bank deposits. On 4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was
ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest
Development in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. Tan Kim Liong
moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was
directed to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and
confnement will be ordered. Resisting the 2 orders, the China Bank and
Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of
the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4)
exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the
depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public ofcials, [4] or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim
Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a
possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifcally
referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of
judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject
to garnishment to satisfy a fnal judgment against it in view of the
aforementioned provisions of law.
Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply
with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.
Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two
houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry
into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being
garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real
inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the
disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach
of execution to satisfy a judgment. In the present case, the lower court did
not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
The Supreme Court afrmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27
March 1972, with costs against the petitioners.
Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista
GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring
Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World
War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy,
and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine
Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now
Philippine Veterans Afairs Ofce) is an agency of the Government charged
with the administration of diferent laws giving various benefts in favor of
veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955,
Gasilao fled a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act
65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he was sufering from
Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to
Gasilaos failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to
establish his service-connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the
Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to
complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing,
the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he
was awarded the full benefts of section 9 of Republic Act 65.
Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for
an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and
each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilaos monthly pension was,
however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases
provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were
released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufcient to
pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were
released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of
the benefts thereunder from said date.
In 1973, Gasilao fled an action against the Board to recover the pension,
which he claims he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he frst fled his
application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was fnally approved.
The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that
since the section impliedly requires that the application fled should frst be
approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive
his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefts should commence from
the date of approval of the application.
Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from
1968.
Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran
pensions is to compensate a class of men who sufered in the service for the
hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and more
particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to
sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. A veteran
pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and
recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during
times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For
this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to
pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor
the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with
other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must
depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65
is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and
interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges, and
benefts granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old
positions in government, educational benefts, the privilege to take
promotion examinations, a life pension for the incapacited, pension for
widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefts. Upholding the
Board that the pension awards are made efective only upon approval of the
application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which
had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. Such
stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with
the spirit and intent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.
The Supreme Court modifed the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the
Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the
Philippine Veterans Afairs Ofce) to make Gasilaos pension efective 18
December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for
each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former
amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968; and
declaring the diferentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his
unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June
1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the
availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.
Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He
was survived by his legitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and
Macario, and sister Marcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted
of three parcels of land (Cadastral Lot 25, covered by Tax Declaration 11950,
Cadastral Lot 26, covered by Tax Declaration 11951, and Cadastral Lot 27,
covered by Tax Declaration 11949). On 4 May 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold
Lot 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra by means of a deed of sale, and in
consideration of P1,000.00. Meanwhile, Marcela sold her share to Venancio.
Bartolomes share was sold by his heirs to Tomas. On 24 September 1968,
an Extrajudicial Partition with Confrmation of Sale was executed by and
among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra.
After the partition, Venancio owned 1041 square meters consisting of Lot 27
and portion of Lot 26 (which is approximately 749 square meters), Anselmo
owned 405 square meters of Lot 26, while the heirs of Tomas owned 1,116
square meters, the whole of Lot 25. Thereafter on 15 June 1970, Venancio
sold the whole of Lot 27 and a 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 to spouses
Lino Longalong and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 through a
relocation survey that the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26 was outside
Longalongs fence as Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a title in his
name (Original Certifcate of Title 0-4221) covering the whole of Lot 26).
Eforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita
Salvatierra (widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino
Longalong to return to the latter the 149 square meter portion of Lot 26.
Longalong fled a case with the Regional Trial Court for the reconveyance of
the said portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the
grounds that Longalong failed to establish ownership of the portion of the
land in question, and that the prescriptive period of four years from
discovery of the alleged fraud committed by defendants predecessor
Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintifs should have fled their action
had already elapsed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
ruling that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to
sell; and as to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro
indiviso share therein to, but he cannot sell more than his share therein.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square
meters in Lot 26
Held: When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the
literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article
1370 of the Civil Code (If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.) Contracts which are the private laws of the
contracting parties, should be fulflled according to the literal sense of their
stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter
what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity
are present. In the present case, there is no ambiguity in the terms and
stipulations of the extrajudicial partition (Extrajudicial Partition with
Confrmation of Sale). Since Macarios share (later Anselmos) is only 405 of
the 749 square meters comprising Lot 26, Venancio was entitled to the
remaining 344 square meters of Lot 26, 149 square meters of which was sold
to Longalong. Supplemented by the holding that the prescriptive period on
reconveyance is ten years and not four years, as held in Caro v. CA,
Longalong is entitled to reconveyance as his complaint was fled fve years
after the constitution of Anselmos fraudulent Original Certifcate of title.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for want of merit, with costs against
petitioners.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.
The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its
petition for mandamus. The court determined Republic Act 2023 was
enacted only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees debt from the latters salary and turn this over to the employees
credit union; but which does not convert the credit unions credit into a frst
priority credit.
Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give frst priority in the matter of
payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.
Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for
the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope
of its operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil
Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference
of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023
speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the
legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023
were to give frst priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of
employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of Republic Act 2023
which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit
unions shall enjoy frst priority in the deduction from the employees wages
and salaries.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 &
3 of opinio
Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City
with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving
his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its
passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores,
and Estelita Nemeo. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in
favor of the ofended parties likewise being awarded.
Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al.
fled with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and
independent civil action for damages allegedly sufered by them from the
reckless driving of Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin Abellana, the
alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the
dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no
reservation for the fling thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued
by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was
already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28 April 1967 that
the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He
noted that the ofended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or
reserved their right to institute it separately in the City Court; but which
they fled in the CFI. In view of the waiver and reservation, the Court would
be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused and in favor of
the ofended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.
1. Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if
originally instituted in the CFI
The rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the
appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case shall be tried in all
respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court
(Section 7 of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in civil cases under
Section 9 of Rule 40. An interpretation that an independent civil action is
barred absent a reservation under Section 1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur,
as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the rule and
ignores what is explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.
2. A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a
constitutional doubt
A court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as
would give rise to a constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court,
both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not
extend to any diminution, increase or modifcation of substantive right.
Thus, substantive right cannot to be frittered away by a construction that
could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the ofended parties failed at
the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. Article 33 of the
Civil Code is quite clear when it provides that in cases of . physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
3. Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored
in the pursuit of serving the interest of a client; Construction should
be based on legal norm, not literalness
A counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to
assure parties justice according to law, in serving the interest of his client.
He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. The law as an instrument of
social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction
sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there
is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of
vindicating an alleged right.
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
Facts: In the certifcation election held on February 27, 1976, respondent
Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again,
admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present
Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast sufces for certifcation of the
victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There
were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face
therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certifed in accordance with
the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the
doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be
counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were
seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent Director.
Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the
Philippine Blooming Mills
Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari
does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the
deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive
ofcials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules
and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by
Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took efect on 3
February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the
public as far back as 1 May 1974, although its date of efectivity was
postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more
than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory
rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court
certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules.
As far back as In re Allen, a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as
ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive ofcers of the government, whose
duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily
control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so frmly embedded
in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it. There
was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v.
Raferty, a 1918 decision: Courts will and should respect the
contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive
ofcers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby. Since then, such a
doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, the construction placed by the ofce charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given
controlling weight.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner
PAFLU.
Philippine Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC
GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring
Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective
bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to
the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the
Union fled a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the
parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding
the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3
September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-
stage wage increase for all rank and fle employees, retroactive to 1April
1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted
to take efect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the
living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was
implemented efective 1 May 1977 by the company. The controversy arose
when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage
increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The
company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase
(roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD
1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month,
contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds
between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which
were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption
provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other
hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525)
is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union fled a complaint for unfair labor practice
and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order
was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred the
case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the
machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this
order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the
order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious
lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that
agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per
month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions
provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union
fled for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same
on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement
falls under the exceptions.
Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3
September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and efect, although the
increase on the frst year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in
the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before
May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in
paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a
perfected contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no
grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the
letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was
based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The
company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in
recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with infation
brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting
the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic
and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3
September 1977).
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word grant as used
in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the
exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on
misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties,
the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation
and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains
the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the
construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it
was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because
it goes beyond the scope of the law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision
of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the
increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of
P0.80 daily efective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases
embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees;
with costs against the company.
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union fled a complaint against the bank for
the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Ofce IV in Manila. Conciliation
having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certifed for
arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T.
Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioners
complaint for payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from
the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by
paying their holiday pay up to and including January 1976.
On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending,
among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay.
Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same
Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the
rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The
controversial section thereof reads as Status of employees paid by the
month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of
the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all
days in the month whether worked or not. On 23 April 1976, Policy
Instruction 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister)
interpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by reason of the ruling laid
down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy
Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.
On 30 August 1976, the Union fled a motion for a writ of execution to
enforce the arbiters decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed.
On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of
execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its
employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank
appealed from the order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June
1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing the banks
appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21
February 1979, the bank fled with the Ofce of the Minister of Labor a
motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On
13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief of Research
and Information of the Commission to compute the holiday pay of the IBAA
employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor
Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Ofce of the
Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an
order setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978,
and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for certiorari
charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly
paid employees are excluded from the benefts of holiday pay.
Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree
850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid
employees are not excluded from the benefts of holiday pay. However, the
implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of
Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefts by inserting,
under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides
that: employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the
number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory
or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in
the month whether worked or not. Even if contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by executive ofcers whose duty is to enforce it is
given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous,
the same must be declared as null and void. So long, as the regulations
relate solely to carrying into efect the provisions of the law, they are valid.
Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be
followed. A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fxed for
its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
fnally determine what the law means.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1
on leave
Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in
representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a
complaint with the Regional Ofce IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of
10 unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime
diferentials for worked legal holidays from 1 November 1974.
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid
employees the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay diferentials to
all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.
On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and
dismissed the petitioners claim for lack of merit basing its decision on
Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9,
claiming the rule that If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less
than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is
uniform from January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the
10 paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly
salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still
entitled to the 10 paid legal holidays.
Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly
paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who
rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or
overtime pay diferentials.
Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation,
which diminishes the benefts of labor more than what the statute delimits
or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of
the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefts of holiday pay are clear
and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the
beneft. In Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the beneft is principally intended for daily paid
employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay.
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a
statute by executive ofcers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great
weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same
must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refne
and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the
government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has
engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of
governmental power. Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement
the Labor Code and Policy Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU
v. Inciong, and thus applies in the case at bar. Since the private respondent
premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear
that the employees belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the
payment of 10 legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code,
aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law
from the benefts of such holiday pay
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers 7 September
1976 order, and reinstated with modifcation (deleting the interest payments)
the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC afrming the 30 October 1975
resolution of the Labor Arbiter.
Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission
GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 15 October 1958, the Social Security Commission (SSC) issued
its Circular 22 providing that efective 1 November 1958, all employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and
include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as
well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will
comprise the Employees remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2%
and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any
one month. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, Victorias Milling Company, Inc.,
wrote the SSC in efect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a
previous Circular 7 (7 October 1957) , and further questioned the validity of
the circular for lack of authority on the part of the SSC to promulgate it
without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Ofcial Gazette. Overruling these objections, the SSC ruled that Circular 22
is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Ofcial Gazette to be efective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion
as to how the law should be construed. Not satisfed with this ruling,
petitioner comes to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether Circular 22 is a rule or regulation.
Held: There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and
an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to
an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules
and regulations, it makes a new law with the force and efect of a valid law,
while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy,
purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature.
The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has
been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that have the efect of law. A rule is
binding on the courts so long as the procedure fxed for its promulgation is
followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom On the other hand, administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
fnally determine what the law means.
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with
their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifcally defned in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted
in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular
phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning
for some other purpose. RA 1161 specifcally defned what compensation
should mean For the purposes of this Act. RA1792 amended such
defnition by deleting some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By
virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law,
whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the
phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed resolution, with costs against
appellant.
Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Ofce of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from efecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confrmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without
the confrmation of the Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint
Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confrmation, and thus,
the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the ofce and receive
all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs.
1. Standing to fle suit / Prohibition as proper remedy: Procedural
questions set aside due to demands of public interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in
the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
decide, setting aside the fner procedural questions of whether prohibition is
the proper remedy to test Misons right to the ofce of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring
this suit.
2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give efect to
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.
The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v.
Rodriguez) The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they
say and provide.
3. Presidents power to appoint
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President to
appoint 4 groups of ofcers: (1) the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, ofcers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other ofcers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other ofcers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4)
ofcers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone. The frst group is clearly appointed with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such ofcers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confrmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third
groups of ofcers can be made by the President without the consent
(confrmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined
through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission.
4. Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the
case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the frst group require the consent (confrmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
5. Constitutional provision presumed to have been framed and
adopted in light of prior laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with
reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their
judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all
presidential appointments required the consent (confrmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse-trading and
similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent
with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the
above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the
1973 Constitution, it is not difcult for the Court to state that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground
by requiring the consent (confrmation) of the Commission on Appointments
for the frst group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confrmation, the appointment of other ofcers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., ofcers of
lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support
this conclusion.
6. Construction of also in second sentence; consideration of
diferent language of proximate sentences to determine meaning
The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in
like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said
second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the
ofcers enumerated in the frst sentence, can appoint (without such
consent or confrmation) the ofcers mentioned in the second sentence,
contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the ofcers
mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
ofcers mentioned in the frst sentence. Rather than limit the area of
consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the
context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive signifcance
from the fact that the frst sentence speaks of nomination by the President
and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by
the President. And, this use of diferent language in 2 sentences proximate
to each other underscores a diference in message conveyed and perceptions
established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.
7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive in character;
Limitations construed strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifcations of such power should be strictly construed.
Such limitations or qualifcations must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. In the case at bar, the frst sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
8. The use of word alone after President in third sentence is a
lapse in draftsmanship, a literal import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word
President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than
anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution,
the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confrmation by the Commission on Appointments,
except appointments to ofces expressly mentioned in the frst sentence.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word
alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest
the appointment of lower-ranked ofcers in the President alone, or in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
ofcers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in him, without need of confrmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third
sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article
VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the
second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the frst sentence, are not subject
to confrmation by the Commission on Appointments.
9. President authorized Commissioner of Bureau of Customs;
Commissioner not included with the frst group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is
not one of those within the frst group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments
that need the consent (confrmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October
1972).
10. Laws approved during the efectivity of previous constitution
must be read in harmony with the new one
RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the efectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,
like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the efectivity of the
1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony
with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such
appointment, however, no longer needs the confrmation of the Commission
on Appointments.
Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
receive such compensation as may be fxed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in ofce. It also provides that until
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
Associate Justice, ffteen thousand pesos. When Justice Perfecto assumed
ofce, Congress had not provided otherwise, by fxing a diferent salary for
associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the
Constitution, i.e., ffteen thousand pesos a year.
The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the
amount under protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a
member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate
the Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
judiciary amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of
compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with
the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of
afairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their
ofces during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in ofce. Thus, next to permanency in ofce, nothing can
contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fxed provision for
their support. In the general course of human nature, a power over a mans
subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of the
judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.
Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a
gratuity or privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based
upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is
a guaranty whose fulfllment is as much as part of the consideration agreed
as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the
citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby
judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualifed by
talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern.
On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at
the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with
their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the
onerous duties of their high ofce. So, it is irrefutable that the guaranty
against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption
from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which
others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration
is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the
public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax.
The Supreme Court afrmed the judgment.
Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur
Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income
taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower
court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic
Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salaries of judicial ofcers, if not to counteract the ruling
on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public ofcial, specially a judicial ofcer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise.
Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public ofcial, specially a judicial ofcer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within
the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that
in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section
13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in ofce, found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
ofcers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defned and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government
is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts
can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret
and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a confict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and
has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid
down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the efect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial ofcer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
The Supreme Court afrmed the decision, afrming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Ofce to continue the deduction of withholding
taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members
of the judiciary. This was afrmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4
December 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualifed Judges presiding over
Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Ofcer of
the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. With the fling of the petition, the Court deemed it best to
settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the
matter administratively.
Issue: Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution.
Held: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
efect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation ofered by the framers. In the present case, Section 10, Article
VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fxing
another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be
higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. Thus, the debates, interpolations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was fnally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members
of the Judiciary taxable.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila
that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in
the fulfllment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners
attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its infuence in human
afairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its infuence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating infuence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the Government. Of
course, the phrase advantageous to the Government does not authorize
the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, beneft or support of a particular sect or
church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the beneft of the
Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was
to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the
country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a
map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which ofered to buy 51%
of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian frm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the
Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince
Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the
national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found
in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid
of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufcient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fxed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to
facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further
the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around
the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and
add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision inefective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As
against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a diferent principle and have often become in efect extensive
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fne, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters.
In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American
hotel when it frst opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various signifcant events which have shaped
Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a
choice has to be made between a qualifed foreigner and a qualifed
Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Ofce of the Government Corporate
Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to
Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at
P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to efect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1
on leave
Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Ofcial Gazette or otherwise efectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ
of mandamus to compel respondent public ofcials to publish, and or cause
the publication in the Ofcial Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. They maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for the petition. The
respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They
further contend that publication in the Ofcial Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the efectiveness of laws where the laws provide for their
own efectivity dates. Thus publication is not indispensable.
Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the
efectivity of laws
Held: Publication in the Ofcial Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its efectivity date for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of efectivity, which is
the ffteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself
provides for the date when it goes into efect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the efectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however,
considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Ofcial Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its efectivity. The clear object of the such
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further,
publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations
and make the said penalties binding on the persons afected thereby. In the
present case, Presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and efect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Ofcial Gazette is an operative fact, which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justifed.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Ofcial
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and that unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and efect.
Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring
Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court afrmed the necessity for the
publication to the Ofcial Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and efect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.
Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarifcation of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory
opinion. February Revolution took place, which subsequently required the
new Solicitor General to fle a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section
18 of the Rules of Court).
Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided.
Held: The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, refers to the date of efectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law efective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual ffteen-day period
shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2)
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative
rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly afects
only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fll in the
details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defned shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Ofcial Gazette, to become efective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date specifed by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after
and based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised
Motor Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and
Trafc Code) became efective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within
Urdaneta when a member of Urdanetas Municipal Police asked him to stop.
He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S.
1964), for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintifs
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued
to him. This incident took place about 200 meters away from a school
building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal
complaint was fled in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for
violation of Ordinance 3 (S. 1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for
the annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of
Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge
Soriano was enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal case. On 29
June 1966, the Court of First Instance Lingayen held in its decision that the
ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by RA 4136. The writ of
preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano defnite and permanent. It
also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from enforcing said ordinace
throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the plaintifs drivers license,
and to pay the cost of the suit. The public ofcials appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The
ordinances validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the mother
statute (not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was
brought against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
used the phrase vehicular trafc (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not
distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks
and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
defniteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average
man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and
ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of
conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classifcation of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit requirement laid
down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one of the four
classifcations mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The classifcations
which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of Section 36
which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or
enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds
other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the
foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed decision.
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez
GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)
En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.
Facts: Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was
under the administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium
sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate. When the fertilizers
arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from
the Central in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18
November 1955 the Central fled, through the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid (the
17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore
upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed
by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt from the 17%
exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as amended by RA
1375.
On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The
Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-
examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The
Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines. On 18
January 1957, the Auditor General afrmed the ruling of the Auditor of the
Central Bank upon the ground that the importation of the fertilizers does
not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601,
as amended by RA 1375; and thus afrming the decision of the Auditor,
Central Bank of the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde fled the petition
for review in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the
exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended
by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).
Held: The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from
the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters or
farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers
exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through
their cooperatives. The word directly has been interpreted to mean
without anything intervening. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers
made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is
not imported directly as required by the exemption.
When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law
is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed
liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from
tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes
are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer.
Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers
through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would be rendering
useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers
imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.
CIR v. CA
GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)
Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-stock,
non-proft educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over
the Philippines. One auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture
(IPC), which has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of
private respondent. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science
studies of Philippine society and culture. Occasionally, it accepts
sponsorships for its research activities from international organizations,
private foundations and government agencies. On 8 July 1983, private
respondent received from Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand
letter dated 3 June 1983, assessing private respondent the sum of
P174,043.97 for alleged defciency contractors tax, and an assessment
dated 27 June 1983 in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged defciency income
tax, both for the fscal year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax
liabilities, private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and
subsequently fled with the latter a memorandum contesting the validity of
the assessments. On 17 March 988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision
canceling the assessment for defciency income tax but modifying the
assessment for defciency contractors tax by increasing the amount due to
P193,475.55. Unsatisfed, private respondent requested for a
reconsideration or reinvestigation of the modifed assessment.
At the same time, it fled in the respondent court a petition for review of the
said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition was pending before
the respondent court, petitioner issued a fnal decision dated 3 August 1988
reducing the assessment for defciency contractors tax from P193,475.55 to
P46,516.41, exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the
respondent court set aside respondents decision, and canceling the
defciency contractors tax assessment in the amount of P46,516.41
exclusive of surcharge and interest for the fscal year ended 31 March 1978.
No pronouncement as to cost. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR
SP 31790, afrmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord
with said decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a petition for
review.
Issues:
Whether the private respondent has the
burden of proof in the tax case.
Whether the private respondent is
taxable as an independent contractor.
Held: The Commissioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption
without frst applying the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in the
imposition of taxes. It is obviously both illogical and impractical to determine
who are exempted without frst determining who are covered by the aforesaid
provision. The Commissioner should have determined frst if private
respondent was covered by Section 205, applying the rule of strict
interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on the populace,
before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom, following the rule of
construction where the tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against
the taxpayer.
The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be
construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and
unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for
that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the
letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and
the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication. In case
of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the
government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not
to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly
and clearly import. In the present case, Ateneos Institute of Philippine
Culture never sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a
business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of the
university. Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically
not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or donations which are tax-exempt
as shown by private respondents compliance with the requirement of
Section 123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the
exemption of such gifts to an educational institution.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and afrmed the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the private respondent is not a
contractor selling its services for a fee but an academic institution
conducting these researches pursuant to its commitments to education and,
ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously continued
operating for so long despite its accumulation of signifcant losses, we can
only agree with both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals that
education and not proft is motive for undertaking the research projects.
Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos
GR 120082, 11 September 1996 (261 SCRA 667)
Third Division, Davide Jr. (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by
virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its creation, MCIAA enjoyed
the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with
Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October 1994, the Ofce of the
Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment of realty taxes on several
parcels of land belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such
demand for payment as baseless and unjustifed. It also asserted that it is
an instrumentality of the government performing a governmental functions,
which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. It
nonetheless stands in the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of
the national government by the very nature of its powers and functions. The
City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account, insisting
that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose tax exemption
privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), and not an instrumentality of the government but
merely a government owned corporation performing proprietary functions.
MCIAA paid its tax account under protest when City is about to issue a
warrant of levy against the MCIAAs properties.
On 29 December 1994, MCIAA fled a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the
Cebu Regional Trial Court contending that the taxing power of local
government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees on an
instrumentality of the national government. It contends that by the nature
of its powers and functions, it has the footing of an agency or
instrumentality of the national government; which claim the City rejects.
On 22 March 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition, citing that close
reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and withdrawal of tax
exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled Corporations. MCIAAs
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May
1995 order, the petitioner fled the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.
Held: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized society,
or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from
taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown
and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated,
taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the
grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the
rigid rule of construction does not apply because the practical efect of the
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled
by the government in the course of its operations. Further, since taxation is
the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this
rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material
consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is
thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is a taxable person
under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only exempted from the payment of
real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is
conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject
to all taxes, except real property tax. Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local
Government Code (LGC) expressly provides that All general and special
laws, acts, city charters, decrees [sic], executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modifed
accordingly. With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption
provided for in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the
LGC. Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
efective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and afrmed the challenged
decision and order of the RTC Cebu; without pronouncement as to costs.
Serfno v. CA
GR L-40858, 15 September 1987
Second Division, Paras (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1937, a parcel of land was patented in the name of
Pacifco Casamayor (OCT 1839). On 14 December 1945, he sold said land in
favor of Nemesia D. Balatazar (TCT No. 57-N, 18 January 1946). OCT 1839
was lost during the war and upon petition of Nemesia Baltazar, the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental ordered the reconstitution thereof.
Pursuant thereto, OCT 14-R (1839) was issued on 18 January 1946 in the
name of Pacifco Casamayor. On that same day, TCT 57-N was issued in the
name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT 14-R (1839). On
15 August 1951, Nemesia Baltazar, sold said property to Lopez Sugar
Central Mill Co., and the latter did not present the documents for
registration until 17 December 1964 to the Ofce of the Registry of Deeds.
Said ofce refused registration upon its discovery that the same property
was covered by another certifcate of title, TCT 38985, in the name of
Federico Serfno. On 19 November 1964, the spouses Serfnos mortgaged the
land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00; which was inscribed in TCT No. 38985.
The Lopez Sugar Central instituted an action to recover said land; and the
lower court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 38985;
issuance of a new TCT in the name of plaintif; and the payment of the
plaintif PNB the loan of spouses Serfnos secured by said land. Both parties
appealed from this decision of the trial court. Ruling on the assignment of
errors, the appellate court afrmed the judgment of the trial court with
modifcation in its decision setting aside the decision of the trial court
declaring plaintif liable to PNB for payment, however, ordering the plaintif
to reimburse the Serfno spouses of the sum P1,839.49, representing the
unpaid taxes and penalties paid by the latter when they repurchased the
property. Hence, the appeal by the spouses Serfno and PNB to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the auction sale of the disputed property was null and void.
Held: The assailed decision of the appellate court declares that the
prescribed procedure in auction sales of property for tax delinquency being
in derogation of property rights should be followed punctiliously. Strict
adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the
protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of
collusion between the buyer and the public ofcials called upon to enforce
such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in
general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-
fulfllment of which vitiates the sale. In the present case, Lopez Sugar
Central was not entirely negligent in its payment of land taxes. The record
shows that taxes were paid for the years 1950 to 1953 and a receipt therefor
was obtained in its name. The sale therefore by the Province of Negros
Occidental of the land in dispute to the spouses Serfnos was void since the
Province of Negros Occidental was not the real owner of the property thus
sold. In turn, the spouses Serfnos title which has been derived from that of
the Province of Negros Occidental is likewise void. However, the fact that the
public auction sale of the disputed property was not valid cannot in any way
be attributed to the mortgagees fault. The inability of the Register of Deeds
to notify the actual owner or Lopez Sugar Central of the scheduled public
auction sale was partly due to the failure of Lopez Sugar Central to declare
the land in its name for a number of years and to pay the complete taxes
thereon. PNB is therefore entitled to the payment of the mortgage loan as
ruled by the trial court and exempted from the payment of costs.
The Supreme Court afrmed the assailed decision, with modifcation that
PNB mortgage credit must be paid by Lopez Sugar Central.
Manahan v. ECC
GR L-44899, 22 April 1981 (104 SCRA 198)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: Maria E. Manahan, the petitioner, is the widow of Nazario Manahan,
Jr., who died of Enteric Fever while employed as classroom teacher in Las
Pias Municipal High School, Las Pias, Rizal, on 8 May, 1975. The
deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on 20
July 1969, and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated
for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975. Thus, the
petitioner fled a claim with the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) for death beneft under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated 19
June 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a fnding that the ailment of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease, and
that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in efect to typhoid fever, in the
sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.
The petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which afrmed the decision of the GSIS on a fnding that the ailment of the
deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of
the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. Thus, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Workmens Compensation should be resolved in favor of
the worker
Held: The Transitory and Final Provisions of the New Labor Code provides
that all actions and claims accruing prior to the efectivity of this Code shall
be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their
accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II (Prescription of
Ofenses and Claims), workmens compensation claims accruing prior to the
efectivity of this Code and during the period from 1 November 1974 up to
31 December 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with
the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued Hence, this
Court applied the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, as
amended, on passing upon petitioners claim.. The illness that claimed the
life of the deceased may had its onset before 10 December 1974, thus, his
action accrued before 10 December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of
doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social
legislations like the Workmens Compensation Act and the Labor Code
should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give
relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former
should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now
the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act in this case, the
presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS
to pay the petitioner the amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation
beneft and P600.00 as attorneys fees, to reimburse the petitioners
expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the
deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts, and to
pay administrative fees.
Villavert v. ECC
GR L-48605, 14 December 1981 (110 SCRA 233)
First Division, Fernandez (p): 4 concurring
Facts: Domina N. Villavert, the petitioner, is the mother of the late Marcelino
N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis on 12 December
1975 employed as a Code Verifer in the Philippine Constabulary. The
deceased also performed the duties of a computer operator and clerk typist.
On 11 December 1975, the deceased reported as usual to the Constabulary
Computer Center in Camp Crame. He performed his duties not only as Code
Verifer but also handled administrative functions, computer operation and
typing jobs due to shortage of civilian personnel. Although he was
complaining of chest pain and headache late in the afternoon of said day, he
was required to render overtime service until late in the day, typing
voluminous classifed communications, computing allowances and
preparing checks for the salary of PC-INP personnel throughout the country
for distribution on or before 15 December 1975. Gasping for breath,
perspiring profusely, and mumbling incoherent words while asleep, and
when he was not able to regain consciousness, he was rushed to the
University of the East-Ramon Magsaysay (UERM) Memorial Hospital where
he died at 5:30 am. The NBI stated that the exact cause of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown, although most research data
agree that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the
development of the disease.
On 18 March 1976, she fled a claim for income benefts for the death of her
son under PD 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). GSIS denied the claim on the ground that acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease and that the
petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the
fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The
petitioner appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). On
31 May 1978, the ECC afrmed the decision of GSIS denying the claim.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefts.
Held: The Medico Legal Ofcer of the NBI stated that the exact cause of
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis (acute infammation with hemorrhagic
necrosis of the pancreas) is still unknown despite extensive researches in
this feld, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental
stresses are strong causal factors in the development of the disease. There is
no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a bout of alcoholic
intoxication shortly before he died, neither is there a showing that he used
drugs; negating the association provided by Principles of Internal Medicine
(by Harrison 7th Edition, p. 1571). From the foregoing facts of record, it is
clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis
which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed
as code verifer, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine
Constabulary. Further, Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the ECC and ordered the GSIS
to pay the petitioner death benefts in the amount of P6,000.00.
Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRC
GR L-64204, 31 May 1985 (135 SCRA 669)
First Division, Melencio-Herrera (p): 5 concurring, 1 on leave
Facts: On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.
entered into a Contract of Services with Calmar Security Agency whereby
the latter undertook to supply the former with security guards at the rate of
P300.00 per month for each guard. Thereafter, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo
Borata and Silvino Tudio fled a Complaint against the Security Agency and
petitioner, for underpayment of salary, non-payment of living allowance, and
13th month pay. Thereafter, fve other guards fled their complaint for the
same causes of action. Petitioner contended that complainants have no
cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship
between them. They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy
of the amounts paid to it under the Contract of Services, it could not
possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws.
Assigned for compulsory arbitration, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint for want of employer-employee relationship. When
the case was appealed to the NLRC, the decision was modifed by holding
that petitioner is liable to pay complainants, jointly and severally, with the
Security Agency on the ground that the petitioner is an indirect employer
pursuant to Articles 106 and 107. Hence, the appeal. The petitioner
contended that NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the
fact that it was not under oath and the required appeal fee was not paid; in
holding it jointly and severally liable with the Security Agency; and in
refusing to give due course to its Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue(s):
Whether the formal defects of the
appeal of the security agency invalidate
the appeal.
Whether the security guards from the
agency are entitled to benefts claimed
from the company
Held: The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal
defects. The lack of verifcation could have been easily corrected by requiring
an oath. The appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed. Failure to
pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and discretion
must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to
substantial justice. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power
must be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of
circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances. Moreover, as
provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor
Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that in the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the
work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he
is liable to employees directly employed by him, and Article 107 provides
that the provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of
any work, task, job or project. In the case at bar, petitioner became an
indirect employer of respondents-complainants when petitioner entered into
a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired the
complainants to work as guards for the former. However, the petitioners
liability should be without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement against
the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to
complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming
that petitioners payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is
charged with knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation
that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
others.
The Supreme Court afrmed the judgment under review, without prejudice
to petitioners right to seek reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for
such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. Costs against
the private respondent.
Ty v. First National Surety
GR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)
En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring
Facts: At diferent times within a period of two months prior to 24
December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in
the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance
companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which
issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintifs benefciary was his
employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums.
On 24 December 1953, a fre broke out which totally destroyed the
Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintif was
injured on the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila
Central University hospital, and after receiving frst-aid, he went to the
National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in
index, middle, fourth, and ffth fngers of left hand). From 26 December
1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment in the hospital.
The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability
of plaintifs left hand. Plaintif fled the corresponding notice of accident and
notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity.
Defendants rejected plaintifs claim for indemnity for the reason that there
being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability sufered by
him was not covered by his policy.
Plaintif sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which
dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintif appealed to the Court of
First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which
absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance
policy for the disability of his left hand.
Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between
the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specifc that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the
case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between
temporary disability and total disability need not be made in relation to
ones occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that
common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or
renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the
plaintif or his employer, for whose beneft the policies were issued, it can
not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all
of which defne partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation
through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case
at bar.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed decision, with costs against the
plaintif-appellant.
De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance
GR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring
Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy.
In connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-
professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout
with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight
and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of
the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope
of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death reported as
hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the
policy on the ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was
not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and benefciary under the policy,
fled a claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under
the insurance policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI
Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specifc performance. Defendant
insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his
participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not
covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision in
favor of the plaintif; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintif
for the death of the latters son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorneys
fees. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.
Held: The terms accident and accidental have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously,
without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without ones foresight
or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual efect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no
accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional,
unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces
or brings about the result of injury or death. Where the death or injury is
not the natural or probable result of the insureds voluntary act, which
produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies
insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present case,
while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, if
without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not
have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death
or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not
declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract (What was
included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging
in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any
kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant insurance
company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports
among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not
intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed decision, with costs against
appellant.
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance
GR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)
First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.
Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4
warehouses in Tabaco, Albay used for the storage of stocks of copra and of
hemp in which he dealt extensively. They had been, with their contents,
insured with the Insurance Company since 1937, and the lose made payable
to the Philippine National Bank as mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the
extent of its interest. On 21 July 1940, fre of undetermined origin that
broke out and lasted almost one week, gutted and completely destroyed
Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the merchandise stored therein. Plaintif-
appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the same date. The insurance
Company resisted payment, claiming violation of warranties and conditions,
fling of fraudulent claims, and that the fre had been deliberately caused by
the insured or by other persons in connivance with him. Qua Chee Gan, his
brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were indicted and tried in
1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial court in a fnal
decision on 9 July 1941.
With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940 with the
Court of First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain
fre insurance policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd., through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon
certain bodegas and merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21
June 1940. The records of the original case were destroyed during the
liberation of the region, and were reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that
lasted several years, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of the plaintif,
ordering the insurance company to pay Qua Chee Gan the sum of
P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000 (2nd), P5,000 (3rd), P15,000
(4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per annum in
accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26 September
1940, until each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed
the complaint in intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fre
insurance policy prohibited the storage in the premises of oils (animal
and/or vegetable and/or mineral and their liquid products having a fash
point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a fash point below
300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.
Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of
claims under the insurance policy.
Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of
oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products
having a fash point below 300 Fahrenheit, and is decidedly ambiguous
and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, Oils mean lubricants and not
gasoline or kerosene. By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance
company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity
must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured,
specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no reason why the prohibition of
keeping gasoline in the premises could not be expressed clearly and
unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public can readily
understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the company
intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been
plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of
infammable oils on the premises, though prohibited by the policy, does not
void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to the
weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions against
keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not be
avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles are
necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business
conducted on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in
the burned bodegas, and that Bodega No. 2 which was not burned and
where the gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured
bodegas.
The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment appealed
from, thus afrming it; with costs against the appellant.
Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines
GR L-34382, 20 July 1983 (123 SCRA 425)
First division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 2 on leave.
Facts: On 13 January 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS Eastern
Jupiter from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire
Rods. The vessel is owned and operated by Eastern Shipping Lines. The
shipment was insured with Home Insurance against all risks in the amount
of P1,580,105.06. 53 of the 2361 coils discharged from the vessel were in
bad order. The Consignee ultimately received the 2,361 coils with 73 coils
loose and partly cut, and 28 coils and partly cut, which had to be
considered as scrap. The weight also had a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kgs,
or 1,209.56 lbs. For the loss/damage sufered by the cargo, Home Insurance
paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by
virtue of which Home Insurance became subrogated to the rights and
actions of the Phelps Dodge. Home Insurance made demands for payment
against Eastern Shipping and the transportation company for
reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same.
(A case Home insurance v. NV Nedlloyd Lijnen consolidated with this case
is of the same nature).
Filing its cases in court, Home Insurance avers that it is a foreign insurance
company authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent,
Victor Bello (who holds ofce at Makati) in both cases. In L-34382, Eastern
Shipping Lines denies the allegation of plaintifs capacity to sue for lack of
knowledge or information sufcient to form a belief as to the truth thereof,
while Angel Jose Transportation admits the allegation. In L-34383, NV
Nedlloyd Lijnen, Columbian Philippines, and Guacods denied plaintifs
capacity to sue. The court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the
same ground, that the plaintif failed to prove its capacity to sue, even if the
petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its
insurance business in the Philippines during the fling of the case. Hence,
the petition.
Issue: Whether a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
initially without a license can claim indemnity through Philippine Courts.
Held: The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable,
not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development
of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among
countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade,
unlike if the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help
in the development of trade. The law simply means that no foreign
corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippine
Islands, as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the
license required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be
permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary holding would
bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be
and can be easily avoided. In the present case, the lack of capacity at the
time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the subsequent
registration. Such is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these
cases.The petitioner sufciently alleged its capacity to sue when it averred in
its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to
do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that
its ofce address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati; as
required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. General denials
inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the
light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. Nevertheless,
even if the plaintifs lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an
issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that
it had the authority to engage in the insurance business at the time it fled
the complaints.
The Supreme Court consolidated and granted the petitions, reversed and set
aside the CFI decisions. In L-34382 (Civil Case 71923), Eastern Shipping
Lines and Angel Jose Transportation Inc. are ordered to pay the Home
Insurance Company the sum of P1,630.22 each with interest at the legal
rate from 5 January 1968 until fully paid. Each shall also pay one-half of
the costs. The Court dismissed the counterclaim of Angel Jose
Transportation Inc. In L-34383, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen or its agent Columbian
Phil. Inc. was ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with
interest at the legal rate from 1 February 1968 until fully paid, the sum of
P500.00 attorneys fees, and costs. The Court dismissed the complaint
against Guacods, Inc.
Co v. Republic
GR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)
First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring
Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He
owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to
Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of
Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog
dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and fnished his
primary studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both schools being recognized
by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been
accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization.
He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never
gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant
dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in
Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00
which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to
civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to
town festas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in
the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have
earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which
he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of
less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a
co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a
salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the
same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been
delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not fle his
income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than
P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco
business.
Petitioner fled his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing,
the court ordered that a certifcate of naturalization be issued to petitioner
after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes fnal and all
the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision
of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the
Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he
believes in, he answered democracy.; that he stated that his father had
already fled his income tax return, when asked why he did not fle his
income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certifcate of
registration, but not the alien certifcates of registration of his wife and child.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed
by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.
Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not
necessarily include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the
land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution.
Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so stating
that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the
belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufcient
to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the
principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show
that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with
the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Actl; and
further failed to fle his income tax return despite his fxed salary of
P1,440.00 a year and his proft of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and
received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the
proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is
required by law for one to fle an income tax return.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court
erred in granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic
GR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring
Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of
Chinese parents. He came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921
and was given the corresponding alien certifcate of residence and
registration. He settled in Cebu City (where he as continuously resided up
to the present time). Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese
High School, a private institution recognized by the government. He speaks
and writes English and the Cebu dialect. He, having associated with some
Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the
lumber business (1946-present). He invested P5,000.00 capital in the
business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00.
Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a proft
share worth P10,000.00 every year. He has no tax liability to the
government. He possesses all the qualifcations and none of the
disqualifcations prescribed by law. As to his family, he married one Sy Siok
Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the
Cebu City. All these children had been issued the corresponding alien
certifcate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a
naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the exception of
William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and
Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at
present studying in private schools and colleges recognized by the
government.
Lee Cho fled a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First
Iinstance of Cebu. On 30 August 1956, the court rendered decision fnding
petitioner qualifed to be a Filipino citizen. On 2 October 1957, however, the
government fled a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which if presented may afect the qualifcation of petitioner, and
fnding the same well founded, the court entertained the motion. After
hearing, the court again rendered decision reafrming its holding that
petitioner is qualifed to become a Filipino citizen. The government
interposed an appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for
naturalization.
Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed
in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulflled. In
the present case, the petitioner has not fled any declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously
in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by
the government. Angelita Lee has only reached grade fve and no explanation
was given why no secondary education was aforded her. Lourdes Lee has
studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped
allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however,
that she continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly
Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the
sincerity of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were
proper he should not have tolerated such deviation from the educational
requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to become a
Filipino citizen.
The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs
against petitioner.
Guerrero v. CA
GR L-44570, 30 May 1986 (142 SCRA 136)
Second Division, Gutierrez (p): 4 concurring, 1 taking no part.
Facts: On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy
and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. In 1969, Apolinario
Benitez was taken by Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60
heads of cows which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut
plantation situated at the Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Benitez was
allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and
his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean
the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to
do such other similar chores. Harvest time which usually comes every 3
months. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds
from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the
cows he was paid P500 a year.
On 10 September 1971, RA 6389 amending RA 3844 declared share tenancy
relationships as contrary to public policy. Sometime in the early part of
1973, Benitez was refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-hectare
portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he used to
gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the
matter to the attention of the Ofce of Special Unit in the Ofce of the
President in Malacaang, Manila. This led to an execution of an agreement
whereby defendants agreed to let plaintif work on the 16-hectare portion of
the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided
by the provisions of RA 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines).
In July 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to
gather fruits therefrom. The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino Latigay
to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing thereof into copra.
Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the cottage
where Benitez and his family lived, thus, making the Benitez feel that they
meant business. Hence, the case for reinstatement with damages.
Issue: Whether Benitez is a tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law to
warrant reinstatement to the plantation
Held: Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere
agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law,
a tenant being one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or
tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired
laborer who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time, is more consistent with
that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law.
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of
tenancy relationships. Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing
or harrowing of the land but also includes the promotion of growth and the
care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the
earth by general industry. Agreement to share the produce or harvest on a
tercio basis that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the landowners
bolsters the tenancy claim. The agricultural laborer works for the employer,
and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the
employer makes a proft. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in
the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount
of harvest. Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the
right to continue working until such relationship is extinguished according
to law. In the present case, besides these indications, the agreement made
on 2 May 1973 is clear and categorical term that the Benitez is a tenant.
Arguing that the intent was diferent, being that of a hired farmhand, the
law existing at that time the agreement was made militate against the claim.
Benitez did not commit any of the causes that would warrant his ejectment,
and thus, was unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the
Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of
respondent as tenant and granting him damages therefor.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and afrmed
the CA decision. No costs.
Bello v. CA
GR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)
En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.
Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged
for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated
a ladys ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were
convicted. Petitioners fled their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay City, but the prosecution fled a
petition to dismiss appeal on the ground that since the case was within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the
city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary
Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. The CFI per its order of 29 October
1971 did fnd that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court
of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the
records to the city court for execution of judgment. Thereafter, the City
court denied petitioners motion for having been erroneously addressed to
this court instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners predicament that the
CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their
appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to
execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then fled on 14 January 1972 their petition for
prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the People
and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objection
whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two
apparently conficting or clashing principles of law, i.e.. fnality of judicial
decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however,
dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after fnding that the city
courts judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the
CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent
powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that
since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party respondent it
could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can
be said to deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration
denied, petitioners fled the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is
indispensable and the procedural infrmity of misdirecting the appeal to
Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees cause
Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly
interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of
the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a
deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity and therefore a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.
Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more
so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and
unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance
are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals
timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.
The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of
dismissal was not indispensable and could be overlooked in the interest of
speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals act of dismissing the petition
and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was
tantamount to sacrifcing substance to form and to subordinating
substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The
procedural infrmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather
than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the
CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals
as the proper court, should not be over-magnifed as to totally deprive them
of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in
lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition
against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction
against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to
elevate petitioners appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latters
disposition on the merits; without costs.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil
First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands,
therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement, specifcally for the purpose of extending
Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation,
contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public
character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of
the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all
liability under the complaint, without any fnding as to costs. From the
judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the
City of Manila
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the
State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes
with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only fnd (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, fnds that neither of these conditions exists
or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the
right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that
cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the
general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a
small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a
emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground
can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this
immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held
in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery
in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact,
in the general acceptation of the defnition of a public cemetery, would make
the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the
petition of the plaintif must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila
has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But,
whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation
for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those
specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question
of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such
purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists
therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other
ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the trafc situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening
the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been ofered to the city free of charge, which answers
every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, afrmed the judgment
of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.
Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR L-54718, 4 December 1985
En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave
Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for fling of certifcates of candidacy,
one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. fled his sworn certifcate of candidacy as
independent for the ofce of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30
January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza fled an
unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certifcate of
candidacy for personal reasons. His unsworn withdrawal had been
accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25
January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his
companion Mendozas withdrawal, fled his own sworn Certifcate of
Candidacy in substitution of Mendozas for the said ofce of vice mayor as a
one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear
winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray
votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Ofcers opinion that petitioners
name does not appear in the certifed list of candidates. The canvassers
accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed
candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.
On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating
that Mendozas withdrawal was not under oath as required by Section 27 of
the 1978 Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last
day for fling of certifcate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but
on the same day.
Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election
of Villanueva as vice mayor.
Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute
candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualifcation up to mid-day of
the very day of the elections. Mendozas withdrawal was fled on the last
hour of the last day for regular fling of candidacies, which he had fled
earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should
therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after
the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the
Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should
not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The
will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certifcate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory
and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact
that the candidate has not sworn to his certifcate or candidacy. The legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely
directory and Mendozas failure to observe the requirement should be
considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fdes of petitioner Villanueva as
a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his
favor must be counted.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned
Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-
mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected
vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said ofce,
take the oath of ofce and discharge its functions. The resolution is made
immediately executory.
In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner
GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring
Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without
children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain
its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao,
province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree
instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona
Omboy. After confrming the contents of the testament, she requested
Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the
second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark
between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental
witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the
second page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed
witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on
the left margin or any part of the frst page of the testament, composed of
two pages. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the
acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left
margin of the frst and second page, in the presence of the testator,
Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was
executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced
and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue
infuence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying
good health. On 22 February 1957, the testator died in here house in
Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament,
Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada
Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the
last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition
on the ground that the left hand margin of the frst page of the will does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling.
The Court of Appeals certifed the case to the Supreme Court because it
involves purely a question of law.
Issue: Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the frst page is
fatal to render the will void
Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with
the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case,
the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three
testimonial witnesses testifed and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be
sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the
will sufers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the
testatrix on its frst page even if it bears the signature of the three
instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore
cannot be admitted to probate.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR L-28771, 31 March 1971 (38 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation
inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as
husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on
28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia
Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,
questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation
between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.
She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance
taxes thereon on virtue of an afdavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the
donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between
live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and
his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
infuence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is
as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower
court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of
plaintif and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)
remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Santayana
GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)
Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated
to sit in 2nd division
Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed
as Special Agent by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9
March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certifcation to the efect
that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his
appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and
possess the same in the performance of his ofcial duty and for his personal
protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in
possession of the frearms and ammunition without a license to possess
them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding
complaint was fled against the accused. The case underwent trial after
which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was
appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of
frearms
Held: The appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufciently puts him within the category of a peace ofcer equivalent even to
a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v.
Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret
agent with the authority to carry and possess frearms. He was issued a
frearm in the performance of his ofcial duties and for his personal
protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col.
Maristela, as the frearm is government property. No permit was issued,
according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS
agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the
Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the
accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at
the time of appellants appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal
liability for possession of the pistol in question.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana,
canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de ofcio.
People v. Estenzo
GR L-35376, 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur
Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot
4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. Respondent Aotes
fled on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral
Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. Aotes
claim that since the time limit for fling applications for free patents and
applications for judicial confrmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have
been extended up to 31 December 1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is
also extended until 31 December 1980. The judge denied the opposition for
lack of sufcient merit on 9 May 1972, and rendered decision on 22 July
1972 after due hearing, declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating
said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of each.
Dissatisfed with the decision of the lower court, petitioners fled the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-
opening of Cadastral Proceedings.
Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express
mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of
others not expressly mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative
intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for
applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the
same way that it provided the extension of time to fle applications for free
patent and for judicial confrmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The
intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands
which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to
RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so
included in RA 6236. Thus, RA 6236, the very law on which Aotes bases his
petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for
respondents contention. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fxed the time to
reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968,
no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit
for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public
land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension as provided for
by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the
earlier law, RA2061, expressly did. Truly, the extension provided for by RA
6236 applies only to the fling of applications for free patent and for judicial
confrmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of
cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely diferent
from fling an application for a free patent or for judicial confrmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent
Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral
Court; without pronouncement as to costs.
Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p): 7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate
opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner
Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner
impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech.
Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
nature), fashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin. It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner
is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifcally referred to. It is quite apparent that what was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred
to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution. The Constitutional Convention Act
contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, fashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and
cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like.). Taped jingles
therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind
the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently
restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without
pronouncement as to costs.
People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information fled by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was
charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A
preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the fnding of a
probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace,
the defendant is not one of the ofcers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss,
holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A
second motion was fled by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was
held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings,
the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by
the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only
if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of
the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the
term judge includes all ofcers appointed to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors,
it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not
exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously
made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature
has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including
therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges
of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court
and remanded the case for trial on the merits.
Lopez vs. CTA
GR L-9274, 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 10 concur
Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding
customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released.
Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost
and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment,
additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal,
fled by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax
Court, by its resolution of 23 May 1955, dismissed the appeal on the
ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of RA 1125, creating said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme
Court, seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly
appealable to the Court of Tax Appeal.
Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifcally provides that the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Act in
lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions
among others, those afected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. While there is
really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is more reasonable and
logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant and
intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of Collector of
Customs. If persons afected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may
appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control
of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, under the
Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the
persons afected by said decision would, not only be gravely afected but
even destroyed. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation
but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the
wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident
intention of the legislature.
The Supreme Court afrmed the appealed order, holding that under the
Customs Law and RA 1125, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal
decision of the Collector of Customs; with costs.
Sanciangco v. Rono
GR L-68709, 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___)
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1
took no part
Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Ozamiz City, in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by
the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as
a member of the Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod. On 27 March 1984,
petitioner fled his Certifcate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the
Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. Invoking
Section 13(2), Article 5 of BP 697, petitioner informed Vice-Mayor Benjamin
A. Fuentes, Presiding Ofcer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was
resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to the
Minister of Local Government Jose A. Roo, who ruled that since petitioner
is an appointive ofcial, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive
position upon the fling of his Certifcate of Candidacy.
Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latters fling of
a certifcate of candidacy for the Batasan.
Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2), Batas Pambansa 697, admits
of more than one construction, taking into sconsideration the nature of the
positions of the ofcials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors,
members of the various sanggunians or barangay ofcials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as
contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-
encompassing clause reading any person holding public appointive ofce or
position, is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the
language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one
construction, that construction which gives efect to the evident purpose
and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole,
must be followed. A statutes clauses and phrases should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fxing the meaning of any of its parts. The legislative
intent to cover public appointive ofcials in subsection (1), and ofcials
mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local
elective ofcials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan
Pambansa. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, as he was appointed by the
President as a member of the Citys Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of
his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils,
he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he fled his
certifcate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for,
holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
ofcials; without costs.
Capati v. Ocampo [GR L-28742, 30 April 1982]
Second Division, Escolin (p): 4 concur, 2 on leave.
Facts: Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga was the contractor of
the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur.
On 23 May 1967, Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Jesus
Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration of the
amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls
and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifcations
indicated therein. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said
construction on or before 5 June 1967. Ocampo, however, was only able to
fnish the construction on 20 June 1967.
Due to the delay, Capati fled in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85,000.00 with
interest, plus attorneys fees and costs. Ocampo fled a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The
motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract
which provides that all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may
be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. The lowe court dismissed the
complaint. Hence the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order, and ordered the return of
the records to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against
defendant-appellee Ocampo.
1. Where personal actions may be fled
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in
Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such actions
may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintif or any of the plaintifs
resides, at the election of the plaintif. Said section is qualifed by Section 3
of the same rule, providing that by written agreement of the parties the
venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another.
2. May only permissive
The word may is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term may be connotes
possibility; it does not connote certainty. May is an auxillary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. In the case at bar,
the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive.
By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to fle their suits solely and
exclusively with the CFI Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes
to the said court, without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court
specifcally indicated in Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See
related case in Nicolas v. Reparations Commission: May is not mandatory).
Since the complaint has been fled in the CFI Pampanga, where the plaintif
resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b),
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur
Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952
at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. She was registered at
the Local Civil Registrars Ofce as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila.
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs.
Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector
Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling, she used the name Estrella S.
Alfon. She attended her frst grade up to fourth year high school at Stella
Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high
school she enrolled at the Arellano University and fnished Bachelor of
Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show
that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has
exercised her right of sufrage under the same name. She has not committed
any felony or misdemeanor.
She fled a verifed petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be
changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioners prayer on 29 December
1978, granting the change of frst name but not the surname.
The Supreme Court modifed the appealed order in as much as that
petitioner is allowed to change not only her frst name but also her surname
so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without costs.
1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively
The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not
equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it
is equally entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that
as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should
principally use the surname of her father.
2. Grounds for change of name
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable
causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difcult
to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1
Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v.
Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of name should
be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon
since childhood.
Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985]
Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of fve (5) counts of
estafa committed on diferent dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524,
525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was
rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of
17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months
and ffteen 15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court afrmed the decision of the
lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for
execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was
opposed by a probation ofcer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is
disqualifed for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law
(i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by fnal
judgment of an ofense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month
and 1 day and/or a fne of not less than P200). The court denied the
application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due
course to the petitioners application for probation; without costs.
1. Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission
of a crime
The statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the
commission of the crime. When the accused applied for probation he had no
previous conviction by fnal judgment. When he applied for probation the
only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his
application. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the
crime.