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SENATE
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
Section 5.
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member
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of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
TERM AND TENURE
Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately
following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary
of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he
did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives,
as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7,
Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He
asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to
these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.

ISSUE:
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1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE
ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this
chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987)
on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the
people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost
loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of
Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
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constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was
their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P.
Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate
of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty
on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to
obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and
benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose
and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner
seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than
the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio
Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]



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NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep.
Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section
67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
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facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as
they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have
been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of
their respective certificates of candidacy.


ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.



HELD:

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To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one
title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that
had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that
the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether
an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised
in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by
the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on
its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest
and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.

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Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately
upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this
Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do
not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative
power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of
R.A. 9369.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court
upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum
since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as
ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state
interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
QUALIFICATIONS

Pundaodaya versus- Comelec & Noble, G.R.179313, Sept.17, 2009
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Facts:Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.Pundaodaya filed a petition for
disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residencyqualification. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble
is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred thathe is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and
disqualified Noble from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime,
he garnered the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to AnnulProcla
mation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noblequalified to run for
the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue: Should residence and domicile be construed as referring to dwelling? Did Noble effectively change his
domicile?
Held:The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. Toestablish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of thatintention. It
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make itones fixed and
permanent place of abode.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term residence is to be understood not in
itscommon acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is,the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may befound
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

VILANDO VS HRET GR NO 192147
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010
Decision
[1]
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and
declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its Resolution
[2]
dated May 17, 2010, denying
the motion for reconsideration.


In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the
basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062
[3]
issued on May 18, 2007.
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On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis
Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);
[4]
Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);
[5]
and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-
41).
[6]
These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos.
178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against
her.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of
the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by
way of a petition for Quo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against
Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and
ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time
of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs
citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res
judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.

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On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member
of the House of Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:

By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that
respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of the
First District, Negros Oriental. This being so, their petitions must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and declares
that respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sent
to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, the
Commission on Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Chairman,
Commission on Elections, for his information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
[7]


The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its
Resolution dated May 17, 2010.

Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following

GROUNDS:

THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO
AND THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY
BECAUSE:


1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONGS FATHER
FOR THE REASON THAT HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION
IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE
IS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.

2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HER
MOTHER GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOT
ALREADY A FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER
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FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 63 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED
NATIONALITY LAW OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959.

3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY
OF LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN
LOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.
[8]


It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental
from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has
been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no
longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.
[9]
Thus, the petition may
be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered
this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
[10]


Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be
questioned at anytime.
[11]
For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This
position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
[12]
The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again,
as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that
Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.
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In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To
prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which,
however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
[13]

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong v. Comelec,
[14]
thus:
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,
[15]
where the Court of First Instance judge motu
propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of
certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their
certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the
proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or
otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to
inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in
accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act
No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by
the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In
other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after
previous investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the
plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the
certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility
on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is
likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
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Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.
[16]
The
power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature.
[17]
Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.
[18]


Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to
delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise
would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The
HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondent
in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization of
the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because its
jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sitting
Member of the Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedings
for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warranto is
not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not
only be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a
blatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not
parties in this case.
[19]


Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally
not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.
[20]
Under
the present situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face:
As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959
that were offered in evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance and certificate of
naturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for the
conferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary
declaration by a competent court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9,
1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance and
certificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization.
[21]

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The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21,
1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a
naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that
she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a
Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus,
correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the
requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4, Section
1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.

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Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be
considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a
natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a
young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was
elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of
Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is
manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had
informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution
considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the
1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2,
Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected,
was not conferred natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV]
of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born
Filipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:


Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
[22]



Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter
became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No.
63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise
fail.
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As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the
alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine
citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a
reversal of the HRET ruling.

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship. It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a
Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and
contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and
physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor
proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for
registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under
the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much
less like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of
registration is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts
contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to
registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so
where the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her
status as such.
[23]


Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original
citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has
consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting
renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
[24]
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must
be express.
[25]
Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.


Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only
instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a
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determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
[26]
In this case, there is no showing of any
such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo
warranto petition.


In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the
HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the
First District, Negros Oriental.

LIMBONA VS COMELEC GR NO 186006
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, assailing the
Resolution
[1]
dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the
Resolution
[2]
of the Comelec En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband, Mohammad
Exchan Limbona, each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. On April 2, 2007,
private respondent Malik Bobby Alingan filed a disqualification case against Mohammad before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte. On April 12, 2007, Alingan also filed a petition for disqualification against
petitioner.
[3]
Both disqualification cases were premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband lacked the one-
year residency requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar.
[4]


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On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy,
[5]
which was
subsequently approved by the Comelec.
[6]
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss the disqualification case against
her for being moot and academic.
[7]


On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the elections in Pantar because there
was no final list of voters yet. A special election was scheduled for July 23, 2007.
[8]


On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Mohammad as
candidate for mayor for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement.
[9]
Petitioner then filed her
Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21, 2007. On July 23, 2007, Alingan filed a petition for
disqualification against petitioner for, among others, lacking the one-year residency requirement (SPA No. 07-621).
[10]


In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-621
[11]
dated November 23, 2007, the Comelec Second Division ruled that
petitioner was disqualified from running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held that petitioner only became a resident
of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that petitioners domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her
birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident of Barangay Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband
was Barangay Chairman until November 2006. BarangayRapasun, the Comelec said, was petitioners domicile by
operation of law under the Family Code. The Comelec found that the evidence petitioner adduced to prove that she
has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the elections consisted mainly
of self-serving affidavits and were not corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Comelec also took
note of its resolution in another case where it was found that petitioner was not even a registered voter in Pantar.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
[12]


The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2009,
[13]
affirming the
Second Divisions Resolution disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said that the issue of whether petitioner has
complied with the one-year residency rule has been decided by the Supreme Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v.
Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan promulgated on June 25, 2008. The Comelec noted that, in
said case, the Supreme Court upheld the Comelec First Divisions Decision in SPA No. 07-611 disqualifying
petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for failure to comply with the residency requirement.
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Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the Comelecs November 23, 2007 and January 14, 2009
Resolutions. She posits that the Comelec erred in disqualifying her for failure to comply with the one-year residency
requirement. She alleges that in a disqualification case against her husband filed by Nasser Macauyag, another
mayoralty candidate, the Comelec considered her husband as a resident of Pantar and qualified to run for any
elective office there. Petitioner avers that since her husband was qualified to run in Pantar, she is likewise qualified to
run.
[14]


Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically present in that municipality for
almost two years prior to the May 2007 elections. During the time she had been residing in Pantar, she associated
and mingled with residents there, giving her ample time to know the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and economic
potential of the municipality. This, she said, is proof of her intention to establish permanent residency there and her
intent to abandon her domicile in Marawi City.

She next argues that, even as her husband was Punong Barangay of Rapasun, Marawi City, he never
abandoned Pantar as his hometown and domicile of origin. She avers that the performance of her husbands duty in
Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having his domicile elsewhere. Hence, it was incorrect for the Comelec to
have concluded that her husband changed his domicile only on November 11, 2006.
[15]
At the very least, petitioner
says, the Comelecs conflicting resolutions on the issue of her husbands residence should create a doubt that should
be resolved in her and her husbands favor.
[16]


She further contends that to disqualify her would disenfranchise the voters of Pantar, the overwhelming
majority of whom elected her as mayor during the July 23, 2007 special elections.
[17]


The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment, insisting that the Comelec
correctly disqualified petitioner from running as mayor for lack of the one-year residency requirement.
[18]
The OSG
argues that there is no evidence that petitioner has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile
in Marawi City.
[19]
Moreover, the OSG said that this Court has ruled on the issue of petitioners residency in Norlainie
Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan.
[20]
Lastly, the OSG contends that the
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Comelecs ruling in Nasser A. Macauyag v. Mohammad Limbona is not binding on petitioner because she was not a
party to the case.
[21]


We dismiss the Petition.

The issue of petitioners disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been
resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan.
[22]
This
case stemmed from the first disqualification case filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the
Comelec resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and
was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar.


A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007
Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the
January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of the
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as
Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is orderedLIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
[23]



The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It held:

The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile,
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing a
residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community.

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is
no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides. Three rules are,
however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
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somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third,
a man can have but one domicile at a time.

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established.

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for
almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed
by the Comelec:

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which
consists merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has
abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that
respondent has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house for
more than 20 months in Lower Kalangananand yet, there is no independent and
competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention
to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of
Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen
Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-
611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the
said municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao
del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of
marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband,
effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11,
2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it
follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case
of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption
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shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis ours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from
her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the
Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.

Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run
for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x.
[24]


Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was denied with finality on March 3,
2009.
[25]
Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration,
[26]
which the Court treated as a Second Motion for
Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 2009.
[27]
Of late, petitioner has filed a
Manifestation that raises yet again the issues already resolved in the petition and which the Court has, accordingly,
merely noted without action.
[28]
Thus, our ruling therein has now attained finality.

Consequently, the issue of petitioners compliance with the one-year residency requirement is now settled.
We are bound by this Courts ruling in the earlier Limbona case where the issue was squarely raised and
categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this case, especially since the present Petition
merely restates issues already passed upon by the Comelec and affirmed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the Resolution dated
November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621 are AFFIRMED.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary
of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.
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On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of theProvince of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for
candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of
11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of
effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC.
Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his
COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

APPORTIONMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC

In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de Oro. It
increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. In the next election, Cagayan de Oros voters would
be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The
constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13 March 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking
for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that 1.)
Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 2.) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
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common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the
entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only
allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily
denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and
5.) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro
City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not it violates the
equality of representation doctrine.
HELD: Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is
merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in
the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The
fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in
the Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the
halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling
its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further contends that
RA 9371 violates the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district has a higher number of voters
as compared to the other and that one is urbanized the other is rural. This is the clarification; the law clearly
provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the
number of registered voters therein
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Mariano vs Comelec
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
Facts:
Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati as unconstitutional.
They contend that section 51 collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution where
elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51
favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive
terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said
section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
Issue:
Whether petitioners arguments are tenable for litigation

Held:
No. The court dismissed the petitions.
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The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.


Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected
in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
Aquino v COMELEC G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.
07/17/2010
0 Comments

Facts: On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that
the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the
1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995
elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of
candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution
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dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads: respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him
ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution
with the COMELEC en banc.

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend
Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's
Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive
portion of the order reads: hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of
Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of
votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the Commission.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent
Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among
others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged
exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on
June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Commission
RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion,
and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be
studied with more reflection and judiciousness.

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second
Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows: Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and
thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in
the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.


Issue: Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995 as well as
the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner raises the following errors for
consideration, to wit:
1.) The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine and adjudged the disqualification issue involving Congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination being reserved to and lodged exclusively with the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal
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2.) Assuming arguendo that the COMELEC has jurisdiction, said jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedies available to the adverse parties lie in another forum, which it is submitted, is the HRET
(House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) consistent with Sec. 17 Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
3.) The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded grave abuse of discretion when it
proceeded to promulgate its questioned decision. Despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has
t be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC has jurisdiction, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion and serious error in directing without notice the suspension of the proclamation of the
petitioner as the winning Congressional candidate and despite the ministerial nature of such duty to proclaim.
4.) The COMELECs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
5.) The COMELEC critically erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a
year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of Petitioners district (in Makati).
6.) The COMELEC committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the BOC to determine
and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of your
Petitioner in that such directive is in total disregard of the well settled doctrine that a second place candidate or a
person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed a substitute winner.


Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining
respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.


Ratio: Petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner
of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass
upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to
qualifications of candidates.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs
Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the
same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also
a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of
his parents Benigno and Aurora.
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Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. It indicate
that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City."

The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period
required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air.
That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied.
It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate
because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for, public office.
He must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for
the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers
of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in
the negative.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent
commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are
themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And. as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership In the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner
Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondents
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
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The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any
challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever
so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that
all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a
challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious
to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of
Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec.
6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections.
At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that
his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does
notengender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts. To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
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one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
originshould be deemed to continue.

Republic Act No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR


Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who
were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than
2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is
mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled
up completely and all the time?
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Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties
participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR


determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20




additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system



additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for
concerned party



Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?



Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but
is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the
result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful
local representation.


Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

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Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members
of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
,
which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to
the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised
is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.
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2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely
on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants
so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not
being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court
decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists