Cases in Consti

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D.
ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987
and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was
scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As
reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections
which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del
Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February
17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act, did not include the name
of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code,
Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and
Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic)
filing his certificate of candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls
of the House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's
Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and
addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken on
this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress
since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments
due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other
persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in
the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an

election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among
the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very
simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the
Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of
Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents
acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of
striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified
as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the
courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it
is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of
Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in
this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS
FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67
is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are
not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of
disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which
estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further
maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any
encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for
which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running
for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city,
municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from
the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or
within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His
failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right
to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes
beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various
sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and
Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881)
elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision
seems to be different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer

running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or
changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting
it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be the reason behind
it, or the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The
purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let
us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice
in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the
office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with
the mandate of the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the
legislature, and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the people give
them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to
remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate
must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional
grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the
Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the ones they are
holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of
office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on
accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic)
Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This
only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from
the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve
for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of barangay
officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election
Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic)
their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any
other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his mandate to the
people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then,
that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which
was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think
more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public
officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is
because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and
inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If
a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to
serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The
mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to
seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that
Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which we
were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers not only
to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on
accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the
people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted
to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers holding offices other than
the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso facto resigned from their
office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public
Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative
does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of
office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people
with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by
the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be
shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration
of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The
term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes
that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs.
Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy
does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing
other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the
occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the
legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman
cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the
Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.
This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing
a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as
plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of
legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim
expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where
such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten
us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely

resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of
candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in
one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his own, and
therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an intention to
relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which
he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with the
conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's already
there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this
Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election
or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly
made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881,
which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in
Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents
Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll
of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he
exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both
the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove
petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao,
respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason
for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to
be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties
upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy
may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in
purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress
may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in
cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of
fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are
cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the
short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or

administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can
Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President
and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the
Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in
the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court
should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest

(Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX,
Section 67 provides:
(Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the
Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death,
being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not
justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those
found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation.
So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction
of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office.
Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground
to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper
case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the
causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665,
Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code —
does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon
the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the
power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials.
It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or
Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a
certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a
recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the
constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In
other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary
renunciation" as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for
fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was
not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by
the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing
and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context
of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced
from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running
for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman
Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before
some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can
state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional
Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of
"voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the
principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right
of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both
substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act'
of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not
empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman
Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted
to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a
mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was
cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people.
I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this
specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in
purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress
may appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in
cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of
fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are
cloaked in political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the
short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or

administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can
Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President
and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the
Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in
the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court
should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest

(Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX,
Section 67 provides:
(Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the
Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death,
being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not
justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those
found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation.
So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction
of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office.
Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground
to expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper
case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the
causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665,
Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code —
does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon
the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the
power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials.
It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or
Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a
certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a
recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the
constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In
other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary
renunciation" as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for
fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was
not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by
the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing
and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context
of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced
from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running
for a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman
Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before
some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can
state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional
Governor. I submit that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of
"voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the
principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right
of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing
with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to
representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere 'administrative act'
of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both
substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act'
of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not
empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman
Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted
to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a
mistaken claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was
cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people.
I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this
specific cause of Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.
3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.
4 Rollo, 8 and 14.
5 June 1941.
6 Emphasis supplied.
8 No. 1296.
9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.
11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:

"Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."
12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.
13 Underscoring supplied.
14 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.
15 McKittrick vs. Wilson, 350 M 486, 166 SW2d 499, 143 ALR 465.
16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.
17 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.
18 People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Paredes, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6.
19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SW 421.
20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.
21 Garrison vs. City of Shreveport, 154 So. 622, 624, 179 La. 605.
22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19 July to 6 August 1986.
23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring supplied.
24 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.
25 Phil. 94, 196.
26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.
27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818.
28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.
29 Am Jur 926.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The
mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent
is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on

the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as
a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte
in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA
95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on
her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's
theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is
a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead
implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest

mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on
the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none
in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,

therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she

cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on
the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme
Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines
her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of
the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can
be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for
6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the
last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's
contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be

admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she
filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to
be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has
always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove
that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not
presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District
of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to

DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner
alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying

petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive

jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to

indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a
case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that
in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and
a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance
is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay
in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention
of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he
may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to
return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy
in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban,
where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings
and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest
of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times
they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held
that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that
the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for
the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have

affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return
to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an
act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having
been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various
parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover,
and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either
reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it
would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death
of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate
the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino
vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on

grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,
are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates,
petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.
Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile,
both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of
her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even
after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to
change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife
ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic
identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that,
from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to
promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also
obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President
Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her
marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code
merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the
husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile
remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it
is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with
the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile
by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their
marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks
the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public
policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At
that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in
1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she
registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President,
when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of
the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family
domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this
follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of
former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes
the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she
makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine
setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to
her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree
that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the
legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The second
reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by
the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the
most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American
case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed,
the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court
decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when women were
accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-
ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade
of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for
women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to
choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative
inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in
case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the
rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic
oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on
women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of
marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose
known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d),
the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no
longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same
rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic
common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice
except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino
women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against
women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as
follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain
restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very
close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her
parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth
civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to
support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being
proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute
divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free
to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to
place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are
concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1)
adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the
life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal
Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of

the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may
be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses
to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is
authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal
partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the
husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father
whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to
eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3,
1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal
treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint
right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of
conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as
well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 the right to jointly manage
the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code
which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the
husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband
and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals
specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in
certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is

dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or
insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot
get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del
Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10
years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without
consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money
to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting
his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as
a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn

v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife
from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No
less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after
retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate
the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him
insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on
equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family
properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their
children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail
over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis
supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as
started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous
rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code
which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the
Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it
by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still
bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot
survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987
Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the
State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact,
section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall
ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's
treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner
reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary
consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her
husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that
no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she
could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but
through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead
and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has
been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove
she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-
based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests
for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for
our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national
security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable
as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit
and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park
which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to
recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All

Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol

Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse

in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his
letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to
repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,

that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation
of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood
that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account
and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in
Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were
completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my
residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte.
It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of
Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte,
she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is
nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors
of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in
said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on
January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial
admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did
not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and
Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot
should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8
which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary
value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a
certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of
course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original
certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not
render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date
after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law,
and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts
with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to
disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District
of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the
records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been
thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First
District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition
is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
(Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein)
had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such
move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of
Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he
is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow
respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not
lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New
Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . .
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the
Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District
of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of
Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No.
2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the
proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1,
1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme
Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702)
questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable
ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the
respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be
forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously
promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it

transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District
of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the
First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments
and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office.
We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of
equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner
who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and
the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude
a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime
contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot
satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of
the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on
highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will
give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality
of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and
Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead
husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over
his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce
us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against
married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the
Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present
intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has
voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a
present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of
the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is
generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of
choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called
domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the
old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408,
415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile
independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic
relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S.
§7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of
domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the
constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent
Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place
other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart
from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to
her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband
in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual
change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By
legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the
spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The
question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the
individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile
so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the
reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the
death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed
from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful
purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her
husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to
prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for
Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private
respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show
and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
§16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a
new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-
year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside
in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered
her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various
places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position
of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her
loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her
brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was
allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
(Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to
use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for
the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein
until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be
elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by
the 1987 Constitution.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified
from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did
the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a
startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results
of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that
petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by
directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election
purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte
and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile
of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one
adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled
in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to
live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this
point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or
"domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed
by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary
tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or
domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes
even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to
close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will
have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one
must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by
the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more
murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is
imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by
experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with
the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights
are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It
is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a
conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889,
the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's
being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the
right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is
related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the
family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is
also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the
law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental
authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother
assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal
freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case
the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income
is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother
who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless
the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow
might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from
beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked
no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among
nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the
Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had
been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women."
(Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to
the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international
bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In
ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit
and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and
women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for
its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the
sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family
domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the
right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of
the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several
others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to
that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure
visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court
now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be
removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's
Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle
being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of
men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under
the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not
at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same,
regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the
domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to
her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In
returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of
choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up
her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of
the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes
in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and
weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it
must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle,
has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express

statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121
SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer
"all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification
and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX,
C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of
the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election
exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such
as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns
and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act
to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be
disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will
not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified
candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must
accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the
rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]),
and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case
of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201
SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in
by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy
reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as
a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova,
De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two
reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave.
(Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed
in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and
Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I
think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event
they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum,
not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no
moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to
submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing
for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity
(due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to
continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain
matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
(Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it
sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in
the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of
candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private
respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained,
proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate,
whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public
office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in
their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the
generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this
Court did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even
after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating
to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is
the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
§ 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's
qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its
silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates
unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the
power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that
he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and
vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien
has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of
disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the
election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office
before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming
office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest
or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after
his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the
Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution.
In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of
disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009;
that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte
may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995
and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her
proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates
on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice
Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with
the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that — "no
person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and
write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood
as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in
numerous cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a
person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with
his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which
the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one
year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only
has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the
election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he
would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence
period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional
representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to
return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for
abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a
candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences
in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no
effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental
law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment
and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said
district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en
banc) —
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban,
Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic
in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She
claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter
in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter
Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in
the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the
constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent
entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/

Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN

I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING ELECTION: ________
Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR

IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-
constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts
stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of
Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte
in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district,
Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the
next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in
said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R.
86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case
of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other
purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may,
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern
with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission
on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and
in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate
not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court
should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been
stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most
especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the
same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the
basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to
this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken
up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time,
taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in
1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him
and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel,
Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines
in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely
temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that
she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31,
1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct
No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to
register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"

wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN
THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with
the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of
political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with
domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the
concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue
thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the
latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by
operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a
new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of
origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of
birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium
propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes
called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced
by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin
in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter
to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in
her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course,
those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite
residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to
acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal
domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium
originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost
her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her
continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the
contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By
operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an
intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's
subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family
Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted
to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law
that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative
intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot
have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained
Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is
fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance
with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law.
The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination
of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this
theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does
not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile
of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd
Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said
party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law,
other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which
the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge
on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we
assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such
abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In
fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much
more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in
1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she
lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital
coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was
only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the
right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband
until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the
presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue
after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint
right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has
the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this
case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in
petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which
either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between
the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference;
and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of
the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent
commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan,
more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
[1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the
COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately
and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or
circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the
petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or
by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin,
which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her
domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for
only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the
position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary
would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation
of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or
actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage
(28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new
domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:
the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This
right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For
instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession
or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he
may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in
business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot
validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of
residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home
belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good
faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1,
1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends.
Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain
limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses,
and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile,"
and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to
remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
[1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband,
which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her
domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's
death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the
power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note
that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the
time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was
there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of
candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters
in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as
Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992
(photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28
January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy
sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly
declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In
the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she
declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to
such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her
certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that
forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue
of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in
other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117
of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason
of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or
national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law"
is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage
of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance
which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases
and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit
(Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo
et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed
an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light
of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200
SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted
marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence
thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of
the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises
her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has
exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things
that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates,
petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were
domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place.
Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile,
both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of
her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even
after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to
change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife
ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic
identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that,
from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to
promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also
obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President
Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her
marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code
merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the
husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile
remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it
is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with
the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile
by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their
marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks
the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public
policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At
that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in
1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she
registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President,
when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of
the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family
domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this
follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of
law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or
intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of
former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes
the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she
makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead
husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine
setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to
her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree
that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the
legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The second
reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by
the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is
an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the
most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American
case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was
unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed,
the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court
decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when women were
accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-
ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade
of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for
women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to
choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative
inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in
case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the
rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic
oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on
women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of
marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose
known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d),
the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no
longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same
rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic
common law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice
except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino
women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against
women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as
follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain
restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others,
regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very
close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her
parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth
civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in
business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to
support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being
proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute
divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free
to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to
place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are
concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1)
adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the
life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal
Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of

the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may
be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses
to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is
authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal
partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the
husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father
whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the
unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to
eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3,
1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal
treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by
abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint
right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of
conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as
well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 the right to jointly manage
the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code
which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the
husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband
and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals
specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in
certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is

dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or

insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot
get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del
Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10
years with different women and treated his wife roughly and without
consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money
to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting
his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as
a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn

v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife
from the control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No
less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after
retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate
the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him
insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on
equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family
properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their
children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail
over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis
supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as
started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous
rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code
which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the
Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it
by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still
bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm
guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot
survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987
Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the
State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact,
section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall
ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's
treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner
reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary
consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her
husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that
no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the
fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she
could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but
through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead
and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has
been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove
she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-
based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to
reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her
affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests
for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for
our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national
security and welfare.
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable
as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit
and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park
which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to
recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All

Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse

in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his
letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to
repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,

that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation
of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood
that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account
and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in
Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were
completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my
residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte.
It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of
Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte,
she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is
nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors
of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in
said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on
January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial
admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did
not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and
Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot
should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8
which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary
value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a
certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of
course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original
certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not
render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date
after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law,
and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the
disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary
evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts
with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to
disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District
of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the
records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been
thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First
District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition
is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
(Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein)
had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer
the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such
move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of
Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he
is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow
respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not
lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New
Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . .
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the
Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District
of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of
Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No.
2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the
proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1,
1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme
Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702)
questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable
ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the
respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be
forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously
promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it

transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District
of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of
Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the
First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments
and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office.
We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of
equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner
who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and
the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude
a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime
contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot
satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of
the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on
highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will
give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality
of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and
Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead
husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over
his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce
us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against
married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the
Constitution forbids it.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of
Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present
intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has
voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a
present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every
individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of
the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is
generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of
choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28
C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called
domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the
old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408,
415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile
independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic
relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S.
§7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of
domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the
constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent
Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as
conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place
other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart
from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to
her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband
in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual
change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By
legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the
spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The
question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the
individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile
so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the
reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the
death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed
from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful
purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her
husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to
prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for
Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private
respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show
and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
§16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an
acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a
new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-
year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside
in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered
her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various
places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position
of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her
loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her
brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was
allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
(Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to
use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for
the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein
until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be
elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by
the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified
from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did
the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a
startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results
of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that
petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by
directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the
interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on
aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election
purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte
and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile
of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one
adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled
in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to
live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this
point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or
"domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed
by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the
husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile
remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left
behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary
tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or
domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes
even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to
close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin
upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be
endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will
have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one
must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by
the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more
murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is
imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by
experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with
the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights
are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It
is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a
conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889,
the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's
being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the
right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is
related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the
family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is
also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may,
therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the
law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental
authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother
assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal
freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title,
except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case
the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income
is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother
who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless
the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow
might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from
beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked
no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among
nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the
Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had
been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women."
(Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to
the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international
bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In
ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit
and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and
women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were
speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for
its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the
sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of
discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the
unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family
domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the
right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the enjoyment of
the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly
exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several
others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned,
Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building
Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to
that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure
visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court
now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be
removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's
Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle
being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of
men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under
the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial,
according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not
at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same,
regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the
domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to
her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In
returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of
choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up
her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of
the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals
and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes
in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and
weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it
must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle,
has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal
attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express

statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121
SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer
"all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification
and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX,
C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of
the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In
election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez
vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must
be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election
exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such
as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns
and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act
to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be
disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will
not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified
candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must
accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the
rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]),
and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case
of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201
SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in
by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy
reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as
a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova,
De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two
reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave.
(Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed
in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and
Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I
think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event
they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum,
not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no
moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to
submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing
for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-
proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning
candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity
(due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to
continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain
matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
(Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For
Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it
sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in
the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of
candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private
respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained,
proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate,
whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public
office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in
their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the
generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this
Court did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even
after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating
to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is
the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166,
§ 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's
qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its
silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates
unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the
power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that
he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and
vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien
has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of
disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited
election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the use of
"manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the
election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office
before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming
office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest
or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after
his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the
Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution.
In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of
disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009;
that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte
may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections
in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995
and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her
proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates
on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice
Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with
the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that — "no
person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and
write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood
as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in
numerous cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a
person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with
his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which
the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one
year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only
has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the
election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he
would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence
period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional
representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to
return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for
abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a
candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences
in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no
effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most
advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term
"residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental
law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment
and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said
district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now
assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en
banc) —
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban,
Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic
in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in
San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang

Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She
claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter
in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter
Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in
the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the
constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent
entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/

Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot,

Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN

I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING ELECTION: ________
Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR

IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-
constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts
stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of
Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive
component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that
petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte
in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the
constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the
next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in
said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R.
86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case
of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other
purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may,
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of
the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern
with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or
after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate
SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission
on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when
evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the
elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and
in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply
because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate
not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court
should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been
stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most
especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the
same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the
basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to
this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken
up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time,
taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in
1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him
and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel,
Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines
in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely
temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that
she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31,
1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct
No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to
register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election
Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that
municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a
resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy"

wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN
THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with
the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference
between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of
political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with
domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the
concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue
thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and
inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the
latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by
operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the
"domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a
new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of
origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth,
domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of
birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium
propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes
called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced
by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only
international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin
in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter
to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in
her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those
places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course,
those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient
purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite
residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to
acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal
domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium
originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost
her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her
continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the
contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By
operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an
intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's
subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family
Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted
to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium
necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not
intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law
that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative
intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot
have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained
Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is
fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance
with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law.
The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination
of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this
theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some
difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily
abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does
not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he
evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile
of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd
Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said
party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law,
other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which
the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge
on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we
assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such
abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In
fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much
more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in
1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she
lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital
coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was
only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the
right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband
until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the
presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue
after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint
right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has
the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this
case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in
petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of
women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which
either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between
the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference;
and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of
the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having
automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the
political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent
commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the
election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan,
more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the
COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84
[1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the
COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC
Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately
and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or
circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the
petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or
by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin,
which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her
domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for
only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the
position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary
would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her
marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation
of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or
actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage
(28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new
domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:
the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This
right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For
instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession
or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he
may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in
business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot
validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of
residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home
belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good
faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1,
1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends.
Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain
limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family
domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses,
and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile,"
and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to
remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
[1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband,
which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her
domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's
death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the
power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her
domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note
that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the
time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to
effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was
there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of
candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a
widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the
Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters
in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as
Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992
(photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28
January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy
sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly
declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In
the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she
declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to
such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her
certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that
forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue
of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294
[1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original
residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in
other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117
of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason
of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or
national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law"
is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage
of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance
which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases
and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit
(Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or
residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively
establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo
et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed
an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light
of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200
SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted
marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence
thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of
the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises
her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has
exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Footnotes
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless

he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.
3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".
5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".
6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".
9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo,

p. 116, Annex "F".
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances

surrounding the filling up of the original certificate thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the

House of Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District
of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as
I allegedly lack residence in the constituency because of the entry of the
word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the word

"RESIDENCE" to mean actual or physical residence, and the word "SEVEN"
merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate

that at lease one (1) month had passed from my registration as voter of
Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months under
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE" as my actual or physical residence in the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy

stating "THAT I AM eligible for said Office" was sufficient to affirm that I
possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of the
House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995
elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban

City, a component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte I never
intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always
intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban
City to live and stay there. On November 5, 1992; I bought my Residence
Certificate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof as
Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's Affidavit
explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in

1938, when was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died
on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez, brought
me and my brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban
City) his hometown.
xxx xxx xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or

residence of origin have not abandoned and have never intended to abandon
my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always intend to
return whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still
the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos
Norte and registered as a voter there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the

Philippines. Together, we lived in Malacañang Palace and I registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now San
Juan, Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I
had to live with my husband to serve him when he was congressman,
Senator and President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years
however, I never intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence
of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I was a child.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday

anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly
visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important
functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and
innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in
February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the PCGG, and
were destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx xxx xxx
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte even if my residences there were not
livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however,
did not permit and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence
of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with
PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed

the majority opinion. Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando
dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24,
1995 and to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction;
Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7, 1995
Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.
17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando

and Julio F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting opinions. In
disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:
As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on March

8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is disqualified to
run for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one (1) year of
residence in the place where she wanted to be elected.
18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".
19 Rollo, Annex "D".
20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).
21 Id. at 969.
22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).
23 Id.
24 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.
26 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
28 Id, see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v.

Guray, supra
note 22.
29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July

22, 1986).
30 Id.
31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
32 Id, at 714.
33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).
35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country

solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private or
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations;
service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or national police
force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance
with law shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
36 Rollo, p. 38.
37 18 Am Jur 219-220.
38 20 Am Jur 71.
39 TOLENTINO 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL

CODE, 220 (1987).
40 Id.
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL

CODE, 220 (1987).
42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the
domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of
her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved,
as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has
given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by
agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the
husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or
where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's
domicile. 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De La Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife
to automatically revert to her original domicile or acquire a new domicile
under these situations, all the more should it sanction a reversion — or the
acquisition of a new domicile by the wife — upon the death of her husband.
43 41 Phi. 13 (1920).
44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husband's
domicile is not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish
jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa
223) or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Code; 354.)
45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).
46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction.
However, taking another approach, she writes:
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term "family domicile" instead
of family residence because the spouses may have multiple residences, and
the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy
the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits.
SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
102 (1988).
47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).
50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac.
742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo.
App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353,
354.
52 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
Sec. 7 Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate Candidacy.

The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral

Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131 (a) (W. Ross translation,

1925 ed).
2 It provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives

unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a
domicile different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated pursuant
to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects the
wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Viña
v. Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
4 Op cit.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.
7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.
8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.
9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.
10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.
11 Ibid.
12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
13 Supra.
14 Supra.
15 In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99
Misc. 582.
16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
18 404 US 71.
19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.

20 Op cit., p. 84.
21 Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.
22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino,

the Civil Code Revision Committee stated:
Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and
changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino Life since then have
revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from
foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or
inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to contemporary
developments and trends.
In particular — to cite only a few instances — (1) the property regime of

conjugal partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom, especially
in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of
property; (2) there have considerably been more grounds for annulment of
marriage by the Church than those provided by the Code, thus giving rise to
the absurd situation of several marriages already annulled under Canon Law
but still considered subsisting under the Civil Law and making it necessary to
make the grounds for annulment under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal
treatment of husband and wife as to rights and responsibilities, which
necessitates a response to the long-standing clamor for equality between
men and women now mandated as a policy to be implemented under the
New Constitution; (4) the inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening
marriage and the family as basic social institutions recognized as such by the
New Constitution; (5) recent developments have shown the absurdity of
limiting the grounds for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds
provided under the Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to
protect our children in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and (7) to bring
our law on paternity and filiation in step with or abreast of the latest scientific
discoveries." (Emphasis supplied)
23 Article 96, Family Code.
28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.
29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-
185.
30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
31 Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.
32 Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.
33 Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.
34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607
(1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: "The State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service . . . ."
36 Annex "G," Petition.
37 Petition, Annex "B-1" pp. 6-7.
38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).
1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The

Family Code of the Philippines.
2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.
3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed to Col. Kempis.
1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."
2 Art. 110: "The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
3 Art. 110, Civil Code.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which
is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,

Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as
the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in
the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent
portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the
municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the
municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the
municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato
— are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the
statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident
and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title"
of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional
requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the impression
that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the
substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results
of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the
fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This
posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the
title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of
those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not
reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here.
The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act
Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was
assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in
reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the
bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces
must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly
germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands
altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces
under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality
of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating
a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport,
219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village
of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of
the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and
Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name
of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa
county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing
his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which
reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit
Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to
uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a
sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do
not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as
surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act
for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected
by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW
262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act
goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous
in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is
not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of
the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in
the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers
those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of
a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must
fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court,
thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for
any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of
the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted
area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton,
if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom?
The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State
in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in
the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for
their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is
capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory,
and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247
creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and
enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one
barrios — not nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly
evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the
government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the
reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to
assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed
into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal
corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community?
How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not
supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems,
or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute
to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may
not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one
— barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the
traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a
Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine
barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no
substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated
differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on
whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that
the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town
to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with
the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote
in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto
different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place
where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired
therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for
the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that
when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may
become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to
give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in
the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an
enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of
another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the
constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts
about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar to those found in
the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.2 Where the
subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision
thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the
subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction
must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every
end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression in
its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4 held that
the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which
the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied
upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of
such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision
assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. While the case of Government vs.
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three, the
present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as
indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by
the majority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission
on Elections,5 up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion coming from Justice
Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of
Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This
Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION
(c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX,
AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted,
the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and
to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not
germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re
retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that
there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that
there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with
reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to
the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which
should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of
Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming
from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that,
with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from
persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to
accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities
outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself
would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary
powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to
this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities
located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao
del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from
Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this
to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named
as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying
precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v.
Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a "construction
which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon
Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied
in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained
acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to
give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute
is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think
we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator
which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the
Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the
legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent
intention was to enact an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone,
construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to
[their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase
"lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it,
having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the
choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by
another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two
other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the
interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194,
198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v.
Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by
Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which
supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary
favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of
constitutionality."14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative
measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its
validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as
above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly
brought to light in the opinion of the Court.
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any
of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period
of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as
a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. 1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in
its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following
grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite
the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he
lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with
out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent
and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in
court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino
citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born
because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-
born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of
the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is
not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban
Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

Footnote
1 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.
2 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
3An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960).
4 Said provision reads:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
of the election.
5 Rollo, p. 36.
6 Id., at 69.
7 Id., at 13.
8 Article IV, Section 1.
9TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE

PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.
10 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.
11During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the
applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated
April 11,1975, as amended.
12 Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:
(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government and well as with the community in which
he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
languages; and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the learning of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.
13 Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:
(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less
than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions
and ideal s of the Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at
war, during the period of such war;
(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
14 Section 1, R.A. 530.
15 Section 2, C.A. No. 63.
16An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936).
17
1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No. 63);
2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);
3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the application) in the
Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);
4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually al

faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or
subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).
18 See note 13.
19 Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.
20 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).
23 Ibid.
24 314 SCRA 438 (1999)
25 Id., at 450.
26 Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)
27 See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.
28 The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

29 Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an Electoral
composed of nine Members three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
30 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

vs.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral
Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress. Let
me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to
Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2),1 Article IV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine
citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with
Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine
Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American
citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63,
he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and
decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of
Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Force of
the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with
the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit
of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Main Issue
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C.
Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the
answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person
"who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject,
explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.5 He defines repatriation
as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain condition."6 Webster buttresses
this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as "to restore or return to
one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x."7 In relation to our subject
matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a
recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his
becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon
repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen – would not be
consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization,
which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with which he
has previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x
x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a
natural-born citizen.
2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born
Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born,
because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the
Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would properly fall
under the second category (naturalized).11
Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which
they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in
the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has become
such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the
1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered
"natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to
do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution,
excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship.14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include
"[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof,"
meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are
not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent – being clearly and
concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally
reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of
Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In
other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen, nothing less.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent
Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the
Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision.
The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its
perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent,
constitutional body with its own specific mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of Congress
"shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications their
respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a coequal
branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in
excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice
Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial
of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained,
the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How
then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal
definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation made in good faith and
grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial
doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.
Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent
any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial decision, this
Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions on matters over
which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we
disagree with the conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of
discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse.21
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision
upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely
abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or
hostility" in such exercise.
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It
cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The
people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private
respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80,
119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In
such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility;
to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so
constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot.25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in
election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's choice than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms.27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of
the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner
that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote."28
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization

Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization.29 Protectionist
barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to
aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more
liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely
want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of
developmental skills, know-how and capital. 1âw phi 1.nêt
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who
want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the
law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their former
citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries,
because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former
Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but
of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino is private respondent who, in
only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted
municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was
overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar
the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's
prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnote
1 "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx xxx x x x"
2"Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x."
3"Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any
of the following ways and/or events:
xxx xxx x x x"
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: x x x ."
4 Sec. 1 thereof provides:
"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S. citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where
he resides of last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
5 1995 ed.
6 Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)
7 Webster's Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.
8Webster's, ibid., defines reacquire as "to acquire again", and acquire as "to get as one's
own."
9
Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v.
Thaye, 143 US 135.
10Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999

ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS S1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d aliens and Citizens, s1411.
11 See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.
12 Supra.
13 Assailed Decision, p. 8.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
16 Sec.17, Art. IV. (Emphasis ours.)
17Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil 139 (1936).
18Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990; and Morrero
v Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520, December 22,
1997.
19
Co. v. HRET, ibid.
20 Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.
21 Ibid.
22 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
23 "The following were the results of the election:

Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119
Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448
Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941
Manuel R. Castro 622
Mariano A. Padlan 171"
(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)
24 Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.
25 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.
26 Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.
27 Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.
28 Ibid
29See Pacifico A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odysey and Legacy:
The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by
Atty. Antonio M. Eliciano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998 ed. See
also Artenio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New Paradigms," a lecture delivered during
the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

vs.
CRUZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that
private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified
as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?

The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens
– have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The
problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in
Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement of being a
natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be
elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents,
spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States
Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost five years,
he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California and was
issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993,
he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the
Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in
the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his
Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995,
the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for
one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself
as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio
Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District
of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative
Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March
15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a
natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which
provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-
born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C.
Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be
sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker,
and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same
was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renuciation
of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite
the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen of
the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in
the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point
and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the
privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an
alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits, privileges and
attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply
with requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a
natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino
from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his
reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a
natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but
more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish
subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of natural-born status
from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a
reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United
States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens
of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11th of April, of
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at
the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine
Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as
"people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not
as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent
qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more
strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either
the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to
resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent
thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later was jus
sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly
to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of
its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to
do anything to acquire full citizenship.5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in
the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he
subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition of
natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens
enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as
" those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE
TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES,
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to
execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and
constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who
adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual
significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not
phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the

document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning,
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition according to
its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of
these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the
restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic
approach and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can
not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.
As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice
A.R. Melo:8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time
consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended), he,
nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting
his adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987
Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial
or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby opines that a natural-
born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of
a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also
cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be
Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the
1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is so
placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance
and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the government directly
involved and given the dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later
adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to
refer to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine citizenship.'
Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is
only room for application. The phrase 'from birth indicates that there is a starting point of his
citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous, constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a member
of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the
Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can be merely a citizen
of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the
Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United
States) guide and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and
bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to the
President and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be
elected to the National Assembly.11 Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution was amended did
natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice of
the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court.14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being
natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime Minister,
Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the
Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the cabinet must be natural-born
citizens.16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens.17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of
the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of
natural born citizen and citizenship in general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that the
constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural born Filipino
citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly
respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored.
He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected
to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking
any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance,
the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population
of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
Cabusao San Fernando
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Ocampo Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No.
9716:
District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego 176,383
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777
Minalabac Gainza
Pamplona Milaor
Pasacao
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043
Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of
the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the
Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step,
marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on
the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now
before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the
Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the
new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the
former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in
the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing
legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000
inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative
seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of
district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly
250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found
in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used
by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the
creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative
district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in

Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal
of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for
the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an
additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly
valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avv phi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents
maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or
quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition
is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been
ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is
in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No.
9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by
reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and
substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important
issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is
in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of
the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in
a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When
there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there
is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To
doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city
to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the
subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the
law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic
Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone
district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a
population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does
not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within
a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to
be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its
population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely

an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations
on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing
the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to
the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population
had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the
sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country
into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner:
first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member
and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to
be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan
Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration
as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56
million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each
province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73
provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was
more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and
Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried
whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be
apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must
be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its
transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north
and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there
would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He
then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that
District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second
District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in
the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that
said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000
while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the
Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and
Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in
one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for
Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City
so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second
District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is
only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the
year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for
purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise,
Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and
offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united,
Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through
Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the
Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of
many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the
earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was
put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by
the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will
have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The
Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing
area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting
of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among
the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong
proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution
requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not
allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non
for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has
increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─

based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional
Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section
5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the
Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly
based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the
reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is
valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by
the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population
of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district
should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional
debates on the exact issue presented by this petition. 1av vphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

(On Official Leave)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
1 Republic Act No. 9716 was published in the 15 October 2009 issue of the Manila Standard.
2Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics
Office.
3Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics
Office.
4 Rollo, p. 40.
5 Id. at 12.
6 Id. at 14-15.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 16.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 12-13.
13 Id. at 96.
14Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Fortich
v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
15Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 528 (2002); Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000); Lim v. Executive Secretary, 430 Phil. 555,
580 (2002).
16 Id.
17 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
18 G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
19 346 Phil. 321 (1997).
20 Supra note 15.
21 Id.
22 Supra note 15 at 580.
23 G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
24 Alvarez v. Guingona, 322 Phil. 774, 789 (1996).
The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11 November 1993, 227
25
SCRA 703, 705-706.
26 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 136-138.
27 312 Phil. 259 (1995).
28 Id. at 272-273.
29 Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 1859-1881.
30 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 1861.
34 Id. at 1867.
35 Id. at 1872.
36 Id. at 1867-1868.
37 Id. at 1861.
38 Id. at 1874.
39 G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310.
40 Rollo, p. 4.
41Sen. Aquino, Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others that
have been recommended together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested based on one
standard, not separate standards for everybody. It is our opinion and that is the source of this
discussion and of this debate; that we hold that there is a 250,000-rule embodied in so many
provisions of the Constitution. Our distinguished collegue from the Bicol and Makati areas
does not agree. I think we have established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the
Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on
to the next point so as not to be accused of delaying the passage of the bill any
further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the proposed first
district? Because having done the same, instead of having the 170,000-figure, we
would have a 269,222 population figure.
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view
the details from this particular rostrum, with the indulgence of our distinguished
colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. x x x.
x x x x.
Now, the first district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the
province, area-wise. Libmanan is the biggest municipality in the entire or present first
district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter what – because that is
the biggest. Anyway, we move it left, we move it right, it would change the
configuration. Those are the practical difficulties in trying to figure out how. That is
the situation. As we see, there is a water extension of the gulf. We cannot connect
them because they are separated by water. So it is no longer contiguous because it
is separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it. That is what I was
saying about mathematical formula. We cannot have mathematical formula when a
natural boundary like water cannot make the municipalities contiguous. That is the
picture. It is all there.
The violet is the tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-speaking province
so that is the only way to divide it. So much has been done in the Lower House in
trying to figure it out. But as long as the three Congressman do not agree, then there
is nothing we can do about it. That Representative, what the Congressman say in his
district is "king". He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We respect
that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway. (TSN, Senate Plenary
Debates on H.B. No. 4264, 22 September 2009).
42Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility – so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by, or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Cabrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182084, 6
October 2008, 567 SCRA 686, 691).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and
republican State"1 that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian
concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion allows, for the first time
under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one
representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all
other legislative districts created by Congress send one representative each because they all meet
the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the
clear and precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the
creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)2 of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These
constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2)
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of
legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of
legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA 9716
grossly violates these constitutional standards.
Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
There was never any debate3 in the design of our government that the members of the House of
Representatives, just like the members of the Senate, represent people – not provinces, cities, or
any other political unit.4 The only difference is that the members of the Senate represent the people
at large while the members of the House represent the people in legislative districts. Thus,
population – or the number of inhabitants in a district – is the essential measure of representation in
the House of Representatives.5 Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the
previous Constitutions,6 could not be any clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle of
"one person, one vote,"7 is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a "democratic
and republican State."8 A democracy in its pure state is one where the majority of the people, under
the principle of "one person, one vote," directly run the government.9 A republic is one which has no
monarch, royalty or nobility,10 ruled by a representative government elected by the majority of the
people under the principle of "one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the
laws.11 A republic is also known as a representative democracy. The democratic and republican
ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common principle of equality -- equality in voting power,
and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power -- that
each vote is worth the same as any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or literacy,
voters have an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal
representation for equal numbers of people12 or equal voting weight per legislative district. In
constitutional parlance, this means representation for every legislative district "in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 13 or
proportional representation. Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting power
is inherent in proportional representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck
down an apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only;
(b) x x x gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; (c)
[gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato x x x more than both, five
members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while Davao
with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less
inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) [gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member only,
while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.14 x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of the
House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants."15
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Members
of the House "shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants" in the 1935
Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
The addition of the phrase "on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" was meant to stress that
the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative
district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the
phrase "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one
legislative district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the
Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district for
every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces,
cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI mandates that "[e]ach city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one representative."
Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum population applicable to every
legislative district following the rule on uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether
in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the
number of the population increases, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
Thus, a province shall have one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000. This
insures that proportional representation is maintained if there are increases in the population of a
province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is meant by a "progressive ratio" in the
apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the apportionment of
legislative districts compared to the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is that the 1987
Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of uniformity in the apportionment of
legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the
minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in
cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion that this
country is a "democratic and republican State."16 This ruling of the majority strikes a debilitating blow
at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government.
Under the majority’s ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard to
any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000,
50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional standards of proportional
representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum
population requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the

constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative
districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means that legislative districts
in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even less) to 250,000, while
legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end
of our democratic and republican system of government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987
Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:

Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA 9716 will
be tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section,"17 referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards
relate to first, population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on
proportional representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in legislatures.
Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district, which was not present
in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of
legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population increases in accordance with the
rule on proportional representation. Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three
rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area.
The Constitution18 and the Ordinance19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the minimum
population of a legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum
population requirement applies equally to legislative districts apportioned in provinces and the
Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall be]
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To
reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to legislative districts in
"provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned in provinces, if
freed from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies two, four, ten times lower
than in districts apportioned in cities, violating the constitutional command that apportionment shall
be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section 5 of
Article VI, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a minimum
"population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the
increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the
apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent."
To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section 5
of Article VI. This Court cannot add other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts

the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Sur’s proposed five legislative districts by flouting the
standards of proportional representation among legislative districts and the minimum population per
legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of only
176,383, which is 29% below the constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have populations way above the minimum
with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed Second District)
and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the disparity is so high that three of the proposed districts
(Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts) have populations more than double that of the proposed First
District.20 This results in wide variances among the districts’ populations. Still using the 2007 census,
the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764.21 The populations of the proposed
districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).22 This means that the smallest proposed district
(First District) is underpopulated by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed district (Third
District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation (for
voters in the First District) fails even the most liberal application of the constitutional standards.
Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than 200% compared to votes from the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Second District.
Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200%
compared to votes in the First District while those in the Second District suffer more than 60%
undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the last
digit, for every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing from
negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick, such variances are grossly
anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional representation. In the United States, the
Supreme Court there ruled that a variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of
proof of a good faith effort to achieve a mathematically exact apportionment.23
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquino’s attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed
districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide variances in
population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for political expediency: his colleagues in the
Senate deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a Congressman] is
king [in his district]."24 This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716.
Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote valuation, and consequently with the constitutional standard of
proportional representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent Congressmen, an invalid
standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating the
proposed First District, which will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum population of
250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be complied with to the last digit. The
Constitution mandates a population of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative district in
a city, and under the principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in
provinces and in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"

No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one representative"
means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be created with it.25 Can
this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the affirmative is to ignore the
constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned "in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the
Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is
evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.26
Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or
Mariano v. COMELEC27 and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC28 as normative props to shore up the hollow
proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the minimum population of 250,000
as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the first place, the Constitutional Commission, exercising
constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it textualized in Section 5,
Article VI, in the interest of creating legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate
concerns.29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification, possessed the greater sovereign
power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution,
the people in the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional Commission’s
discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987
Constitution and subject to the reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in Section 5, unlike the Constitutional
Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratification by the sovereign people.
Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum population requirement of
250,000 in creating a legislative district. Thus, in Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled
the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification
by the National Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the population of
Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives.30
Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas
Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994 stood at
508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a
highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in Cagayan
de Oro City, the two districts created complied with the minimum population of 250,000 (254,644 and
299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC.31 Contrary to the assertion of
the majority opinion, neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports the claim
that Congress can create a legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the
contrary, these cases confirm that every legislative district must have a minimum population of
250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC32 struck down a law creating a
legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of the 250,000 minimum
requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments
More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the
Constitution’s mandate that "[w]ithin three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."33 Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting piecemeal reapportionment laws for
individual areas, either for this sole purpose34 or ancillary to the conversion35 or creation36 of a local
government unit, at the behest of legislators representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects
Congress to intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional
imperatives. RA 9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched interests,
sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of representative democracy, at the altar of
political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of Representatives with
two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other
favored districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small,
favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable than
the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally abhorrent
scheme, a scheme that for the first time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new politically
privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to be a "democratic and republican State."37 To
uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant violation of the constitutional standards requiring
proportional representation and a minimum population in the creation of legislative districts. This will
derail our one person, one vote representative democracy from the tracks clearly and precisely laid
down in the 1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political elite
exercising more legislative power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged political
status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which is banned under the 1987
Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous constitutional
revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a "democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one
vote" that insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal than
others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our democracy. This Court is supposed to be
the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more
equal than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our
democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No.
9716 for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation and minimum population in
the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." (Emphasis supplied)
2 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides: "Within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section." (Emphasis supplied)
3 The creation of the union of the United States of America was nearly aborted because of
the bitter controversy in the drafting of the US Constitution on the manner of representation
to the US Congress. The debate pitted, on the one hand, small States which wanted
representation by State and, on the other hand, delegates who insisted on direct
representation, consistent with democratic ideals. The impasse was broken by what is
popularly known as the Great Compromise, allowing States to send two representatives to
the US Senate (regardless of population) and reserving membership in the US House of
Representatives to Congressmen directly elected by the people in legislative districts based
on proportional representation. (See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 [1964].)
4 Or as a parallel ruling in another jurisdiction puts it:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters,
not farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of
government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a
free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system. (Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 [1964].)
5 Save for those elected under the part-list system who represent sectors.
6Substantially identical provisions are found in Section 2, Article VIII (1973 Constitution) and
Section 5, Article VI (1935 Constitution).
7 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides: "Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens
of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
8 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
9 The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions described the Philippines as a "republican State." During
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna explained
that the word "democratic" was added "to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are
instances where the people would act directly, and not through their representatives." IV
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 735, 17 September 1986.
10Section 31, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No law granting a title of royalty or
nobility shall be enacted."
11John Adams wrote in 1787 that the "only true definition of a republic" is "a government, in
which all men, rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and
servants, the first citizen and the last, are equally subject to the laws." The Founders’
Constitution, Republican Government, Chapter 4, Document 10, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s10.html, accessed 3 April 2010.
12 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 11 [1964].
13 Section 5(1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

14Macias v. COMELEC, No. L-18684, 14 September 1961, 3 SCRA 1, 5-6. The Court took
note of the following addition malapportionments: "These were not the only instances of
unequal apportionment. We see that Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and
Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got
2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323
inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5." (Id. at 6.)
15 Section 5, Article VI, 1935 Constitution.
17 Section 5(4), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
18
Section 5(3), Article VI provides: "Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
(Emphasis supplied)
19 Section 3, which provides:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members
as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to
the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province
was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election.
20 See note 22.
21 Based on Camarines Sur’s total population of 1,693,821.
22 The range of deviations is shown below (based on the 2007 census):
District No. Population % Variation

From Ideal
1 176,383 - 47.9
2 276,777 - 18.3
3 439,043 + 29.6
4 372,548 + 9.9
5 429,070 + 26.6
23 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The U.S. Supreme Court declared:
Article I, § 2 establishes a "high standard of justice and common sense" for the
apportionment of congressional districts: "equal representation for equal numbers of
people." x x x. Precise mathematical equality, however, may be impossible to
achieve in an imperfect world; therefore the "equal representation" standard is
enforced only to the extent of requiring that districts be apportioned to achieve
population equality "as nearly as is practicable." x x x As we explained further
in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra:
"[T]he ‘as nearly as practicable’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith
effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. x x x. Unless population variances
among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the
State must justify each variance, no matter how small."
Article I, § 2, therefore, "permits only the limited population variances which are
unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which
justification is shown."
xxx
x x x Adopting any standard other than population equality, using the best census
data available, x x x would subtly erode the Constitution's ideal of equal
representation. If state legislators knew that a certain de minimis level of population
differences were acceptable, they would doubtless strive to achieve that level rather
than equality. x x x Furthermore, choosing a different standard would import a high
degree of arbitrariness into the process of reviewing apportionment plans. x x x. In
this case, appellants argue that a maximum deviation of approximately 0.7% should
be considered de minimis. If we accept that argument, how are we to regard
deviations of 0.8%, 0.95%, 1%, or 1.1%? (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
24As evident in the following exchange between petitioner and Senator Joker Arroyo
(Petition, pp. 23-24):
Sen. Aquino. Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others
that have been recommended together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested
based on one standard, not separate standards for everybody. It is our opinion and
that is the source of this discussion and of this debate, that we hold that there is a
250,000-rule embodied in so many provisions of the Constitution. Our distinguished
colleague from the Bicol and Makati areas does not agree. I think we have
established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may we move on
to the next point so as not be accused of delaying the passage of the bill any further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the proposed first
district? Because having done the same, instead of having the 170,000-figure, we
would have a 269,222 population figure. O achieve
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We cannot view
the details from this particular rostrum, with the indulgence of our distinguished
colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. As I have said, the brown portion in that map of Camarines Sur ─ I do
not know what district it is but it is - represented by Congressman Fuentebella. He
does not want this district touched. There is nothing we can do about it since he does
not want it to be touched.
The red portion is represented by Congressman Alfelor. He does not want his district
to be touched. The green portion is represented by Congressman Villafuerte. He
does not also want it touched. Even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants,
he does not want it touched.
Now, the first district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40% of the
province, area-wise. Libmanan is the biggest municipality in the entire or present first
district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move that no matter what – because that is
the biggest. Anyway, we move it left, we move it right, it would change the
configuration. Those are the practical difficulties in trying to figure out how. That is
the situation. As we see, there is a water extension of the gulf. We cannot connect
them because they are separated by water. So it is no longer contiguous because it
is separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it. That is what I was
saying about mathematical formula. We cannot have mathematical formula when a
natural boundary like water cannot make the municipalities contiguous. That is the
picture. It is all there.
The violet is the Tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-speaking

province so that is the only way to divide it. So much has been done in the Lower
House in trying to figure it out. But as long as the three Congressmen do not agree,
then there is nothing we can do about it. That is the power. For those of us who have
served in the House of Representative, what the Congressman says in his district is
"king". He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We respect that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway.
Sen. Aquino. Mr. President, the question is, why not include Libmanan in the
proposed first district? The proposed first district has the towns of Del Gallego which
is, I am not sure, in the northernmost tip of Camarines Sur, Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
they are all adjacent to each other on the map previously shown and that can be
done. That can be reconfigured if we were just using geography and the test of
territoriality.
Now, in sequel to that, the proposed second district of Magarao, Panaman (sic) and
Camaligan can be placed in the proposed second district and it will have a population
of 258,000. The body of water alluded to by our distinguished colleague, it seems in
our map that the municipalities mentioned are all on the same side of the waterway.
We do not see where the issue of contiguousness comes in to play. The proposed
third district, with these changes, would still be having a population of 364,187.
The only point we are trying to raise is that if it just a question of territory and
population, there seems to be other ways of having configured these districts to
enable Camarines Sur to have its entire complement of six districts. If the answer is,
that the congressmen there who are now representing Camarines Sur cannot agree
on the other modes of configuring their district, then that is another. But will our
distinguished colleague agree that there is no constitutional prohibition for us to
reconfigure these districts on a different formula.
Sen. Arroyo. Mr. President, this is where the Senate must differ to the House of
Representatives. Redistricting is a local bill and it cannot emanate from the Senate. It
will emanate only from the House of Representatives. This has been debated in the
House of Representatives over and over and no one could agree. So, in its wisdom,
the House of Representatives agreed to what has been presented here. If we agree
now it to reconfigure it, the Senate now will be intruding into what is purely a House
of Representatives business. This is redistricting. Quite frankly, what business does
the Senate have in trying to reconfigure out the provinces when we do not represent
any particular district? Only congressmen who are familiar with their own districts can
discuss this. (Emphasis supplied)
25Thus, in Sema v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008, 558 SCRA 700) we struck
down a statutory provision authorizing a regional legislative assembly to create provinces
because the creation of provinces entails the creation of legislative districts which is the sole
prerogative of Congress.
26Although extant legislation allows creation of provinces with population of less than
250,000 (Section 461(a) of Republic Act No. 7160), this is no reason to validate RA 9716
because Section 5(1) of Article VI trumps any statute. At any rate, the constitutionality of
Section 461(a) is not before the Court.
27 312 Phil 259 (1995).
28 G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290.
29 Thus, the Constitutional Commission’s decision to relax the population threshold in

Palawan, Benguet, and Baguio and consider other standards in apportioning legislative
districts in Cavite (urbanization and livelihood), Maguindanao (political stability), and Laguna
(topography), as noted in the Decision.
30 312 Phil 259 (1995).
31 G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309.
32 G.R. No. 188078, 15 March 2010.
33 Section 5(4), Article VI.
34 E.g., RA 9371.
35 E.g., RA 7854.
36E.g., Republic Act No. 4695 creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao
and Kalinga- Apayao and providing for their legislative districts.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s discussion on the procedural issue.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus standi. Petitioners
are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the initiative of a taxpayer,
a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.1 Republic Act No.
9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the
expenditure of public funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencia’s conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a population of
250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencia’s assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) but
also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article. 2 Both provisions must be read together in light of the
constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to
existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces under
the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.3 The actual population of the City of Makati during
the Senate deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to be enacted into R.A. No.
7854 was 508,174.4 That is why the Court in Mariano declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.5 (emphasis in the original)
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it
merely stated that Makati’s legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum
population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time presupposes that Makati must
still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of
a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population. There
is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to the income
requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.6 Notably, the ponencia spliced that
portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the ponencia quotes:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (emphasis and underscoring in the original by the
ponente)
It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts
as above 250,000. Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de
Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro’s first district have a total population
of 254,644 while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a
disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum population
requirement at the time of reappportionment. The ponencia’s construal of the disparity in population
sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the disparity of population in the
present case.
The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark was used
in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of Commissioner
Hilario Davide, Jr.7 reflects so.
x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. Each city or each province with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least
one Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative. x x x x The ordinance fixes at
200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among the provinces and cities
with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The
population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of
reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into
account the mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have at
least one representative, we at first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each for
all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in
accordance with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. x x x x.
(capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of 250,000 to
both cities and provinces in the initial apportionment, in proportion to the country’s total population at
that time (56 million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986
initial apportionment of the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmark’s application in
the present petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present population yardstick is. If the
present estimated population of 90 million is to be the dividend,8 then there would roughly be one
legislative district representative for every 450,000.
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000. This is
the average "uniform and progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus, using the present population
figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons per district. Using
anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360 representatives of
legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of population.
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and
Zamboanga Sibugay effected through Republic Act No. 93579 and Republic Act No.
9360,10 respectively. At the time of the congressional deliberations and effectivity of these laws, the
population count in these provinces more than met the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat already had a
population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year,11 while Zamboanga Sibugay met the population
threshold in 2001 with an estimated 503,700 headcount.12
The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a factor."13 Far from
it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial apportionment and
districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna, Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear
that population and contiguity were the primary considerations, and the extraneous factors
considered were circumspectly subsumed thereto.
The ponencia harps on petitioners’ admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX
legislative districts, given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing
wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is a wrong premise. It bears
noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A. 9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts. It did not,
however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily form
another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyo’s during the Senate Plenary
Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz: "When it comes to their district, congressmen are kings. We cannot
touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district of Rep.
Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it
touched."14
The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and progressive
ratio prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in Camarines
Sur based on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. 9716, it
suffered a very significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors15 cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting, particularly
the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic difference is a weak
basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction that as basis would see a
wholesale redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects being spoken. Imagine
Binondo being segregated from the Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the
ground that Fookien is largely spoken in Binondo.
The former first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur. But the
former fourth district (which is now the fifth) comprises the same percentage of land area, if not
bigger. If land area was a factor, then the former fourth district should have been re-districted also
since it is endowed with a big area like the former first district.
The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the first district. But so
is the municipality of Cabusao which is situated northeast of Libmanan and which is bordered by the
same body of water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new first district. Considering the similar
geographical location of the two municipalities, there is no compelling reason to segregate Libmanan
from the first district and tack it to the newly created second district.
The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims16 had already ruled that these factors cannot be permissively
considered in legislative reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for
judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic constitutional
standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the [State].
xxxx
[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We realize that it is a
practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of
residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional
requirement. So long as the divergences from a strict population principle are constitutionally
permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible
factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history
or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for
deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. x x
x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly, Camarines Sur’s malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.17
A final word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in the
composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitution’s clear
limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic
lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of
Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious
ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition

and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,

MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO

PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL

COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP,
AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have
authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws --
not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second
Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc,
affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives
as regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the
party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and
the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage

Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos

Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec
en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was
entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon,
was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that
the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the
literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would
defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking
the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-
ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28,
1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women
Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead,
it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the
52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of
the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system
should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the]
multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two
percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to
51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division)
hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly
situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of
names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as
party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP

35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section
5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution
No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules
and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List
System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two
percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this
method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the
12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous
Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis
of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that
(1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives;
and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties,
as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other
words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given
(1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or
(2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent
threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties,
three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict
application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the
constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with
three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its
Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by
RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were
more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38
parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any
other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No.
136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and
Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP;
and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in
amplification of their verbal arguments.14
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the
twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified
party be determined?
The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions
should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent

Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives

x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998
national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the
time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it
prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent
party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the
ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the
twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-
list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is
not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to
craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the
context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to
apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation
are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a
minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list
system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as
the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a
five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors.
There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other
parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our
proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about
20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the
Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are
many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we
are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to
open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that
people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a

multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the
implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will
open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty.
x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations
into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the
party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged
in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941,
we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as
"parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as
against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that
garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to
distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the
law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes
obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated in figures, a
party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party
that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to
one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems
arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20
percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just
described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats.
Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats
only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes
obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by
this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a
German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the
Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total
number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes
garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of
additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats

No. of additional
to be allocated
No. of votes of seats of party
x =
party concerned concerned
Total no. of votes of
(Integer.decimal)
qualified parties
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order
of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution
of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Votes Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5

3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4

6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3

13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining
more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen
qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like
the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent
for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably
pointed out by private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit
to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the
Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be
transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the
Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent
of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to
be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.
Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has
already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is
entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the
formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of
a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the
present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We
said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does
not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by
the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat.
Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
= first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off
is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party
shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total
number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest
rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives. 1âw phi 1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the
first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total
number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second
party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only
six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty
percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
Additional seats No. of votes of No. of additional

for concerned = concerned party x seats allocated to
party the first party
Total No. of votes
for party-list system
No. of votes of
first party
Total No. of
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed
as follows:
No. of votes
Additional seats of ABA No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of vites of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646

.64 or 0 additional seat, since
for concerned = x1=
rounding off is not to be applied
party (ABA) 503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial Additional Total

Garnered Total No. Seats
Votes of
Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.64
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.62
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 1
FEDERATION 0.61
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 1
0.51
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 1
0.47
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.47
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.47
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.46
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 =

0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 1
0.39
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 1
NATCCO 0.38
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 1

0.37
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would
result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve
other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit
through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no
more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the
formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because
it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power
and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the
propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing
body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an
amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the
strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits,
the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three
each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation"
mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total
failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed
a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the
implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some
time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as
a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a
clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno , J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza , J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
Footnotes
* At the outset of this case, I offered to inhibit myself from participating in these cases
because, prior to my appointment to this Court, I had been a general counsel and director of
one of the respondents. However, the Court unanimously resolved to deny my request for
the following reasons: (1) I was merely a voluntary non-compensated officer of the non-profit
Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), (2) the present case and its
antecedents were not extant during my incumbency at PCCI, and (3) this case involved
important constitutional questions, and the Court believed that all justices should as much as
possible participate and vote. This Court action was announced during the Oral Argument on
July 1, 1999.
1
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 62-71. Penned by Comm. Japal M. Guiani, concurred in by
Comm. Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Al. Haj.; with Pres. Comm. Julio F. Desamito,
dissenting.
2
People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Toward Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement (PAG-ASA) v. Comelec.
Rollo in GR No. 136781, pp. 81-109. Per curiam, concurred in by Comm. and Officer-in-
3
Charge Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Comms. Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M.
Marohombsar, Al. Haj. Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissented;
while Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe took no part, being "out of town."
4
See II Record of the Constitutional Commission 253.
5
§10, RA 7941.
6
Commission on Elections, Party-List Canvass Report No. 16 (By Rank); Assailed Comelec
en banc Resolution, p. 22.
7
Resolution No. 3047-C, September 9, 1998.
8
People's Reform Party (PRP), Ang Lakas OCW, KAMPIL, Maharlika, Women Power, Inc.,
NACUSIP, Aniban Ng Mga Magsasaka, Mangingisda at Manggagawa sa Agrikultura Inc., All
Trade Unions Congress Party (ATUCP), and Anak-Mindanao (AMIN).
9
More accurately, it should be "House of Representatives."
See Dissenting Opinion of Comm. T.D. Flores and the Memorandum for petitioners in GR
10
No. 136786 which was filed with the Court on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys. Hans Leo J.
Cacdac, Raissa H. Jajurie and Manuel Senar.
11
Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Japal M. Guiani and Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar.
Comms. Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores. Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe did
12
not vote, as he was "out of town."
The Petitions of PROMDI, ABANSE! PINAY and COOP-NATCCO were dismissed for
13
procedural deficiencies. SANLAKAS did not file any petition.
14
These consolidated cases were deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court
of Intervenor NACUSIP's Memorandum on July 20, 1999. This was signed by Attys. Froilan
M. Bacungan, Porfirio V. Sison and Zoilo V. de la Cruz. The writing of this Decision was,
however, assigned to this ponente only on September 26, 2000 during the deliberations and
verbal discussions of the contentious issues, wherein the Court, by majority vote, upheld his
then dissenting views.
15
§5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
In their Consolidated Memorandum filed on July 12, 1999 and signed by Attys. Rodante B.
16
Marcoleta, Jeremias U. Montemayor, R.A.V. Saguisag, Romeo G. Roxas and Katrina

Legarda-Santos, petitioners submitted this similar computation:
"208 : ¼ = 208/4 = 52 or 208 : 0.8 (0.20) = 52"
17
See the Concurring Opinion of Comm. Tancangco, in which she posits that the "strict
application" of the two percent threshold may become a "mathematical impossibility,"
because "52 seats multiplied by two percent yields a total of 104 percent." Though
theoretically imaginable, such feared impossibility will not ripen to a judicial controversy,
because two percent of the votes will never be achieved by each of 52 parties in the same
election. In short, the fear is purely academic. Besides, the mathematical impossibility
wrongly assumes that the Constitution requires all 52 seats to be filled up all the time. See
also Memorandum for private respondents dated July 9, 1999 and signed by Attys. Arturo M.
Tolentino, C. Fortunato R. Balasbas and Miguel Amador S.O. Camero.
18
II Record of the Senate 145, Second Regular Session, Ninth Congress.
19
Transcript, House of Representatives, November 22, 1994, p. 34.
20
II Record of the Constitutional Commission 256.
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Reviewer-Primer, 2nd
21
ed. (1992), p. 15.
22
§5, Article VI of the Constitution.
23
Quijano v. Development Board, 35 SCRA 270, October 16, 1970; Luzon Surety v. de
Garcia, 30 SCRA 111, October 31, 1969, cited in the Memorandum of the Solicitor General,
filed on July 12, 1999 and signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Cecilio O.
Estoesta and Sol. Ma. Antonia Edita C. Dizon.
24
Supra.
25
In its en banc Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, Comelec adopted this simple
formula, but discarded it in the assailed Resolutions.
26
In fairness, the Group of 38 explains these differences in the context of its concluding plea
to dilute the two percent threshold. See Memorandum for private respondents, pp. 44-46.
214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992; 219 SCRA 329, March 1, 1993 (Resolution on the
27
Motion for Reconsideration).
See Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756,
28
November 18, 1998.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4, 1996;
29
Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, 786, November 18, 1998; People v. Court of
Appeals and Casan Maquiling, GR No. 128986, June 21, 1999.
30
§2 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
31
Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I. Prefatory Statement
The case at bar is one of first impression and of immense difficulty. The constitutional issues
involved are full of slippery slopes but the most difficult one concerns the apportionment of additional
seats to the parties that hurdled the 2% threshold requirement. There is much to be admired in the
mathematical formula forwarded by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, but
with due respect, I find more attractive the majority formula, crafted with equal expertise by another
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio Panganiban. To be sure, the two formulae may be faulted
by mathematicians obsessed with exactitude but the fault lies with the inexactitude of the law itself.
However it may be, I join the majority of my brethren for I find its geometry of the phrase
"proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system" more expressive of the
spirit of the Constitution, albeit, arguable.
II. Issues
The case at bar, however, is suffused with other significant constitutional issues. They are:
1. Is it a mandatory requirement that a party/organization/coalition should obtain at least 2%

of the total votes cast for the party-list system to be entitled to a seat?
2. Is it mandatory to fill up all the 52 seats allotted for the party-list representatives of the
House of Representatives as provided for under Article VI, Sec. 5(2) of the 1987
Constitution? If so, how are the seats to be allocated?
3. Whether Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution requires that every time the number of
district representatives is increased from 200 there should be a corresponding increase in
the number of party-list representatives so that, as there are now 208 district representatives,
there should be 52 party-list representatives constituting 20% of the total number of
members of the House of Representatives;
4. Whether the 2% threshold requirement in Section 11(b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional;
and
5. Whether the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b), R.A. 7941 is not unconstitutional.
In addition to the scholarly disquisitions of the majority opinion, I humbly offer the following:
III. Submissions
A. The 2% threshold requirement
Respondent Commission refused to give a strict and literal interpretation to the 2% requirement of
Section 11 of R.A. 7941 on the ground that it runs contrary to the Constitution and the law which is
"to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives," "to represent the broadest sector of the Philippine society," and "to encourage
multi-party system." It likewise proffered the thesis that to allow only the 13 proclaimed
parties/organization to be represented in the House of Representatives will result in the
concentration of party-list representation to only a few sectors, namely urban poor, veterans, women
and peasantry. Thus, respondent Commission holds that all the sectors should be equally
represented and hence should be given one seat each.
Like the majority of the brethren, I cannot support such a stance. The Record of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, as well as that of the Senate deliberations, will clearly disclose a
specific intent to impose a minimum percentage of votes to be obtained, that is, at least two
(2%) percent of the total votes cast nationwide, in order that a party/organization/coalition
under the party-list system may have a seat in the House of Representatives. I quote relevant
excerpts from the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
"a) MR. MONSOD. x x x Anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the
50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the
vote.
"What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no
reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group,
should not have a voice in the National Assembly. x x x If each of them gets only one percent or five
of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if
they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent
of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list
system.
"We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same
time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get
a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly.1
"b) MR. MONSOD. x x x When these parties register with the COMELEC, they would
simultaneously submit a list of the people who would sit in case they win the required
number of votes in the order in which they place them. x x x If they win the required number
of votes, let us say they win 400,000 votes, then they will have one seat. If they win 2 million
votes, then they will have five seats.2
"c) MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society
through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and
operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of
classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would
like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral
groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. When we talk about
limiting it, if there are two parties, then we are opening it up to the extent of 30 seats. We are
amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody
who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast
their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody
who has a constituency of 500,000 votes, nationwide, deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per
family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are
many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What
we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it
is our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve
seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats
within that system.3
"d) MR. TADEO. x x x Ngayon, sa ganitong kalagayan, gusto ko po lamang ipaliwanag ang
party list. Ang ibig sabihin nito, doon sa ilalim ng two-party system, kapag kumuha ka ng 51
percent, iyong ibang partido ay wala nang nakuhang puwesto sa legislature. Ang ibig sabihin
ng party list system, makakuha ka lamang ng 2.5 percent ay mayroon ka nang isang
puwesto.4
Similarly, I call attention to the pertinent debates in the Senate, viz.:
"a) Senator Gonzales: Yes, Mr. President. But nonetheless, if his party qualifies, at least, for
the minimum number of the requirement to be entitled to a seat, then he would be
proclaimed by the Commission as having been elected under the party-list system.5
"b) Senator Gonzales: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was
raised by, I think, Senator Osmena when he said that a political party must have obtained at
least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the
party-list system.
"They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate
political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through
the backdoor under the name of party-list system, Mr. President.6
"c) Senator Tolentino: x x x Mr. President, the required number of votes here refers to the
votes that will qualify it for certain number of representatives. The phrase "required number
of votes" simply means here the number of votes that will qualify it to have a certain number
of representatives in the House of Representatives.7
"d) Senator Gonzales: Would not all of them be entitled to a proportionate seat in the three
categories allocated for the party-list members?
"Senator Tolentino: If they do not receive the votes that would be needed in order to give them a
proportionate number of seats, then, of course, they would not have any seat in the category in
which they are.
"Senator Gonzales: That is why in my interpellation during our last session, I suggested that,
probably, it would be better to set a minimum percentage of votes to be received by them in order to
qualify for a seat so that we can, more or less, limit the party-list members to those who obtain a
substantial portion of the votes cast, Mr. President.8
"e) Senator Gonzales: x x x The idea is to open the system so that it is not all or nothing.
Kahit na hindi manalo ang kaniyang kandidato but he obtained at least the minimum number
of votes cast, which I would propose later in order to ensure that only those with a more or
less substantial following can be represented, then the purpose of party-list system has
already been achieved.9
"f) Senator Gonzales: My amendment, Mr. President, will be x x x add the following:
"Provided, however that a political party or group whether national, regional, or sectoral must
obtain at least two (2) percent of the votes cast to be entitled to a seat."
"Senator Tolentino: A minimum of 2 percent of what?
"Senator Gonzales: My initial position, Mr. President, is the total votes cast nationwide. At least, it
would have a right to demand representation. Imagine a political party obtaining only 10,000 votes
nationwide, it is already entitled to a seat. I do not think that is doing justice to the representative
system.10
"g) Senator Gonzales: x x x We said that in the minimum number of votes for a political
party, whether national or regional or a sectoral organization to be entitled to the party list, it
must have received at least 2 percent of the votes cast in that category."11
The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:

1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;12
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are
very low, from participating in the elections;13
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system ;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within
the system;14
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President
of the Philippines;15
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who
have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor
under the name of the party-list system;16 and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.17
We are not at liberty to pass judgment on the wisdom of the law. The principle of separation of
powers prohibits this Court from engaging in judicial legislation. Both the legislative intent and the
language of the law as to the 2% threshold requirement are clear and unambiguous. It leaves no
room for further interpretation. It demands our obeisance.
Respondent Commission is of the mind that the sectoral groups have a vested right to a seat in the
House of Representatives. It assumes that this is mandated by the law which aims to provide a
party-list system where the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society can actively
participate and attain the broadest possible representation in the House of Representatives. The
assumption cannot stand scrutiny.
First, in order that a sectoral group or party can participate under the party-list system, it should
comply with certain statutory requirements such as the filing, before the Comelec, of a manifestation
(Section 4) and a petition (Section 5) expressing its intent to participate in the party-list system.
Comelec is required to verify and review such petition, and is empowered to refuse or cancel the
registration of a sectoral party on grounds stated in the law.
Second, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission and the Senate, it was clear that
the party-list system is not synonymous with that of sectoral representation. Sectoral representation
means that certain sectors would have reserved seats; under the party-list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors.18 The party-list system recognizes the right of sectoral parties or
organizations to register. Nonetheless, it only enables these sectors to be part of the party, if they
have the capacity, but it does not reserve any seat for the sectors. To stress, it is not a reserve seat
system.19
Third, the framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages
in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through an outright
constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral representatives and no
further. Thereafter, they have to earn their seats through participation in the party-list system. Thus:
"MR. OPLE. x x x The ideal manner of securing functional representation is through a party
list system through popular suffrage so that when sectoral representatives get into a
legislative body on this basis, rather than direct regional or district representation, they can
rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather
than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines. I think, therefore,
this proposed amendment now meets this test. There is an outright constitutional gift for the
first two terms of the sectoral representatives but, after that, they will have to earn the seats
through participation in a party list system or, even beyond that, to be direct competitors with
established and more orthodox parties in the general political arena. I see no reason why
after having occupied seats in the House of Representatives for two terms, the
representatives of the sectors may not be able to combine their forces in order to form their
own political parties or become powerful adjuncts to existing political parties so that they will
enjoy not only the benefits of a party list system but also the benefits of being able to
compete directly in the wider political arena.
"x x x And after two or three terms, then they will be in a position to take full advantage of the party
list system so that on the basis of two-and-a-half percent or two percent of all the qualified voters in
the country, one seat is earned x x x. Let us assume that the representatives of these organizations
x x x occupy the seats for two terms, will not six years be enough for them to amalgamate their
forces if there is enough basis of unification so that, from their platform in the legislature, they can,
through a party list system, amass as many seats as are available now outside territorial
representation? And beyond that, they can even rise to the level of a major political party able to
compete for territorial representation both for the Senate and the House of Representatives.
"x x x Therefore, I support this amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift,
but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system, and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable
of contesting political power in the constitutional arena for major political parties."20
Fourth, the objective of the party-list system is not alone to provide representation to sectoral
groups but also to accord proportionate representation for political parties participating in the
election, so that those political parties whose candidates did not win in any district but obtained a
substantial amount of the votes cast by the people will not be completely denied representation in
the House.21
Fifth, in the Senate, it was proposed that all the sectors mentioned in the law should be entitled to at
least one seat each.22 This proposal was not approved for it is nowhere to be found in the present
law. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the lawmakers did not contemplate a reserve seat system for
the sectoral groups. Verily, the ruling of respondent Commission that the party-list groups from rank
nos. 1 to 51 shall be given one seat each so that all sectors are represented runs contrary to the
intendment of the legislature.
There is no constitutional right to win elections, only the constitutional right to equal opportunity
to participate in and influence the selection of candidates. It is not a violation of equal protection to
deny legislative seats to losing candidates. The fact that minorities or interest groups in an electoral
unit find themselves consistently outvoted and without a person elected from their particular group is
no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that the complaining
minority or interest group has been denied access to the political system.23
And neither can the sectoral groups claim discrimination simply because they failed to get a seat in
the House of Representatives. It is not enough to prove that some of the sectors are not represented
because the party or organization representing them failed to win in the elections. It must be shown
that the party-list system was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further discriminate
against them.24
In the past, it cannot be gainsaid that there was a hostility against sectoral groups as their unelected
representatives were criticized as people who owed their seats to a constitutional provision and
could not rise to the same status or dignity as those elected by the people.25 This criticism was laid to
rest with the passage of the party-list system where sectoral representatives had to undergo an
election. To be sure, these sectoral candidates were given a favored treatment. During the Senate
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1913, which later became R.A. 7941, Senator Tolentino
emphatically declared that the purpose of the party-list system is "to give access to the House those
who are considered as marginal political groups that cannot elect a representative in one district, but
when taken together nationally, they may be able to have a representative."26 But while given a
favored treatment, the sectoral candidates were not guaranteed seats. Indeed, the party-list system
was devised to replace the reserve seat system. For unlike the reserve seat system which assured
sectoral groups of a seat in the House of Representatives, the party-list system merely provides for a
mechanism by which the sectoral groups can run for election as sectoral representatives. The very
essence of the party-list system is representation by election.
The lack of success in the elections is not indicative of a lack of access to the political system but
rather from a failure of the parties/organizations to turn out as many of the voters as will enable them
to meet the required number of votes. The access guideline touches upon whether the political
processes are open to minorities or sectoral groups, not on whether such groups are successful
once access has been obtained.27 The party-list system was conceived in order to open the system
to sectoral representation, but it does not warrant representation for these sectors with absolute
certainty.
Finally, Section 6 of R.A. 7941 provides that the Comelec may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party if it fails to obtain at least two percent of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. If a
sectoral party cannot even register when it fails to obtain the 2% required number of votes, with
more reason that it should not be entitled to get a seat in the House of Representatives. An absurdity
may arise where a sectoral party which failed to meet the 2% threshold is given a seat in the House
but is actually disqualified for registration and therefore has no legal personality and standing as
such.
B. The 20% membership requirement for sectoral representatives
Respondent Commission held that a restriction on the allocation of seats only to those obtaining the
2% threshold will prevent compliance with the purported constitutional and statutory mandate that
the party-list representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives, including the party list. The ruling is predicated on the supposition that the 20%
requirement is mandatory and that the law requires that all the seats apportioned to sectoral
representatives must be filled up.
Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members x x x who shall be elected from
legislative districts, x x x and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." The record of the ConCom will
show that the delegates considered this provision as a grant of authority to the legislature, and
hence should not be viewed as either directory or mandatory.28
Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof, that "the party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list." Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of law must be read in harmony with the other provisions.
Consequently, subparagraph (2) should be accorded a similar treatment as subparagraph (1), i.e.,
that it is neither directory nor mandatory, but simply a grant of legislative authority.
In the exercise of such authority, Congress passed R.A. 7941 which contains exactly the same
provision as that found in the Constitution. The query is whether Congress intended the 20%
requirement as a ceiling or whether it intended all the seats allocated to sectoral groups to be filled
up. Section 5 of Article VI, as originally worded, provides that "the sectoral or party-list
representatives shall in no case exceed twenty percent of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives." From the language thereof, it is clear that the framers intended to simply impose a
ceiling. Nevertheless, in its final form, the phrase "in no case exceed" was deleted. Does this mean
then that the 20% requirement was meant to be mandatory? A perusal of the Record of the ConCom
will negate this implication, thus:
"MR. GASCON. In the Gentleman’s proposal, he has replaced the words ‘SHALL APPOINT" by
"MAY APPOINT" which means there is a possibility that the President will not appoint. Will it not be
best that to make that assurance - since it was the intent, I believe, during our deliberation that either
we should write an ordinance with regard to sectoral representation or encourage an appointment by
the President - we change the words "MAY APPOINT" to "SHALL APPOINT"?
"x x x xxx xxx
"MR. MONSOD. x x x I would be more comfortable by just saying: "THE PRESIDENT MAY FILL."
"The President may have her commitments to labor and the peasant sector. But a directive on this
point may in fact be counterproductive because she may not have the full period to look into how to
implement the selection. If we do it that way, the President may be hurried into a selection because
she has to comply with it by July and it may not be a good or meaningful selection. It may be
necessary that there will be, as Commissioner Lerum said, various congresses in order to make it a
real systematic choice. I do not know if there is enough time. But why do we not leave it to the
President to determine if there is time to do this properly?"29
The word "may" was used in the final version of the Constitution. Ostensibly, ConCom wanted to
give the President the discretion whether to appoint sectoral representatives or not. If the President
does not, then there can be vacancies in the seats allocated for sectoral representatives. Perforce,
such an eventuality is not highly improbable and cannot thus be disregarded or ignored.
The Senate deliberations on the matter are more revealing:
"1) Senator Alvarez: But, Mr. President, we already have a ceiling of 20 percent for party-list
representatives.30
"2) Senator Herrera: So that if there will only be two organizations participating, even if we
have to give them the maximum, these two organizations will only be entitled to ten seats,
and that will be less than the number of 25 seats that are supposed to be covered under the
party list system.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President. That is what is going to happen if we limit to five seats. But
as had been brought out in the interpellations last night, if we use as a basis the total number of
votes cast for the parties that are participating in the party-list system of election, then, perhaps,
there would be no need of a limitation to five seats because the proportion can be strictly applied.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Senator Maceda: Mr. President, just on this point. In the example given, if a party gets a certain
percentage of votes that should entitle it to seven seats or eight seats and then it is cut down to five
seats - the first computation will be to compute the percentage of all the parties, and they get a
corresponding number of seats - what happens to the excess since there is a limitation on five
seats?
"Senator Tolentino: What is going to happen is, there may be vacancies under this system.
"Senator Maceda: I just wanted to clarify that.
"Senator Tolentino: That is why, I think, the basis must always be the total number of votes and give
them what is due them in the mathematical proportion.
"Senator Maceda: But even based on the total number of votes, we may have one or two major
parties or major labor organizations, for that matter, really getting more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: Yes, that is going to happen, Mr. President, if there is no limitation. But the
alternative is we will have some vacancies in the House of Representatives.
"Senator Maceda: Because the alternative to vacancies, if it is so provided in the law, would be to
further redistribute the vacancies. After providing for the parties that get a maximum of five seats,
then the excess could be reapportioned among all the parties that would not be getting the maximum
of five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That could be expressly provided for.
"Senator Maceda: Yes, that could be the other alternative. But as framed now, the result would be
that there would be vacancies if some parties get more than five seats.
"Senator Tolentino: That is right, Mr. President.31
It bears to stress that in imposing a limitation on the number of seats to which a sectoral group or
organization may be entitled, the lawmakers anticipated that vacancies will occur. To obviate the
possibility, it was proposed in the Senate that "the excess of seats, if any, shall be proportionally
allotted to the participants entitled to a smaller number of seats." The purpose was to distribute
proportionately the excess seats to those who are lower in rank.32 The proposal was approved in the
Senate, but was not included in the final version of the law. Hence, it stands to reason that the
lawmakers did not intend to fill up the entire 20% allotted to the sectoral groups. This is not at all
surprising given the sentiment shared among members of the House of Representatives against
sectoral representation.33
Respondent Commission further held that allocating the seats only to those obtaining the 2%
threshold will prevent compliance with the alleged constitutional mandate that the party-list
representatives shall be composed of 20% of the entire membership of the House of
Representatives. Again, I beg to disagree for it unduly assumes that the 2% threshold is not
mandatory and that it is essential to fill up the entire 20% of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives. In effect, the respondent Commission effectively voids the 2% threshold using the
mandatory or directory nature of certain provisions of the law. This is too artificial a technique of
interpretation for what we ought to decipher is the real legislative intent, which can only be
ascertained from the nature and object of the act, and the consequences which would result from
construing it one way or another.34 Using these guidelines, it is clear that the 2% threshold is
mandatory while the 20% requirement is but a ceiling.
A corollary issue raised is whether Article VI, Section 5(2) of the Constitution requires that everytime
the number of district representatives is increased from 200 there shall be a corresponding increase
in the number of party-list representatives. The answer can be found in the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission, to wit:
"MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question. Is the intent of the proposal of Commissioner Monsod
to maintain the ratio of 80 percent legislative district and 20 percent party list representatives on a
constant basis?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. GASCON. Regardless of the number of legislative representatives and the number of the party
list representatives?
"MR. MONSOD. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer."
Similarly, the Senate records reveal the following exchange between Senator Osmena and Senator
Tolentino:
"Senator Osmena: x x x Going to paragraph (2), it states:
"The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
And paragraph (1) states:
"The House shall be composed of not more than 250 members. Twenty percent of 250 would be 50.
Is that the total number to be elected? Or is it 20 percent of the existing membership of the House
which, I think, is 207?
"The membership of the House is changing because every time we enact a law creating a province,
a new member is added. Like in the case of Mandaluyong, a newly created city, a new member is
added.
"As a matter of fact, we have a bill before us - which I do not think is the right thing to do - which
creates one more seat in Makati through the operation of a simple law and not through
reapportionment.
"In effect, Mr. President, the number of members of the House is not static. It can change from time
to time. It can increase or it can even conceivably decrease if there are mergers.
"What is the 20 percent going to be based on, Mr. President?

"Senator Tolentino: The 20 per centum would be what is provided already by law. I think the creation
of new cities may not automatically involve an increase in the number of members of the House but
may have to wait until a new district is provided by law, Mr. President.
"In other words, if that is the interpretation, then the membership will remain the same.
"But if we take a different view that every city or every new province is entitled, by the Constitution
itself, to a member, that means the number will actually change depending upon the number of seats
that we add by the creation of new urbanized cities or new provinces.
"That will mean that in every election where there is a party list system, the computation of the
number of seats for the party list will change."35
Upon further clarification by Senator Lina, it was explained by Senator Tolentino that it will not be a
fixed and definite number of seats but that the party-list representatives shall constitute a given
percentage of the total number of the Members of the House of Representatives to be elected
including those under the party-list.36
C. The 3-seat limitation
The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as many party groups as
possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of
giving as much as possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated.37 The purpose is to allow as
many as possible of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to have a seat
in Congress,38 and to have enough seats left for those who are way below the list.39 There is nothing
offensive to this requirement as to warrant a declaration of unconstitutionality. Indeed, the parties do
not attack this provision as legally infirmed.
IV. Conclusion
The party list-system of election is one of the major innovations in our 1987 Constitution. The system
gives the poor and the powerless in our society a fighting chance to elect representatives in
Congress who will act as their real mouthpieces. In a country like ours where vested interest reigns
and may reign till kingdom come, this rare opportunity given by the Constitution to our less privileged
people should be re-examined so that the exercise of the privilege will not be diluted by
undemocratic restraints. R.A. 7941 while brimming with good intention can stand a lot of
improvements. Hopefully, the bills filed and that may still be filed in Congress improving R.A. 7941
may bring about the day when our democracy will be more vibrant, as they who have less in life will
have more in law because they themselves can make the law.
I vote with the majority.
Footnotes
1 Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, pp. 85-86.
2 Id., p. 253.
3 Id., p. 256.
4 Id., p. 562.
5 Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, p. 143.
6 Id., p. 145.
7 Id., No. 34, p. 164.
8 Id., p. 186.
9 Id., p. 343.
10 Id., No. 37, p. 349.
11 Id., No. 40, p. 511.
12 Id., p. 500.
13 Id., p. 501.
14 Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 256.
15 Id., p. 567.
17 Id., No. 37, p. 343.
18 Record of the ConCom, Vol. II, p. 85.
19 Id., p. 253.
20 Id., pp. 567-568.
21 Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 37, pp. 342-343.
22 Id., p. 352.
23 Shapiro v. State of Maryland, 336 F.Supp. 1205 (1972).
24 Nevett, et al. v. Sides, et al., 571 F.2d 209 (1978).
25 Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 332.
27 Clark, et al. v. Marengo County, et al., 469 F. Supp. 1150 (1979).

28 Record of the ConCom, Vol. V, p. 80.
29 Id., p. 335.
31 Id., No. 34, p. 159.
32 Id., No. 37, pp. 195, 344.
33 See: Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 32, p. 129; No. 37, p. 351.
34Menssen, et al. v. Eureka Unit Dist. No. 140, Woodford County, et al., 388 N.E.2d 273
(1979).
35 Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 33, pp. 137-138.
36 Id., No. 37, pp. 349-350.
37 Id., No. 32, p. 126.
38 Id., No. 33, p. 139.
39 Id., No. 34, p. 159.
DISSENTING
MENDOZA, J.:
My disagreement with the majority is in respect of its computation of the number of seats to which
the parties, organizations, and coalitions, which obtained more than 2 percent of the votes for the
party-list system are entitled to have under the Constitution and the implementing law, R.A. No.
7941. Beyond affirming the election of the 14 party-list representatives as the majority does, I
contend that 25 more should be proclaimed to give each of the winning parties, organizations, and
coalitions the maximum three seats allowed by law, thus bringing the total number of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives to 39. I am afraid that today’s ruling, denying
additional seats to the winning groups, bodes ill for the future of the party-list system in this country.
To be sure, those who drafted the Constitution simply sketched out the basic features of proportional
representation, leaving it to Congress to flesh out the bare bones of an idea. The record of the
Constitutional Commission shows:
MR. RODRIGO: Then, I will propound my question to Commissioner Monsod whose name appears
as number one in the list.
My question have reference to the party list system and the sectoral representation in the House of
Representatives. I would like to preface my questions by stating that I am in favor of the basic idea
of having sectoral representation and representation by means of the party list in the House of
Representatives. However, from the very beginning, I already expressed my misgivings about the
mechanics, the practicableness of this idea. I think this is in line with the thinking of the
Constitutional Commission on this matter. We like this party list and sectoral representation, if they
can be implemented properly. And we should leave to the legislature the enactment of the
implementing laws or the enabling acts. The legislature will have more time to study the problem on
how this can be implemented. The legislature can go into details on the mechanics. This we cannot
do in the Constitutional Commission because a Constitution must be brief, concise and broad.
So, I am very glad when I read this proposed amendment which stated twice the phrase "AS
PROVIDED BY LAW." . . .
And so, my first question is: In the light of the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," do I take it that this
party list system and the sectoral representation provision will not take effect until an enabling act or
an implementing legislation shall have been enacted by Congress?
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, the first Assembly will be in March or April. But when we say "AS
PROVIDED BY LAW," it could really mean that it may be by ordinance appended to this Constitution
or an executive order by the incumbent President or, as the Gentleman has said, by law provided by
the incoming Congress. So, it could be any of these ways.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, we are all witnesses to the difficulty in arriving at a consensus of
these very novel ideas on the disputes that we have had. And up to now, there is no real consensus
yet. Does the Commissioner believe that we should really try to go into the details by enacting an
ordinance to the Constitution? In other words, should we force the issue? Should we insist that
before this Constitution is submitted to the people in a plebiscite, we shall have already defined the
details on how this party list system and sectoral representation can be implemented in the first
election after the ratification of the Constitution?
MR. MONSOD: We just want to establish the principle of the party list system with sectoral
representation in the present Constitution. We can discuss whether the body in its collective wisdom
feels that it is qualified or should go into the ordinance after we have established the principle, and
we will be guided by the vote or judgment of this Commission.1
When the fundamental law, therefore, emerged from the Commission, Art. VI, §5 merely provided:
SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law except the religious
sector.
Pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941 which in pertinent
parts provides:
SEC. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
....
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Rep. Tito R. Espinosa, co-sponsor of the bill which became R.A. No. 7941, explained that the
system embodied in the law was largely patterned after the mixed party-list system in Germany.
Indeed, the decision to use the German model is clear from the exchanges in the Constitutional
Commission between Commissioners Blas F. Ople and Christian S. Monsod.2 The difference
between our system and that of Germany is that whereas in Germany half (328) of the seats in the
Bundestag are filled by direct vote and the other half (328) are filled through the party-list system, in
our case the membership of the House of Representatives is composed of 80 percent district and 20
percent party-list representatives.
The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in
Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining the number of
seats a party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number of votes
obtained by each party and then the product should be divided by the sum total of the second votes
obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes. First, each party receives
one seat for each whole number resulting from the calculation. The remaining seats are then
allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted
in R.A. No. 7941, §11. As Representative Espinosa said:
MR. ESPINOSA: [T]his mathematical computation or formula was patterned after that of Niemeyer
formula which is being practiced in Germany as formerly stated. As this is the formula or
mathematical computation which they have seen most fit to be applied in a party-list system. This is
not just a formula arrived at because of suggestions of individual Members of the Committee but
rather a pattern which was already used, as I have said, in the assembly of Germany.3
The rules in §11 require a four-step process of distributing the seats for the party-list system. Using
the results of the last elections, the application of the rules in §11 is as follows:
Step 1. R.A. No. 7941, §11 states that "the parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections."
The first step, therefore, is to rank the groups taking part in the election for party-list seats and get
the total number of votes cast for all of them. Then determine which of them obtained at least 2
percent of the total votes cast. The application of this rule shows that only 13 parties, organizations,
and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes (9,155,309) cast for the party-list system.
Step 2. R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "the parties, organizations, or coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each."
Since only 13 parties, organizations, and coalitions obtained at least 2 percent of the total votes cast,
only they should initially get one seat each. The results of applying Steps 1 and 2 are shown in Table
1:
Table 1
DETERMINATION OF 2 PERCENTERS AND INITIAL

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS TO THEM
Percentage of
Actual votes Guaranteed
Group votes cast for
received seat
party-list
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1
4. VETERANS FEDERATION 304,902 3.33% 1
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1
7. NCSFO 338,303 2.60% 1
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1
14. SENIOR CITIZENS 143,444 1.57% 1
15. Other Parties 5,582,427 Each with
less than
2%
Total 9,155,309 100% 13
Step 3. R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The initial allocation
of seats to the 13 parties and organizations which obtained at least 2 percent of the votes leaves 39
seats (52 minus 13) available for further distribution. How should this be done? As stated earlier,
Congress adopted the Niemeyer formula for distributing seats in the Bundestag.
Accordingly, the number of additional seats to which a 2 percenter is entitled should be determined
by multiplying the number of seats remaining by the total number of votes obtained by that party and
dividing the product by the total number of votes (3,429,438) garnered by all the 2 percenters. The 2
percenters are each entitled to the additional seats equivalent to the integer portion of the resulting
product. Thus, APEC will have five additional seats computed as follows:
39 x 503,487
= 5.73
3,429,438
The result of the application of this formula is shown in Column 4 of Table 2, with 32 seats (the sum
of the integer portions of the resulting products) being apportioned among the 2 percenters. The
seats remaining after the distribution of seats in accordance with Step 3 should be distributed to the
two percenters in the descending order of the decimal portions of the products shown in Column 4.
This distribution of the remaining seats is shown in Column 5.
Table 2
SECOND DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Guaranteed Additional Extra Total

Total votes
Group seats seats seats
obtained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7

2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,902 1 3.47 4

FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4

9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,438 13 32 7 52
It may be asked why, despite the fact that most of the parties have already exceeded the three-seat
limit while the rest have obtained three seats, the computation is still brought forward. The answer is
that it is possible that every party will get three or more seats after following the procedure in Step 3.
The only reason why, in the cases at bar, the results seem to make the distribution of excess seats
superfluous is that the 2 percenters are not sufficiently numerous.
Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives, which at present are
52. Thus, Art. VI, §5(2) of the Constitution that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." This provision
thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in
fact all seats reserved for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law
limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio, the entire
number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting the number of seats initially distributed to
the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
The above formula is similar to that used by this Court in determining the proportional representation
of political parties in the Commission on Appointments of Congress. Art. VI, §18 of the Constitution
provides that the Commission shall be composed of "the President of the Senate as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein." In Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales,4 this Court held:5
As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Senate is composed of the following
members or Senators representing the respective political affiliations:
LDP - 15 senators
NPC - 5 senators
LAKAS-NUCD - 3 senators
LP-PDP-LABAN - 1 senator
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follows:
No. of senators of a political party

x 12 seats
Total No. of senators elected
the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional representation of each
political party with elected representatives in the Senate, is as follows:
Political Party/ Proportional

Membership
Political Coalition Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members
NPC 5 2.5 members

LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
Step 4. Finally, R.A. No. 7941, §11 provides that "each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats." Hence, the 2 percenters, which are determined to be
entitled to more than three seats are finally allotted three seats each, or 38 seats in all, as shown in
Column 8 of Table 3. This incidentally leaves 13 seats in the House of Representatives for the party-
list vacant.
Table 3
FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Party/organization/ Total number of Seats in excess Total number

coalition seats obtained of 3 seats allowed
1. APEC 7 4 3
2. ABA 5 2 3
3. ALAGAD 4 1 3
4. VETERANS 4 1 3
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 4 1 3
6. AKO 4 1 3
7. NCSFO 4 1 3
8. ABANSE! PINAY 4 1 3
9. AKBAYAN! 4 1 3
10. BUTIL 3 - 3
11. SANLAKAS 3 - 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 3 - 3
13. COCOFED 3 - 3
TOTAL 52 13 39
On the basis of the foregoing computations, I reach the following conclusions:
1. The proclamation by the COMELEC of the 13 parties, which obtained at least 2 percent of
the votes cast for the party-list system, should be affirmed.
2. The 13 parties should be given two (2) additional seats, with the exception of APEC which
should be allotted only one (1) additional seat, thus giving each party the maximum three (3)
seats allowed by law, on the basis of votes obtained by them in proportion to the votes cast
for all of them. This means a total of 25 party-list representatives belonging to the 13 parties
will be added to the 14 now in office, bringing to 39 the total number of party-list
representatives in the House.
3. The decision of the COMELEC en banc allocating seats to 38 other parties, all of which
failed to obtain at least 2 percent of the total votes cast, is set aside.
4. The proclamation of 25 additional party-list representatives will leave 13 seats for party-list
representatives vacant. While Art. VI, §5(b) of the Constitution fixes a ratio of 80 percent
district to 20 percent party-list representatives, does not really require that all seats allotted to
party-list representatives - at present 52 - be filled.
The results of the application of the foregoing steps are summarized and explained in the
Consolidated Table appended to this opinion.
II
The majority holds that "the Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no
application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character
of the twenty percent allocation." Claiming that it is "obvious that the Philippine style party-list system
is a unique model which demands an equally unique formula," the majority instead allocates seats to
the winning groups in a manner which cannot be justified in terms of the rules in §11. While it
disavows any intention to "reinvent or second-guess [the law]," the majority in reality does so and in
the process engages in a bit of judicial legislation.
First. In determining the number of seats to which the first party is entitled, the majority applies the
"one seat for every 2 percent" rule.6 But after once applying the rule to the highest ranking party, the
majority does not apply it to the rest of the 2 percenters. Indeed, it cannot consistently do so
because it is mathematically impossible to require that the 52 seats for party-list representatives be
filled at the rate of 2 percent per seat. That would mean that the votes needed to win the 52 seats is
104 percent of the votes cast in the election. The majority admits this. It says that its "formula will be
applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be
used to determine the additional seats of the other qualified parties."
If the formula applies only to the first party, then it is no formula at all because it is incapable of
consistent and general application. It is even iniquitous. If a party got 5.5 percent of the votes and is
given two (2) seats, it is hard to see why the next ranking party, which got 5 percent of the votes
should get only one (1) seat.
Indeed, the law does not distinguish between the first ranking party and the rest of the other 2
percenters insofar as obtaining additional seats are concerned. The law provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes." The operative word is "their" which refers to none other than the total
number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. The plain language of the law is that the basis for the
allocation of additional seats is the total number of votes cast for the 2 percenters. This rule applies
to all parties obtaining more than 2 percent of the votes cast for the winning parties.
Second. In determining the additional seats for the 2 percenters after determining the number of
seats for the first ranking party, the majority uses the following formula:
Additional seats No of votes of No. of additional

= x
for concerned concerned party seats allocated to the
party first party
No. of votes of
first party
R.A. No. 7941, §11 requires the determination of two types of proportions. The first is the
determination of the proportion of the votes obtained by a party in relation to the total number of
votes cast for the party-list. The purpose of the rule is to determine whether a party was able to
hurdle the 2 percent threshold. The second is the determination of number of votes a party obtained
in proportion to the number of votes cast for all the parties obtaining at least 2 percent of the votes.
The purpose for determining the second proportion is to allocate the seats left after the initial
allocation of one (1) seat each to every 2 percenter. The total number of votes obtained by a party in
relation to the total number of votes obtained by all 2 percenters is multiplied by the remaining
number of seats.
If an analogy is needed to explain this formula, the remaining 39 seats may be likened to a pie to be
distributed among the 2 percenters. The way to distribute it is to use the weight of their individual
votes in relation to their total number of votes. There is no reason for using the number of votes of
the first party as a divisor since it is not the votes obtained by the first ranking party which are being
distributed.
In truth, §11 does not say that those garnering more than 2 percent of the votes "shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to the number of additional seats given to the highest ranking party."
What it says is that such additional seats must be "in proportion to their total number of votes," the
antecedent of "their" being "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes."
Third. I see no legal or logical basis for the majority’s fixation with designating the highest ranking
participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to
be allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats of the so-called first party. One will search
in vain the proceedings of both Houses of Congress for a discussion of this procedure or even just a
reference to it. There is none.
Fourth. Still it is argued that there should be a distinction between the number of seats for the first
ranking party and those for the rest of the 2 percenters. As an example, the majority cites the case of
a first ranking party obtaining 20 percent of the votes and the second ranking party obtaining 6
percent of the votes. According to the majority, to give the two parties the same number of seats
would be to violate the "proportional representation parameter."
As already stated, however, the majority’s inordinate concern with the first ranking party is not
consistently carried to the other 2 percenters. The result is that if the first ranking party obtains 5.99
percent of the total votes cast, the second ranking party 5.98 percent, and the last ranking party 2.0
percent, under the majority’s formula, the .01 percent difference between the first and the second
ranking party will justify the difference of one (1) seat between them. However, the 3.98 percent
difference between the second ranking party and the last ranking party is disregarded by the
majority. Indeed, even under the majority’s novel formula of proportional representation, its own
parameters are violated.
Fifth. In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1
seat for every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2) with respect to the
rest of the 2 percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets at least six
percent, in which case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party
should get an extra seat. I cannot see how this formula could have been intended by Congress. Only
in a Pickwickian sense can the result of the application of such "formula" be considered proportional
representation.
Sixth. The formula adopted by the majority effectively deprives party-list representatives of
representation considering that it eliminates the ratio 4 district representatives to 1 party-list
representative in the House. This is so because, under the rule formulated by the majority, it
becomes very difficult to reach the ceiling of 20 percent of the House. In the case at bar, to fill 52
seats in the House, the first ranking party would have to obtain exactly 6 percent of the votes and 25
other parties must get at least 3 percent. In practical terms, this formula violates the Constitution
insofar as it makes it improbable to obtain the ceiling of 20 percent thereby preventing the realization
of the framers’s intent of opening up the system to party-list representatives.
Seventh. The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are not the first
ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so because, with their votes
being proportioned against the votes of the first ranking party, there will never be an instance where
the additional seats of these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941,
§11 which contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum number of
seats allowed by law.
_________________
Already, the proportion of party-list representatives to district representatives is small compared to

the mixed system in Germany where half of the seats (328) of the Bundestag are district
representatives and the other half (328) are reserved for party-list representatives. The ruling
announced today would ensure that the proportion of party-list representatives to the district
representatives who constitute 80 percent of the total membership in the House of Representatives
is even less than 20 percent. The constitutional intent to afford marginalized groups in our society to
be represented in the House is thus frustrated if not subverted.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petitions in these cases and to order the Commission on
Elections to proclaim as elected one additional nominee of APEC and two additional nominees of
each of the following parties, organizations, or coalitions: ABA, ALAGAD, VETERANS
FEDERATION, PROMDI, AKO, NCSCFO, ABANSE! PINAY, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, SANLAKAS,
COOP-NATCCO, and COCOFED.
Footnotes
1
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (hereafter referred to as
RECORD) 572-573 (Session of August 1, 1986).
2 2 Record 258 (Session of July 25, 1986); 567-568 (Session of Aug. 1, 1986).
3 Transcript, House of Representatives, Session of November 22, 1994, pp. 66-67.
4 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
5 Id. at 791-92.
6 The rule is allegedly based on Resolution No. 2847 of the COMELEC. The resolution does
not, however, contain the alleged rule. To the contrary, it reiterates in §12 that "The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes; Provided finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats each." It is only in the illustration attached as Annex
A to the resolution where it is stated that the computation under Column D of the Table of
Allocation of Seats is made at the rate of "1 seat for every 2%; maximum of 3 seats." How
this was arrived at was not explained.
Consolidated Table
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Actual Percentage Guaranteed Additional Extra Total6 Seats Total
votes of seat3 seats4 seats5 in number
received1 votes cast excess of seats
for of allowed7
party-list2 3
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 5.73 1 7 4 3
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 3.66 1 5 2 3
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 3.55 4 1 3
4. VETERANS 304,902 3.33% 1 3.47 4 1 3
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 2.90 1 4 1 3
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 2.72 1 4 1 3
7. NCSFO 338,303 2.60% 1 2.71 1 4 1 3
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 2.68 1 4 1 3
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 2.64 1 4 1 3
10 BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 2.45 3 - 3
11. 194,617 2.13% 1 2.21 3 - 3
SANLAKAS
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 2.16 3 - 3
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 2.12 3 - 3
14. SENIOR 143,444 1.57%
CITIZENS
15. Other 5,582,427 Each with
Parties less than
2%
TOTAL 9,155,309 100% 13 32 7 52 13 39
1 COMELEC Canvass Report dated June 1, 1998.
2 Obtained by dividing the votes received by one party by the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system.
3Pursuant to the first clause of R.A. No. 7941, §11(b) which provides: "The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each."
4 Pursuant to the second clause of R.A. No. 7941, §11(b) which provides: "Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes." This is obtained by dividing the total votes
received by a 2 percenter over the total votes received by all 2 percenters.
5 Allocated by ranking the decimal portions of the resulting products shown in Column 4.
6 Sum of integers in Column 4 & 5.
7Pursuant to the third clause of R.A. NO. 7941 which provides: "Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for
certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT
filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails
NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations
and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced
that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in
both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes
cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution,
docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna,
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List,
as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three
thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) 102,430

from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo,
Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-
list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand
four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the
parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-
list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared
the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as
found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462
votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-
list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and
that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List Projected total number of votes
1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have
obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

= party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List Percentage Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as
entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed
seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list,
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable
only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in
proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the
2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS,
ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and
how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in
allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and
Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or
coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results."
1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being
moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion
for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list
organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition
for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to
implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First
Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and
another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under
RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the
same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list
organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as
clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation,"
this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives. 1avv phi 1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts.
On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats Number of seats available to

available to legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a
legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left
the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on
the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented
Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress
enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition
as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since
there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list
votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA
7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately
preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining
seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3)
seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each
party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median
percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANAT’s second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do
not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by
dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified
party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After
all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from
the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all
the seats are filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections.27
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-
list.28
Votes Garnered over

Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party Total Votes for
Garnered Seat
Party-List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-
list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one
seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party
list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume
that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats
and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes
for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure
shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated,
at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the
two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between
the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat
cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Votes
Garnered
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
over Applying
Seat Seats (C), in
Votes Total the three
Rank Party (First (Second whole
Garnered Votes for seat cap
Round) Round) integers
Party (E)
(B) (C) (D)
List, in %
(A)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36
winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the
Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or
30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass
on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties,
are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral
lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common
ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties
can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated
with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in
Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we
set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and
even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for
major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941
reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section
5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed
to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can
field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found
in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from
the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats,
the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-
list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ARTURO D. BRION

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 86-87. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion
Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
3 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
4Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 103-108. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T.
Ferrer.
5 396 Phil. 419 (2000).
6Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-986; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-815. Party-List Canvass Report No. 32,
as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 70.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 88-92.
9 Id. at 150-153.
10 Id. at 86-87.
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), p. 112.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 158-159. NBC Resolution No. 07-74, 24 July 2007.
13 Id. at 160-161. NBC Resolution No. 07-87, 3 August 2007.
14 NBC Resolution No. 07-97, 4 September 2007.
15Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certification should have included An Waray, which was
proclaimed on 4 September 2007 under NBC Resolution No. 07-97.
16 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14.
17 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22.
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.
19 Supra note 5 at 424.
20 Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining

Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the
law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat.
Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be
entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number
of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
Proportion of votes of first party relative to
=
total votes for party-list system
Total votes for
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of
the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
xxx
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified
parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional
representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes
cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say,
twenty percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory
mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an
equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to
grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion
to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional

Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex
fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
Total No. of votes

of party-list system No. of additional
Additional seats
= x seats allocated
for concerned party
No. of votes to the first party
of first party
Total No. of votes

of party-list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats
= x seats allocated to
for concerned party
No. of votes the first party
of first party
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for
the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat
for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats
to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In
fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in
excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the
maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate
proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need
to work within such extant parameter.
21 Id. at 475-481.
22The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided in Section 10 of R.A. No.
7941.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.
24 Id. at 48.
25 Id. at 1076.
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.
27Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-List Canvass Report No. 32,
as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
28 Id.
29 Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.
30 Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.
31The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine and below is less
than one.
32 II Record, Constitutional Commission 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August 1986).
Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor
33
Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 350 (2001).
34 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).
35
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as
genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying premise that the party-list system
was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of major
political parties to the party-list system.
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec1 with regard to the computation of seat
allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority
as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the
participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence
this dissent.
To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.2
It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the disqualification of the major political parties on the
ground that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented, and not the mainstream
political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the Court ruled through then Associate, later
Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly registered political party, organization or group may participate, the role of the
Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress through the
"Filipino-style" party-list elections. Characterizing the party-list system as a social justice vehicle, the Court batted for the
empowerment of the masses, thus—
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a
direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory achieved by the marginalized in the political
arena in Ang Bagong Bayani. In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list system, Mr. Justice Carpio
relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Allegedly, the said deliberations indicate that the party-list system is
open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors.3 Buttressing his
view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that the major political parties also fall within the term "political parties" in the Definition of Terms in
Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he holds that the qualifications of a party-list
nominee as prescribed in Section 9 of the said law do not specify any financial status or educational requirement, hence, it is not
necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity."5 It is then concluded that major political
parties may now participate in the party-list system.
With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give utmost
deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign
people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face.6
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and
clause. 7 We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some words idle and
nugatory.8 The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the
people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions,9 the President was permitted to fill by
appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the
respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the elected Members of the interim Batasang
Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral
representatives on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by the people.10 To 1avv phi 1
avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the President was given all the leeway to "break new ground and precisely plant
the seeds for sectoral representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly of the
process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation."11 Similarly, limiting the
party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from participating in the election of their
representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good";12 the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making;13 the right
of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation;14 the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with
its role as a primary social economic force;15 the right of teachers to professional advancement;16 the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and
policies,17 and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.18
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This
is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted
for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission19 that major political
parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political
parties20 made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted,
yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only
obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties21 or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties
garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list
representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered
more than 2%.22
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still
haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the
Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the
traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political
parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate
their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list
system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
2 Id.
3 II Record, Constitutional Commission, 25 July 1986, pp. 256-257.
4 Section 3.
5 Main opinion, p. 33.
6 G.R. No.83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337.
7 Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.
8 Id.
9 Article XVIII.
10 V Record, Constitutional Commission, 1 October 1986, p. 332.
11 Id. at 330.
12 Article XIII, Section 1.
13 Article XIII, Sec. 16.
14 Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to section 14.
15 Article XIII, Sec. 3, in relation to Article II, Sec. 18.
16 Article XIV, Sec. 5.
17 Article XIV, Sec. 17.
18 Article II, Sec. 20.
19 Id., at 562.
20As noted in Bagong Bayani: Nationalist People’s Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino, Aksyon Demokratiko, Partido ng Masang Pilipino, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan and
Liberal Party.
21 Nationalist People’s Coalition, Lakas NUCD-UMDP and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
22 Party List Canvass Report No. 26, Commission on Elections.
SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a
party-list group to a seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79411 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the people’s broadest
representation in Congress,2 the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
Article VI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides:
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.3
This party-list provision in the Constitution intends to open the system4 of representation by allowing different sectors, parties,
organizations and coalitions to win a legislative seat. It diversifies the membership in the legislature and "gives genuine power to
the people."5 As aforesaid, the Constitution desires the people’s widest representation in Congress.
To determine the total number of seats that will be allocated to party-list groups based on the foregoing constitutional provision,
this Court, in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,6 declared:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated
for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives, including those under the
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives

x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily
result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
On the basis of this formula, the number of party-list seats is not static; it could add up to a substantial figure depending on the
additional number of legislative districts which Congress may create. Thus, for instance, the ponencia states that "since the 14th
Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives," based on
the following computation:
220
x .20 = 55
.80
To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 117 of which
sets, among others, the inviolable parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition, must obtain at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to claim one seat in the House of Representatives. This is referred to as
the threshold vote, or the minimum vote requirement.
Here lies the crux of its unconstitutionality.
Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives which may be occupied by
party-list representatives can never exceed fifty (50), because:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list system)
= 50
2%
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the
number of district representatives.
I see a scenario in the future when, because of the inexorable growth in the country’s population, Congress should see fit to
increase the legislative district seats to 400. If that happens, there would be a corresponding adjustment in party-list
representation that will translate to 100 party-list seats, applying the formula in Veterans Federation Party, viz:
400
x .20 = 100
.80
Yet, by virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of seats that the political parties, organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50.
This is not an unlikely scenario. Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party, we
see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of
55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50
seats. After all, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
This, to my mind, stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941. A legal provision that poses an insurmountable
barrier to the full implementation and realization of the constitutional provision on the party-list system should be declared void.
As Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno says in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, "(W)e should strive to make every word of the
fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some word idle and nugatory."8
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a
minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion
in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed —
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the
legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been
given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to
the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the
creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no
longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the
Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not
mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941,
enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the
constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition
as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the
duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a
particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, what then do we use as the norm for a minimum vote requirement to entitle a political party,
sectoral organization or coalition, to a party-list seat in the House of Representatives?
I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to the minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we
abide by the sensible standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement,
inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats. Thus, at present, considering that there are 55 seats
allocated for party-list groups, the formula should be:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1.818%
55 party-list seats
The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we
presented above should ever come to pass, and there are 100 seats allocated for party-list groups, then the threshold vote
should be 1%, based on the following computation:
100%
(Total number of votes cast for party-list)
= 1%
100 party-list seats
This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the composition of the
House of Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people’s representation in the House of Representatives;
and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution.
Time changes and laws change with it.10 And the Constitution ---
must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes
of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from being a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of
the nation.11
Thus, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it
unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated.12
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on March 3, 1995.
2 Section 2, R.A. 7941, provides:
"The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable the Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives, by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible." (Emphasis supplied.)
4Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359
SCRA 698, 716.
5 Id. at 717.
6
G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000; 342 SCRA 244.
7 In full, the provision reads:
"Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
"In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
"(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats."
8 Citing Lamborn v. Bell, 20 L.R.A. 241, 18 Colo. 346, 32.
9 Id. at 290.
10 Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 314-315.
11 Isagani A. Cruz, "A Quintessential Constitution," San Beda Law Journal, April 1972.
12 Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704, 730-731.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by
its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL
ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-
LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and
others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses
of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It
intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus,
allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were
made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled
day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance
of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a
separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions
and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426
dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections.
Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation'
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is
a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable
level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more
importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or
Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that
"the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed
Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR
No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents
named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001;
and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may
proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001,
the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were
directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five
days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the
Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in
the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such
challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1
(d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec,
however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan
Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time.
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not
yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued
with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent
of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this
Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the
issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a
nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties
in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part,
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand,
the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution
and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be
registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors,
boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll
watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out
that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the
following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-
Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional
district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the
system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count
their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states
that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point,
the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders
and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the
party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of
these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our
people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this
first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving
genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means
of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives
of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more
law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise
clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90)
days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate
in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC
may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA
No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not
disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during
the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically
those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be
elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim
that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list
system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are
manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common
sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the
Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list
system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout
engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political
power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise
more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted --
to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected
and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice
in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly
empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those
marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor,
even those in the underground movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them
came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional
district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the
seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even
those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the
party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to
enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of
Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it
would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a
student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously,
the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the
dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for
the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-
marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for
the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the
prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who
are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The
clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled
from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The
presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction
and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order
to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
[may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x
only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer
to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms:
the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA
7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the
law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria for participation is well defined.
Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of
Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue
here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the
clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the
party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any
group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list
elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores
the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the
law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of
the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground
that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-
Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have
the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll
watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but,
inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties
would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however,
is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to
show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate
in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it
appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through
its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record --
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of
its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that
they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political
party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the
religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional
proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members
and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from
well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly
the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is
not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous
community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the
Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see
any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious

purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states
that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be
disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded
or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization
must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent
of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list
candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the
law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to
be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of
the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to
betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee
must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee
proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular
district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have
less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those
who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is
a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is
possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does
not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices
them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create
a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their
marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA
7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty
offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the
framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of
the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties
and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the
House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance
report within 30 days from notice hereof. 1âwphi 1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming
any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will
have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12890 March 8, 1918
BERNABE FLORES, protestant-appellant,

vs.
JOSE ZURBITO, ET AL., protestees.
JOSE ZURBITO, appellee.
Rafael de la Sierra for appellant.

Federico Olbes for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an election protest. The only question presented is:
Whether or not the protestees had been given legal notice of the protest presented by the protestant
and appellant? If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the judgment of the lower court
must be reversed and the cause remanded with direction to the lower court to reinstate the same
and to proceed to a determination of the protest upon its merits. Upon the other hand, if said
question is answered in the negative, then the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
This is the second time the parties hereto have been before this court in relation of the said election
protest.1 In their first appeal the present appellant alleged that the lower court had deprived him of
the right to be heard by dismissing his protest upon the ground that the same had been signed by
his attorney instead of by himself personally. This court, upon a consideration of the question
presented in that appeal, following a decision theretofore rendered in the case of De Castro vs.
Salas and Santiago (34 Phil. Rep., 818), revoked the order of dismissal and ordered that the record
be returned to the lower court with proceed to hear said protest upon its merits. The cause was
remanded to the lower court in accordance with said order. It was reinstated, a time was set for trial
and witnesses were subpoenaed. At the time fixed for the trial Jose Zurbito presented a motion of
dismissal of the protest upon the ground that all of the candidates who had been voted for, for the
office of governor, had not given notice of said protest. Upon a consideration of that motion the lower
court found that the said candidates had not given legal notice of said protest and dismissed the
same with costs against the protestant. From that order the protestant appealed to this court. The
appellant contends that the notice required by law had been given and that his protest should have
been heard upon its merits.
The facts pertinent to the question presented by the appellant are undenied and are as follows: That
an election was held in the Province of Sorsogon on the 6th day of June, 1916, for the office of
governor of said province; that at said election Bernabe Flores, Jose Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and
Rosendo Gabionsa were candidates for the office of governor; that at the close of said election the
votes were canvassed and Jose Zurbito was proclaimed duly elected by the provincial board of
canvassers on the 8th day of July, 1916; that the said Bernabe Flores on the 19th day of July, 1916,
presented a protest in the Court of First Instance against said election, alleging that many frauds had
been committed and prayed for a recanvass of the votes and an investigation of said frauds; that
notice of said protest was given to Jose Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and Rosendo Gabionsa by sending
to each of them a copy of the same by registered mail (see pp. 93, 94 and 127 of record) which was
received by each of them; that in addition to said notice by registered mail a copy of the protest was
delivered to the appellee Jose Zurbito and received by him personally (Exhibit C, p. 95); that Antonio
Rocha and Rosendo Gabiosa failed to appear and answer or defend said protest in any manner
whatsoever at any time during the pendency of the action in the court below; that a copy of said
protest was delivered to Jose Zurbito and received by him personally on the 27th day of July, 1916,
(Exhibit C, p. 95); that on the 25th day of July, 1916, the said Jose Zurbito appeared in court
and presented a motion in said protest relating to the custody of the ballot boxes during the
pendency of said protest (p. 25), which motion was granted by the court on the same day (p. 26);
that on the 27th day of July, 1916, Jose Zurbito again appeared in court, and without making any
pretension whatever that he had not appeared in said court for the purpose of defending the protest,
presented another motion praying that the same be dismissed for the reason that it was signed by
the attorney for the protestant and not by the protestant himself (p. 30); that on the 7th day of
August, 1916, after hearing the respective parties, Fernando Salas, judge, granted said motion and
dismissed said protest with costs against the protestant; that from that order the protestant appealed
to the Supreme Court and obtained a reversal of the same by a decision of the Supreme Court of the
27th day of December, 1916, (p. 107); that the cause was remanded to the lower court with direction
that the protest be reinstated and that the court proceed to hear the same upon its merits; that at the
time set for the trial after the reinstatement of the cause Jose Zurbito again appeared and presented
another motion praying that the protest be dismissed because proper notice had not been given to
the protestees, which motion was granted on the 16th day of March, 1917, and the present appeal
was perfected from that order.
While the law provides that the node of procedure, in election contest, shall be "upon motion with
notice" (Sec. 27, Act No. 1582; sec. 2, Act No. 2170; sec. 578, Act No. 2657; sec. 481, Act No.
2711) it does not contain any provision as to the method of giving notice. And while it has been held,
in order to more conveniently prove the fact that notice had been given, that the provisions of Act
No. 190 (section 396) should be followed, it has never been held that the notice of the protest must
be given in accordance with the provisions of said Act (No. 190). (Campos vs. Wislizenus and
Aldanese, 35 Phil. Rep., 373.) While service of a copy of the protest and notice of the same is
important and necessary, the receipt of the protest and the notice may be waived by the protestee, If
he voluntarily appears, by a general appearance, without specially and explicitly objecting to the lack
of notice, etc., he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person, and an objection thereafter
made upon the ground that no notice was received will not avail him. It is then made too late. He has
given the court jurisdiction over his person.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever

form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal
method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written
direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may
be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is
not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such
appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the
appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other
purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. (Handy vs. Insurance Co., 37 Ohio St., 366; Elliott vs. Lawhead, 43 Ohio
St., 171; New Jersey vs. New York, 6 Peters [U. S.], 323; Livingston vs. Gibbons, 4 Johnson's
Chancery [N. Y.], 94; Fitzgerald etc. Co. vs. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S., 98.) The taking of any
proceedings on the part of the defendant, other than a special appearance or a motion or plea
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, is equivalent to a general appearance and is a submission of
the defendant's person to the jurisdiction of the court. (New Jersey vs. New York, 6 Peters [U. S.],
323; Texas etc. Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U. S., 105) An appearance in court, either in person or by
counsel, for any purpose other than to expressly object to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, waives want of process and service of notice. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person. (Henderson vs. Carbondale etc. Co., 140 U. S., 25; Rhode Island vs.
Massachusetts, 12 Peters [U. S.], 657.) A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general appearance if the
party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon further ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Elliott vs. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St., 171.) In the
present case, Jose Zurbito appeared in court on three different occasions; first, to make a motion
relating to the custody of the ballot boxes during the pendency of the action; second, to make a
motion to dismiss the protest upon the ground that the same had not been signed by the protestant
personally, and third, to dismiss the protest upon the ground that he had not been duly notified of the
same. Each of the first and second appearances were sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over his
person and authority to decide the questions presented. With reference to his third appearance the
record shows by Exhibit C that he had actually received notice of the protest together [with] a copy of
the protest filed in court. His appearance without objecting to the jurisdiction of the court waived all
objections to the form and manner of service of notice. (Provident et. Association vs. Ford, 114 U.
S., 635, 639.)
Considering, therefore, (a) that all of the candidates received actual notice of the protest as well as a
copy of the protest, and (b) that Jose Zurbito not only received actual notice of the protest together
with a copy of the same, but actually appeared in court and thereby gave the court jurisdiction over
his person, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment dismissing the protest be revoked
and that the cause be remanded to the court whence it came with direction that said protest be
reinstated for the purpose of deciding the issues presented by the same upon their merits. And
without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners,

vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.
D. Ignacio Castillo for petitioners.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dated September 22, 1947, placing one Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of
land claimed to belong to petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court on August 24,
1939, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to satisfy the payment of
an obligation.
The facts involved in this case are: On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina,
Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favor
of their brother Eladio Ramos giving the latter authority to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favor
of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, by virtue of
the power of attorney abovementioned, Eladio Ramos executed in favor of one Romualdo Rivera a
mortgage on therefore said property. Together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment
of loan of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. When Eladio Ramos failed to pay
the obligation on its date of maturity, Romualdo Rivera, the mortgage, filed an action to foreclosure
the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio
Ramos (civil case No. 7668). The summons was served only upon Eladio Ramos, who acknowledge
the service in his own behalf and in that services of Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez, who put in his
appearance for all the defendants, and submitted an answer in their behalf. After trial, at which both
parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the
plaintiff his obligation of 300, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, from August
9, 1934, until its full payment, plus the sum of 100 as attorney's fees, and ordering the foreclosure of
the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within ninety (90) days from the date
the decision becomes final. The decision was rendered on August 24, 1939. As Eladio Ramos failed
to pay the judgment within the period therein specified, on motion of the plaintiff, the court ordered
the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties, which were sold to the plaintiff as the highest
bidder and the provincial sheriff issued the corresponding deed of the sale in his favor. The sale was
confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to
Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she be placed in possession thereof. This motion
was granted on September 22, 1947. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were
summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to
comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the
nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not
properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by
petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to
punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this petition
for certiorari.
The issues posed by the petitioners relate (1) to the validity of the decision rendered by the lower
court on August 24, 1939, in civil case No. 7668, ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage excluded
by Eladio Ramos on the properties in question; and (2) to the validity of the order of the court dated
September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez
in possession to place respondent Felipa Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her
from the mortgagee.
As regards the first issue, we are of the opinion that the claim of the petitioners can not be sustained
for the reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack to a judgment which on its face is valid and
regular and has become final long ago. It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is
valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose
(Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717).
Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners were not properly served with summons in civil
case No. 7668, as they claim, the defect in the service was cured when the petitioners voluntarily
appeared and answered the complaint thru their attorney of record, Lauro C. Maiquez who appeared
in their behalf in all stages of the case. Since an Attorney Maiquez who appeared for the petitioners
must be presumed to have been authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in all the
stages of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to overcome such
presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53). This is specially so when, as in the instant case, it is
only after the lapse of more than nine (9) years after the judgment has been rendered that
petitioners thought of challenging the jurisdiction of the court.
The second issue raised by the petitioners is not also taken, for the simple reason that the issuance
of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the
purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary
duty of the court can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of
limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61
Phil., 201). This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the properties mortgaged sold by order of the
court, and purchaser thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to be placed in their
possession. In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the litigation and save
multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason is seen why the court cannot issue a peremptory order
to place the ultimate purchaser in the possession of the property.
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court
has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at
law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in
possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees and thus
avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).
It has also been held:
In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor
continues in possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary
remedy to put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) provides that the confirmation of
the sale by judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their respective
rights and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the duty of the
competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the
property which he purchased at the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final
decree confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). Emphasis supplied.
The following American authorities may also be involved in support of the order of the lower court:
A court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction in action for the foreclosure of the mortgage,
and having decreed a sale of the premises, RETAINS its jurisdiction and has authority to put
the purchaser in possession of the property, without compelling him to resort to an action of
law. (27 Cyc., 1937; 42 C. J., 271 and cases there cited.) (Bold types and emphasis
supplied).
. . . It does not appear to consist with sound principle that the court which has exclusive
authority to foreclosure the equity of redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in
interest before it, and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to
put the purchaser into possession against one of the very parties to the suit, and who is
bound by the decree. When the court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, and has
investigated and decided upon the merits, it is not sufficient for the ends of justice merely to
declare the right without affording the remedy. If it was to be understood that after a decree
and sale mortgaged premises, the mortgagor, or other party to the suit, or perhaps, those
who have been let into possession by the mortgagor, pendente lite, could withhold the
possession in defiance of the authority of this court, and compel the purchaser to resort to a
court of law, I apprehend that the delay and expense and inconvenience of such a course of
proceeding would greatly impair the value and diminish the results of sales under a decree.
(See Notes to Wilson v. Polk, 51 Am. D., 151). (Kershew v. Thompson, 4 Johns, Ch., 609).
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PABLO, M., concurrente:
El 16 de junio de 1948, el Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Pangasinan ordeno a los
recurrentes que compareciesen el 8 de julio del mismo año, alas 8:30 a.m., para explicar sus
rzaones porque no deben ser castigados por desacato por rehusar cumplir la orden de ejecucion
expedida en la causa civil No. 7668 el 5 de enero de 1948. Los recurrentes presentaron una mocion
de reconsideracion que fue denegada. Y acuden ante este Tribunal en un recurso de certiorari. La
solitud debe denegarse, pues contra cualquiera resolucion sobre el incidente de desacato pueden
los recurrentes presentar apelacion. El articulo 1 de la Regla 67 dispone que "Cuando un juzgado,
junta, o funcionario investido de facultades judiciales, hubiere actuado sin jurisdiccion o se hubierse
excedido de su competencia o con grave abuso de ella, y, en la tramitacion ordinaria del caso, no
existiere el recurso de apelacion ni ninguno otro que fuese llano, expedito y adecuado, toda presona
por ello agraviada podra presentar solicitud bajo juramento ant e el Tribunal correspondiente
alegando con certeza los hechos del caso y pidiendo se dicte sentencia que anule o modifique, con
arrespidiendo se dicte sentencia que anule o modifigue, con arreglo a derecho, lo actuado por dicho
Tribunal, junta o funcionario, con las costas." Esta disposicion esta interpretada en varias ocasiones:
Solamente procede el remedio de certiorari cuando un tribunal, en el ejercicio de sus

funciones judiciales, haya actuado sin jurisdiccion o con exceso de ella o con grave abuso
de discrecion y que, en la tramitacion ordinaria, no tiene el recurrente el remedio sencillo y
expedito de apelacion. (Regla No. 67, articulo 1). Si por cada error cometido por un juzgado
inferior se permitiese corregirlo por medio del recurso de certiorari, los asuntos serian
intrminables. (Regala contra El Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan, 44 O.G.,
30).
No. se expedira mandamiento de certiorari a menos que resulte de una manera clara que el
Juez contra el cual se dirige procedio sin jurisdiccion o se excedio en ella o abuso
gravemente en el ejercicio de su discreccion; no se expedira para subsanar errores de
procedimiento o enmendar conclusiones de hecho o de derecho erroneas. Si el Juez tiene
jurisdiccion sobre la materia litigiosa y sobre las partes, todo cuando decida sobre las
custiones pertinentes a la cause son resoluciones que estan dentro de su jurisdiccion y por
irregulares o reeneas que sean no pueden corregirse mediante certiorari. (Ong
Sit contra Piccio y otros, 44 O.G. 4915.)
De si el Juzgado inferior erro al dictar ordenes, el error debe suscitarse en una apelacion y
no en un recurso de certiorari. Solamente se recurre a este remedio cuenda no cabe
apelacion. Demaisip y otra contra Makalintal y otros, 47 O.G., Supp. (1) 153.)
Tenian los recurrentes, en el curso ordinario de los procedimientos, un remedio para corregir
cualquier error que pudiera haber cometido el Juzgado.
Por estas razones, es improcedente el recurso de certiorari.
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting:
I am in complete agreement with the majority decision on the two propositions formulated in the
opening paragraph, namely; (1) that the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged
property was in accordance with law, and (2) that placing Felipa Lopez in Possession of the said
property was a natural corollary of the first. But the appealed order also threatens the petitioners with
punishment for contempt if they refuse to vacate the lands. This, to me the most important feature of
the order, has been ignored or brushed aside in the decision. By its sweeping denial of the petition,
this Court sanctions the impending punishment. To this extent, I dissent.
In the case of U.S. vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil., 183, the Court said:
A writ of execution to sheriff directing him to place a plaintiff in possession of property held
by a defendant and failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to surrender the property
does not constitute contempt or disobedience to an agent of authority as defined in art. 252,
P.C. It is the duty of the sheriff to place the proper party in possession. Whether a refusal to
deliver the property to the sheriff on demand would constitute contempt, quaere.
xxx xxx xxx

A person can not be punished because of his alleged disobedience of an order of court not
addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff directing
the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order
addressed to the defendant. Such an order must been addressed to an officer of the court
and not to either the plaintiff or the defendant. The party in possession may have been
unwilling to deliver the land, but such unwillingness does not constitute an act of
disobedience to order of an agent of authorities, as defined by art. 252, P.C. The
disobedience contemplated by said article consists in the failure or refusal to obey a direct
judicial order and not an order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties. In the
case at bar, while the order does direct that the party in possession shall surrender the
property to the proper person, it does not and could not order his to do so to do. Instead of
executing the judgment himself, the sheriff merely ordered the defendant to deliver the
property. A sheriff has no power to require any person to perform an act which he himself is
bound to perform. Under such circumstances, disobedience on the part of the person to
whom the sheriff gave such an order does not constitute a crime.
Act 3170, subsequently passed, added a new paragraph to Section 232 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, reading as follows:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
5. The person defeated in civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real estate
who, after having been evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance
with the judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession by
the person whom the sheriff placed in possession of said realty.
But the new enactment has not given courts a new power to punish the recalcitrant loser for
contempt before he is evicted. It is only when he reenters or attempts to reenter after he is
punishment. In the case at bar, the purchaser of the mortgaged property has never been placed in
possession thereof by the sheriff, much less have the present occupants been evicted therefrom.
The validity of the lower court's order that is the subject of the present proceeding is not attacked on
the ground of lack of authority of the court to punish for contempt for their refusal to quit lands; but
this Court's decision in keeping silent on this vital point could or would, be construed as a green light
signal for the respondent Judge to proceed with the enforcement of his said order with all it's
intended ramifications.
I do not believe that the petitioners' action is punishable as for contempt on another ground.
Although they were included as parties defendants in the foreclosure suit, yet the dispositive part of
the judgment imposes no duty on them either to pay the mortgaged debt or to make delivery of the
mortgaged property. As was said in U.S. vs. Ramayrat, supra, "the disobedience contemplated by
Art. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure consist in the failure or refusal to obey a direct judicial order
and not an order which is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties."
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Tañada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to
deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to
explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator
Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed
his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he
did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read
slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with,
but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner
and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his
privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator
Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement.
At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was
recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore,
urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze
the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not
allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his
place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a
majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with
Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without
costs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J., concurring:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate
because the legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by
petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726;
23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then
its proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its
proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a
political question the determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue
involves a constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by
the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly
less. And for obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the
Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent
believing as they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group
believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of
admission to the contrary, does not find it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the
Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups? This
anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain
unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws,
resolutions and other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt
because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may extend, in
diverse forms, to the House of Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as
the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is
developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a large
extent, be stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as
the guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the final word on the constitutional mandate
governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion, under the present
circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the situation which
demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.
As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate,2I firmly believe that
although petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be
countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting President of
the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll
was called, only twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and
therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter are clear.
The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum.
the house of representative consist of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a
majority or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority of which quorum must, of
course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than
the majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed. Vacancies from
death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion
of Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23
S. E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot

transact business, this view being in keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting
a smaller number than a quorum to adjourn from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40
OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is then established, created by the mere presence
of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or
faction of the majority present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a majority,
and when that majority are present, the power of the House arises. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph
& Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)
If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all
have been duly notified, and the minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority
of those present may act, provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number.
In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum,
and a majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum,
the power of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th
ed., sec. 283.)3
Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is
true that respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he represent the
majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the
present senatorial alignment, he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of
the situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is absolutely essential in
the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic
principles consecrated in our Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our
political life as a republican form of government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a
mockery.
The situation now in this Court is this — there are four members who believe that there was
no quorum in respondent's election as against four other member who believe that there was
such quorum. Two members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal
to assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of
whether or not respondent has been legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under
the present conditions. This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other
measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by
them by convening a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by reiterating therein all that
has been previously done by them. This is a suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is
watching with a happy heart the movement of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning
for a clean and honest government in this dear country of ours.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the
position of President of the Senate is in issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents
took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen
because of the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as
acting President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of
the Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been properly adjourned,
and the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump
session, and said rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which
was opened by petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators who remained in the
session hall had only continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the
President of the Senate was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President
of Senate, to fill the vacate position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February
21, 1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two
Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano
TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos
Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada,
Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera,
Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding
session was being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness
the session, became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and
other peace officers to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued
and several shots were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard
because the spectators would either shout to drown their voices or would demeans that some other
Senator should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was
impossible for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure and without
grave danger to its integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator
Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no
objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine
other Senator namely, Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles
David, Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left
the session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum
and, assuming the presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into a rump
session, in which a resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the
Senate and electing respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent pretended to
assume the office of president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of
the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full
power to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the
Rules of the Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be
called in the Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the
presidency except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none
of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that
convened in the rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and
the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada announced and reserved in
open session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour
privilege, it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President,
petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February
21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M. Tañada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the
secretary of the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were preferred against the herein
petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an
integral part hereof:
(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session
hall until about 11:35 A.M.;
(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Tañada and
Sanidad and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution,
after which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that
the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order;
(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges
their functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make
use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech on
the charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following
22 Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz,
M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,
Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose
Avelino;
(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute,
but this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy;
(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the
charges against petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and when after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics
of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad
"Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to
recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak.
(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by
prearrangement, but the police officers present were able to maintain order. No shots were fired
among the audience, as alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo
Angeles David, one of petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of the session, evidently again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to
prevent Senator Tañada from speaking;
(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote;
(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote;
(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.
(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and
Clarin followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in
sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner, whereupon
Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record
— as it was in so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;
(p) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges against the petitioner contained in the
Resolution, attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval
ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete
text of said Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously approved;
(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral
part hereof as Exhibit "2". Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent
having abstained from voting;
(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his
oath of Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since
then, has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said
office;
(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in
his favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there
was no opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;
(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was
evidently and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive Senator Tañada of his right to take
the floor and to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all
means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68,
Exhibit "1", and that when the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in
the said session was ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;
(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked
and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the
Chair while the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate
President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had
the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by
petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by
anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at
4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the
Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of
Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill
and confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum;
that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he
did not count with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the
specialinvestigation committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner
deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(b) No cause of action as there are only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against
twelve Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his out
ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group
of ten Senators to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the
Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.
In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political question, the determination of which by the Senate
is binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of
the Philippines and said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5
Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the Senate is the only body that can
determine from time to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said
body; and this Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an
encroachment upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to
Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.
Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events,
it is only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the
present controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it does, a purely political question, the
determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and conclusive on
the courts.
The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the
question has been determined by the Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of
them represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled,
it would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the
Senate.
The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve
the enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the
Senate. Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not
only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the
Constitution, it cannot be divested.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various court, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error,
as the law or the rules of the court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts
in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or
regulations is in question.
(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.
Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the
truth on the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reached the settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.
Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting
President of the Senate and that executive recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The
contention is erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which
the Legislature power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide
questions of law, much less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive
power, which in the philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the
Legislative power, do so. The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.
The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from
time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a litigation likein the
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them.
To shirk that responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the
powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of
which the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to thelegality of the
adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring
vacant the position of President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could
continue holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of
justice have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the
resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to
vote, Senator Tañada voted,Senator Tañada voted in the negative, alleging as ground damaging
facts, supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of
petitioner. At the same time, Senator Tañada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to
be held on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of delivering during
the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said charges.
On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Tañada
and Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a
Committee of three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructed to
proceed immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.
Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE

SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the
Philippines Government and leaders of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacañang palace on
January 15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least,
tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government, and placed the interest of grafters and
corrupt officials as supreme and above the welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is
impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the
press, especially the Chronicle Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as
follows:
The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the
investigations of the surplus property commission irregularities and the immigration quota
scadal as acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed the
National Bureau of Investigation agents for persecuting Liberal party leaders.
"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because
in that place are no investigations, no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after
us."
Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his
actuations which, he claimed, were mainly responsible for the division of the party into two
hostile camps.
Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in
power, because why should we be saints when in reality we are not?
He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the
surplus property scandal and the immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the
Liberal Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the late
President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against the Liberal Party", Avelino said.
Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the
government, Avelino maintained that the Liberal Party men are entitled to more
considerations and should be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain measure of tolerance,
Avelino said, adding, "What are we in power for?"
Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of
Presidential Roxas. As a result of these investigations, the members of Congress are
subjected to unjust and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is worse is
the fact that these senators and representatives are being pilloried in public without formal
charges filed against them. (Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).
At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to
President Quirino on Liberal Party discipline. At the same time he demanded
"tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by the party in power.
The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing

specific has teen filed against atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of
Investigation agents have persecuted top leader of the LiberalParty. That is not
justice. That is injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.
Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot
permit abuses, you must at leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in realitywe are not? We are
not angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go
to hell wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of
Interior to go after us.
When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the
bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.
Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St.
Francis' convent. When thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to
produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers that thehunted man had gone
the other way.
Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.
xxx xxx xxx

The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of
the memory of the late President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of
enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader in the eyes of the public.
If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it,
because Quirino's administration is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.
Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members
are stockholders. Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit.
The Liberal Party, he said, has practically no dividends at all. It has lost even its
original capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments to the government of
Nacionalistas like: Lino Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General
Manager of the National Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January
18, 1949.).
WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of
January 16, 1949, the Senate President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and
threatened that "unless the proper redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to
take the necessary steps to protect my reputation and good name";
WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification
demanded by the Senate President, but on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949,
challenged him to take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished the truth,
we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further
repeated the publication of their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate
President has not carried out his threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication,
thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and corruption;
WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were
exhibited photostatic copies of four checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have
come into the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had assumed his
office;
WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the
National City Bank of the National City Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in
favor of the Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife,
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippine
National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the
Nederlands Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino,
Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;
WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a
Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the
Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving
Account No. 63436 with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the
Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn by the aforementioned Chinese concern,
Chiung Liu Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate
President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her
current account with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the
Senate President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other
checks totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank
on October 26, 1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;
WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the
Senate on February 18, 1946, in an attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to
be interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details and definiteness that it
left many doubts unsettled;
WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that
the same represented proceeds from the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is
directly contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath
before the Horilleno Investigating Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been
loaned byhim to the Senate President, who repaid the same within ten days;
WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948,
deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made in the current account of the Senate President's
wife Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86
were deposited before his election to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after
his election;
WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his
speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect that he and his wife had made substantial amounts
in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;
WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en
politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it
was right for the Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds committed
by the opposition;
WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President
justified the commission of electoral frauds, which justification is a direct attack on the
sovereignty of the people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;
WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on

Appointments which passes upon all Presidential appointment, including thoseto the
judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to
interfere with and influence some judge in decidingcase pending before, thereby imperilling
the independence of the judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;
WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate
demand a through, impartial and immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,
1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed

2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning
at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not
then opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time petitioner
ascended the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the
resolution introduced by the Senators Tañada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to
his side Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.
Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that
petitioner called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.
Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and
the roll call showed the presence of the following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco,
Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia,
Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was
again opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the
reading of the minutes proceeded.
Senator Tañada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the
session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes.
he wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator
who speak without having been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair
to recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak, and every time he would make the request,
Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from
individuals of the audience, where two fist fight took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard
from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of
the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe
motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged
the gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and,
thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique
Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him. Twelve SEnator, respondent and his
eleven supporters, remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the
SEnate, ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag raised
the question of quorum and the question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll
call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to
continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of record that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore
and those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to
preside over the session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the
Chair.
Senator Tañada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against
petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration
and approval of said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by
Senator Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to
the President Pro-tempore and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which
read as follows:
RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

AND DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT
OFTHE SENATE.
Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable
Jose Avelino, President of the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby
declared vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated Acting
President of the SEnate, until further orders from this Body.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz
and has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting President of
theSenate.
The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we
believe the following conclusions are unavoidable.
1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the
Senate could not continue holding session and transact business for lack of quorum.
In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.
ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT
A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain
restriction, it has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even
questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made
after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the
journal. The motion is not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an
appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too
tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a
democratic social order. Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything
other than placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.
There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to
decree motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in
thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to
said effect was properly made and met with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it
was right for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection, provided
the motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the
motion, did not object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence,
however, fails to support petitioner's claim.
We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of
opinion that the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator Tañada was bent on delivering a
speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by Senator
Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation
of said charges had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949,
when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In
said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of
confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of
Senators, believing themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to waste any time to give a
showing of said majority and must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to
wrestfrom him the Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the
Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and
had been requesting that Senator Tañada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Tañada himself
made attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process
that would give due course to the investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68,
Exhibit 1, and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.
This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session
hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the
Tañada and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's
Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the session beopened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session
under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving
petitioner such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to
take measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the
petitioner and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least,
delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his
impedingouster, by the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.
The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
QUORUM
There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only
twelve Senators, those composing respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll
call ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had raised the question
of quorum.
The Constitution provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article
VI.)
The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual
members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership
of each chamber of Congress.
The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less
than thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the
majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact
that the above constitutional provision does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of
the amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments
that can validly change the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution.
"Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of
said members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context
of the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their
political nature and implications, are justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the
Supreme Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should
there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the
Philippines, according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional
question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent
was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application
and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the Constitution. Should the two absent
Senators comeand attend the session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the
Senate will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each
group supporting petitioner's and respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the
Senate. Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested
from respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and revolution, there is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance
with the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong committed
within the framework of democracy it established in this country. Should this Supreme Court refuse
to exercise jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such
shirking of official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the
issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of Congress, but also the
presidential succession as provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty
which we should not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the
Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner
and his nine supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to
transact business.
4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing
respondent as acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution
for lack of quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the
Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential
succession, so much so that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not
entitle respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes the
invalidity of respondent's election.
Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would
not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a
mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point of view of
laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great
importance, such as who will wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the questions that this Court
must answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective
supporters in the Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive
business and should not be minded for the purposes of our decision.
The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of
their own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the
polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the
Senate and the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the
Constitution and by the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step
beyond said legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of
justice, the latter cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of
jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of
the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the
President of the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and
above objections voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the
majority, we cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion:
Otherwise, we would be disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would
be printing the stamp of our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny
imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the
functioning and actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving
the country of the benefits of legislation.
When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and
prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him
and to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous
importance which we should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us.
Such complaint constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve
Senators, in utter violation of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother
agency of government can offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint
has been filed.
The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective
action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent individual
units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can onlyact in
organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the
organizing element without which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The
importance of such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional
Convention, and that is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the
existence of quorum for the former National Assembly to transact official business and that
requirement was also imposed by the National Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted
itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original
text of the Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty
reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less
than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution
provides for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact
official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into
a quorum to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend
the session, even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with
petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the
Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to
displease the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to
continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the
orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago,
he impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground — the injustice
then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero now being more
generally recognized — petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this
sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people,
the final arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That
conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively
nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of
humanity springing fromthe golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold
onslaughts from many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing
their will through fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently
demand a more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of administration of
justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a
philosophy and social order based on constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all
conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this Court
to refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail —
and by experience we know that it had suffered many failures — than revolution. This immeasurable
responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the performance of its plain duty and should
dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of
wind.
The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility,
should not be understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as
enunciated by Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in practice
the system of check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make
absolute that principle is to open the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate
governments within a government and three independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid
such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles
embodied in the fundamental law.
Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts.
The Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power
of courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the silence, when
the proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall, had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional
provisions. The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and
outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.
To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been
advanced that, the President of the Philippines having recognized respondent as a duly elected
acting President of the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory
sprouts from the same ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how
the latter should dispose of a pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge
by saying that nothing should guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our
official functions, disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about
it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may
split into two groups after a presidential election and each group may proclaim a different candidate
as the duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the
principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious
Pilate, wash our hands and let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77
Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The
more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the
escutcheon of the post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.
We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments
or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed
to continue transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free
expressionof the will of the majority.
BRIONES, M., dissente:
Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito
adelantar las siguientes observaciones:
(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. — Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en
los asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La
cuestion constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido de
que esta Corte deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la
cuestion de si el grupo de senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado
tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha facultad, puesto que cuando
dicho grupo se reunio no habia un quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la
Constitucion y de los reglamentos del Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser
enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros
en demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las manos en un ademan de inhibicion
pilatista; no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-del-desierto estilo
aveztruz. El issue constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy importante. Tiene
repercusiones directas y vitalisimas en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio
supremo de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica
el tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional
es lo esencial e importante.
Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto
surgido en el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una
tremenda crisis nacional, preñada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras instituciones
politicas, para el orden publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la nacion.
Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de
America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del año 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La
analogia es completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos Senadores, cada cual
pretendiendo ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la
genuina representacion popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers
Senate", por los nombres de los presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte
Suprema de New Jersey no podia asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion
eminentemente politica, por tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso y, por boca
de su Presidente el eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo el siguiente categorico
pronunciamiento:
. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by this
record, we have no doubt; and we are further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to
conceive of any crisis in public affairs that would more imperatively than the present one call
for the intervention of such judicial authority. (supra, p. 758.)
Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas

por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema
necesidad de resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la
estabilidad del gobierno y ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto: no existe la
misma razon de extrema necesidad en el presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre
las dos facciones en nuestro Senado esta afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda
cabe de que la normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave preocupacion de todo el mundo y con
grave daño de la tranquilidad publica?
(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. — Estimo
que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion
frente a la oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el. En vista de esta
oposicion, el deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de levantamiento de la sesion
presentada por el Senador Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar
levantada la sesion. Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando rutinariamente el
presiding officer puede dar por aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad
de levantar la sesion no estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma
sumamente peligrosa en manos de un presidente despotico y arbitrario.
La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus

facultades inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y
tumulto en la sala de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no
justifican semejante pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos. Lo que debia haber
hecho el Senador Avelino era tratar de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden.
Tenia medios para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los
senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion y los senadores del otro grupo tenian
perfecto derecho a proceder como procedieron, quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la
sesion. Esta sesion venia a ser una tacita reconduccion — una simple prolongacion de la sesion
que habia sido declarada abierta por el presidente Avelino con un quorum presente de 22
miembros.
(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de quorum. — Es cosa
establecida y admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12
miembros del grupo llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado "Senado
de Avelino". En esta coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion
del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la
lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes que al
comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y
solamente respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores del grupo de Cuenco.
Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el Senado
de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe
ser de 13 miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la Union americana
esta repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado firmemente la doctrina de que la base para
determinar el quorum legislativo es el numero total de miembros elegidos y debidamente
cualificados de cada camara.1 En el presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por
tanto, el grupo Cuenco no podia seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta
de quorum. De acuerdo con la Constitucion y los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos
caminos para actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o
compeler la asistencia de suficientes senadores del otro grupo para constituir dicho quorum,
pudiendo a dicho efecto ordenar inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas. (Constitucion de Filipinas,
art. VI, sec. 10, ap. 2;2 Reglamento del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.3) Asi que todos los
procedimientos efectuados por el grupo Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.
Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto constitucional sobre quorum es

significativo. Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute a quorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en el texto enmendado de
1940 se dice: "A majority of each House shall constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se
quiere deducir la consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso sea la
posibilidad de una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la existencia de
un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la
enmienda no han hecho mas que copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion federal
americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el sentido de que señala, como base
para determinar el quorum, la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por
tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido
tradicional de que la base para la determinacion del quorum la totalidad de los miembros electos y
cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es elemental en hermeneutica legal que una misma
cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas
racional para el quorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero
incluyendo al Senador Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar
gravemente enfermo, hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento de ser
llamado por el Senado. El fundamento de esta opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no
debe ser contado un miembro que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es
igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es
convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas
eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el precepto constitucional y la regla
pertinente no establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir.
(4) Cual es el remedio. — No cabe duda de que una mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a
reorganizar el Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas
prescritas por la Constitucion, las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo Cuenco que
al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo menos hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos
constitucionales y legales para efectuar una reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler
la asistencia de un numero suficiente de Senadores para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si
fuese necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo
sigan boicoteando las sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el
grupo Avelino acude voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos grupos pueden buenamente
restaurar la normalidad constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la reorganizacion que desee y dicte la
mayoria.
Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y
facultad para ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de
sus adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos
concierne son sus repercusiones juridicas.
Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la republica, el que

mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de
un clima politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de
mano y de estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) — eso que caracteriza la historia azarosa de las
llamadas "banana republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo
rigor, sin blandas transigencias, la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que
la implementan.
Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his
election was illegal.
It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a
member of the Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or
permanently. There is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session be the
criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of
communication should operate to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the
purpose of determining the presence of a majority.
The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the
theoretical and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to fulfill their
missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become
more apparent. The interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to
transact business so long as it is a majority of the legislators present in the country. Nothing in my
opinion could have been farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit,
under circumstances, less than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people
to approve measures that might vitally affect their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The
necessity of arresting absent members to complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the
necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for
ruling out absentees who are beyond the legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a law-
making body and is little concerned with jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is
an emergency measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to
arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who were inside the
Philippines territory. This is especially true in the United States of America, after whose form of
government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to the other side of the globe.
This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1).
In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising
authority within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a
senate that, it is alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other reasons
alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate
branch of the government so much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.
Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:
An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by authority of law;
xxx xxx xxx
This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by
the legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can
only be raised by the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures.
(Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the
Senate appointed by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would
not be the Senate by the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more
reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The
interest of the public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy
determination of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and public
order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers'
Reports, annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent
on the question of this Court's jurisdiction.
March 14, 1949
RESOLUTION
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose
Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has
resolved, by a majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this
Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice
Briones in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground
that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the latter's
persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is
in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction
but concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the
question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.
FERIA, J., concurring:
In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether
this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners
Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and compel
the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of
Sec. 11, Article VI, of the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating
to the election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et al.,
who were represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the
jurisdiction of this Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case on the ground that the
question therein involved was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented
by Attorney Jose W. Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends
that this Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court
had jurisdiction.
And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was
whether it was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the
respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment
to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the
United states of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was
not passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives,
voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents
maintained the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the
exclusive province of the Legislature.
The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State
Constitution of the United States of American, after which our owns is patterned, has given rise to
the distinction between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and
politicalquestions which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under
the Constitution, by the People in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government, except to the
extent that the power to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or
statutory provision. Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a
justiceable one, it has been generally held that the first involves political rights which consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the government of
the government, while justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights
accorded to every member of the community or nation.
Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate case and controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the
jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which
comeswithin the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to
decide, the judicial department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act
of the Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of
thecourts is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied.
Divorced from the remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of alegislative or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a
coercive force.
Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood,
45 Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of
said respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and therefore this
Court had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and
dissented from the decision of the majority.
When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling
of the Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the
present case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim of stare decisis,
and in order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said
that "The Supreme Court has changed its color i.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time
according to the political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally
from the habits of though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the
sympathy they could not but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The
ANNALS of the American Academyof Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino
case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide
whether or not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing to
abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of
the Justices, who have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the
jurisdiction of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases,
so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well.
But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was
a quorum in the session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority,
not on the number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and
this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason
of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house
is empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for
considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that
Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the
present Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of
the Senate, the actual members of the SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-
three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the
Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the case
of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not
disqualified. And in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2,
of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in imposing death excepted
from the court those members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this Court
held that the absence of the Chief Justice Avanceña, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a
legal disqualification, and his vote was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the
decision imposing death penalty.
PABLO, J., concurrente:
Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia
jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin
embargo, nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar
resoluciones. Desde luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La huelga en el Senado continua.
Los recientes acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones
dentro y fuera del pais. Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia pueden
desbordase y causar fatales consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es
necesario, impedirlo.
El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles
en varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la
solitud original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto
a mi voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una
parte, ni por la anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.
La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben importante las consecuencias; pero como
ciudadano, me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico. Al
pueblo interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza es transigir, pues,
para que haya seis votos que sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion
anterior, fracasara todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la crisis en el
Senado.
El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que
hubo quorum en la continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del Senador Avelino y
compañeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce
senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que
el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion. Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un
conflicto que esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para
dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce senadores formaban quorum.
De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or
hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit which
seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide
in judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for
the study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the
teaching may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-
being and collective happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from
many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We
intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left hanging in
the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment
and reasonable and just in a quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half
of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like
mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent
persons with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news
reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and
movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of
political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been
shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the
upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives.
It has already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of
the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous
in belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one
way or another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe
it to be right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several
Senators who in not remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to the present the Supreme Court
has and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at present
abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous
controversies as the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in
democracy, the role of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of
the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the
merits.
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in
the Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a
colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring
inconsistencies.
Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role
as spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution.
Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case
raises vital constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our
Constitutional Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the
organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to
decide such constitutional questions.
Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike
to attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the
legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful
than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers
temporarily stop to work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But
society is menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy
and chaos are its alternatives.
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor
officials and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of quorum should not be
leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the constitutional
amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The
words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because
they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National
Assembly and in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the
majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (½). It can neverbe identified with one-half (½) or
less than one-half (½). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less
is etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all
opposites, and in the same way that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the
creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less
than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24)
units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid,
Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two
equal number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one
hand cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning
great. Majority means the greater of two numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number
greater than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It presupposes the
existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators
composing the Senate.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum
created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the session of
February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)
The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by
one among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take
measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such
House may provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for
the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.
As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the
picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings
us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator
Mariano J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel
for petitioner, manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting
President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions.
He would only make of record his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner
from presiding over said sessions.
The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent
under oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so
that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure, is
inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about
respondent's testimony, because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and
petitioner's counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.
Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to

refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from
the historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.
If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he
has sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment
made under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been not only
failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his
group of Senators have given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue
warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions of the
Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping
him, have to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical
endeavor to compel them to attend the sessions?
The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in
all newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered,
weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday sessions, February
18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command
the position of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the
sessions of the Senate, the most characteristic and important function of President of the Senate.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of
office. (Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p.
980-981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's
reason? They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the
motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to
exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of
the majority has only increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to
sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt
that the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it, the present national
crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest
are highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that
they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers entrusted with the
execution. Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that
demand remedial legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife
would have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court
would have ordered petitioner's reposition.
Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would
certainly have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the sessions with senators
of the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The twelve
senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all
the disputed actuations of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they
would have succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of President of
the Senate.
Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy,
by quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken
the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's action in
adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of
the Cuenco group would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for
immediate execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing the session hall.
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious
charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot
demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result
will not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position by attending the
sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.
Footnotes
1 On this matter, the vote is 6 to 4 in favor of lack of jurisdiction.
2 On this matter, the vote is 4 to 4.
3 Quoted with approval in U.S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed., 321, 325.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
1 ". . . . Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides:
"Each House shall be the judge of the elections. . . . and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business."
"Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court of that country held in U.S. vs. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 36 L. Ed. 321, 325:
"The Constitution provides that 'a majority of each (house) shall constitute
a quorum to do business.' In other words, when a majority are present, the House is
in a position to do business. Its capacity to transact business is then established,
created by the mere presence of a majority, and does not depend upon the
disposition or assent or action of any single member or fraction of the majority
present. All that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that
majority are present, the power of the House arises."
"The same decision quoted with approval from Dillon, Mun. Corp., the following rule:
". . . If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all tha agents are
assembled, or if all have been duly notified, and the minority refuse or neglect to
meet with the others, a majority of those present may act, provided those present
constitute a majority of the whole number. In other words, in such case, a major part
of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may
act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to
act is, in general, considered to cease."
"Quorum as used in U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business, is, of the purposes of the Assembly, not less than
the majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed.
Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining
the quorum." (Opinion of Justices, 12 Fla. 653)
2A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide.
3CHAPTER VI — The house — Sec. 23. A majority of the Senators shall constitute
a quorum to do business.
"SEC. 24. Whenever the question of quorum is raised by any Senator in any session,
the Chair shall immediately order a roll call and announce forthwith the result.
"This shall be done without debate. If after the roll call it appears that there is
no quorum, a majority of the Senators present may other the Sergeant-at-arms to
summon the attendance of absent Senators, and, if necessary, to compel their
attendance, in which case the order that that effect shall not be subject to debate.
"SEC. 25. Only for a just cause may a Senator be excused from atttending the
session."

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer

MR. PEREZ (L.):

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely

It is more general, more embracing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or

C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or

C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

1 Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

2 Annex "C" of Petition; Rollo, 24.

3 Annex "E" of Petition; Id., 30.

4 Rollo, 8 and 14.

9 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 8 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.

10 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985. Underscoring supplied.

11 Compared to the provision in the 1973 Constitution which reads:

12 Memorandum for Respondents, 9.

14 Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104.

16 People ex rel. Fleming vs. Shorb, 100 Cal 537 P. 163.

17 Am Jur. 2d, p. 63.

19 State ex rel. Atty. Gen. vs. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 SW 421.

20 State vs. Driscoll, 54 P. 2d 571, 576, 101 Mont. 348.

22 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 591, 19 July to 6 August 1986.

23 Records of the Batasang Pambansa, 21 October 1985, Underscoring supplied.

24 1 July 1967, 20 SCRA 620, 625.

25 Phil. 94, 196.

26 Section 8, Rule III, Rules of the House of Representatives.

27 Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818.

28 Burton vs. U.S., 202 U.S. 344.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

II. The Jurisdictional Issue