Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DIGESTS
ATTY. TRANQUIL SALVADOR III
MIDTERMS
COVERAGE:
Filing Fees
Jurisdiction
Rules 1 - 56
REALTY
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Filing Fees
DEVT
FACTS:
Ruby Shelter obtained a loan from Tan and
Obiedo secured by a REM consisting of 5
parcels of land in the name of the former.
Despite an extension granted by Tan and
Obiedo and several negotiations, Ruby was not
able to pay.
Hence, Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of a MOA,
executed Deeds of Absolute sale in their favor
covering the 5 parcels of land. The MOA
provided that if Ruby fails to pay the loan, 5
deeds of absolute sale would be executed in
favor of Tan and Obiedo.
So Ruby Shelter filed complaint for declaration
of nullity of the deeds. Believing that their
action was one which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, they paid docket fees
amounting to about 13K. It said that it only
wanted to annul the deeds so no issue of title
or recovery of possession is present to classify
it as a real action.
Tan and Obiedo moved to dismiss the
complaint and ask for damages (also pursuant
to the MOA there was a provision that if
Ruby Shelter brought suit against them, it
would be liable for P 10M) contending that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because the case involved recovery of real
property making it a real action which requires
payment of docket fees equivalent to a
percentage of the fair market value of the land
(P 700K).
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo
ordering Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket
fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Ruby Shelter should pay additional docket
fees.
HELD/RATIO: YES. For the court to acquire jurisdiction,
docket fees must be paid first. Payment is mandatory
and jurisdictional.
To determine whether an action is real, it must affect
title to or recovery of possession of real property. In
this case, Ruby Shelter did not disclose certain facts
which would classify the complaint it filed as a real
action (like the execution of deeds of sale pursuant to
a MOA). The action was really one for recovery of
possession of the parcels of land. Hence, it is a real
action.
The docket fees for cases involving real property
depend on the fair market value (or the stated value)
of the same: the higher the value, the higher the fees
due. For those incapable of pecuniary estimation, a
fixed or flat rate is imposed.
PHILIPPINE
LOGISTICS
FIRST
INSURANCE
VS.
FIRST
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Filing Fees
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Issues:
1) Whether BNP failed to pay the correct docket
fees
2) Whether the Clerk of court applied the wrong
exchange rate
3) Whether the amount of interest was not
specified in the prayer, rendering the
complaint void.
Held:
1) Petitioner relied on a case decided in 1989 where
Rule 141 was applied, the interest and costs
having been excluded in the computation of the
aggregate amount. However, the present case was
filed in 1998, when such rule had already been
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94.
The amended rule includes the interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and other costs in the computation of
the aggregate amount. In the complaint,
respondent
prayed
for
accrued
interest
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid.
The complaint having been filed on September 7,
1998, respondents claim includes the interest from
August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent not having paid the fees for such,
cannot claim the interest within such duration,
unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend
its complaint within a reasonable time and specify
the precise amount of interest petitioners owe
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ARTICLE III
Coverage
Section 1. Persons qualified for exemption from
payment of legal fees. Persons who shall enjoy the
benefit of exemption from the payment of legal fees
incidental to instituting an action in court, as an
original proceeding or on appeal, granted under this
Rule shall be limited only to clients of the NCLA and
the chapter legal aid offices.
The said clients shall refer to those indigents qualified
to receive free legal aid service from the NCLA and the
chapter legal aid offices. Their qualifications shall be
determined based on the tests provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. The
following shall be disqualified from the coverage of this
Rule. Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices.
(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered by
developmental legal aid or public interest causes
involving juridical entities which are non-stock, nonprofit organizations, non-governmental organizations
and peoples organizations whose individual members
will pass the means test provided in this Rule;
(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merit
tests;
(c) Parties already represented by a counsel de parte;
(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands or buildings
with respect to the filing of collection or unlawful
detainer suits against their tenants and
(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA or
chapter legal aid office previously in a case where the
NCLA or chapter legal aid office withdrew its
representation because of a falsity in the application or
in any of the affidavits supporting the said application.
Section 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. The NCLA
and the chapter legal aid offices shall not handle the
following:
(a) Cases where conflicting interests will be
represented by the NCLA and the chapter legal aid
offices and
(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.
ARTICLE IV
Tests of Indigency
Section 1. Tests for determining who may be clients of
the NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters.
The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as the
case may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid by
the combined application of the means and merit tests
and the consideration of other relevant factors
provided for in the following sections.
Section 2. Means test; exception. (a) This test shall
be based on the following criteria: (i) the applicant and
that of his immediate family must have a gross
monthly income that does not exceed an amount
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Jurisdiction
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Jurisdiction
ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA
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Jurisdiction
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VARGAS V. CAMINAS
Facts: Jesus Garcia, as a developer of Trans-American
Sales and Exposition, sold a townhouse to the Caminas
spouses. However, Garcia also sold the same
townhouse to the Vargas spouses as payment for
various construction materials. Furthermore, Garcia
also mortgaged the same townhouse in favour of the
De Guzman spouses as security for a loan.
The Caminas spouses filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage (to the De
Guzmans) and deed of sale (to the Vargases). Vargas
also filed a complaint for specific performance.
The Vargas spouses raised the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB. The De Guzmans argue that the HLURB
has no jurisdiction over cases involving the declaration
of nullity of a mortgage contract filed against the
mortgagee. The Caminas argue that the Vargas
spouses are estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction of the trial court.
The RTC and CA decided in favour of the
Caminas spouses.
The case obviously falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB based on PD 957.
Issue: The case obviously falls under the jurisdiction
of the HLURB based on PD 957, but are the Vargas
spouses estopped from raising the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC? NO.
Ruling: The rule is that jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In this
case, Vargas raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
during the Rejoinder. The trial court failed to address
the issue of jurisdiction in its decision. Clearly, the trial
court erred in not dismissing the case before it. Under
the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss
an action whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it
is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by
conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown,
among others, that the representation must have been
made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the
matter.
Lozon v. NLRC came up with a clear rule on
whether jurisdiction by estoppel applies or does not. It
stated that: The operation of the principle of estoppel
on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
Jurisdiction
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Exception
Tijam v Sibonghanoy BUT this is an
exceptional case because here the lack of jurisdiction
was invoked only after 15yrs, and when the case was
already with the CA. Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in
cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in
Tijam. Laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
Jurisdiction
DE BARRERA v LEGASPI
FACTS: This is a land dispute between De Barrera and
Legaspi who is the present possessor of a parcel of
land in Misamis Occidental. Legaspi was evicted by
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RULE 3: PARTIES
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA
KEIHIN V. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORP.
Facts:
On
Sept.
5,
2003,
Helen
Valenzuela
(petitioner) was caught with packing tape
inside her bag. Disciplinary action was
instituted against Helen wherein she admitted
the offense and manifested that she would
accept whatever penalty would be imposed
upon her.
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BANDA v. ERMITA
Facts: Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO
378 issued by GMA, characterizing their action as a
class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all
their co-employees at the National Printing Office
(NPO).
The assailed EO removed the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements
of
government
agencies
and
instrumentalities, making it now compete with the
private sector, except in the printing of election
paraphernalia. They perceive this EO to be a threat to
their security of tenure and contend that it is beyond
GMAs power to amend or repeal the law creating the
NPO, which Aquino issued pursuant to her legislative
power.
Issue: Whether the petition indeed qualifies as a class
suit - NO
Ratio: Courts must exercise utmost caution before
allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the
requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For
while no difficulty may arise if the decision is favorable
to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision
were otherwise as those who are deemed impleaded
by their self-appointed representative would certainly
claim denial of due process.
Sec. 12 of Rule 3 defines a class suit, the
requisites of which are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently
numerous or representative of the class an can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
An action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon
the attending facts, and the complaint or other
pleading initiating the class action should allege the
existence of the necessary facts: 1) the existence of a
subject matter of common interest, and 2) the
existence of a class and the number of persons in the
alleged class, in order that the court might be able to
determine whether the members of the class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court, to contrast the number appearing on
the record with the number in the class, and to
determine whether claimants adequately represent the
class and subject matter of general or common
interest.
In this case, the petition failed to state the
number of NPO employees who would be affected by
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MIAA
v.
RIVERA
ASSOCIATIONS
LESSEE
HOMEOWNERS
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SUMALJAG V. LITERATO
NAPERE V. BARBARONA
FACTS:
Barbarona is the owner of a parcel of land in
Leyte. A lot owned by Anacleto Napere
adjoined the lot of Barbarona on one side.
When Anacleto Napere died, his son Juan
Napere and his wife (petitioner) planted
coconut trees on some portions.
Barbarona then filed a complaint against Juan
Napere for encroaching on a portion of his lot
and cultivating the coconut planted on the
formers lot. Despite demands from Barbarona,
Napere refused to vacate.
Juan Napere died. His counsel informed the
court about this but no formal substitution of
the heirs were made.
Eventually, a judgment in favor of Barbarona
was rendered. The heirs of Napere appealed to
the CA that the judgment rendered was void
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure of the
court to formally substitute Naperes heirs to
the case. CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment is void.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Failure of the court to formally
substitute the heirs of a party in a case which survives
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RULING:
NO. It is a proper but not an indispensable party.
Heritage is mistaken when it claims that it is an
indispensible party to the case and that it was not
included in the case before the CIAC. Being a
transferee of the interests of PEA over the Project
during the pendency of the case before the CIAC, it is
bound by the proceedings in like manner as PEA.
Rule 3 of Section 20 (now Section 19, Rule 3) of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 20. Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer
of interest, the action may be continued by or against
the original party unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or joined with the original
party.
This Court has declared in a number of
decisions that a transferee pendente lite stands in
exactly the same position as its predecessor-ininterest, the original defendant, and is bound by the
proceedings had in the case before the property was
transferred to it. It is a proper but not an
indispensible party as it would in any event be
bound by the judgment against his predecessor.
This would follow even if it is not formally
included as a defendant through an amendment
of the complaint.
Verily, the non-inclusion of Heritage in the
proceedings before the CIAC is of no moment as the
Rules of Court specifically allows the proceedings to
proceed with the original parties while binding the
transferee.
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requirements:
a)
income
requirementthe
applicants should not have a gross monthly income of
more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property
requirementthey should not own property with an
assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.
In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras
submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura
and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner
Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of
PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the Naga City
assessor stating that petitioners do not have property
declared in their names for taxation. With respect to
the income requirement, it is clear that the gross
monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio
F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita
Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00
monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule
141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement
was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct
in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants
although the court should have applied Rule 141,
Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing
of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule
141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section
16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application
could not have been granted as the combined PhP
13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP
3,000.00 monthly income threshold.
Petitioners however argue in their MR that the
rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section
21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which
authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if
the court is satisfied that the party is "one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family." The trial court did not give credence to this
view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but
ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party.
The position of petitioners on the need to use
Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as
indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on
whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141,
Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications
or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16
and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been
superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees.
The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21
and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule
141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently
amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003,
which is now the present rule) are still valid and
enforceable rules on indigent litigants.
For one, the history of the two seemingly
conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the
intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of
Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have
been amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section
16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M.
No. 83-6-389-0. Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent
litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000
and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite
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RULE 5: VENUE
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN vs. HON.
JANE AURORA C. LANTION
Facts: Petitioners Spouses Renato and Angelina Lantin
took several peso and dollar loans from respondent
Planters Development Bank (Planters) and executed
several real estate mortgages and promissory notes to
cover the loans. They defaulted on the payments so
Planters foreclosed the mortgaged lots. The foreclosed
properties were sold at a public auction where Planters
was the winning bidder. Spouses Lantin filed against
Planters and its officers a Complaint for Declaration of
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BONGATO V. MALVAR
Facts: Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner Teresita
Bongato, alleging that the latter unlawfully entered a
parcel of land which belonged to the spouses and
erected thereon a house of light materials. Petitioner
Bongato filed an extension of time to file an answer
which the MTCC denied because it said it was
proscribed under the Rule on Summary Procedure and
likewise containing no notice of hearing. Petitioner, on
several occasions, changed counsels, each of which
filed an answer and a motion to dismiss respectively.
Both were denied by the MTCC. The answer was
denied because it was filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period while the motion to dismiss was
denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner
Bongato to vacate the land in question, and to pay
rentals, attorneys fees, and the costs of the suit. RTC
affirmed. Petitioner Bongato filed an MR.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration only insofar as to
determine the location of the houses involved in this
civil case so that the Court will know whether they are
located on one and the same lot or a lot different from
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BANARES V. BALISING
Facts: Balising filed complaints for estafa against
Banares and other accused. They pleaded not guilty
and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure
of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings
before
the
Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Banares
furthermore contended that since they lived in the
same barangay and the amount involved in each of the
cases did not exceed P200.00, the cases were to be
referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa first before
being filed in court (based on the LGC and Rules on
Summary Procedure).
The MTC ruled in favour of Banares and
dismissed the cases pursuant to the Rules on
Summary Procedure. After 2 months, Balising filed a
motion to revive the criminal cases stating that the
requirement of referral to the Lupon had already been
complied with. This was granted by the MTC.
Banares contends that he Order of the MTC
dismissing the cases had long become final and
executory, thus Balising should have re-filed the cases
instead of filing a motion to revive.
Balising, on the other hand, claimed that the
revival was in accordance with sec. 18 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. They state that the rule on
finality of judgments do not apply to cases covered by
the Rules on Summary Procedure. They further insist
that cases dismissed without prejudice for noncompliance with the requirement of conciliation before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa may be revived summarily
by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the
number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of
the case.
Issue: Does the rule on finality of judgments apply to
the Rules on Summary Procedure? YES.
Ruling: First, one must distinguish between a final
order and interlocutory order. A "final order" issued by
a court has been defined as one which disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined
by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon. Previous jurisprudence state that an
order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom is timely filed. As such, the dismissal of the
criminal cases against Banares is a final order.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of
15 days from his receipt of the court's decision or
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PLEADINGS
JOCSON v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Jocson filed a complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel
Corp & Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp (MCFC). The trial
Court rendered a decision in favor of Jocson, directing
the execution sale to satisfy the judgment against
respondents. Respondents appealed to the CA. CA
decided in favor of Jocson. Respondents no longer
appealed the CA decision, making such final &
executory. The execution sale pushed through, with
Tiusing winning as the highest bidder.
Marcelo Steel filed a motion to annul said sale,
stating that its obligation was joint, instead of solidary,
and that the total price of the properties sold on
execution was extremely inadequate. Trial court ruled
in favor of Marcelo Steel. Jocson moved for
reconsideration. Tiusing also filed a Motion for
Intervention, as he was the winner of the auction. Trial
court denied both. Jocson filed a Notice of Appeal,
which she later withdrew. In lieu of such, both Jocson
& Tiusing filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA
denied. Both filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was again, denied.
Jocson, in the meantime, filed a Motion for
Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to
implement the decision against MCFC.
ISSUE: W/N the withdrawal of the Notice of Appeal
may be done by substituting such with a Petition for
Certiorari? - NO.
RATIO: The petition was only signed by Tiusings
counsel, supposedly on behalf of Jocsons. However,
the rules provide that every pleading must be signed
by all the petitioners or their respective counsels,
otherwise, such pleadings produce no legal effect.
Only Tiusing signed the Verification &
Certification of non-forum shopping. Jocson did not
sign such, despite the rules stating that every petition
for certiorari must be verified. Although Tiusing filed a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to file,
verify & certify the petition, such was done only 4
months after the petition was filed, with no explanation
as to why it was belatedly filed.
In addition, Jocson already filed a Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to executed the
decision against the other respondent, MCFC. The filing
of this is incompatible with a Petition for Review,
because such means that Jocson already recognizes
that the judgment against Marcelo Steel is still
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AGANA v. LAGMAN
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of
title, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondent, claiming that she is the sole heir
of Cruz, thus she is the sole owner of the lot, which
was fraudulently sold to Lopez, who subsequently sold
such to respondent.
Respondent filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
respondents counterclaim for lack of certificate of nonforum shopping. Trial court denied the motion. Upon
petitioners MR, TC reversed itself, dismissing
respondents counterclaim. But TC again recalled its
order dismissing the counterclaim.
ISSUE: W/N a compulsory counterclaim requires a
certificate of non-forum shopping? - NO.
RATIO: The SC Administrative Circular, with respect to
the need for a certificate of non-forum shopping for
counterclaims refer only to initiatory pleadings. This
does not include compulsory counterclaims, as these
are merely reactions or responses to the complaint. If
one does not include a compulsory counterclaim in its
answer, then such is deemed waived.
Permissive
counterclaims,
however,
are
considered initiatory pleadings. Thus, non-inclusion of
a certificate of non-forum shopping in permissive
counterclaims is deemed fatal.
Compulsory Counterclaim of respondent: That
because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified
acts of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and
continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of at
least P400M which the law, equity and justice require
that to be paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse
the attorneys fees of P200M.
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REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic,
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
against Marcos properties before the Sandiganbayan.
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the
aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated
to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks. In addition, the petition sought
the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property.
A General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements dated December 28, 1993 were executed
by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. The agreements included
a stipulation that the US$356 million presumed to be
owned by the Marcoses under some conditions.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation
on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the
motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and
that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining
10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Republic prayed for a summary judgement
over the controversy which was opposed by
respondent marcos.
Sandiganbayan
granted
the
prayer
of
petitioner Republic and rendered a judgment in favour
of the latter, declaring the Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value
equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31,
2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. However, in 2002 and upon the
motion of Mrs. Araneta who adopted the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Marcoses, the
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Summary:
Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will
be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not
sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment. A summary
judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits
that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary
judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is
no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the
prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists
no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a
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JUABAN v. ESPINA
FACTS This stemmed from 3 interlinked cases.
Heirs of Bancale sued for the recovery of certain
properties against Eva Paras and others (Case No. 1).
Petitioners Juaban and Zosa were their counsels. The
heirs then entered into an Agreemenet to Sell and to
Buy with respondent Espina, where they agreed to sell
the subject property to respondent or his assignee with
the amount of P2M as advance payment on the
purchase price. Espina duly paid the said amount. He
then designated respondent Cebu Bay Discovery
Properties, Inc. (CDPI) as the vendee. Subsequently,
respondents found out that Juaban and Zosa had filed
a motion to fix their attorneys fees which was granted
and fixed by the RTC at P9M. The heirs moved for
reconsideration but were denied. They filed a Notice of
Appeal which was indirectly overruled when the court
granted the motion for execution filed by petitioners. A
writ of execution was then issued followed by the sale
of the subject properties to petitioners for P9M, despite
the express instruction of the writ that the attorneys
fees were to be taken from the money due from the
buyer to the sellers under the agreement.
However, the RTC, under a new presiding
judge, reversed and granted the MR of the heirs.
Meanwhile, petitioners were able to obtain a final deed
of sale from Sheriff Gato on the ground that no
redemption of the subject properties was made (Thus,
an administrative complaint against the sheriff was
filed for allegedly acting with manifest bias and
partiality [Case No. 2]).
Respondents also filed an injunction and
damages case to enjoin the sale in a public auction by
Sheriff Gato, allegedly unaware, at the time of the
filing of said case, that the properties had already been
sold (Case No. 3). The court granted petitioners
Motion to Dismiss.
On appeal, CA reversed and ordered the writ of
preliminary injunction to be made permanent.
RELEVANT ISSUEs
1.
Whether respondent Espina has authority to
file the case. YES
2.
Whether the certificate of non-forum shopping
is invalid given that it was only signed by one
of the plaintiffs, i.e. respondent Espina. (Ergo,
whether the complaint should be dismissed
due to non-compliance with the requirements
of the Rules.) NO & NO!
42
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Digests
FILIPINAS TEXTILE v. CA
FACTS: Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. (Filtex) applied and
was issued letters of credit by State Investment
House, Inc. (SIHI) for the purchase of various textile
materials from its suppliers. The suppliers issued
several sight drafts payable to the order of SIHI, which
were duly accepted by Filtex. The sight drafts were
negotiated to and acquired in due course by SIHI
which paid the value thereof to the suppliers for the
account of Filtex. On behalf of Filtex, Bernardino
Villanueva
executed
a
comprehensive
surety
agreement whereby he guaranteed, jointly and
severally with Filtex, the full and punctual payment of
Filtexs indebtedness. To ensure the payment of the
sight drafts, Filtex issued to SIHI several trust receipts
and replacement trust receipts whereby Filtex agreed
to hold the merchandise in trust for SIHI, with liberty
to sell the same for SIHIs account but without
authority to make any other disposition of the said
goods. Filtex failed to pay. SIHI filed a Complaint for
Collection.
Petitioners argued that the comprehensive
surety agreement and the trust receipts upon which
the Complaint was based was null and void for lack of
consent; that SIHI materially altered the terms and
conditions of the surety agreement; and that the
obligation was fully paid with overpayment. However,
petitioners failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of said documents in
their respective Answers. On Appeal, petitioners
claimed that the documents were inadmissible in
evidence due to the non-payment of documentary
stamp taxes as required by the NIRC.
SIHI contended that the petitioners expressly
admitted the due execution of the documents in their
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44
Digests
SY TIONG v. SY CHIM
FACTS: [*this is a consolidated case, the facts in G.R.
No. 179438 is the one relevant to Rem]
FACTS: The corporation Sy Siy Ho & Sons filed a
criminal case for robbery against the Sps. Sy [ Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy] after failing to respond to
the demand letter for accounting of misappropriated
money. It was alleged and found that they failed to
make cash de deposits to any of the corporations
banks hence the total bank remittances for the past
years were less than that reflected in the corporate
financial statements. They have P67, 117, 230.30 as
unaccounted receipts and disbursements. Also, after a
demand letter was sent to them, they stopped
reporting to the company.
Sy Tiong, the Corporate VP called for a special
meeting where he was elected president and his wife
Juanita the new VP. The corporation filed an amended
complaint for accounting and damages against the
Sps. Sy for complete and true accounting of all
amounts misappropriated. The Sps Sy answered that
the meeting was without authority and that they were
the ones authorized by the by-laws to control and
administer the corporation. They also filed their
counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages.
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Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on nonforum shopping in the MBTCs petition was signed by
its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did
not render the said petition defective in form.
Digests
DEFAULT
ANUNCACION v. BOCANEGRA
FACTS: 9/29/2000 Anunciacion filed a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Title. The
complaint averred that Bocanegra may be served with
summons and legal processes through Atty. Rogelio G.
Pizarro, Jr. The summons, together with the copies of
the complaint, were then served on Atty. Pizarro. The
record shows that before the filing of the said
complaint, Atty. Pizarro wrote a demand letter on
behalf of respondents and addressed to Anunciacion,
demanding that they vacate the land owned by
Bocanegra.
10/27/2000 - Bocanegra filed a Motion to
Dismiss (MTD) on the ground that the complaint stated
no cause of action. Petitioners filed their Comment on
the MTD.
11/13/2000 Bocanegra files a Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the
MTD, alleging an additional ground that petitioners
failed to pay the required filing fee.
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11/27/2000
Anunciacion
filed
their
Opposition to the Supplemental MTD and Comment to
the Reply to the Comment on the MTD
11/27/2000 Bocanegra filed a Second
Supplemental MTD and Manifestation citing the
following grounds:
1.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party.
2.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim.
3.) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action.
Anunciacion filed their Additional Comment on
the MTD, Supplemental MTD and Comment on the
Second Supplemental MTD
2/19/2001 RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents as
defendants. MR was denied.
Anunciacion filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari, which the CA dismissed upon finding that
there was no waiver of the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondents in the form of
voluntary appearance. Applying Section 20, Rule 14,
the CA held that although the grounds alleged in the 2
earlier Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss were lack of cause of action and failure to pay
the required filing fee, the filing of the said motions did
not constitute a waiver of the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on their persons as defendants. The CA
concluded that there was no voluntary appearance on
the part of respondents/defendants despite the filing of
the aforesaid motions. MR was denied.
Anunciacion filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court
ISSUE AND RULING: W/N the filings of the MTD and
the Supplemental MTD by Bocanegra amounted to
voluntary appearance before the RTC Yes, case was
reinstated and remanded for further proceedings
(dismissal by the RTC was erroneous)
RATIO: Bocanegra filed a MTD dated 10/25/2000 with
only one ground (that the pleading asserting the claim
"states no cause of action"). Under this ground,
respondents raised the issues that the defendants
anchored their complaint on a WRONG Decree of
Registration; that the Government recognized the
authenticity of the land title; and that the Plaintiffs do
NOT have the legal personality to 'quiet the title' of the
subject property.
Section 20, Rule 14 states that the
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
MTD of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.
The filing of the 10/25/2000 MTD, without
invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the
part of the respondents under Sec. 20, Rule 14. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the
47
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MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC
FACTS: On 24 February 1999 Martinez filed a petition
for the registration in his name of 3 parcels of land
included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. He
alleged that he had purchased the lots in 1952 from
his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were
traceable up to the 1870s. It was claimed that he had
remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the
lots had remained unencumbered; and that they
became private property through prescription pursuant
to Sec. 48(b) of CA 141. He further claimed that he
had been constrained to initiate the proceedings
because the Director of the Land Management Services
had failed to do so despite the completion of the
cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del Sur.
The case was docketed and raffled to the RTC of
Surigao del Sur, Br.27. On 30 September 1999, the
OSG, in behalf of the Republic, opposed the petition on
the grounds that appellee's possession was not in
accordance with CA 141; that his muniments of title
were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition and
possession of the subject parcels; and that the
properties formed part of the public domain and thus
not susceptible to private appropriation.
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC
issued an order of general default, even against the
Republic on 29 March 2000 because during the hearing
on the said date, no party opposed Martinezs petition.
On 1 August 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision
concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-ininterest had proved the required possession under CA
141 and thus decreed the registration.
On 10 October 2003, the CA reversed the
decision of the trial court. No MR was filed by Martinez
instead, it filed the present Petition for Review with
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether an order of general default issued by
a trial court in a land registration case bars the
Republic, through the OSG, from interposing an appeal
from the trial courts subsequent decision in favor of
the applicant. NO.
RATIO: The SC decision is based on the argument of
the OSG that the default order was proper or regular.9
9
48
Digests
Please read the original for the evolution of the rule with
regard to the right to appeal by a defaulted defendant.
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51
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PAGCOR v. LOPEZ
FACTS: PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with
FILGAME and BELLE Jai-Alai Corporation (BELLE) for
the resumption of the Jai-Alai operations in the
country. FILGAME and BELLE jointly agreed to provide
funds for pre-operating expenses and working capital
while PAGCOR shall manage, operate and control all
aspects of the Jai-Alai operations.
However, the Office of the President of the
Philippines issued a Memorandum directing PAGCOR to
close down all PAGCOR facilities and outlets in Jai-Alai,
on-line bingo and internet casino gaming. The DILG,
through Secretary Alfredo S. Lim, caused the closure
of the Jai-Alai main fronton.
FILGAME and BELLE filed the case for Specific
Performance and Injunction with prayer for Damages
and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against PAGCOR, DILG and
Secretary Alfredo Lim. Respondent judge issued a writ
of temporary restraining order.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court rendered a
decision enjoining PAGCOR, Belle, and Filgame from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games,
and from enforcing the agreement entered into by
them for that purpose.
Consequently, FILGAME and BELLE filed a
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint with the trial
court where the cause of action was changed, i.e.,
from Specific Performance to Recovery of Sum of
Money. FILGAME and BELLE sought to recover their
pre-operating expenses and/or investments including
the goodwill money which they allegedly invested with
PAGCOR. PAGCOR filed an opposition on the ground
that there is a substantial change in the complaint and
cause of action.
Respondent judge admitted the
amended complaint.
PAGCOR filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint on the ground that the trial court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the case for failure of the
plaintiffs to pay the prescribed docket fees. It claimed
that the amended complaint, which sought recovery of
the pre-operating expenses and investments including
the goodwill money, should have docket fees of
P15,775,903.68. Said Motion to Dismiss was denied by
the respondent judge.
FILGAME and BELLE manifested their intention
to file a Motion for Summary Judgment which they
subsequently filed. PAGCOR filed its opposition thereto.
Respondent judge did not conduct any hearing on the
motion for summary judgment. He thereafter rendered
his decision by way of Summary Judgment in favor of
FILGAME and BELLE.
PAGCOR charges respondent judge for gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and filed the
present administrative case.
ISSUE and RULING: w/n respondent judge erred in:
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TIU v. PBCOM
FACTS: Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI),
represented by herein petitioners Henry Tiu,
Christopher Go, and George Co, applied for a real
estate
loan
with
the
Philippine
Bank
of
Communications (PBCOM). The first loan was secured
by a piece of land as collateral. Subsequently, a bigger
loan was applied for by AWRI but without an additional
real estate collateral. Instead, the members of the
Board of Directors of AWRI were required to become
sureties under a Surety Agreement. AWRI defaulted on
its obligation and offered all its properties to be applied
in a dacion en pago arrangement. PBCOM, however,
rejected this offer and sued for collection. In the
Answer of petitioners, they claimed that the Surety
Agreement attached to the complaint were falsified,
considering that when they signed the same, the
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BILL OF PARTICULARS
BARITUA v. MERCADER
FACTS: The original complaint was filed against JB
Lines, Inc. (Petitioner) by heirs of Dominador Mercader
(respondents) arising from the breach of contract of
carriage.
Dominador Mercader boarded petitioners bus
bound for Northern Samar as a paying passenger. He
was not able to reach his destination because the said
bus fell into the river resulting in his death.
Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to
dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent
matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on the
primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead
Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and that the
cause of action is a suit against a wrong and nonexistent party.
Respondents filed an opposition to the said
motion and an amended complaint. In its answer,
petitioners denied specifically all the material
allegations in the complaint.
The RTC, after due trial, rendered the decision
in favor of the respondents. This was affirmed by the
CA modifying only the amount of lost earnings to be
awarded .
ISSUE: Whether the CA disregarded petitioners'
procedural rights when it ruled on the case without
recognizing their motion for bill of particulars. NO.
RATIO: Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it
passed sub silencio on the trial court's failure to rule
frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars.
It must be noted that petitioners' counsel
manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for
a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from
March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however,
filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or
eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court.
Moreover, such motion was already moot and
academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had
already filed their answer and several other pleadings
to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court, provides:
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"Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -Before responding to a pleading, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not
averred
with
sufficient
definiteness
or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare
his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a
reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10)
days from service thereof. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of, the
paragraphs wherein they are contained, and
the details desired."16 (emphasis supplied)
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58
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A.
Depositions
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to crossexamine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule
115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court in respect of the
admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous
testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him;
The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was
subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the
criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was
not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private
prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and
previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan
Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from
Davao City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be
categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence,
unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the
negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this point.
It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly
complied with in criminal cases, hence, mere sending of
subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove
inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power
to arrest. In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have
the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a partylitigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed
fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for
the prosecution.
B.
60
Depositions
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Deposition
testimony
not
substitute
for
actual
General Rule
Exceptions
1
61
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Witness is dead;
Witness resides 100kms from the place of trial or
hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering
the deposition;
3. Witness is unable to attend because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment;
4. Party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena;
or
5. Upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used.
NB: The party against whom the deposition is sought to be
used should have been present or represented at the taking of
the deposition, or at least had due notice thereof.
SC said here that the certification by the Bureau of
Immigration provided the necessary evidentiary support to
prove that Corral was out of the country when the deposition
was offered.
Also, on waiver
Depositions
62
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Depositions
appropriate time.
On claim that deposition will prevent court from observing the
demeanor
San Luis wrong. Depositions are allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court. It precisely falls within one of the
exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use
of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony
of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the
prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge. Depositions
are allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court; that is,
with leave of court if the summons have been served, without
leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and provided,
further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.
On right to cross-examine
The rules allow San Luis to submit cross-interrogatories upon
private respondent with sufficient fullness and freedom.
On lack of enforcement for perjury
No issue yet so court will not rule on it.
F.
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applies.
See Section 15, Rule 119 on the examination of witness for the
prosecution. Please note that a slightly different rule exists for the
examination of witness for the defense under Section 13 of Rule 119.)
3
While it is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that CivPro rules apply to all actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings, the suppletory application of the same come into play
only in situations not adequately covered by CrimPro rules on criminal
cases.
Depositions
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Depositions
ROWENA
DULAY,
etc
v.
65
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Depositions
66
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Consequences
interrogatories
of
failure
to
answer
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L.
Depositions
DBP v. CA
Petitioner: Development Bank of the Philippines
Respondent: CA and Rosalinda Canadalla-Go, represented by
her Atty-in-fact Benito A. Canadalla
FACTS: Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from
petitioner DBP for purposes of financing her piggery business.
As security, Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over two parcels of land. Canadalla again obtained
another loan of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage
over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel. Canadalla
failed to comply with her obligations to DBP so DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. The mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which
emerged as the only bidder.
Canadalla was able to redeem one of the foreclosed
properties but failed to redeem the others since they could not
agree on the redemption price. Irene Canadalla allegedly later
assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter,
private respondent Rosalinda Canadalla-Go. When Go failed to
redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the
subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in
its name.
Go filed with the RTC of Makati City a Supplemental
Complaint for the "Exercise of Right of Redemption and
Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of
Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." After the DBP
filed its Answer but before the parties could proceed to trial,
Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party. Thereafter,
the DBP filed its Comment.
During the hearing, Go objected to the Comment
reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2,
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the
reasons for the admission or denial of matters for which an
admission was requested. For its part, the DBP manifested
that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents
contained in the Request for Admission are substantially the
69
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Depositions
70
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Depositions
71
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Depositions
IN relation to topic:
Not so Impt
Production
Order
Provisions
in
72
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SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
VS
GATEWAY
Depositions
nullified the ruling of the trial court. It ruled that both the
Motion for Production of Documents and the of the trial court
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27 of
the Rules of Court. It further held that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the matters
regarding the contents of the documents sought to be
produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be
deemed established in accordance with Solidbanks claim.
ISSUE W/N SOLIDBANKs Motion for Production and Inspection
complies with the Rules of Court. NO.
HELD
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides the
mechanics for the production of documents and the inspection
of things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the
inspection of sources of evidence other than documents, such
as land or other property in the possession or control of the
other party. The purpose of the statute is to enable a partylitigant to discover material information which, by reason of an
opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial
scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of
obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the
custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further
extension of the concept of pretrial. Rule 27 of the Revised
Rules of Court permits fishing for evidence, the only
limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be
produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of
the party ordered to produce them and that they are material
to any matter involved in the action. Mutual knowledge of all
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession.
In this case, GATEWAY assigned to SOLIDBANK the
proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance and
by virtue of the assignment, GATEWAY was obligated to remit
to SOLIDBANK all payments received from ALLIANCE.
Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of
the documents and why these are material to the action.
However, the motion was fatally defective because of its
failure to specify with particularity the documents it
required Gateway to produce. Since the motion for
production and inspection of documents called for a blanket
inspection. SOLIDBANKs request for inspection of "all
documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or
involving the Back-end Services Agreement" was simply too
broad and too generalized in scope.
SC held that a motion for production and inspection
of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a
promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be
limited to those documents designated with sufficient
particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can
easily identify the documents he is required to produce
OTHER NOTES:
The requisites in order that a party may compel the
other party to produce or allow the inspection of
documents or things (according to Security Bank vs
CA)
73
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Depositions
74
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which only Civil Case No. 5823 was raffled. The parties
did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions
nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on
the absence of an order for consolidation of the two
cases. Instead, they directly interposed their
respective appeals to the CA.
In the CA, the two cases were consolidated. CA
modified the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 5822
but reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 5823,
ordering B.G. Magno to pay the Spouses Yu and Leyte
Lumber P625,000.00 plus attorneys fees and cost of
suit.
The spouses Yu filed an MR. CA denied the
motion, hence the the present petition for review
under Rule 45 to set aside the CA decision.
Issues: 1. W/N it was proper for Judge Francisco of
Branch 6 to render a decision in a case filed and heard
in Branch 8, in the absence of a motion or order of
consolidation of the two cases? Yes, it was proper.
2. W/N Branch 6 could consider the evidence
presented in Branch 8? Yes, it could since there was
consolidation of both cases.
Held and Ratio:
1. There was nothing irregular in procedure taken by
Judge Francisco of Branch 6 in formulating the decision
in Civil Case No. 5822 which was pending and tried in
Branch 8. The records show that there had been a
previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate
the two cases for decision by judge Francisco of Branch
6.
As early as six months prior to the
promulgation of Judge Franciscos decisions in the two
cases, there appears to have been a transfer or
consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties
knew of it, albeit the actual date when the two cases
were consolidated or transferred does not appear on
record. Nonetheless, the fact remains that no
opposition or objection in any manner was registered
by either of the parties to the same, thereby evincing
their consent thereto. SC cited several instances: i.e.
when BG Magno and the estate filed a Motion to Lift,
Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with
Branch 6, the caption thereof indicated the docket
numbers of both cases; when the longstanding counsel
of both spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber filed his Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel and when their new counsel
entered his Formal Appearance, in the caption thereof
was also written the docket numbers of both cases. It
is, therefore, already too late in the day for both
spouses Yu and Leyte Lumber to question the
competence of Judge Francisco to render the separate
decisions in the two cases.
2. Consolidation by Branch 6 was proper. A court may
order several actions pending before it to be tried
together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and
depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,
provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case
to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give
77
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Section 1.
Consolidation. When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
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PEOPLE VS CACHOLA
FACTS. In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E.
Barnachea lost his mother, an elder brother, an uncle,
and a cousin as a result of the carnage that took place
at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999 right inside
their house in Brgy. Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union.
Their horrible death was attributed to herein accusedappellants.
At the trial before the RTC the prosecution
presented as witnesses Jessie and his brother and
neighbors, as well as several police officers. Their
testimonies disclose that when Jessie was about to
leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncles house
next door, two armed men suddenly entered the front
door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to drop to
the floor, and then hit him in the back. Without much
ado, the intruders shot to death Jessies uncle,
Victorino V. Lolarga. Jessie forthwith crawled and hid
under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third
man who had also entered the house. The men
entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the
rampage was over and after the malefactors had
already departed, Jessie came out of his hiding place
and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw his
mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother Felix
Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all
slaughtered.
Meanwhile, Jessies eldest brother, Robert E.
Barnachea testidfied that he saw armed men running
towards their house. He scampered away and hid at
the back of his uncles house. From where he was
hiding, he noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and
marking fruits and vegetables dealer, parked in front
of the fence of their house. In the next instant, he
heard gunshots and then saw men running from his
house. The men hurriedly boarded the jeep and left
the place. The jeep did not go unnoticed by the
neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in
front of Rodas Store, around 100 meters away from
the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by
very slowly going towards the Barnachea residence.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense
counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the
motion outright and set the schedule for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense. Instead
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CORP
V.
EQUITABLE
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BASCUG VS ARANDAY
Facts: Laurentino Bascug filed a complaint charging
Judge Aranday with grave misconduct, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, malicious delay in the
administration of justice and violation of the code of
judicial conduct.
(There are several cases from which the admin
complaint arose from. But only the facts related to the
charge of grave misconduct is related to judgment on
the pleadings)
RELATED PART: In the civil case of Vicente
Ditching vs Odisco Farms System Cooperative
Foundation, Bascug charged Judge Aranday with gross
misconduct when he directed a judgment on the
pleadings. Bascug who was actually the president of
Odisco Farms, claims that Judge Aranday declared the
parties as having agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings even when Odisco Farms
never agreed to it. In fact, Bascug alleges that Odisco
Farms did not submit any memorandum for judgment
on the pleadings required by Judge Aranday in one of
his orders. Nevertheless, despite the absence of such
memorandum, Judge Aranday rendered judgment
based on the pleadings in favor of Vicente Ditching et
al. An MR was filed but was denied. Case was brought
to the CA and the case was remanded for further
proceeding.
Judge Aranday contends that parties had
manifested that they had no objection to the
submission of the case for judgment on the pleadings.
Issue: Whether Judge Aranday was correct
rendering a judgment on the pleadings? NO
in
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HELD:
1. NO, there was substantial compliance.
Eland claimed that the 10 day notice rule
under Rule 35 Sec. 3 was violated when they received
a copy of the motion for summary judgment only on
the very same day that the motion is set for hearing.
Eland further claims that the TC never conducted any
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
The above contention, however, is misguided.
The CA was correct in its observation that there was
substantial compliance with due process. The CA ruled,
as the records show, that the 10 day notice rule was
substantially complied with because when Garcia et al
filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9,
1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on
the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that
the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or
10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
2. YES.
Eland further argues that summary judgment
is not proper in an action for quieting of title. The
Court however disagrees. This Court has already ruled
that any action can be the subject of a summary
judgment with the sole exception of actions for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation.
3. YES.
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds
that the grant of summary judgment was not proper.
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings
on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving
party show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the nonexistence of a genuine issue is the determining
factor in granting a motion for summary judgment,
and the movant has the burden of proving such
nonexistence. The TC found no genuine issue as to any
material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-
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HELD: SC: The SC brought to our attention the 2page decision of the RTC.
While Judge Querubin
Querubin mentioned his factual findings, the legal
basis of his ruling is not set out in the decision. Judge
Querubin failed to meet faithfully the requirement
demanded by the Constitution from the courts in
rendering their decisions.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution declares
that:
Sec. 14.
No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall
be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
The court must inform the parties to a case of
the legal basis for the courts decision so that if a party
appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the
points of law to which it disagrees. Every judge should
know the constitutional mandate and the rationale
behind it. Judge Querubin should have known the
exacting standard imposed on courts by Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution and should not have
sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevitys sake.
The failure of the trial court decision to measure
up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross
to ignore as it is in stark contrast to the CAs decision.
The CAs decision, while also brief, being only three
pages long, laid down the factual and legal reasons
why Antonio and Soledad are the ones liable to
SPCMA, and not PNB. The CAs discussion of the
merits of this case enabled the parties to pinpoint the
proper issues that we now review.
Side note: the SC upheld the decision of the CA,
holding the spouses liable
(interest issue they were claiming that there
was double imposition of interest: sps. Consing did
not only bind themselves to pay the principal amount,
they also promised to pay (1) the interest of 1% per
month on all the overdue accounts, (2) the additional
sum of 25% of the total amount due as attorneys
fees, and (3) 10% of the indebtedness as liquidated
damages which, in either case, shall not be less than
P250. Since they freely entered into the contract, the
stipulations in the contract are binding on them.)
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INTRAMUROS TENNIS
TOURISM AUTHORITY
CLUB
V.
PHILIPPINE
FACTS:
Private
respondent
Philippine
Tourism
Authority (Tourism Authority) owns the Victoria Tennis
Courts in Intramuros, Manila by virtue of PD 1763. In a
Memorandum of Agreement executed in 1987, Tourism
Authority transferred the management, operation,
administration and development of the Victoria Tennis
Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association
(Tennis Association) for a period of 10 years. Petitioner
Intramuros Tennis Club (ITC) is an affiliate of Tennis
Association and has for its members tennis players and
enthusiasts who regularly use the facilities of the
Victoria Tennis Courts.
During the effectivity of the MOA, the Tourism
Authority wrote to the Tennis Association alleging
violations by the Tennis Association of the terms and
conditions of the MOA. The former demanded the
surrender of the possession of Victoria Tennis Courts.
The Tourism Authority wrote a second letter
demanding the Tennis Association to vacate the
premises and to give way to the Tourism Authoritys
golf course expansion program with private respondent
Club Intramuros.
Petitioners Tennis Association instituted a case
for preliminary injunction, damages and prayer for TRO
with the RTC. Among others, it alleged that by
complying with the demand to vacate, petitioner ITC
stands to sustain liability because it had prior
commitments to use the Victoria Tennis Courts for two
activities.
The TRO was granted as well as the
preliminary injunction.
Tourism Authority filed a motion to dismiss
stating that in view of the expiration of the MOA,
petitioners cause of action was moot and academic.
Motion to Dismiss was granted. Petitioners Tennis
Association appealed. While the appeal was pending,
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ISSUE:
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file a motion for new trial since a motion for new trial
should be filed within the period to appeal, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment.
The motion for new trial suspends the running of the
period to appeal but does not extend the time within
which an appeal must be perfected. Hence if denied, a
movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the
balance of the reglementary period within which to
appeal.
Since 30 Nov. 30 was a holiday, Fernandez had
up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for new
trial. Instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before
the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion
for extension of time to file petition for review.
Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion
before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to
the RTC and filed on 09 December 1994 a motion for
new trial.
Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's motion for
new trial was filed out of time. The fifteen (15)-day
period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be
extended. Motions for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed
only in connection with cases pending before the
Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested. No such
motion may be filed before any lower courts.
Side Issue: Does a motion for an extension of time to
file a petition for review divest the RTC of its
jurisdiction?
No. Jurisdiction is lost once an appeal is
perfected. An appeal is perfected when there is a
timely filing of the petition (such as petition for review)
and the payment of docket and other lawful fees.
In this case, the CA has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the case because Fernandez merely
filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for
review but not the petition for review itself.
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NEYPES V CA
Facts: Neypes, along with other petitioners, filed an
action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction against Bureau of Lands, Land Bank, and
the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. The heirs of del
Mundo filed an MR claiming that the action had already
prescribed. The RTC Judge ruled agreed with the heirs
and dismissed the case because of prescription.
On Feb 12, 1998, the TC rendered the decision that
the action had prescribed.
On March 3, 1998, Neypes received the copy of the
decision.
On March 18, 1998 (15 days after receipt), Neypes
filed an MR.
On July 1, 1998, the TC denied the MR.
On July 22, 1998, Neypes received the order denying
the MR.
On July 27, 1998, Neypes filed a notice of appeal,
paying the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal claiming it
was 8 days late. Neypes claimed that they were not
late and that the 15-day period only started when they
received the order denying the MR. CA claimed that
the 15-day period started way back in March 3 when
Neypes received the copy of the decision.
Issue: When should the reglementary period start?
How many days are left, if any?
Held: An appeal should be taken within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
3
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted
upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of
time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in
this Court shall be deemed abandoned.
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TAN V CA
Facts: Petitioner Annie Tan, owner of AJ & T Trading,
leased a portion of the ground floor of her building in
Binondo in favor of private respondent Bloomberry
Export Manufacturing. The lease was for five years at
a monthly rental of P20k for the first three years. Tan
filed for ejectment against Bloomberry for several
alleged violations of the lease contract (e.g. failure to
pay rentals on time and encroachment on the adjacent
premises without her consent). Then, Bloomberry tried
to pay the rent, but it was refused by Tan, so
Bloomberry filed a case for consignation. The two
cases were consolidated. MTC Manila ruled that Tan
failed to substantiate her case with that degree of
proof required by law. It dismissed the complaint for
ejectment. Meanwhile, the case for consignation
became moot and academic for Tans failure to appeal
the MTC decision, thus allowing Bloomberry to consign
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NAVAROSA V. COMELEC
Facts:
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ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in finding that the lower court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in granting execution
pending appeal of its decision YES
(2) Whether or not the filing of a bond can be
considered a good reason to justify immediate
execution under Section 2, Rule 39 NO
HELD:
In upholding the writ of execution pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the lower
court had, prior to it its issuance, duly noted the
presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 23 allowing execution as
an exception, or pending appeal, even before final
Judgment, to wit:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the
execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special
order.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals accepted as
"good reasons" that ISM's appeal appears to be
dilatory in view of its virtual admission of fault when it
adopted the project "Code Red" consisting of safety
and emergency measures only after the death of
plaintiffs-spouses Torralba's son, and the delay of the
case which already affected plaintiffs spouses Torralbas
financially.
For purposes only of determining the
correctness of the writ of execution pending appeal,
the SC could not see how the lower courts came upon
the conclusion of virtual admission of fault or
negligence by ISM based on ISM's swimming coachs
admission that he read the school paper article
introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by
ISM, the article was not an official statement of the
school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover,
the statement of Mr. Noli Reloj that he read the article
on "Code Red" cannot be construed as an admission of
liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion of
the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely
on the foregoing exchange rests on shaky ground.
(1)
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(2)
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CURATA V PPA
FACTS: (its a very complicated case composed of 7
consolidated cases but for our topic I pinpointed the
relevant facts nalang)
2 Executive orders (385 and 431) placed the
BPZ under the PPAs jurisdiction in pursuance of this
the PPA instituted expropriation proceedings for 185
lots represented by 231 individuals and entities. The
PPA offered to pay for just compensation which the
parties rejected. The defendants were divided into 3
groups: Dimayacyac, Ortega and Cruz Groups. There
were also individuals not included in the groups.
THE FIRST COMPENSATION ORDER
The RTC ordered the expropriation of the lots
so the Commissioners were asked to conduct a report
and later the RTC gave their first compensation order
ordering the PPA to pay the Dimayacyac group 5500
instead of 4800 as recommended. Dimayacyac moved
for execution citing that the group consisted of
members who were of advanced age which was
opposed by PPA but which was nevertheless allowed by
the RTC in the July 24, 2000 Order granting the motion
of execution.
July 31, 2000- RTC issued Order issuing a writ
of execution.
August 2 and 3 - Then a notice of
garnishment was issued to LBP Batangas City Branch
by Sheriff Quino.
August 10- PPA filed a "Notice of Appeal with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal
and Pay Appeal Fee."
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GARCIA v. PAL
Facts: PAL filed administrative charges against
petitioners (employees) after they were caught in the
act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel raided the PAL Center. They were dismissed
after due notice, which prompted them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor and
ordered PAL to immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision. But prior to this,
the SEC placed PAL under rehabilitation receivership
due to severe financial losses. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision. However, the Labor Arbiter
subsequently issued a Writ of Execution on the
reinstatement aspect and Notice of Garnishment. The
NLRC affirmed their validity but suspended and
referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver.
PAL went to the CA, arguing that the
subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the
basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of the
decision and the impossibility to comply with such due
to corporate rehabilitation. The CA partially granted
the petition and reinstated the NLRC Resolution insofar
as it suspended the proceedings. Subsequently, SEC
granted PALs request to exit from rehabilitation
proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether the LAs order of reinstatement is
immediately executory pending appeal YES
2. Whether it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay wages during
the period of appeal despite reversal of said
order YES
3. Given these, whether petitioners are entitled to
their salaries - NO
Ratio:
Immediate Execution of Reinstatement Order
The SC cites seemingly divergent decisions
concerning
reinstatement
pending
appeal,
or
particularly, the option of payroll reinstatement. One
view is that a dismissed employee whose case was
favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive
wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is
immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining
order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the
order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the
eployer to comply therewith (Air Philippines v.
Zamora). The other view is found in the case of
Genuino v. NLRC, which says that if the decision of the
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ARCENAS V CA
Facts: The case takes its roots from Civil Case No.
35349 (1st CASE) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now Regional Trial Court), which was an action for
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Held:
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over his person?
NO. Arcenas was no longer residing and found in the
Philippines. He left for the United States in June of
1993 as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. Hence,
summons could have been served on him either
personally or by publication. However, since the
complaint filed against him was one in personam and
did not involve the personal status of the private
respondent, nor any property in the Philippines in
which Arcenas had or claimed an interest, or which de
la Riva had attached, summons should have been
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FACTS:
Petitioner Albino Josef bought shoe materials on
credit from respondent Otelio Santos.
Josef failed to pay so Santos filed a case for
collection of sum of money.
Marikina RTC found Josef liable. Josef appealed but
CA affirmed RTC. Josef went to SC via certiorari
but it was dismissed. The Judgment became final
and executory.
Santos moved for issuance of a writ of execution,
which was opposed by Josef. Still, the writ was
granted and subsequently issued and enforced.
Certain personal properties subject of the writ of
execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real
property located at Marikina City was sold by way
of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment
credit. Santos emerged as the winning bidder and
a Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor.
Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with the
CA, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale of the
personal and real properties. Josef claimed that the
personal properties did not belong to him but to
his children; and that the real property covered
was his family home thus exempt from execution.
CA dismissed the petition for failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order
granting the motion for execution and ordering the
issuance of a writ therefor, as well as for his failure
to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing
as required under the Rules of Court. MR was also
denied. Hence, this petition.
JOSEF v. SANTOS
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Rule IV
EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only
the properties of the losing party shall be the subject of
execution, except:
(a)
The losing partys family home constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code or Family Code or as may be
provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the homestead
in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection
therewith, subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b)
His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c)
Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing party
such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the amount
fixed by law;
(d)
Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
three (3) months;
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(e)
The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors,
clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding
the amount fixed by law;
(f)
So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
personal services within the month preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family;
(g)
All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing
or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(h)
Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his
trade or employment of a value not exceeding three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos;
(i)
Other properties especially exempted by law.
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BENITEZ VS ACOSTA
Facts: The complainant here is Gloria Benitez in
representation of her mother, Amparo Osla. The
Mother was the defendant in a civil case (Leon Basas
vs Amparo Osilas) filed with the MCTC. It would appear
that judgment was rendered against the Mother for a
sum of money.
Benitez alleges that in implementing the writ of
execution and conducting the execution sale,
respondent Medel Acosta who is the sheriff committed
the following: a) ignored the bid of Gloria Benitez and
Edna Samson; b) sold the jeepney to the highest
bidder, Mario Timbol, who was absent and only sent
his bid through a Joe Castillo who was also absent; c)
sold the jeepney for an unconscionably low price; d)
Mario Timbol and Joe Castillo were merely fronts since
it was Sheriff Acosta who really wanted the jeepney;
e) failed to the deliver the jeepney; f) did not make a
return of the writ of execution; and g) did not comply
with the notice requirements. Sheriff Acosta is then
being charged with grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
Issue: Whether there was irregularity in the execution
of the judgment? YES
Held: Sec14, rule39 of the ROC requires the sheriff to:
1) make a return and submit it to the court
immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the
judgment; and 2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied
in full, to make a report to the court within 30days
after his receipt of the writ and state why full
satisfaction could not be made. The sheriff shall
continue making a report every 30 days on
proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is
full satisfied. The reason for this requirement is to
update the court as to the status of the execution and
give it an idea why the judgment has not been
satisfied. It also provides the court an idea as to how
efficient court processes are after the judgment has
been promulgated. The over-all purpose of the
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ST.
AVIATION
SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS
V.
GRAND
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ISSUES:
Whether the Singapore High Court has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the
service of summons upon its office in the
Philippines -YES
Whether the judgment by default by the Singapore
High Court is enforceable in the Philippines -YES
RULING: (Generally, in the absence of a special
contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of a
foreign country. However, under the rules of comity,
utility and convenience, nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments
of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.)
Under Rule 39, Sec. 48, a foreign judgment or
order against a person is merely presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and may be repelled,
among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority or by want of notice to the party against
whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
Respondent contends that the service of
summons is void and that the Singapore Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum, which in this case is the law of
Singapore. In this case, the petitioner moved for leave
of court to serve a copy of the Writs of Summons
outside Singapore, which was granted. This service of
summons outside Singapore is in accordance with
Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 1996 of
Singapore: xxx c) by a method of service authorized
by the law of that country for service of any originating
process issued by that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is
acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his
deputy or other proper court officer either personally
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STATE INVESTMENT
MOTORS
TRUST
INC.
V.
DELTA
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LEON
AND
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FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45)
from the decision of the Special 8th division of the
CA.
Aguilar was appointed as election officer and
Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers in
Laguna during the 1998 elections.
After partially canvassing the votes, he abandoned
his duty and never returned.
The winners of the election were proclaimed but the
certificates of canvass did not bear Aguilars
signature as he was missing in action.
Thereafter, he was charged with abandonment and
neglect of duty by COMELEC. He was placed under a
6month suspension.
Aguilar moved twice to reconsider the suspension
claiming that his absence was due to illness, physical
exhaustion and threats from violent groups. Both
MRs were denied.
Aguilar then appealed to the CSC and filed his Notice
of Appeal together with his appeal memorandum.
CSC affirmed the finding of COMELEC but modified
the penalty by imposing dismissal.
Aguilar appealed to the CA via Rule 43
CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the CSC decision
had already become final in view of the untimely
submission of Aguilars MR which was filed 9 days
beyond the 15 day period.
Aguilar contends that he should be excused because
his MR was belated only by 1 day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aguilar may be excused YES
Whether or not Aguilar should be dismissed - NO
HELD:
Aguilar was late only by 1 day and not 9 days. Even
so, this is excused because the deadline for the filing
of the MR fell on a weekend. This explains why
Aguilar was late by a day. In the interest of justice,
procedural rules must be relaxed. Remember that
cases must be disposed off according to their merits
and not merely on technicality.
The COMELEC ruling of suspension should be
followed and not the CSC ruling of dismissal. This is
because according to CSC rules cases appealed to it
should have underwent only one MR. however, in
this case, Aguilar filed 2 MRs before the COMELEC.
Thus the appeal with the CSC should have been
denied for failure to comply with its rules. That
having been said, the COMELEC ruling had become
final and executory.
Appeals
CONEJOS V CA
Facts: Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. (Estate) owns a
lot in Cebu, being bought by petitioner Teresita
Conejos. Private respondent Eutiquio Plania then
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with Conejos whereby they agreed that each of them
would pay half of the purchase price of the 134 sq. m
116
Digests
Appeals
Appeals
Digests
the
Petition
for
certiorari
was
Digests
Appeals
Digests
Appeals
120
Digests
Rule 47
Digests
NERI V. LEYSON
Facts:
Rule 47
Issue:
123
Digests
Rule 47
124
Digests
SALERA V A1 INVESTORS
FACTS: On August 27, 1992, Teodora Salera, mother
of the petitioners, contracted a P50,000.00 loan and
issued a promissory note to respondent A-1 Investors,
Inc. Salera defaulted and A-1 filed a complaint (First
Case) in the MTC, Quezon City against Teodora and
impleaded her husband, Saturnino Sr. The summons
1
Rule 47
Digests
Rule 47:
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.- The annulment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition.- The action shall
be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging
therein with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.. . .
A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the
petition intended for the court and indicated as such by
the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with
the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state
the status of the same, and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom."
It is clear from the contents of the complaint
filed by the petitioners that the action is not for
annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996. It
does not allege "with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action"
which petitioners now claim are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of
the decision in the First Case attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits
of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of
action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, submitted
together with the complaint. Petitioners cannot now
mislead the court into treating the complaint for
Rule 47
COLE V ALFARO
Facts: The case began from a sale of townhouse unit
owned by Agda which gave rise to 5 petitions
stemming from the complaint for non-delivery of title
filed by spouses Aurora, Cinco, Jingco,Cingco-Jingco
and Cole w/ the HLURB Arbiter against Agda and PNB.
On Feb 20, 1991 the HLURB arbiter rendered
judgment against Agda and PNB. HLU Board of
Commisioners affirmed the decision. The Office of the
Pres also affirmed the decision.
Agda questioned the arbiters decision to the
CA via petition for certiorari. After 6 years from
rendering the arbiters decision the CA dismissed the
petition ruling that the HLURB Rules of Procedure
provided that the decision of the Arbiter may be
appealed to the Board and thereafter to the Office of
the President and also laches. The decision became
final and executory on July 23, 1997, and an entry of
judgment was made on November 13, 1997.
On October 21, 1995, Agda filed with the QC
RTC an action for rescission of contracts against
spouses Cole to nullify the Memorandum of
Agreement selling one townhouse unit to them. Coles
children substituted him upon his death and his son
Charles moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. TC denied the motion so Cole filed
petition for certiorari with the CA. (1st petition)
The CA dismissed Agdas complaint because of
forum shopping and that the Boards decision is res
judicata to the rescission case in the RTC. Agda
appealed to the SC. The SC dismissed the appeal for
filing beyond the period which became final and
executory on February 2, 1999.
On August 28, 1997, Agda filed with the CA a
petition for annulment of judgment of the Arbiters
decision rendered on February 20 and that of the
Office of the President dated February 27. Cole moved
to dismiss. Because of the inaction by the CA on the
MtD Cole filed a petition for mandamus with
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
with the SC to compel the CA to resolve his Mtd and to
summarily dismiss the petition for annulment.(2nd
petition) Despite the pending annulment proceeding
Agda on Feb 25, 99 filed a petition for review with the
Office of the pres questioning the Boards decision. The
OoP issued an order requiring Agda to pay the appeal
fee and the Coles to submit memoranda. Cole filed
another petition for certiorari asking for the dismissal
of the petition. SC dismissed the petition and denied
the mr.
On June 30, 1999, CA declared null and void the
arbiters decision and the OoPs decision dated for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. 2 petitions
for annulment of judgment were filed, the first on July
14, 1999 by Lolita Cole and her son Atty. Cole and the
second, on September 7, 1999, by Charito Cole-Alfaro,
126
Digests
Rule 47
127
FINALS
COVERAGE:
Provrem
SCA
Crimpro
Evidence
SpecPro (No cases)
Digests
ProvRem
TORRES V. SATSATIN
Facts: The siblings Sofia Torres (Sofia), Fructosa
Torres (Fructosa), and Mario Torres (Mario) each own
adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land. In 1997,
Nicanor Satsatin (Nicanor) asked petitioners mother,
Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After
consultation with the siblings, Agrapina agreed to allow
Nicanor to sell the properties for them. They
authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of
Attorney, to negotiate for the sale of the properties.
Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar
Resources, Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly agreed to
purchase the three parcels of land, together with the
10,000-square-meter property owned by a certain
Rustica Aledia, for P35,000,000.00. Nicanor was
supposed to remit to them the total amount of
P28,000,000.00 or P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia,
Fructosa, and the heirs of Mario.
Despite the fact that Solar has already paid the
entire purchase price of P35,000,000.00 to Nicanor,
has only remitted the total amount of P9,000,000.00,
leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00.
Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Nicanor
failed to remit to them the balance of P19,000,000.00.
Nicanor allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista
Grande BF Resort Village, Las Pias City and a car,
which he registered in the names of his unemployed
children.
The siblings then filed a Complaint for sum of money
and damages, against Nicanor and his unemployed
children. They also filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among
130
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
YU v. NGO TE
FACTS:
Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu)
purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent
soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter
three postdated checks as payment which were
subsequently returned dishonored and stamped
ACCOUNT CLOSED.
Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but they
refused. Te filed with the RTC a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.
In support of her prayer for preliminary
attachment, Te attached to her Complaint an
Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were
guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase
agreement for they never intended to pay the
contract price, and that, based on reliable
information, they were about to move or dispose of
their properties to defraud their creditors.
Upon Tes posting of an attachment bond, the RTC
issued an Order of Attachment/Levy on the basis
of which the Sheriff levied and attached Spouses
Yus properties in Cebu City consisting of one
parcel of land and several vehicles.
Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for
damages and an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of
Preliminary Attachment. They also filed a Claim
Against Surety Bond in which they demanded
payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which
issued the attachment bond representing the
damages
they
allegedly
sustained
as
a
consequence of the wrongful attachment of their
properties.
RTC issued an Order discharging from attachment
some of the vehicles on humanitarian grounds but
maintained custody of the land and the passenger
bus. Spouses Yu filed a MR, which the RTC denied.
CA: The writ of preliminary attachment issued by
the respondent court was improvidently issued and
should be discharged.
Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no
avail. Te filed with the SC a Petition for Review
on Certiorari but was denied. Thus, the finding of
the CA on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy
ProvRem
132
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
SUPERLINES V. PNCC
FACTS: A Superlines bus swerved and crashed into the
radio room of PNCC while the bus was traveling north
and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane.
During the investigation, the bus was turned over to
the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own
investigation of the incident. Because of lack of
adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic
investigator Lopera, towed by the PNCC patrol to its
compound where it was stored.
Superlines requested PNCC to release the bus
but it refused despite the willingness of the former to
repair the damaged radio room. PNCC demanded the
sum of P40K for repair although Superlines estimate
for the repair of the radio room was only P10K.
Because of the refusal, Superlines filed a complaint for
replevin with damages.
The Lower Court sided with Superlines but
since Superlines is unable to put op the bond for the
issuance of the writ of replevin, it opted to forego the
140
Digests
ProvRem
LT.
GEN.
ALFONSO
PADERANGA
DAGUDAG
V.
JUDGE
141
Digests
of
exhaustion
of
ProvRem
Digests
ProvRem
143
Digests
OCAMPO V. TIRONA
Facts: Leonardo Ocampo alleged that he was the
owner of a parcel of land in Pasay City and that he
bought it from Rosauro Breton. Possession and
management of the land was already with him despite
the TCT not being issued yet. Leonora Tirona was the
lessee of the land even before Ocampo bought it.
Upon acquisition of ownership by Ocampo, he
sent a formal notice to Tirona. Tirona religiously paid
her rents until the subject premises were declared
under area for priority development. As such, Tirona
invoked her right to first refusal and refused to pay her
rent until the NHA processed her papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Tirona. Tironas defense was that Ocampo was
not the owner thus she shouldnt pay him rent. It
should be noted that Tirona kept changing the theory
of her case stating that Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza
owned the land when the case was at the MTC and
stating that Breton was the owner when the case was
appealed to the RTC.
Issue: Should the complaint for unlawful detainer
prosper? YES.
Decision: First, the issue of ownership is not essential
to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease
and the expiration of its term are the only elements of
the action. The defense of ownership does not change
the summary nature of the action. The affected party
should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate
action, because a certificate of title cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful]
detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession
de jure that either party may set forth in his pleadings,
and an appeal does not operate to change the nature
of the original action.
Furthermore, Tirona was estopped from
denying that Ocampo had possession of the lease
agreement. She paid her rent to him until such
declaration of the area for priority development. The
sale of a leased property places the vendee into the
shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound
himself to pay.
Lastly (and more importantly), Tirona should
have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against
her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for
interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know
the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby
a person who has property whether personal or real, in
his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims
S.C.A.
Digests
ARREZA v DIAZ
FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of
a housing complex located in Balara Quezon City. It
instituted an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz
who were conflicting claimants of the property. the
RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said decision,
Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to Arreza
and Diaz was compelled to transfer possession
together with all improvements to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against
Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost of
the improvements which amounted to approximately
S.C.A.
Digests
S.C.A.
MALANA V TAPPA
FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al.
(Danao heirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in
Tugegarao which they inherited from Anastacio
Danao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed
Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa) to build on
and occupy the southern portion of the subject
property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter
would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and
his heirs might need it. Danao heirs claimed that
respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy
the subject property even after Consuelos death,
building their residences thereon using permanent
materials. Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et al.
were
claiming
ownership
over
the
subject
property. Averring that they already needed it, Danao
heirs demanded that respondents vacate the
same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs
referred
their
land
dispute
to
the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings,
respondents asserted that they owned the subject
property
and
presented
documents
ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed
this, saying that the documents were falsified and
highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al.
created a cloud upon the heirs title to the
property. Thus,
the
heirs
filed
a
case
for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the
RTC.
147
Digests
S.C.A.
Digests
MEJIA v. GABAYAN
*This is a confusing case, a lot of petitions were filed
at paulit ulit yung nangyayari, but the Declaratory
Relief part was very short, not the main issue*
FACTS: Mejia is the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in Isabela. The lot was a portion of a large
tract of land covered by a homestead patent granted
to his father.
S.C.A.
Digests
Certiorari
S.C.A.
Digests
S.C.A.
Prohibition
entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other official
indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy. xxx.
151
Digests
S.C.A.
Mandamus
LAMBINO V. COMELEC
FACTS: Lambino et al gathered signatures and filed a
petition with the Comelec for the holding of a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under the
Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735). In
substance, their initiative petition sought to amend the
Constitution by adopting a unicameral-parliamentary
form of government. They claimed that their petition
was supported by at least 12% of all registered voters,
with each legislative district being represented by at
least 3% of its registered voters.
The Comelec denied the initiative petition for
lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions.
The Comelec invoked the case of Santiago v. Comelec
where the SC declared RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the 1987 Constitutions initiative clause.
Lambino now go to the SC seeking the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside the Comelecs resolution and to compel the
Comelec to give due course
to
their
initiative
petition.
ISSUE: Was there GAD in denying the Initiative
petition? NO.
HELD: Petitioners failed to comply with the
requirements of the Constitution for conducting an
initiative. The people signing the proposal must sign
the entire proposal and the proposal must be
embodied in the petition. These two elements are
present only if the full text of the amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such proposal in a petition. A signature sheet is
meaningless if the person signing has not first seen
what he is signing. The signature sheet which the
people signed merely asked the people if they wanted
a change in the form of government into a
parliamentary system.
Moreover, the initiative petition contained
matters totally unrelated to the change in the form of
government. This forces people to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of each they
may find unacceptable.
Further, an initiative petition applies only to
amendments and not revision. A revision implies a
change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of checks and balances or
separation of powers. The initiative here is an a
revision and not merely an amendment.
Lastly, RA 6735 provides that the people must
sign the petition. The 6.3 million signatories did not
152
Digests
ESQUIVEL VS OMBUDSMAN
Facts: PO2 Herminigildo Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto
Catacutan charged Mayor Antonio Esquivel and his
brother Baranggay Eboy Esquivel with illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder
and grave threats. Others who participated in the
alleged crime were also charged.
The charge was initially filed with the PNPCIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detection Group).
Their initial investigation shows that while Eduardo was
about to eat lunch, the 2 Esquivels together with
others disarmed him of his service pistol. He was then
forced to board a vehicle and brought to the Municipal
Hall.
While on board the vehicle, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him and threatened to kill him. Upon arriving
at the municipal hall, the mayor ordered Eduardo to be
killed. At this point, Catacutan arrived to verify what
happened to his teammate. He was also threatened.
The mayor struck Eduardo in the nape with a handgun
while
Eboy
was
holding
him.
Eduardo
lost
consciousness. When he woke up, he was released but
not before being forced to sign a statement in the
police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
Eduardo surmises that this happened because the
mayor believed him to be among the law enforcers
who raided a jueteng den wherein members of a crime
syndicate who are connected to the mayor where
arrested.
The records were forwarded by the PNP-CIDG
to the ombudsman. The deputy ombudsman
recommended Mayor Esquivel and Bgy. Captain Eboy
Esquivel to be both indicted for the crime of less
serious physical injuries while Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats. Charges against the others were
dismissed. Ombudsman approved this resolution so
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Esquivels brought the matter to the SC via
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ombudsman
when it failed to consider the exculpatory evidence.
Said evidence is the admission of Eduardo that he was
in good physical condition (the one he was forced to
S.C.A.
NO!
(Note: This case is under mandamus only.
There is only 1paragraph in the case relating to
mandamus. But Ill discuss certiorari and prohibition as
well)
Eduardo admitted signing the document but
the admission merely applied to the execution of such
and not to its truthfulness. Esquivels argument is
evidentiary in nature and its probative value can be
best passed upon after a full blown trial on the merits.
As such, certiorari is not the proper remedy. The SC is
not a trier of facts.
Prohibition is a writ directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. Here,
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the criminal cases is
clearly found on law (since one of the accused, Mayor
esquivel, is of salary grade 27, sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction. It is only when none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade27 or
higher will the rtc or mtc have jurisdiction). Being an
extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted
to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by
law are adequate and available.40 Prohibition is granted
only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to
afford redress. That the petitioners have another and
complete remedy at law, through an appeal or
otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for
denying the issuance of the writ.41 In this case,
petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash
the informations at the first instance but they did not.
Also, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an
inferior court unless the attention of the court whose
proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to
the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
foundation of this rule is the respect and consideration
due to the lower court and the expediency of
preventing unnecessary litigation. Here, the issue of
jurisdiction was raised only in the SC and not before
the sandiganbayan.
MANDAMUS: it is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of
mandamus to control or review the exercise of
discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion
and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the Court. When a decision has been reached in a
matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may
153
Digests
S.C.A.
DIVINAGRACIA
VS
CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS) AND PEOPLES
BROADCASTING SERVICE (PBS)
FACTS: CBS and PBS (C/PBS), two of the three
networks that operate Bombo Radyo Philippines,
operate radio broadcasting services by virtue of their
legislative franchises (RA 7477 and 7582). Under the
RAs, there is common provision, aimed towards the
constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of
public utilities, that C/PBS should offer 30% of its
common stocks to the public. Following these laws,
NTC thus granted Provisional Authorities3 to C/PBS.
DIVINAGRACIA then filed 2 complaints against
C/PBS, alleging that he was the owner of 12% of the
shares of stock of C/PBS separately, and that both
stations failed to make the 30% public offering of their
stocks as mandated by the RAs. For this failure, he
prayed to cancel the Provisional Authorities
granted to C/PBS as well as in its legislative
franchises. NTC dismissed, saying it was not
competent to render a ruling on that issue, that the
complaint was a collateral attack on the legislative
franchises of C/PBS, and that the same is more
properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to
154
Digests
S.C.A.
OTHER NOTES:
Licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and
provisional authorities are junior to the legislative
franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority
of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising
authority of the State through Congress. The issuance
of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative
franchises established by Congress. NTC cannot,
without clear and proper delegation by Congress,
prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
And the role of the courts, through quo
warranto proceedings,
neatly
complements
the
traditional separation of powers that come to bear in
our analysis. DIVINAGRACIAs theory that NTC has the
presumed authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued
to due holders of legislative franchise to engage in
broadcast operations would violate the separation of
powers.
Digests
Res Judicata
One of the requisites of the doctrine of res judicata is
that the court that rendered the final judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation
proceedings, res judicata does not apply even if the
Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on
the merits.
Legality of Entry into Premises
Bardillon argued that the CA erred when it ignored the
RTCs Writ of Possession over her property issued
despite the pending MR. SC not persuaded. The
requirement for the issuance of a writ of possession in
an expropriation case are governed by Sec. 2, Rule 67.
On the part of the LGUs, it is also governed by Sec.
195 of the LGC.
The requisites for authorizing
immediate entry are: 1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and 2)
the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the
FMV of the property to be expropriated based on its
current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the
issuance of the Writ after it had filed the Complaint
and deposited the amount required was proper.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation
is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the
course of the proceedings. If petitioner objects to the
necessity of the takeover of her property, she should
say so in her Answer. The RTC has the power to
5
S.C.A.
REPUBLIC V MANGOTARA
Facts: (Long and confusing case)
7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914
case of Cacho v. Government of the United States
(1914 Cacho case).
1914 Cacho Case
In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria
applied for the registration of 2 parcels of land in the
Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province (now called Iligan
City, Lanao Del Norte). Only the Government opposed
Doa Demetria's applications for registration on the
ground that the two parcels of land were the property
of the United States and formed part of a military
reservation, generally known as Camp Overton.
The land registration court ruled that the
applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion
of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog only; and her application as to all the rest of
the land solicited in said case is denied. Moreover, the
applicant should present the corresponding deed from
Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned
30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases
is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and
the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doa Demetria appealed to
the Supreme Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision.
83 years later, the Court was again called upon
to settle a matter concerning the registration of the
Lots in the case of Cacho v. CA.
1997 Cacho case
Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late
Doa Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the
RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title (OCTs). RTC granted Teofilo's
petition and ordered the reconstitution and re-issuance
of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The original issuance
of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that
had become final.
CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed
to the SC. The SC reversed the judgment of the CA
and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the
re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The
Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued
and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting
Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic
Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land
Registration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the
decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new
numbers and OCTs were issued for 2 parcels of land in
Dona Demetrias name.
THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR
The dispute did not end with the termination of the
1997 Cacho case. Another 4 cases involving the same
156
Digests
S.C.A.
Digests
S.C.A.
Digests
S.C.A.
Digests
S.C.A.
Digests
APO FRUITS V. CA
Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. (HPI) offered to sell their land pursuant
to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or
CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications
to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank fixed the
just
compensation
at P165,484.47/hectare,
that
is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for
HPI. The valuation was rejected, prompting Land Bank,
upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit accounts in
the names of AFC and HPI, and to credit in said
accounts
the
sums
of P26,409,549.86
(AFC)
and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). AFC and HPI withdrew the
amounts in cash from the accounts, but afterwards,
they filed separate complaints for determination of just
S.C.A.
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S.C.A.
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S.C.A.
ISSUE:
WON Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount
equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated
property and not to the accrued interest? NO.
Holy Trinity is also entitled to the accrued
interest.
Note: TRB is contending that Holy Trinity is only
entitled to the exact amount as defined in Sec. 4 of RA
8974 and Sec. 2 Rule 67 (hindi daw kasama ang
interest).
RULING:
TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriation
procedures under RA 8974 and Rule 67. The former
specifically governs expropriation proceedings for
national government infrastructure projects. In the
case of Republic vs. Gingoyon, the SC ruled that under
RA 8974, the government is required to make
immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas in Rule 67, the government is
authorized only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary.
In the case at bar, the proceedings deal with
the expropriation of properties intended for a national
government infrastructure project. Thus, the RTC was
correct in applying the procedure laid out in RA 8974,
by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be
expropriated.
The controversy though arises not from the
amount of the deposit but as to the ownership of the
interest that had since accrued on the deposited
amount.
The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA. The
critical factor in the different modes of effecting
163
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S.C.A.
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S.C.A.
BACALING V. MUYA
Facts: The spouses Ramon Bacaling were the owners
of 3 parcels of land in Iloilo City. In 1955, the
landholding was subdivided 110 sub-lots and approved
as "residential" or "subdivision" by the National Urban
Planning Commission (NUPC) and the Bureau of Lands.
It was referred to as the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision.
A real estate loan of P600k was granted to the spouses
Bacaling by GSIS for the development of the
subdivision. To secure the repayment of the loan, the
Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real estate
mortgage over their parcels of land including the sublots. The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on
the loan and consequently the mortgage constituted on
the sub-lots was foreclosed by the GSIS. After a court
case that reached all the way to the SC, Nelita
Bacaling (by then a widow) in 1989 was eventually
able to restore to herself ownership of the 110 sublots.
In 1972, respondents Felomino Muya, and 4
others clandestinely entered and occupied the entire
110 sub-lots. Muya claimed that they were legally
instituted by Bacaling as tenant-tillers and later on
their relationship changed into a leasehold. In 1980,
they secured certificates of land transfer in their
names for the 110 sub-lots. Jose Juan Tong, bought
the sub-lots after Bacaling has repurchased the subject
property GSIS. To secure performance of the contract
of absolute sale and facilitate the transfer of title of the
lots to Jose Juan Tong, Bacaling appointed him in 1992
as her attorney-in-fact, under an irrevocable special
power of attorney.
Using the irrevocable special power of attorney
executed in his favor, petitioner Tong (together with
Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the
certificates of land transfer against respondents with
the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR). The DAR,
however, dismissed the petition on the ground that
there had been no legitimate conversion of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to
residential. Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse
DAR Orders to the Office of the President which
reversed the DAR decision. The OP Decision found that
the sub-lots had been completely converted from
agricultural to residential lots as a result of the
declarations of the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands.
Muya elevated the OP Decision to the Court of
Appeals. CA reversed the OP Decision and validated
the certificates of land transfers in favor of
165
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property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an
interest in the property are indispensable parties; as
such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership
between him and the respondent does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner
of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance
of his lawful shares.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being
entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of
the respondent in the subject properties. The plaintiff
is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties,
considering that the absence of one such party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial
court could not validly render judgment and grant
relief in favor of the private respondent.
In the present action, the private respondent, as
the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the
following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo
Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz
Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao
which purchased the property from Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the
purchase price of the property.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present. Hence,
the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.
S.C.A.
UY V. SANTIAGO
FACTS: The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Uy in
4 consolidated ejectment cases.
Palomado et al
appealed the cases to the RTC which affirmed in toto
the decision of the MTC.
Uy filed a motion for
execution pending appeal while Palomado filed a
Petition for Review before the CA. RTC Judge Santiago
denied the motion for execution pending appeal. Uy
filed an MR which was likewise denied.
Uy filed a Petition for Mandamus for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. As
basis for denying Uys Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal, Judge Santiago cited Palomados compliance
with the requirements to stay immediate execution of
judgment, namely: (1) perfection of appeal; (2) filing
of a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodic deposit of the
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.
Uy contends that Rule 70, Section 10, which
enumerated the above-mentioned requirements, has
already been expressly repealed by Rule 70, Section
21 and that the execution of appealed ejectment
decisions with the RTC cannot now be stayed.
Issue: w/n the decisions of RTC in appealed ejectment
cases pending appeal w/ CA are immediately executor
YES!
RATIO: Sec. 19 is applicable only to ejectment cases
pending appeal with the RTC, and Sec. 21 applies to
those decided by the RTC. Under Sec. 19, the other
party may file a supersedeas bond to stay the appeal
while under Sec. 21, the decision of the RTC is
immediately executory.
It is only execution of the MTC judgment
pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by a
compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70,
Section 19. On the other hand, once the RTC has
rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such
decision shall, under Rule 70, be immediately
executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a
Petition for Review, before the CA and/or SC.
Palomados argument that execution pending
appeal would deprive them of their right to due
process of law as it would render moot and academic
their Petition for Review before the CA deserves scant
consideration. Finding the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal a clear duty of respondent
Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie
against him.
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169
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FUENTES V. ALBARRACIN
Facts: Judge Albarracin issued an ex-parte motion for
demolition of buildings and other properties of
Fuentes, et. al. This stemmed from a forcible entry
case filed by JS Francisco and Sons against Fuentes,
et. al., which was decided in favour of the former.
Fuentes filed for a petition for annulment of judgment
but Albarracin still issued for the demolition of the
buildings despite such pending petition. As a result,
Fuentes, et. al filed an administrative complaint for
gross ignorance of the law against Albarracin.
S.C.A.
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171
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ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary that in cases involving claims for
just compensation under R.A. 6657 that the decision of
the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB
before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
NO!
RATIO:
o LBPs arguments: that the petition for valuation and
payment of just compensation was filed with the
DARAB- Regional Adjudicator in 2002, long before
the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that
under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB
Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity
shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at
the time of their filing; that clear from the transitory
provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB
which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition
with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003
DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC;
that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the
time of the filing of Belista's claim for just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision
of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly
to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994
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DARAB
Rules
that
petitioner
brought
the
adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
Belistas arguments: LBP's petition with the RTC is
an original action and, since the case was filed at a
time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was
already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before
resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed
by the CA.
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR.
The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x
xx
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special
Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination
of
just
compensation
to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of
just
compensation
to
landowners
and
the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No.
6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction
on just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1)
"all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]." The provisions of 50 must be construed in
harmony with this provision by considering cases
involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on
the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency
which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No.
6657) and over criminal cases.
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to
Issue
Hold
Departure
MONDEJAR V BUBAN
Facts: Buban was the judge in the case of People v
Mondejar, which was a BP 22 case against Mondejar
docketed in the Tacloban MTCC. During the case,
Buban issued a hold departure order against
Mondejar. Mondejar filed an admin case against Buban
for gross ignorance of the law. She claims that
according to SC Circular 39-97, the hold departure
order can only be issued in criminal cases under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC (take note that BP 22
cases are under the MTC). She also claimed that she
was not given the opportunity to be heard.
Bubans excuse was that he was not aware of
such circular. After he managed to get a copy of such
circular from the Executive Judge of the Tacloban RTC,
he lifted the hold departure order. On the due
process issue, he claimed that Mondejar was notified
but did not show up in the hearing (this issue was not
touched upon in the decision)
The
OCA
recommended
that
he
be
reprimanded.
Issue: Was Buban grossly ignorant of the law?
Held: Yes. Judge Buban reprimanded.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue
hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of
the said circular specifically provides that "holddeparture orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts." Clearly then, criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of Buban to have issued one in the instant
case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence." The Court, in
exercising administrative supervision of all lower
courts, has not been remised in reminding the
members of the bench to exert due diligence in
keeping abreast with the development in law and
jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new
circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of
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SERRANA V. SANDIGANBANYAN
(Sorry, this is a long digest but mostly because I
included the pertinent law provisions just in case sir
asks for an enumeration.)
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
student of the UP-Cebu, thus a government scholar.
She was appointed by President Joseph Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
Serrana, with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).
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has
promulgated
and
may
thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan
to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" _____In case private individuals are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive
jurisdiction
over
them.
" _____Any provisions of law or Rules of Court
to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times,
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a
penal statute which represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Section
10 of R.A. No. 3019 provides that all prosecutions for
violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
R.A.
No.
3019 does NOT contain an
enumeration
of
the
cases
over
which
the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by Serrana, deals not
with the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individual:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
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2. No concurrent jurisdiction
Under the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction,
when
judicial/quasi-judicial
bodies
have
equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the others. Assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct
of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to
be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same
case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest
between these bodies as to which will first complete
the investigation. In the present case, it is the
Ombudsman before whom the complaint was
initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.
Unlike the cases of Cojuangco v. PCGG which
upheld the jurisdiction of the PCGG over the alleged
use of coco levy funds; Sanchez v. Demetriou where
the Court recognized the authority of DOJ prosecutors
to conduct preliminary investigation against Mayor
Sanchez for the alleged rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez; and Aguinaldo v. Domagas where the
Court affirmed the authority of the DOJ panel of
prosecutors to file an information without previous
authority from the Ombudsman, there was no
simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies and no conflicting findings or orders.
In this case, however, the complaint was filed ahead
with the Office of Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Moreover, to allow the same complaint
to be filed successively before 2 or more investigative
bodies would: (1) promote multiplicity of proceedings;
(2) cause undue difficulties on respondent; (3) result
in conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of
respondent; and (4) entail unnecessary expenditure of
public funds.
[More on Ombudsmans authority]
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution
specifically vests in the Office of the Ombudsman
the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or
employees. To discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution
endowed
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman with special features which puts it a
notch
above
other
grievance-handling,
investigate bodies. The Office of the Ombudsman
was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as
the principal and primary complaints and action center
for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic
maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted
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FACT-FINDING
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Orlando Savlador in his
capacity as consultant of the PCGG detailed with the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest
Loans against private respondents who were former
officers of the Development Bank of the Philippines and
Pagdanan Timber Products (PTPI), and were charged
with the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Fact-Finding Committee upon
investigation, determined that in 1974 the said
respondents effected a loan transaction between the
DBP and the PTPI which bore the characteristics of a
behest loan.
The complaint was filed in the Office of the
Ombdudsman for violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). In 1998 the Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint and held that (1) there was no
evidence that the loan was a behest loan at the
command or urging of previous government officials
(Marcos); (2) PTPI complied with the DBP requirement
that it would increase its paid up capital; (3) the loan
was not undercollateralized and (4) the complaint was
barred by prescription.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, alleging
that the Ombusmand committed grave abuse of
discretion in (1) holding that the offenses charged in
the complaint had already prescribed and (2)
dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause to
indict private respondents for violation of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in (1) holding that the offenses
charged in the complaint had already prescribed and
(2) dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause
to indict private respondents for violation of the Anti
Graft and Courrpt Practices Act.
Held: (1) YES,NO. Petition is Dismissed,
Ombudsmans decision affirmed.
1. The Ombudsman incorrectly held that the ten year
prescriptive period commenced on the date of the
violation of RA 3019. Prescription as provided by law
shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not know
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. Thus in this case it was impossible for
the State to have known the violations of RA 3019
committed in 1974 as the transactions were done with
the
connivance
and
conspiracy
between
the
beneficiaries of the loans and the public officials
involved.
Therefore the prescriptive period commenced
from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after
the the investigation of the Committee. Prescription did
not set in when the complaint was filed in 1998 or
183
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CASTRO v DELORIA
FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman
before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The
information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer
of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections.
Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug
31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of
the
Ombudsman
to
conduct
the
preliminary
investigation and file the Information since it failed t to
allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she
was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case
filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may
be investigated and prosecuted only by the public
prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose
prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by
theSandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction
of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary
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ANTONINO V. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
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COMPLAINT
OR
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SASOT v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation and is
the registered owner of NBA trademarks and
names of NBA basketball teams. These names are
used on garment products, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer.
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JOSE
RAMISCAL,
JR.
196
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the arraignment of an
from the filing of the
the accused has appeared
the charge is pending,
E. PRESCRIPTION
PANAGUITON V. DOJ
Facts: Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1.9M from Panaguiton. Cawili and his
business associate, Tongson, jointly issued in favor of
Panaguiton 3 checks in payment of the said loans. All 3
checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson.
The checks bounced. Panaguiton made formal
demands upon Cawili and Tongson but to no avail.
Panaguiton filed, on August 24, 1955, a complaint
against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP 22 before
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. Tongson claimed
that he had been unjustly included as partyrespondent
Panaguiton,
he
had
lent
various sums to Cawili and had filed BP 22 cases
against Cawili as well. Tongson pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To
counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongsons signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the
checks. In a resolution, City Prosecutor Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial
appeal before the DOJ even while the case against
Cawili
was
filed
before
the
proper
court. Assistant City Prosecutor
(ACP)
Sampaga
dismissed the complaint against Tongson. In her
resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, which
provides that violations penalized by BP 22 shall
prescribe after 4 years. The filing of the complaint
before the Quezon City Prosecutor did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates
judicial,
and
not
administrative
proceedings. Upon appeal, the DOJ flip-flopped in its
decisions but eventually ruled through the assailed
resolution that the offense had already prescribed and
ordered the withdrawal of the 3 informations.
Panaguiton thus filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA
which
was
dismissed
for
failure to attach a proper
verification
and
certification of non-forum shopping.
Issue: (Procedural) WON there was substantial
compliance with the verification requirement YES!
(Substantial) WON the filing of a complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor interruptes the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of
BP 22 YES!
Ruling: Panaguitans filing of his complaintaffidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on August 24,
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings
197
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AND
DIRECTION
OF
CRIMINAL
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Criminal
Cases:
Spouses
sought
partial
reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the
deletion of the award of civil indemnity but it was
denied. Caroline appealed to the RTC.
CrimPro
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based
on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
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Soriano v. People
Facts: The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of
the BSP transmitted a letter to the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter attached as annexes
five affidavits, which would allegedly serve as bases for
filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689,
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Held/Ratio:
Preliminary investigation not the occasion for full and
exhaustive display of evidence
SC ruled that whether the fax message is
admissible in evidence and whether the element of
deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters
best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the
preliminary investigation. In Andres vs. Justice
Secretary Cuevas the SC held that: a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of evidence. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In short, the validity and merits of accusations
and defenses, as well as the admissibility of evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.
(side note) RTC Judge Dumayas shouldve decided the
motion to withdraw upon his own personal
determination
SC also held that RTC Judge Dumayas should
not have relied solely on the recommendation of the
DOJ Secretary to have the informations withdrawn.
Citing several cases, the SC held that a judge acts
with GADLEJ when he grants a prosecutors motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against an accused on the
basis solely of the recommendation of the secretary.
Such reliance on the secretary is an abdication of the
trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.
Furthermore, the trial court is not bound to
adopt the resolution of the DOJ Secretary since it is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the
merits of the case. In other words, the dismissal of the
case was based upon considerations other than the
judges own personal individual conviction that there
was no case against the accused.
OKABE v GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was
alleged in the complaint that Maruyama entrusted to
Okabe a sum of money for the latter, who was
engaged in the business of door to door delivery, to
remit to the Philippines. Okabe failed to remit such
amount.
The complaint for estafa was filed with the 2 nd
assistant city prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
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PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts: Police operatives sent an entrapment to catch
Redentor Teck (alias Frank) and Joseph Junio selling
drugs. Caught in the act, the two were arrested. They
did not disclose their source of shabu, but they
admitted working for Lawrence Wang (public
respondent)s modeling agency. They also disclosed
that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early
the following morning, and that their employer (Wang)
could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look
for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
Frank and Junio.
Under surveillance, Wang came out of the
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On
nearing the car, police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves, asked his name and, upon
hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, they
found an unlicensed pistol. At the same time, in his car
were bags of shabu, P650,000.00 cash, electronic and
mechanical scales and an unlicensed handgun.
Wang filed a Demurrer to Evidence, praying for
his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases
against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions
evidence against him. RTC Judge Laguio granted the
demurrer.
Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and
seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
Held: (The topic is under Arrest, but there is a
discussion on double jeopardy in this case. In brief: An
order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to
an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.)
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of
Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a
warrant under these grounds: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught
in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
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Investigating
Justice
recommended
the
dismissal of Judge Perello for gross ignorance of the
law for her failure to conduct any hearing on the
application for bail. As to the Omando case, she was
exonerated.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Perello should be dismissed for
gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings
before granting the bails.
HELD/RATIO: Yes. But merely suspended for 6
months. Should have conducted bail hearings!
The Constitution provides that all persons
charged with criminal offenses shall be entitled to post
bail except if charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment or death)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
The matter of determining whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge. Such discretion must be
sound and exercised within reasonable bounds.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an
application for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor should
be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at least his
recommendation on the matter must be sought.
In case an application for bail is filed, the judge
is entrusted to observe the following duties:
1.
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of
right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation;
2.
Where
bail
is
a
matter
of
discretion, conduct
a
hearing of
the
application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion;
3.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution; and
4.
If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.
In the Omadan case, she complied with these
duties. HOWEVER, in the Pascual and Uy cases, she
didnt comply with procedure. She did not conduct the
requisite hearings. In so doing, it was respondent
Judges defense that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not
a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in
which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable
only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as
such, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not
required.
A plain reading of the law would immediately
show that shabu is a dangerous drug and not a
controlled precursor. If only respondent Judge
prudently went over the pertinent provisions of R.A.
No. 9165, she would have easily ascertained that. She
needed only to read the law plainly and even keep
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LEVISTE V. CA
Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste (Leviste) was charged
with the murder of Rafael de las Alas. The RTC-Makati
convicted Leviste for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion perpetual as maximum.
Leviste appealed his conviction with the CA.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition. Leviste also claimed the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied the application for bail invoking
the principle that discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. The CA found
that Leviste failed to show that he suffered from
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put
his life in danger. In denying the application for bail,
the CA made a preliminary evaluation of Levistes case
and determined that there was no substantial reason
sufficient to overturn the evidence of his guilt. CA also
denied Levistes MR.
Leviste filed this petition for certiorari claiming
that the denial of his application for bail amounted to
grave abuse of the discretion since the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the 3rd paragraph of Sec.
5, Rule 114 were not present.
Issue: Did the CA commit GADALEJ? (in an application
for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more
than 6 years, should bail be automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?)
Held: Petition denied, no GADALEJ. The right to bail
under par. 3 of Section 5 is discretionary.
A. The application for bail pending appeal has two
stages
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any
any
and
said
DOMINGO V. PAGAYATAN
Petitioner: Commissioner Andre Domingo
Respondent: Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan,
RTC Branch 46 San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
FACTS:The Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation
Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M.
Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he was an
overstaying and undocumented alien, in violation of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peaflorida
was also a fugitive from justice since he stood indicted
in the United States for health care fraud which
resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S.
Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the
Office of the President. The SDO became final and
executor.
Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice
of Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida.
On the scheduled hearing, Judge Pagayatan denied the
P40,000 bail recommended by the Provincial
Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused
on the ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged
with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable
offense. Judge Pagayatan ordered the commitment of
Peaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day,
the BOI received information that respondent judge
had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida
without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording
prior notice to the BOI of such action. Commissioner
Domingo was appalled not only by the respondents
employment of legal subterfuges in ordering the
release of Peaflorida whose Summary Deportation
Order had already become final and executory, but
also by the respondents bad faith in deceiving them
into surrendering the custody of an undesirable alien
federal fugitive to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
As a result, Commissioner Domingo filed a
letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging Pagayatan with gross
ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, Judge Pagayatan explained
that the prosecution and the defense jointly
manifested that it would be fair and just if the court
would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of
the accused Peaflorida at P250,000.00 and that he
granted the motion to fix bail; and that at the time he
issued the order fixing the bail bond, he was not aware
that a deportation order has already been issued by
the BOI.
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SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
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The
information
merely
states
that
petitioner was being charged for the crime of violation
of R.A. 7610 without citing the specific sections
alleged to have been violated by petitioner.
Nonetheless, we do not find this omission sufficient to
invalidate the information. The character of the crime
is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. The sufficiency of an information is not
negated by an incomplete or defective designation of
the crime in the caption or other parts of the
information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and
sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
True, the information herein may not refer
to specific section/s of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been
violated by the petitioner, but it is all to evident that
the body of the information contains an averment of
the acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner
which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under
Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A.
7610 is being violated by Olivarez is inconsequential.
What is determinative of the offense is the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint
or information.The prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner committed acts of
sexual abuse against Elitiong.
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of
his
right
to
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS v. SALUD
(Actually, hindi ko alam kung ano yung related sa
Rights of the Accused sa case na to. More on Evidence
siya.)
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HERRERA V. ALBA
Facts: Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother,
Armi Alba, filed before the RTC a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against
Rosendo Herrera. Herrera denied that he is the
biological father of Rosendo and also denied physical
contact with Rosendos mother.
Rosendo filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Herrera opposed and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. He further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination. RTC
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YULO V. PEOPLE
PETITION
FOR
RADIO
AND
TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR AMPATUAN
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VIRATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(sorry! Long case)
FACTS: Cesar Virata is one of the defendants in the
case of Republic vs Romualdez which was filed by the
PCGG. The case involves the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth allegedly amassed by the defendants in that
case during the marcos years. The complaint was
amended 3times. The last amended complaint filed
with the sandiganbayan states the following relevant
allegations against virata:
[summarized version]
Par.14: defendants...engaged in devises,
schemes and strategems to unjustly enrich themselves
by... (b) giving meralco undue advantage (increasing
power rates while reducing electric franchise tax); (g)
justify meralcos anomalous acquisition of electric
cooperatives; (m) manipulated the formation of
Erecton Holdings for the purpose of assuming the
obligation of Erecton Inc with Philguarantee (Virata is
an official of philguarantee) so that Erecton Inc can
borrow more capital its obligation with philguarantee
amounting to more than P2B.
Par.17: acting as dummies, nominees...to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained.
Par.18: Acts of defendant... constitute gross
abuse of official position... to the grave and irreparable
damage of the Filipino people.
Virata filed a bill of particulars asserting that
these allegations are vague and not averred with
sufficient definiteness to enable him to effectively
prepare his responsive pleadings. Sandiganbayan
partially granted the motion. Only with regard to
par.17 and 18 was the republic required to file a bill of
particulars. As to the others, Sandiganbayan declared
them to be clear and specific enough to allow Virata to
file an intelligent responsive pleading.
OSG submitted the bill of particulars relating to
par17 and 18. Virata filed a motion to strike out this
bill of particular and to defer the filing of his answer. It
is alleged that the bill of particulars aver for the first
time new actionable wrongs allegedly committed by
him in various official capacities and that the
allegations do not indicate that he was a dummy,
nominee or agent (which was the allegation in the
complaint) but rather a government officer acting in
his own name.
Meanwhile, Virata filed a petition for certiorari
with the SC with regard to the denial of his bill of
particulars with regard to par.14 and sections b,g and
m. SC granted the petition. OSG filed a manifestation
that since PCGG is the investigating body with the
complete records of the case, it is in a better position
to supply the bill of particulars. Thus, PCGG submitted
a bill of particulars (no.2) in relation to par.14 and
subparagraphs b,g and m.
Virata filed a comment with a motion to
dismiss. According to him, bill of particulars no.2 is
merely a rehash of the assertions made in the last
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compared
MTQ
and
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LAZARTE V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: NHA awarded a contract for infrastructure
works with A.C. Cruz Construction which was funded
by World Bank in the amount of P7.67M. During the
construction, the Project Engineer discovered that the
company issued a report on an additional work for the
excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
works but after further investigation, learned that
there was no such actual work done (ghost activity).
The project engineer filed a recommendation with the
project office to terminate the contract with the
construction company. After several referrals, the NHA
decided to rescind the said contract due to the
anomalies discovered.
However, despite the
rescission, the construction company continued to
work on the project until the project was awarded to
the new construction company, Triad Construction.
Further investigations revealed that AC Cruz
Construction was doing ghost activities and was
undertaking substandard and defective works.
In
addition, officers of the NHA have overpaid AC Cruz
Construction for the portion that was already started
and finished by the said company (P232K overpaid)
(they were paid P1M for the partial work done).
Because of this, several officers of the NHA were
charged with violating Sec.3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ff
grounds: 1) the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense; (2) the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations against them
have been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution failed to
determine the individual participation of all the accused
in the information.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash of
petitioner. So Pet filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: w/n the motion to quash should be granted.
NO
HELD: The denial of a motion to quash is not
correctible by certiorari. Well-established is the rule
that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but
for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
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PEOPLE V. SUNGA
FACTS: Jocelyn Tan, a 15 year old girl was raped then
killed by smashing a stone on her head. An information
was filed in the RTC of Puerto Princesa City charging
Sunga, among others for the crime of rape with
homicide. The prosecution relied on 2 supposed
extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
Exhibit A was a sworn statement bearing
Sungas signature and that of his assisting counsel,
Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto
Princesa City Legal Officer, stating that he knew details
about Jocelyns death. This was executed after being
informed of his rights under custodial investigation. He
chose Atty. Rocamora. Atty. Rocamora briefly
conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give
a confession and informing him of the consequences
thereof. Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with
Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions
before the police precinct.
Exhibit I was executed before the Special
Investigator of the Puerto Princesa office of the NBI.
This statement embodied a waiver by Sunga of his
right to counsel.
Sunga claims that he was subjected to violence
and intimidation in executing Exhibit A. He then
retracted his statements in Exhibit I.
ISSUE: Were the extrajudicial admissions valid? NO.
HELD: A
person
under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense is guaranteed the following
rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain
silent; (2) the right to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, and to be
provided with one if he cannot afford the services of
counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these
rights.
With regard to his admission under exhibit A,
such was invalid because Atty. Rocamora was the City
Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa. Independent counsel
for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of
the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and
support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, which includes
maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his
office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.
Furthermore, Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all,
fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to
giving his (Sungas) admission. Evidently, Atty.
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DAYAP v SENDIONG
FACTS: Dayap was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property. It was alleged that Dayap was the
driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident
with a Colt Galant driven by Lou Gene Sendiong
causing instant death to the latter and less serious
physical injuries to the latters passenger. The MTC
granted Dayap Demurrer to Evidence saying that
prosecution failed to establish that Dayap was really
the one driving the cargo truck. The MTC further stated
that prosecution also wasnt able to prove the death
and injuries of the victim as there were not death
certificate and medical certificates submitted as
evidence. The MTC gave credence to the evidence of
the Dayap, showing that it was the victims car which
swerved into the cargo trucks lane thereby being the
proximate cause of the accident. The MTC relied on the
accident sketch contained in the police blotter to
support this conclusion.
Aggrieved, Sendiong filed a petition for
certiorari under 65 with the RTC. The RTC affirmed the
acquittal of Dayap but ordered the case remanded to
the MTC for the hearing of the civil aspect.
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SALAZAR V. PEOPLE
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CONSULTA v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Appellant Pedro Consulta was charged and
convicted with Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. It
was alleged in the Information that Consulta stole
private complainant Nelia Silvestre's 18k gold
necklace. It was alleged that At about 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon of June 7, 1999, Nelia, together with
Maria Viovicente and Veronica Amar, boarded a tricycle
on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching
Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin
Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their
threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and
Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying
Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal
ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin. Appellant added
Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
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NICDAO VS CHING
FACTS: In October 1995, Clarita Nicdao, as the
proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, together
with her husband, approached Ching, a Chinese
national, to borrow money. This was done in order for
the Nicdao spouses to settle their financial obligations
in the business. They agreed that respondent Nicdao
would leave the checks undated and that she would
pay the loans within one year. However, when
petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one
year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly
said that she had no cash.
On October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching deposited
the checks that she issued to him. As he earlier stated,
the checks were dishonored by the bank for being
"DAIF."(drawn against insufficient cheverloo). Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Ching, together with Emma
Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to respondent Nicdao
which, however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they
separately filed the criminal complaints against the
latter.
Eleven (11) Informations were filed with the
MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan. At
about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal
complaints also for violation of BP 22, were filed
against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to
be the common law spouse of petitioner Ching. As
such, there are now 2 criminal cases, one for the 11
informations, the other for 14 infromations.
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RULE 122-125
PEOPLE v. ABON
(Incestuous rape case)
Facts: While his 13-year-old daughter was sleeping,
Abon raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina
and made a push and pull movement for about 20 to
30 minutes. Because her grandmother did not believe
her, she went to a friends house who helped her
report the incident to the police.
The physical
examination found her hymen to have already been
ruptured and that she had old lacerations inflicted
approximately 3 months before.
Abon pleaded not guilty and interposed denial
and alibi as defenses. He claimed he was working in
another place (Rizal) and did not see his children who
were living in Pangasinan. He said his daughter filed
the case against him because he used to whip her very
hard on the buttocks with a stick.
The RTC imposed the death penalty. On
automatic review, CA affirmed, observing that Abon
failed to show any inconsistency in daughters
testimony and neither did he prove any ill-motive
which would prompt her to concoct her incest rape
story. Abon appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether death penalty is the proper penalty NO
The SC discussed appeals as a preliminary matter,
which is the important topic here.
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HELD:
Rules on Appeal
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a
decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. It is not a right but a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only and in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.
Sec. 3 of Rule 122 provides that where the
penalty imposed by the RTC is reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, an appeal is made directly to the SC
by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final appeal from and by
serving a copy upon the adverse party. On the other
hand, a case where the penalty imposed is death will
be automatically reviewed by the SC without a need
for filing a notice of appeal. However, the case of
Mateo modified these rules by providing an
intermediate review of the cases by the CA where the
penalty
imposed
is
reclusion
perpetua,
life
imprisonment, or death.
Pursuant to this, the SC issued AM No. 00-503-SC 2004-10-12, amending the governing review of
death penalty cases, the pertinent provision of which
reads:
(c) The appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment or where a
lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to
the more, serious offense for
which the penalty
of death,
reclusion
perpetua,
or
life
imprisonment is imposed, shall be
by notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals
in
accordance
with
paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in
cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court
of Appeals shall automatically review
the judgment as provided in Section 10
of this Rule.
The CA judgment in these cases may be
appealed to the SC by notice of appeal filed with the
CA.
Also affecting the rules on appeal is the
enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty, which took effect in
2006. Under Sec. 2, the imposition of the death
penalty is prohibited and in lieu thereof, it imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
RPC, or life imprisonment, if otherwise. Hence, in the
provisions of the Rules of Court on appeals, death
penalty cases are no longer operational.
SC said penalty imposed is reduced to
reclusion pereptua without eligibility for parole.
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DEUS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Deus was charged for the crime of
illegal sale of shabu, in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. He was caught through a buy-bust
operation.
On May 17, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment
finding accused Deus guilty. Accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on May 17,
2006. On August 24, 2006, accused filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA. He raised as issue the failure of the trial court
judge to comply with Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure requiring that the pre-trial order be signed
by the accused and his counsel. The CA then appointed
and designated the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) as
counsel de oficio for the accused. PAO filed a motion to
admit the petition for certiorari to appeal his conviction
for the crime of illegal sale of shabu.
According to the CA, in the higher interest of
justice, the petition for certiorari filed by PAO is
admitted (note: not granted ha, just admitted for the
court to consider). In resolving the petition, the CA
dismissed this petition for certiorari.
From the CA, the accused filed a Petition for
Review in the SC. He urges the application of Section
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused resorted to a
proper mode of appeal from the RTCs decision
to the CA. (NO. Accused should have filed
an appeal to the CA, and not a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.)
2. Should a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure be made considering that accused
acted without the assistance of counsel when
he filed his urgent motion for reconsideration
of the RTCs judgment of conviction and the
special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. (YES)
HELD:
1. Re issue #1: A perusal of the petition reveals that
the assailed Decision (decision of conviction) was
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. As such, the proper remedy for a party
aggrieved thereby is an ordinary appeal pursuant
to Sections 3 and 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended, which can be
availed of by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment, within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. However, instead of filing
an appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration of the subject
decision on June 24, 2006, accused-petitioner
resorted to the instant petition for certiorari which
the Court cannot treat as an appeal for having
been filed on August 24, 2006 or way beyond the
period to appeal.
2. Re issue #2: The SC in this case qualified its
answer. In sum, it said that the judgment of
conviction became final and executory since
accused resorted to the wrong mode of appeal,
hence the running of the reglementary period was
not tolled. However, in the interest of justice, the
case is remanded.
In detail, the SC said: Since the judgment
of conviction had not been appealed within the
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TAMAYO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Aurora Tamayo and her friend, Erlinda
Anicas (Anicas), were charged with estafa.
According to the information, Tamayo and Anicas
were given 120K by the Sotto spouses for the
assembly of a jeepney. They eventually became
suspicious when no progress was being shown.
Hence, they sent a lawyer to get reimbursement.
Unfortunately, the found out that the money was
misappropriated for the petitioners personal use.
As a defense, Tamayo said that she gave the
money to one Ernesto Rayana who was supposed
to assemble the jeep. Tamayo and Rayana
allegedly had problems resulting to the former
filing a complaint against the latter before the
officials of the barangay where Ravana resided.
Eventually, he also sued Rayana for estafa but the
latter has gone into hiding.
RTC convicted Tamayo. CA affirmed. The decision
became final and executor and was entered into
the Books of Entries of Judgments. The RTC issued
an Order for her arrest.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation before the RTC
alleging that while the instant case was pending
with the CA, she and Pedro (Sotto) had settled
their disputes and that Pedro would no longer
pursue the present case against her. She prayed
for the cancellation of the RTC order.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend the Writ of
Execution of the RTC Order stating that when the
case was pending review in the CA, the Private
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HELD/RATIO: NO.
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the rules in modifying a
judgment of conviction, to wit:
SEC. 7. Modification of Judgment. - A judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. As can be
gleaned from the foregoing provision, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside only if the
judgment is not yet final. Further, a judgment
becomes final when no appeal is seasonably
perfected.
Under the Rules of Court, judgments of the
Court of Appeals in criminal cases must be appealed by
the accused within fifteen (15) days from service of a
copy thereof upon the accused or her counsel either
(a) by filing a motion for reconsideration, or (b) by
filing a motion for new trial, or (c) by filing a petition
for review oncertiorari to this Court. Petitioner did
nothing of these.
Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed, altered or modified in any respect except to
correct
clerical
errors
or
to
make nunc pro
tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final
judgment except to execute it. No court, not even this
Court, has the power to revive, review, or modify a
judgment which has become final and executory. This
rule is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that the judgment of the
court must become final at some definite date fixed by
law. It is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the
issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.
As in this case, the alleged compromise
between petitioner and Pedro, wherein petitioner
allegedly reimbursed to Pedro the amount swindled in
exchange for Pedro's consent to dismiss the instant
case, does not extinguish petitioner's criminal liability
for estafa. With regard to the effect of the alleged
compromise on petitioner's civil liability, it is true that
a compromise extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability
of an accused. However, such rule cannot be applied in
favor of petitioner.
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SY TAN VS SY TIONG
FACTS: On February 17, 2010, the Court rendered a
Decision in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v.
Sy Tiong Gue, et al.,the decretal portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC
dated
September
1,
2003 and October
28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant
Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.
On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a MR wherein
respondents informed the Court, albeit belatedly, that
the RTC granted their motion for the withdrawal of the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375.
According to the Respondents, the RTC took into
consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August
29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that
the elements of Robbery were absent. Thus, there was
lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of
the Information.
Conseqently, in view of the withdrawal of the
Information for Robbery, respondents argued that the
quashal of the subject search warrants and the
determination of the issue of whether or not there was
probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of
the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts
of
robbery
has
been
rendered
moot
and
academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further
delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.
On the other hand, Tan, in his Comment,
maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what
respondents have previously alleged in their Comment
and which have been passed upon by the Court in the
subject decision. Tan alleges that he also filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for
Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the
same incidents and that should the Information for
Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the
items seized by virtue of the subject search
warrants will be used as evidence therein.
On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their
Reply.
According to respondents, even if an
Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the
basis of the same incident subject matter of the
dismissed case of robbery, Tan cannot include the
GWYN
QUINICOT
PHILIPPINES
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
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A. ADMISSIBILITY
GARCILLANO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Note: Sir did not give any citation for this but I only
found 1 garcillano vs house of reps lang naman.
Also, case is more on Consti rather than evidence.
Super short lang yung for rem)
Facts: Tapes which appears to contain a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between GMA and a high
ranking official of the comelec (Garci) surfaced. The
hello garci tapes allegedly contained GMAs
instructions to garci to manipulate the votes in her
favor.
A congressional investigation in the House of
Reps was conducted. And after a prolonged debate,
the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of
the house. However, the house committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Garcia filed a
petition for prohibition and injunction with the SC to
retrain the house committees from using these tape
recordings in their reports and for other purposes.
Later, the house discussion and debates on the hello
garci tapes abruptly stopped.
2years later, the matter was brought to life
again in the Senate after Lacsons privilege speech.
Lengthy debates ensued as to whether conducting a
legislative inquiry on the matter will violate the AntiWiretapping Law and the Consti. A petition was filed
with the SC by retired justices of the CA to bar the
senate from conducting its scheduled legislative
inquiry. SC did not issue an injunctive writ so the
senate proceeded with its public hearings.
Issue: Whether proceedings of the House and of the
Senate should be stopped? YES.
Held: Petition regarding proceeding in the House is
dismissed for being moot and academic. Recall that the
proceedings have been stopped already. As to the
proceedings in the Senate, SC grants petition to stop
them.
SC reasons out that the Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear violation of the constitutional
requirement under Art6, sec21: Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. What constitutes publication is set forth in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws
shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
Note that the respondents in this case (house
of reps) admit the senate rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation had been published only in
Evidence
PEOPLE V LAUGA
FACTS: Lauga was accused of qualified rape for raping
his 13 year old daughter AAA. It was alleged in the
Information that in the afternoon of March 15, 2000,
AAA was left alone at home while her father, Lauga,
went to have a drinking spree at the neighbors place.
AAAs mother and brother, BBB, also went out. At
10pm, Lauga woke AAA up, removed his pants, slid
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her
pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he
had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his
penis inside her vagina.
When BBB arrived, he found AAA crying. Lauga
claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB
decided to take AAA with him. On their way to their
maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching
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their
grandmothers
house,
they
told
their
grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which,
they sought the assistance of the head of the Bantay
Bayan, Moises Boy Banting.
Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only
his underwear. He invited appellant to the police
station, to which Lauga obliged. At the police outpost,
he admitted that he raped AAA because he was unable
to control himself.
After a physical examination, the medical
certificate of Dra. Alsula shows that the victims hymen
was freshly lacerated. On his defense, Lauga asserted
that the charge against him was ill-motivated because
he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of
their
children
after
engaging
in
a
heated
argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary
measure. He said that, on the day of the alleged rape,
he was furious to find that no food was prepared for
him and when his wife answered back when
confronted, this infuriated him that he kicked her hard
on her buttocks. Later that evening, he was awakened
by the members of Bantay Bayan and asked him to
go with them. He later learned that he was under
detention because AAA charged him with rape.
RTC found Lauga guilty of qualified rape. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the alleged confession made before
a bantay bayan is admissible NO
2. WON the testimony of prosecution witnesses
are credible - YES
HELD:
1. NO. Lauga argued that even if he confessed to
Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was
inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted
by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such
requirement.
First, this Court needs to ascertain whether or
not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this
Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an
accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
This Court is convinced that "bantay bayan,"
are recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and
order at the barangay level. Thus, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Evidence
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B. JUDICIAL NOTICE
CORINTHIAN GARDENS VS SPOUSES TANJANGCO
FACTS: This case relates to a property dispute within
the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, managed by their
association (Corinthian). Sps. Tanjangco alleges that
the perimeter fence of the Cuasos, encroached on their
lot which is directly adjacent to theirs. Because the
Cuasos refused to demolish the fence, the Tanjangcos
filed a suit for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
In turn, the Cuasos filed a Third Party
Complaint against Corinthian, Paraz Construction and
De Dios Realty and Surveying. They ascribed
negligence to Paraz for its failure to ascertain the
proper specifications of their house; and to De Dios
for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby exposing them to litigation.
They faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying
their accuracy, as well as making representations as to
De Dios' integrity and competence (being the firm who
conducted all the previous surveying for the developer,
Corinthian recommended the services of De Dios).
The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian
exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the
Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian
should also be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such construction.
The RTC ruled that the fence did in fact
encroach on the Tanjangco lot. However, since the
Cuasos were builders in good faith, the court gave the
Tanjangcos the option to sell and the former the option
to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price
to be agreed upon by both. In the event that the
Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at
the latter's expense. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos
to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from
the time of the filing of the complaint. Paraz was found
negligent for their disregard of the boundaries and was
ordered to pay damages. The complaint with respect to
De Dios and Corinthian was dismissed.
Because the RTC denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, the Tanjangcos appealed to the CA.
The Cuasos and Paraz also appealed.
On appeal, the CA reversed. It held that the
Cuasos were in bad faith and were land grabbers. Thus
the Tanjangcos were given the right to demand the
demolition of the fence, subject to their reimbursement
to the Cuasos of the necessary expenses for the
preservation of the fence. Also, the Cuasos were
ordered to pay, considering its location and category,
P10k a month as rent for the use and occupation of the
lot. They were also ordered to pay hefty sums for
damages and attorneys fees.
The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos
were dismissed. Paraz, De Dios and Corinthian were all
found negligent, and were ordered to contribute to all
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TOSHIBA V CIR
FACTS: Toshiba is registered with PEZA as an
Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise. It is also
registered with BIR as a VAT-taxpayer. As a taxexempt entity and with its export sales VAT-exempt,
Toshiba wants to claim for credit/refund of its
unutilized input VAT payments attributable to its
export sales. CIR opposes this claim, stating that
Toshiba failed to show that the total amount claimed
as VAT input taxes are properly substantiated by
official receipts and invoices, and have been offset
against any output tax. It also said that Toshiba is not
entitled to the credit/refund of its input VAT payments
because, being a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export
enterprise, Toshiba is not subject to VAT. Wellestablished is the rule that claims for refund/tax credit
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
as it partakes the nature of exemption from tax.
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented
documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax
credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any
evidence at all.
Issue: Is Toshiba VAT-registered and are its export
sales subject to zero-rated VAT? Yes.
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Held: The arguments of the CIR that Toshiba is VATexempt and the latters export sales are VAT-exempt
transactions are inconsistent with the explicit
admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba is a
registered VAT entity and that it is subject to zero
percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.1 The CIR is
bound by these admissions, which it could not
eventually contradict in its MR.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and
submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised
to do so by the CTA at the end of the pre-trial
conference. The approval of the Joint Stipulation by
the CTA marked the start of the pre-trial process.
Under Rule 18, sec. 2(d), part of the purposes of pretrial is the possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof.
The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must
be treated as a judicial admission. Section 4, Rule 129
provides that a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made. The Court cannot
lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when
the opposing party relied upon the same and
accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted.
Absent finding of the commission of a mistake,
much more, of a palpable one, the Court holds that the
CIR cannot escape the binding effect of its
judicial admissions. The CIR does not deny that his
counsel, Revenue Attorney Biazon of the BIR, signed
the Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of
Toshiba. Considering the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, Atty. Biazon is
presumed to have read, studied, and understood the
contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the
same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the
contrary, which it failed to do so.
Further, the judicial admissions of the CIR in
the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically false,
wrong, or illegal. On the contrary, they are
consistent with the ruling of this Court in a previous
case involving the same parties, CIR v Toshiba,
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered
enterprises.
An admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings does not require proof. Thus, in light
of the judicial admissions of Toshiba, the CTA correctly
confined itself to the other factual issues submitted for
resolution by the parties.
Evidence
D. PARAFFIN TEST
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Marturillas, a barangay capt. in Davao City,
was charged with homicide, for the shooting of the
victim Artemio Pantinople. Basically, around 7:30pm at
the night of the incident, witness Lito Santos, neighbor
of Artemio, heard a gunshot while eating supper. When
he looked outside, he noticed smoke and fire coming
from the muzzle of a big gun, which was about 10
meters away. Moments later, Lito saw Artemio clasping
his chest and staggering towards his (Litos) kitchen,
while shouting Help me, I was shot by the captain.
Lito however did not approach Artemio right after the
shooting because his own wife warned him that he
might also be shot. Lito then saw Artemios wife,
Ernita, who shouted and cried, Kapitan, bakit mo
binaril ang aking asawa? Lito did not see who the
shooter was, but Ernita, who also testified during trial,
saw appellant Marturillas carrying with him a long
firearm, which looked like an M-14 rifle. She testified
that she had a clear view of Marturillas at that time
since the place was well illuminated. Immediately after
the shooting incident, Ernita called out to her
neighbors for help. When the police arrived at the
scene, Ernita informed them that it was Marturillas
who was responsible for the shooting. With this
information, the police went to the house of Marturillas
and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing
of Artemio. Marturillas was invited to go to the police
station and was asked by the police to bring with him
his M-14 rifle, to which the accused-appellant
complied. Marturillas was then subjected to paraffin
testing by the PNP Crime Lab the day after the
shooting incident. The next day, the results of the
paraffin test were released which found Marturillas
NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates. After trial, the RTC
found Marturillas guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, saying that
Marturillas was positively identified as the person
running away from the crime scene immediately after
the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of
the victim himself that he had been shot by the
captain, clearly established the latters complicity in
the crime. Now with the SC, Marturillas contends
that there should have been no finding of guilt
because of the negative results of the paraffin
test and that the prosecution miserably failed to
establish the type of gun used in the commission of
the crime.
ISSUE: W/N Marturillas should be acquitted on
the ground of the negative results of the paraffin
test. NO.
RATIO: While they were negative, that fact alone did
not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and
time again, the SC has held that a negative paraffin
test result is not a conclusive proof that a person
has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to
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Evidence
Issues:
1. Whether there was error in the application of
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)? No.
2. Whether there was error in the application of
the best evidence rule under Rule 130
Section 3? No.
Held: Petition denied.
Rule 132 Section 10 (d) and (e)
Gaws case was not prejudiced by the RTCs treatment
of Suy Bens testimony during cross-examination as
her evidence.
The delineation of a piece of evidence as part
of the evidence of one party or the other is only
significant in determining whether the party on whose
shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the
quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden.
In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff
who must establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of
evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to
consider the entirety of the evidence presented by
both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances of the case, culled from the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former's testimony. Unlike an ordinary
witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse
witness in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of
an adverse witness, although the calling party does not
vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless
bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or
remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,
therefore, not bound by the latter's testimony only in
the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to
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THE
BY
PHILIPPINES
REASON
V.
OF
SALVADOR
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PEOPLE V. CANETE
FACTS:
Spouses Paquito and Sedaria Caete had 3
children, one of whom was Alma. Later on, the
spouses decided to live separately. As a result,
Alma lived with his father.
Paquito and Alma lived with the formers brother,
Kakingcio Caete, who was also married and had
children. Alma called Kakingcios wife Yaya
Alejandra.
Paquito and Alma eventually went back to their old
home after a while. But Paquito became blind and
a paralytic. So Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma
fetched to live with him and his family again. By
then, Alma was already twelve years old. She
noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and
amiable to her.
One night, may ganap! Alma was sleeping when
she felt someone caressing her Kakingcio.
Eventually, he raped her after threatening her with
an 8-inch..knife. She lost consciousness in the
process and woke up with a bloody vagina. She
cried.
Another evening, Alma was awakened when she
felt her pants being pulled down. She resisted then
ran to Ka Caring (a neighbor) and revealed that
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grounds
of presidential
communications
privilege in relation to her executive and policy
decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot,
any more than the other branches of government,
invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its
officials and employees from investigations by the
proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing
required to overcome the presumption favoring
confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness
of
the
function
in
the
performance of which the material was sought,
and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task
requires and our decision implies no judgment
whatever
concerning
possible
presidential
involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary,
we think the sufficiency of the Committee's
showing must depend solely on whether the
subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to
the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's
functions...The sufficiency of the Committee's
showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are
critical to the performance of its legislative
functions. There is a clear difference between
Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a
grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task,
legislative judgments normally depend more on
the
predicted
consequences
of
proposed
legislative
actions
and
their
political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of
past events; Congress frequently legislates on the
basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings.
In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns
entirely on its ability to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that certain named
individuals did or did not commit specific crimes.
*On the claim that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege will violate the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern: SC might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before
them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for 11 hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested
his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information (Article III, Sec.
7 of the Constitution), like any other right, is subject to
limitation. The provision itself expressly provides the
limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of RA No. 6713, Article 229 of
the RPC, Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and Section
276
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PEOPLE OF
INVENCION
THE
PHILIPPINES
V.
ARTEMIO
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PEOPLE VS SATORRE
Facts: Herminiano Satorre was charged with the
Murder of Romero Pantilgan. Wife of victim testified
that while she was asleep, she was awakened by a
gunshot. When she went out to the porch, she found
her dead husband lying on the ground with a gunshot
wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a baranggay kagawad,
testified that they went they went to the Pantilgan
residence to verify a report regarding a dead person.
Rufino testified that Abraham Satorre, the accuseds
father, admitted that it was his son who shot
Pantilgan.
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284
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PEOPLE V TABARNERO
HELD: The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed
to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments
does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to
give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did the
same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage,
pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Habit,
R. DYING DECLARATION
288
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Held/Ratio:
First of all, was it a dying declaration? Yes! It complied
with the requisites.
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1)
refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness
of an impending death; 3) be made freely and
voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the
death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5)
have been made by a declarant competent to testify as
a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.
289
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THE
REGULAR
COURSE
OF
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document,
the
evidence
must
be
clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.
Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld. The trial court itself held
that (n)o countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the documents
legality or its validity.[
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it
would be deemed an ancient document and thus still
presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more
than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to
be genuine.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property
was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on
a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code. The
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies
only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the
present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No.
911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property
was declared solely in Navarros name. This tends to
support the argument that the Property was not
conjugal.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
admitting
the
documents
presented
by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
The CA was correct in refusing to give any
probative value to the alleged death certificate of
Guevarra and the affidavit of dela Cruz. Petitioners
belatedly attached these documents to their appellees
brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents
for the first time on appeal without any explanation.
For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally
offer in evidence these documents before the trial
court as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court. To admit these documents now is contrary to
due process, as it deprives respondents of the
opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were
admitted, they would not controvert Navarros
ownership of the Property. These documents do not
prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that
Navarro did not own the Property. Petitioners
admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied
before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate
court that this constitutes an impermissible change of
theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he cannot change his theory on
295
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DIZON V CTA
Facts: Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a
petition for the probate was filed with the RTC. The
probate court then appointed retired SC Justice Dizon
and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon
(petitioner)
as
Special
and
Assistant
Special
Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose
(Estate).
Justice
Dizon
informed
respondent
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
of the special proceedings for the Estate.
Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of
the Estate the required estate tax return. Atty.
Gonzales filed the estate tax return with the BIR
Regional Office, showing therein a NIL (ZERO) estate
tax liability.
However, the Assistant Commissioner for
Collection of the BIR, Montalban, issued Estate Tax
Assessment Notice, demanding the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax.
Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration
of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of
P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. Dizon filed a
petition for review before the CTA.
During the trial before the CTA, the BIRs
counsel presented one witness in the person of Alberto
Enriquez, who was one of the revenue examiners who
conducted the investigation on the estate tax case of
the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of the direct
examination of the witness, he identified a number of
documentary evidence.
Dizon contends that the evidence should not
have been admitted because there was no formal offer
of evidence.
The CTA, relying on the case of Vda. de Oate,
ruled that the evidence was admissible despite lack of
a formal offer stating:
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Although
the
above-mentioned
documents were not formally offered
as
evidence
for
respondent,
considering that respondent has been
declared
to
have
waived
the
presentation thereof during the hearing
on March 20, 1996, still they could be
considered as evidence for respondent
since they were properly identified
during the presentation of respondent's
witness, whose testimony was duly
recorded as part of the records of this
case. Besides, the documents marked
as respondent's exhibits formed part of
the BIR records of the case.
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should
be
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PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
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301
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