POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Part 2

SOVEREIGNTY-compare
a. Police Power
b. Eminent Domain
c. Taxation
Police Power
A. Definition
by Justice Shaw
the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to
make, ordain, and establish all
manner
of
wholesome
and
reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same.Ermita-Malate Hotel &
Motel Operators Assn. V. Mayor of
Manila L-24693, 7/31/67
B. Scope
Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580
Binay v. Domingo, 9/11/91
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155
Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil 148
Assn. Of Small landowners v. Sec. ,
7/14/89
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569
PASEI v. Sec Drilon, 163 SCRA 386
OSMENA v. COMELEC, 3/31/98 (RA
6646)-media ad ban
C. Tests: lawful subject and means
US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
Lawful subject
Taxicab Operators v. BOT, 119 SCRA 597
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 597
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SRA 323
DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533

Sangalang v. IAC, GR. 71169

Del Rosario v. Bengson, 180 SCRA 521
Lawful means
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
People v. Chan, 65 Phil 611
City Govt. V. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759
NIDC v. PVB, 12/10/90
City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA
308(2005); White Light Corporation vs. City
of Manila, 576 SCRA 416(2009)
Void-for-Vagueness Rule as applied to penal
lawsP. v. Siton, 600 SCRA 476 (2009)
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Sec. 9 Article IIIPrivate property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation
A. Definition and Scope- WHAT IS
PRIVATE PROPERTY?

Comelec in the guise of regulation

require print media to allot ad space
for comelec purposes without paying
just
compensationPPI
V.
COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272 [1995];
BUT
in
TELEBAP/GMA
v.
COMELEC, 4/21/98, Supreme Court
held that franchise holders are subject
to regulation by COMELEC.

"private
property"
includes
patrimonial properties of local
government units City of Baguio vs.
NAWASA, 106 Phil 144

B. Who may exercise the power of eminent

domain
Congress
Local legislative Bodies-by
delegation

What about a Barangay?

Barangay Matictic v. Elbinias,
148 SCRA 83

back the property? No. Forform Dev.

Corp. v. PNR, GR 124795, 12/10/08.

Requisites when exercised by a

local govt. Heirs of Suguitan
vs. City of Mandaluyong, 328
SCRA 137

Quasi-public corporation

C. Requirements:

if imposition in right of way

acquisition amounts to deprivation of
proprietary rights, it is equivalent to
exercise of eminent domain-(NPC
vs. Santa Loro vda de Capin, GR
175176, 10/17/08, citing NPC vs.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, 18
January 1991, 193 SCRA 1, 6-8)
prohibition in the guise of regulation
to protect view of public plaza- P v.
Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443 (1958)

gov. regulation re: telephone

interconnection- RP v. PLDT, 26
SCRA 620 (1969)

Ordinance requiring 6% of burial

lots allotted to paupers. City Govt.
of QC v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759
(1983)

Requirements before writ is issuedIgnacio v. Guerrero, 5/29/87

a. Meaning-

meaning of taking-Republic v.
Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336
time of taking- HLI v. PARC, GR
171101, 4/24/12

No valid taking if bound by

existing contract-Noble v. City of
Manila, 67 Phil 1

2. Public use

1. Taking of private property

If
there
is
taking
without
expropriation and payment of just
compensation, the owner cannot take

Guido v. Rural Progress Adm.,

84 Phil 847; Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA ;
Sena v. Manila Railroad Co., 42
Phil 102; Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SCRA 461 (socialized
housing); Manosca v. CA,
1/29/96
(492
sq.m.
as
historical site); Prov. of Cam.
Sur v. CA., GR No. 103125
5/17/93

A condemnor should commit to

use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it
should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to
return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter so
desires. [Vda. de Ouano vs.
Republic,
642
SCRA
384(2011)]

Corollarily, if this particular

purpose or intent is not initiated
or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then
the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of

the property, subject to the

return of the amount of just
compensation
received.[Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority
vs. Lozada, Sr., 613 SCRA
618(2010)], abandoning Fery v.
Mun. of Cabanatuan, 42 Phil.
28 (1921)

Not valid exercise

City of Manila v. Chinese
Community, 40 Phil 349

De Knecht v. Bautista, 100 SCRA

660

Republic v. De Knect, 2/12/89

Manotok v. CA, 5/21/87

3. Just Compensation
a. Fair Market Value
EPZA v. Dulay, 4/29/87
b. Cut off point valuation-time of
taking Under RULE 67, Rules of Court,
just compensation is determined at
the time of FILING; BUT this
must yield if a substantive law
applies, just like expropriation
initiated by local governments
under SECTION 19 of RA 7160.
(City of Cebu vs. SPS. Dedamo,
GR 142971, May 7, 2002)

POWER OF TAXATION
Note : this should be taken up in
Taxation Law Review

BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Function of the Bill of Rights: To limit
governmental powers:

no taking if land believed to be

public- NPC v. CA, 3/11/96

B. 1987 with the 1973 constitutional

provisions on the bill of rights
compared.

b. Just means prompt paymentCosculluela v. CA, 164 SCRA

393 ;

If the land is taken under

PD 72 but no payment of
just compensation yet, what
is the reckoning point in the
determination of just
compensation ? DAR v.
Goduco, GR 174007,
6/27/12

C.

[i]n
cases
where
the
government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right
to recover possession of their
property. [Republic vs. Lim,
462 SCRA 265(2005)]

Hierarchy of Rights- freedom of

assembly vs. property right of
employer- PBM Employees Org. v.
PBM Co., Inc., 50 SCRA 189 (1973)

DUE PROCESS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
A. Concepts:
Meanings in relation to due process:

o Person, Deprivation-denial,
Life, Liberty, Property

USA v. Purganan, GR No. 148571,

9/29/02)
Before Judicial Bodies
Requisites:
Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil.
921

Aspects of due process:

-substantive and procedural

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

1. Impartial and competent court

Paderanga v. Azura, 136 SCRA
266
People v. CA, 262 SCRA 452
People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441
(repeated intervention of the
judge)
Webb vs. People, 276 SCRA 243
(impartiality; repeated
unfavorable rulings; publicity)
People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA
54 (publicity)

Violation:
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
People v. Fajardo, 100 Phil 443 (1958)
Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)
Traffic Command v. Gonong, 7/13/90
No violations:
US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910)
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155
Layno v. Sandigan, 136 SCRA 536
Requirement for Publication
Tanada v. Tuvera, GR 63915,
12/29/86

Not Impartial
Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194
Galman v. Sandigan, 144 SCRA 43\
Tabuena v. Sandigan, 268 SCRA 332
[1997] (read majority and dissenting
views)
People V. Opida, 142 SCRA 295

Void for Vagueness

P. v. Siton, 600 SCRA 476 (2009)
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In General
impartiality and cold neutralityCojuangco v. PCGG, 10/2/90

2. Jurisdiction
Banco Espanol, supra
Rabino v. Cruz, 222 SCRA 493

improper identification of suspectPeople v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122

deprivation of opportunity to be
heard-Alonte v. Savellano, 287
SCRA 245; Marcos v. Sandigan,
10/6/98

Due process does not always call for

a prior opportunity to be heard; a
subsequent opportunity is enough
when the extradition court hears the
petition for extradition. (Govt. of

3. Lawful hearing

A person cannot be convicted

without hearing; void. (David v.
Aguilizan, 94 SCRA 707);

much less without being

charged. ( Pagasian v. Azura, 184
SCRA 391); People v. Beriales, 70
SCRA 361; Lorenzana v. Cayetano,
78 SCRA 485 ; Court cannot hold
counsel in contempt (indirect)

without notice and hearing. (Surea v.

Juntereal, 84 SCRA 5)

Alliance of Democratic Free

Labor Org. vs. Laguesma, 254
SCRA 565;
Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Pascual, 259 SCRA 604;
Go vs. Napolcom, 271 SCRA 447

The summary rules do not dispense

with the right of the accused to a
hearing and confrontation of
witnesses. (Combate v. San Jose,
135 SCRA 693)

2. the tribunal must consider the

evidence presented.
Baguio Country Club v. NLRC,
119 SCRA 557;
Planters
Products v. NLRC, 1/20/89

No denial if opportunity is given but LOST

accused was granted continuances to
enable him to present his evidence
and he failed to do so. (Sequin v.
People, 3/13/89);

3. the decision must have something

to support itself

Failure of counsel to cross examine

the witnesses of the adverse party on
account negligence (DBP/APT v. CA,
1/29/99);

4. the evidence must be substantial

and substantial evidence means
such evidence as a reasonable mind
must accept as adequate to support
a conclusion

Grossly negligent counsel-Amil v.

CA, 10/7/99

5. the decision must be based on the

evidence presented at the hearing;
or at least contained in the records
and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Go v. Napolcom, 271
SCRA 447)

4. Valid judgment- appeal

Reliefs in excess of what prayed

for. DIONA v. BALANGUE, GR
173559, 07 Jan. 2013.

DUE PROCESS BEFORE

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

6. the tribunal or body or any of its

judges must act on its own or his
own independent consideration of
the law and the facts of the
controversy and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate. (Lupo
v. AAD 190 SCRA 69)

A. Must be vested with jurisdiction

teacher who is a member of

the (investigating) committee
was
not
appointed
in
accordance with law. Fabella
v. CA, 283 SCRA 256 [1997]

7. the board or body should in all

controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

B. Requirements: Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69

Phil. 635
1. right to a hearing which includes
the right to present one's case and
submit evidence in support thereof.

Specific cases:

-failure to comply with the twin notice

requirement is not violation of due
process, but merely violation of the
requirements of the law, and thus
rendering
the
act
ineffectual.
SERRANO vs. NLRC, 323 SCRA 445
De Leon v. NLRC, 100 SCRA 691
Berina v. PMI, 117 SCRA 581
Guzman v. NU, 142 SCRA 699permissible limitations on rights of
students
Mabuhay Textile v. Ongpin, 2/28/86
Gonzales v. CSC, 9/2/93
Is actual hearing necessary? No.
Ong v. Parel, 156 SCRA 768
Var Orient v. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 732
St. Marys College v. NLRC, 181 SCRA
62
Board of Regents v. Telan, 10/21/93
BUT in the disciplinary proceedings against
local elective officials, hearing when
provided by law is indispensable. Joson v.
Exec. Sec. , 5/20/98
Opportunity to be heard is lost if failed to
appear or answer despite notice. ALU v.
NLRC, 9/29/90

Notice and hearing not essential

when an administrative body is
performing its rule making power
(Phil. Consumer v. Sec. of DECS,
153 SCRA 622)

An administrative agency may be

empowered to grant provisional toll
rate adjustment without hearing.
The reason is that provisional rates
are by their nature temporary and
subject to adjustment in conformity
with the rates approved after final
hearing. Padua vs. Ranada, GR no.
141949, 10/14/02.

But notice and hearing is required

when performing its quasi-judicial
function: PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz,
180 SCRA 218 (1989)

An officer cannot review his own

decision- (Zambales Chromite v. CA,
94 SCRA 261)

In re: Atty. Asoy, 152 SCRA 45

Yu v. Santiago, 169 SCRA 364

Notice to squatters (previously

determined as such) sufficient for
ejectment, besides squatting is a
nuisance which can be abated
without judicial hearing. Mendoza
v. NHA, 111 SCRA 637

Taking of property without hearing

and notice as to valuation under PD
1224, a denial of due process,
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461

Administrative due process does not

require assistance of counselLumiqued vs. Exenea, 11/18/97

Motion for reconsideration or appeal will

cure the defect. Simpao v. CSC, 11/15/90;
Valderama v. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308
Hearing not essential in the following:
arrest of criminal offenders before
filing of charges
distraint in taxation
preventive suspension
removal of acting employees
cancellation of passport
presumptions
Miscellaneous

Requirements
A. It must be based upon substantial
distinctions:

When the Special Prosecutor

reinstated the complaint against
them, without their knowledge,
there is denial of due process.
(ROXAS vs. VASQUEZ, GR No.
114944, 5/29/02)

CSC V. LUCAS, 301 SCRA 560,

charged of simple misconduct but
found guilty of another offense.

ROXAS & CO. v. CA, 12/17/99notice

to
landowners
thru
administrator of hacienda, a violation
of due process as administrator is not
duly authorized and does not know
what to do with the notice.

B. Persons protected
C. Classifications:

There is no denial of due process if

the law(Ombudsman Act of 1989)
making any order of suspension of
not more than one month final. (Alba
v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753)

No valid distinctions
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA
270
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
Gumabon v. Director, 37 SCRA 420
PJA v. Pardo, 11/11/93
Chavez v. SANDIGAN, 12/9/98
BIRAOGO v. Phil Truth
Commission, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)
Distinctions valid
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12
Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
Nunez v. Sandigan, 111 SCRA 433
Taxicab Operators v. BOT, 117
SCRA 597
PASEI v. Drilon, 6/30/88
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
Himagan v. People, GR 113811
10/7/94
Tiu v. CA, 301 SCRA 278
Aguinaldo v. Comelec, 308 SCRA
770
TELEBAP v. Comelec, 289 SCRA

In
general,
in
extradition
proceedings, prospective extraditees
are not entitled to notice and hearing
BEFORE warrants for their arrest
can be issued and NOT ENTITLED
TO BAIL and PROVISIONAL
LIBERTY while the extradition
proceedings
are
pending.
GOVERNMENT OF USA vs.
HON. PURGANAN, GR No.
148571, Sept. 24, 2002;
see
however the case of Govt of the
Special Adm. Region of Hongkong
vs. Olalia, supra where the
extraditee was allowed bail after two
years of detention while awaiting
extradition.

337
Farinas v. Exec. Sec., 417 SCRA
503 (2003); Quinto v. Comelec, 613
SCRA 385 (2010) on the distinction
between elected and appointed
officials on the matter of deemedresigned provisions

EQUAL PROTECTION - nor shall be

denied the equal protection of the laws.

A. Definitions
7

The concept of relative

constitutionality Central Bank

Employees Association, Inc. vs.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446
SCRA 299(2004)
Imbong v. Ochoa, supra

Article III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and with the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

B. It must be germane to the purpose

of the law
C. It must not be limited to existing
conditions only. (Ormoc Sugar v.
City of Ormoc, 22 SCRA 603)
D. It must apply equally to all
members of the class
Marcos v. CA, 9/5/97
Nolasco v. Comelec, 275 SCRA 762

Sec 3(1)The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise.

Not a case of:

Regala v. Sandigan, 262 SCRA 122

Sec. 3(2) Any evidence obtained in violation

of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

E. Misc.A mayor may be charged with

violation of the Anti graft & Corrupt
Practices At for manifest partiality in
not observing equal protection in
issuance of permits to vendors.
(Olivarez v. Sandigan, 248 SCRA
700)

HISTORICAL AID: Read the separate

opinion of Justice PUNO in the case of
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 407
SCRA 10 (2003)
A. Extent of protection
-to protect the privacy and sanctity of the
persons, his home, possessions against
arbitrary invasion or intrusion by the state,
and extends to all persons, natural or
juridical.

cancellation of probation for nonpayment of civil liability- not a

violation, Soriano v. CA, 304 SCRA
231
SEARCH AND SEIZURES

Rule: Searches and Arrests without warrant

are presumed unreasonable and that all
unreasonable searches/arrests are illegal.
B. REQUISITES OF WARRANT
Probable cause in search warrants - such
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection

with the offense are in the place sought to be

searched.

personally
means
personal
evaluationSoliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA
393-

Probable cause requires that in

offenses involving a negative ingredient
(like illegal possession of firearms), the
best proof obtainable (certification of
lack of license) must be presented to
support the issuance of the warrant.
NALA vs. Judge Barroso, Jr., GR No.
153087, Aug. 7, 2003

by the Judge
Judge to take deposition in writing
and attach to the record. Mata vs.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 388.
Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 not bound by the certification of the
fiscal; Placer vs. Villanueva, 126
SCRA 463- may require additional
affidavits. People vs. Inting, 187
SCRA 788- certification of the fiscal
is ineffectual as basis for existence
of probable cause. Lim vs. Felix,
2/19/91-(citing Inting) it is the
supporting documents behind the
prosecutor's certification that are
material in assisting the Judge to
make the determination of probable
cause.

SEARCH
When is there a search? P. V. BOLASA,
12/22/99 peeping thru window
Sec. Rule 126 (one specific offense)
Cases:
Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553non payment of customs duties;
application for warrant was made even
if seizures may be made without
warrant;

Roberts v. CA., 3/5/96Ho vs. People/Sandigan, 10/9/97

If the judge finds probable cause, is
he bound to issue a warrant of arrest?
No. Sumulde vs. Salvani, 9/26/88
(MTC case)

Sec. Vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301violation of Central Bank rules

Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. CA.,261
SCRA 944

If the judge finds no probable cause,

should merely require additional
affidavits/ documents/evidence from
the prosecution. Reyes v. Montessa,
247 SCRA 85.

Probable cause in Arrest Warrant - such

facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.

The trial courts jurisdiction is

limited to the determination of
whether there is probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the accused. Instead, the trial
court assumed the function of the

Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA

435
Probable cause must
personally by the judge

be

determined

prosecutor by determining
there was probable cause
filing of the information for
[Co vs. Republic, 539
147(2007)]

whether
for the
Murder.
SCRA

issuance of warrant of arrest, such

procedure
could
convert
the
determination into a full-blown trial of
the entire proceedings. Govt. of USA
v. Purganan, GR 148571, 9/24/02

The determination must be made after

examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce

NOTE: In case of arrest, this does not

apply where an information has been filed.
It must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

Examination of witnesses:
By the clerk of court- not valid. Bache
vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823;

Description of the place to be search:

The controlling subject of search
warrants is the place indicated in the
warrant itself and not the place
identified by the police (citing
PICOP vs Asuncion, 106 SCAD
621 [1999]). The search on a place
different from what is indicated in
the search warrant is void, hence the
items seized by virtue of the warrant
are inadmissible in evidence. People
vs. Francisco, 387 SCRA 569
(2002) 173 SCAD 420, 8/22/02.

Perfunctory and no deposition- not

valid. Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA
477;
Searching questions and answers. Luna
vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313;
May adopt previous investigations of
special counsel. Marinas vs. Siochi,
104 SCRA 423; Prudente vs. Dayrit,
12/14/89 ;
Pendon vs. CA, 11/16/90- no
searching questions; Silva vs.
Presiding Judge, 10/21/91; Affidavit on
hearsay info. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil.
33;

The search of the workshop being

integral part of the residence subject
of the search is valid. (Cupcupin vs.
People, GR 132389, 11/19/02)
No descriptio personae
John Doe with sufficient descriptio
personae (People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil
169)

Affidavit should establish probable

cause. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA
467.
Issuance of warrant of arrest in
extradition proceedings. Even under
Section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution does not require a notice
and hearing before issuance of warrant
of arrest. To allow the accused to be
heard and to present evidence during
the prima facie determination for the

50 John Does. Pangandaman v.

Caesar, 159 SCRA 599.
General warrants/roving
Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
20th Century Fox Films vs. CA,

10

PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253

Columbia Pictures v. Flores, 223
SCRA 761
Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70
Columbia Pictures vs. CA., 262
SCRA 219

Not valid
Luz v. People, 667 SCRA 421, citing
Knowles v. IOWA, 525 US 113
(1998)
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402;
People v. Encinada, GR No. 116720
10/21/97

Place searched different

[p]lace searched different from the place
described in the warrant (People vs. CA,
291 SCRA 400); The controlling subject of
search warrants is the place indicated in the
warrant itself and not the place identified by
the police (citing PICOP vs Asuncion, 106
SCAD 621 [1999]). The search on a place
different from what is indicated in the search
warrant is void, hence the items seized by
virtue of the warrant are inadmissible in
evidence (People vs. Francisco, supra)

1) Search must be in the place of

arrest- "Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA
509
2) Search must be in the premises
within his reach- P. V. Santos, 236
SCRA 689.
3) within his immediate controlP. V. Musa, 217 SCRA (586 citing
Chimel v. State of CA, 395 US
752[1969]; People v. Leangsiri, 252
SCA 21; ESPANO V. CA, 288
SCRA 558

C. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND

SEISURES
there must always be probable
cause and based on personal
knowlege (but see: stop & frisk
rule)

BUT see: P. vs. Cuenco, 11/16/98;

Not a case of: locked cabinet cannot
be said to be within immediate
control. Valeroso vs. Court of
Appeals, 598 SCRA 41(2009)

People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 9/4/86

P. V. Cuison, 4/18/96
(Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42)

b. MOVING VEHICLES
Carrol vs. US, 267 US 132 People vs. Malmstedt, supra
People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63
People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 2/21/91
People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277
People v. Que, 265 SCRA 721

1. WARRANTLESS SEARCH
a. SEARCH incidental to a valid arrest
Valid
Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil 439People vs. Malmstedt, 6/19/91
People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646
People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 229
(4/6/90)
People v. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679
Padilla vs. CA/People, 3/12/97
COURT ADM. v. BARRON, AM RTJ
98-1420, 10/8/98; PEOPLE V.
VALDEZ, 304 SCRA 140; OBRA v.
CA, 10/28/99

The fact that the vehicle looked

suspicious simply because it is not
common for it to be covered with leaves,
does not constitute probable cause.
Caballes vs. CA, 373 SCRA 221
c. Enforcement of CUSTOMS and
TARIFF laws

11

Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

People vs. Lising, 275 SCRA 804

People vs. Laserna, GR No. 109250,
9/5/97- not valid stop & frisk but
there is waiver
P. V. MONTILLA 284 SCRA 703
P. V. CORREA, 285 SCRA 679

d. EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW

Harris vs. US, 390 US 23; People vs.
Musa, 217 SCRA 597- not in plain
view;
Requisites:
1) prior valid intrusion;
2)
evidence
inadvertently
discovered;
3) evidence immediately apparent;
4) plain view justified seizure
without further search.

NOT VALID
De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 689
People v. Encinada, GR No. 116720
10/2/97-no valid waiver under
intimidating circumstances

Search while serving a warrant.

P. v. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679;

Visual search of motor vehicle

yielding in plain view the
prohibited drug. P. v. Que
Ming Kha, GR 133265,
5/29/02;

f. STOP & FRISK- reasonable suspicion

TERRY V. OHIO, 392 US 1
Posadas vs. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
People v. Mengote, GR No. 87059 6/22/92
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255
Manalili vs. CA., GR No. 113447, 10/9/97
Malacat vs. CA., GR No. 123595, 12/12/97
Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611 (2007)

seizure from clothesline not

valid as there was no valid
intrusion- P v. Rondero, 320
SCRA 383 (1999)

g. Airport Searches
-checked-in luggage in a passenger
plane, a consent to inspection in
accordance
with
customs
and
regulations. People vs. Gatward, 267
SCRA 785; The scope of search
pursuant airport security procedure is
not confined only to search for weapons
under the Terry search doctrine.
Under existing law (RA 6235), holders
of airline tickets and their hand-carried
luggages are subject to search for and
seizure of prohibited articles. People vs.
CANTON, 179 SCAD 585, (2002)

e. WAIVER
valid
P. Vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144
P. V. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557
P. V. Cruz, 165 SCRA 134
Lopez vs. Commissioner of
Customs, 68 SCRA 320

No consent by the accused, a deaf

mute, where no interpreter assisted
him.. People vs. Asis, GR
1425331, 10/15/02

Limited consent: Veroy vs.

Layague, 210 SCRA 97-

when
accused
does
not
understand-P. V. CHUA HO SAN,
308 SCRA 432
P. V. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

Exigent circumstances:
P. v. De Gracia, 7/6/94 233 SCRA 716
(1994)

People vs. Sotto, 275 SCRA 191

12

(a) When, in his presence, the

person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;

MISCELLANEOUS

Saturation drives Guazon vs. De

Villa, 1/30/90

Mandatory drug testing: SJS vs.

Dangerous Drugs Board, 570
SCRA 410(2008) as to drug testing
on respondents in preliminary
investigations.

(b) When an offense has just been

committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge
of
facts
or
circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and

Limited search
1. Checkpoints- when public safety
requires/ routine inspection allowed;
BUT visual search only- Valmonte vs.
De Villa, 9/29/89

(c) When the person to be arrested

is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement
to another.

Valid
People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494
(driver nervous and jittery)
Posadas vs. CA, 188 SCRA 288

People vs. Dela Cruz, 4/18/90

People vs. Maspil, 8/20/90 (compare
with Amminudin case)
People vs. Sucro, 3/18/91; Espiritu vs.
Gen. Lim, 10/3/91 (see dissents)
Cayao v. Del Mundo, 9/15/93
People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586
People v. Monda, 11/22/93
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376
People v. Cendana, 190 SCRA 538

Not Valid
Aniag vs. Comelec, (not valid
search)
2. Warrantless search or seizures may
be justified in case of:
a. Danger, physical harm to the
officer
b. Destruction of evidence
c. Danger to third persons
d. Driving while intoxicated
e. Seaches in hot pursuit
(People v. Hernandez, 12/21/94)

RECENT Commission of a crime

Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 [1991]
Padilla vs. CA/People, 3/12/97People vs. alok, 266 SCRA 154
People vs. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357
People vs. Jayson, GR No. 120330,
11/18/97
Three hours People vs.
GERENTE, 219 SCRA 756

2. WARRANTLESS ARREST
Under Sec. 5, Rule 113- when
lawful.
A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

13

Crime committed on the same day

and coupled with personal
knowledge of police officers
obtained from the victims who
pointed to the accused at the time of
arrest. The search and seizure that
ensued are valid as incidental to a
valid arrest. (NOTE: the accused
was traced to the hospital where he
is being treated for his wound
sustained during the robbery).
People vs. Vinalon, 384 SCRA 623
(2002)

Fiscal-Lim vs. Ponce DeLeon, 66

SCRA 299
Sec. of Labor- Salazar vs. Achacoso,
3/14/90Sec. of Finance- Pres. Task Force vs.
CA., 171 SCRA 348
PCGG- Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
255 SCRA 438
DISINI v. Sec. of Justice, supra

Under what circumstance may the

president issue orders of arrest? May they
be the subject of judicial review? Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 US 78 (1909); Garcia-Padilla
v. Enrile, GR 61388, 4/20/83; Morales v.
Enrile, GR 61016, 4/26/83

Not recent
one day- P. V. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740
Void- Not committing a crime
People vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRa 325
Malacat vs. People, 12/15/97
P. vs. Chua Ho San, 305 SCRA 433
P. vs. Bansil, 304 SCRA 432 (eating halohalo

D. Miscellaneous:
Unjustified warrantless searchesthere was sufficient time to procure a
warrant
Rizal Alih vs. Castro, 6/23/87MHP vs. CA, 236 SCRA 227-

No personal knowledge of arresting

officers
People vs. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79
People vs. Mahusay, GR No. 91483
11/18/97
People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668-

E. Properties Subject to Seizure

1. Rule 126 , Sec. 2
-Proceeds/fruits of the crime
-Means in the commission of the
crime

b. Continuing Offenses:
Garcia Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472
Umil vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435

-Item/s not indicated in the search

warrant cannot be seized- Tambasen
v. People, 246 SCRA 184

Hot pursuit arrest

People vs. Recepcion, 391 SCRA 558
(2002)

a. Disposition
properties

of

illegally

seized

a. subject to return. Uykhetin vs.

Villareal, 42 Phil 886

Non-judicial officers cannot issue

warrant:
Commissioner of immigration- Moreno
v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562- order of
deportation; Harvey vs. Santiago,
6/26/88 (compare with Moreno case);

b. pending determination, firearms

remain in custodia legis. Roan
vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687;
Alih vs. Castro, supra.

14

c. must be returned even if intended

to be used by the prosecution.
Bagalihog v. Fernandez 6/27/91

upon lawful order of the court, or when

public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.

P. V. Dichoso, 223 SCRA

714-

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of

this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

F. ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE

*used generically; in contemplation of

future developments

1. Exlusionary Rule; defense is personalStonehill vs. Diokno, supra (abandoning

Moncado ruling)
People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 07
People vs. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246

note: any exception must be based on

probable cause since this right is carved out
of the search and seizure clause.

2. Illegality of seizure cannot be invoked

against the state if seizure was made by a
private individual- (P. v. Marti, 193 SCRA
57; Waterous Drug Corp. vs. NLRC, GR
No. 113271, 10/16/97)

A. Part of RIGHT TO PRIVACY1. Katz v. US, 389 US 347 (1967)

there is illegal search and seizure
even without trespass, abandoning
Olmstead v. US, 277 US 438
(1928)

3. Warrantless search may not be validated

by obstention of subsequent warrant.
Manlavi v. Gacott, 244 SCRA 50; Velasco
vs. CA, 245 SCRA 677)

2. Constitutionality of provision of
RA 3019 requiring submission of
periodic financial statements of
public officers/ employees. Morfe
v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424

4. Effect of Plea- P. v. Navarro, 10/7/98

RULE 114 SEC. 26. Bail not a bar
to objections on illegal arrest, lack
of
or
irregular
preliminary
investigation x x x provided that he
raises them before entering his plea.
x x x

3. Unconstitutionality of requiring
national I.D. (OPLE v. TORRES,
GR. No. 127685, 7/23/98); on
constitutionality of unified ID
system under EO 420 (KMU vs.
Director, NEDA et al., GR No.
167798, April 19, 2006)

E. Illegality actionable- Aberca vs.

Ver, 4/15/88 (law enforcement
officers; MHP vs. CA, 236 SCRA
227(on private individuals)

4. POLLO v. Constantino David,

659 SCRA 198- (no expectation
of privacy in use of govt
computers); Bersamins Dissent:
the MO allows reduced expectation
of privacy in respect of the
communications created, stored,

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION and

CORRESPONDENCE
Article IV. Section 3.
(1) The privacy of communication* and
correspondence shall be inviolable except

15

sent, or received after office hours

through the office computer, ...

Aspects:
1. Freedom from prior restraint
2. Freedom from subsequent
punishment

Cases
Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- wife
taking the private communications of
husband-doctor with his paramour held
NOT VALID;

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
-"a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." (cited in an
EN BANC decision in [G.R. No. 148560.
November 19, 2001] JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA,
petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)

BUT in WATEROUS DRUG CORP. vs.

NLRC, 10/16/97- the opening of an envelop
by the officer of the petitioner corporation
addressed to the private respondent, and
found the check evidencing the overprice in
the purchase of medicine was considered
VALID.
Anti-wire Tapping Act (RA 4200)
Cases

OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
"a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means
which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms." (NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed
325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S.
479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960)] cited in
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR
No. 148560, 11/19/01)

Ganaan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 telephone extension not covered
Ramirez vs. CA, 9/28/95 GR 93833 tape recording taken by one of the parties
covered by the penal clause of the law.
Disini v. Sec. of Justice, supra

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines

then have special application only to free
speech cases.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Constitutional provisions
-Sec. 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

DISINI v. Sec. of Justice, GR 203335,

2/18/14
1) Freedom from Censorship or PRIOR
RESTRAINT- official government
restrictions on expression prior to actual
publication or dissemination

Sec. 18(1) No person shall be

detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations.
A. Importance- essential to the nature of a
free state.
B. Scope: Expression, Speech, Press, etc.
C. Freedom of Speech and Press

a) Example of prior restraints

-licenses or permits
-judicial prior restraint (injunctions)
-movie censorship (on a lower level)
-license taxes

16

Cases:

people and their accessibility to

children.

PRIOR RESTRAINT
Statutory labeling; court injunctions -In
Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697
[1931], a statute making " a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical "a
nuisance and persons publishing or in
possession of such materials may be
enjoined, was considered as a form of
prior restraint and declared as
unconstitutional.

prohibition on expression of political

views on plebiscite issues -COMELEC
RESOLUTION not allowing columnists
to express their opinion on the
referendum on the cordillera autonomySanidad v. Comelec, 1/29/90
prohibiting taped political jingles.
Mutuc v. Comelec, 36 SCRA 2281970

Injunctions- In New York Times co. V.

US, 403 US [1971], the US Supreme
Court, in setting aside the injunction
issued against New York Times for
publishing the contents of a classified
study entitled "History of U.S. Decision
Making Process in Vietnam Policy,
said: "The word 'security' is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should
not be invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment. The guarding of military
and diplomatic secrets at the expense of
informed representative government
provides no real security of our
Republic."

Exit polls-On the validity of EXIT

POLLS.
ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING
CORP. VS.
COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)
Surveys
THUS a prohibition of publication of
surveys affecting candidates under
Sec.4 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional :
1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of
expression
even
though
such
suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 357 SCRA
496(2001)

Closures:
-newspaper offices- Burgos vs. Chief of
Staff, 133 SCRA 800; Corro vs.
Lising, 137 SCRA 541;
-radio station Eastern Broadcasting v.
Dans, 137 SCRA 647
-there must be a hearing and the
application of clear and present
danger
-need of licensing not to regulate
content but allocation of airwaves
-freedom of broadcast lesser in
scope than the press because of
pervasive influence in the lives of

17

Mere press statements of the Secretary

of Justice and of the NTC in question
constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint (due to the chilling
effect) that has transgressed the
Constitution. Chavez vs. Gonzales,
545 SCRA 441(2008)

Election stickers- Comelec Resolution

prohibiting decals and stickers on cars

or moving vehicles an infringement of

freedom of expression. A case of
overbreadth.
-Adiong
vs.
COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712.

Prosser and Keeton- public figures

were held to have lost, to some
extent at least, their right of privacy.
Because-they sought publicity and
consented to it, and so could not
complain when they receive it; their
personalities and their affairs had
already become public, and could no
longer be regarded as their own
private business; and that the press
had a privilege , under the
Constitution to inform the public
about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest.
See also Lagunzad v. vda. De
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)

Exceptions to prior restraint rule

Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697
-nations is at war
-obscene publication
-incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow of orderly govt.
Allowable prior restraints; Censorship :In
Times Film Corp. V. City of Chicago, 365
US 43 [1961], a requirement under a
municipal ordinance for submission to a
censor before exhibition was considered
valid on the premise that films differ from
other forms of expression and that
"requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications and the
security of the community life may be
protected against incitements to acts of
violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government."
BUT There should exist judicial remedy: In
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51
[1965]- the lack of judicial participation
in the procedure which bars a film, nor
even assurance prompt judicial review,
led the Court to reverse the conviction
of the accused who was tried for
violation of a law which requires prior
submission to the State Board of
Censors.

BUT-must be fairly truthful and

historical
in its presentation of
events; no presentation of private
life; no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts.(Ayer)

2) FREEDOM FROM SUBSEQUENT

PUNISHMENT
TESTS:

Administrative determination of what is

allowable material for TV & film
exhibition may be granted by
Congress. INK v. MTCRB-7/26/96

Restraining the exhibition of the

JESSICA ALFARO Story without
laying down any factual basis
constituting a clear and present
danger that would justify prior
restraint VIOLATES FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION.
VIVA
PRODUCTIONS v. CA, Webb,
GR 123881, 3/13/97

1) DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE

(content based)

Freedom and Right to Privacy

Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160
SCRA 861 (1988); quoting from

18

Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652

[1925]- the State has the power to
prescribe and punish speech which

"creates a dangerous tendency which

the State has the right to prevent."

free speech as in necessary to avoid the

danger."

- An attempt to overthrow the

government by force, even though
doomed from the outset because of
inadequate numbers or power of the
revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for
Congress to prevent. Dennis v. US, 341
US 494 [1951]

People vs. Perez, 45 Phil 599 [1923] The conviction of the accused for
violation of Art. 256 of the Penal Code
was upheld by the Supreme Court and
said: "Criticism, no matter how severe,
on the Executive, the Legislature, and
the Judiciary, is within the range of
liberty of speech, unless the intention
and effect be seditious. But when the
intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of
assembly and petition must yield to
punitive measures designed to maintain
the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the
laws, and the existence of the State."

Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524

[1951]-

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWOGonzales v. Comelec

The "dangerous tendency" and "clear
and present danger" doctrines, it
should not escape notice, were
fashioned in the course of testing
legislation of a particular typelegislation limiting speech expected
to have deleterious consequences on
the security and public order of the
community. The essential difference
between the two doctrines related to
the degree of proximity of the
apprehended danger which justified
the restriction upon speech. The
"dangerous
tendency"
doctrine
permitted
the
application
of
restrictions
once
a
rational
connection between the speech
restrained
and
the
danger
apprehended- the "tendency" of one
to create the other- was shown. The
"clear and present danger" rule, in
contrast, required the Government to
defer application of restrictions until
the apprehended danger was much
more visible, until its realization was
imminent and nigh at hand. "
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA
811-Applying the Clear and Present
Danger rule on the constitutionality
of COMELEC ban on exit polls.

2) Clear and Present Danger Rule

Schenck v. US, 249 US 47[1919]-rule

formulated by Justice Holmes "whether
the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree." "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justified such invasion of

3) Balancing of Interest Test- (contentneutral)- not all evils easily lend themselves,
like sedition, to measurement of proximity
and degree

19

Formulated
in
American
Communications Assn. V. Douds, 339
US 282, it was said: "When particular
conduct is regulated in the interest of

public order, and the regulation results in

an
indirect,
conditional,
partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the
courts is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands the greater
protection
under
the
particular
circumstances present."

F. Misc.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
US 568- libel and obscenity.

Gonzales v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835

[1969] citing the DOUDS case- the
upheld (due to lack of one vote to
declare nullity) the validity of RA 4880
prohibiting
early
nomination
of
candidates and limiting the campaign
period.

1.

UNIDO vs. Comelec, 104 SCRA 17Comelec's power to regulate time in

broadcast media and space in the papers,
not violative of freedom of expression
because of more paramount general
welfare and public interest. Besides the
regulation is for a limited period only.

IMBONG V. COMELEC, 35 SCRA

28[1970] - applying the yardstick in the
Gonzales, the court upheld the validity
of Par, 1, Sec. 8(A) of RA 6132 banning
political parties in the nomination and
election
of
delegates
to
the
Constitutional Convention.

The same result was obtained in

BADOY v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 285
[1970]- where the Court upheld the
validity of Comelec Resolution No. RR724 issued pursuant to Sec. 12 (F) of RA
6132 which prohibits the printing and
publication of such comments and
articles, which are not paid, unless the
names of all the candidates are
mentioned with equal prominence.

of RA 6646 is valid exercise of police

power
to
regulate
media
of
communication and information to
ensure equal opportunity, time and space
and the right to reply-

Criticism of Public Conduct

(executive, legislative, judicial and
other officers) should be exercised
outside the proscriptions of sedition,
libel and contempt and other
limitations of the law
US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 [1918]
Mercado v. CFI, 8/25/82.
Sub- Judice rule
P. vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil 265-power of
contempt cannot be exercised when
the court has lost its jurisdiction over
the case. Neither can it represent the
appellate court where the case is
pending appeal.
But even if
terminated, the comments must be
couched in a respectful language to
prevent impairment of the people's
faith and respect for the judiciary

ContemptSupreme Court (dangerous tendency

rule) Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 2/1/89; ;
IN RE \: EMIL JURADO, 243
SCRA 299
Inferior Courts (clear and present
danger is also used)
2. NewspapersPolicarpio v. Manila Times, 5/30/62
Lopez v. CA, 34 SCRA 116 [1970]

OSMENA v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA

447- reiterating NPC V. COMELEC,
207 SCRA 1- it was held that Sec. 11(b)
20

3. Freedom of expression vs. Right to

Privacy

What is the doctrine of fair

comment. Read- BORJAL V.
CA,
301
SCRA 1/15/99
reiterating NY v. Sullivan, 376
US 254

Ayer vs. Judge Capulong, 160

SCRA 861 [1988]-Right of Sen.
Enrile to privacy must yield to
the right of the public to know
the historical background of the
EDSA revolution

Privileged communications
Pleadings:
a. Utterances published in
judicial proceedings - privileged

Lagunzad v. Sotto vda. De

Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476including a little romance on the
movie potrayal of the life of
Moises Padilla is an invasion of
the right to privacy of a person
even if he is a public figure.

b. Provided relevant
Armovit v. Purisima,
11/15/82
Gutierrez v. Abila, 1/30/82
c. Including Remarks during the
trial
Malit v. People, 5/31/82

4. LIBEL not within the constitutional

protection
Defenses
to
Libel/Defamation/
Contempt
a) Privileged communications (RPC
354)- Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:

d. Pleading even if not yet acted upon

by the court-Cuenco v. Cuenco, 70
SCRA 212; Santos v. CA, 10/21/91
NOTE: (PRIVILEGE IS FROM
PRESUMPTION OF MALICEPRIVILEGE DISAPPEARS WHEN
ACTUAL MALICE IS PROVED.)

1. A private communication
made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and

5. OBSCENITY- Test (Miller v.

California, 37L ed 2d 419)
Whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards
should find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest'

2. A fair and true report, made in

good
faith,
without
any
comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or any
statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or
any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

"Whether the work depicts or

describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law and "Whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."

21

not valid as the power is for

regulation but not prohibition

CASES:
P. v. Kottinger, 45 Phil 352- postcards
showing natives half naked clad in
their native costumes
P. v. Go Pin, 8/8/55Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717
[1985]
Pita v. CA, 10/5/89- The court, and not
the mayor, has the authority to
declare what is obscene.

Allowable Regulation as to place

Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731
(1970) provided for another venue
(sunken garden) due to student
rallies degenerating into violence
(valid)
guidelines
Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553denial of permit was invalid as there
was no showing of probability (not
mere possibility) of clear and
present danger that might arise as a
result of the meeting. (see also
guidelines in the grant and/or denial
of the permit.

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
& PETITION THE GOV'T. FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCE
1. Tests: legality of assembly-Purpose test.
Auspices Rule:
Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil
255- upholding the denial of the permit
due to seditious speeches uttered in
previous meetings of the communists led
by Evangelista.

2. Right not subject to prior restraint, but

only the use of public place.

Public Assembly Act (BP 880)

(policy of maximum tolerance; BP
880s; constitutionality upheld;
Permit requirement, not a prior
restraint on the right but on the use
of public place. BAYAN et al., vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA et al., GR
no. 169838, April 25, 2006 on
Calibrated Pre-emptive Response
policy;

Unjustified denials
Wholesale cancellation of permits
without justifications. David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160
(2006)
In modifying the permit outright,
respondent gravely abused his discretion
when he did not immediately inform the
IBP who should have been heard first on
the matter of his perceived imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil that
may warrant the changing of the venue.
IBP vs. Atienza, 613 SCRA 518(2010)

3. Students did not shed their constitutional

rights at the school gate. Malabanan
vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359

No power to prohibit; exception-clear and

present danger
Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71applying the "clear and present
danger" test, denial of permit to hold
rally at Plaza Miranda on the ground
that the political passions are high,

4.

Right prevails over the mere property

right of employers PBM Employees v.
Phil Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

22

Sec. 5 Art. III

"No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession
and
worship,
without
discrimination
or
preference, shall forever be allowed.

Free-Exercise Clause cases

American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, 101 Phil 398- requiring
permit to sell bible and other
religious literature an infringement
of
religious
freedom;
TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF
FINANCE, 249 SCRA 628-VAT to
sale of bibles so incidental as to
make it difficult to differentiate it
from any other economic imposition
that might make the right to
disseminate religious doctrines
costly.

No religious test shall be required for the

exercise of civil or political rights."
Sec. 6 Art. II - The separation of Church
and State shall be inviolable."
A. MEANING - Religion:
"any specific system of belief, worship,
conduct often involving a code of ethics and
philosophy"(Webster); "a profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator"(Aglipay v. Ruiz, supra)

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205

(1972)

Ebranilag v. Div. Supt. Of Cebu,

219 SCRA 256- abrogated the
ruling in Gerona v. Secretary, 106
Phil 11 where Flag salute law
upheld vs. Right of Jehovah's
witnesses; (see also ruling dated
Dec. 29, 1995) on the Motion for
Reconsideration

German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA

514 - The invocation of the right
must be in good faith

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope

Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974)-free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to
contract rights

INK v. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1 characterizing as "gimmick" the

support given by the INK to its
members in a rape case freedom of
religion demands respect for every
creed

B. Aspects the freedom: Cantwell v.

Connecticut (310 US 296, 1940)
1. Freedom to believe
2. Freedom to act on one's belief
Employment Division v. Smith, 494
US 872 (1990)
Separation of Church and State
Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651
(August 4, 2003)
Non-establishment clause cases
Everson v. Board of Education,
330 US 1, (1947) reimbursement of
transportation expenses incidentally
supports parochial schools-valid

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil 201 (1937)

- commemorative postage stamps on
the
International
Eucharistic
Congress; incidental benefit.
Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510statue not acquired with public
funds raised by taxation.
23

Imbong v. Ochoa, supra

C. Cases:

Religious test
Pamil v. Teleron, 11/20/78 prohibiting
ecclesiastics
from
running in any municipal elective
office.

Abode
Rubi v. Prov. Board of Mindoro,
39 Phil 660 - reservation for nonchristian tribe;

Prior Restraint-Clear and Present Danger

test
INK v. MTCRB- 7/26/96-any
restraint can only be justified only
on the ground that there is clear and
present danger of an evil that the
State has the right to prevent.
Eccleastical intramurals-judiciary
Long v. Basa, 9/27/01-expulsion
from membership from the church
as provide by its by laws without
notice and hearing is pure
ecclesiastical matter.

Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil

778-170 women of ill repute to
Davao

Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851domestic cannot be compelled to

stay (MORAL DURESS) even if
she had not worked the advances
made by her employment agency.

Travel
Kwong v. PCGG, 12/7/87passports of alien investors owning
33% of a sequestered firm

Fonacier v. CA, 96 Phil. 417

(1955)-court will interfere if there is
violation of the internal regulations
and it affects property rights.

LIBERTY OF ABODE & TRAVEL

Sec. 6, Art. III
"The liberty of abode and changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law."

Phil Assn. of Service Exporters,

Inc. v. Drilon (supra) - DOLE
Order No. 1 prohibiting deployment
of female domestics in certain areas
abroad

Manotoc vs CA, 142 SCRA 149 hold order against an accused on

bail

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA

669 - ban on the return of Marcos/
(on reconsideration) his body;
-BUT everyone has the right leave
any country, including his own, and
to return to his country. (Art. 13(2)
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights)

Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, 247

SCRA 127-not absolute right to
travel because of criminal cases

A. Purpose: To strengthen individual's

liberty under the due process clause and the
right to privacy
B. Limitations:
Abode- by law & court order
Travel- national security, public
safety, public health (as required by law)
24

against accused. Accused failed to

prove necessity of her travel.

case by case basis whether the

matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects
the public. A public right-Legaspi
v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Sec. 7 Art. III- "The right of the people

to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided
by law."

SCOPE
Peoples right to know the laws.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446

They add that the duty to disclose

this information was vested in the
government when the negotiations
moved from the formulation and
exploratory stage to the firming up of
definite propositions or official
recommendations. CHAVEZ v.
PCGG, GR No. 130716, 12/9/98

Access to names of executive

officials holding multiple positions in
government, list of recipients of
luxury vehicles seized by Bureau of
Customs BUT must comply with
limitations under RA 6713 as to
reasonable working hours, subject to
reasonable claims of confidentiality.
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835,
8/14/00

Voting slips constituting the decision

of the members of MTRCB are not
private nor confidential because they
are made in the exercise of official
duty.
Aquino-Sarmiento
vs.
Morato, 203 SCRA 515

Agreements; including supporting

records/reports. Includes access to
evaluation
reports,
recommendations, legal and expert

PRIOR TO 1973 CONSTITUTION merely

statutory right

Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil 383 compelling register of deeds to

permit examination of his records
relating to sales of private lands to
aliens authorized by statute.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14mun. Mayor has the right to examine
judicial records.

As right under 1973 & 1987 Constitution

Superior to the right of privacy of

Batasan members to their GSIS loan
records. Valmonte vs. Belmonte,
170 SCRA 256

In determining whether or not a

particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. Public concern like
public interest is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace
a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis,
it is for the courts to determine on a
25

opinions, minutes of the meetings,

terms of reference and other
documents attached to such reports
or minutes, all relating to the joint
venture agreement. Chavez vs.
PEA/AMARI, GR 133250, 7/9/02

disclosure is the strong and

sufficient showing of
need.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Section 8, Art. III - "The right of the people,
including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions,
associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged."

Proposed agreement with rebels.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH
COTABATO vs. GRP PEACE
PANEL
ON
ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN, G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008.

Sec. 2(5) Art. IX-B - "the right to selforganization shall not be denied to gov't.
Employees"

Limitations:
1. National security matters;
2. Trade Secrets & banking secrecy
laws;
3. Information
relating
to
apprehension,
detention,
prosecution prior to arrest,
detention, prosecution;

A. CASES:
Purposes not contrary to law
Conspiracy Statute. People vs.
Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)(Anti
Subversion Act)

4. Deliberative process; executive

privilege,
diplomatic
secrets
CHAVEZ v. PCGG, GR No.
130716, 12/9/98

The law may limit the right. United

Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs.
LAGUESMA, 288 SCRA 15upholding Art. 245 of Labor code
prohibiting managerial employees
from forming or joining labor
organizationbecause top or middle
managers are executives who receive
from their employers information
that is not only confidential, but also
not generally available to the public,
or to their competitors, or to other
employees.

Labor; closed shop agreements not

against the right to association; nonimpairment of obligations of
contract. VICTORIAS MILLING
CO. INC.
v. Victorias-Manapla
Workers Org.-PAFLU, 9 SCRA 154

Includes the right not associate on

religious grounds. Victoriano vs.

a. Including
on-going
diplomatic
negotiations
(US RP Base Agreement)
PMPF v. Manglapus (G.R.
No. 84642, Resolution of
the Court En Banc dated
September 13, 1988;
b. offers/counter-offers
in
treaty negotiations are
privileged
even
after
conclusion of the treaty.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO,
558 SCRA 468 (2008); The
standard to be employed in
determining whether there
is a sufficient public
interest
in
favor
of

26

Elizalde Rope Worker's Union, 59

SCRA 54

the non-impairment clause. Lim Sr. vs.

Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 34 SCRA 751(1970)

Automatic membership- in law, contracts

Integrated Bar; dues, In re: Edillon,
84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Homeowners association-PADCOM
Condominium Corp. vs. ORTIGAS
CENTER ASSOCIATION, INC.,GR
146807, 5/9/02;

Contractual exemptionsContractual tax exemptions, in the real

sense of the term and where the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution
can rightly be invoked, are those agreed
to by the taxing authority in contracts,
such as those contained in government
bonds or debentures, lawfully entered
into by them under enabling laws in
which the government, acting in its
private capacity, sheds its cloak of
authority and waives its governmental
immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this
kind may not be revoked without
impairing the obligations of contracts.
These contractual tax exemptions,
however, are not to be confused with
tax
exemptions
granted
under
franchises. A franchise partakes the
nature of a grant which is beyond the
purview of the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution. MERALCO V.
PROV. OF LAGUNA, 306 SCRA 750
(1999)

BUT not compelled membership

without consent. Sta. Clara
Homeowners Association v. Gaston,
374 SCRA 396
Sec. 9, Art. III -EMINENT DOMAIN
(discussed earlier)

NON IMPAIRMENT
Sec. 10, Art. III. "No Law impairing the
obligations of contract shall be passed.
A. Purpose: To protect the integrity of
obligations of contracts
B. Meanings: Law, Impairment, contract

Timber License Agreement, Permits-not

contracts. Tan v. Director of Forestry,
125 SCRA 302 (1983); Alvarez vs.
PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA
444(2009)

law within the meaning of this

constitutional provision has reference
primarily to statutes and ordinances of
municipal corporations.
Executive
orders issued by the President whether
derived from his constitutional powers
or valid statutes may likewise be
considered as such. It does not cover,
therefore, the exercise of the quasijudicial power of a department head
even if affirmed by the President. The
administrative process in such a case
partakes more of an adjudicatory
character. It is bereft of any legislative
significance. It falls outside the scope of

27

Impairment- A law which changes the

terms of a legal contract between
parties, either in the time or mode of
performance,
or
imposes
new
conditions, or dispenses with those
expressed, or authorizes for its
satisfaction something different from
that provided in its terms, is law which
impairs the obligation of a contract and

is therefore null and void. Clemons vs.

Nolting, 42 Phil., 702(1922)

Tiro v. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697Administrative

memorandum
discontinuing assignment of salaries of
public school teachers to their creditors
not violative of the non-impairment
clause.
Creditors have sufficient
remedies.

Examples:
Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil 68 Moratorium law annulled as legislative
undue interference and violative of the
non-impairment clause

SEC. 11. FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS

AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES AN

Ganzon v. Insierto, 123 SCRA 713trial court cannot substitute a surety

bond in place of the mortgage to secure
the loan

ADEQUATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE SHALL NOT

BE DENIED TO ANY PERSON BY REASON OF
POVERTY.

Agrix /NDC v. PVB, 192 SCRA 257Presidential Decree creating the New
Agrix and at the same time removing
the right of the mortgagee on properties
of Agrix to rely on their mortgage,
violative of the non-impairment clause.
There is no valid exercise of police
power since no public interest is served.

See: Rule 3, Sec. 22, Rules of Court

Exceptions to the non-impairment clause

POLICE POWER prevails over the
Clause
Kabiling v. NHA, 12/18/87 - PD 1808
directing the cancellation of sale,
awards, etc is an exercise of police
power in pursuance of the government
housing project.
Ilusorio v. CAR, 17 SCRA 25Subsequent law changing share tenancy
to leasehold
relationship validly
applied to existing tenancy relationship.
Ortigas & Co. Vs. Feati Bank, 94
SCRA 533 -Zoning ordinance as
exercise of police power superior to
contract restrictions

28

information (People v. Ayson, 175

SCRA 216 (1989)

RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER

INVESTIGATION
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) the law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families."

Custodial investigation "any

questioning
initiated
by
law
enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436)

Scope- from taking into custody up

to the filing of the criminal

Scope-rights available even after the

filing of information. People v.
Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995);
Confession was made outside of
custodial investigation, but accused
was already charged in court and in
the process of critical pre-trial stage,
the right applies.
People vs.
ESPANOLA, 271 SCRA 689 (1997)

Includes formal or non formal

investigations- P. v. BRAVO, 318
SCRA 812 (1999)

Before the Bantay Bayan

Barangay Tanods.
People
LAUGA, GR 186228, 3/15/10

INCLUDES an instance where both

accused went voluntarily to the
police station and the investigating
officer started asking questions to
elicit information from them;
belated presence of lawyer 5 days
later. P. v. ORDONO, GR 132154,
6/29/00

or
v.

NO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS

SCOPE:
Not confined to period prior to filing of
information

1. Spontaneous statements-the right

does not exist if the accused gives a
spontaneous statement before he
could be advised. Aballe v. People,
183 SCRA 196 (1990); or confessed
before taken in custody-People v.
Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611; People
v. Tobias, 266 SCRA 229; P. V.
BARRIENTOS, 285 SCRA 221
2. Investigations by: private partiesconfession to newsman People v.
Andan, 269 SCRA 95; or admission
to the employer- People v. Ayson,

29

supra; or to a public officer who is

not a law enforcer. Office of Court
Administrator v. Sumilang, 271
SCRA 316

or communication must be in a language

known to and understood by said person;
2.

He must be WARNED that he has

the right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be sued used as
evidence against him.

3.

He must be INFORMED that he has

the right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent and
competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;

4.

He must be INFORMED that if he

has no lawyer or cannot afford the
services of lawyer, one will be provided
for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or one
acting in his behalf;

5.

That whether or not the person

arrested has a lawyer, he must be
INFORMED
that
no
custodial
investigation in any form shall be
conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been
made;

6.

The person arrested must be

INFORMED that, at any time, he has the
right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means. Telephone,
radio, letter or messenger----with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed),
any member of his immediate family; or
any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national
or
international
nongovernmental organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;

3. Police Line-up- not part of any

custodial inquest.
People v.
Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471
4. Signing a booking sheet- People v.
Morico, 246 SCRA 214
5. Removal of personal items- People
v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615, including
hair evidence from the accused-P. V.
RONDERO, 12/9/99
6. Preliminary investigation before the
prosecutor, not part of custodial
investigation. Ladiana v. People
GR 144293, 12/4/02
PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

IN

In People v. Mahinay, GR No. 122485,

2/1/99, the Court, as guardian of the
rights of the people, laid down the
PROCEDURE, GUIDELINES AND
DUTIES which the arresting, detaining,
inviting or investigating officer or his
companions must observe at th time of
making the arrest and again at and
during the custodial investigation or
interrogation in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and RA
7438 (1992), to wit: (MEMORIZE)
1.

The person arrested, detained,

invited or under custodial investigation
MUST INFORMED in a language
known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be
shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
any; Every other warnings, information

30

7.

He must BE INFORMED that he

has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure
that he understood the same;

8.

In addition, if the person arrested

waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
INFORMED that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;

9.

That the person arrested must be

INFORMED that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with the warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not
yet commenced, or the interrogation has
begun;

10.

the person arrested must be

INFORMED that his initial waiver of his
right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of rights does not bar him
from invoking it at any other time during
the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or
volunteered some information or
statements;

11.

reiterated in 1985 case of People vs. Galit

and requirements under RA 7438)
A. "TO BE INFORMED"
SCOPE:
1. the right includes the right of the
accused to be informed of his right to
counsel, but also that he has the right
to have counsel of his own choice
and must be afforded the opportunity
to exercise it. People v. Binamira,
277 SCRA 232.
the accused was not told of his right
to have a competent and independent
counsel of his choice. He was not
asked if he had any such counsel in
mind, and if he could not afford to
hire the services of such lawyer, and
if he could not, if he would agree to
be assisted by the lawyer provided
for him. He was not informed that
he could waive his right and that the
waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of his counsel. People v.
Agustin, 240 SCRA 541
2. accused was not informed that if
he could not afford the services of a
lawyer, he would be provided with
one. People v. dela Cruz, 9/17/97
3. the right is available even if the
accused is in a foreign land, People
v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432

He must be INFORMED that any

statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

4. the burden of proof as to whether

the right has been given is on the
prosecution . People v. Camat, 257
SCRA 52

(The ruling summarizes the safeguards

provided under P. V. Duero, 104 SCRA 379,
citing Miranda); People v. Deniega,
12/29/95 citing Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,

Insufficient Warning:

31

information from them.

P.
ORDONO, GR 132154, 6/29/00

inadequate
explanation-[P.
v.
Ramos, 39 SCRA 236] (Grade six
grad)

in a language known to him- [P. v.

Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2] (visayan;
answers in monosyllabic opo

long
question
followed
by
monosyllabic answer does not satisfy
the constitutional requirements- [P.
v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465]

meaningful
transmission
of
information- [.P v. Camalog,
1/31/89]

Police line-up not part of custodial inquest (Ibid) ; but in P. v. Hassan, 157
SCRA 261 (2nd div.), the confrontation
at the funeral parlor was tainted police
line-up wherein the right should have
been available, OR the identification of
the uncounselled accused in a police
line-up AFTER the START of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible.
People v. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585
People vs. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660Totality of Circumstances Test in police
line-up

D. "RIGHT TO BE SILENT"
no inference of guilt on silence of the
accused. (P. v. Alegre, 94 SCRA
109; P. V. Arciaga, 99 SCRA 1)

v.

INDEPENDENT:
provided by the investigator and agreed
to by the accused People v. Calvo, 269 SCA 676
People v. Hernandez, 12/4/97
P. V. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393,
deemed agreed when no objection
is interposed.

during the trial, it is counsel not the

court who should apprise the
accused.(P. v. Tampus, 96 SCRA
624)

Provided but not independent:

"RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND

INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL,
PREFERABLY
OF
HIS
OWN
CHOICE."
A. Available at the START of Custodial
Investigation. Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA
642,en banc);

P. V. Matos-Viduya, 9/11/90"nandiyan na po si fiscal kaya hindi

ko na kailangan ng abogado".

P. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 (NBI

provided counsel, not valid) P. V.
Januario,et.al., 2/7/97-lawyer an
NBI applicant;
P. V. Alegria,
9/28/90, P. V. Agustin, 1/25/95
(foisted upon him, not valid); P.
Sahagun, 274 SCRA 208- the
assisting lawyer is following up a
case with NBI

case of municipal attorney-People v.

Culala, 10/13/99; or the Municipal

Burden of Proof- the prosecution should

present
proof
of
competence,
independence of, a lawyer of choice of
the accused.
People v. Santos,
12/22/97
INCLUDES an instance where both
accused went voluntarily to the police
station and the investigating officer
started asking questions to elicit
32

Mayor even if a lawyer-People vs.

Velarde, GR 139333, 7/18/02

He cannot be Special Counsel,

Public or Private Prosecutor,
Counsel of the Police, or a
Municipal Attorney People v.
Bandula, 232 SCRA 565

-counsel failed to explain the legal

consequence of confession to the
accused. P. v. Labtan, 12/8/99

The modifiers competent and

independent were terms absent in
all organic laws previous to the
1987 Constitution. Their addition
in the fundamental law of 1987
was meant to stress the primacy
accorded to the voluntariness of the
choice, under the uniquely stressful
conditions
of
a
custodial
investigation, by according the
accused, deprived of normal
conditions guaranteeing individual
autonomy, an informed judgment
based on the choices given to him
by a competent and independent
lawyer."

Furthermore, the PAO lawyer who

assisted him did not dutifully and
faithfully assisted the accused
during
the
course
of
the
investigation.
The standards of
competent counsel were not met.
People vs. Alberto, 173 SCAD 472,
Aug. 22, 2002

Competent
People v. COMPIL, 244 SCRA
125, The belated arrival of the
lawyer before the actual signing of
the confession does not cure the
defect, because the investigators
were already able to extract
incriminatory statements from the
accused.

must be present and be able to

advise and assist his client from the
time he answers the first questions
asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the confession.
The lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and
the that the person under
investigation fully understands the
nature and consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights.
(P. V.
Bacamante, 248 SCR 47,56)
SEC. 2(a) of RA 7438 provides:
any
person
under
custodial
investigation shall at ALL TIMES
be assisted by counsel.

Preferably of his own choice

People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450
But cannot insist on his
choice.
AMION
V.
CHIONGSON, 301 SCRA
614.

COMPETENT means Effective AND

vigilant from the moment the investigation
starts. A confession given when the
accused was unprotected cannot be
used in court. People v. Lucero,
249 SCRA 425. (P. V. Paule, 261
SCRA 649

WAIVERPrior to 1987 Constitution-Morales

v. Enrile, supra (obiter) ; P v. Galit, supra
(lis mota) ; REQUIREMENT OF WAIVER
APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY-from APRIL
26, 1983, when MORALES case was
promulgated. (FILOTEO vs. SANDIGAN,
263 SCRA 222

33

to be valid, there should be

proof (prosecutions burden) that
the lawyer assisted the accused
during the interrogation, and that
he to the accused explained the
contents and purpose of the
document. People v. Pagaura,
267 SCRA 17

not only against the confessant, but

even against his co-accused as
well. People vs. Delmo, 175 SCAD
873, [Oct. 4, 2002]

Under RA 7438, to be admissible,

an extrajudicial confession in
general must be: 1) voluntary; 2)
made with assistance of competent
and independent counsel; 3)
confession must be express; 4) in
writing.

Recount of the confession by the

investigating officer on the stand is
not
admissible.
People
vs.
LOZADA, 406 SCRA 494 [July
2003]

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Any evidence derived from admissions
obtained in violation of the right also
inadmissible:
Nature of evidence

Receipt of Seized property-People

v. Morico, 246 SCRA 214;

Signature on seized propertyPeople v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256

SCRA 182; People v. Salazar, 266
SCRA 607;

PEOPLE V. ALICANDO, 251 SCRA

293; People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79;

The signatures on the letters seized

from accused not admissible as
admission due to absence of counsel,
but the letters themselves were taken
as fruit of the search incidental to
valid arrest.
MARCELO V.
SANDIGAN, 302 SCRA 102
(1999);

BUT in P. V. LINSANGAN, 195 SCRA

784 (1991), although the accused was not
assisted by counsel when he initialed the
P10 bills the police found tucked in his
waist, it was held that the right against self
incrimination or his Miranda rights are not
violated, because the possession of the
marked bills did not constitute a crime, the
subject of prosecution being his act of
selling marijuana cigarettes. Note: more of
search incidental to a valid arrest.

34

Verbal and non-verbal: applies to

both
verbal
and
non-verbal
confession/admission; statements &
pieces of evidence (jewelries) taken
in violation of the rights People v.
Bonola, 274 sCRA 238.

BUT SEE. People v. Malimit, 264

SCRA 167 (1996) the violation of
the rights of the accused rendered
inadmissible
the
extra-judicial
confession made during the
custodial investigation.
The
admissibility of other evidence
(wallet and keys for the victim) if
they are relevant to the issue and in
not otherwise excluded by law or
the rule, is not affected even if they
were taken in the course of custodial
investigation. NOTE: the objection
was on self incrimination grounds

reclusion
perpetua
imprisonment.

But failure to object to confession

given without assistance of counsel,
renders it admissible. People v.
Gonzales, GR 142932, 5/29/02

Confession
through
interpreter
hearsay (interpreter not presented),
P. v. Rapeza, 520 SCRA 596

-where the penalty is 22 years

imprisonment, it is classified as
reclusion perpetua. People. v.
Reyes, 212 SCRA 402

Even if the privilege of the writ is

suspended
Even in capital offense or offense
punishable with reclusion perpetrua,
if the evidence of guilt is not strong

-upon conviction pending appeal in

other offenses with concurring
circumstances (Obosa vs. CA., 266
SCRA 281 (1997) the trend
towards a strict attitude towards the
allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that
judicial
discretionparticularly
with respect to extending bail
should be exercised not with laxity
but with caution and only for strong
reasons. [Leviste vs. Court of
Appeals, 615 SCRA 619(2010),
citing Obosa v. CA]

A. Whether available
1) Available Accused in custody even if not yet
charged - Teehankee v. Rovira, 42
OG 717

Charged for murder but found guilty

of homicide, bail (applied for before
conviction) may be granted. People
v. Plaza, 602 SCRA 457 (2009)

-or upon conviction for other

offenses where the circumstances
under Sec. 5 of Rule 114 are
present

See: Sec. 10 Rule 114, 1985 Rules on

Criminal Procedure

life

2) Not Available
Not as a matter of right; NEITHER a
matter of discretion-upon conviction but before finality
in capital offenses or offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment (P. v. FORTES,
223 SCRA 619)

RIGHT TO BAIL
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.

or

Under Rule 114, Sec.3

-Before and after conviction but
before finality in cases before the
MTC.
-Before conviction by RTC of an
offense NOT punishable by death,

-not available to the military

(COMENDADOR v. DE VILLA,
200 SCRA 80)

35

Extradition- As a rule, not available in

extradition proceedings as they are not in
the nature of criminal proceedings.
Govt. of USA vs. Purganan, 9/24/02,
but
see
Govt of Hongkong Special Adm.
Region v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

B. Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail

Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312

2. penalty for the offense

Chu v. Dolalas, 260 SCRA 309

prosecution should be allowed full

opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt is strong - P. Vs.
San Diego, 26 SCRA 522

Bail hearing mandatory in capital

offenses.
BANTUAS
v.
Pangadapun 292 SCRA 622

a person on bail cannot leave the country

without the consent of the courtManotoc v. CA 5/30/86

A warrant of arrest issued without

recommendation
for
bail
after
cancellation of the bail bond of the
accused on his failure to appear is a
violation of the right to bail. The offense
(Estafa) is not punishable with reclusion
perpetua. Parada v. Veneracion, 269
SCRA 371

1. financial ability
Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1excessive; P1,195,200 for multiple
murder.
Almeda v. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 demanding cash

3. character and reputation of the accused

4. age and health
5. weight of the evidence
6. probability of appearance
7. forfeiture of other bonds
8. fugitive from justice when arrested
9. pendency of other cases

1. DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL

CASESSec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law."

C. Miscellaneous

Meaning of Due Process in criminal cases(procedural protection)

arraignment as condition for the

approval of the bail, otherwise, the
accused may be precluded from filing
motion to quash. LAVIDES vs. CA, GR
129670, 2/1/00

Bail Hearing

trial of a criminal before a court of

competent jurisdiction, for bringing the
party against who the proceeding is had into
court, and notifying him of the case he is
required to meet, for giving him an
opportunity to be heard in his defense, for
the deliberation and judgment of the court,
and for an appeal from that judgment to the
highest tribunal of the state for hearing and
judgment there. US v. Grant, 18 Phil 122
(1910)

Even if the bail is a matter of rightthe fiscal should be notified (Chin v.

Gustillo, 8/11/95

a. Competent court

36

Military Courts have no jurisdiction

over civilians when civil courts are
open and functioning. Ex Parte
Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (1866); Martial
law- due process not necessarily
judicial.
Aquino v. Military
Commission, 63 SCRA 546 (1975);
Overturned Aquino. Olaguer v.
Military Commission, 150 SCRA
144 (1987); Convictions set aside; to
be refiled/retried before civil courts.
Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700
(1987); Acquittal an operative fact
that cannot be ignored. Tan v.
Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990)

-there must extrinsic evidence to

prove that respondent Judge was
motivated by malice or bad faith.
WEBB v. People, GR 127262,
7/24/97

But questions propounded by the

Court for clarification will not
constitute bias. People v. Herida,
3/5/01

BUT SEE- Sec. 3(3) Rule 119 of

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
3. After the witnesses testified on
the desistance, the court proceeded to
convict the accused in rape case
without giving him a chance to
present his evidence. ALONTE V.
JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA
245

People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295

(1986)-bias shown by the judges
belaboring on the criminal record &
tattoo of the accused (even asked
accused whether he was convicted by
the Phil. Mental Hospital)
Presiding justice and prosecution
invited to Malacanang. Galman v.
Sandigan, 144 SCRA 43

2. Order of trial
Alejandro v. Pepito, 96
SCRA 322
Sacay v. Sandigan, 7/10/86

Ignacio v. Villaluz, 90 SCRA 16

(1979)conviction
of
arson
committed to destroy evidence of
malversation;
convicting
judge
disqualified to try malversation case.

-the cross examination of the accused

& witnesses indicated bias. Imelda
Marcos v. Sandigan, GR 126995
10/6/98 reiterating Tabuena v.
Sandigan, 268 SCRA 332

b. Observance of procedures
1. Preliminary investigation
Patanao v. Enage, 121
SCRA 228
Rolito Go v. CA, 2/11/92

-impartial and disinterested tribunal

Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18
(1972)recantation of an extrajudicial statement made before the
same judge who notarized the
statement.

c. Non-publication of criminal laws

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
"Sec. 14 (2) In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved..."
Legal significance of presumption of
innocence
Accusation not synonymous with
guilt People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59
37

Dumlao v. Comelec, 123 SCRA 327

be the informant alone or the

police officer. This proof is
essential to ensure that lawabiding citizens are not
unlawfully
induced
to
commit the offense. [People
vs. Paloma, 644 SCRA
164(2011)]

Who has the "onus probandi";

Proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; moral certaintyo If the evidence is susceptible
of two interpretations, one
pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other his
innocence, the prosecution
failed to overcome the
presumption of innocence,
and thus, appellant (accused)
entitled
to
an
acquittal.People
v.
Maraorao, GR 174369,
June 20, 2012

o sole witness does not inspire

belief. Aguirre v. People, 155
SCRA 337
o defense
is
weak,
but
prosecution is weaker. P v.
Guinto, 184 SCRA 287

o moral certainty of every

circumstance. P. v. Quiason,
78 SCRA 513;

Presumption of innocence in the

order of trial-Alejandro v. Pepito,
96 SCRA 322Sacay v.Sandigan, 7/10/86Sec. 3(3) Rule 119; 1985
Rule on Criminal Procedure

o just like the identity of the

drug
in
CHAIN
OF
CUSTODY RULE under Sec.
21 of RA 9165 as proof of
moral certainty as to the
identity of the drug. People v.
DE GUZMAN, GR 186498,
3/26/10, People v. Umipang,
GR 190321, April 25, 2012

Constitutional presumption v. statutory

presumptions
Presumption of regularity of
performance cannot prevail over the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence. P. v. Flores, 165 SCRA
71

o Under the objective test set

by the Court in People v.
Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999),
the prosecution must clearly
and adequately show the
details of the purported sale,
namely, the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to
purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration,
and, finally, the accuseds
delivery of the illegal drug to
the buyer, whether the latter

38

PRESUMPTIONS
o -Rules of presumptions based
on human experience and
conduct;
not against the
constitutional presumption of
innocence as the legislature
has the power to provide that
proof of certain facts will
constitute
prima
facie
evidence of the guilt of the
accused provided there is a
rational connection between
the facts proved and the

ultimate
fact
presumed.
Hizon v. CA., 265 SCRA
517
o -unexplained flight
o -unexplained possession of a
stolen object

newly retained counsel is present

but not ready to proceed to
unfamiliarity with the case.
Moslares v. CA, 291 SCRA 440
-accused due to language problem
cannot communicate with his
counsel concerning his defense
(People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325)

RIGHT TO BE HEARD
"and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel

Failure of counsel to render

effective legal representation. P. V.
BERMAS, 306 SCRA 135; P. v.
DURANGO, 329 SCRA 758-

A. Throughout from investigation [Under

Sec. 12(1)], arraignment and trial/appeal

In general, the accused showed be

given the full opportunity to present
his evidence

People vs. FERRER, 406 SCRA

658 [July 2003] (right to counsel as
part of due process)

With
assistance
of
counsel
(mandatory) (P. V. Holgado, 86
Phil 752) he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he
does not know to establish his
innocence.

C. No denial of the right on a mere allegation that counsel is

incompetent or gross negligencePeople v. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187;
People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682;
People v. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553

B. There is denial of the right to assistance

of counsel if-

-counsel de oficio did not properly

advise accused-P. V. Hondolero, 72
SCRa 422

Or where accused who failed to

present additional evidence despite
having asked for postponement no
less than 40 times. Maliwat v. CA.,
257 SCRA 718

counsels
carelessly
contrived
procedural strategy results to
injustice.
De Guzman vs.
Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171

D. Right is not waived Even if lawyer failed to appear 4

times but accused always present. P.
v. DIAZ, 311 SCRA 585;

-on gross negligence of counsel

(Reyes v. CA., 267 SCRA 241)

E. But the right does not include plenary

prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent
counsels from representing him. AMION
V. CHIONGSON, 301 SCRA 614.

-counsel is not a lawyer- Delgado v.

CA, 145 SCRA 35
-Court ordered the accused to have
waived his right to present evidence
on account of his absence but his

NATURE AND CAUSE OF

ACCUSATION

39

"to be informed of the nature and cause

of accusation against him.."

Rule 110 Sec. 8 & 9

"Sec. 8. Designation of the offense whenever possible, a complaint or
information should state the designation
given to the offense by the statute, besides
the statement of the acts or omissions
constituting the same, and if there is no such
designation, reference should be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing
it.

no interpreter assisted the accused

during arraignment. People v.
Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653;
But belated arraignment was held to
be valid in P. V. Cabale, 185 SCRA
140, despite arraignment was made
after the case was submitted for
decision

2. The allegations controls;

not the designation- Soriano v.
Sandigan, 131 SCRA 184;

Sec. 9 Cause of accusation - The acts or

omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and
concise language without repetition, not
necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged and enable the court
to pronounce judgment."

allegations in the criminal

information
may
be
supplemented by attachment
thereof. People v. Rosare, 264
SCRA 398; P. V. VILLAMOR,
10/7/98; P. V. SADIOSA, 290
SCRA 92;

The nature of the charge is

determined
not
from
the
preamble but from the recital of
the facts alleged in the body of
the
complaint.
People
v.
Rodriguez, 376 SCRA 408

DUTY
OF
THE
COURT
upon
ARRAIGNMENT- Sec. 6 Rule 116- P. V.
AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315

3. Conviction Accused cannot be convicted of

a different offense that what was
alleged: (People v. Corral, 157
SCRA 678;

A. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED: purposesee P. v. VALDESANCHO, GR 137051,

5/30/01;

Includes the mental competence of

the accused to be arraigned. People
v. Alcalde, GR 139225, 5/29/02

Rape does not include qualified

seduction
(People
v.
Manansala, 273 SCRA 502;

Even a charge of estafa by

issuance of bouncing checks
does not authorize conviction of
BP 22. (People v. Cuyugan, GR
146641, 11/18/02);

B. includes1. Arraignment- part of due process

Cannot be tried in absentia without

arraignment. Borja v. Mendoza, 77
SCRA 422

40

Separate criminal information

for murder and violation of AntiCarnapping Act does not
authorize
conviction
for
complex crime of robbery with
homicide (People v. Legaspi,
246 SCRA 206;

just like:
Malversation includes
Estafa (Sabiniano v. CA, 249 SCRA
241)

illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the

illegal possession of marijuana,
except if the seller was also
apprehended in the illegal possession
of another quantity of marijuana not
covered by or not included in the
illegal sale, and the other quantity of
marijuana was probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the
accused. [People vs. Lacerna 278
SCRA 561(1997)

Qualifying circumstance must be

alleged and proved. People v.
Reyes, 242 SCRA 264o illegal recruitment to large
scale;
People
v.
Evangelista, 256 SCRA
611
o illegal
posssession
(firearm used in the
killing); P. V. PEREZ,
9/24/98;

METHOD PROVEN is different

from method of commission as
alleged:
People v. Ortega, 276
SCRA 166;

Conviction for several counts must

follow the number of counts as
charged in the criminal information

TRIAL
"to have a speedy, impartial and public
trial."
"Sec, 14(2) ..."after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified."
Speedy trial
Read: RA 8493-Speedy Trial Act

Variance with evidence

Conviction for rape on dates other
than what was alleged, violates the
right. People v. Cruz, 259 SCRA
109; BUT SEE: P. v. Flores, 311
SCRA 170-date of rape not essential;
But again, in P. v. Ladrillo, 12/8/99,
on or about 1992 considered not
definite.
In conviction on the basis of conspiracy,
conspiracy must be alleged and proved. P.
v. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360
Conviction for lesser crimes necessarily
included41

starts upon filing of info (P. V.

Orsal, 113 SCRA 226)

if there is unreasonable delayGuerrero v. CA, 257 SCRA 708

Conde v. Rivera, 59 Phil 650- more

than one year of repeated
postponements by the prosecution.

P v. Baladjay, 113 SCRA 284- 11

years of prosecution

P. V. Araula, 111 SCRA 598;

delay in 49 days

no

Tatad v. Sandigan, 159 SCRA 70;

Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745speedy trial

dependent
upon
circumstances

P. v. Laya, 161 SCRA 327; there is

delay in 2 months

dismissal on this ground equivalent to

acquital -Salcedo v. Mendoza, 88 SCRA
811
Impartial trial:
"Cold neutrality of an impartial
judge", must not only be impartial
but must appear impartial,

Cannot
proceed
without
arraignment-Borja v. Mendoza 77
SCRA 420

No plea in absentia (Nolasco v.

Enrile, 139 SCRA 502)

The rule does not prevent

confiscation of the bailbond (People
v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198)

JUDGMENT may proceed after trial

in absentia (P. v. Acabal, 9/23/93)

5. Right to be present at the trial may be

waived, except when his presence is
necessary for indentification Aquino v. Mil. Com., 63
SCRA 546
Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA
273

which was NOT in the ff. cases:

o Ignacio v. Villaluz, 90 SCRA
16
o Galman v. Pamaran, supra
o P. v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295
o Marcos v. Sandigan, 10/6/98

Or during arraignment or promulgation of

decision, except when conviction is for a
light offense.

RODRIGUEZ
v.
JUDGE
BLANCAFLOR, GR 190171,
3/14/11

RIGHT TO CONFRONT
"to meet the witnesses face to face..."

but impartiality is not affected due to

the fact that the judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation was the
one who tried the case.
P. v.
Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120

A. Hearsay rule-Exceptions
B. To afford the accused opportunity for
cross examination-US v. Javier, 37 Phil
449

Public trial
P. vs. Tampus, 3/28/80; hearing at
the Bilibid prisons valid

C. Coverage

Trial in absentia
Purpose of the rule (People v. Salas,
143 SCRA 163)

42

Available during the trial, not in

custodial
investigation-People
v.
Camat, 256 SCRA 52

Combate v. San Jose, 135 SCRA 693

- In cases falling under summary rules,
the right of cross examination still

present and there can be no conviction

on mere submission of affidavits.

Monje, 175 SCAD 635 [Sept. 27,

2002]

The use of a previous decision as basis

for conviction in a subsequent case,
violates the right (People v. Miyake,
9/16/97

COMPULSORY PROCESS
"and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf."

D. Waiver- Even if there is no cross

examination where the right was lost due
to the fault of the accused - Fulgado v.
CA, 182 SCRA 81

Testimony of a witness (who met an

untimely death) against the accused,
admissible although cross examination
was not complete where there was
extensive cross examination and
covered the material points. People v.
Seneres, 99 SCRA 92.

A party who had opportunity to crossexamine a witness but failed to avail

himself of it, necessarily forfeits his
right and the testimony will be allowed
to remain on record. Savory
Luncheonetter vs. Lakas etc. , GR L38964, 1/31/75, 62 SCRA 258.

court entrusting to the accused the

responsibility of bringing to court his
witness despite request for subpoena
(P. v. Berdaje, 99 SCRA 388)

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Sec. 15 Art. III
"the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it."
A. Function: to question and/or assail the
validity of detention or confinement
B. Examples:
1. physical or moral restraint (Caunca
v. Salazar, supra)
2. judgement of conviction where the
court is without jurisdiction

But when the cross-examination is not

or cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party offering
the witness, or to the witness himself,
the uncompleted testimony is rendered
incompetent and inadmissible in
evidence. Ortigas Jr. vs. Lufthansa et
al., GR No. L-28773, 6/30/75, 64
SCRA 610.

3. Further detention is illegal because

of a law or ruling reducing the
sentence for the same crime
committed
by
the
detainee
(Gumabon v. Dir. Of Prison, 37
SCRA 420
4. or that no charges have been filed
before the civil courts despite the
Enrile v. Cruz ruling mandating the
refiling of cases of those convicted
by military commissions. Ordonez
v. Director of Prisons, 8/4/94

The failure of the witness to appear on

the scheduled (4) hearings without
justifiable cause for purposes of crossexamination by the accused deprives
the accused of his right to confront the
witnesses against him. People vs.

5. The confinement by virtue of an

Arrest order issued by judge related
43

to the private complainant by 3rd

degree by affinity, is correctible by
Habeas Corpus. Calvan vs. CA,
341 SCRA 806

Sec. 5 Art. VIII

SC shall promulgate rules providing for
a
simplified
and
inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases.
SC may temporarily assign judges
Maximum period to decide-24 mos. For SC
- 12 mos. For collegiate courts
- 3 mos. For lower courts

C. WHEN NOT AVAILABLE

1. writ not available where the
confinement became legal although
it was illegal from the beginning
(Harvey v. Santiago, supra
reiterating Matsura v. Dir. Prisons,
77 Phil 1050); Velasco v. Larkings,
7/7/95

B. Cases:
Abadia v. CA, 9/23/94 - the right is
available to military personnel
facing court-martial proceedings.
The absence of period of appeal
from the decision of the court
martial to the reviewing body is not
a justification for the denial of such
right.

2. Likewise not available where the

appeal or certiorari is the proper
remedy.
3. Cannot be resorted to compel
husband to live with wife.
ILUSORIO vs. CA, 332 SCRA 169
C.

How obtained:
petition
writ issues as a matter of course
directing the person in custody to
produce the body in court and
show cause the validity of the
detention. (But if the respondent
is a private person, the writ calls
for the immediate placement of
the person under the custody of
the court (Rule 102)

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Sec. 16 Art. 111
"All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies."
A. Constitutional mandate/provisions
toward implementation of the right

44

Unexplained failure to submit

formal offer by the prosecution for
almost 5 yrs. in an administrative
proceeding violates the right.
ROQUERO v. the Chancellor of
UP-Manila, GR 181851, 3/9/10

Delay in deciding the case, violates

the right: (BPI V. JUDGE
GENEROSO, 10/25/95- failure to
decide a unlawful detainer case for
one year and six months); Bolain v.
Occiano, 266 SCRA 203, failure to
decide a barangay election protest
within 15-day period under Sec.
252 of the Omnibus Election Code;
Anchangco vs. Ombudsman, 268
SCRA 301, unresolved case for
more than 6 yrs; DUTERTE v.
SANDIGAN, 289 SCRA 721 more
than 4 yrs.; CERVANTES v.
SANDIGAN, 5/18/99. (unresolved
charge for six years; information
quashed by the SC)

NO UNREASONABLE DELAY IF:

stand. Bagadiong v. Gonzales,

94 SCRA 906 (1979)

Delay is caused by the person seeking

the right (Socrates v. Sandigan, 253
SCRA 773;

o Disclosure of clients identity by

a lawyer [Regala v. Sandigan,
262 SCRA 122 (1996)]

OR DELAY is due to the complexity of

the case -BINAY V. Sandigan,
10/1/99

C. Nature of protection from-testimonial

compulsion
o including giving specimen of
handwritingBeltran
v.
Samson, 50 Phil 570; & signing
receipts of confiscated items- P.
V. Policarpio, 158 SCRa 85;

SELF INCRIMINATION
Sec. 17 No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself."

BUT NOT physical compulsion

o a substance taken from the body
and tested for gonorrhea in a rape
case. US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil
145;
physical
exam
for
pregnancy.
Villaflor
v.
Summers, 41 Phil 62; to wear a
certain clothing and fitted the
accused. P. V. Otadora, 86 Phil
244; or against object evidence
(wallet & personal items of
victim) obtained from the place
pointed to by the accused during
the investigation. Note: the
uncounselled
confession
is
inadmissible but not the object. People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA
167 (1996; Or taking a hair
from the accused. P. v.
Rondero, 320 SCRA 383
(1999).

A. Availability
Available not only in criminal cases,
but also in civil and administrative
proceedings

Effects of Immunity Statutes:

o use immunity; PD 1886 (Agrava
Board)-Galman v. Pamaran,
138 SCRA 294 (1985)
o transactional immunity

B. Coverage:
o Not only during the trial or
proceeding, but also in any
investigation by law enforcement
officers/agencies. People v.
Maqueda, 3/22/95 (abrogating
P. V. Ayson, 175 SCRA
216[1989] )
o Accused may even refuse to take
the stand-Chavez v. CA, 24
SCRA 663

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE- Sec.

18(2)
"No involutary servitude in any form
shall exist except as punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted."

o Premature for the defendant

presented as adverse party
witness to invoke the right in
refusing to take the witness

45

A. Forms: Involuntary Servitude, slavery,

peonage

A. Meaning:
inhuman,
barbarous,
and
shocking to the conscience
(People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA
1299

When applicable:
Caunca v. Salazar, supra
Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4
(1944)

"it takes more than merely being

harsh, excessive, out of proportion,
or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution, .... but
"must be flagrantly and plainly
oppressive, wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the
community." (People v. Estoista, 93
Phil 674)

public duty -In the proper

administration of justice, the Court,
under its coercive power, compel the
stenographer to transcribe the
stenographic notes. Aclaracion v.
Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131

92 years not cruel or unusual; 3 fold

rule -Veniegas v. People, 115 SCRA
79

People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA

682 upholding the restoration of
death penalty by RA 7659

Imbong v. Ochoa, supra

lethal injection not cruel-Echegaray

v. Sec. of Justice, 10/12/98

B. Prohibition not applicable:

punishment for a crime
military service - People v. Zosa,
posse comitatus (power of the
county)- U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil
245(1915)
patria potestas return to work orders - Kaisahan ng
Mangagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco
sawmills, 80 Phil 521 (1948)

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS
"Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it.
Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT

Sec. 20 "No person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
A. Meaning-

(2)The
employment
of
physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the
use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law."

46

1.

It is unlawful to issue a warrant

of arrest on the basis of the allegations
in the criminal complaint for nonpayment of debt. (Adm.- Serafin v.
Lindayag, 67 SCRA 166)

2.

Imprisonment may be had for

fraudulent acts: Lozano v. Martinez,
supra

3.

Subsidiary imprisonment in case

of non-refund of money illegally
obtained, valid (U.S. vs. Cara, 41 Phil
826) note: part of the penalty for the
crime.

4.

The present law however

imposes only subsidiary imprisonment
in case of failure of pay fine and
should not exceed six (6) years.

5.

POLL TAX- a fixed sum levied

upon every person in a certain class
without regard to his property or
occupation.
Case:
People v.
Linsangan, 62 Phil 646 - the
constitutional proviso (1935) was
applied even if the conviction was
pending appeal.

or is necessarily included in the offense

charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall
not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following
instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due
to supervening facts arising from the
same act or omission constituting the
former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver
charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or
information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in
section 1(f) of Rule 116.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY also known as Res

Judicata in Prison Grey
"Sec. 21, No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act."

In any of the foregoing cases, where the

accused satisfies or serves in whole or in
part the judgment, he shall be credited with
the same in the event of conviction for the
graver offense. (7a)

RULE 117
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal;
double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes

A. Act punished by Ordinance and Statute Conviction of an act (unlawful

installation of electrical wiring)
punished by an ordinance, cannot be
prosecuted again for Theft (under
Art. 308 RPC)- P. v. Relova, 148
SCRA 292
B. HISTORY read- People v. Velasco, 340 SCRA
207 (2000)
C. REQUISITES OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY:

47

a. Valid complaint or information

US v. Yam, 21 Phil 67
Cudia v. CA, 284 SCRA 173

should be termination of the

first jeopardy so that the
subsequent charge while the
first charge is still pending does
not call for the application of
the rule.

b. Competent court

Court without jurisdiction

De Guzman v. Escalona, 98
SCRA 619; Cunanan v. Arceo,
242 SCRA 88; military courts
Olaguer v. Mil. Com., 150 SCRA
144;
Tan
v.
Barrios,
10/18/90

a. Conviction- 15 days to appeal; final if

convict starts to serve sentence or waives the
right appeal.

But if the Court is with

jurisdiction but erroneously
dismissed the case motu propio,
the dismissal inures to the
benefit of the accused who may
claim double jeopardy (US v.
Regala, 28 Phil 57)

c. Valid Arraignment

US v. Solis, 6 Phil 676

Plea is withdrawn if
accused starts to present
complete self defense (P. v.
Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119)

there is invalid plea if the

prosecution is denied due
process (Dimatulac v. Villon,
10/12/98)

The
accused
cannot
be
prosecuted for an offense anew
that necessarily includes an
offense for which the accused
was convicted. A motion for
reinvestigation
by
the
Prosecution from a conviction of
the accused for homicide to
modify the offense charge to
murder places the accused in
double jeopardy. Potot v. People
GR 143547, 6/26/02

b. Acquittal- immediately executory Bustamante v. Maceren, 48

SCRA 155

2. Conviction, acquittal, or the case

dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express the consent of the
accused
Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159
P. v. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424
Note: In an en banc (9-3-2)
decision in People v. Pineda,
2/16/93, the SC that there

48

a verbal dismissal is not final

until written and signed by the
judge and may be recalled
(Rivera v. People, 8/30/90)

However under military law, a

decision of military tribunal,
whether acquittal/ conviction/
dismissal
is
merely
recommendatory and subject to
review
by
the
reviewing
authority. Flores v. Enrile,
7/20/82

vs. City Court of Silay, 74

SCRA 247)

Discharge of an accused to be a
state witness equivalent to
acquittal (Sec. 10 Rule 119)
provided he complies with the
conditions of the discharge
(People
v.
Delos
Reyes,
10/22/92) that is he refuses or
fails to testify. But there must be
proof of the refusal or unjustified
failure (Bogo-Medellin Milling v.
Son, 209 SCRA 329 [1992])

o Where the dismissal was

issued with grave abuse, or
in excess
or without
jurisdiction, the dismissal
is void, and no bar to the
reinstatement of the case.
(People v.Pablo, 98 SCRA
301; People v. Montessa,
248 SCRA 641; People v.
Tampal, 244 SCRA 202;
People v. Leviste, 255
SCRA 238; Dela Rosa v.
CA, 253 SCRA 499)

c. Dismissal- without the express consent

of the accused

Failure to object or mere silence

on the dismissal, implied not
express consent

Express consent may be in the

form of:

1)

Verbal conformity
equivalent to express
consent- P. V. Pilpa, 79
SCRA 81

2)

Motion of the accusedEstoppel/ waiver-moving

for the dismissal of the case:
People v. Obsania, 23
SCRA 1249; People v.
Salico, 84 Phil 722

BUT When the first jeopardy was

terminated by the court having
no or having lost jurisdiction

o Prosecutor
failed
to
present additional witness
despite
availability
(Merciales v. CA, 379
SCRA 345)
o as when the judge blindly
relied
on
the
recommendation of the
prosecutor
for
the
dismissal
of
the
information. (CEREZO v.
People,
GR
185230,
6/1/11)

Upon motion of the accused

but no waiver:
o invocation of the accused
of the right to speedy trialEsmena v. Pogoy, 100
SCRA 861

3. SECOND JEOPARDY, for the SAME

OFFENSE- not same act
a. Test: "same evidence test" as a general
rule, when evidence need in one case will
support conviction in the other - US v. Tan
Oco, 34 Phil 772[1916]. BUT THE TRUE
TEST NOW is under Sec. 9 of Rule 117:

o insufficiency of evidence
even if the dismissal is
termed as provisional. (P.

49

fiscal and of the offended

party, except as provided in
Sec. 1 (f) of Rule 116 (People
v. Hon Villarama, 6/23/92)

Whether one offense is identical

with the other; or whether it is an
attempt or frustration of the other; or
whether one offense necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in
the other

Absorption theory in rebellion

(Hernandez ruling as reiterated in
Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA
217[1990]

Doctrine
of
SUPERVENING
EVENT (Melo doctrine)

No identity of offense when the

second offense was not yet in
existence at the time of first
prosecution. (Melo p. People, 85
Phil 766); Scar and deformity was
not yet in existence and developed
only after (P. v. Adil, 76 SCRA 462

but if the exact nature of the injury

was in existence, but due to the
incompetence of the physician, it
was not discovered, the Melo
doctrine will not apply. (P. vs. City
Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637)

Under Sec. 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules

on Criminal Procedure, the ruling in
P. v. City Court, supra, may now be
obviated, there is no double
jeopardy, if:
o The graver offense developed
due to supervening facts
arising from the same act or
omission constituting the
former charge;

o The facts constituting the

graver charge became known
or were discovered only after
a plea is entered in the former
complaint or information; or

Assault upon a person in

authority includes the crime of
less serious physical injuries
(Tacas v. People, 8/31/76);
selling
shabu
includes
possession

In criminal negligence,
what is being punished is the
negligence. Buerano v. CA ,
7/19/82 citing P. V. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (3/29/68); So once
convicted or entered a plea of
slight physical injuries, the
accused could not be tried
anymore of the more serious
crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide and
damages to property arising
from the same act. (note: there
is only one crime of
negligence, hence there is no
application of Art. 48) Ivler v.
Hon. Judge, GR 172716,
11/17/10

act giving rise to several

offenses which may prosecuted
separately
o Issuing bouncing checks may
give rise to two distinct
offenses punishable by BP 22
and by Art. 315 (par. 2, d) of
the Revised Penal Code (Ada
v. Judge Virola, 4/17/89).

o The plea of guilty to the

lesser offense was made
without he consent of the
50

of the court, places the accused

in double jeopardy. Bautista v.
Cuneta-Pangilinan,
GR
189754, Oct. 24, 2012

o Several offended parties. (P. v.

Balasa, 9/3/98)
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY not available:
When the accused is in estoppel
or when the accused waives the
right by moving for dismissal of
the case,
EXCEPT: 1) when the dismissal was on
the basis of insufficiency of evidence or
(2) the right to speedy trial. (P vs. Verra
GR 134732, 5/29/02)
C. APPEALS
By accused- throws out open the
whole case and the appellate court
may impose a higher penalty than
that imposed by the lower court.
[Trono v. US, 11 Phil 726 (1905)]

Prosecution CANNOT APPEALFrom an acquittal (P. v. Ang Cho

Kio, 95 Phil 475[1954]); even if it
ascribes grave abuse of discretion
(circumvention as there is no
showing) P. v. CA, 308 SCRA 687;
To increase the penalty (CB v. CA ,
GR 41859, 3/8/89); Neither can the
private offended part MOVE FOR
RECONSIDERATON
of
a
judgment of acquittal of the SC,
People v. WEBB, GR 176864,
1/18/11.
BUT CERTIORARI-the only way to
nullify an acquittal or to increase the
penalty is to show grave abuse of
discretion. (P. v. Sandiganbayan,
491 SCRA 185; P. v. Dela Torre, GR
137953-58, 4/11/02)

Where STATE denied due

process: due to serious nonfeasance
of
prosecutor.
Merciales v. CA, 379 SCRA
345; or haphazard handling of
the prosecutor Valencia v.
Sandiganbayan, 473 SCRA 279

To increase the penalty where

there is grave abuse. Villareal v.
People, GR 151258; People v.
CA, GR 154954, (both) 2/1/12
(LENNY VILLA case)

Accuseds Motion to withdraw

appeal is subject to approval of
the appellate court. (Teodoro vs.
CA., 258 SCRA 603)

An acquittal on appeal not

effective/valid if appellate court
has no jurisdiction. (Limpangog
v. CA, 11/26/99)

Double jeopardy cannot be

invoked if (1) judgment of
acquittal rendered with grave
abuse
of
discretion;
2)
prosecution is deprived of due
prosess. Ysidoro v. Hon de
Castro, GR 171513, 2/6/12

EX POST FACTO LAW

"No ex post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted. (Sec.22 Art. III)
A. Instances where the law becomes ex post
facto: CALDER v. BULL cited in US v.
Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]

Certiorari
questioning
the
judgment but not the jurisdiction
51

1. Every law that makes criminal an action

done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an action.
Imposing a penalty to an act which is
not criminal at the time of its
commission. (US v. Diaz Conde, 42
Phil 766 (1922)

The protection referred to is not

limited to a former conviction,
acquittal or amnesty. It may also
refer to :
o Refiling of the cases
against the petitioner in the
civil courts, after the
promulgation
of
the
Olaguer ruling (declaring
the military commission
without jurisdiction over
civilians)
would
be
violative of the ex post
facto rule, since petitioners
would be deprived of the
protection to acquittal by
the military commission
which tried them. (Tan v.
Barrios, 10/18/90)

2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or

makes it greater than when it was committed
3. Every law that changes punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed.
Change in the manner of execution
of death penalty from garrote to
hanging US v. Merin, 2 Phil 88,
1903)
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender.

5. Every law which, assuming to regulate

civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a
right for something which when done was
lawful.
o R.A. 1379 cannot applied to affect
properties acquired prior to its
enactment and effectivity (Katigbak
v. Sol Gen, 180 SCRA 540)
6. Every law which deprives persons
accused of crime of some lawful protection
to which they have become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Retroactive application of a law

lengthening the prescriptive
period of a crime. People v.
Sandiganbayan & Paredes, 211
SCRA 241(1992)]

A retroactive application of the

interpretation of BP 22 should not
be made to affect those who relied
on the interpretation made by the
Dept. of Justice. (Co v. CA, 227
SCRA 444, (1993)

Retroactive application of the

aggravated penalty of life
imprisonment for large-scale
illegal recruitment. [People v.
Taguba, 229 SCRA 188 (1994)]

B. Essential nature:

Concern criminal/penal matters

52

Does not apply when the law is

not penal in character, as when:
o

Cases: People v. Ferrer, supra (not a

case of)

Administrative in naturePreventive suspension under

Batas Blg. 195 which was enacted
after the conviction of the accused
and pending his appeal. [Bayot v.
Sandigan, 128 SCRA 383 (1984)]

ARTICLE IV. CITIZENSHIP

A. General
1. Permanent membership in a political
community.
Right to enjoy political rights
Duty of allegiance

Extradition treaty- (Wright

v. CA, 8/15/94); including
probation law-(Fajardo v. CA,
302 SCRA 503)

2. Modes of acquiring citizenship:

o jus soli
o jus sanguinis does not apply to
filiation by adoption
o naturalization

Procedural - Diminution of
the two-step appeal to one in
cases
triable
by
the
Sandiganbayan
merely
procedural. (Nunez v. Sandigan,
111 SCRA 433)

B. Who are citizens of the Philippines?

Jurisdiction - RA 7975
amending PD 1606 vesting on
Sandiganbayan to try crimes
committed by public officials with
salary grade of 27 or higher is
procedural (not penal) and its
retroactive application does not
violate the ex post facto rule.
(Subido vs. Sandiganbayan, 266
SCRA 379)

1. Those citizens of the Philippines

at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
See: 1973 & 1935 Constitution

Non-penal laws such as tax

laws- Assessment of back taxes.
(Sesbreno vs. CBA, 270 SCRA
360)
BILL OF ATTAINDER

According to Cummings vs. Missouri (4

Wall, 277) is legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. If the
punishment is less than death, it is called bill
of pains and penalties.

Phil Bill of 1902, Jones Law,

1916- inhabitants of the Phil.
Who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 (date of exchange
of ratification of the treaty of
Paris), who did not opt in
writing to retain Spanish
nationality between April 11,
1899 and Oct. 11, 1900
(including their children) are
deemed
citizens
of
the
Philippines. (Valles v.Comelec,
GR No. 137000, August 9,
2000)

2. Those whose fathers or mothers

are citizens of the Philippines;

53

Sec. of Justice, 5 SCRA

108 (1962)

a. Must the child be legitimate

to acquire the citizenship of
the father? SEE: FORNIER
et al., vs. COMELEC et. al.,
GR No. 161824, March 3,
2004 ;

3. Those born before January 17,

1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Phil. Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
o This is a transitory provision
o Election
When should the mother be a
Filipino, at the time of birth of
the child, or at the time of
election? At the time of election
according to VILLAHERMOSA
v.
Commissioner
of
Immigration, 80 Phil. 541
(1948)

how (formal-expressly by sworn

statement with an oath of
allegiance to the constitution
filed with civil registry or
non-formal-by participating
in the elections

being elected to public office

(CO v. HRET, 199 SCRA
692 (1991)

participation in election (In

re: Mallare, 59 SCRA 45
[1974])

4. Those naturalized in accordance

with law.
A. Modes of Naturalization
1.
General lawRevised Naturalization Law- CA
473 6/17/39 (judicial process)
2.
Special lawe.g. grant to Fr. Paul
3.
Mass
naturalization law-Phil Bill of
1902

when-within reasonable time (3

yrs.)
o While both the 1935
Constitution and CA 625
did not prescribe the
period to elect Phil.
Citizenship,
election
should be made within
reasonable time which
according to the Opinion
of the Secretary of Justice
is
three
(3)years.
Election made fourteen
(14) years after reaching
the age of majority was
not
valid.
(Re:
Application for admission
to the Phil. Bar, Vicente
Ching, Bar Matter No.
914, Oct, 1, 1999). Held
earlier in DY CUENCO v.

B. Effect of naturalization of a father on

legitimate minor children-

54

in general, the minor children

become citizens of the Philippines.
(CA 473, Secs. 15, 16.

The repatriation of the mother

benefits the child (Talaroc v. Uy, 92
Phil 52 (1952)

On the wife?

o She becomes Filipino provided

she shows by administrative
procedure for the cancellation of
her alien certificate AND she has
none of the disqualifications
found in CA 473. [Burca v.
Republic, 51 SCRA 248 (1973)]

CA No. 473 on naturalized citizens

a.
Cancelled
when
fraudulently obtained
b.
Permanent residence in
country of origin within 5 years from
naturalization.
c.
Petition is found to have
been made on an invalid declaration
of intent, or
d.
Upon failure to comply
with the requirements for education
of minor children, or
e.
Allows himself to be a
dummy for alients

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those

who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural born citizens.

NOTES:
o Possession of an Alien Certificate of
Registration, unaccompanied by
proof of performance of acts
whereby Phil. Citizenship is lost is
not adequate proof of loss of
citizenship. (Aznar v. Comelec and
Osmena, 185 SCRA 703 [1990]

Who are natural born citizens?

including those citizens by elections
or those repatriated when they are
formerly natural born.

o Application for alien certificate of

registration and possession of
Australian passport are not enough to
show renunciation. (Valles v.
Comelec, 8/9/00; see also Mercado
v. manzano., 5/26/99)- where it was
held that dual citizenship as
disqualification under the Local
Govt. Code must be understood to
mean dual allegiance.

Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost

or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.
C. LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
CA No. 63
C. Naturalization in a foreign country
D. Express renunciation
c. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the constitution or laws of
a foreign country
d. Rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country.
e. Cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization
f. Declared as a deserter of the Phil.
Armed forces in time of war
g. Marriage of a filipina to foreigner

IMPORTANT

55

Naturalization
certificate
may
cancelled-if obtained fraudulently
obtained

A decision in naturalization
proceeding is never res judicata. It
can always be re-opened anytime.

o BUT if a) a persons citizenship

be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where he is a party;
b)
the
Solgen
or
his
representative toock an active
part in the resolution thereof; c)
the finding on citizenship is
affirmed by the SC, res judicata
may be set in.
(Burca vs.
Republic, 51 SCRA 248,
reiterated in Valles v. Comelec,
8/9/00)

of application
opinion)

(by

plurality

of

Repatriation allows a Filipino to

recover his natural-born citizenship
(Bengzon III v. HRET, Cruz, GR
142840, 5/5/01)

3. BY DIRECT GRANT BY LAW (CA 63)

Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it.

Taking allegiance with another

country is renunciation (LABO v.
Comelec, 8/1/89)

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.

REACQUISITION
1. By NATURALIZATION
2. By REPATRIATION (for natural born
citizens)
a. Grounds:

The constitution proscribes dual allegiance,

not dual citizenship.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP

o Filipino women who have lost

their Phil. Citizenship by marriage
to aliens. Natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Phil.
Citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity. RA 8171
took effect on Oct. 23, 1995

What are the instances when a Filipino

citizen may possess dual citizenship?

o DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW or

Citizenship
Retention
and
Reacquisition
ActRA
9225[2003].
NOTES
Participation in election is not a
mode of reacquisition of Phil.
Citizenship. (Frivaldo vs. 174 SCRA
245[1989]- In the subsequent
Frivaldo case (257 SCRA 727), it
was held that the effectivity of
repatriation was deemed at the time

56

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or

mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli.

Those born in the Philippines of

Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their fathers country
such children are citizens of such
country.

Those who marry aliens if by the

laws of the latters country, the
former are considered (Filipino)
citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have
renounced Phil. Citizenship.

The disqualification of dual citizenship

under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code should be interpreted as referring
to dual allegiance. Phil. citizenship
may be elected by filing their certificate
of candidacy to terminate the status of
dual citizenship. (Mercado v. Manzano,
307 SCRA 730).

The Congress shall provide a system for

securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

ARTICLE V
Suffrage
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised
by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.

The Congress shall also design a

procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of
other persons. Until then, they shall be
allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections
may promulgate to protect the secrecy of
the ballot

Suffrage- both a right and a duty

Residence
synonymous
with
domicile- that means not only
intention to reside in a fixed place,
but also personal presence in that
place,
coupled
with
conduct
indicative of such intention.

To acquire a new domicile, it is

required that: 1) physical presence in
the place; 2) an intention to remain;
3) intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus non revertendi and
animus manendi) Gallego v. Verra,
73 Phil. 453 [1941]

Disqualifications on the right of

suffrage cannot include literacy,
property, or other substantive
requirements.

Under the ABSENTEE VOTING

LAW (RA 9189), overseas Filipinos
are allowed to vote if they execute an
affidavit to resume actual physical
permanent
residence
in
the
Philippines. Does this not violate the
residency requirement under the
Constitution?
ANSWER:
The
provision under Sec. 2 of Article V
of the Constitution is an exception to
the residency requirement; and (2)
The affidavit merely confirms the
intent of the voter of not abandoning,
or returning to, his domicile.
(Macalintal vs. Comelec et al., GR
157013, July 10, 2003)

SEC. 2.

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