Output for PSEL40 – Fundamentals of Political, Criminal, and Procedural Jurisprudence

Garcia, Keith Nicole V.

BA – PolSci 4
201900090

Political Jurisprudence

I. GR No. 88211, September 15, 1989, Ferdinand E. Marcos et. Al., (petitioners) vs. Raul Manglapus et.
Al., (respondents)

Facts
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii on September 28, 1989. In a
statement, President Corazon Aquino said “… the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country … be it this under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.”
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners.

Issues

Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of the petitioners.

Ruling

The motion for reconsideration was denied. This was because the President has unstated residual
powers implied from the grant of executive power which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution; this
is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental
powers among the three separate branches.

II. G.R. No. 213847, July 12, 2016, Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, and People of the
Philippines, respondents.

Facts
On August 18, 2015. petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was granted his petition for certiorari by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and was ordered his provisional release upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00. Immediate release was directed and the petitioner was released from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful case.

The People had relied on the following grounds for the reversal of decision on August 18 2015,
to wit:
1. “The decision granting bail to petitioner was premised on … a fragile state of health and on
other unsupported grounds unique and personal to him. In granting bail to petitioner on the
foregoing grounds, the decision is unduly and radically modified …
a. The decision openly ignored … the constitutionally-mandated procedure for
determining … a crime punishable for reclusion perpetua … such as plunder can be
granted bail.

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b. The decision also disregarded constitutional principles and relevant court procedures
when it granted petitioner’s request for bail on the ground that he is not a flight risk,
premised on a loose finding that the principal purpose of bail is merely to secure the
appearance of an accused during trial.
c. … the matter of granting bail to the persons accused of crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua …., the decision erroneously held that petitioner should be
granted bail because of his fragile state of health, and because of other unsupported
and debatable circumstances purely personal and peculiar to him, …
2. The decision violates the people’s constitutional right to due process of law since it was based
on grounds not raised in the petition and therefore never refuted or contested.
3. The decision gave preferential treatment and undue favor to petitioner in a manner
inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not Juan Ponce Enrile is entitled to bail.

Held

The court finds no compelling reason to reverse its decision of August 18, 2015. The People were
not kept in the dark on the health condition of the petitioner. He manifested to the Sandiganbayan his
currently frail health, and presented medical certificates to show that his physical health required constant
medical attention.

The imputation of “preferential treatment” in “undue favor” of the petitioner is absolutely bereft of
basis. The petitioner was released due to proper bases – legal as well as factual – for the favorable
consideration and treatment of his plea for provisional liberty on bail. The Court has taken into consideration
other circumstances, such as his advanced age and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect
for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and his individual public and private reputation.

III. G. R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919, Zacarias Villavicencio, et al., petitioners vs. Justo Lukban et al.,
respondents.

Facts

Between October 16 and 25, 1918, Manila City Mayor Jose Lukban had ordered 170 women with ill
repute to be confined to their houses by police force. Then on the night of October 25, Lukban, along with
the chief of police, Anton Hohman, ordered authorities for 170 women, to be shipped to Davao, Mindanao.
The women were given no information as to where they were going, nor reason to protest. The women were
forced into vessels escorted by a Bureau of Labor representative and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. They arrived at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor

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 Output for PSEL40 – Fundamentals of Political, Criminal, and Procedural Jurisprudence
Garcia, Keith Nicole V.
BA – PolSci 4
201900090
and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women
were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.

Simultaneously, the attorney for the relatives and friends of the women presented an application for
habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. The application was made to include all the women who
were sent away to Davao. The application alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by
Justo Lukban, Anton Hohman, and other unknown parties. The writ was granted, and Lukban and Hohman
admitted certain facts to confirm the sequestration and deportation of the 170 women. It was revealed that
the women were destined to be laborers with good salaries on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales.

Issue

Whether or not Manila City Mayor Lukban and chief of police Hohman had the right to deport
women with ill repute.

Held

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. "The law," said Justice Miller,
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of
the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and
makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should
permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

Criminal Jurisprudence

I. G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971, People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Gomez, et al.,
defendants.

Facts

On or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, Jaime Jose Y Gomez, Basilio Pineda, Jr.
alias “Boy”, Eduardo Aquino Y Payumo alias “Eddie”, and Rogelo Cañal Y Sevilla alias “Roger”, as
principals, Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon Y Romero, and Jessie Guion Y Envoltario as accomplices,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design, forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva against her will, and did, then and there

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 Output for PSEL40 – Fundamentals of Political, Criminal, and Procedural Jurisprudence
Garcia, Keith Nicole V.
BA – PolSci 4
201900090
take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the
four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have raped de la
Riva, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
civil code. The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Forcible Abduction
and Rape with sentences to each of them to the death penalty.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case.

Held

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court
applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all
the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed
forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends
of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death
penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, the Court received a formal manifestation that
Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this
development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.

The judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly
and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of
40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

II. G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997, Robin Cariño Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, petitioner, vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

Facts

On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the
possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla. Petitioner was correspondingly charged on
December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered
judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an

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 Output for PSEL40 – Fundamentals of Political, Criminal, and Procedural Jurisprudence
Garcia, Keith Nicole V.
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201900090
"indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21
years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that
no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension illegal.

Issue

Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search valid.

Held

Yes. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than
mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and
ammunition petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense
(illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

III. G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010, Antonio Lejano, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines.

Facts

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved
the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the
fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information
for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.

Issues

Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is
entitled to belief.

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Held

No. The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of the
testimony. In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.

Procedural Jurisprudence

I. G.R. No. 200242 July 17, 2012, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, petitioner, vs. Senate of the
Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., respondents.

Facts

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on
Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188
Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.

Petitioner has cited previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of
petitioner’s appointment as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of
petitioner for "derailing his administration’s mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach
him was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and supporters, including "hidden forces"
who will be benefited by his ouster. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses
imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the
outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the
Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

Issue

Whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction,
which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Held

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BA – PolSci 4
201900090
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence
of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.

The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office.

The present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on
the ground of MOOTNESS.

II. G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999, People of the Philippines, petitioner, vs., Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
respondent.

Facts

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape
with Homicide.

During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion
To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of (1) Steven
Butcher, (2) Debora Farmer, (3) Jaci Alston, (4) Ami Smalley, and (5) John Pavlisin before the general
consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses
in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be
compelled by a subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.

Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals
whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime
charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section
4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in
criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of
discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during
trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the
conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.

Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari6 naming as respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, the People and
private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399, respondent
Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.]
Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a consular officer of the

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Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He has the right to completely and fully present
evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due
process.

Issue

Whether or not Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is Applicable to Criminal Proceedings.

Held

The denial is not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable to the criminal proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of these
witnesses by deposition it to put [a] premium on technicality at the expense of the constitutional rights of
the accused, which this court is not inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or innocence
of the petitioner is bound to hinge heavily upon the testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves
upon public respondent not only to guarantee that accused is given a reasonable opportunity to present
his evidence, but also to allow him a certain latitude in the presentation of his evidence, lest he may be
so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. Finally,
even if respondent's contention is correct, it cannot be denied that the case at bar includes the recovery
of the civil liability of the accused, which normally is done through a civil case.

III. G.R. No. 220598 April 18, 2017, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines and
the Sandiganbayan, (First Division), respondents.

Facts

The Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015;
GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for
insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and
MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and
granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-
prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the
corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well
as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution

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 Output for PSEL40 – Fundamentals of Political, Criminal, and Procedural Jurisprudence
Garcia, Keith Nicole V.
BA – PolSci 4
201900090
of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the
charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to
be informed of the accusation against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime
of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.

Issue

Whether or not the State … failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly
required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of
the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder.

Held

The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.

To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies
in light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of
their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has
thereby limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the
proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their
evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of discretion attending the
denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with the
stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.