RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE

1) Timbol v. Cano 1 SCRA 1271 (Flores)

Facts:
-

Mercedes Cano died in August 1945, leaving her son Florante, then only 11
years old, as her only heir. In 1946, Jose Cano, brother of the deceased, was
appointed as administrator of Mercedes estate.
In 1951, upon motion of the administrator, the court imposing several conditions
approved the lease of several parcels of agricultural land to the administrator.
The proceeds of the lease were to be used for the maintenance of the minor child
of the deceased.
In 1956, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the child
Florante, the court approved the reduction of the annual rental from 4,000 to
2,000, and the conversion of a 30 hectare parcel into a subdivision.
In 1957 a project of partition, designating Florante as the sole and exclusive heir
was approved. Florante was the appointed administrator of the estate, in place of
Jose. Florante then sought to enlarge the proposed subdivision plan.
Cano objected contending the enlargement of the proposed subdivision plan
would reduce the area of the lands leased to him. The court granted Florantes
motion and held that Canos lease contracts were illegal under Art 1626 (person
disqualified to buy are also disqualified to lease) and Art 1491 (3) (administrators
cannot acquire property under the administration) of the Civil Code. Hence this
appeal. Cano contend that only a court of general jurisdiction can annul his rights
under the contract.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to invalidate the lease
Held: Yes
In probate proceedings the court 1) orders the probate of a will (sec 5 rule 80) 2)
grants letters of administration to the party best qualified ( sec 6 rule 80) 3)
supervises and controls all acts of administration and hears and approves all
claims against the estate (sec 13 rule 87) 4) orders the payment of debts (sec 14
rule 89) 5) authorizes the sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real property
(sec 2 rule 90) and 6) directs the delivery of property to persons entitled (sec 1,
rule 91).
A court acts as a trustee and as such should jealously guard the estate and see
that is wisely and economically administered not dissipated. If the probate court
has the right to approve the lease, it may order its revocation or reduction of the
subject matter of the lease. Canos contention that with the approval of the
partition the court has lost jurisdiction is untenable. A probate court loses
jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all debts, the remaining
estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The debts have not
been paid and the estate has not yet been delivered to the heirs.
2) Jaucian v. Querol 38 Phil 707 (Flores)
Facts:

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In October, 1908, Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero executed a private

writing in which they acknowledged themselves to be indebted to Roman Jaucian
in the sum of P13,332.33.
The writing indicates that they jointly and severally acknowledge their
indebtedness with an interest of 10 % per annum
Rogero signed this document in the capacity of surety for Dayandante however
as clearly seen is the document the former bound himself solidarily and nothing
in the terms show that he did only as surety
Rogero filed a action against Jaucian claiming her signature was procured by
fraud, while Jaucian asked for the payment of the claim which had matured
The Trial Court ruled for Rogero, Jaucian appealed and during the pendency of
such appeal Rogero died and was substituted by her administrator Querol, the
SC reversed the judgment of the trial court and ruled that Jaucians claim was
valid
However, during the pendency of the above appeal after Querol was made
administrator and the committee on claims made its first report on Sept 3,
1912. Only one and a half years after said report was given, did Jaucian
enter an appearance in the estate proceedings petitioning for execution of the
private document plus 10% interest (claiming that Dayandante principal debtor
was insolvent)
Querol opposed claiming that more than 18 months had past from the filing of
the report of the committee and the court was w/o jurisdiction to entertain
the demand of Jaucian. After hearing, the court suggested or stated that
Jaucians claim was merely contingent and he should have first filed an action
against Dayandante to prove the principal debtors insolvency, so that the
supposed surety estate of Rogero would have basis for subrogation. Jaucian
followed such suggestion, and after obtaining judgment against Dayandante
refilled a petition contending that the order of the court admitted the claim.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the court in its April 13, 1914 order admitted the claim of
Jaucian when it suggested he go after the principal debtor first
2) Whether or not Jaucians claim was contingent, thus presentation of the claim
within the prescribed period was unnecessary?
Held: No to both
1)
2)

It was not a final order, and not appealable. There were no rights conferred by
said order that precludes the administrator from making an opposition when the
petition was renewed.
Jaucian claims that the deceased was merely a surety, and his claim was
contingent. According to the code of civil procedure such claims "may be
presented with the proof to the committee," and it follows that such presentation
is optional. He further contends that if a creditor holding a contingent claim does
not see fit to avail himself of the privilege thus provided, there is nothing in the
law which says that his claim is barred or prescribed, and that such creditor,
under section 748 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at any time within two years
from the time allowed other creditors to present their claims, may, if his claim
becomes absolute within that period present it to the court for allowance.

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However, the court gave more credence to the contention of Querol that
contingent claims like absolute claims are barred for non-presentation to
the committee and that the claim in question was in reality an absolute
claim and therefore indisputably barred. The deceased bound herself
solidarily with the debtor, and thus it is clear that she was, after her death
absolutely liable. If the claim had been duly presented to the committee for
allowance by petitioner then it would have been allowed. This not being the
case, Jaucians petition must fail.
3) Cu Unjieng v. Tiaoqui 64 Phil. 569 (Enriquez)
Facts:
Tiaoqui instituted a civil case against Cu Unjieng, Cu Unjieng and Morales (defendants) to
recover P140,000. The court ordered attachment of the properties of the defendant upon a
bond filed Tiaoqui. The defendants filed a counterclaim for P9,050 for losses and
damages incurred because of the suit.
Tiaoqui died while the suit was pending. His intestate proceedings were commenced and
administrators of his estate and commissioners on claims and appraisal were appointed.
The commissioners submitted their report stating that there were no claims against the
estate. The court, then ordered the administrators to present a final account and a project
of partition of the estate. The administrators asked for 2 extensions of the period to
present the final account and project of partition because there were properties and
credits of the estate that were still subject to pending litigations. The court granted both
motions for extension and authorized the administrators to substitute Tiaoqui in the civil
case against Cu Unjieng and company
The administrator finally presented the final account on 28 February but asked for an
extension of the time to file the project of partition still on the ground of pending litigation
involving properties of the estate. The final account was approved and the administrators
were ordered to present the project of partition of the properties not involved in the
litigation within 30 days. The administrators presented the project of partition within the
time given which was approved by the court. The court then issued an order requiring the
administrators to pay the inheritance tax, to deliver the properties to the heirs and verify
payment of tax and delivery of properties to the heirs. After verifying the payment of the
tax and delivery of the properties the court relieved the administrators of their duties and
cancelled their respective bonds and ordered the closing and final filing of the record of
the intestate proceedings.
After some time, the administrators asked for an ex parte petition for the reopening of the
intestate proceedings because of the still pending civil case. The court ordered the
reopening of the intestate proceedings for the sole purpose of enabling the administrators
to prosecute the civil case.
The defendants in the civil case filed a motion to annul the delivery of the properties of the
estate to the heirs and for the return of the said properties to the estate, to answer for the
counterclaim in case it should prosper. The motion was denied and the defendants
appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of the delivery executed by the administrators should be
cancelled and the heirs should return the properties received by them to the estate in
order to answer for the counterclaim of the defendants in the pending civil case when the
latter did not appear in the intestate proceedings and did not inform the court of their
counterclaim and asked for a retention of properties to pay the counterclaim.

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Held: The deed of delivery cannot be cancelled and the heirs are not liable to return the
properties received by them because the defendants did not inform the court of their
counterclaim and they failed to ask for retention of properties to answer for the
counterclaim.
The counterclaim is a claim under Sec. 701 of the Code of Civil Procedure which did not
have to be presented to the committee on claims. The counterclaim is also not a
contingent claim because the obligation sought to be enforced against the deceased and
his estate by the defendants does not depend on an uncertain or future event. The
obligation arose from the time the civil case was filed and the preliminary attachment was
obtained. The term contingent has reference to uncertainty of the liability and not the
uncertainty in which the realization or collection of the claim may be involved. Although
not a contingent claim which needs to be presented to the committee on claims, the
defendants, however, were still duty-bound to inform the probate court, which had
exclusive jurisdiction over the properties of the estate, of their claims if they wanted some
remedy from said court.
The administrators have the duty of informing the court of the claims against the estate.
This duty was partly complied with by the repeated notice to the court that there were
pending litigations involving the properties, one of which is the subject civil case against
the Cu Unjiengs. Such duty, however, was co-extensive with that of the defendants in the
civil case and the latter were not relieved thereof by the conduct that might have been
observed by the administrators. It cannot be denied that if the defendants-appellants
wanted some remedy from said court for the protection of their rights, they should timely
apply to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in
case it should prosper
Hence the court is not duty bound to order the cancellation of the deed of delivery and the
return by the heirs of the properties received by them. The court was not directly informed
of said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was ready for distribution, it
appearing from the report of the committee that there were no debts to be paid and it
being inferable form the record that the expenses of administration, including the
inheritance tax, had already been paid. The defendants remedy is that, after having
obtained favorable judgment in the civil suit, they ask that the heirs contribute in proportion
to the value of the properties received by them, to pay their counterclaim
4) Intestate of Januaria Gonzales 72 Phil 245 (Verzosa)
Facts:
The Court below ordered heirs of deceased Januaria Gonzales to pay the creditor
Sisenando Abarro P800. Since there was no payment, the only property left by deceased
was sold at public auction and awarded to Sisenando as highest bidder. Deed of Sale
provided redemption period. The period expired so the creditor/winning bidder moved to
get a final deed of sale. Respondent Tomasa de Guia opposed, alleging that she delivered
redemption money to sheriff. Allegation proved true so, creditor appealed.
Issue: w/n Tomasa de Guia has a right to redeem property of deceased sold at public
auction to the creditor?
Held: NO, Sheriffs sale valid, sale made to creditor is final.
-In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by
the probate court for payment of debts are final and are not subject to legal redemption.
Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the

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sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person. (sorry, puro Spanish yung
ratio, eh.)
-Purchaser acted undoubtedly under erroneous impression that legal redemption was
valid, accepting thus the deed w/o objections. But, General Rule: no estoppel attaches to
validate a contract or any part thereof that is contrary to law.
5) Echaus v. Blanco 179 SCRA 704 (Tan, E.)
Facts:
Echaus, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased father Luis Puetevella, filed a
complaint against CN Hodges for accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta
Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits as remaining assets of their business
and the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary damages (money claim, civil
case). During the pendency of the case, CN Hodges died. The court then ordered the
substitution of PCIBank, as administrator of the estate of CN Hodges, as party defendant.
No objection to the order was interposed by PCIBank, neither was there a motion to
dismiss filed by counsel of CN Hodges.
Meanwhile, a petition for settlement of the estate of CN Hodges was instituted before the
CFI of Iloilo. A notice to creditors was duly filed.
Later, a judgment on the civil case was rendered in favor of Echaus. The court issued a
writ of execution, but it was not enforced because Echaus opted to file a motion for the
payment of judgment. The latter motion was not acted upon because it was opposed by
Magno, the administratrix of the wife of CN Hodges. Magnos opposition, motion for
intervention, petition for review, petition for certiorari and mandamus were all denied by
the proper courts. Anent such denial, Echauss motion for payment still was not acted
upon because it was thereafter blocked by a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Supreme Court. Echaus then filed this petition for mandamus.
Issues/Held:
1. Whether the civil case, being a money claim, should have been dismissed and
instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of CN Hodges; Whether the death
of CN Hodges deprived RTC of jurisdiction.
NO. Section 21 of Rule 3 is only procedural and may be waived. PCIBanks
failure to object to its substitution as party defendant amounted to a waiver, and
its active participation in the proceedings before the court estopped PCIBank
from questioning the jurisdiction of the said court.
2.

3.

Whether the filing of the motion for payment four years after the publication of the
notice to creditors bars Echaus from claiming from the estate.
NO. Money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such
terms as are equitable. At the time Echauss motion to direct payment on the
judgment credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet.
Whether the properties belonging to the estate of CN Hodges, as being in custodia
legis during the pendency of the settlement proceedings, could be attached for
satisfaction of a judgment, i.e., Whether a writ of execution is the proper remedy to
enforce payment of a judgment.

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4.

NO, unless the attachment is for the purposes of execution of the interest of an
heir. The attachment of the estate itself nor any property therein for the
satisfaction of the claim against the decedent is not permitted by the Rules. The
judgment credit should be admitted as a claim against the estate of CN Hodges,
and the ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the
estate of a deceased person is for the claimant to present a claim before the
probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount
thereof. This was the procedure correctly chosen by Echaus.

Whether an order to direct payment of a judgment credit as a claim against the estate
of CN Hodges is compellable by mandamus.
NO, for two reasons.
a. The judge was restrained to act upon the motion for payment because of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injuction by the SC.
b. Immediate payment of a judgment as a claim is not a matter of right. A
judgment against the executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due
course of administration, the amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not
create a lien upon the property of the estate, or give the judgment creditor
any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule 86). The time for paying debts (and
legacies) is to be fixed by the probate court having jurisdiction over the
estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18).

RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF

DECEDENT
1) Estate OF Gamboa v. Florenza 12 Phil 191 (Tan, L.)
In the estate proceedings of Luis Gamboa Carpizo, Balbino Jaucian had a claim for
P2,720 secured by a real estate mortgage. The lower court, upon recommendation of the
commissioners, authorized the sale of the mortgaged property and the payment of
Jaucians claim from the proceeds. The property was then sold and Jaucian paid.
Issue: Whether the lower court had the power to order the sale of a mortgaged property to
satisfy the claim of a mortgage creditor?
Held: No. There is nothing giving the court authority to sell the property for the purpose of
paying a specific debt. It may be that the court would have authority to sell the property
for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate, in general.
Also, the notice requirement was not complied with before the sale of the real property,
contrary to the rules.
2) Bonaga v. Soler 2 SCRA 755 (Penaflorida)
3) Vda De Celis v. Vda De la Sanga 93 Phil 909 (Gan)
Facts:
Teofilo Asuncion died instituting as heir his sister Asuncion de la Santa. Ricardo de la
Santa filed a petition praying that he be allowed to file such petitions, pleadings and etc.,
as may be necessary for the protection of his mothers (Asuncion) interest as one of the
heirs of Teofilo. On the same date, Ricardo also filed a motion praying that the

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administrator be compelled to pay the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB) the amount of
P1,600 due from Teofilo.
The Court issued an order denying Ricardos petition to represent Asuncion on the ground
that there was no showing that Ricardo was a member of the bar. However, the Court
abstained from acting on the motion to pay AIB P1,600.
The other instituted heirs of Teofilo later filed a petition in court in order to sell a house and
lot for P350,000. After several postponements, the Court eventually issued an order
authorizing the administrator to sell the property. Asuncion then filed a petition stating that
since the order to sell has not yet been carried out, she prayed that instead of the house
and lot, other personal properties of the estate should be sold. However, this petition was
not acted upon.
Eventually, the property was sold to Luisa de Celis for the price of P320,000.
Asuncion filed a petition to annul the sale of the property on the ground that he was not
notified of the petition for authority to sell. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
annulled the sale.
Issue:
Whether the sale may be annulled on the ground that Asuncion was not given notice?
Held:
No the sale may not be annulled.
Objection of one of the heirs to the application for authority to sell a property of the estate,
or her failure to receive the notice of such application, is not a sufficient legal cause to
annul the sale ordered by the court. It appears from the records that Asuncion was aware
of the petition for authority to sell. Moreover, the probate court has authority under Section
4 and 7 of Rule 90 to grant authority to the administrator to sell properties of the decedent
despite objection of one or some of the heirs.
4) De Jesus v. De Jesus 3 SCRA 548 (Verzosa)
FACTS:
Widow Ines Alejandrino, administratrix, filed inventory of deceased Melecio de Jesus
estate in the intestate proceedings. Sister of deceased, Eusebia, filed money claim
against the estate w/c was never heard. Instead, Ines, Eusebia and heirs of another
brother, Cirilo, entered into stipulation of facts where Ines recognized that Eusebia and
Cirilo are co-owners w/ deceased of a parcel of land registered in name of deceased only,
in trust for all the co-owners. Eusebia waived her money claim in an agreement.
Agreements were presented and approved by probate court. Later, Ines was replaced by
her son Leon in the administration of estate. Leon filed action to annul stipulations above
on the theory that they are null and void for lack of jurisdiction and lack of required notices
to interested parties. Trial court dismissed the action based on res judicata and
prescription, so, Leon & co. appealed the order.
ISSUE: w/n questioned stipulations are void and ineffective for lack of jurisdiction and lack
of notice to heirs of deceased?
HELD: YES, stipulations void and ineffective as to lack of notice but probate court has
jurisdiction to approve stipulations.
-Probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve of the stipulations in question, not
only as an incident to its power to exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of

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the deceased, but under Rules of Court, which permits the probate court, whenever the
deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to authorize the
executor or administrator to deed such property to the person or persons for whose use
and benefit it was so held.
-Probate courts empowered to approve stipulations regarding co-ownership of property
held in trust by the deceased: probate court could approve, as it did approve, the
agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common ownership of the
property in question and the trust character of the exclusive title held by the deceased
over the same.
-Probate court empowered to deed property held in trust to persons for whose benefit it
was so held
- However, Rules of Court provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the
administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the
trust only "after notice given as required in the last preceding section"; i.e., that. "no such
conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been
given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has been
given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper." Notice to heirs is
mandatory for approval of conveyance of property held in trust by deceased. No notice =
void. Plaintiffs Leon & co. should be given opportunity to prove lack of notice.
-Appealed order reversed, case remanded.
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE
1) Lopez v. Lopez 68 Phil 227 (Gan)
Facts:
Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of Emeterio Lopez claiming
to be an acknowledged natural daughter and praying that she be declared his universal
heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate valued at less than P6,000. Adela Lopez
filed an opposition and prayed that as nephews and nieces of Emeterio, adjudged entitled
to the property left by him.
Concepcion filed an amended petition alleging that the value of the property should be
P9,000 and hence, cannot be distributed summarily, but thru regular administration
proceedings.
An administrator was appointed and filed a motion for declaration of heirs. The Lower
Court issued an order declaring Concepcion as an acknowledged natural child of
Emeterio.
Issue:
Whether the Lower Court erred in declaring Concepcion as an acknowledged natural child
of Emeterio
Held:
No, the Lower Court did not commit an error.
It is a well-settled rule that a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a
deceased need not maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in
the intestate proceedings by alleging and proving therein his or her status as such, and
climing accordingly the right to share in the inheritance.
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is alleged to be
insufficient. It is said that there is no prayer therein that she be declared an acknowledged
natural child. However, in the body of the petition, there is an allegation that she is a

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natural child of the deceased. Inasmuch as the recognition of her status is a prerequisite
to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared universal heiress implies a like
prayer that she be declared as an acknowledged natural child.
(In this case, the facts used as basis by the lower court for declaring that the petitioner
had been in an uninterrupted possession of the status of natural child was stated,
however, it is in Spanish.)

2) Heirs of Perfecto Santiesban v. Santiesban 68 Phil 367 (Tan,L)

Facts: Benita Lambengco died intestate leaving her husband and children as heirs to her
estate. Ambrosio, the husband/widower, was appointed administrator during the testate
proceedings. Subsequently, the heirs all agreed to a partition. The properties were
delivered pursuant to the partition and all claims were satisfied including taxes.
Ambrosio, upon receipt of his share (eight parcels of land), sold the same to his daughter
Guadalupe. Macondray & Co. questioned the sale alleging it was the owner thereof by
virtue of a foreclosure sale. In a separate case, Macondray was adjudged owner of the
eight parcels.
Two years after the close of the intestate proceedings, Ambrosio moved to reopen the
same because of the prejudice he suffered by virtue of the ruling granting ownership to
Macondray. The court eventually granted his motion despite the opposition of the other
heirs.

Issue: Whether RTC of Iloilo branch 26 can exercise jurisdiction over the case for partition,
recovery of possession of ownership and damages notwithstanding the ongoing special
proceedings in branch 23 of the same court?
Held: No, the RTC of Iloilo lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia's action while the
probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir,
and terminating the proceedings.

Issue: Whether the lower court can reopen the intestate proceedings?
Held: No. The intestate proceedings were terminated upon the settlement of the claims
including taxes and the distribution of the shares of the heirs. This happened when the
court approved the partition.
3) Solivio v. CA 183 SCRA 119 (Chotrani)
Facts:

This case involves the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., who

died a bachelor. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father.

Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with

Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came,
for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to
carry out the plan of the deceased.

So Celedonia carried out the plan by filing a special proceeding

in RTC of Iloilo (Branch 23) for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of
Esteban and she prayed that the court declare her as sole heir and that after payment
of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to
her.

The court ruled in her favor and upon payment of all taxes and
charges Celedonia used the remaining money to set up the foundation.

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Thus "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA

FOUNDATION" was formed and registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission
Four months after, Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration
( in Branch 23) of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased.
The court denied her motion.
Concordia filed one year and two months later in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo (Branch 26) for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages against Celedonia.
RTC (Branch 26) ruled in favor of Concordia and required
Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue

of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator
from his duties
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can
not properly be made an independent action. A separate action for the declaration of
heirs is not proper.
A partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding.
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefore has not elapsed
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received
his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action,
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.

4) Salvador v. Sta. Maria 20 SCRA 604 (Penaflorida)

5) Timbol v. Cano supra (look at rule 88 1st case)

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6) Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental 33 SCRA 252 (Zuniga)

continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Facts:
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No.
6344) alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the
lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition alleging that
Don Juan had executed a Will in Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and
interest to commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private
respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and
on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings,
and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it.
Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the
Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by
said court.
Held:
When the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien (like the deceased) the Courts
of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the
Manila Courts - province and city where the deceased left considerable properties.
A special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will,
is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a CFI it is found it that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice
that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall

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Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or
intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask
for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination
the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court
having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child.
RULE 91 ESCHEAT
1) Municipal Council of Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose 65 Phil (Oberio)
FACTS:
-The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition wherein they claim the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of escheat. Petitioner based right to
escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Jesuit Fathers, hacienda
included, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on to the
Crown of Spain. As a result of the war between Spain and US, latter acquired all
properties of Spain in the Phils. and by virtue of the Tyding McDuffie Law, US ceded to the
Commonwealth of the Phils all properties.
-Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, moved for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to entitle the
applicants to the escheat.
-Carlos Young, claiming to be the lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered
with Colegio de San Jose, intervened and also filed a motion to dismiss.
-The lower court overruled the objection of the Municipality to the appearance and
intervention of Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young and dismissed the petition for
escheat
ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheat should be dismissed
HELD: Yes. According to Sec. 750 (now Sec. 1, Rule 91) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because
they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are: (1) that a person died intestate or without leaving
any will; (2) that he has left real or personal property and that he was the owner thereof;
(3) that he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and; (4) that the
one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where the deceased had his last
residence, or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality where
the property is situated.
Sec. 751 (now Sec. 3, Rule 91) provides that after the publication and trial, if the
court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in
the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled thereto, it may order, after the
payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat, and in such case, it shall
adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last
residence and the real property to the municipality or municipalities where they are
situated. [If the hacienda has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated
to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a

Atty. Ronald

deceased person who has not left heir or person who may legally claim it. From the
moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be
the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose
or the Jesuit Fathers, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Phils by
virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris]
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased
person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal
heirs. It is not any ordinary action but a special proceeding. The proceeding should be
commenced by a petition and not by a complaint.
In a special proceeding for escheat under Sections 750 to 752 (now Sec 1-3,
Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging
to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an
interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. [In
this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young alleged that they have a material
interest in the hacienda (being the owner and lessee). They have a right to appear in the
case or to substantiate their respective alleged rights]
2) Republic v. IAC 148 SCRA 271 (Tan, E.)
Facts:
There was a parcel of land in the City of Zamboanga, registered in 1930 in the name of
Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese national who has not been heard from since the end of
World War II. Under the Philippine Property Act of 1946, the land was supposed to be
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines. The transfer was never made, however, and
the property remained registered in the name of Koyama.
In 1976, the Republic of the Philippines instituted escheat proceedings under Rule 91 of
the Rules of Court against the property, claiming that the owner of the land had been
absent for the past ten years or more and that he may be presumed dead for the purpose
of appointing his successor. It further alleged that the owner left no heirs or persons
entitled to the said property.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals declared the property escheated in favor of the
City of Zamboanga, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 91, that the court shall xxx assign xxx the
real estate to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated.

government not by virtue of the escheat proceedings but on the strength of the transfer
authorized and required by the said Act.
3) Vicenta Tan v. City of Davao 166 SCRA 73 (Lim)
FACTS:

The Republic wanted the property to be under its name, and not under the City of
Zamboangas. Thus this petition for review.

Issue:
Which between the Rules of Court and the Phil. Property Act should apply to determine
the owner of the disputed property.

Held:
The Philippine Property Act, thus ownership should be vested with the Republic. Where it
comes to ordinary real properties the owners of which may be presumed dead and left no
heirs, the same may be escheated, conformably to Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, in favor
of the political subdivisions in which they are located. The said Rule, however, does not
cover properties taken from enemy nationals as a result of World War II and required to be
transferred to the Republic of the pHilippines by the United States in accordance with its
own enactment known as the Phil. Property Act. Such properties belong to the Philippine

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Spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia were residents of Davao City
They adopted Dominga Garcia who married Tan Seng, with whom she had 3
children Vicenta, Mariano and Luis.
Dominga and her children migrated to China
According to petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1995 and left a 1966 sq
m lot., neither she or her children came claimed the lot since their departure for
China.
Cornelia Pizarro, the adoptive parent of Dominga died in 1936, her nephew
Ramon Pizarro occupied part of the land of dominga and collected rentals from
other people who had houses on the land.
Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, informed the Solicitor General
about the land.
An investigation followed as to the whereabouts of Dominga and her children
Ramon alleged that Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga lived in Bacolod Aurelio
Pizarro controverted the statement as to his knowledge Vicenta was in China
ON September 1962, the City of Davao filed for escheat proceedings. The city
alleged that Dominga and her children are presumed to be dead.
Ramon Pizarro opposed the proceedings.
Controversy centers on whether Vicenta Tan is alive. Pizarro tried to prove this
through 1. supposed pictures of the missing heir 2. an extra judicial settlement of
Domingas Estate and 3. A special power of attorney that she supposedly signed
(thumbmarked) in favor of Pizarro.
Pizarro alleged that he met with Vicenta twice, once in davao (where she showed
him her scar an identifying scar on her thigh) and the other time in hongkong and
that she told him to take care of the land.
He also testified that title to the land was given to him by Dominga when she
returned to the Philippines and borrowed money from him.
A witness for Pizarro identified Vicenta as the woman in the photos with buck
teeth, claiming that when he saw vicenta when she was five, her teeth were not
in good form.
There was also an argument that only the SOLICITOR GENERAL can file
escheat proceedings under section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the City of Davao was entitled to the escheat proceedings
Held. YES.

Pizarros statements were inconsistent and ring with untruthfulness

o A woman who he hasnt seen for 43 years will not show him her thigh

Atty. Ronald

It is impossible to identify a woman in the photo in the basis of buck

teeth and that her teeth were not in good form when she was five, we al
know that teeth at that age are only temporary and would be replaced.
o Neither did the court believe that Vicenta coud speak chavacano (Pizaro
said that they conversed in chavacano in hong kong) taking into
consideration that she left the country when she was seven.
o The documents were thumbmarked when Pizarro testified that Vicenta
can actually read and Write.
As to the argument that only the solicitor general can file for escheat proceedings
o THE REVISED RULES OF COURT SHALL NOT BE APPLIED TO THE
CASE FOR TO DO SO WOULD WORK INJUSTICE TO THE CITY OF
DAVAO. THE REVISED RLES OF COURT TOOK EFFECT ONLY ON
JANUARY 1,1964, WHEN THE PETITION WAS FILED, THE
APPLICABLE RULE WAS RULE 92 OF THE 1940 RULES OF COURT.
o

4) Bermudo v. CA 55 SCRA 8 (Aguinaldo) (CASE NOT FOUND)

5) Republic v. CFI of Manila 165 SCRA 11 (Laurente)
RULE 92 GUARDIANSHIP
1) Francisco v. CA 127 SCRA 371 (Dino)
FACTS:
1. Feliciano FRANCISCO was the duly appointed guardian of Estefania San Pedro
(ward).
2. Pelagio Francisco (RESPONDENT) claimed to be a first cousin of the ward and
petitioned for the removal of FRANSISCO as guardian on the basis of the latters
failure to submit an inventory of the estate of the ward and to render an
accounting. Further, it was alleged that when FRANCISCO sold a land belonging
to the ward for 14K, only 12K was reported in the inventory.
3. An order was made relieving FRANCISCO as guardian. Subsequently, this order
was reconsidered. Nevertheless, the judge ordered the retirement of
FRANCISCO as guardian, on the ground of old age (72 years old).
4. While FRANCISCOs appeal of the above order was still pending,
RESPONDENT was appointed as the new guardian of the ward.
ISSUES/RULING:
1. Whether old age as a ground for removing a guardian constitutes a good
ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal
In this case, YES. There is a need for the retirement of FRANCISCO as guardian
of the ward. This is supported by the finding that the delay of the accounting and
inventory made by FRANCISCO is attributable to his old age. To sustain his
guardianship would be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a
controlling criterion in determining a persons fitness or qualification to be
appointed or retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
NOTE: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character. It is
designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended

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to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward
may personally require. Guardianship involves loco parentis.
In determining the selection of a guardian, the ff may be taken into consideration
by the court: Financial situation, physical condition, sound judgment, prudence
and trustworthiness, morals, character and conduct, present and past history, as
well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of a
guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.
A guardian becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by
mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as
to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office.
2.

Whether the decision ordering the retirement of FRANCISCO was validly

executed pending appeal
YES. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter
of sound discretion on the part of the trial court and the appellate court will not
interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion unless there has
been an abuse thereof. As aptly stated by the lower court, there was need for
execution for an indefinite discontinuance in office (guardianship) would defeat
the intent and purpose of the order relieving the present guardian.

2) Lavides v. City of Lucena 114 SCRA 187 (Dino)

FACTS:
1. Upon the death of his wife, Alberto LAVIDES instituted guardianship proceedings
with the City Court over their 7 minor children. In his petition, he alleged that the
estate of his deceased wife amounted to PhP35, 000 or that an amount of PhP5,
000 would pertain to each child.
2. LAVIDES was approved and appointed as guardian. By virtue of his appointment,
he sold shares of stock belonging to the estate. He submitted the Deed of
Exchange for confirmation and approval of the court.
3. While the confirmation was pending, the new presiding judge of the court
reviewed the records and ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction, seeing as the estate was worth PhP35, 000 and therefore, outside
the jurisdiction of the city court. (*Note that this decision came more than 7 years
after the approval of LAVIDES as guardian.)
ISSUE: What determines jurisdiction of the guardianship court? Value of the estate
(PhP35, 000) or the individual values of the estate of the wards (PhP5, 000 each)
RULING: Individual estates of the wards. Under Sec.1, Rule 92 the value of the property
of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court
has jurisdiction. That property referred to is the individual estate of the minor, so much so
that when there are more than 1 minor or incompetent sought to be placed under
guardianship, what determines which court has jurisdiction is the value of the individual
property of each minor or incompetent.

Atty. Ronald

NOTE: In this case, reference was made to the case of Delgado v. Gamboa. The court
held that the same was inapplicable since in the Delgado case, the amount of the estate
of each individual child was clearly in excess of the jurisdiction of the inferior court. In this
case, the value of PhP5, 000 for each child was well within the jurisdiction of the city court.
What is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent, but the value of the
individual share of each of the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought to be appointed
individually not collectively.
3) Parco v. CA 111 SCRA 262 (Padlan)
FACTS:
1. Francisco RODRIGUEZ is the guardian of the Soledad Rodriguez (ward). With
the authority and approval of CFI Judge (who took cognizance of the
proceedings upon authorization from the Secretary of Justice), RODRIGUEZ sold
3 parcels of land to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista (PETITIONERS). The sale
was made for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of the ward. Titles
over said parcels of lands were issued in favor of the PETITIONERS.
2. More than a year after the sale, RODRIGUEZ sought an order requiring
PETITIONERS to appear before the court for examination on the basis that the 3
parcels of land were allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed
and embezzled. The contentions of RODRIGUEZ may be summarized as
follows:
a. For LOTS 1 and 2: RODRIGUEZ alleges that the transfer of titles in
favor of PETITIONERS was made under a loan agreement and not an
absolute sale, with a further agreement that he could recover the same
within 3 months. It is also alleged that the PETITIONERS have already
sold said lots to another person, and have refused to reconvey the titles
or turn over the proceeds in favor of RODRIGUEZ.
b. For LOT 3: RODRIGUEZ claims that the transfer was made under the
agreement that PETITIONERS would sell the property. It was further
agreed that after having secured a buyer, PhP12, 000 will be paid to
RODRIGUEZ and after the sale, PhP15, 000 will be paid to
RODRIGUEZs agents.
PETITIONERS counter that the transfer of titles was made by deeds of absolute
sale which were approved by the guardianship court.
3. A decision was subsequently rendered ordering PETITIONERS to reconvey the 3
parcels of land to RODRIGUEZ.
ISSUE: Whether the guardianship court had jurisdiction over the determination of title or
ownership of the 3 parcels of land
RULING: No jurisdiction. As held in the case of Cui v. Piccio, where title to any property
said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, the determination of said title
or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the
property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings.
In this case, there is definitely a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the
disputed properties. Thus, this situation requires the determination of title or ownership of

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the 3 parcels of land which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should
be threshed out in a separate ordinary action.
NOTE: In this case, two branches of the CFI of Quezon concurrently assumed jurisdiction
over the proceedings. Branch I assumed original jurisdiction which was later on assigned
to Branch IV (by virtue of the order of the Sec. of Justice to unclog the dockets). When
Branch I issued an order re-assuming jurisdiction over the case, Branch IV actually
ordered that the records be forwarded and returned to the former. However, it
subsequently threshed out the issue of ownership of the parcels of land, which decision is
the subject of the present appeal. This only bolsters that the court no longer had
jurisdiction over the proceedings of the case.
4) Office of Court Administrator v. Gines 224 SCRA 261 (Padlan)
*This case is takes off from the reports of the investigating judge on the matter of an
administrative complaint filed by the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge
Gines, Court Interpreter Flores, etc etc.
The reports basically cover a two year period wherein Judge GINES, worked in cahoots
with his employees of Branch 26 of RTC San Fernando, La Union (FLORES included),
violating procedural rules for failing to conduct a raffle draw for the assignment of cases.
In short, a significant amount of cases (136 total according to one report, and approx 80
according to another) went to the Branch 26 without undergoing the mandated raffle,
contrary to the mandate of SC Circular No. 7.
*The important part of this case for SpecPro is the Courts discussion of one of the special
proceedings which was directly assigned to Branch 26 (fishy-fishy in short), which tends
to prove that GINES is guilty of gross ignorance palpable abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In the guardianship proceedings over Juan LAGMAY, there were glaring irregularities that
were observed:
1. Branch 26 was originally typewritten as part of the caption (remember in
Legforms, dapat blank, kasi subject to raffle.. ). Further, Flores name (Court
Interpreter) was already indicated in the petition.
2. Regina VALDEZ (claiming to be the niece of LAGMAY) filed the petition for
guardianship, alleging that she is a resident of San Fernando, La Union. She
alleged however, that LAGMAY (ward) was presently residing in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. It was also alleged that LAGMAY is an American citizen, single,
childless and a retired seaman receiving pension from the US.

3.
4.

Despite this fact (under the Rules, jurisdiction lies in the court where the minor or
incompetent person resides, see Sec 1, Rule 92), GINES immediately gave due
course to the petition and directed that notices be served, and granted letters of
guardianship in favor of VALDEZ. (*Note: VALDEZ is also the aunt of GINES)
Further, there was no order setting the case for hearing, at a particular date time
and place. No notices were sent to any of the kin or even to Juan Lagmay
himself.
The bond supposedly required from Valdez was not yet filed, but still, Flores
administered oath to the former.

Atty. Ronald

5.

Judge Gines also directed that the person having custody of Juan Lagmay be
ordered to release the latter and turn him over to the special sheriffs, under pain
of contempt. When this person refused to turn over custody over Lagmay, the
judge ordered his arrest (The remedy in this case should have been a petition for
habeas corpus, and not to have the person having custody cited for contempt,
much less arrested).

2.

All in all, it is evident that GINES showed gross ignorance or a brazen and blatant
disregard of procedural laws, grave misconduct, palpable abuse of authority and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He is therefore unfit to continue in the
service.
PS: The other employees were suspended without pay
FOR BIBO RECIT: The other special proceeding mentioned in this case (showing the dirty
nature of GINES, hehe) pertains to the judicial confirmation of the de facto adoption of
Cecilia Averion. According the court, there is no such proceeding pertaining to a de facto
adoption. Thus, in confirming the so-called de facto adoption, GINES carved a name for
himself in history, for no action or proceeding for judicial confirmation of a de facto
adoption is authorized in this jurisdiction. MABUHAY KA GINES!!!
5) Vancil v. Belmes 358 SCRA 707 (Zuniga)
Facts:

Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman, died in the US in 1986. Reeder had 2

children (Valerie and Vincent) by his common-law wife, Helen Belmes. Bonifacia
was Reeder's mother.
In 1987 Bonifacia commenced guardianship proceedings over the persons and
properties of 6-year old Valerie and 2-year old Vincent. It is claimed in the petition
that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate
consisting of proceeds from their father's death pension benefits worth P100K.
Bonifacia was appointed their guardian.
Helen opposed, asserting that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship
Bonifacia alleged Helen was not morally unfit to be a guardian, considering that
her live-in partner raped Valerie several times.
In 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes'
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and
Vincent. The CA reversed the RTC.
In 1998 Valerie turned 18, thus she was no longer covered by the guardianship
proceedings.

Held: As between the mother and grandmother of Vincent, the mother should be his
guardian because:
1. Helen, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that
of Bonifacia to be his guardian.
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Bonifacia,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not
suited to be the guardian of Vincent.

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Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian.
Bonifacia is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. She will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian.
She will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also
qualify as a guardian.
Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents
only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that
there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged
with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty
by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject
to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement,
the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.

6) Katipunan v. Katipunan 375 SCRA 200 (Zuniga)

Facts:

In 1985 Braulio Katipunan, assisted by his brother Miguel, sold a lot/apartment

building to the Balguma brothers. Braulio's title was cancelled and a new one
was issued to the Balgumas.
In 1987 Braulio filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
He averred that his brother Miguel, Atty. Balguma and Inocencio Valdez
convinced him to work abroad. They made him sign a document purportedly
a contract of employment, which document turned out to be a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
He further alleged that he did not receive the consideration stated in the
contract.
He was shocked when his sister Agueda told him that the Balguma brothers
sent a letter to the lessees of the apartment informing them that they are the
new owners. He claimed that the three, with evident bad faith, conspired with
one another in taking advantage of his ignorance, he being only a third
grader.
Twice Braulio moved to dismiss his complaint, which were granted. In granting
his motions for reconsideration (to pursue the case again), the trial court was
convinced that respondent did not sign the motions to dismiss voluntarily
because of his poor comprehension, as shown by the medical report of Dr.
Annette Revilla, a Resident Psychiatrist at the PGH. Besides, the trial court noted
that Braulio was not assisted by counsel in signing the said motions, thus it is
possible that he did not understand the consequences of his action.
The trial court set the case for pre-trial. The court likewise granted Braulio's
motion to appoint Agueda as his guardian ad litem.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that respondent failed to prove
his causes of action since he admitted that: (1) he obtained loans from the
Balgumas; (2) he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3) he acknowledged
selling the property and that he stopped collecting the rentals.

Atty. Ronald

10

The CA reversed the trial court.

Held: The title of the Balgumas should be annulled. It is apparent that the contract entered
into by Braulio and Atty. Balguma is voidable because Braulio is an incompetent.
Since Braulio has a mental state of a six year old child, he can not be considered as fully
capacitated. He falls under the category of incompetent as defined in Section 2, Rule 92
of the Rules of Court:
the word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, can not, without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract manifest a vitiated consent
on the part of Braulio. Undue influence was exerted upon him by his brother Miguel and
Inocencio Valdez and Atty. Balguma. They did not explain to him the nature and contents
of the document. Worse, they deprived him of a reasonable freedom of choice. It bears
stressing that he reached only grade three. Thus, it was impossible for him to understand
the contents of the contract written in English and embellished in legal jargon. The trial
court took cognizance of the medical finding of Dr. Revilla (as an expert witness) who
testified that, based on the tests she conducted, she found that Braulio has a very low IQ
and a mind of a six-year old child. In fact, the trial court had to clarify certain matters
because Braulio was either confused, forgetful or could not comprehend. Thus, his lack of
education, coupled with his mental affliction, placed him not only at a hopelessly
disadvantageous position vis--vis petitioners to enter into a contract, but virtually
rendered him incapable of giving rational consent. To be sure, his ignorance and
weakness made him most vulnerable to the deceitful cajoling and intimidation of
petitioners.

In the Administration Proceeding Mrs. Baluyut was first examined by Ma. Paz U.
Guzman, a psychologist. The latter found that as of September 11 Mrs. Baluyut was "an
integrated well-functioning individual", and "competent enough to understand her Position
relative to the case involving her".
However, the lower court, in the Guardianship Proceeding still issued the
questioned order declaring Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent on the basis of the report of
Doctor Lapuz, without giving notices to the parties, nor allowing the presentation of
evidence, nor the cross-examination of Dr. Lapuz. Only after the issuance of the
questioned order did the lower court require that cross-examination be done, but during
this time, Dr. Lapuz was no longer available for questioning.
Issues:
(1) W/ON the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs.
Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the
administrative proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her
competency to act as administratrix. - - YES
(2) W/ON she was denied due process when the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court summarily declared her an incompetent just one day after it
received the psychiatrist's report and before that report was set for hearing. - YES
Held:
The guardianship proceedings is directed to suspend and await the final
verdict in the Administration Proceeding on competency Mrs. Baluyut to act
as executing or administratrix of the estate. Should it be ruled that Mrs. Baluyut is
competent to act as executrix or administratrix and should there be no other
supervening circumstances that justify the continuation of the guardianship
proceeding, then the same should be dismissed.

(1)

RULE 93 APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

1) Encarnacion Lopez Vda De Baluyot v. Leonor Ines Luciano 72 SCRA 52 (Reyes)
Facts:
This is an appeal by Certiorari from the order of the lower in a Guardianship
Proceeding declaring Mrs. Baluyut incompetent hence requires the appointment of a
guardian.
Sotero Baluyut died at the age of eighty-six years, leaving an estate allegedly
valued at two million pesos. He was survived by Encarnacion Lopez Baluyut (Mrs.
Baluyut), his seventy-five-year old widow. The nephew of Sotero, Alfredo Baluyut filed a
petition for settlement of the estate. In this Administration Proceeding, Alfredo sought to
have Mrs. Baluyut declared incompetent to be the Administrator or Executor. Alfredo then
also filed another petition in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, to
have Mrs. Baluyut declared an incompetent and to place her under guardianship.

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(2)

GR: Is that the Guardianship Proceeding should have original exclusive

jurisdiction of the petition for Guardianship. However, in the present case, Alfredo
initiated an Administration Proceeding and put in issue the COMPETENCY of
Mrs. Baluyut to be an administrator. Hence, the guardianship proceedings should
be suspended and should await the adjudication await the adjudication of the
issue as to Mrs. Baluyut's competency to act as administratrix. The incompetency
to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that
justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person
may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he
could be placed under guardianship. But if a person is competent to act as
executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged
in the law of guardianship.
Due Process was DENIED Mrs. Baluyut because the lower court did not notify
the parties of the filing of the psychiatrist's report, did not give them a chance to
register their objections and did not set the report for hearing as required in
sections 9 to 11, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. Instead, on the day following the
receipt of the report, the lower court declared Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent. Mrs.
Baluyut contends that she was denied due process of law when the
guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency
notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist
Dr. Lapuz. We agree. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored

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11

on clear, positive and definite evidence. Here, what the guardianship court did
was to declare Mrs. Baluyut as an incompetent, and then subsequently schedule
the cross-examination of the psychiatrist. The guardianship court should have
first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut
before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Moreover, the
lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of
the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the
filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and
give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be
present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has
been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in
support of their respective allegations" In the instant case, the lower court
before hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut immediately
subjected her to a psychiatric examination. That unorthodox procedure was not
warranted. Undoubtedly, the lower court could consult a psychiatrist but the
normal procedure is to hear first the evidence of the parties and examine the
prospective ward.
2) Yangco v. CFI of Manila 21 Phil 184 (Aguinaldo)
3) Badillo v. Ferrer 152 SCRA 407 (Singson)
Facts:
Macario Badillo died intestate survived by his widow Clarita Ferrer and 5 minor
children. He left a parcel of land valued at P7,500 wherein the minors inherited a 1/12
share each (P625.00), which is less than the P2,000 mentioned in Article 320 of the Civil
Code.
On January 18, 1967, the widow, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of
the minor plaintiffs, executed s Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the land thru
which it was sold to defendants-appellants spouses Gregorio Soromero and Eleuteria
Rana (spouses Soromero).
On November 11, 1968, Modesto Badillo, sister of the deceased, was able to
obtain guardianship over the persons and properties of the minor plaintiffs, without
personal notice to their mother, who was alleged could not be located in spite of the
efforts exerted.
On July 23, 1970, their guardian caused the minor plaintiffs to file a complaint for
the annulment of the sale of their participation in the land to spouses Soromero and
conceding the validity of the sale of the widows participation in the land, they asked that,
as co-owners, they be allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption.
Issue:
1.) W/N the sale of the shares of the minor plaintiffs in the ownership of the land
which was made by their mother, defendant Clarita Ferrer Badillo, in favor of
the defendant-appellant spouses Soromero valid and binding upon the minor
plaintiffs? NO
2.) W/N the minor plaintiffs, as co-owners of the land in question, may still
exercise their right of redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code? NO
Held:
1.) Rule 93, Section 7 of the ROC provides when the property of the child
under parental authority is worth 2,000 or less, the father or the mother,

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without the necessity of the court appointment, shall be his legal guardian.
When the property of the child is worth more than P2,000, the father or the
mother shall be considered guardian with the childs duties and obligations
of guardians under these rules, and shall file a petition required by section 2
hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable
person.
Although the provision stated above automatically designates the mother as
the legal guardian of the minor plaintiffs without need of any judicial
appointment in case the latters property does not exceed P2,000, the
mother still has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to
the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in the land, as her
powers as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and
cannot include the power of disposition, and she should have first secured
court approval before alienation of the property.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and sale is an unenforceable contract
under Art. 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable unless ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or one who acted beyond his
powers.
Art. 1317. Xxx a contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.
2.) Art. 1623. The right of legal redemption shall not be exercised except within
the 30 days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
civil registry of property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to possible redemptioners.
When the mother signed and received on January 18, 1967 her copy of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, the document evidencing the
transfer of the property in question to the defendant appellants spouses
Soromero, she also in effect received the notice in writing required by Art.
1623 in behalf of her children. On the other hand, guardian of the minor
plaintiffs, Modesta Badillo, was only appointed as such on November 11,
1968. Since the required notice was served on January 18, 1967 and the
offer to redeem was only made after November 11, 1968, the period for legal
redemption has already expired and the appellants cannot now be ordered
to reconvey to the minors that portion of the undivided property which
originally belonged to their mother.

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12

The appellants were ordered to restore to the minors the full ownership and
possession of the latters 5/12 share in the undivided property by executing the proper
deed of conveyance. The appellants ownership over the remaining 7/12 share in the
undivided property is hereby confirmed.
4) Uy v. Court of Appeals 346 SCRA 246 (Oberio)
FACTS:
- The controversy came about when Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. suffered a stroke which
left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Dr Jardeleza, Sr. is the
father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein petitioner Gilda
Jardeleza and father of petitioner Glenda Uy.
-Upon learning that one piece of real property (in Iloilo) belonging to Sr. Jardeleza
spouses was about to be sold, Respondent Teodoro filed a petition for guardianship,
docketed as Spec Pr. No. 4689. It also prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, alienated.
-A few days later, Petitioner Gilda filed a petition docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 4691
regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers
of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same. She averred
the physical and mental incapacity of her husband and the need to urgently sell the
property to defray hospitalization and medical expenses.
-The RTC of Iloilo issued an order finding SP No. 4691 sufficient in form and substance,
and setting the hearing thereof. It rendered a decision finding that it was convinced that
Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot 4291 and improvements was necessary to
defray the expenses. Said Court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by
Petitioner Gilda was pursuant to Art. 124 of the Family Code and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Sec.253 of
the same Code.
-Respondent Teodoro filed his Opposition to the proceedings (SP No. 4691), him being
unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He
also filed a MR of the judgment and a motion for consolidation of the two cases. He
contended that the summary proceedings were irregularly applied.
-While MR was pending, Petitioner Gilda sold Lot 4291 to her daughter Petitioner Glenda.
The latter filed an urgent motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale to which
Respondent Teodoro filed his Opposition.
-Court issued an Order denying Respondent Teodoros MR and approving Petitioner
Glendas motion for approval of the DAS.
- On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the trial court to dismiss the special
proceedings approving the deed of sale, which was also declared void.
- Petitioners filed MR. Denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Gilda as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., who suffered a
stroke rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage
their conjugal property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property
under Art. 124 of the FC and dispose of property with the approval of the court in a
summary proceeding.
HELD: No. in regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation
contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned

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the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, the trial court found that the subject spouse is an incompetent who was in
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, without motor and mental
faculties. In such a case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under
Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the FC may
apply to the wifes administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife
who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guarding under the ROC. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the
wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95 of the Revised Rules of Court,
not a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code.
5) Jardeleza v. Jardeleza 347 SCRA 10 (Concepcion)
Facts:
[Case is the same facts/parties in the previous case Uy v. CA. Only that here,
the court ruled on the merits of substantive law, as opposed to a ruling based
on due process in the Uy case]
Dr. Enresto Jardeleza and Gilda are husband and wife, wed before the Family
Code. Ernesto suffered a stroke, which left him in a coma. Petitioner Tedoro
(son of Ernesto) filed a petition for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his
mother (Gilda). Petitioner Teodoro, however, later filed a motion requesting for
the issuance of letters of guardianship to him instead, on the ground that his
mother considered the property acquired by Ernesto as her own and she did
not want to be appointed guardian. Opposition was filed. TC later on dismissed
the petition for guardianship, offering as sole explanation that the petition is
superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under Art.
124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
W/N Art. 124 of the FC renders the appointment of a judicial guardian over the
person and estate of an incompetent married person superfluous
Held: NO
Art. 124, 2nd Par. of the Family Code
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offeror.

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13

As discussed in Uy (previous case), the situation(s) contemplated under Art.

124 of the FC is one where

the spouse is absent,

spouse is separated in fact
spouse has abandoned the other
Consent of the spouse is withheld or cannot be obtained

Such does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is

incapacitated or incompetpent to give consent, in which the proper remedy is
judicial guardianship (RoC Rule 93).
6) Cabales v. Court of Appeals 531 SCRA 691 (Chotrani)
Cabales v Court of Appeals
Facts:

Rufino Cabales died and was survived by wife Saturnina and

children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.

Brothers Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property

to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8)
years.

Alberto also secured a note (vale) from Dr. Corrompido in the

amount of P300.00.

A year after Alberto passed away leaving as his heirs his wife
and his son petitioner Nelson.

Bonifacio and Albino tendered their share of the payment of

P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of
sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son,
Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.

Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco

and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00

The contract contained the following provision: It is hereby

declared and understood that the amount of P2,286.00 corresponding and belonging
to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the
execution of this instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and
delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.

Later, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit

to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from
respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid
Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto,
i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as
his vale of P300.00.

Petitioners now have filed, a complaint for redemption of the

subject land plus damages against respondent spouses.

In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that

petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering
that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share of

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the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to
consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption.
The trial court ruled against petitioners
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided share to the
property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the
contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds. The
appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of oneseventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights
when she repurchased his share to the property.

Issue: WON the sale to the respondent spouses of the subject property is valid and
binding on petitioners RITO and NELSON who were minors at the time the contract of
sale was entered into?
Held: NO.

Before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By

operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were
transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.

The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the

brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their
pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his
rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife
and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos
mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him.

Art 320 and 326 of the NCC provide that the father, or, in his
absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the
amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to
this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case,
automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any
judicial appointment in case the latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos

Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without

necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or oneseventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos

However as provided by the ROC of 1964, a legal guardian

only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not
include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority.

And according to Art 1403 of the NCC, contracts entered into in

the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers are unenforceable.

Thus, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of

petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification
rendered the sale valid and binding as to him

With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the

contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any
and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and,

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14

if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property.
She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in
its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their proindiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.
RULE 94 BONDS OF GUARDIANS

The plaintiff is the guardian of one Tito Jocsing, an imbecile, appointed by the court to
succeed Jungsay, the former guardian, who absconded with the funds of his ward. The
defendants are the absconding guardian and his bondsmen. The bondsmen appealed
from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P6,000. The bondsmen allege that
P4,400 should be credited in their favor relying on article 1834 of the Civil Code, which
gives to the surety the benefit of a levy (excusion), even when a judgment is rendered
against both the surety and the principal. The P4,400 credit they are claiming is the value
of the property attached as that of the absconding guardian. But all these are in the
exclusive possession of third parties under claim of ownership.

1) Delfin Nario v. Phil American Life Insurance Co. 20 SCRA 434 (Macasaet)
Facts
- Mrs. Nario applied for a life insurance policy with Phil American LIfe Insurance Company
designating her husband (Delfin) and unemancipated son (Ernesto), as irrevocable
beneficiaries, with a face value of 5,000 (20 year endowment plan).
-After 3 years, Mrs. NArio applied for a loan with the insurance company, the proceeds to
be used for the schoole expenses of her minor son.
- The application bore the consent and written signature of Delfin in 2 capacities. 1- as one
of the irrevocable beneficiaries and 2- as the father- guardian of Ernesto.
- The Insurance Company denied the application on the ground that the consent of the
son must be obtained with authority of the court.
- After the denial, Mrs. Nario sought to surrender the policy, but the same was denied for
the same reason as the former.
- Hence a suit against the INsurance Company seeking to compel the latter to grant the
loan application/ surrender of the policy.
- Answer- affirmative defense - the acts of disposition by the parents are not within their
authority.
Issue: whether the parents have the authority to act in behalf of their son considering the
amount of their son's share in the insurance (2,500)
Held: No
- The basis of the amount to be received by the son is measured at its FMV not Cash
Surrender Value (520)
-Art 320 of CC provides- "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property
is worth more than 2,000, the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of CFI.
Rules on guardianship provides- Sec 7. " PArents and guardians- When the property is
lessthan 2000--> the parents w/o necessity of court appointment becomes the guardian.
If greater than 2000--> parents shall file petition for guardianship.
- Even if the basis would be the CSV, still the parents' authority over the estate of the ward
would not extend to acts of encumbrance or disposition, as distinguised from acts acts of
management and administration.
2) Arroyo v. Jungsay 34 Phil 589 (Hosaka)
(this is a 3-pager case but every bit of it is important)
FACTS:

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ISSUE:
Whether the bondsmen should be credited with P4,400.
HELD: NO.
According to article 1832, before the surety is entitled to this benefit, he must point out to
the creditor property of the principal debtor which can be sold and which is sufficient to
cover the amount of the debt.
Court quotes Manresa: As explicitly stated in the article, it is not sufficient that the surety
claim the benefit of discussion in time, nor that in so doing he designate property of the
debtor wherein to satisfy the debt. It is also necessary that another condition be fulfilled, to
wit, that such property be realizable and that it be situated in Spanish territorybecause
the attachment of property situated a great distance away would be a lengthy and
extremely difficult proceeding and one that, if actually not opposed to, yet does not very
well accord with the purpose of the bond, that is, to insure the fulfillment of the obligation
and at the same time furnish the creditor with the means of obtaining its fulfillment without
hindrance or delaysas the surety is the sole person who benefits by the discussion and
the one most interested in avoiding difficulties in its execution, it is he, therefore, who
should designate the property out of which the recovery is to be made
In Hill & Co. vs. Bourcier and Pond (29 La. Ann., 841), where provisions similar to our Civil
Code were under consideration, the court said:
The surety has the right, under certain circumstances, to demand the discussion
of the property of the principal debtor. Where suit is brought against the surety
alone, he may interpose the plea, and compel the creditor to discuss the principal
debtor. The effect of this is to stay proceedings against the surety until judgment
has been obtained against the principal debtor, and execution against his
property has proved insufficient. When the suit is brought against the surety and
the principal debtor the plea of discussion does not require or authorize any
suspension of the proceedings; but the judgment will be so modified as to require
the creditor to proceed by execution against the property of the principal, and to
exhaust it before resorting to the property of the surety.
In either case, the surety who desires to avail himself of this right must demand it
in limine, on the institution of proceedings against him. He must, moreover, point
out to the creditor property of the principal debtor, not incumbered, subject to
seizure; and must furnish a sufficient sum to have the discussion carried into
effect.

Atty. Ronald

15

The property pointed out by the sureties in this case is not sufficient to pay the
indebtedness; it is not salable; it is so incumbered that third parties have full possession
under claim of ownership, without leaving to the absconding guardian a fractional or
reversionary interest without, determining first whether the claim of one or more of the
occupants is well founded. In all these respects the sureties have failed to meet the
requirements of article 1832 of the Civil Code.

Issue: (1) Whether the transfer to San Agustin was void ab

initio?
(2) Whether the transfer was invalid because it was not necessary nor
beneficial to the
ward?
Held: YES to both.

Where a guardian absconds or is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the proper method,
under article 1834 of the Civil Code and section 577 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in
order to ascertain whether such guardian is liable and to what extent, in order to bind the
sureties on his official bond, is by a proceeding in the nature of a civil action wherein the
sureties are made parties and given an opportunity to be heard. All this was done in the
instant case.
RULE 95 SELLING AND ENCUMBERING PROPERTY OF WARD
1) De Pua v. San Agustin 106 SCRA 7 (Gonzales)
Facts:
The spouses Enrique and Maxima died intestate leaving several heirs including Leonora
(insane) who was under judicial guardianship of Eldegardes Yuson de Pua. A Project of
Partition was approved by the court which included Lot 634-A, 632 and 633.
De Pua filed a verified petition, praying for authority to sell Lot No. 634-A. The court
granted the petition on the ground that "the sale of the aforesaid property will be beneficial
to the ward and her minor children because the proceeds thereof could be expended for
their maintenance. Lot No. 634-A was sold to Justiniano San Agustin, for P13,750.00. This
sale was approved by the court and De Pua was directed to deposit with the PNB the
proceeds of the sale.
Mrs. de Pua filed a second petition praying for authority to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633.
However, the true area of the two lots - i.e., eleven (11) instead of only one and one-half
(1-1/2) hectares - was disclosed in this petition. The same day that this second petition
was filed, Mrs. de Pua also filed a "Motion to Approve Sale of Property" because Lots Nos.
632 and 633 had in the meantime been already sold by her to Dr. Justiniano San Agustin
the day before.
Acting on this second motion, the Court denied the petition to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633
declaring that the sale of the property is not necessary or would not be beneficial to the
ward as there was only a recent sale of property. Meanwhile, because the co-heirs
learned thru the sale by appellant guardian Mrs. de Pua to Dr. San Agustin that Lots Nos.
632 and 633 consisted not merely of 1.5 hectares but 11, steps were taken towards the
return of the said properties and they were correspondingly returned to the estate for
proper disposition.
However an amended project of partition was approved by the court which contains a
provision that recognizes the sale to San Agustin. The court rendered an order confirming
the sale to San Agustin and held that the initial order denying petition to sell property void
for being erroneous.

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Ratio:
To start with, it most be emphasized that what appellee asked the court to confirm was a
sale in 1959, or seven years before the filing of said motion to confirm sale, and what is
more, it was a sale which the court refused to authorize in its initial order, for the simple
reason that in its opinion, considering that a previous sale of Lot 634-A for P13,750.00 had
just been approved, it could not see why it would again be "necessary," after just a few
days, "or beneficial to the ward" that the two lots, Lots 632 and 633 should still be sold.
The Court has ruled that under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 96 (now Rule 95) that the
properties of Leonora, the ward of appellant Mrs. de Pua could be sold only under
authority of the guardianship court in Special Proceedings No. 282. Without such
authority, any sale would necessarily be illegal.
The approval by the probate court of the amended project of partition recognizing the
same to San Agustin did not in any degree confer upon Mrs. de Pua the power to dispose
of the lots in question without prior permission of the guardianship court. We hold that
court had no jurisdiction to authorize the sale of any property belonging to an heir who is
under guardianship without first requiring the guardian to secure the corresponding
authority from the guardianship court. Worse, much less could the probate court have any
power to effectively approve a sale of an heir-ward which had, as in this case, been
actually disapproved by the guardianship court.
A guardianship court is designed purposely to see to it that the interests of wards under its
jurisdiction are taken care of by the court's appointed guardian with the diligence and
prudence of a bonus pater familiae. We are not convinced that such standard of care was
observed in the impugned order of the court confirming the sale to San Agustin.
2) Gonzales v. Ordonez-Benitez 181 SCRA 401 (Gonzales)
Facts:
Rodolfo Gonzalez was formerly married to Carmen Rojas. They had four (4) children,
namely: Salvador, Eduardo, Ramon and Pacita.
Rodolfo then married Dr. Luz Dizon. They had two (2) children, namely: Maria Luisa and
Isabel.
Rodolfo and Luz executed an "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and for
Establishment of Separation of Property," for the declared purpose of avoiding "confusion
and or differences among the two sets of heirs (of said Rodolfo Gonzalez) in the
settlement of the estates of the said spouses in case of death." They then filed a petition
with the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila for approval of their agreement.
The children by the first marriage moved for, and were granted leave, to intervene in the
case.

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16

Salvador Gonzalez, the eldest of the four children of the first marriage, instituted in the
same Court proceedings to place under guardianship the property of his father, Rodolfo P.
Gonzalez, grounded on the latter's alleged incapacity "to manage and direct his financial
and ownership status" resulting from the deterioration of his mental faculties on account of
illness and advanced age.

property of the first nuptials and the nature and character of the property acquired by
either or both of the spouses of the second marriage.
3) Pardo de Tavera v. El Hogar 98 Phil 481 (Bisnar)
Facts:

Rodolfo with his wife then drew up a contract for the sale of two parcels of land and cause
the annotation of the sales as adverse claims on the corresponding certificates of title.
Salvador R. Gonzalez himself caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated on the title of
several properties of the spouses. His requests for annotation were based on the
pendency of the guardianship proceeding involving the property of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez.
Rodolfo filed a petition for cancellation of said notices of lis pendens assailing that lis
pendens is not proper in guardianship proceedings. Salvador opposed the petition for
cancellation of the notices of lis pendens. The Court promulgated an Order denying the
petition for cancellation on the ground that, the Court finds it has not been established that
the purpose of the notice of lis pendens is merely for molesting the proposed ward and
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of petitioners, considering especially, the fact
that efforts are being made to dispose of some properties pertaining to the proposed ward.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not cancelling the lis pendens?

Held: NO

Ratio:
The children of the first marriage indisputably have an interest in the property of the first
marriage, as well as in the property of the second. They have a right to allege and prove in
the appropriate proceeding in the proper forum that their father, Rodolfo, had brought
property acquired by him and his first wife into his second marriage with Luz Dizon, and
also that all or certain of the property acquired during said second marriage is conjugal in
character. And they have the right to challenge in the appropriate proceeding in the proper
forum, as they have done, their father's capacity to make dispositions of property acquired
during either of his marriages. The issues necessarily involved are factual, i.e., the degree
of Rodolfo's alleged incapacity; the manner and other circumstances of the acquisition of
the properties during the first and second marriages; the attendance of fraud, or undue
pressure or influence on any dispositions or attempts at disposition by Rodolfo of any
property. Obviously, these issues cannot be resolved without evidence which, to be sure,
may not be received and passed upon by this Court in the first instance. And until these
issues are resolved, there is clearly a need to warn any person interested in any property
titled in the name of Rodolfo, among others, of the pendency of the proceedings which
might eventually result in the invalidation of any transaction made by said Rodolfo
affecting such property.
Whether the person whose property is sought to be placed under guardianship be sole
owner, or co-owner of property is immaterial. If shown to be non compos mentis, any
disposition made by him under either supposition would be equally defective. The
argument that Dr. Gonzalez needs no protection not only because he has no separate
property, but also because he is not at all incompetent is also specious. Precisely, the
chief issues to be determined by evidence before the Court a quo are whether or not Dr.
Gonzalez is indeed incompetent, and whether or not there has been liquidation of the

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Petitioner, Carmen de Tavera was three years old when her family decided to
form a corporation for the purpose of constructing a modern building on a lot that
they co-owned (Carmen was also a co-owner)
Thus all the co-owners traded in their share of the property in exchange for
shares of stock of the company. Carmen who was a minor was represented by
her guardian (also her mother) who petitioned the court to allow her to accept
shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for Carmens share of the property
To facilitate their project Tavera Luna inc (the company) mortgaged the property
El Hogar fil. Which loaned them 1million P and 300k respectively.
The company defaulted on the loan and the property was foreclosed and not
redeemed.
El Hogar was the winning bidder in the auction and acquired the property which it
sold to Berg.
A decade later Carmen filed a action to annul the transfer of her share of the coownership by her guardian to the company.
The Lower courts sided with her and ordered the cancellation of the titles issued
to respondents at least with respect to Carmens share.

Hence this appeal

Issue:
Was the probate courts order allowing the transfer of Pet shares to be transferred to the
company valid?
Held: Yes
a. Pet alleges that the original petition to authorize the transfer was not verified
But the court ruled that Lack of verification of a petition filed in a probate court
for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a minor is not a
jurisdictional defect. It should have been attacked directly not collaterally.
b. The petition did not show the necessity or expediency of the sale.
the court ruled it is not necessary for a grant of authority. To state that the
income is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or maintain or educate
the ward when a minor. It is enough that it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that it is for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or part of it, is sold and the
proceeds put out at interest or some productive security.
c. That the court did not direct the next of kin of the ward and all persons interested
to appear before the court at the time and place specified.
There was already substantial compliance. Since her mother and her uncle and
aunt who where her only next of kin, also transferred their shares to the
company. Next of kin in this context is taken to mean those who are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.
Finally, the hearing on the petition required by the section does not mean that
witnesses must have testified and that evidence must have been presented. If

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17

the court is satisfied that the allegations in the petition are true and the interested
persons and next of kin did not object since they will also benefit from the
scheme, the provision is deemed complied with.
4) Lindain v. CA 212 SCRA 725 (Fernandez)
5) Maneclang v. Baun 208 SCRA 179 (Bautista)
FACTS:

Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo
Maneclang and 9 children.

Petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of
her legitimate children. At the time of the filing of the petition, 7 of the 9 children
were still minors. No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor
children.

Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan City.

The administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition in the

settlement proceeding asking the court to give him "the authority to dispose of so
much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the
petition. Notice was given to the surviving spouse but not to the the heirs of
Margarita.

Despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court authorized the
administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the estate for the
purpose of paying off the obligations

Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate
estate, executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan, represented by
its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion of Lot 203. This sale was approved
by the intestate court.

The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed
thereon a public market. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession
of the property since the construction of the market.

Other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
administrator pursuant of the same authority granted by the court Order.

Some time thereafter, Adelaida Maneclang, daughter of decedent and new

judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, filed an action for the annulment of
the sales made by the previous administrator, cancellation of titles, recovery of
possession and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun,
et al. and the City of Dagupan.

The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale
executed in its favor by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang.

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Evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its
then incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the property to the City
of Dagupan and that the said City has been leasing the premises out to
numerous tenants.

Trial court ruled in favor of Maneclang and annulled the Deed of Sale executed
by Oscar, ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Title in favor of the City of
Dagupan and ordered the City to pay accumulated rentals and to restore the
possession of the land to plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale executed by the judicial administrator to the City of
Dagupan is valid
HELD: NO, sale is null and void

Article 320 of the present Civil Code incorporates the amendment that if the
property under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of
the Court of First Instance. This provision then restores the old rule which made
the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child's property.

Be that as it may, it does not follow that for purposes of complying with the
requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father
is notice to the children. The Rules explicitly state that the notice must be in be
writing and must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court
shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given
to the interested parties.

There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by
a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such
counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the surviving spouse,
Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector
Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not
represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with
no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then,
the requirement of notice was not satisfied.

The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and
essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order
approving it would be null and void ab initio. The reason behind this requirement
is that the heirs, as the presumptive owners since they succeed to all the rights
and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter's death, are the
persons directly affected by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be
deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.

Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order granting the
application for the sale, the sale itself, and the Order approving the sale are all
void ab initio as against said children.

HOWEVER, the Court ruled that there was laches on the part of the children who
were already of legal age when the deed of sale was executed. They should
have taken immediate steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do so for 13
years amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute laches. Accordingly,
the estate is entitled to recover only 5/9 of the questioned property since only 5 of
the 9 children were still minors at the time the deed of sale was executed.

Atty. Ronald

18

RULE 96 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS

1) Parco v. CA 111 SCRA 262 Supra (look at RULE 92 #3)
2) Cui v. Piccio 91 Phil 712 (Sandico)
3) Caniza v. Court of Appeals 268 SCRA 640 (Valdez)

evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or

conveyed away any personal property of the ward. The court has no authority
to determine the right of property or to order delivery it is the duty of the
guardian to bring the proper action.
Only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his
title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery
to the guardian.

Amparo (guardian) brought an action for unlawful detainer against Estrada

spouses in the name of Caniza (ward)- urgent need of the house for support,
maintenance and medical treatment

RULE 97 TERMINATIONS OF GUARDIANSHIP

Estrada spouses- in consideration of their faithful service, they had been

considered by Caniza as family and bequeathed the house and lot to them
through a holographic will
Caniza subsequently died. Estrada spouses questions the right of Amparo to
continue representing Caniza after her death

Facts:
-

1) Ypil v. Salas 89 SCRA 172 (Nepomoceno)

ISSUE: w/n Amparo lost all authority as judicial guardian and ceased to have
legal personality to represent after death of Caniza?
Held: No
The relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of
either the guardian or the ward. However, under Rule 3, Sec. 17 of the ROC:
the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator.
The action, not being a purely personal one, survived Caniza's death and her
demise did not extinguish the suit instituted by the guardian.
4) Daracan v. Natividad 341 SCRA 161 (Valdez)
In a guardianship proceeding of spouses Francisco, Judge Natividad issued a
writ of preliminary attachment against the Daracan spouses.
Natividad issued the order to protect and preserve the property of the ward
based on sworn assertion of the guardian that the Daracan spouses were
indebted to the ward
Daracan spouses filed a complaint against Natividad on grounds of ignorance
of the law, oppression, gross partiality and knowingly rendering unjust order.
ISSUE: w/n Natividad can issue a writ of preliminary attachment in a case of
guardianship proceeding?
Held: No
In proceeding when there are persons suspected of embezzling or concealing
property of the ward the purpose is merely to elicit information or secure

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petitioner as judicial guardian of one incompetent, Yao, filed two original

complaints for annulments of deeds of sale over parcels of land owned by the
principal, Yao, on the ground of fraud and illegality
during the pendency of the case, the ward, Lao, died
the lower court dismissed both cases, claiming that upon the death of the ward,
the guardianship is terminated, and all the powers and duties of the guardian
ceased; hence the guardian no longer had the authority to continue the case
petitioner appeals, claiming that the case is a real action which survives the
death of the real party under Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
it should be noted that the same petitioner was appointed administrator and was
granted letters testamentary in special proceedings

Issue: w/n the lower court was correct in dismissing the cases
Held: no
Ratio:
it may be true as respondents contend that petitioner is the plaintiff in both cases
but this is so only in form and in captions thereof
the real truth and substance of the matter is that as plaintiff, petitioner was suing
as guardian, the legal representative of the real party in interest who is the
incompetent ward and under the peculiar facts of the case wherein admittedly the
real party in interest died during the pendency of the civil cases instituted by his
guardian in his behalf and admittedly also said guardian was appointed thereafter
administrator of the intestate estate of the incompetent ward and issued letters of
administration by the same judge presiding and acting in said civil cases, by the
rule cited above (Sec. 17, Rule 3) finds clear application and implementation
under said aforementioned rule, the court shall order the legal representative of
the deceased in his capacity as administrator of the estate to appear for and in
behalf of the interest of the deceased
it therefore becomes the duty of petitioner to appear as administrator of the
estate and no longer as judicial guardian of the incompetent ward
the captions of the pleadings must thus be amended
there is no necessity of filing new civil actions for it would serve no useful
purpose in the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice since the parties
are already before the court and the issues have already been joined
moreover, the actions or claims survive, being for annulment of deeds of sale of
real property belonging to the estate

Atty. Ronald

19

2) Crisostomo v. Endencia 66 Phil 1 (Nepomoceno)

Facts:
-

petitioner was appointed guardian of one incompetent, Petrona Crisostomo,

while she was confined at the National Psychopathic Hospital
upon her release, petitioner as guardian filed a verified petition asking that the
court declare the that the incompetent had recovered her mental facilities, and
that she was able to take care of her person and to administer her property,
cancel the bond filed by the guardian, and order the termination of guardianship
this petition was supported by a verified statement of the incompetent stating
under oath that she was in good health and had recovered her mental faculties
and was already able to take care of herself and administer her property;
additionally, two medical certificates were also provided attesting that she has
recovered her mental faculties
petition for termination of guardianship was approved
later on, respondent, who was the brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in
the same guardianship proceedings in the same court asking for the restoration
order granted beforehand be set aside and that the case be reopened and a new
guardian be appointed on the grounds that the restoration order was null and
void for being entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent
and without hearing and that the incompetent has not recovered her mentality
petitioner former guardian opposed claiming that the order was final and the
court has lost jurisdiction to reverse
lower court ordered annulment of restoration order

Issues: 1) w/n the court had jurisdiction to grant the petition for restoration; 2) w/n the
annulment of the restoration order was valid
Held: yes to issue 1, no to issue 2
Ratio:
Issue 1
it is beyond question that the judge who took cognizance of and granted the
petition to restore capacity had full jurisdiction conferred by the Code of Civil
Procedure
the procedure followed by virtue of a petition for restoration of competency is
neither new nor independent; it is a continuation of the original guardianship
proceedings
if the court had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the person and property of
the incompetent, it is obvious that it had like jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and grant the petition for restoration which was filed
Issue 2
in order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent
may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under this
section (sec. 562, Code of Civil Procedure), (1) that a verified petition be
presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within
the third degree, or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the
incompetent has recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case
may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same for
hearing and notify the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in the
discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought

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the section does not require notice of the hearing to any other person except the
guardian and the incompetent
in the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by the
guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of
the incompetent
in the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mental
faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement
when she stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties
in these circumstances the only logical conclusion is that the requisites of sec
562 have at least been substantially complied with and that the notice and the
hearing were unnecessary and superfluous
it is true that under the section the respondent could have appeared at the
hearing and opposed the petition, but this right given to him by law is not
absolute in the sense that he is also entitled to a personal notice
his situation is like that of a person who, not being a defendant in an ordinary
action and not having been notified of the complaint, learns of the existence of
the suit and discovers that he has a direct interest in the subject matter of the
litigation; there is no question that he would be entitled to take part therein as
intervener, but he cannot successfully ask for the annulment of the judgment to
be rendered on the ground that he had a right to cited or notified and to be
present at the trial because it happened that he had an interest in the case
the order issued by the respondent judge annulling the restoration order is null
and void because the court was without jurisdiction to enter the same after
accounts of the guardian had been approved, his bond cancelled and the record
of the guardianship proceedings deemed closed and filed away definitely
when the respondent filed his motion asking the annulment of the order, the latter
had already become final and binding upon the parties
the guardianship case was no longer before the court because the accounts of
the guardian had been definitely approved, his bond had been cancelled, he had
been relieved of his charge, and the incompetent had recovered her capacity
before the law

3) Vda de Bengson v. Philippine National Bank 3 SCRA 751 (Singson)

Facts:
Carmen Padilla Vda. De Bengson, as a mother of a veteran who died in World War II,
became entitled to certain accrued interest benefits and to a monthly death compensation
for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon
inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration
filed Special Proc. In the CFI of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered
adjudging Carmen to be incompetent and appointed PNB as guardian of her estate
comprising of monies due from the said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship
were issued in favor of PNB.
Alleging that she had regained her competence, the ward, by counsel filed a petition
asking for an order terminating the guardianship and for the delivery of her residuary
estate. This was opposed by the Veterans Admin. On the ground that by reason of her
advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still incompetent within the
meaning of Sec. 2 Rule 98 of the ROC.
On march 30, 1960, the son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a Manifestation to the
effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent. He prayed to be appointed
guardian of the wards estate in place of the PNB.

Atty. Ronald

20

Issue:
W/N PNB may be removed as guardian of Carmen Vda. De Bengson and appoint
Francisco Bengson in its stead NO
Held:
Section 2, Rule 98 of the ROC provides when a guardian becomes insane or otherwise
incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the
estate, or failed for 30 days after it is due to render an account, or make a return, the court
may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender
the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.
Since the rules enumerate the grounds for removal, a guardian cannot be legally removed
from office except for the causes therein mentioned. Accordingly, conflict of interest has
been held as sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic
interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the extent that a court uses
its discretion in appraising whether a person in unsuitable or incapable of discharging his
trust, that much can be said that removal is discretionary. But, the discretion must be
exercised within the law, and when the latter laid down the grounds for removal of a
guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of the grounds.
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the recond would indicate that there as
any legal ground upon which removal of the PNB as guardian was unfounded.

RULE 98 TRUSTEES
1) Tiangco v. Francisco 68 Phil 639 (Austria)
2) Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. de la Pena 26 Phil 144 (Aquino)
Facts:
- This is an appeal by the administrator of the estate of Father De la Pea (defendant)
from a judgment of the CFI, awarding to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro (plaintiff) the
sum of P6,641, with interest.
- Fr. De la Pea was the representative of plaintiff over the legacy which it held in trust for
the construction of a leper hospital.
- In 1898, the books Fr. De la Pea, as trustee, had on hand the sum of P6,641 collected
by him for the charitable purposes aforesaid. Subsequently, he deposited in his personal
account P19,000 in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (Bank) at Iloilo.
- During the war of the revolution, Fr. De la Pea was arrested by the military authorities
as a political prisoner because they claimed that he was an insurgent and the funds
deposited had been collected by him for revolutionary purposes.
- A confiscation order was issued to the Bank for the deposit of Fr. De la Pea in favor of
the United States Army officer and turned over to the Government.
Issue and Ratio:
1. W/N the trust funds was included in the P19,000 deposited in the account of Fr. De la
Pea in the bank
- Yes. A careful examination of the case leads us to the conclusion that said trust funds
were a part of the funds deposited and which were removed and confiscated by the
military authorities of the United States.
2. W/N the estate of Fr. De la Pea is liable for the loss of the trust fund

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- No. Fr. De la Pea's liability is determined the Civil Code which states that "a person
obliged to give something is also bound to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a
good father of a family" (art. 1094), it also provides that "no one shall be liable for events
which could not be foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the
exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so
declares." (Art. 1105.)
- The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in his personal account does not add to
his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a debtor who must respond at all
hazards. There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it as he did and there was no
law which changed his responsibility be reason of the deposit.
- While it may be true that one who is under obligation to do or give a thing is in duty
bound, when he sees events approaching the results of which will be dangerous to his
trust, to take all reasonable means and measures to escape or, if unavoidable, to temper
the effects of those events, we do not feel constrained to hold that, in choosing between
two means equally legal, he is culpably negligent in selecting one whereas he would not
have been if he had selected the other. The deposit was forcibly taken by the military
forces of one of the combatants during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions
of the Civil Code he would be exempt from responsibility.
- The judgment is reversed.
Dissent by Justice TRENT (I think he might ask this but its up to the encoders if they
want to include this)
- Fr. De la Pea was a trustee or an agent of the plaintiff. The money was clothed with all
the immunities and protection with which the law seeks to invest trust funds. But when Fr.
De la Pea mixed the trust fund with his own and deposited the whole in the bank to his
personal account, his act stamped on the said fund his own private marks and unclothed it
of all the protection it had. If it had been deposited in the name of Fr. De la Pea as
trustee or agent it may be presumed that the military authorities would not have
confiscated it for the reason that they were looking for insurgent funds only. Again, the
plaintiff had no reason to suppose that De la Pea would attempt to strip the fund of its
identity, nor had he said or done anything which tended to relieve De la Pea from the
legal reponsibility which pertains to the care and custody of trust funds.
- The US SC in the United State vs. Thomas said that "Trustees are only bound to
exercise the same care and solicitude with regard to the trust property which they would
exercise with regard to their own. Equity will not exact more of them. They are not liable
for a loss by theft without their fault. But this exemption ceases when they mix the trustmoney with their own, whereby it loses its identity, and they become mere debtors."
3) De Leon v. Molo Peckson 6 SCRA 978 (Temprosa)
4) Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. CA 312 SCRA 603 (Temprosa)
5) Saltiga de Romero v. CA 319 SCRA 180 (Fernandez)
FACTS:

Eugenio Romero bought from Celedonio Jaug and Sofia Macan the latters
rights, interest, participation and possession of 12 hectares of land (then a public
land)

Eugenio applied for a homestead patent for the same but was disapproved by
the Bureau of Lands because Romero already had applied for a homestead

Atty. Ronald

21

patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from owning the additional 12
hectares
As a result, Eugenio placed the application in the name of his eldest son Eutiqio;
supposedly in trust for all his children
Eutiqio married, so the application was transferred in the name of Lutero, the
second son
When Lutero got married, the application was again transferred in the name of
the younger brother Ricardo
When the patent was issued, the same was issued in the name of Lutero
The appellants claim, however, that he obtained the same under Fraud and that
they were in fact the real oocupants and owners of said land
Lutero presented evidence to the effect that sometime in 1969, a policeman
picked him up and was brought to the office of the Mayor and was forced to
sign affidavits that state that he had sold 3 hectares each out of the 12 hectares
to the appellants (sisters and brother-in-law)
RTC decided in favor of Lutero; CA affirmed;thus, the present case for Certiorari
under the SC

alleged agreement between the family that LUTERO would merely hold the lot in
trust for the benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The alleged agreement was not proven
and even assuming that the petitioners duly proved the existence of the trust,
said trust would be of doubtful validity considering that it would promote a direct
violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisition of a
homestead patent.
As for the alleged sale of three portions of the lot for a consideration of P3,000.00
each evidenced by the three affidavits of sale, they are void. CA 141 prohibits the
alienation of a homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent and
grant under Section 118.

6) Land Bank v. Court of Appeals 409 SCRA 455 (Sabio)

ISSUE:

whether Lutero acquired the land in question in trust for the benefit of the heirs of
Eugenio
HELD:

"A trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership
in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the
equitable ownership of the former entitling him to performance of certain duties
and the exercise of certain powers by the latter." Trust relations between parties
may be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the
direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words evidencing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which
without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of
law as a matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties.
Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into by
operation of law

Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration
and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed
always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his
legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are
created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who,
by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or hold the legal right to
property, which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

However, it has been held that a trust will not be created when, for the purpose of
evading the law prohibiting one from taking or holding real property, he takes a
conveyance thereof in the name of a third person.

In the present case, the petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the
existence of the trust. Petitioners merely alleged that LUTERO, through
fraudulent means, had the title of Lot 23 Pls-35 issued in his name contrary to the

Specpro 3D/ 2008-2009

Chua

Atty. Ronald

22