On November 13, 1991, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.

2312 pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7155. Resolution No. 2313 provides: x x x The plebiscite shall
be held on December 15, 1991 in the areas or units affected, namely the
barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo,
only 2,890 favored its creation while 3,439 voted against the creation of the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise,
the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines

Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991
throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the
plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and
illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312
should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-NaLupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, PagAsa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have
included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscite conducted is valid.

RULING:

Yes.

The Court ruled that respondent COMELC did not commit grave abuse in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the
creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa is valid.

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phrase political units directly affected, is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa was well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

TAN vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local
Government Code
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An
Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the
Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz
and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay,
Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to
belong to the new province).

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a

plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for
Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in
complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those
living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not
included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte
would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum
area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites
of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO.
Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of
the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental
(parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental

because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected

entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is
applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of
the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in
the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected.
The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to
mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the
points raised by the petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent
nullity.

Basco vs PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES
MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),
respondent.
FACTS: The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a
franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 to establish, operate

and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating
casino Philippine Tourist. The operation was considered a success for it proved
to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic
projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain
this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to
enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law.
The petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege among
others that the same is null and void for being contrary to morals, public policy
and public order, monopolistic and tends toward crony economy. They also
contend that PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of
the principle of local autonomy.
ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila has the right to impose taxes on PAGCOR
HELD: The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Thus, the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax
therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax (Bernas, the
Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government.
The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
operative law until amended, repealed or revoked (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of
the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means decentralization (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp.
435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an imperium in imperio.

Municipality of Paraaque vs
V.M. Realty Corporation GR
127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012

G.R. No. 127820

292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of
1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of
land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by
providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project. Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a
negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk
of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint
failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and

(b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or

res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was
treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the
complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.
Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA
7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its
power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its
legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a
law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code,
which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter
only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought
the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit
of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take
immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through
condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The
petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform
program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the
like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate
to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being
developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation
patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a
barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.

Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767226-case-digest-heirs-juanchoardona/#ixzz2rKjJfmBT