Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do,
quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between
spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth
unveiled in the following pages, dark and
irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims
any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses

capability to fulfill the marital obligations

even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and
24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void. After careful consideration,
we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August
1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got
married before a minister of the Gospel4 at
the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,

Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of

their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition
to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his
petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family
Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
He asserted that respondents incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the
present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she

previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
She only confessed the truth about the
boys parentage when petitioner learned
about it from other sources after their
marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brotherin-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a
psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a freelance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a
single member of her family ever witnessed

her alleged singing activities with the group.

In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the
Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes
Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner
claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote
and sent the letters to him when she
admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he

discovered they were not known in or

connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of
greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a
higher income. She bought a sala set from
a public market but told petitioner that she
acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from
other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and
jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer
take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt
a reconciliation but since her behavior did
not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner

presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist,
who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they
observed that respondents persistent and
constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological.
It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and
respect.22 They further asserted that
respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis
for her to suspect that petitioner was having
an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically

incapacitated to perform her essential

marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent
claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of
her husband. She asserted that there was
no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man
from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt
to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from Davids act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and
Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for
two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris

de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed
held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to
petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an
officemate of her husband but averred that

she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic

matter if she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husbands whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent
lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from
her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the
totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr.
Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted
by his assistant,33together with the

screening procedures and the

Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted,
led him to conclude that respondent was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that
might point to the presence of disabling
trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that
there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not
the one who administered and interpreted
respondents psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable
because a good liar can fake the results of
such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to
petitioners evidence and held that

respondents propensity to lying about

almost anythingher occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income,
among othershad been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondents
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial
court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its
decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the
Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed
with modification by both the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held

instead that only respondent was impaired
by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently,
the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals
of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs
judgment. While conceding that respondent
may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondents psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements
in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity
had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts
pronouncement, petitioner elevated the

case to this Court. He contends herein that

the evidence conclusively establish
respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the
Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual
allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect from the appellate courts because
the trial court had an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals
did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the
appellate court concluded that such
evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the

factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as
to whether the state of facts as presented
by petitioner sufficiently meets the
standards set for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. These standards were definitively
laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also
known as the Molina case45), and indeed
the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC
in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas
decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has
yet to squarely affirm the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was
only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was

psychologically incapacitated under Article

36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may
have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family
Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme
Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and
the succeeding cases did ordain was a set
of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the
grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of

marriage, shall likewise be void even if such

incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullity of marriage is novel in our body of
laws, although mental incapacity has long
been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited
from contracting marriage persons "who are
not in the full enjoyment of their reason at
the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons
were ordained as void,52 in the same class
as marriages with underage parties and
persons already married, among others. A
partys mental capacity was not a ground
for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party
was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable
marriage" under the Marriage Law of

1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses

incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted
by a party of "unsound mind" was classified
under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a
voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or
lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was
not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among
the marriages classified as voidable under
Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one
contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage
is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given
which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus
on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not
constitute a specie of vice of consent.

Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both

members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, have
opined that psychological incapacity is not a
vice of consent, and conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in
the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original
understanding of Article 36 as phrased by
the Family Code committee. Tolentino
opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity
of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under

Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and

thus] should have been a cause for
annulment of the marriage only."62 At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital
obligations, because then this would
amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were
answered, beginning with Santos v. Court
of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity
pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a
mere inability to comply with them, was

further affirmed in the Molina66 case.

Therein, the Court, through then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed
that "[t]he evidence [to establish
psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such extent that
the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present
understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of

marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that
the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the
preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision ona
case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v.
Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity

exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than
in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the
definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not
cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity
may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each

case, current trends in psychological and

even canonical thought, and experience. It
is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful
in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
same time, the Molina guidelines are not
set in stone, the clear legislative intent
mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from
this evolutionary understanding of Article
36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at
present, and indeed the disposition of this
case shall rely primarily on that precedent.
There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of

the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law
experts in the interpretation of
psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged
that the concept of psychological incapacity
was derived from canon law,73 and as one
member admitted, enacted as a solution to
the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent
under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to
disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court
has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole

source of influence in the interpretation of

Article 36. Even though the concept may
have been derived from canon law, its
incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred
in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity
is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on
lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on
another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively

promote its total developmen[t]," and that

"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish
the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the
foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect

marriage and the family. This has been

accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes
the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of
nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of
marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken
into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a

psychologically incapacitated person as a

nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage.
Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives
of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand
or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us
as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the

guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as
the general rules. They warrant citation in
full:
1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim

of the parties. Both the family and

marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not

have given valid assumption thereof.

Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be

absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be

accepted as root causes. The illness

must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting
marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that
to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidencewhat is

decreed as canonically invalid should also

be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional
requirement that the Solicitor General issue
a certification stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the

fiscals participation in the hearings before

the trial court is extant from the records of
this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the
RTC are now deemed binding on this Court,
owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts. As such, it must
be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality.
The question remains whether her pattern
of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with
Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently
satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome
his burden in proving the psychological

incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own

testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He
also presented two (2) expert witnesses
from the field of psychology who testified
that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity.
In any event, both courts below considered
petitioners evidence as credible enough.
Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an
action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of
action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between

private parties, but is impressed with State

interest, the Family Code likewise requires
the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent
with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would
necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents
psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior
"of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing

personalities and situations," of writing

letters to petitioner using fictitious names,
and of lying about her actual occupation,
income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in
generalities, were further linked to medical
or clinical causes by expert witnesses from
the field of psychology. Petitioner presented
two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on
the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are]
terribly wrong with the standards. There are
a couple of things that seems (sic) to be
repeated over and over again in the
affidavit. One of which is the persistent,

constant and repeated lying of the

"respondent"; which, I think, based on
assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that
because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect
that one owes towards another. The lack of
concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings.
But then when one talks and expresse[s]
their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the
truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,

what do you think is going to happen as far

as this relationship is concerned. Therefore,
it undermines that basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that
due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she
is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of
Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness
for the petitioner, testified that the
respondent has been calling up the
petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on
the activities of the petitioner and ask him
on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can
you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the

point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic)
that her husband is having an affair with a
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then
that is pathological. That is not abnormal.
We all feel jealous, in the same way as we
also lie every now and then; but everything
that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to
the fact that the husband is having an affair
with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair
with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid
jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy,
would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was

presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner.
He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie
[and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their
conclusions of psychological incapacity on
the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as
well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court
had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that
personal examination of the subject by the
physician is not required for the spouse to
be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology
utilized by petitioners witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical
conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and

Lopezs common conclusion of

respondents psychological incapacity
hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioners version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioners expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence
presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above
are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that
respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing

abilities, her income, etc. She has this

fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities. She practically
lived in a world of make believe making her
therefore not in a position to give meaning
and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly
lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts
to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological
incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married
petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in
the dark about her natural childs real

parentage as she only confessed when the

latter had found out the truth after their
marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only
a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondents
psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to
respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a
failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least

abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses

and the trial court were emphatic on
respondents inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were
revelatory of respondents inability to
understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital
bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable
to adhere to reality cannot be expected to
adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded
that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had
amply exhibited her ability to perform her
marital obligations. We are not convinced.

Given the nature of her psychological

condition, her willingness to remain in the
marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. Respondents ability to
even comprehend what the essential
marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondents ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment
to the marriage cannot be accorded much
credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article
45(3) of the Family Code which states that
a marriage may be annulled if the consent
of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds

for action for the annulment of marriage." It

would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud
under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to
her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to
comply with the essential marital obligations
as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code. Article 68, in particular,
enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. As
noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see
how an inveterate pathological liar would be

able to commit to the basic tenets of

relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred
when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no
reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioners efforts
to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention
of Molina, which held that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal
of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in

a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing

the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause93was
appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting
another marriage without the Tribunals
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case
maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited
by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty
with a perceptive vigor markedly

inadequate for the practical understanding

of the conjugal Covenant or serious
impaired from the correct appreciation of
the integral significance and implications of
the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove
with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in
Causa and premised on the testimonies of
the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the
Respondent made the marriage option in
tenure of adverse personality constracts
that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of
the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of
her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the

Respondent was impaired from eliciting

a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological
incapacity was arrived at not only by the
trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet,
we must clarify the proper import of the
Church rulings annulling the marriage in
this case. They hold sway since they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioners
allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondents version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed
such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is
the factual findings of the judicial trier of
facts, and not that of the canonical courts,

that are accorded significant recognition by

this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the
requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting
that it did not appear certain that
respondents condition was incurable and
that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he
and his wife initially separated, he returned
to her, desiring to make their marriage
work. However, respondents aberrant
behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From
this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondents condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be

definitively concluded that respondents
condition is incurable? It would seem, at
least, that respondents psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable
feat. Certainly, it would have been easier
had petitioners expert witnesses
characterized respondents condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on
whether the psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good
reason for the experts taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in
1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered
its decision on 10 August 1995. These
events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such

requirement was not expressly stated in

Article 36 or any other provision of the
Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos,
which was decided in January 1995, began
its discussion by first citing the deliberations
of the Family Code committee,96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars,97 before
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice
Caguioas opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity
is incurable,"99 and the view of a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila that psychological incapacity must
be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity,
the Court in Santos omitted any reference

to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was
decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent
on whether respondents psychological
incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate
that the incurability of the psychological
incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial
of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial courts decision
that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the
Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply

retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation
or construction placed by the courts of a
law constitutes a part of that law as of the
date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we
approach this present case from utterly
practical considerations. The requirement
that psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there
was no categorical averment from the
expert witnesses that respondents
psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If
we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those

cases tried before Molina or Santos,

especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would
not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced
as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in
stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason
to mandate in this case an expert medical
or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause
to present evidence to that effect at the time
this case was tried by the RTC more than
ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that
the incurability of respondents

psychological incapacity has been

established by the petitioner. Any lingering
doubts are further dispelled by the fact that
the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an
integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has
established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present
petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first
place. It is possible that respondent, despite
her psychological state, remains in love
with petitioner, as exhibited by her

persistent challenge to the petition for

nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondents avowed
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet
the Court decides these cases on legal
reasons and not vapid sentimentality.
Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more
than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID
under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division