124. Antonio vs.

Reyes *reversed Pesca

March 10, 2006 – J. Tinga *stop using inviolable institution as defense; promoting wedlock upon people incapable
of marriage

Facts:
1. Leonilo (26) and Marie (36) met in August 1989.
2. Barely a year after, they got married at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding in 1990.
3. Out of their union, a child was born in 1991, who died 5 months later.
4. In 1993, he filed a petition to have his marriage declared null and void, grounded on FC 36, alleging that she was
psychologically incapacitated, which existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and up to the present.
5. He claimed that she persistently lied:
(1) She concealed that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced him as the
family’s adopted child. She only told the truth when Leonilo learned about it from other sources after
their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some
of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology.
(4) She claimed to be a singer with Blackgold Recording Company, yet not a single member of her family
ever witnessed her singing activities. She claimed that a show was held in her honor and even presented
an invitation, but Leonilo discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million. She admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, altering her payslip to make it appear that
she earned more. She
bought a sala set from a public market but claimed that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from others on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor
his whereabouts.
When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
6. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist,
who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that she was essentially a normal person; however, they observed that her
persistent and
constant lying abnormal or pathological.
7. In reply, she presented her version and presented Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations.
8. The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of
due discretion on the part of the parties.
9. The trail court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence. The marriage was declared null and void.

10. While the case was pending before the CA, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed by both the
National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal (but only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion), then upheld by the Vatican.
11. Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed.

Issue: Are the facts presented sufficient to meet the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage?
Held: YES.
Ruling:
The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines operate as the
general rules:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
** Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s
claims. He also presented 2 expert witnesses from the field of psychology.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical.
** The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior
"of perenially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations.”
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
** She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner.
Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations.
** The root cause of her psychological incapacity has been medically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the court’s decision. The persistent lying undermines that
basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also
lie every now and then, but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal. Also, he pointed out that after
having initially separated, he returned to her. However, she continued to lie and maintained her excessive
jealousy. From this fact, he draws that it is incurable.
Such illness must be grave enough. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
** It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before he left
his wife. It was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced FC 68-71 as regards the husband and wife as well as FC
220, 221 and 225 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
** Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar
would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983.
** Such deliberate ignorance of the church annulment is in contravention of Molina. Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed
such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value.
72. De Castro vs. De Castro
13 Feb 2008 – J. Tinga
Facts:
1. Reinel Anthony de Castro and Annabelle Assidao met and became sweethearts in 1991.
2. In Sep 1994, they applied for a marriage license in Pasig City. But when they went back, it had already expired.
3. In Oct 1994, they had their first intercourse. They regularly had sex thereafter.
4. On 13 Mar 1995, in order to push through with the wedding, they executed an affidavit stating that they had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. They got married on the same day but did not live
together after.
5. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to Reinna Tricia de Castro. Since birth, Annabelle’s been the one
supporting her.
6. On 4 Jun 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint for support claiming that Reinel has reneged in his responsibility.
7. As a defense, Reinel denied getting married since they did not obtain a marriage license and has never
acknowledged the child.
8. On 16 Oct 2000, RTC ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a license and
declared that Reinel is the natural father of the child and thus obliged to give her support.
9. Reinel appealed arguing that the RTC erred in ordering him to provide support. CA denied the appeal holding
that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of their marriage. Also, on 17 Apr 1998, Reinel
admitted, thru an affidavit, that he is the legitimate father of the child.
10. CA also ruled that since this is an action for support, the RTC erred in declaring the marriage as null and void.
Thus the appeal.

Issue:

1. Does the RTC have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage?
2. Is the child Reinel’s daughter?
Held: The RTC had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage. The child is Reinel’s illegitimate daughter.
Ruling:

1. RTC had jurisdiction. In Ninal vs Badayog, “other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. The court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same as long as it is essential to the determination of the case.”
2. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio. It is clear that they did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage.
3. The law that dispenses with the marriage license for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years aims to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame, and embarrassment with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
4. In this case, there was no scandalous cohabitation at all. The false affidavit so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement.
5. On the second issue, the birth certificate of the child lists Reinel as the father. Also, he claimed in an affidavit
waiving additional
tax exemption in favor of Annabelle that he is the legitimate father of the child. The wedding pictures also show
that he was not forced to undergo the wedding ceremony. He smiled and kissed the bride!
121. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals
29 Jan 2004 – J. Ynares-Santiago *courts have no jurisdiction to dissolve church marriage
Facts:
1. On 28 Sep 1966, David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married in a civil ceremony. Church wedding followed on
20 May 1967. The union produced four children.
2. According to David, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-
marital affairs with several men and was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist.
3. Despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with a Jordanian national (Mustafa Ibrahim)
whom she married and had two children. When Mustafa left, she went back to him together with the two children.
4. On 9 Dec 1995, Sharon abandoned her first family and left for Jordan with her two children from Mustafa. Since
then, she would only return to the country on special occasions.
5. On 1 Apr 1997, David filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage. Summons was published
in the Pilipino Star Ngayon considering that Sharon did not reside or could be found in the country.
6. David presented Dr. Natividad Dayan who declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder.
7. After trial, the court declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
8. Upon appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Does the aberrant sexual behavior of Sharon fall within the term “psychological incapacity?”
Held: No.

Ruling:
1. A personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition.
2. Sharon’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could
not have known the obligations she was assuming. It appears that her promiscuity did not exist prior to or at
inception of the marriage.
3. Her sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity
within the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.
4. It must be shown that the acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make Sharon completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations.
5. The evidence presented refers only to grounds for legal separation.
114. Hernandez vs. CA
December 8, 1999 – J. Mendoza *habitual drinking is not psychological incapacity
Facts:
1. Lucita was in her first year of teaching zoology and botany, when Mario became her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts when he was no longer his teacher. In 1981, they got married (and had 3
children).
2. For two more years, his parents paid for his tuition fees, while she provided his allowances and other financial
needs.
3. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, she discovered his extra-marital affair. Subsequently, he left the
conjugal home and abandoned her and their child. When he came back, however, she accepted him.
4. From 1983 up to 1986, as he could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help in her businesses by
delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift (had smoking and drinking
sprees, plus betted on cock fights) and had other women, her business (buy and sell) suffered.
5. Upon the recommendation of a family friend, he was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. While
employed, his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. He even had a daughter with one of
the women. When she confronted him about his relationship with a certain Tess, he beat her up, as a result, she
was confined in the hospital. He was employed only for 5 years because he availed himself of the early retirement
plan offered by the company. Instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent
spent the money on himself.
6. As a result of his extreme promiscuity, he contracted gonorrhea and infected her. They, then, received
treatment.
7. The he abandoned them.
8. She sent him a letter expressing her frustration, that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. Also, she
stated her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
9. She then learned that he left for the Middle East, and since then, his whereabouts had been unknown.
10. She filed a petition for annulment, and in 1993, the trial court dismissed it. The circumstances she mentioned
by in support of her claim that he was “psychologically incapacitated” to marry her are among the grounds cited as
valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (FC 55), not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or
annulment. Also, the court did grant relief under FC 46(3), as there is no dispute that the “gonorrhea” transmitted
to her by respondent occurred 5 years after their marriage.
11. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Should their marriage be annulled on the ground of his psychological incapacity?

Held: NO.

Ruling:
1. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
2. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, he was suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent
was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.
3. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent’s
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity ofthe marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

77. Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez

8 Mar 2001 – J. Davide
Facts:
1. On 21 May 1966, Herminia Borja-Manzano and David Manzano were married in Caloocan City. Four children
were born.
2. On 22 Mar 1993, David Manzano contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Sanchez.
3. Judge Sanchez claims that he did not know that Manzano was married. He showed evidence that Manzano and
Payao noted in their separate affidavits executed on the same day that they were both separated.
4. On 12 May 1999, Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Sachez.
5. After evaluation, the Court Administrator recommended that the Judge be found guilty and fined 2,000 pesos.

Issue: Is Manzano’s second marriage valid?

Held: No. Judge Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. OCA recommendation affirmed.
Ruling:
1. Not all the requirements for a valid exemption from marriage license based on Article 36 of the Family Code
were present in the second marriage. The parties both had legal impediments to marry each other.
2. Judge ought to know that a subsisting marriage is an impediment which would make the subsequent marriage
null and void. He cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting marriages because it was clearly
stated in their affidavits.
3. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie; much less authorize the parties to remarry. Free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting marriage.
It merely exempts them from marriage license requirement. In this case, it was merely de facto since there was no
judicial declaration of the separation.
4. Judge clearly demonstrated ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

147. Ninal vs. Bayadog

March 14, 2000 - Ynares Santiago
Facts:
1. Pepito was married to Teodulfa (1974). He shot and killed her. (April 24 1985)
2. Pepito married Norma Badayog (respondent) by executing an affidavit dated Dec 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for 5 years and thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
3. Pepito died in a car crash (Feb 19, 1997)
4. Petitioners are the children of Pepito who filed a petition to declare the marriage between Badayog and their
father void for lack of a marriage license.
5. Respondent says that the petitioners have no cause of action because they are not among the persons under
who could file an action for annulment of marriage. (Art 47 of Fam Code)

Issue: Do the petitioners have standing to question the said marriage?

Held: Yes
Ruling:
1. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had lapsed.
2. Although they had been living with each other for 5 years, the law provides that those 5 years must be in a
nature of perfect union that is valid under the law (without any third party involved, in his case, he was still
married, thus the clock only started ticking the moment his first marriage ended).
3. The code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Concept:
1. A marriage, though void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party thereto can marry again,
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void.
2. Voidable Marriage- can be assailed only during the life time of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. (Thus there is a
prescriptive period)
3. Void Marriage- can be questioned even after the death of either party. (Thus there is no prescriptive period)
- have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contributions.

113. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Molina

13 February 1997 – Panganiban *irreconcilable differences not psychological incapacity
Facts:
1. H&W: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a
son a year after.
2. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage,
3. observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them,
4. from his dependency from his parents, and
5. his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
6. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter.
7. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City.
8. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later.
9. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.
10. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina.
11. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
12. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here
is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to
the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
2. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of
Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
3. In present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations.
4. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
5. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world:
(1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently
proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage;
(4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable;
(5) such illness must be grave enough;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husband and wife, and
Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children;
(7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and
(8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

116. Republic vs. Dagdag

9 Feb 2001 – J. Quisumbing *emotional immaturity not psychological incapacity
Facts:
1. On 7 Sep 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Dagdag, 20 years old. They begot two children.
2. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear, and then disappear again. During the times when he was present, he indulged on
drinking sprees, force his wife to submit to sex, and when she refused, inflict physical injuries on her.
3. On Oct 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. She later found out that he was
imprisoned and escaped on 22 Oct 1985.
4. On 3 Jul 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Summons was served by publication.
5. During the hearing on 17 Dec 1990, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. She then presented her sister-in-law
as the lone witness. She testified that the couple always quarreled and that Avelino never stayed for long at their
house.
6. After Erlinda rested her case, the court gave the investigating prosecutor until 2 Jan 1991 to submit his
manifestation.
7. On 27 Dec 1990, without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court rendered a decision declaring
the marriage void. It denied the motion for reconsideration of the OSG.
8. On 22 Apr 1993, the CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Was the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino as being emotionally immature and irresponsible, a
habitual alcoholic, and
a fugitive from justice sufficiently proven?
Held: No.
Ruling:
1. Taking into consideration the guidelines in Molina, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary
requirements to prove psychological incapacity.
a) No psychiatrist or doctor testified to the alleged psychological incapacity.
b) The allegation that Avelino was a fugitive from justice was not proven.
c) The investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the
trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.
2. Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case depends crucially on the facts of the case, more
than in any field of the law. No case is on “all fours” with another case.
144. Suazo vs. Suazo
March 10, 2010 – J. Brion
Facts:
1. Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met. They were residents of Laguna at that time. The
courtship took months.
2. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a
ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.
3. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their
marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as
household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged
Angelito to find work and violent quarrels (resulting to physical injuries on Jocelyn) often resulted because of
Jocelyn’s efforts.
4. Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.
5. Ten years after their separation, October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage.
6. Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
7. The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the
parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
8. In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of
physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but
significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
9. Psychologist on cross:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this kind of
personality affects the other party.
10. Brief History of Angelito by the Psychologist, based on Jocelyn’s testimony:
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4
siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother
is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship.
Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of
their day to day living.
11. RTC:
She was able to prove that right from the start of her married life, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to
physical injuries inflicted upon her. She is a battered wife and she served as a servant in his husband’s family. This
is because at the time of their marriage, they are still young and were forced only to marry. The petitioner and the
respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, he blamed her family for said early
marriage. The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented. She is entitled to the relief prayed for.
12. CA Ruling:
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner
with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to
separate and divorce.

Issue: Is there basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Held: NO.
Ruling:
The Law and the Precedents:
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Santos v. Court of Appeals declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability.
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v. Court
of Appeals (Molina).
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Pesca v. Pesca clarifies that the Molina
guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or
construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." All cases – involving the application of
Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases.
This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te (Te) which
revisited the Molina guidelines. Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code
did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. Te thus assumes it a basic premise
that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application. Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value,
saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law. Again, upholding the trial court’s findings
and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of
parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfil the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-
to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. The Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not
suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other
perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement
that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.
The SC on the Case:
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity
and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological
condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn
whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be
insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment
and the physical beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she
declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a
personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. Habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological
incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.

112. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

January 16, 1997-- Torres, Jr
Facts:
1. Plaintiff (case prior to this) filed a case of annulment based on psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband (petitioner here).
2. She claims (among many things apparenlty) that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis.
3. She claims that the defendant married her in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the apperance of a normal man.
4. Defendand however claims that it is the plaintiff who does not want to have sex with her and that she always
avoided him and that the one time he forced to himself on his wife to have sex he stopped because she was
shaking and did not like it.
5. Defendant insists that the marriage remain valid because they are young and there is still a chance of it working
out (bait talaga ng mga lalaki)
6. The defendant submited himself to a physical exam and there is no evidence of impotency. Its only that the
defendant has a “soft erection” which is why is penis snot in its full length, but it is still capable of further erection
and capable of having sexual intercourse.
7. The RTC and CA annulled the marriage because... (look at ruling)
8. Present Case: Petitioner does not want his marriage to be annulled and says that there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, thus no basis for the courts to rule in annulling their
marriage.
Issue:
1. Should the marriage remain valid? Held: No
2. Is not wishing to have sex a vital ground in establishing psychological incapacity? Held: Yes

Ruling:
1. The mere fact that it is the husband who is fighting to keep the marriage valid proves that there is no collusion
between the parties. (obviously because his wife wants it annulled while he wants to keep the marriage)
2. Also, he admitted that he and his wife never had sex.
3. The Physical exam showed that he did not carry a physical defect.
4. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage (not wanting to have sex) is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this court clearly demonstrates an “utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning to marriage.”
5. The Family code provides that it is an “essential martital obligation [to]... procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.” (333)
Concept:
1. The Family code provides that it is an “essential marital obligation [to]... procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.” (333)
[QUESTION: does this apply to civil code as well?]
2. There needs to be a shared feeling between husband and wife. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love, respect, sacrifice and
a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.” (334)
[QUESTION: is this an obiter?]

Te vs Te

579 SCRA 193 – Civil Law – Family Code – Article 36: Psychological Incapacity – Molina Case Merely a
Guideline
Every case involving psychological incapacity must be resolved on a case-to-case basis
Note: This case relaxed the application of the Molina Guidelines
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu at a Filipino-Chinese gathering at a school campus. They
did not have interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they
share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed to Kenneth that they
should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he was still young and jobless. But due to Rowena’s
persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found
themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court
and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth
was treated like a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later,
Kenneth was able to escape and he was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her
to live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance instead so that they
could live together separately or just stay with her uncle.
Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate
lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Rowena. Rowena
did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is
collusion between the two parties. Eventually, the case was tried. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the
psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between
Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both
parties’ unreadiness to commitment and their young age. Kenneth was still in the state of finding his fate and
fighting boredom, while Rowena was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the
marriage is void upon the findings of the expert psychologist. The Solicitor General (OSG) appealed and the Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case). The clinical psychologist did not
personally examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by Kenneth. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were
requirements set forth in the Molina caseto be followed as guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines
established in the landmark case of Molina.
HELD: Yes, such is possible. The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a
set of rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that the subsequent cases
after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.” The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there
is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties’ psychological
disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations
as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

CASE DIGEST: SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS RAMON REYE S (EXPERT

OPINION; HEARSAY EVIDENCE)

March 26, 2015

G.R. NO. 185286, AUGUST 18, 2010

SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS. RAMON REYES,
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions, caused the petitioner to file a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated.
Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to
petitioner and father to their children.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical
psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be
suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong
sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and declared the
parties’ marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. It held:

“In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his “come and go” attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family,
sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business
pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of
drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences
and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] “defects” were
not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they
lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households,
but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter,
[respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].”
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held:

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and
Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one
spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case,
the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of
one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or
personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-
in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on
a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily
have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does
not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors
Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business
attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s
or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting,
and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
The respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4)
failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.