Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War

Author(s): Efraim Karsh

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 256-268
Published by: Middle East Institute
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GEOPOLITICAL DETERMINISM: THE

ORIGINS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Efraim Karsh

XVAR, like any socialphenomenon,has bothits generalandspecificcauses.

On the generallevel, war can be an occasionaloutburstof a deep-rootedhistorical
conflict. Such a conflict may arise from ethnic, national,or religiousenmity, from
competition over natural resources or territory, or over regional or global
hegemony. The specific causes of war lie in the subjectiveinterpretationsof such
historical conflict and assessments regardingadequatemeans for handlingit at a
given moment. Assessments derive from such factors as the world views, images,
and beliefs of the relevant leaders, from bureaucraticpolitics (power struggles
within the rulingelites), and from a combinationof these factors.
In the case of the Iran-IraqWar, the general cause is often attributedto the
ethnic and religiousdivide that has separatedArabs and Persians, Shi'i and Sunni
Muslims since at least the seventh century. One scholar's view is that, "Seen in
a long-termhistoricalperspective, the currentIran-IraqWar is just anotherphase
in a strugglebetween the two countriesthat stretchesback a milleniumor more." I
The war is "the latest outbreakin an age-old strugglebetween the Persians and
Arabs for dominationof the Gulf and the rich Tigris and EuphratesValley to its
north," accordingto another observer of the conflict.2
1. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled (New York: Praeger for the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), The Washington Papers Series, no.
92, p. 1.
2. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 291. For
a similar view on the origins of the war see Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis
(London: Croom Helm, 1984), chapter 1.
Efraim Karsh is a lecturer on regional security at the Department of War Studies, King's College, the
University of London. He is the author of The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987) and the editor of The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and
Implications (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1989).
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 44, NO. 2, SPRING 1990

* 257
IRAN-IRAQ

On the immediatelevel, the outbreakof the war is commonly explained by

what may be called the grand design theory. According to this theory, the Iraqi
invasion of Iran in September 1980reflected President SaddamHussein's ambitions. These rangedfrom the occupationof Iranianterritory(the Shattal-Araband
Khuzistan),throughthe inflictionof "a humiliatingand perhapsdecisive defeat on
the Iranianrevolution, which he found troublesome,"3to the desire to assert Iraq
casthe preeminentArab and Gulf state.
This article offers an alternative explanation for the occurrence of the
I]ran-IraqWar. It argues that geopolitics is the most importantsingle factor that
has influenced Iranian-Iraqirelations for generations and, in consequence, accounts for the outbreak of the war. The eruption of the war, according to this
theory, is neitherthe direct extension of the ancient Arab-Persianrivalrynor the
outcome of a premeditatedgranddesign;ratherit is the productof the geopolitical
interaction between two disparate neighbors. More concretely, the war began
because the weaker state, Iraq, attemptedto resist the hegemonic aspirationsof
its strongerneighbor,Iran, to reshapethe regionalstatus quo accordingto its own
image.

ORIGINS OF IRANIAN-IRAQIRELATIONS
Intriguing as it is, the emphasis on the deep-rooted historical animosity
between Arabs and Persians suffers from two major flaws. First, it overlooks
lengthy periods of cooperation between these two groups, motivated both by
sharedreligiousand culturalaffinitiesand by convergingeconomic interests such
as trade. Second, intensive as it was duringthe Umayyad (661-750)and the early
Abbasid (750-945)caliphates, Iraqi-Persianinteractionwas disruptedin the latter
part of the tenth century, with the de facto demise of the Abbasid Empire, to be
resumed only in the aftermathof WorldWar I.
Thus, from 945 until the early sixteenth century, the vast territoriesoccupying present-day Iran and Iraq were controlled, with occasional intervals, by
successive dynasties, mainly of Mongol and Turkish origins: the Buwayhids
(945-1055), the SelUukTurks (1055-1157), the Hulagu, Timur, and Il-Khan
Mongols (1219-1408), and the TurkomanTurks (1408-1499). With the reemergence of Persia as an independent regional empire under the Safavid dynasty
(1500-1736),the area that is now Iraqbecame the battlefieldfor intermittentwars
between the Ottomansand the Persians.These wars, nevertheless, had nothingto
do with Persian-Arabanimosity; ratherthey were the manifestationof a power
3. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (London: Counterpoint, 1986), p. 125. For a
similar view see also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 57; Anthony Cordesman, The
Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 645-46; William
0. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., The
Iran-Iraq War (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 37.

258 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

struggle between the two empires, colored with strong religious elements, for
hegemony and domination.
In other words, geopoliticalrealitiesformedthe majorimpetusfor the Safavid
policy while ideological-religiousfactors played a supportive role, however
important,by rallying public will behind the regime's strategic goals. Although
religious zeal would occasionally cause Safavid rulers to overlook geopolitical
considerations,to the Persiansthe landmassto their western frontierwas merely
a medium of advance for expansion or, alternatively, a useful buffer zone to
separate Persia's holdings from its major regional rival, the Ottoman Empire.
Withthe mutualdecline of the Turkishand the Persianempiresover the centuries
and the appearanceof new and more menacingthreats from other directionsRussia and Great Britain-these two rivals were graduallydriven toward accommodation. Then followed a long host of bilateral treaties, most notably the
Erzerum agreements of 1823 and 1847. Indeed, the vagueness of these two
agreementson the issue of borderdemarcation,not dispelled by the 1911Tehran
and 1913 Constantinopleprotocols, was to remain a major bone of contention
between Iran and Iraq into the late twentieth century. Just as the geopolitical
factor had figuredprominentlyin Persian-Ottomanaffairs,so has it constitutedthe
frameworkfor twentieth-centuryIraqi-Iranianbilateralrelations. By and large,
this relationship has reflected both the inherent problems and the converging
interests emanatingfrom direct physical contiguitybetween two uneven powers.
To the newly established state of Iraq (1921)geographyposed an existential
challenge. Virtuallya landlockedcountry, whose coastline on the Gulf is only 15
kilometerslong, and surroundedby four countrieswith at least two-Turkey and
Iran-larger and irredentist,Iraq sufferedfrom an inherent feeling of insecurity
from the early days of its statehood. This "encirclementcomplex" is understandable. First, Iraq's major source of income, oil, cannot be exported without the
goodwill of its neighbors, Syria and Turkey, or "without coming so close to
Iranianterritoryin the south that it cannot be said to enjoy territorialsecurity at
all for its principalmeans of survival."4Second, as one of the successor states to
the OttomanEmpire, Iraq inheritednot a few Ottomanprivileges- particularly
favorable border agreements-without at the same time enjoying the imperial
power or statureto supportthese gains. This state of affairsaroused Turkishand
Iranianirredentism,which in turn exacerbatedIraq's feeling of vulnerability.5
The proximity of Iraq's major strategicand economic assets to the Turkish
and Iranian frontiers has been no less worrisome for Baghdad. The northern
oil-richprovinces of Mosul and Kirkuk,for example, lie close to Turkeyand Iran.
whereas Baghdadand Basra are only 120and 30 kilometersrespectively from the
Iranianborder.The Shatt al-Arab,Iraq's only outlet to the PersianGulf, could be
4. Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iran-Iraq War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 59 (Winter
1980/81), p. 277.
5. Indeed, there is a long-standing Turkish claim for the province of Mosul. Moreover, in 1922
Turkey backed up this claim by military action.

IRAN-IRAQ* 259

easily controlled by Iran. Finally, Iraq's internalfragmentationalong ethnic and

religious lines-Kurds versus Arabs, Sunnis versus Shias-has had a weakening
effect on the country by impedingthe crystallizationof an Iraqi nationalidentity
and by constitutinga lodestone for external interference.6
Comparedwith these geostrategicpredicaments,Iran's position seems enviable. Not only is Iran a much largercountry in territoryand population, but its
majorstrategiccenters are located, by and large, deep inside the country-Tehran
is some 700 kilometers inside Iran-and enjoy better topographicalprotection
than do their Iraqi counterparts. Also, and in sharp contrast to Iraq's highly
restricted access to the Gulf, Iran possesses a long Gulf coastline of some 2,000
kilometers which makes it the major contender for regional hegemony and
prevents a cripplingencirclementsimilarto that faced by Iraq.
Yet, Iran faces a prime geostrategicconstraintthat for a long time mitigated
its relative advantages over Iraq-namely its 1,700-kilometerborder with the
Soviet Union. During the two centuries since the early 1720s, when Peter the
Great for the first time capturedPersianterritory,to the seizure of power by the
Bolsheviks in 1917, Russia graduallyemerged as the principalsecurity threat to
Iran. Employinga wide spectrumof means that rangedfrom diplomaticpressures
to economic penetration,to direct militaryintervention,czarist Russia conducted
a persistent drive southward. In the peace treaties of Gulistan (1813) and
Turkumanchai(1828), Persia lost to Russia most of its Caucasian possessions,
gave up its rightto maintaina navy on the CaspianSea, which thereby became a
Russian lake, and paid a humiliatingindemnityof 20 million rubles.7
The fact that the Russian thrust southwardcoincided with a growing British
interest in the PersianGulf did little to ease Iran'sposition. On the contrary,from
the nineteenthcentury onward, Persiabecame yet anotherarenafor GreatPower
competition with its adverse implications for this country. In 1907, following
Russian-Britishreconciliationin the Triple Entente, the two powers partitioned
Persia into spheres of influence, leaving a buffer zone between them as an
independentand neutralentity.8
Endingthe Russian militarypresence in Persiaand abrogatingall the treaties
and concessions secured by the czarist regime, the communistrevolutionaroused
Persianhopes of a modificationin Russianpolicy. Yet Persia's rulers were quick
to realize that Bolshevik Russia was not willing to distance itself from the
traditionalczarist ambitions in their country, and, in May 1920, Soviet forces
invaded and established the Soviet Republic of Gilan, the first case of a
Soviet-sponsoredcommunistregime in Asia.
6. Marr, History of Iraq, p. 5: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University

Press, 1969),pp. 3-5; Uriel Dann, Iraq UnderQassem (New York: Praeger, 1969),pp. 1-2.
7. It is interestingto note, however, that these treaties followed decisive Persiandefeats in
two wars initiated by them, not Russia. For the full texts of the treaties see J.C. Hurewitz, ed.,
Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand

Co., 1966),vol. I, pp. 84-6, 96-102.

8. For the full text of the 1907partitionagreeementsee Hurewitz, ibid., pp. 265-7.

260 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Persia's apparentadvantages in comparisonto Iraq were also mitigated by

Baghdad's special relationshipwith GreatBritain. Until 1932, Iraq constituted an
integral part of the British Empire, and from that date to 1958-when the
Hashemite dynasty was overthrownby General Abd al-Karimal-Qasim-it was
an importantblock in the edifice of Britain's regional position. Thus, it was the
British factor that improved Baghdad's bargainingposition vis-'a-vis Tehran
during the 1930s, as illustrated by Iraq's gains in the 1937 Shatt al-Arab
agreement.Duringthe 1920s, Britainhad also shieldedIraqfrom Saudi encroachments.
BALANCE OF WEAKNESS

This was the geopolitical backgroundagainst which Iranian-Iraqirelations

developed. On the one hand, there was Persia with its markedgeopolitical and
geostrategicpreponderanceover Iraq, yet heavily constrainedby its contiguityto
a GreatPower and fully mindfulof Iraq'sclose association with GreatBritain.On
the other hand lay Iraq, plagued by domestic fragmentation,sufferingfrom an
inherent "encirclement complex," and smaller and weaker than Persia. This
delicate "balance of weakness" dictated mutualcaution and restraintand led to
a peaceful coexistence that lasted, with occasional vicissitudes, until the late
1960s. To be sure, overriding interests to coexistence did not prevent the
occasional emergence of differencesor frictions, most of which revolved around
territorialissues. Yet both sides were equally inclined to resolve their disagreements throughpeaceful means, and even in those crises that most uncharacteristically involved the risk of a frontal confrontation,such as the 1959 and 1961
crises, realism prevailedover rhetoric, dictatingstrategicretreats.
Recognizing Iran's fundamental superiority, especially in the Gulf, Iraq
directed its energies toward the Arab world, a potentiallymore rewardingarena.
This resulted in Hashemite Iraq's (1921-1958) championship of the cause of
pan-Arabismand its efforts to unite the Fertile Crescent; it also explains in part
Iraq's repeated attempts to bring about a union with Syria, as well as its
occasional encroachmentson Kuwait.
Iran for its part, largely preoccupiedwith the eliminationof foreign interference in its domestic affairsadopted a two-prongedpolicy. In addition to dealing
successfully with Great Britainand the Soviet Union on a bilateralbasis,9 Reza
Shah (1921-1941) opted for closer relations with Iran's Muslim neighbors,
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq. Accordingly, on April 25, 1929, Iran extended
official recognition to Iraq, thereby paving the way for the evolution of close
9. Reza Shah succeeded in maneuvering Soviet troops out of Iran and destroying the Gilan
Republic by signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviets in February 1921. The treaty, nevertheless,
opened the door for possible Soviet military intervention in Iran if Iranian territory were to become a
springboard for external aggression against the Soviet Union. For the full text of the treaty see
Hurewitz, ibid., vol. II, pp. 90-5.

IRAN-IRAQ* 261

Iranian-Iraqicooperation which culminatedin King Faysal's official visit to Iran

in April 1932.The generaldirectionof bilateralrelationswas set earlierin 1929by
a provisional agreement, and was followed during the coming years by mutual
collaborationin quellingthe Kurdishinsurgencyin both countries.10
On July 4, 1937, having debated the issue at the League of Nations' Council
for three years, the two countries signed a boundarytreaty (outside the framework of the league) that sought to resolve the disputed territoriallegacy of the
Ottoman Empire. According to the treaty, the Iraqi-Iranianfrontier was to run
along the lines delineatedby the ConstantinopleProtocol of 1913and the findings
of the Frontier Commission of 1914. This, in turn, meant complete Iraqi
sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab,with the exception of a four-mileanchorage
area near Abadan where the border ran along the thalweg (median) line.
Furthermore,Iraq assumed responsibilityfor the navigationregime in the Shatt,
namely such duties as pilotage, collection of dues, and health measures.'1
Requiringmutualconcessions-substantial on Iran's part, minoron the Iraqi
side12-the 1937 treaty clearly reflected a keen recognition of the need for
accommodation,if not cooperation. Reinforced as a result of the gatheringwar
clouds in Europe and the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia, this awareness was
further illustrated by the conclusion of a bilateral treaty of friendship and,
perhaps, more significantly,by the signing of the Sa'adabadPact between Iran,
Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistanon July 18, 1937. This treaty representedthe first
attempt after World War I to ensure regionalsecurity throughexclusive reliance
on the combined resources of indigenousleaders.13
POST-WORLDWARH
This delicate balance of weakness, which had stood at the root of friendly
relationsbetween Iranand Iraq,extended into the post-WorldWarII era. Greatly
alarmed by the transformationof the Soviet Union into one of the two most
powerful states on the international scene, 14 both Iran and Iraq sought to
counterbalancethe Soviet presence by drawingcloser to the Westernpowers and
by continuingtheir peaceful coexistence. In June 1949, duringan official visit to
10. Abdulghani,Iraq and Iran, p. 10.
11. These responsibilitieswere renderedto Iraqon a temporarybasis-for a periodof one year,
or more if an extension was effected-so as to enable the two partiesto sign a conventionregulating
the navigationalregimein the river. The fact that such a conventionwas not reachedwas exploitedby
Iran in justificationof repeateddemandsto alter the delimitationof the frontieralong the river, in
general, and in justificationof its 1969unilateralabrogationof the 1937treaty, in particular.
12. Priorto 1937Iranwas adamantlyopposed to the ConstantinopleProtocolof 1913which it
viewed as favoringIraq. The Iraqiconcessions in the 1937agreementwere confinedto recognitionof
the principleof thalwegnear Abadan.
13. For the full text of the Sa'adabadPact see Hurewitz,Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, vol. II, pp. 214-16.
14. This development was of particularconcern for Tehran in view of the manifest Soviet
interestin northernIranas evidencedby the establishmentof the communistAzarbayjanrepublicand
supportfor an independentKurdishrepublic.

262 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Tehran by the Iraqi regent, Prince Abd al-Ilah, a treaty of "good neighborly"
relations was signed, and the two countries embarkedon a joint effort to resolve
their unsettled territorialproblems. As late as 1957,only a short while before the
overthrowof the monarchyin Iraq,the two sides reachedan agreementto appoint
a joint commission for the administrationof the Shatt al-Araband to submit the
issue of boundarydemarcationto a Swedish arbitrator.15 Cooperationreached its
peak with the participationof the two states in the BaghdadPact (1955-58).
The overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq by General Qasim in July
1958, with its attendant surge of communist power in Iraq and intensified
Iraqi-Sovietrelations, aroused deep concern in Tehran and drove Iran to enter
into a defense agreementwith the United States in 1959.To a certainextent, until
that time bilateral relations had been governed by a spirit of royal solidarity
similar to the one characterizingthe monarchicalpost-WestphalianEuropean
state-system; geopolitical interests apart, neither regime had sought to discredit
its counterpart since both derived their legitimacy from the same principle of
dynastic sanctity. Withthe delegitimizationof the Iraqimonarchicalsystem, Iran
could only hope that the new regimewould also recognize a basic convergence of
interests between the two countries.
Tehransoon realizedthat geopoliticalrealitieswere strongerthan revolutionary rhetoric. To be sure, Qasim's break with his predecessors' pro-Western
conduct and the reorientationof Iraq'sforeignpolicy in the directionof the Soviet
Union was by no means a minor development.As noted by a long-timeobserver
of Iraqi politics, however, "Qasim's foreign policy was governed by essentially
the same forces that shaped the foreignpolicy of the Old Regime." 16 A protege of
the formerprime minister, Nuri al-Said, Qasim apparentlyinheriteda measure of
his patron's awareness of both Iraq's relative weakness vis-a-vis its non-Arab
neighbors and its common interests with them. This awareness was already
reflectedin the proclamationof the July Revolution, which stated Iraq's intention
to cultivate brotherlyties with Arab and Muslim states and to honor previously
signed internationalundertakings.Accordingly,Qasimwas extremelyreluctantto
dissociate Iraq from the BaghdadPact, taking the ultimate step of withdrawing
from the defense organizationon March 24, 1959, only in the face of heavy
internaland external pressures.17
Notwithstandingtwo severe bilateralcrises-December 1959-January1960
and February-April 1961,18-the general pattern of Iraqi-Iranian relations,
namely, Iraq's awareness of Iran's potential and Tehran's inability to transform
its inherent dominance into regional hegemony, was fundamentallymaintained
15. R. K. Ramazani,Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville:University Press of
Virginia, 1975), p. 402.
16. M. Khadduri,Republican Iraq, p. 181.
17. Ibid., pp. 182-4.
18. For a detailed descriptionof the crises see Ramazani,Iran's Foreign Policy, pp. 401-2;
ShahramChubinand SepehrZabih,The Foreign Relations of Iran, (Berkeley:Universityof California
Press, 1974),pp. 172-6; Abdulghani,Iraq and Iran, pp. 15-6.

IRAN-IRAQ* 263

duringthe Qasim years and furtherconsolidatedin the post-Qasimera. It was not

accidental that Egypt, rather than neighboring Iraq, spearheaded the Arab
campaignagainst Iran duringthe 1950s and the 1960s. Indeed, while Egypt was
voicing the claim for Arabistan(that is, Khuzistan), Iraq was preoccupied with
removing sources of bilateralfriction, such as Iraniansupport for the Kurds in
Iraqand offshoreoil concessions. Withinthis framework,the Iraqipresident,Abd
al-RahmanArif, dispatcheda high-rankingdelegationled by the foreign minister
and ministerof state to Tehranin February1964to discuss bilateralissues. In late
1965 a vigorous exchange of notes took place between the premiers. Relations
between the two states reachedtheirpeak in March1967when PresidentArif paid
an official visit to Iran.
Although failing to produce any concrete results, these contacts alleviated
mutual apprehensionsand distrust and, above all, depicted the persistent joint
interest in accommodation.Yet this spiritwas soon to give way to antagonismand
bitter rivalry as external developmentsupset the long-heldbalance of weakness,
thereby driving Iran to attempt to translate its geopolitical superiorityvis-a-vis
Iraq into the concrete currencyof hegemony.
Iran's Road to Regional Hegemony: 1968-1975
The 1970switnessed a gradualevolutionfroma balanceof weakness to Iran's
ascendancy to militaryleadershipin the PersianGulf. This process, which began
in the late 1960sand became an establishedfact in 1975with the conclusion of the
borderagreementbetween Iranand Iraq, was the result of Shah MuhammadReza
Pahlavi's ambitions-a combinationof hegemonial, indeed, even imperial, aspirations and a desire for absolute security.
Because of a series of events, the shahembarkedon an ambitiousdrive aimed
at assertingIran's position as the leadingpower in the Gulf: the announcementin
1968of Britain'sintentionto withdrawfrom its militarybases east of Suez, Iraq's
growingalignmentwith the Soviet Union, the diminutionof a direct Soviet threat
following the significantimprovementin Iranian-Sovietrelationsbeginningin the
early 1960s,and risingoil revenues. To justify this policy, the shah arguedthat the
responsibilityfor maintainingGulf securitylay solely with the local states and that
no external powers were to be allowed to interferein the affairsof the region. As
the largest and most powerful Gulf country, Iran had a moral, historical, and
geopoliticalobligationto ensure stabilityin this regionnot only for benefitslocally
but also for the benefit of the world.19
19. The shah on many occasions emphasized his views as reported by the Guardian (London),
October 9, 1971; Agence France-Presse, June 24, 1974, from Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS-MEA), June 24, 1974, p. RI; Deutsche Presse Agentur, June 10, 1976, from FBIS-MEA, June
11, 1976, p. R2.

264 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

The shah's perceptionof Iranas the "guardianof the Gulf,''20 a regulartheme

in his pronouncementsin the 1970s, manifesteditself in an impressive expansion
of Iran's militarycapabilitiesthat turnedit into the most powerfulcountry in the
Gulf. This new prowess was highlightedby a series of Iranianactions intendedto
signal-both to the Gulf countries and the Great Powers-exactly who had the
finalsay in the region. These included,interalia, the occupationon November 30,
1971, of the islands of Abu Musa and the Greaterand Lesser Tunbs, near the
Straitof Hormuz, which were at the time underthe sovereigntyof the emiratesof
Shara and Ras al-Khaymarespectively. Also includedwas the militaryintervention in Omanfrom 1972-76at the requestof SultanQabusto suppressthe Dhofari
rebels then operatingalong Oman'sborderwith South Yemen (and supportedby
the latter).
The most salient manifestationof the shah's mounting ambitions was the
intensifyingpressure on Iraq, a neighborthat was clearly less powerful but one
that constituted the only potential obstacle on Iran's road to militarysupremacy
in the Gulf. In July 1969, Tehran was implicated in an abortive coup attempt
against the Baath regime in Iraq.21During that same year Iran had already
challengedthe prevailingstatus quo by unilaterallyabrogatingthe 1937agreement
on the navigationregime in the Shatt al-Arab.These actions were followed by a
series of Iranian moves in the early 1970s that severely exacerbated bilateral
relations:among them, attemptspoliticallyto isolate Iraqfrom other Arab states
of the Gulf throughthe establishmentof a regionaldefense organizationcomprising Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and the provisionof extensive economic and
militaryassistance to the Kurdishrebels in northernIraq. The growing hostility
between the two countries erupted into violence in the winter of 1974-75 with
fierce borderclashes involvingtanks, heavy artillery,and aircraftwhich virtually
left the Iraqi army on the verge of collapse.
Unable to suppress an insurgencythat imposed an intolerableburdenon its
domestic system, Iraqhad no alternativebut to seek some kind of agreementwith
Iranthat would lead to the withdrawalof Iraniansupportfor the Kurds. This took
the form of the Algiers Agreementof March6, 1975,which contained significant
Iraqi territorial concessions, including the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab
waterway's boundaryon the basis of the thalweg line.22
20. See, for example, Tehran Domestic Service, October 6, 1970, in British Broadcasting
Corporation(BBC), Summary of World Broadcasts, October 8, 1970, ME/3502/A/1;Guardian,
October 9, 1971; Financial Times, May 31, 1973; Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1973.

21. FredHalliday,Iran:Dictatorshipand Development(Harmondsworth,UK: Penguin,1979),

p. 274.
22. The Algiers Agreementstipulatedthe demarcationof the landfrontierin accordancewith
the 1913Protocol of Constantinopleand the verbalaccord of 1914;agreementto demarcatethe Shatt
al-Arabwaterway'sboundaryon the basis of the thalwegline; agreementto "re-establishsecurityand
mutual confidence along their common frontiers" and undertaketo exercise a strict and effective
controlwith the aim of finallyputtingan end to "all infiltrationsof a subversivecharacterfrom either
side"; the pledge of both parties to regard the provisions negotiated at the 1975Organizationof
PetroleumExportingCountriesmeetingas indivisibleelements of a comprehensivesettlement, such

IRAN-IRAQ* 265

The Algiers Agreementopened a new era in regionalrelations, the era of Pax

Irana. The agreement reflected Baghdad's painful realization that an effective
enforcement of Iraq's internal sovereignty depended on the goodwill of its
neighborto the east. Withinless than a decade, the shah had managedto achieve
his goal-to substitute a relationship that presupposed unquestioned Iranian
dominancefor the old Iraq-Iranstatus quo based on the 1937agreement. Having
attainedthis goal, Irannaturallyevolved froma revisionistinto a status quo power
and began to advocate the perpetuationof stabilityin the Gulf. Iraq, for its part,
was neitherin the position to underminethe newly establishedregionalordernor
did it have any inclinationto do so. Instead, the Baath regime turned inward to
halt the Kurdishinsurgency, to reconstructits armedforces, and to stabilize the
country's social, economic, and political systems. Consequently, the Algiers
Agreementwas followed by a period of much reduced tension between Iraq and
Iran, a period that lasted for four years until the overthrow of the shah.
GOING TO WAR:IRAQAND REVOLUTIONARY IRAN
The IranianRevolution and the inception of the Islamic Republic changed
Iran's strategicrelationshipwith Iraqfundamentally,as the revolutionaryregime
sought to overturnthe status quo providedfor by the Algiers Agreement. Even
though revolutionaryambitionswere also related to the rest of the Gulf states as
well, several factors made Iraqthe primarytargetfor the export of the revolution.
WithShias accountingfor approximately60 percentof Iraq'stotal population,the
revolutionaryregime in Tehrancould, and certainlydid, entertainhopes that this
community, which had always viewed itself as a deprivedgroup, would emulate
the Iranianexample and rise against its "oppressors." These expectations were
furtherfueled not only by the secular "heretic" natureof the Baath, which was
adamantlyopposed to the very notion of an Islamicpoliticalorder, but also by the
location of the holiest Shi'i shrines-Karbala, Najaf, and Kazimiyya-on Iraqi
territory,a combinationthat could serve as a potentiallypowerfulweapon in the
hands of the Islamic regime.
Above all, however, the mullahs in Tehranwere confronted with the same
geostrategic dilemma faced by the shah a decade earlier: Iraq's position as the
majorpotentialobstacle to Iran's quest for regionalhegemony. Just as the shah's
road to supremacyinvolved subduingIraq, the replacementof the status quo in
the PersianGulf by an Islamic orderhad to begin with the removal of the primary
hindranceto this goal, the secular Baath regime. In the words of Hujjatal-Islam
Sadeq Khalkhali,"We have taken the path of true Islam and our aim in defeating
that a breach of any one would be considered a violation of the spirit of the Algiers Agreement. For
the English text of the agreement see the New York Times, March 8, 1975.

266 mMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Saddam [Hussein] lies in the fact that we consider Saddamthe main obstacle to
the advance of Islam in the region.''23
Interestinglyenough, Iraq's initial response to the shah's departureand the
emergence of Ayatollah RuhollahKhomeiniwas by and large positive. Not only
did the Baath regime not attempt to take advantageof the civil strife in Iran to
revise the Algiers Agreement, but it was also quick to indicate its willingness to
abide by the status quo between the two states. As then-Vice President Saddam
Hussein put it, "A regime which does not supportthe enemy againstus and does
not intervene in our affairs, and whose world policy correspondsto the interests
of the Iranian and Iraqi people, will certainly receive our respect and
appreciation. "'24

This positive attitudetowardthe revolutionaryregime continuedthroughout

the spring and summer of 1979. The Iraqi government took the opportunityof
Iran'swithdrawalfromthe CentralTreatyOrganization(CENTO)to offer its good
offices in case Iran should decide to join the Non-AlignedMovement, and as late
as August 1979 Iraqi authoritiesextended an invitation to the Iranianpremier,
Mehdi Bazargan,to visit Iraq.25The Iraqileaders at the time referredto Iran as
a brotherly nation, linked to the Arab people of Iraq by "strong ties of Islam,
history and noble traditions,"and praisedthe revolutionaryregime in Tehranfor
pursuinga policy that underlinedthese "deep historical relations." 26
Tehran did not, however, reciprocate this goodwill. In June 1979, the
revolutionaryregime began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rise up and
overthrow the Baath regime.27A few months later, Tehran escalated its antiBaath campaignby resumingits supportfor the IraqiKurds (which had ended in
1975), providing aid to undergroundShi'i movements (in particularthe Da'wa
Party) in Iraq, and initiatingattacks against prominentIraqi officials, the most
significantbeing the failed attempt on the life of Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi deputy
premier, on April 1, 1980.
To check these pressures, Baghdad resorted to suppressing Shi'i underground organizations, expelling Iranian citizens (as well as Iraqi citizens of
Persian origin) en masse, attempting to organize a united Arab front, and
supportingIranianseparatistelements such as the IranianKurdsand the Arabs in
Khuzistan. These countermeasuresfailed to impress the revolutionaryregime,
and, respondingto Hussein's pledge to take revenge for the attempton the life of
Aziz, Ayatollah Khomeinicalled on the IraqiShias on June 9, 1980,to overthrow
Saddam'sgovernment.Iran'sforeignminister,SadeghGhobtzadegh,revealed on
the same day that his government had made the decision to topple the Baath
23. Tehran Domestic Service, July 24, 1982, in BBC Summary, July 27, 1982, ME/7088/A/2.
24. Iraqi News Agency, February 14, 1979, from FBIS-MEA, February 15, 1979, p. El.
25. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, pp. 58-9.
26. See, for example, interview with President Ahmad Hasan Baqr, in BBC Summary, May 22,
1979, ME/6122/A/1-2.
27. See, for example, BBC Summary, June 8, 1979, ME/6144/A5 and June 9, 1979, ME/
6145/A7.

IRAN-IRAQ* 267

regime. The same theme was reiteratedtwo days later by the Iranianpresident,
Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr,who also warnedthat Iran would go to war in the event
of further deterioration in the situation on the border.28In April 1980, the
Iranian-Iraqiconfrontationentered a new phase with clashes along the common
frontier;in August these escalated into heavy fightinginvolving tank and artillery
duels and air strikes.
Iran's activities in general, and the protractedand escalating border fighting
in particular,led Iraqi decision makers to the conclusion that Baghdad had no
alternativebut to contain the Iranianthreatby resortingto arms. Faced, for the
second time within a decade, with Iran's determinationto reshape the regional
status quo according to its own design and with the bitter memory of armed
conflicts with Iranin the early 1970s,the Baathleaders seriously doubtedthat the
Iraqi political system could sustain anotherprolonged, exhausting confrontation
with Iran. Added to these concerns was the view of the nature of the new
theocratic regime with its uncompromisingand revolutionary goals and the
growing evidence that the Iranianregime was set upon destabilizingthe Baath.
Consequently, the Iraqigovernmentgraduallycame to realize that the only way
to contain the Iranianthreat was to exploit Iran's temporaryweakness following
the revolution and to raise the stakes for both sides by resortingto armedforce.
CONCLUSIONS
Iranian-Iraqirelations in general, and the outbreak of the Iran-IraqWar in
particular,illustratethe validity of the general rule that "vicinity, or nearness of
situation,constitutes nations [sic] naturalenemies."29These factors also describe
the limits of this rule. On the one hand, the elements of competition and rivalry
inherentin almost any neighborlyinteractionhave not been absent from IranianIraqi relations, as evidenced by the various crises and wars between the two
states. On the other hand, notwithstandingthe ethnic and religious divisions
among Persians and Arabs, the periods of convergence and cooperationbetween
twentieth-century Iran and Iraq have exceeded by far those of hostility and
antagonism.
This state of affairs stems from the markedgeopolitical inequality between
Iranand Iraqthat moderatedthe acuteness of the inherentsources of antagonism
and generated a mutually recognized modus vivendi. This compromise was
maintainedfor nearly five decades and was characterizedby Baghdad's awareness of Iranian geopolitical superiorityand by Tehran's inability to impose its
hegemony over Iraq. Moreover, even after the disappearanceof the balance of
weakness and the consequent Iraniandrive for regional hegemony, Iraq, after a
28. Guardian, April 3, 1980; Financial Times, April 12, 1980; International Herald Tribune,
April 10, 1980; Daily Telegraph, April 9, 1980.
29. Alexander Hamilton, as quoted in Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin, 1979), p. 157.

268 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

brief period of resistance, proved willing to abide by the new status quo
established by the Algiers Agreement.
It was only after 1979 when the revolutionaryregime in Iran had begun its
determinedthrustto replace the regionalsetting with the hithertounprecedented
idea of an Islamic order-a thrust that inscribed on its ideological flag the
overthrow of the Baath regime-that Iraq no longer felt able to live with Iran's
position of superiority because of the simple fact that acquiescence could
eventually lead to the regime's demise. In the Iraqi view, then, the geopolitical
relationship between Iraq and Iran was transformedby the revolution from a
.'mixed motive game" into a zero-sumgame. The shah, for all his militarypower
and ambitiousobjectives was perceived by Iraqisas rational,even if unpleasant.
Certainly his goals from the late 1960s onward were opposed to Iraqi national
interests, and he could satisfy them only at Iraq's expense. With the exception,
however, of the 1969plot, the shahwas not so muchinterestedin topplingthe Baath
regimeas he was in preventingIraqfrom competingmilitarilywith Iran. Once the
shah'saspirationsfor Gulfhegemonywere recognized,a deal-disadvantageousas it
was for Iraq-was struckand both partieswere expected to live up to it.
Paradoxically,the Gulf war, the most acute direct outcome of Iran's attempt
to export its revolutionary message, introduced a fundamental, though not
precipitous, shift in Iran's perceptionof its regionalrole toward the direction of
the shah's geopolitical world view. With Iran's ill-equippedarmedforces unable
to breach the Iraqi line of defense, the civilian populationdecisively exhausted,
and the economy largely devastated, most of the Iranian decision makers
increasinglybecame disillusioned with the far-reachingaspirationsto shape the
Gulf along Islamic lines; they opted insteadto agree to a cease-fireon the basis of
the 1975 status quo. As Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,then speaker of the
Iranianparliamentand the strongestpoliticalfigurein Tehranafter Khomeini,put
it in February 1986at one of Iran's brightestmoments in the war, the capture of
the Faw Peninsula, "We do accept that half of the Shatt al-Arabbelongs to Iran
and the other half to Iraq. We do accept the thalweg which is internationallaw.
We seek nothing more than that."30
In short, Tehran'sacceptanceof United Nations SecurityCouncilResolution
598 and its insistence duringthe peace talks on the perpetuationof the 1975status
quo depict a keen awareness on the part of the revolutionary regime of the
reemergenceof the balance of weakness in Iranian-Iraqirelations and, therefore,
the consequent need to scale down, however temporarily,Iran's regional ambitions. Whetherand for how long this newly established balance will survive still
remainsto be seen.

30. Tehran Domestic Service, February 24, 1986, in BBC Summary, February 26, 1986,
ME/8193/A/3, emphasis added.