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Term Paper On A Priori Knowledge
Term Paper On A Priori Knowledge
1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. All squares have four edges.
3. For any propositions P and Q, if it is true that P or Q and it is false that P, then
it is true that Q.
4. If A > B and B > C, then A > C.
5. No surface can be uniformly read and uniformly blue at the same time.
Dialectical Arguments for a priori reasons
First argument: It is concerned with the relation between experience and certain of
the beliefs which it intuitively seems to justify. On any account of the justificatory
force of experience, there will be some beliefs whose justification derives from a
direct relation to experience and others whose relation to experience is less direct.
The most straightforward version of this picture would be a broadly foundationalist
view in which the more directly justified beliefs are justified by the content of
experience alone, without the need for any reasoning or any further premises.
The class of beliefs that are broadly empirical but clearly not justified by a direct
relation to experience is extremely large and important, something that is so for any
conception of the scope of direct experiential justification that has ever been
seriously advocated. This indirectly justified class of beliefs will include at least:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
How can experience non-directly justify beliefs of these kinds? If experience can
provide a good reason for thinking that a belief in this category is true, then we
have a logically prior good reason for believing some conditional proposition having
a conjunction of beliefs for which there are direct experiential reasons as
antecedent and the further belief we are focusing on as consequent
b (Jeb -> Jl(b1&b2&bn) -> b), where Jeb = a belief justified by experience and Jlb is belief
justified by logically prior reason
P1: Experience (e) can indirectly-justify (IJ) a belief (B).
P2: If P1, then (b1&b2&bn) -> B).
P3: (b1&b2&bn) -> B.
C: IJeB
Here, b1, b2,bn are propositions that are directly justified by experience.
The argument depends on the truth of the conditional (P3). Why should we assume its truth? If B can be
reduced completely to the conjunction of beliefs that are directly justified by experience, then the
conditional is directly justified by experience. However, if B is irreducible to the conjunction and is over
and above the conjunction, then B cannot be directly justified by experience. Given this, it follows that
the conditional is justified a priori. Otherwise, we have no reason for thinking that any empirical claim
that is not directly justified by experience is true. (This seems an extreme outcome to BonJour).
2nd argument for a priori reasons
P1: If {(p->q)&p}->q (P), then there is a good reason for thinking that a conditional claim is true (Q).
P2. Q cannot be established by experience.
P3: Q can be established by another argument (conditional in form, involving transition from premisses to
conclusion), but this doesnt answer the issuewhat establishes the truth of the conditional claim? Only
leads to further regress.
C: Q can only be established a priori.