CIVIL LAW

FELIPE vs. LEUTERIO

G.R. No. L-4606, May 30, 1952
FACTS
On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was
held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the
chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the
second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges
protesting

the

verdict

and

alleged

that

one

of

the

judges

committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board

refused

to

amend

their

award,

Imperial

filed

complaint

in

court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3 rd place in the
vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place.
ISSUE
Does the Judiciary have the power to reverse the award of the
board of judges of an oratorical contest?
HELD
No. The Judiciary does not have the power to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical contest. No jurisdiction.
Error is contemplated by law as a misapplication of a statute or
provision.

There

could

be

error

in

the

computation

of

final

scores, but it is not error in context of law. The Court would

not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar
contests. The decision of the board in such contests, although
only implied, is final and unappealable.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.

PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY, INC vs. YABUT

G.R. No. 108115, October 27, 1995
FACTS
John Elston Yabut was disqualified from joining the third race
for violating the weight requirement for soap box derby after
winning

the

first

race.

As

result

disqualification,

the

father,

private respondent Geminiano Yabut, Jr. (together with

Roadway Express, Inc.) filed a complaint for actual, moral and

exemplary damages with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
alleging that the arbitrary disqualification of his son caused
embarrassment

and

humiliation

resulting

to

"mental

anguish,

serious anxiety, social humiliation and sleepless nights.

ISSUE
Does

disqualification

embarrassment

and

from

humiliation

the

race

entitle

that
the

resulted

private

into

respondent

Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral damages?

HELD
No.

Disqualification

embarrassment

and

from

humiliation

the
does

race
not

that

resulted

entitle

the

into

private

respondent Germiniano Yabut, Jr. and his son to claims to moral

damages.
John Elston Yabut should have observed the rules of sportsmanship
and sporting play.

The maxim that "the judges decision is final"

simplifies sports adjudication to a degree which the larger arena

of life does not ordinarily mirror. Nonetheless, it is simplicity
in procedure which we of the courts ought to altogether idealize
or sometimes aim for.

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

Court

of

Appeals

Amended

Decision dated December 9, 1992 is hereby REVERSED and the trial

court's decision REINSTATED.

PE vs. PE
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
FACTS
Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an
unmarried

woman

24

years

of

age.

Defendant,

married

man,

frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted

her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and
conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this
they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair
continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared
from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the
handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador
the present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil
Code.

The

lower

court

dismissed

the

action

and

plaintiffs

appealed.

ISSUE
Are the plaintiffs-appellants correct in filing a case against
the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and name by
having an affair with the daughter of the first?

HELD
Yes.

The

plaintiffs-appellants

are

correct

in

filing

case

against the defendant-appellee for tarnishing their honor and

name by having an affair with the daughter of the first.
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was
he, who seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in
love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and
love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with
her.
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Defendant

is

sentenced

to

pay

the

plaintiffs

attorney's fees and expenses of litigations.

Costs against appellee.

HERMOSISIMA vs. CA
4

for

damages,

G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960

FACTS
The complainant was 10 yrs older than the petitioner but they had
a very intimate relationship that's why they are regarded as
engaged then they had a child. However, the petitioner breaches
his promise to marry the complainant and married a woman named
Romanita

Perez.

This

served

as

the

cause

of

action

of

the

complainant to file a complaint against the petitioner.

Soledad Cagigas, the complaint, filed with said of her child,
Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry the complainant; he married another
woman. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, to pay, by
way of alimony pendente lite, and for other damages.

ISSUE
Whether or not the moral damages are recoverable for breach of
promise to marry
HELD
Yes. Moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.
Because

of

petitioner's

seduction

power,

the

complainant,

overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual

desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman
after all,

Section 1, Article 2217 of the Civil Code provides:

5

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,

serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission.
Article 2219 also states that:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
It appeared that because of the defendant-appellants seductive
prowess,

plaintiff-appellee

overwhelmed

by

her

love

for

him

yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and selfcontrol.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and
the

moral

damages,

which

were

increased

to

P5,614.25

compensatory damages and P7,000.00 for moral damages.

for

TANJANCO vs. SANTOS

G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
FACTS
Apolonio Tanjanco, (defendant) and Araceli Santos have a carnal
relationship in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage
(undying love, etc). Because of their sexual relationship, the
plaintiff conceived a child and the defendant refused to marry
Santos. Santos claimed that defendant caused her moral shock,
mental and emotional anguish and social humiliation. (Art 21 of
the new Civil Code)
The Lower court dismissed the case due to failure to state the
cause of action.
The Court of Appeals favored Santos.

ISSUE
Whether or not breach of a promise to marry can be consider

HELD
No. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained
intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with
the

idea

of

seduction.

mutual passion.

Plainly,

there

is

voluntariness

and

Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no

other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by

CFI in dismissing the complaint.
It was also established that their sexual relationship continued
even after Tanjacos refusal to marry Santos.

AYTONA vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962

FACTS
December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed
petitioner

(DominadorAytona)

as

ad

interim

Governor

of

the

Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath.

When Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued
Order No. 2 which recalled Aytonas position and at the same time
he appointed Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is
qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was
validly appointed by the ex-president. Macapagal averred that the
ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly
done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an
attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

ISSUE
Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

HELD
No it is not. Such appointment is not valid.
In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments

in

one

night,

President

Garcia

exercised

double

care; and therefore, such appointments fall beyond the intent and
spirit of

the

constitutional

provision

granting

authority to issue ad interim appointments.

the

Executive

GILLERA vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-20741, January 31, 1964
FACTS
December 26, 1961 Socorro Gillera was appointed as interim
member of the board of pharmaceutical examiners by Pres.
Carlos

P.

Garcia

for

three

years.

Gillera

accepted

the

appointment, took oath on Dec. 28, 1961, and assumed office

until Dec. 31, 1961 where the exec sec informed her of her
withdrawal in view of Pres. Admin. Order No. 2
On Dec. 29, 1962 Corazon C. Fernandez was appointed to the
position which was already occupied by petitioner. Solicitor
General for the respondent contested that because that was
withdrawn and recalled pursuant to Administrative Order No.
2 of the President, but by virtue of the two presidential
designations

on

January

11

and

May

18,

1962,

which

terminated upon the release of the examination results on

June 14, 1962; that her participation in the July, 1962
examinations was effected upon the verbal permission and on
the belief of the former Executive Secretary of the Board of
Examiners. Amado del Rosario, that in the absence of a
successor, petitioner could continue discharging the office
of

examiner

under

the

"hold-over"

doctrine;

that

"the

designation of respondent Fernandez to the position of Dr.

Cruz which petitioner (Gillera) was occupying by virtue of
her designation" indicated that the latter's right to the
same position had already ceased.
ISSUES
Is the ad interim appointment of the petitioner on Dec. 28,
1961 validly recalled or withdrawn?
RULING
9

The court has decided that petitioners appointment is valid

and she is entitled to the position as member of the board
of pharmaceutical examiners. this Court not only did not
categorically declare Administrative Order No. 2 valid and
all appointments made by then outgoing President Garcia,
ineffective, but clearly indicated that its decision was
more

influenced

by

the

doubtful

character

of

the

appointments themselves and not by the contention that the

President had validly recalled them. As a matter of fact, in
the decision in that Aytona case it was stated that, "the
filling

up

of

vacancies

(by

the

outgoing

President)

in

important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some

assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of
the

need

for

the

appointment

and

the

appointee's

qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted." It is for the

foregoing

basic

consideration,

i.e.,

the

necessity

of

filling the position, that the appointee is qualified, and

that it was not one of those "mass ad interim appointments"
issued

in

single

night,

that

this

Court

upheld

the

validity of an appointment to the position of Auxiliary

Justice of the Peace,
released

on

extended by President Garcia and

December

20,

1961,

notwithstanding

Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal.

In the instant case, even the new President recognized the
need for the immediate filling of the position of Member of
the

Board

of

Pharmaceutical

Examiners,

in

view

of

the

examinations that were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7,

1962, that he (the President) saw it fit, "as a matter of
emergency

in

order

not

to

disrupt

public

service"

to

"designate" petitioner herself to the same position to which

she was previously appointed and had qualified. There is
also no allegation that petitioner is not qualified to the
said

office,

or

that

her

appointment
10

was

one

of

those

attended by the "mad scramble in Malacaan" in the evening

of

December

29,

1961.

On

the

contrary,

it

is

not

controverted by respondents that petitioner's appointment

was extended on December 26, 1961 or even before the actual
expiry of the term of Examiner Cruz, which was a few days
before

the

examinations

would

take

place,

although

said

appointment was to take effect only on December 28, 1961,

and in fact petitioner took her oath of office only on the
latter date. Clearly, it cannot be said that in the instant
case, petitioner's appointment was not the result of the
President's deliberate action, considering her qualification
and the exigency of the service.

ALBETZ INVESTMENTS, INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. L-32570, February 28, 1977
FACTS
The Calma spouses were the lessees of a lot in Prudencio
Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The defendant Albetz Investments,
Inc., the lessor, needing the premises in order to construct
a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to it and upon
refusal

of

the

Calma

brought

an

action

of

Spouses,

Albetz

Investments,

unlawful

detainer

against

Inc.

Vicenta

Calma. Judgment by default was rendered by the Municipal

Court, ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under
her to vacate the premises and to pay the corresponding
rentals. The judgment having become final, Atty. Macario
S. Meneses,

director

and

lawyer

of

Albetz

Investments,

Inc., filed a motion for execution. The motion was granted

and the Municipal Court issued the writ of execution. To
forestall the enforcement of the writ of execution, private
respondents
certiorari

file
and

several

actions,

injunction,

to

petition

wit;
for

petition

for

certiorari

and

prohibition, and action for specific performance

11

Four days after the dismissal of the last action or eighteen

months

from

execution

the

and

date

the

of

the

consequent

issuance
writ

of

of

the

writ

demolition,

of
the

Sheriff, at the instance of defendant Albetz Investments,

Inc., thru its lawyer, Atty. Meneses, demolished the house
of'

the

spouses

Calma

without any

new

writ

or

order

for demolition having been issued by the Municipal Court

.They commenced the instant action in the Court of First
Instance

of

defendants

Manila.

and

the

They

deputy

contend
sheriff

among

others

demolished

the

that
house

indiscriminately and the personal properties were carelessly

placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs .The
Court of Appeals affirmed en toto the decision of the Court
of First Instance.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower courts erred in awarding damages in
favor of Calma Spouses
RULING
Negative. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

Certainly,

the

demolition

complained

of

in

the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent

with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner,
it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the
occupants

of

the

their belongings

house

there

no

from.

time
No

at

damage

all

to

remove

worth mentioning

would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments,

Inc. if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed
to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties,
12

considering that this would not have taken a considerable

length of time

FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
FACTS
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 151 rendered decision denying the petition for declaration
of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
court

noted

that

suffering

from

epilepsy

does

not

amount

to

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and

the evidence on record was insufficient to prove infidelity. On
April

20,

2001,

petitioner's

motion

for

reconsideration

was

denied, the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence

that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing

them,

could

not

have

given

valid

assumption

thereof.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in

toto the judgment of the trial court. On June 9, 2004, Court of
Appeals

resolves

the

motion

for

reconsideration

filed

by

petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris, denying the petition for

review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the said
court dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively,
for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court
of Appeals committed any reversible error.

ISSUE
: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of marriage will render the judgment in
favor to the petitioner?
13

RULING
The petition is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
The

evidence

on

record

did

not

convincingly

establish

that

respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is

absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at
the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
The Court found Brixs alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"Leaving-the-house" attitude whenever he and Amy quarreled, the
violent

tendencies

infidelity,
preference

the
to

family, are
condition
essential

abandonment

spend

not

but

during

more

rooted
mere

obligations

epileptic

attacks,

and

of

time

with

on some

refusal
of

lack

or

support,

his band

mates

debilitating
unwillingness

marriage.

the

mere

sexual
and

his

than

his

psychological
to

assume

the

showing

of

irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no

wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage

SEVILLA vs. CARDENAS

G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006
FACTS

14

In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he

claimed

that

through

employed

upon

him

by

machinations,
Carmelita

N.

duress

and

Cardenas

and

intimidation
the

latters

father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the

Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and
signed a marriage contract before the Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did obtain any marriage
license

from

any

Civil

Registry.

Consequently,

no

marriage

license was presented to the solemnizing officer. For her part,

Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime and claimed that she
and

Jaime

were

married

civilly

and

in

church

ceremony

thereafter. She claimed that both marriages were registered with

the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. Also, she contends that he is stopped from invoking the
lack of marriage license after having married to her for 25
years. The trial court declared the marriage void ab initio due
to the absence of a marriage license. It is based its ruling in
the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar that no
marriage license was issued in favour of the parties, thus the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage was fictitious.

ISSUE
Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar
stating that no marriage license was issued are sufficient to
declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

RULING
The petition is DENIED.
Marriage License is an essential requisite for the validity of a
marriage. -

A marriage license is an essential requisite for the

15

validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is

of no exception.
The certification must state that the document does not exist.
Thus the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his
office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient
proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule
132 of the rules of Court.

Presumption of regularity, rebutted. Given the documentary and

testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792
may

have

been

entered,

the

presumption

of

regularity

of

performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in

issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According to
Section 3(m),[20] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed is among the
disputable
official

presumptions.
acts

may

be

The

presumption

rebutted

by

of

regularity

affirmative

evidence

of
of

irregularity or failure to perform a duty .The presumption of

regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can
be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the
first and second certifications. Moreover, the absence of the
logbook

is

not

conclusive

proof

of

non-issuance

of

Marriage

License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as [th]e [Court[ believed

true in case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
logbook, [th]e [Court] cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

16

The States policy is towards the strengthening of the family.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact

leans

towards

the

validity

of

the

marriage,

the

indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this

presumption with great favour. It is not to be lightly replied;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is
mindful

of

the

policy

of

1987

Constitution

to

protect

and

strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution

and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

17

FAMANILA vs. CA
G.R. No. 150429, August 29, 2006
FACTS
This

is

petition

for

review

on

certiorari

assailing

the

decision of the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the ruling of

the NLRC which dismissed petitioners complaint for payment of
disability and other benefits.
Petitioner

Roberto

Famanila

was

hired

by

the

respondent

NFD

International Manning Agents, Inc. as a Messman for Hansa Riga, a

vessel

registered

barbership

and

Management

owned

by

Limited.

its

He

principal,

was

respondent

repatriated

by

the

principal because of his permanently disability. With this, he

signed a Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991 and settled
his claim by accepting the amount of US$13,200 from respondents.
Petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of disability
benefits,

share

in

the

insurance

proceeds,

moral

damage

and

attorneys fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint due to

prescription,

which

was

affirmed

by

the

NLRC

and

the

CA.

Petitioner contends that he did not sign the Receipt and Release
voluntarily or freely because of his disability. He argued that
such disability as well as financial constraints vitiated his
consent, making the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
ISSUE
Whether the Receipt and Release is valid and enforceable.
RULING
The

petition

is

DENIED.

The

Receipt

and

Release

signed

by

petitioner is valid, absent of vitiated consent.

Disability is not a factor that may vitiate consent. A vitiated
consent

does

not

make

contract

void

and

unenforceable.

vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under

the

Civil

Code,

the

vices

of

consent
18

are

mistake,

violence,

intimidation,

undue

influence

or

fraud.

If

consent

is

given

through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract

is voidable. A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a
proper action in court Petitioner contends that his permanent and
total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release
thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability
is not among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save
for petitioners self-serving allegations, there is no proof on
record

that

his

consent

was

vitiated

on

account

of

his

disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the

validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld.
Dire necessity is not a ground for annulling the Receipt and
Release. it is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere
consent and from that moment the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of

what has been expressly stipulated but also

to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be

in

keeping

with

good

faith,

usage

and

law.

Further,

dire

necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt

and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was
forced to sign it.

19

SPS BATAL vs. SPS LUZ

G.R. No. 163601, September 27, 2006
FACTS
Spouses Luz and Kenichiro contracted the services of FrankBatal
to survey the lot they purchased. Based on such survey, they
constructed concrete fence on said land. A case was filed against
them for alleged encroachment of a designated right of way. They
found out that Frank was not the licensed geodetic engineer but
his wife, Erlinda.
Frank admitted his mistake and offered to share in the expenses
for

the

demolition

and

reconstruction

of

the

portion

of

the

fence, but he failed to deliver, prompting respondent spouses to

file

complaint.

Petitioner

spouses

contend

that

Erlinda

supervised her husbands work, and claimed that the fence was
already erected on the house and lot of respondent spouses before
they were contracted to do a resurvey and laying out of concrete
monuments. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses, and held
that encroachment of the perimeter fence on the right of way was
cause by the negligence of petitioner-spouses. The Ca affirmed
the ruling of the RTC and held that petitioner-spouses cannot
claim that the error of the construction of the fence was due to
the unilateral act if respondent spouses in building the fence
without their consent as they gave their word that the boundaries
laid on through the concrete monuments are correct.

ISSUE
Whether petitioners exercised the required diligence in laying
out the boundaries on respondents property as a basis for the
erection of a perimeter fence.

20

RULING
The petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Culpa

aquiliana

vis-a-vis

culpa

contractual.

Culpa,

or

negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as

culpa

aquiliana,

which

is

the

wrongful

or

negligent

act

or

omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an

obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other
obligation,

or

as

culpa

contractual,

which

is

the

fault

or

negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which

already

existed,

and

which

increases

the

liability

from

such

existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176

of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles; while
culpa contractual is governed Article 1170 to 1174 of the same
code.

Petitioners committed breach of contract. in the present case,

it

is

clear

contractual
diligence

in

that

the

obligations,
the

petitioners,
failed

placement

of

to

the

in

carrying

exercise
markings

for

out

the
the

their

requisite
concrete

perimeter fence that was later constructed. The placement of the

markings had been done solely by petitioner Frank Batal who is
not a geodetic engineer. It was later discovered that it was not
he but his wife, petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is the licensed
geodetic engineer and who is, therefore, the one qualified to do
the work. Petitioner Frank Batals installation of the concrete
cyclone monuments had been done without the adequate supervision
of his wife, Erlinda. As a result, the placement of the monuments
did

not

accurately

reflect

the

dimensions

of

the

lot.

The

respondents, upon assurance given by petitioner Frank Batal that

they could proceed with the construction of the perimeter fence
21

by relying on the purported accuracy of the placement of the

monuments, erected their fence which turned out to encroach in an
adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, the respondents
had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered
damages. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners
are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance
with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code

PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 107508, April 25, 1996
FACTS
Ministry of Education Culture issued a check payable to Abante
Marketing

and

drawn

against

Philippine

National

Bank

(PNB).

Abante Marketing, deposited the questioned check in its savings

account with Capitol City Development Bank (CAPITOL). In turn,
Capitol deposited the same in its account with the Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCom) which, in turn, sent the check to
PNB for clearing. PNB cleared the check as good and thereafter,
PBCom credited Capitol's account for the amount stated in the
check.

However,

PNB

returned

the

check

to

PBCom

and

debited

PBCom's account for the amount covered by the check, the reason
being that there was a "material alteration" of the check number.
PBCom, as collecting agent of Capitol, then proceeded to debit
the latter's account for the same amount, and subsequently, sent
the check back to petitioner. PNB, however, returned the check to
PBCom. On the other hand, Capitol could not in turn, debit Abante
Marketing's account since the latter had already withdrawn the
amount of the check. Capitol sought clarification from PBCom and
demanded the re-crediting of the amount. PBCom followed suit by
requesting an explanation and re-crediting from PNB. Since the
demands of Capitol were not heeded, it filed a civil suit against
PBCom which in turn, filed a third-party complaint against PNB
22

for

reimbursement/indemnity

with

respect

to

the

claims

of

Capitol. PNB, on its part, filed a fourth-party complaint against

Abante

Marketing.

The Trial Court rendered its decision, ordering PBCom to recredit or reimburse; PNB to reimburse and indemnify PBCom for
whatever
reimburse

amount
and

PBCom

pays

indemnify

PNB

to

Capitol;

for

whatever

Abante
amount

Marketing

to

PNB

to

pays

PBCom. The court dismissed the counterclaims of PBCom and PNB.

The appellate court modified the appealed judgment by ordering
PNB to honor the check. After the check shall have been honored
by PNB, the court ordered PBCom to re-credit Capitol's account
with

it

the

amount.

PNB

filed

the

petition

for

review

on

certiorari averring that under Section 125 of the NIL, any change
that

alters

the

effect

of

the

instrument

is

material

alteration.
ISSUE:
Is the alteration of the serial number a material alteration.
HELD
NO. Sec. 225. What constitutes a material alteration. Any
alteration which changes:
(a) The date;
(b) The sum payable, either for principal or interest;
(c) The time or place of payment;
(d) The number or the relations of the parties;
(e) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made;
(f) Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is
specified, or any other change or addition which alters the
effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material
alteration.

23

Petitioner alleges that under Section 125(f), any change that

alters the effect of the instrument is a material alteration. The
court does not agree.

An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of

the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument
that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party
or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change
to

an

incomplete

instrument

relating

to

the

obligation

of

party. In other words, a material alteration is one which changes

the items which are required to be stated under Section 1 of NIL.
In

his

book

entitled

Pandect

of

Commercial

Law

and

Jurisprudence, Justice Jose C. Vitug opines that an innocent

alteration (generally, changes on items other than those required
to be stated under Sec. 1, N.I.L.) and spoliation (alterations
done by a stranger) will not avoid the instrument, but the holder
may enforce it only according to its original tenor.

24

MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS

GR No. 138509, July 31, 2000
FACTS
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first
marriage

with

annulled,
marriage
1996),

Ma.

Dulce

nullified
with

and

herein

third

nor

Javier.

With

terminated,

petitioner
marriage

said

he

Imelda
with

marriage

contracted
Marbella

certain

not
a

(on

Julia

yet

second

Jan.

25,

Hernandez,

thereafter.
Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb.
25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City.

Thereafter, respondent

initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity

of his first marriage license.

He then filed a motion to suspend

the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for
nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.

The RTC granted the motion, while petitioners

motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE
Whether

or

declaration

not
of

the

subsequent

nullity

of

filing

of

previous

civil

marriage

action

for

constitutes

prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD
Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered
into

marriage.

second

marriage

during

the

subsistence

of

first

Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to

the determination of the criminal charge.

prejudicial question.

It is therefore not a

Respondent cannot be permitted to use his

malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

25

prejudicial

question

is

one

which

arises

in

case

the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved

therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from

the

crime

determines

the

but

so

guilt

intimately

or

connected

innocence

of

the

with

it

accused.

that
Its

it
two

essential elements are:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related

to

the

issue

raised

in

the

criminal

action,

and;

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the

criminal action may proceed.
In

Article

40

of

the

Family

Code,

respondent,

without

first

having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first

marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void
still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party
can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
The

reason

is

that,

without

judicial

declaration

of

its

nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the

case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case

is

not

essential

to

the

determination

of

the

criminal

charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

Parties

to

themselves

a
its

marriage

should

nullity,

not

only

be

permitted

competent

courts

to

judge

having

for
such

authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of

26

the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a

second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy

POLITICAL LAW
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
27

FACTS
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement
ratified by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods,
rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, etc.
Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners
non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to
obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling
for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the
Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the
negotiation is completed.
ISSUES
1 Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the
negotiation process are privileged
Whether

or

not

the

President

can

validly

exclude

Congress,

exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties,

from the negotiation process

RULING
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its
ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs.
Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal
28

dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought

to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the
full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA
has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006,
and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said
document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this,
however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues,
insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved'
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It
is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic
confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the
Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views
during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of
29

lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an

area of greater national interest.

NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP PANEL

G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008
FACTS
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
brought aboutby the Government of the republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) as an aspect of
Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed
inKuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the
Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus andProhibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
TemporaryRestraining Order. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which itgrants the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
theBangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural
resources within internal waters. Theagreement is composed of two
local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region inMuslim
Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions onpublic consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not
the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:
30

GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on

public consultation andthe right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it areunconstitutional
because it is contrary
.RULING
Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all
come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has
never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of
paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the
source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant
Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have
no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or
a justifiable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of
legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can
be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy
admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at
bar just because of the great public interest these cases have
generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public
opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for
settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears
or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by
other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it
31

is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental

principles of constitutional law.

LEGAL ETHICS

CERVANTES vs. PANGILINAN

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709, July 31, 2009

FACTS
32

Respondent Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan issued on December 5,

2001 a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for Slander against
the

therein

accused-herein

subsequently
December

posted

18,

2001,

bail

complainant

fixed

complainant

at

Lanie

P2,000.

pleaded

Cervantes

On

not

who

arraignment

guilty.

She

on

later

filed on January 22, 2002 a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit.

Judge Pangilinan advised complainant that he could not accept her
belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned.
Cervantes charged Judge Pangilinan with Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and Ignorance of the Law
Executive Judge Perfecto Pe of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City through a Resolution, was tasked to investigate the
complaint

made

by

Cervantes.

Judge

Pe

made

the

following

investigation:
Judge Heriberto Pangilinan failed to diligently observe the Rules
on

Summary

Procedure

in

criminal

cases.

The

case

of

simple

slander is punishable by arresto menor with a fine of not more

than P200.00 which is covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure.
Warrant of Arrest should not have been issued against Lanie . He
could have ordered Lanie Cervantes to file her Counter-Affidavit
within

ten

(10)

days

as

provided

by

[t]he

Rules

before

arraignment

ISSUE
Is Judge Heriberto Pangilinan liable with Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and Gross Ignorance of the Law?
RULING
Yes, the Court finds Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge manifested a lack of
33

mastery of the provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure.

Judge

Pangilinan

Cervantes,

issued

fixing

the

bond

Warrant
of

the

of

Arrest

accused

in

against
the

Lanie

amount

of

Php2,000.00. The requirement for the accused to p[o]st bail is

part of the regular procedure[,] not the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
While ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned
for mere errors of judgment absent any bad faith or malice, they
nonetheless have obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and
principles (Belga vs. Buban, 331 SCRA 531). The claim of good
faith and absence of malice in glaring instances of incompetence
and ineptitude does not abate a judges consequent liability.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office
to know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Creer vs. Fabillar,
337 SCRA 632 (2000); Pacris vs. Pagalilauan, 337 SCRA 638

ASTURIAS vs. SERRANO, et al.

A.C. No. 6538, November 25, 2005
FACTS
Dr. Asturias

filed

complaint

for

specific

performance

and

damages against Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) and Fedman

Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. 16640. RTC decided in favor of the complainant on April 6,
1992 to be affirmed by the Court of Appeals with Modification
that the complaint is hereby DISMISSED on July 31, 1998. FSCC did
not make an appeal regarding the decision and thus it became
34

final and executory. Then complainant filed a motion of execution

on August 10, 1999
However on July 1, 2003, the counsel of FSCC filed a petition to
annul

the

RTC

judgment

invoking

Rule

47

of

Rules

of

Court,

stating that they just discovered the decision in March 2003.

This is backed by a verification subscribed and sworn to before a
Notary Public which was made by the respondents, who were members
of the Board of Directors and unit owners of FSCC.
This was contested by the complainant because according to her,
the decision of the RTC was notified at the very latest on August
11, 1999, basing it on the Sheriffs report that the copies of
the decision were furnished to the Administrative Secretary of
FSCC.
ISSUE
It is being contested whether the respondents indeed received the
RTC decision last March 2003 or not. Upon which it will then be
determined whether the respondents are guilty of perjury because
of the sworn statement that they executed.
RULE
The burden to prove that the respondents indeed received the
decision on August 1999 lies with the complainant. Dr. Asturias
has not shown any evidence with regard to the case.
Also, in order to consider a scenario to be perjurious, there
must be a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. In
this case, as it has been mentioned in the previous paragraph,
the complainant hasnt produced or shown any evidenced that would
prove that the respondents have willfully and deliberately sworn
a falsehood in the verification made in the presence of a notary
public. Therefore the petition for review is DENIED.

35

LABOR LAW
ASIA PACIFIC CHARTERING (PHILS.) INC. vs. FAROLAN
G.R. No.151370, December 4, 2002
FACTS
The termination of a managerial employee on the ground of loss
of

confidence

should

have

basis

and

the

determination

of

the same cannot be left entirely to the employer.

Petitioner Asia Pacific Chartering (Phils.) Inc. (Asia) is tasked
with the selling of passenger and cargo spacesfor Scandinavian
Airlines

System.

Petitioner

Asia,

Catalino

Bondoc

(Bondoc),offered

through

its

Respondent

Vice
Maria

President
Linda

R.

Farolan (Farolan) the sales manager position to which Farolan

accepted.Upon Vice President Bondocs request, Farolan submitted
a detailed report attributing the drop of salesrevenue to market
forces beyond her control. Consequently, Asia directed Roberto
Zozobrado (Zozobrado)to implement solutions. Zozobrado informally
took over Farolans marketing and sales responsibilities butshe
continued to receive her salary. Asia claims that the increase in
sales revenue was due to Zozobradosmanagement. Asia then sent a
letter

of

termination

to

Farolan
36

on

the

ground

of

loss

of

confidence

forcing

Farolan

tofile

complaint

for

illegal

dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal was illegal
for lack of justcause, however, such decision was reversed by the
National

Labor

Relations

Commission

(NLRC)

stating that

the

termination of employment due to loss of confidence is within

management prerogative. On appeal,the Court of Appeals upheld the
labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Respondent Farolans dismissal was illegal
HELD
A

statement

employee

is

of

the

thus

in

requisites

for

order,

wit:

to

valid

(a)

dismissal

the

of

an

employeemust

be

afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be

heard and to defend himself; and (b)dismissal must be for a valid
cause.

The

violated

manner

by

thebasic

Respondent
defense.

She

particular
dismissal
personnel,

precepts

Farolan

theopportunity

to

as

was
be

was

acts

of

and

given

by

trust

Farolan

fairness

dismissed,

omission

required

Respondent
of

heard

never

or

loss

which

to
a

confidence

the

afforded
in

her

stating the

grounds

to

as

process

evidence

notice

respect

dismissed

being

present

written

law. With

due

without

constituting

and

and

was

rank

ground

for
and

for

her
file

valid

dismissal requiresproof of involvement in the alleged events in

question and that mere uncorroborated assertions andaccusations
by

the

employer

will

not

be

sufficient.

But

as

regards

managerial employee, mere existence of abasis for believing that

such

employee

has

breached

the

trust

of

his

employer

would

suffice for his dismissal.Loss of trust and confidence to be a

valid

ground

for

an

employees

dismissal

must

be

based

on

a willful breach and founded

on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done
intentionally,

knowingly

andpurposely,
37

without

justifiable

excuse.It is not disputed that Farolans job description, and the

terms and conditions of her employment, with theexception of her
salary

and

allowances,

were

never

reduced

to

writing.

Even

assuming, however, that Farolan was a managerial employee, the

stated ground (in the letter of termination) for her dismissal,
loss of confidence,
should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be left
entirely to the employer.

BACOLOD-TALISAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.

vs. DELA CRUZ G.R. 179563, April 30, 2009
FACTS
The twin notice requirement provided by law should be observed in order
for a dismissal to be valid.
Romeo dela Cruz (respondent) is an employee of Bacolod-Talisay
Realty Development Corporation(Bacolod-Talisay) as an overseer.
He

was

suspended

for

30

days

for

payroll

paddling,

selling

canepoints without the knowledge and consent of management and

misappropriating the proceeds thereof, and renting out tractor
for use in another farm. After 30 days, he received a letter
informing him that he was dismissedfrom his work.Respondent dela
Cruz and Bacolod-Talisay had a confrontation before the barangay
council but they did notreach any settlement. A case for illegal
dismissal was filed by dela Cruz, and it was dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter as well as the NLRC. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRCfinding that the
Bacolor-Dalisay

did

not

comply

with

the

guidelines

for

the

dismissal of an employee.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner, Bacolod-Talisay observed due process
in dismissing Romeo dela Cruz
38

HELD
The Court of Appeals correctly held though that Bacolod-Talisay
did not comply with the proper procedurein dismissing respondent.
In other words, Bacolod-Talisay failed to afford dela Cruz due
process by failing tocomply with the twin notice requirement in
dismissing him,
viz:
1)
2)

a first notice to apprise him of his fault, and;

a second notice to him that his employment is being
terminated. The letter dated June 3,1997 sent to dela
Cruz was a letter of suspension. It did not comply with
the requiredfirst notice, the purpose of which is to
apprise the employee of the cause for termination and to
give

himreasonable

opportunity

to

explain

his

side.In

fine, while the dismissal of dela Cruz was for a just

cause,

the

procedure

in

observed.

39

effecting

the

same

was

not

TAXATION

DBP vs. CA
G.R. No. 86625, December 22, 1989
FACTS
The Development Bank of the Philippines imported IBM computer
equipment from the United States, and in connection therewith
paid to the Bureau of Customs duties, compensating taxes and
import processing fees in the aggregate sum of P 5,562,926.00. It
thereafter

asked

for

refund

of

the

amount

paid,

invoking

Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 1087 (eff., Jan. 20,1986).

The Customs Commissioner refused to grant the refund, maintaining
that

the

customs

duties,

taxes

and

fees

had

been

correctly

imposed and collected.

The DBP appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on July
31, 1987 adjudicated the controversy in its favor, ordering the
Commissioner of Customs "to refund to ... (it [the DBP]) the
amount of P 5,562,926.00 it paid to the Bureau of Customs ...
(which) shall be applied and credited to the payment of the
subscribed capital stock of the Government in the Bank."
The Commissioner in turn came up to the Supreme Court on an
appeal

by

certiorari,

his

appeal
40

being

docketed

as

G.R.

No.

79635. By Resolution of the Court en banc dated September 15,

1987, however, the appeal was referred to the Court of Appeals
(CA) for the reason that "(s)uch cases emanating from the Court
of

Tax

Appeals

now

fall

within

the

exclusive

appellate

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129."
In the CA the case Ninth Division rendered judgment under date of
October 3, 1988, annulling and setting aside that of the CTA. The
CA ruled that Section 7 (2) of Republic Act No. 1125-pursuant to
which the CTA had therefore been exercising exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, inter alia- had been superseded by said P.D. No. 242, it
being "a settled rule of statutory construction that where there
is irreconcilable repugnancy between two statutes anent the same
subject matter-as there is between P.D. No. 242 and Sec. 7 (2) of
R.A. No. 1125 in regard to the manner of settlement of disputes
involving

customs

duties,

etc.

between

government

offices,

agencies and corporations-the one of late enactment, being the

latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail over
the other which is of earlier enactment."

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases
decided by the CTA.
DECISION
The Court reaffirms its earlier resolution that it is the CA
which is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the

CTA

and

other

quasi-judicial

boards, or commissions.

41

agencies,

instrumentalities,

In view of the comprehensive provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang

129

granting

to

the

IAC(now

the

CA)

"(e)xclusive

appellate

jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,

orders

or

awards

of

Regional

Trial

Courts

and

quasi-judicial

agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those

falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and
of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948." The fact that, as the DBP argues, the CTA is not among the
agencies reorganized by said Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, is of no
moment. What is essential, and indisputable, is that the law did
not, as the DBP imagines, deal only with "Changes in the rules on
procedures;"

and

that

not

only

was

the

Court

of

Appeals

reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened

by Section 9 of the Batas. Its appellate jurisdiction was also
extended to cover not only final judgments of Regional Trial
Courts, but also "all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders

or

awards

of

...

quasi-judicial

agencies,

instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling

within

the

appellate

jurisdiction

of

the

Supreme

Court

in

accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and

of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948," it being noteworthy in this connection that the text of
the law is broad and comprehensive, and the explicitly stated
exceptions
Appeals.

have
Indeed,

appellate

no

reference

the

whatever

intention

jurisdiction

of

the

to
Court

to

the

expand
of

Court

the

Appeals

of

Tax

original

and

over

quasi-

judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, is

further

stressed

excludes

from

interlocutory

by
its

orders

the

last

paragraph

provisions,
issued

under

only
the

of

Section

the
Labor

"decisions
Code

of

Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals."

42

which
and
the

Since final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are

now within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, and since appeals by certiorari may properly be taken
only to this Court, it follows that the mode of appeal from the
Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of Appeals should be by notice
of appeal cum petition for review, consistently with mode of
appeal from other quasi-judicial bodies and agencies prescribed
by

Republic

Act

No.

5434

(eff.,

September

9,1968),

and

that

formerly provided for by Republic Act No. 1125, supra. It is on

this basis that the interim or transitional rules adopted in this
Court's en banc Resolution of January 11, 1983 on the subject
prescribe that appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court from
quasi-judicial

bodies

shall

continue

to

be

governed

by

the

provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not

inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129."

PETRON CORP. vs. TOBIAS, et al.

G.R. No. 158881, April 16, 2008
FACTS
Petron maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas Fishport
Complex in Navotas. Through that depot, it has engaged in the
selling of diesel fuels to vessels used in commercial fishing in
and around Manila Bay.
from

the

wherein

office

the

of

On 1 March 2002, Petron received a letter

Navotas

corporation

was

Mayor,
assessed

respondent
taxes

Toby

"relative

Tiangco,
to

the

figures covering sale of diesel declared by your Navotas Terminal

from

1997

to

2001." The

stated

total

amount

due

was P6,

259,087.62, a figure derived from the gross sales of the depot

during the years in question. The computation sheets that were
attached to the letter made reference to Ordinance 92-03, or the
43

New

Navotas

Revenue

Code

(Navotas

Revenue

Code),

though

such

enactment was not cited in the letter itself.

Petron duly filed with Navotas a letter-protest to the notice of
assessment pursuant to Section 195 of the Code. It argued that it
was exempt from local business taxes in view of Art. 232(h) of
the Implementing Rules (IRR) of the Code, as well as a ruling of
the

Bureau

of

Local

Government

Finance

of

the

Department

of

Finance dated 31 July 1995, the latter stating that sales of

petroleum fuels are not subject to local taxation. The letterprotest was denied by the Navotas Municipal Treasurer, respondent
Manuel

T.

Enriquez,

in

letter

dated

May

2002. This

was

followed by a letter from the Mayor dated 15 May 2002, captioned

"Final Demand to Pay," requiring that Petron pay the assessed
amount within five (5) days from receipt thereof, with a threat
of closure of Petrons operations within Navotas should there be
no

payment. Petron,

through

counsel,

replied

to

the

Mayor

by

another letter posing objections to the threat of closure. The

Mayor did not respond to this last letter.
Thus,

on

20

May

2002,

Petron

filed

with

the

Malabon

RTC

Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment for Deficiency Taxes

with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)

and/or

Preliminary

Injunction.

The

quested

TRO

was

not

issued by the Malabon RTC upon manifestation of respondents that

they would not proceed with the closure of Petrons Navotas bulk
plant until after the RTC shall have decided the case on the
merits. However, while the case was pending decision, respondents
refused to issue a business permit to Petron, thus prompting
Petron

to

file

Supplemental

Complaint

with

Prayer

for

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondents.

On 5 May 2003, the Malabon RTC rendered its Decision dismissing
Petrons

complaint

and

ordering

the

payment

of

the

assessed

amount. Eleven days later, Petron received a Closure Order from

44

the Mayor, directing Petron to cease and desist from operating

the bulk plant. Petron sought a TRO from the Malabon RTC, but
this was denied. Petron also filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order of denial, but this was likewise denied.
On

August

2003,

this

Court

issued

TRO,

enjoining

the

respondents from closing Petrons Navotas bulk plant or otherwise

interfering in its operations.
ISSUE
1. Is the challenged tax on sale of the diesel fuels an excise

tax

on

an

article

enumerated

under

the

NIRC,

thusly

prohibited under Section 133(h) of the Code?

2. Is the challenged tax prohibited by Section 133(h) under

the proviso, "taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products"?

RULING
1. It is evident that Am Jur aside, the current definition of
an excise tax is that of a tax levied on a specific article,
rather than one "upon the performance, carrying on, or the
exercise

of

an

activity."

This

current

definition

was

already in place when the Code was enacted in 1991, and we

can only presume that it was what the Congress had intended
as it specified that local government units could not impose
"excise taxes on articles enumerated under the [NIRC]." This
prohibition must pertain to the same kind of excise taxes as
imposed

by

the

NIRC,

and

not

those

previously

defined

"excise taxes" which were not integrated or denominated as

such in our present tax law.
It is quite apparent, therefore, that our current body of
taxation law does not explicitly accommodate the traditional
definition of excise tax offered by Petron. In fact, absent
any statutory adoption of the traditional definition, it may
45

be

said

that

jurisdiction

starting
refer

in

1986

excise

exclusively

to

taxes

in

specific

this
or ad

valorem taxes imposed under the NIRC. At the very least, it

is this concept of excise tax which we can reasonably assume
that Congress had in mind and actually adopted when it
crafted the Code. The palpable absurdity that ensues should
the alternative interpretation prevail all but strengthens
this position.
The Court thus can assert with clear comfort that excise
taxes, as imposed under the NIRC, do not pertain to "the
performance, carrying on, or exercise of an activity," at
least not to the extent of equating excise with business
taxes.
2. The Court can concede that a tax on a business is distinct
from a tax on the article itself, or for that matter, that a
business tax is distinct from an excise tax. However, such
distinction is immaterial insofar as the latter part of
Section 133(h) is concerned, for the phrase "taxes, fees or
charges on petroleum products" does not qualify the kind of
taxes, fees or charges that could withstand the absolute
prohibition imposed by the provision. It would have been a
different matter had Congress, in crafting Section 133(h),
barred "excise taxes" or "direct taxes," or any category of
taxes only, for then it would be understood that only such
specified taxes on petroleum products could not be imposed
under the prohibition. The absence of such a qualification
leads to the conclusion that all sorts of taxes on petroleum
products,
Section

including

133(h).

business

Where

the

law

taxes,
does

are
not

prohibited

by

distinguish,

we

should not distinguish.

The

language

of

Section

133(h)

makes

plain

that

the

prohibition with respect to petroleum products extends not

only to excise taxes thereon, but all "taxes, fees and
46

charges." The earlier reference in paragraph (h) to excise

taxes comprehends a wider range of subjects of taxation: all
articles already covered by excise taxation under the NIRC,
such

as

products,

alcohol

products,

automobiles,

and

tobacco
such

products,

non-essential

mineral
goods

as

jewelry, goods made of precious metals, perfumes, and yachts

and

other

vessels

intended

for

pleasure

or

sports.

In

contrast, the later reference to "taxes, fees and charges"

pertains only to one class of articles of the many subjects
of excise taxes, specifically, "petroleum products". While
local government units are authorized to burden all such
other

class

of

goods

with

"taxes,

fees

and

charges,"

excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition is imposed

barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect
to petroleum products.

47

COMMERCIAL LAW
EVANGELISTA & CO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. 31684, June 28, 1973
FACTS
On October 9, 1954 a co-partnership was formed under the name of
"Evangelista & Co." On June 7, 1955the Articles of Co-partnership
was

amended

as

to

include

herein

respondent,

Estrella

Abad

Santos, as industrial partner, with herein petitioners Domingo C.

Evangelista,

Jr.,

Leonardo

Atienza

Abad

Santos

and

Conchita

P.Navarro, the original capitalist partners, remaining in that

capacity,

with

contribution

of

P17,500

each.

The

amended

Articles provided, inter alia, that "the contribution of Estrella

Abad

Santos

consists

of

her

industry

being

an

industrial

partner", and that the profits and losses "shall be divided and
distributed among the partners ... in the proportion of 70% for
the first three partners, Domingo C. Evangelista, Jr., Conchita
P. Navarro and Leonardo Atienza Abad Santos to be divided among
them

equally;

and

30%

for

the

fourth

partner

Estrella

Abad

Santos."
On December 17, 1963 herein respondent filed suit against the
three other partners in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
alleging

that

the

partnership,

which

was

also

made

party-

defendant, had been paying dividends to the partners except to

her;

and

refused

that
and

notwithstanding

continued

partnership

books

partnership

affairs

declared

by

defendants

the
be

or

to
to

to

refuse
give

pay
to

demands
and

her

her

partnership.

ordered

her

let

defendants

her

information

any

She

the

share

therefore

render accounting

in

examine

the

regarding

the

the

prayed
to

had

her

dividends
that

the

of

the

partnership business and to pay her corresponding share in the

partnership profits after such accounting, plus attorney's fees
and costs.
48

ISSUE
Whether

or

not

Abad

Santos

is

an

industrial

partner

and

is

entitled to the shares of the partnership?

HELD
Yes. It is not disputed that the provision against the industrial
partner engaging in business for himself seeks to prevent any
conflict

of

interest

between

the

industrial

partner

and

the

partnership and to insure faithful compliance by said partner

with this prestation. That appellee has faithfully complied with
her prestation with respect to appellants is clearly shown by the
fact that it was only after filing of the complaint in this case
and

the

exclusion

answer
under

thereto
the

appellants

codal

art

their Supplemental

Answer,

defendants'

to

answer

exercised

just

mentioned

subsequent

the

their

to

complaint,

by
the

defendants

right

of

alleging

in

filing

of

reached

an

agreement whereby the herein plaintiff been excluded from, and

deprived of, her alleged share, interests or participation, as an
alleged industrial partner, in the defendant partnership and/or
in its net profits or income, on the ground plaintiff has never
contributed her industry to the partnership, instead she has been
and still is a judge of the City Court (formerly Municipal Court)
of the City of Manila, devoting her time to performance of her
duties as such judge and enjoying the privilege and emoluments
appertaining
school

in

to

the

Manila,

said

without

office,
the

aside

express

from

teaching

consent

of

in

the

law

herein

defendants'. Having always knows as an appellee as a City judge

even

before

she

joined

appellant

company

as

an

industrial

partner, why did it take appellants many years before excluding

her from said company as aforequoted allegations? And how can
they

reconcile

appellee

has

such

never

exclusive
been

such

with
a

their main

partner

theory

because

"The

that
real

agreement was to grant the appellee a share of 30% of the net

profits which the appellant partnership may realize from June 7,
49

1955,

until

the

mortgage

of P30,

000.00

obtained

from

the

Rehabilitation Finance Corporal shall have been fully paid.

GARCIA vs. LLAMAS

G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003
FACTS
A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Dionisio
Llamas

against

Petitioner

Romeo

Garcia

and

Eduardo

de

Jesus

alleging that the two borrowed Php 400,000.00 from him. They
bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan on or
before January 23, 1997 with a 15% interest per month. The loan
remained unpaid despite repeated demands by respondent.
Petitioner resisted the complaint alleging that he signed the
promissory note merely as an accommodation party for de Jesus and
the latter had already paid the loan by means of a check and that
the issuance of the check and acceptance thereof novated or
superseded the note.
The trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of
the

respondent

and

directed

petitioner

to

pay

jointly

and

severally respondent the amounts of Php 400,000.00 representing

the principal amount plus interest at 15% per month from January
23, 1997 until the same shall have been fully paid, less the
amount of Php 120,000.00 representing interests already paid.
The Court of Appeals ruled that no novation, express or implied,
had taken place when respondent accepted the check from de Jesus.
According to the CA, the check was issued precisely to pay for
the loan that was covered by the promissory note jointly and
severally undertaken by petitioner and de Jesus. Respondents
acceptance of the check did not serve to make de Jesus the sole
50

debtor

because

first,

the

obligation

incurred

by

him

and

petitioner was joint and several; and second, the check which had
been

intended

to

extinguish

the

obligation

or

not

was

novation

bounced

upon

its

presentment.
ISSUES
(1)

Whether

there

of

the

obligation.

(2) Whether or not the defense that petitioner was only an

accommodation party had any basis.
HELD
For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur:
(1) There must be a previous valid obligation; (2) the parties
concerned must agree to a new contract; (3) the old contract must
be extinguished; and (4) there must be a valid new contract. The
parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had
been extinguished by the issuance and the acceptance of the check
or that the check would take the place of the note. There is no
incompatibility

between

the

promissory

note

and

the

check.

Neither could the payment of interests, which in petitioners

view also constitutes novation, change the terms and conditions
of the obligation. Such payment was already provided for in the
promissory note and, like the check, was totally in accord with
the terms thereof. Also unmeritorious is petitioners argument
that the obligation was novated by the substitution of debtors.
In order to change the person of the debtor, the old must be
expressly released from the obligation, and the third person or
new debtor must assume the formers place in the relation. Wellsettled

is

the

rule

that

novation

is

never

presumed.

Consequently, that which arises from a purported change in the

person

of the

debtor must

be clear

and express.

It is

thus

incumbent on petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally that

novation has indeed taken place. Note also that for novation to
51

be valid and legal, the law requires that the creditor expressly
consent to the substitution of a new debtor.
In a solidary obligation, the creditor is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the
debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to
enforce collection. Having made himself jointly and severally
liable with de Jesus, petitioner is therefore liable for the
entire obligation.
(2) By its terms, the note was made payable to a specific person
rather than bearer to or ordera requisite for negotiability.
Hence, petitioner cannot avail himself of the NILs provisions on
the liabilities and defenses of an accommodation party. Besides,
a non-negotiable note is merely a simple contract in writing and
evidence of such intangible rights as may have been created by
the assent of the parties. The promissory note is thus covered by
the general provisions of the Civil Code, not by the NIL.
Even granting that the NIL was applicable, still petitioner would
be liable for the note. An accommodation party is liable for the
instrument to a holder for value even if, at the time of its
taking, the latter knew the former to be only an accommodation
party. The relation between an accommodation party and the party
accommodated is, in effect, one of principal and surety. It is a
settled rule that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with
the principal and is deemed an original promissory debtor from
the beginning. The liability is immediate and direct.

CRIMINAL LAW
FRANCISCO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 177720, February 18, 2009
52

FACTS
In an Amended Information dated 9 November 2000, which was filed
on 13 November 2000 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, petitioner Eliseo Francisco, Jr. (Francisco) was charged
with Estafa in an Amended Information, as defined in Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard Inc., it is a
credit

card

company

engaged

in

issuing

credit

cards

and

in

acquiring credit card receivables from commercial establishments

arising from the purchase of goods and services by credit card
holders using Mastercard or Visa credit cards issued by other
banks and credit card companies.
Sometime in August 1999, Solidbank, one of the companies which
issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four
questionable
Bankard.Inc

transactions
(private

reflected

complainant)

in

one

decided

account

to

have

in
a

which

thorough

investigations on fraudulent crediting.

ISSUE
Whether

or

not

the

honorable

court

of

appeals

committed

reversible error in affirming the assailed order and decision of

the regional trial court of pasig city, branch 267, despite the
absence of an element in the crime charged for which petitioner
was indicted

RULING
The element of estafa referred to by petitioner Francisco is the
third one under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code in the
following list provided by this Court in several cases:
(1) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess

power,

influence,

qualifications,
53

property,

credit,

agency,

business

or

imaginary

transactions,

or

employs

other

similar deceits;
(2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be

made

or

executed

prior

to

or

simultaneously

with

the

commission of the fraud;

(3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to
part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires
that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the
false

pretense,

fraudulent

act

or

fraudulent

means

be

intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case

wherein a person pretended to possess credit in order to defraud
third

persons

(Solidbank

Mastercard

and

AIG

Visa),

but

the

offended party nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and

consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person is
liable

for

estafa

under

Article

315(a),

even

though

the

fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the offended

party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although
the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.

54

KAPUNAN vs. CA
G.R. Nos. 148213-17,

March 13, 2009

FACTS
Eduardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi who were the members of the AFP
were allegedly charged with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. On
the night of November 12, 1986, the victims were seized and to a
"safe house" in Cubao, then to a secluded area in Antipolo where
they were shot dead. The reports made by the Investigating Panel
disclose that respondent Kapunan, Jr. had created the CounterIntelligence

and

special

project

team

which

headed

the

surveillance of Olalia and that Legaspi was present in the safe

house when they brought Olalia and Alay-ay. Being members of the
AFP who claimed that the act was done for a furtherance of a
political

claim,

(Proclamation

No.

thus
347,

they

are

entitled

entitled

"Granting

to

an

Amnesty

to

amnesty
Rebels,

Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes

Against

Public

Order,

Other

Crimes

Committed

in

Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of

War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission)

uplifting their

criminal liabilities.
The Panel and the Department of Justice denied their petition.
ISSUE
The main issues raised are whether or not the grant of amnesty
under Proclamation No. 347 or 348 extinguished their criminal
liability.
RULING
The Panel refused to consider petitioners defense of amnesty on
the ground that documents pertaining to the amnesty failed to
show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes
for

which

the

amnesty

was

applied
55

for

and

their

criminal

liabilities were not uplifted. It was held that the killings were
not committed in furtherance of a political belief because at
that time, there was no rebellion yet launched against the Cory
Aquino

government.

Department

of

The

Justice

petition
was

for

denied

reconsideration

and

the

Court

to

of

the

Appeals

affirmed the same.

PEOPLE vs. DOMINGO, et al.

G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009
FACTS
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a
Mazda MVP van, arrived at the their poultry farm in Barangay Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San (father) alighted
from the van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture,
appellant

Reyes

and

certain

Juanito

Pataray

(Pataray)

approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside
the

van.

Appellant

Thereupon,

Reyes

appellants

and

Pataray

Arnaldo

and

also

boarded

Flores,

with

the
two

van.
male

companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded

the van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the
van.

Appellants

Reyes

and

Arnaldo

and

their

cohorts

then

blindfolded each member of the Yao family inside the van with
packaging tape.
After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped.
Per

order

of

Sim (mother),

appellants
Robert,

and

their

Raymond

cohorts,

(children)

and

Chua

Ong

Ping

Jona

Abagatnan

(Abagatnan) (housemaid) stepped out of the van with appellants

Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions.
Appellant Flores, with the other male companion, drove the van
with the remaining members of the Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later,

the

van

stopped

again.

Appellant

Flores

and

his

male

companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million

56

pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of

Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter,
appellant Flores and his male companion left the van and fled;
while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained
inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already
left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and sought
the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were
taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one
male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part
of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
On

the

morning

of

the

following

day,

at

around

4:00

a.m.,

appellants and their cohorts tried to contact Yao San regarding

the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus,
appellants

instructed

Abagatnan

to

look

for

Yao

San

in

the

poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and one male companion
escorted

Abagatnan

in

proceeding

to

the

poultry

farm.

Upon

arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter
could not be found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan
to

remind

appellants

Yao
Reyes

San
and

about

the

Arnaldo

ransom

and

their

demanded.
male

Thereafter,

companion

left

Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house.

In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and
appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking,
appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry
farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and
informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert
also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still
held by appellants and their cohorts.

57

On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular

phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants demand. Appellants
allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San
via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond

because

of

newspaper

and

radio

reports

regarding

the

incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report

the incident to the police and also pleaded with them to spare
the

life

of

Chua

Ong

Ping

Sim

and

Raymond.

Appellants

then

instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5
million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview,
Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the payoff at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts
showed up. Yao San waited for appellants call, but none came.
Thus, Yao San left.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond
were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died
of asphyxia by strangulation.
On

26

July

1999,

appellant

Arnaldo

surrendered

to

the

Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp

Crame,

Quezon

City.

Thereupon,

appellant

Arnaldo,

with

the

assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial

confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant
Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a
certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident.
Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of his
cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.
Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes

58

were

identified

in

police

line-up

by

Yao

San,

Robert

and

Abagatnan as their kidnappers.

On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores
in

Balayan,

assistance

Batangas.
of

Atty.

Afterwards,
Rous,

appellant

executed

Flores,

written

with

the

extra-judicial

confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant

Flores identified appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and a
certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident.
Appellant Flores was subsequently identified in a police line-up
by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their kidnappers.
ISSUES
1.)

Whether

Reyes,

Arnaldo

and

Flores

conspired

in

kidnapping the Yao family and;

2.)

Whether

or

not

the

appellants

committed

special

complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

RULING
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in
the execution of the unlawful objective among the accused. When
the

accused

by

their

acts

aimed

at

the

same

object,

one

performing one part and the other performing another part as to

complete the crime, with a view to the attainment of the same
object, conspiracy exists.
As

can

be

statements

gleaned
of

from

Abagatnan,

Pataray approached

and

the

credible

Robert
poked

and

their

testimonies

Yao,
guns

appellant
at

Yao

and

sworn

Reyes

and

San,

and

thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then
took the drivers seat and drove the van, while each member of
the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
59

and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores

instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million as ransom
money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were
among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping
Sim

and

Raymond

in

the

safe-house.

They

also

accompanied

Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for

and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial
confessions how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the
Yao family. Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the
particular role/participation played by each of appellants and
their

cohorts

foregoing

in

the

individual

kidnapping
acts

of

of

the

family.

appellants

and

Clearly,
their

the

cohorts

demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the

Yao family for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Under

Article

267

of

the

Revised

Penal

Code,

the

crime

of

kidnapping is committed with the concurrence of the following

elements:

(1)

the

offender

is

private

individual;

(2)

he

kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter

of

his

liberty;

(3)

the

act

of

detention

or

kidnapping

is

illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the

following

circumstances

is

present:

(a)

the

kidnapping

or

detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by

simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female, or a public officer. All of the foregoing elements
were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences
for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and
their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and
their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control of their
van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family
60

was taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were
made and the kidnap victims include females.

GARCIA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 171951, August 28, 2009
FACTS
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when
Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy
was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him.
Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by
Chys sister, Esquibel.

Chy was about to come out of his house

and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him.

He also

reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back
portion of Chys head.

Chy found an opportunity to escape, he

ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the
mauling.

He also complained of difficulty in breathing.

He was

found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.

He was

pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy confirmed

that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the
injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have
caused the death of Chy.
of homicide.

Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime

The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the

striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused
any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the
victims heart is healthy.

What could have caused said heart

attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted

ISSUE
61

If Garcia is liable for the death of Manuel Chy despite the fact
that the cause of death is myocardial infarction, a non-violent
related cause of death
RULING
The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an
evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal
liability.

Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by

law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with

Article

13(3)

of

the

Revised

Penal

Code.

Nevertheless,

said

circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner.

The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim
could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of
the victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.
Considering

this

mitigating

circumstance,

imposable

penalty

should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in

its minimum period.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate

penalty

of

ten

(10)

years

of

prision

mayor,

as

minimum,

to

fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as

maximum.

CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006
FACTS
Victim Cantre and Saano, together with two other companions had
a drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten oclock in the morning
62

of February 4, 1996.Thereafter, they decided to part ways and

went to their respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and
Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre suddenly
punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the one
responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night.
After being hit, bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone
which is as big as mans fist, ran toward Cantre, and threw it to
the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre
turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried to pacify
the two. Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their
houses. When Cantre arrived at his house, he complained of the
pain in the left side of his back which was hit by the stone. At
that

night,

he

again

complained

of

backache

and

also

of stomachache. Hes condition immediately became worse, and at

around three oclock in the following morning, Cantre died. Right
after

his

death,

Cantre

was

examined

by

Dr.

Conchita

S.

Ulanday ,the Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that

the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the Cantre family requested for an
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim by the NBI. Dr.
Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that the
cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The
victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation

of

blood

in

his

abdominal

cavity

due

to

his

lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.

Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim
but the latter refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When
he saw the victim was about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a
stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the
victim.

He

contended

that

the

throwing

of

the

stone

was

in

defense of his companion. The RTC rendered a decision, which was

later affirmed by the CA, holding that petitioner was criminally
liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a stone from
behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony
63

which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is
criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of
this

unlawful

act

even

if

the

ultimate

result

had

not

been

intended. Hence, these case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim
and thus liable for homicide?
DECISION
While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of
the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence
proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his
lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him
by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the
RTC and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime
or offense for which the petitioner should have been convicted
for. Article
according

to

of
the

the

Revised

means

by

Penal
which

Code

classifies

they

are

felonies

committed,

in

particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies.

These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by
the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender. In
intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is
malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with
deliberate intent (with malice).The offender, in performing the
act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an
injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of
the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender
to another person is unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In
the

Petition

at

bar,

this

Court

cannot,

in

good

conscience,

attribute to petitioner any malicious intent to injure, much less

to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent,
this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan
64

for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and

affirmed

by

petitioner
culpable

the

Court

Calimutan

felony

of

Appeals.

guilty

of reckless

beyond

Instead,

this

reasonable

imprudence

Court

doubt

resulting

in

finds

of

the

homicide

under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw
the

stone

at

the

victim

Cantre

with

the

specific

intent

of

killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What

is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention to
drive

away

the

attacker

who

was,

at

that

point,

the

victim

Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier

described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim
Cantre.

65

PEOPLE vs. DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001
FACTS
On the cloudy morning of October 5, 1995, in Maitum Highway,
Barangay Puerto, CDO, Glenn delos Santos in his driven motor
vehicle, Isuzu Elf, ran over members of the Philippine National
Police (PN) who were jogging in the same direction as the truck
was

proceeding.

Instead

of

applying

his

brake,

the

accused

continued to travel. Because of the incident, 12 PNP joggers were

killed on the spot, 11 were seriously wounded and 10 sustained
minor injuries. Two hours later, the accused surrendered. In the
lower court, the accused was found guilty.
In his appeal, he testified that he had drunk three (3) bottles
of beer earlier before the incident. He also added that because
he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring
lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction, he was
not able to see the joggers. He only realized he hit something
until he noticed the thuds and he couldnt distinguish what he
hit because it was dark.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused intentionally caused the death and
injury of the PNP joggers?
RULING
No, the accused only exhibit an inexcusable lack of precaution.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do

an

act

inexcusable
performing

from

which

lack
or

of

material

precaution

failing

to

damage
on

perform

results

the
such

part

by
of

act,

reason
the

taking

of

person
into

consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of

66

intelligence;

(4)

his

physical

condition;

and

(3)

other

circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

As to its verdict, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious
intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving,
the

accused

should

be

held

guilty

of

the

complex

crime

of

reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious

physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
As to penalty, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof
provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure to
render

assistance

to

the

victim,

therefore,

constitutes

qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the

penalty

by

one

degree.

Moreover,

the

fifth

paragraph

thereof

provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall

exercise

its

sound

discretion

without

regard

to

the

rules

prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through

imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be
considered in the imposition of the penalty.
In this case, it has been alleged in the information and proved
during the trial that the accused, escaped from the scene of the
67

incident, leaving behind the victims. Because the accused, failed

to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under
Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its

medium

period.

Applying

Article

48,

the

maximum

of

said

penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be

imposed.

For

resulting

in

the

separate

slight

offenses

physical

of

injuries,

reckless
the

imprudence

accused

may

be

sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto mayor

in its minimum period.
As far as the award of damages is concerned, the trial courts
award of death indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group
of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for lack of factual
basis,

the

awards

of

P30,000

to

each

of

those

who

suffered

serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who

suffered minor physical injuries.

68

G.R. No. 14258, August 2, 1919

US vs. BAGUIO
FACTS
The

defendant,

organized,

Eugenio

directed

Baguio

and

of

Paete

managed

an

Laguna

said

association

to
known

have
as

Turnuhan and denominated Samahan Abuluyan ng Salapi between

November 1913 till May 1914. The said association was conducting
a

prohibited

game

of

chance

called

Loteria

(Lottery).

Each

member of the said association was subscribed by one or more

shares,

given

Libreta

(memorandum

book)

and

number

representing each share. In return, the member will pay P1 peso

every Sunday and entitled to win a premium of P500 pesos by
drawing lots conducted on the same day every week. The accused
used to receive two (2) centavos for every peso of the amount of
the premium as a recompense for his work as director and manager
of the society or Turnuhan.
ISSUE
Whether or not Eugenio Baguio committed acts in violation of
Gambling Law.
HELD
The accused, Eugenio Baguio was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for he committed acts in violation of Act No 1757 or known
as Gambling Law.
"Gambling," as defined by Section 1 of Act No. 1757, consists:
(a) in the playing of any game for money or any representative of
value or valuable consideration or thing, the result of which
game depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or hazard; or (b) in
the use of any mechanical invention or contrivance to determine
by chance the loser or winner of money or of any representative
69

of value or of any valuable consideration or thing. Section 7 of

said act prohibits absolutely "the playing at and the conducting
of any game of monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy
or any banking or percentage game, or the use of any mechanical
invention or contrivance to determine by chance the winner or
loser

of money

or of

any representative

of value

or of

any

valuable consideration or thing." Section 7 further provides that

"any person taking any part therein or owning or operating any
such mechanical invention or contrivance shall be punished as
provided in Section 3 of said Act."
The lower court held that the defendant was guilty of conducting
a lottery in violation of the law and was duly arrested, charged
and

sentenced

to

pay

fine

of

P100

pesos

and

in

case

of

insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with

the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs.

PEOPLE vs. OANIS

74 Phil 257
G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943
FACTS
70

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a

notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected
house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly
Balagtas

sleeping

with

Galanta

simultaneously

his

back

towards

or

successively

the

door.

fired

at

Oanis
him

and

which

resulted to the victims death. The supposedly Balagtas turned

out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties.
2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability
in the performance of their duty.
HELD
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at
bar. Ignorance facti excusat applies only when the mistake is
committed

without fault

or carelessness.

The fact

that the

supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have

checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs
no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2
requisites

to

justify

this:

(1)

the

offender

acted

in

the

perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or

office,

(2)

that

the

injury

or

offense

committed

be

the

necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or

the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only
the first requisite is present.

71

URBANO vs. IAC

G.R. NO. 72964, January 7, 1988
FACTS
Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters opening of
irrigation system which flooded farmers palay storage. Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later
on. 22 days after incident, Javier died due to tetanus.
ISSUE
Whether or not Urbano is criminally liable?
HELD
No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due to the
hacking.

Proximate

cause

is

that

cause,

w/c,

in

natural

&

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

produces injury & w/o w/c the result wouldnt have occurred. The
rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
& logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the
accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a
criminal

conviction).

Infection

of

wound

was

efficient

intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was distinct &
foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very least is guilty
of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the
facilities

of

barangay

mediators

to

effect

compromise

agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of PD

1508, 2(3) w/c allows settlement of minor offenses.

US vs. AH CHONG
G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910
FACTS
The defendant Ah Chong lived in a quarters together with Pascual
Gualberto. The defendant killed the latter under the impression
72

that the first was being attacked in their own room by robbers or
ladrons. The defendant claimed that Pascual forced open the door
of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
ISSUE
Is the defendant guilty of homicide due to negligence?
HELD
No.

The

defendant

acted

in

good

faith,

without

malice,

or

criminal intent in the belief that he was doing no more than

exercising his legitimate right of self-defense. He cannot be
said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in
the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under
the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels
the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial
court should be REVERSED, and the defendant ACQUITTED of the
crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio.

73

PEOPLE vs. BELTRAN

G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006
FACTS
On

the

night

of

October

25,

1999,

Honorato

Beltran

suddenly

attacked Norman Habla while the latter was resting along the
road. Beltran repeatedly and lethally hacked Habla with a bolo
until the victim died. The following events happened before the
actual attack, Beltran and Habla quarrelled on October 22, 1999
where Beltran claimed that the victim mauled him. Beltran also
claimed that the victim shouted invectives to him and his mother
and challenged him to a fight moments before the attack. The
Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals have found Beltran
guilty for the murder of Habla and ordered Beltran to pay damages
to the family of Habla.
ISSUE(S)
Can Beltran be free of criminal liability by using the justifying
circumstance of Self Defense? Article 11, Revised Penal Code.
Can Beltrans criminal liability be mitigated because the victim
provoked and threatened the defendant and the two have a previous
disagreement? Art 13, Par. 4, Revised Penal Code.
HELD
The

first

Circumstance

two
are

elements

for

missing;

Self

First,

Defense
the

under

presence

Justifying

of

unlawful

aggression. The mere act of insulting and provoking the defendant

to a fight are not considered as unlawful aggression since there
is

no

immediate

threat

to

Beltrans

life

and

limbs.

Second,

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or avoid

it. Given that Habla have indeed insulted and challenge Beltran
to a fight, the manner on how Beltran retaliated shows excessive
use of force or means. There were multiple and lethal blows
inflicted to the victim and most of them landed in the neck and
74

area. Beltran also continued to attack the victim even the latter
fell

to

the

ground

and

was

defenseless.

The

attack

is

not

proportionate to the insults of the victim. The facts show that

the elements are missing to claim self defense as justifying
circumstance.
The

second

issue

focuses

on

the

possible

points

that

will

mitigate Beltrans criminal liability; however this cannot be

applied to this case. The victim may have earlier provoked the
accused but moments before the victim was attacked he was just
resting and no provocation occurred. The defendant cannot also
use

their

defendant

previous
in

order

disagreement
to

mitigate

between
his

the

criminal

victim

and

liability.

the

Their

dispute was settled in the Office of the Barangay. The defendant

cannot claim his acts were immediate vindication against Beltran
since three days have already lapsed since their quarrel and
Beltrans participation in the settlement is a testament that he
has no longer grudge or anger against Habla.
To make matters worse, the manner on how Beltran attacked the
victim was treacherous in nature that aggravates his liability
under the Principles of Aggravating Circumstance (Art 14, RPC).
Beltran stalked the victim before launching the surprise attack.
Beltran carefully planned his execution in order to ensure the
success

of

his

attack

and

eliminates

the

victims

chance

to

defend himself and retaliate.

The following issues were used by the Supreme Court to uphold
with modifications the decision of the lower courts that the
accused is guilty and ordered to pay damages to the family of the
victim.

PAERA, vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011
75

FACTS
Santiago Paera(petitioner) the punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong,
Negros

Occidental

acted

with

resentment,

borne

out

of

the

Darongs namely Vicente Darong, Diosetea Darong and Indalecio

Darong

(complainant)

distribution

scheme,

repeated
causing

refusal

him

to

to

lose

follow
his

his

water

perspective

and

angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

ISSUE
The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of
Grave Threats.
HELD
The rule of the court is affirmative, the petition is denied and
the

decision

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court

of

Dumaguete

City,

Branch 39 is affirm.
Due Process Mischief in Raising New Issues on Appeal
The court would applied this rule if were it not for the fact the
petitioners liberty is at stake.
Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats
Petitioners theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave
Threat because he only had a single mental resulotion, a single
impulse and single intent to threaten the Darongs. The nature of
the crime of Grave Threats and the concepts of continued and
complex crime preclude the adoption of petitioners theory. The
threats were consummated as soon Darongs family heard petitioner
utter his threatening remarks and spoken the threat at different
points in times to the three individual. Article 282 of the RPC
holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person of the latter or his
family

of

any

wrong

amounting
76

to

crime"

This

felony

is

consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the

person threatened."
The Prosecution Proved the Commission of Grave Threats Against
Vicente
The court affirm the ruling because no law requires of private
complainant

as

condition

for

finding

guilt

for

grave

threats

especially if, as here, there were other victims or witnesses who

attested to its commission against non testifying complainant.
No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioners Commission of
Grave Threats
The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the
RPC, which negates criminal liability of -anyone who acts in the
defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance
of this article are present and that the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. In, this
case the petitioner failed to obtain the three requisites.
In the fulfilment of duty of exercise of office the petitioner
exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the
Darongs with bladed weapon, threatening harm on their person for
violating his order.

77

PEOPLE vs. ULEP

G.R 132547, September 20, 2000
FACTS
SP01 Ernesto Ulep, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death

plus

civil

liabilities

(According

to

court

quo,

the

killing of Buenaventura Wapili was attended by treachery thus

qualifying the offense to murder). Death penalty, having imposed
by the trial court made the case for automatic review by the
Supreme

Court.

self-defense

Accused-Appellant

and

justifying

prays

for

circumstance

acquittal,

of

due

fulfillment

to

of

duty.
Wapili, having a high fever, was acting strangely in his home.
His brother- in -law, Leydan, was trying to calm him down. Later
on, he went out from his room naked and chased his brother-inlaw. Leydan, with the help of 2 neighbors tried to tie him with
rope but were unsuccessful. Wapili completely gone crazy kept
running

without

policewoman

to

particular

report

the

direction.

incident

but

Leydan
as

went

Wapili

to

passed

a
the

policewoman's house, he banged latters vehicle, so she called

for assistance. SP01 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the
scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool
(but according to Wapilis relatives and other witnesses, he had
no bolo, only rattan stool). Ulep fired a warning shot but Wapili
charged towards them so Ulep shots him on various parts of his
body. Wapili fell to the ground. Ulep came closer then pumped
another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out.
Wapili

sustained

gunshots

wounds,

the

cause

of

death

is

multiple gunshot wounds but the wound in the head caused the
victims instantaneous death. Ulep voluntary surrendered himself
to the police headquarters after the incident.
ISSUE
78

Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili considering

his claim of self defense and fulfillment of duty?
RULING
WON. The trial courts erred in charging Ulep murder and sentenced
to death penalty?
The evidence at hand does not favor Uleps claim of self-defense.
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the
victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself. In the present case, the records show that the
victim was lying in a prone position on the ground, possibly
unconscious - when accused-appellant shot him in the head. The
aggression that was initially begun by the victim already ceased
when accused-appellant attacked him. From that moment, there was
no longer any danger to his life.
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under
Art. 11, par. 5, of RPC may be successfully invoked; the accused
must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that 1. he
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The second
requisite is lacking in the instant case.
The Court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right. Under Art.
69 of RPC, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable

by

reason

of

the

lack

of

some

of

the

conditions

required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability

79

in the several cases mentioned in Arts. 11 and 12, provided that

the majority of such conditions be present.
This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that
the

killing

of

Wapili

by

accused-appellant

was

attended

by

treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of

the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The victim could not have
been taken by surprise as he was given more than sufficient
warning by accused-appellant before he was shot. The killing of
Wapili was not sought on purpose. Accused-appellant went to the
scene in pursuance of his official duty as a police officer after
having been summoned for assistance.
The

Court

credited

Ulep

with

the

mitigating

circumstance

of

voluntary surrender.
Appealed

Judgment

is

MODIFIED.

Accused-appellant

SPO1

ERNESTO

ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is

sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two
(2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days
of

prision

mayor

minimum

as

maximum.

He

was

also

indemnification as a civil liability.

PEOPLE vs. GEROLAGA, et al.

G.R. 89075, October 15, 1996
FACTS
80

asked

for

In

the

morning

Municipality

of

accused

of

Roberto

March

21,

Aroroy,

Gerolaga,

1987

at

Province
Efren

the

of

Poblacion

Masbate,

Ativo

and

of

the

Philippines,

Remedios

Ruado

Sy

conspiring and helping one another , with intent to kill, evident

premeditation,

treachery

and

in

consideration

of

price

or

reward, assault and stab Antonio Sy with a double bladed dagger,

hitting

on

the

chest,

abdomen

and

other

parts

of

the

body,

thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous

death.
ISSUE
Whether or not other accused Remedios Ruado Sy and Efren Ativo
who were unquestionably absent from the crime scene, equally as
guilty as Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing of the
victim proffer self defense as a justifying circumstances?

HELD
In

Regional

Trial

Court

Decision,

having

convicted

all

the

accused for murder through conspiracy or by and for not having

acquitted

all

reasonable

of

the

doubt,

it

accused
having

herein,

failed

or

upon

the

refused

ground
to

of

consider

exclusively, only the purely admissible factual and more credible

circumstantial evidence obtaining in this case, and to observe
with

liberality,

criminal

or

consistent

penal

justice,

with

the

the

law,

proper

dispensation

jurisprudence

and

of
the

fundamental precepts, as are applicable to, or in the case at

bar.
On the defense of Gerolaga theory, to appreciate self defense,
the following requisites must be clearly proven.
1.Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
and
81

3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending

himself.

However,

even

the

first

and

the

third

requisites were to be appreciated in favor of Gerolaga.

The second requisites have not been met. There was no reasonable
necessity to inflict upon Antonio Sy numerous wounds, five of
them

fatal.

Moreover,

the

justifying

circumstances

of

self

defense may not survive in the face of Gerolagas

flight from the crime scene, his concealment of the weapon and
his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.
On Appeal, accused Gerolagas criminal liability is individual
and separate. He shall be liable only for homicide, not murder as
no qualifying circumstance have been proven beyond reasonable
doubts

because

no

mitigating

or

aggravating

circum,stances

attended the killing.

The prosecution attempted to establish conspiracy by showing that
the reward was financed by appellant Remy Ruado- Sy and that
Efren Ativo delivered the amount to the killer. However, the
unrebutted testimony of Ruado-Sy that with the approval of her
husband,

she

set

aside

the

P3,000.00

as

reward

for

the

indemnification and apprehension of Commander Helen Lipanto and

the fact Activo merely obeyed the order of his employers to
deliver the amount to whoever could identify and apprehend said
NPA commander, no criminal intent to kill Anotnio Sy could be
attributed

to

them.

As

there

is

no

other

evidence

to

prove

conspiracy except the affidavit of confession, even the Solicitor

General

admitted

that

the

Lower

Court

erred

in

finding

the

existence of conspiracy.
Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo are hereby ACQUITTED
and are ordered released immediately, unless they are detained
for some other legal cause.
82

Appellants Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of crime of homicide for which he is hereby imposed the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prison mayor medium as
minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of

fifty thousand pesos P50,000.00).

SABANG vs. PEOPLE 518 SCRA 35

G.R. 168818, March 9, 2007
FACTS
On the eve of the fiesta, there is a drinking spree outside a
store

with

Nicanor

Sabang(petitioner)

Butad,

and

civilian

spouses

Cruz

agent(victim),

and

Andresa

Nilo

Villamor.

Suddenly, Randy Sabang(son of the petitioner) surprisedly came

and

Butad

uttered

the

words,

will

shoot

you

to

Randy.

Petitioner reacted saying, Just try to shoot my child because

Ill never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat. After
which, according to the witnesses, petitioner grabbed the gun
which was tucked on the holster at the waist of Butad and then
heard a gun shot. Thereafter, Butad lying on the floor sustaining
four gun shot that caused his death.
ISSUE
Whether

or

not

petitioners

insistence

on

the

justifying

circumstance of defense of relative deserves merit?

HELD
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded innocence, but during
the presentation of the evidence for the defense, he claimed to
have acted in defense of a relative which is a justifying
circumstance. The Court said that, in order to claim that he
acted

in

defense

of

relative,

the

accused

must

prove

the

concurrence of the three requisites: 1) unlawful aggression on

83

the part of the person killed or injured; 2) reasonable necessity

of

the

means

employed

to

prevent

or

repel

the

unlawful

aggression; and 3) the person defending the relative had no part

in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given by
the relative attacked. The Court finds that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of Butad since there was no imminent
threat on his sons life. Petitioner even said a words dismissing
what Butad uttered, that indicates petitioner did not consider
Butads words a theart at all.

Further, the four gun shot wounds

sustained by Butad negates the claim that killing was justified

but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him.
The Court ruled that, petition is denied for lack of merit. The
assailed

decision

of

the

CA

and

RTC

were

affirmed

with

modification on the award of moral damages.

PEOPLE VS. PRUNA

G.R. 138471 October 10, 2002
FACTS
On January 3, 1995 while a certain Lizette Arabelle Gonzales was
defecating in the grassy area near their neighbors backyard, a
certain

Manuel

Pruna

(a.k.a.

Boy)

called

her

attention

while

sniffing rugby among his friends. Upon responding to Boys call,

84

he then placed her on his lap and tried to touch her sensitive
parts and later on proceeded to bring her along the grassy area
and raped her. Boy was later on arrested.
Prosecution Witnesses and their Statements:
Jacqueline Gonzales, the victims mother, narrated to the court
that she was fetching water from the well when the incident
happened. Noticing that her daughter is not yet home she decided
to look for her and she saw her crying and then Lizette narrated
what happened. Lizette also stated that she knew the accused and
said accused was the one who inserted his penis into her vagina
as she was laid down on the grassy area. She also told the court
that she knew that it was a sin to tell a lie. Dr. Teresita
Quiroz and Teresita Magtanob examined the victim and corroborated
the

findings

of

medico-legal

examination,

respectively.

Examination shows that there are sperm cells present within the
girls vagina signifying sexual intercourse.
Defense Witness and their Statements:
Carlito Bondoc testified that Boy was at home during the time
the incident occurred because he & Carlito were having coffee.
Lower court ruled guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified
Rape and is sentenced to death penalty, thus it is automatically
subject to an immediate review.
ISSUES
1. Is Lizette a credible witness despite of her age?
2. Is Lizettes minority properly established and

if

the

imposition of death penalty is proper.

RULING
1. Yes, it is presumed that a witness is competent and the
burden to prove incompetence lies on the party contesting
the competency of the witness. In this case, despite that
the incident happened when she was three years old and that
the case was filed when she was five years old, the court
presumed that the child is a competent witness because test
of competency relies on intelligence, not age. The fact that
85

the

child

was

able

to

perceive

the

correct

impressions

during the incident and narrate it to the courts, knowing

the consequences of lying proves this.
2. Court set out guidelines for the appreciation of age as
evidence, stating that the best evidences of age are: the
birth certificate, similar authentic certificates, testimony
of the mother and the testimony of the person concerned
(provided it is express and clear). In this case there was
no document presented that can attest to the fact of age of
the

victim.

Though

the

defense

tried

to

contest

the

credibility of Lizette because of her tender age, it does

not mean that the prosecution is relieved from the burden of
proving Lizettes age and also not a proof that indeed
Lizette is below 7 years old, which if true would qualify
accused

to

death

penalty.

Because

there

is

no

concrete

evidence proving the age of the victim, the court cannot

assume an age for Lizette, thats why accused is not guilty
of qualified rape, and the imposition of death penalty is
not proper. However, accused is guilty of statutory rape
because

of

the

mothers

testimony,

and

that

Pruna

is

convicted of statutory rape of a girl below 12 years old and

is

sentenced

Furthermore,

to
the

the
civil

penalty
liability

of

reclusion

for

Perpetua.

indemnity

is

not

enough, moral damages should also be awarded.

PEOPLE VS. CONCEPCION,

386 SCRA 74
G.R. 136844, August 1, 2002
FACTS
The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder
for the killing of Lorenzo Galang. According to the testimonies
of both parties, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall
because he was so drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was
continually disturbing the peace. The accused then came to the
barangay hall to question Galang. But herein lies the differences
86

in the testimonies of the witnesses. The prosecution witness (two

of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion
fired two shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him.
Later on, he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which
wounded Galang in the thigh and then, Concepcion fired three more
shots which hit the victim in the chest and killed him. According
to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the victim
became

so

unruly

that

the

accused

fired

two

warning

shots.

Galang was not scared; instead, he tried to grab the gun from the
accused.

Two shots were accidentally fired which hit Galang,

thus, causing his death.

The accused claims that he should be

exempted because he was performing his lawful duty as a police

officer and that the shooting was purely accidental. The Court
found Concepcion guilty.
ISSUE

Whether or not appellant is exempted from criminal liability

under Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.

Whether or not treachery and abuse of public position are
qualifying circumstances.

RULING
No. The rule in criminal cases is that the prosecution has the
burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. When the
accused admits to the commission of offense charged but raises an
exempting

circumstance

as

defense,

the

burden

of

proof

is

shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant

now

has

the

burden

of

proving

that

he

is

entitled

to

that

exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4)of the Code.

Any person while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
Unfortunately,

the

testimony

of

the

accused

was

full

of

inconsistencies which failed to discharge the burden. For one,

Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun,
87

said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. Concepcion

claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the
barrel

of

the

gun.

The

court

finds

this

inconceivable.

Furthermore, it was not believable that a person so drunk would

try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also had a
handgun tucked by his waist.

Lastly, the prosecution witness

categorically testified that he saw Concepcion shoot the victim

with the M-16 rifle. Also, appellants gun discharged several
shots that hit vital parts of the victims body which the court
do not think as purely accidental.
Treachery is attended in the commission of the crime.
in

this

Though

case,

treachery

treachery

was

is

stated

only

an

in

the

aggravating

However,

circumstance.

information,

it

was

not

alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder.

Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as
a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered as
generic

aggravating

circumstance.

Consequently,

the

crime

committed by appellant is homicide and not murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, not
having been alleged in the information, could not be appreciated
to increase appellants liability.
The appellant is guilty of homicide. The penalty for homicide
under ART 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. There being one
mitigating

circumstance

aggravating

circumstance

of
of

voluntary
treachery,

imposed in its medium period.

88

surrender
the

penalty

and
should

one
be

PEOPLE vs. ANOD G.R. 186420

August 25, 2009
FACTS
On May 16, 1997, before midnight, Samuel Anod (appellant) and his
co-accused Lionel Lumbayan stabbed and hacked to death Erlando
Costan in his house situated in Barangay Borbonan, 5 Bislig,
Surigao del Sur (Borbonan). His body was found by Miguel Platil.
The

following

surrendered

day,

to

May

17,

Andromeda

1997,

appellant

Perater,

Barangay

and

Lumbayan

Chairperson

of

Borbonan, before whom they admitted the killing of Costan. On May

18,

1997,

appellant

and

Lumbayan

were

brought

to

the

police

station. The Barangay Chairperson testified before the RTC that

appellant

narrated

and

admitted

killed
However,

to

her

that

he

and

Lumbayan

Costan.
for

his

defense

the

appellant

claimed

that

he

only

cooperated with Lumbayan out of fear of being stabbed by Lumbayan

who,

at

the

appellant's

time

breast.

of
The

the

incident,

appellant

was

poking

knife

stabbed

Costan

once

at

at

the

considering

the

back.
ISSUE
1.

Whether

the

court

gravely

erred

in

not

appelant's claim on the exempting circumstances of irresistible

force

and

uncontrollable

fear.

2. Whether the court gravely erred in appreciating treachery and

evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances.
RULING
1. No. The appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA
committed any reversible error for not appreciating the exempting
circumstances of irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. The
evidence on record showed that the appellant had the chance to
escape

Lumbayan's

threat

or

engage
89

Lumbayan

in

combat,

as

appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's

allegation of fear or duress is untenable. The court held that in
order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it
is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt
from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act
with freedom. However, for such a defense to prosper, the duress,
force,

fear,

impending,

or

and

intimidation

of

such

must

nature

as

be

present,

to

induce

imminent

and

well-grounded

apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.

A

threat

of

future

injury

is

not

enough.

2. No. Indubitably, the killing of the victim was attended by

treachery. Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime
against

persons,

execution
ensure

thereof

its

employing
which

execution,

means,

tend,

without

methods

directly
risk

to

and
him

or

forms

in

the

specifically,
arising

from

to
any

defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. In this

case, the appellant tied Costan while the latter was lying down
before

he

ensuring

and
the

Lumbayan
execution

stabbed
of

the

the
crime

latter

to

without

SIERRA y CANEDA vs. PEOPLE

GR No. 182941 July 3, 2009
90

death;

risk

to

thus,
them.

FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen year old AAA was playing with her friend
BBB in the 2nd floor of her familys house in Palatiw Pasig. The
petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he
wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and
had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA
undressed

her,

and

also

had

sexual

intercourse

with

her

by

inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned them
not to tell anybody of what they did. AAA told the incident to
her teacher (Elena Gallano) and to the parent of her classmate
(Dolores Mangantula) who both accompanied AAA to the barangay
office.

AAA

was

later

subjected

to

physical

examination

that

revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of

sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical
findings, the petitioner was charged rape.
ISSUES
(1)

Whether

or

not

the

CA

erred

in

not

applying

the

provisions of R.A 9344 on the petitioners exemption from

criminal liability;
(2)

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was

incumbent for the defense to present the petitioners birth

certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A No. 9344 when the
burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by
express provisions of R.A No. 9344.
HELD
(1)

After the examination of the CA decision and the records of

the case, to deviate from the lower courts findings of
guilt. The records show that the prosecution established all
the

elements

testimony
sexual

of

of

the

AAA

intercourse

and

crime

charged

the

indeed

other
take

91

through

the

corroborating

place

as

the

credible
evidence;

information

charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under

the terms of R.A No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only
on the criminal, not on the civil liability.
A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he has acted with discernment, in which
minor

shall

be

proceeded

against

in

case, such

accordance

with

the

provisions of article 80 of this Code.

(2) The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence
showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the
time he committed the crime. Section 7 R.A 9344 expressly
states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may
be determined.
Pursuant to Section 64 R.A No 9344 Criminal Case No120292-H for
rape filed against petitioner
Robert

Sierra

Caneda

is

hereby

DISMISSED.

Petitioner

is

REFERRED to the appropriate local

social

welfare

and

development

officer

who

shall

proceed

in

accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.9344. Petitioner is

ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA P 50,000 as moral damages, and P
30,000 as exemplary damages.

92

DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., vs. CHING, et al.

G.R. No. 161803, February 04, 2008
FACTS
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz, with helper
Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in
Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City,going to Surigao City. They were
delivering

commercial

while

a Joana

Paula

passenger

bus

was

cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two
vehicles

was

parked

prime

mover

with

trailer,

owned

by

private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. as the trailer suffered a

tire

blowout

parked

the

the

night

before.

prime

mover

askew

The

driver

occupying

Cresilito
substantial

Limbaga,
portion

of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. The

prime

mover

was

not

equipped

with

triangular,

collapsible

reflectorized plates, the early warning device as substitute,

Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the
rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. It is
alleged that Limbaga likewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans on
the front and rear of the trailer. To avoid hitting the parked
prime mover, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right,
onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright
and

glaring

pumped

his

headlights
break

and

slowly,

the

approaching

swerved

to

the

passenger
left

to

bus.

avoid

He
the

oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime
mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz
and

Catamora

however,

only

became

suffered

inoperable

minor
as

injuries.
result

of

The
the

Nissan

van,

incident.

On

October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint

for damages against prime mover owner and driver with theft in
Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as
defendant in the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not Prime Mover is liable for the damages suffered by
the Nissan Van
93

HELD
YES,

Defendant

Liberty

Forest,

Inc.

did

not

exercise

the

diligence of a good father of family in managing and running its

business. The evidence on record shows that it failed to provide
its

prime

mover

and

trailer

with

the

required

early

warning

devices with reflectors and it did not keep proper maintenance

and

condition

of

the

prime

mover

and

the

trailer. The

circumstances show that the trailer were provided with worn out
tires and with only one(1) piece of spare tire. We find that
Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on
the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial

portion

of

the

national

road

on

the

lane

of

the passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed parking

of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some
measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. We find
that

private

respondent

Liberty

Forest,

Inc.

was

utterly

negligent in allowing novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate

vehicle, such as a truck loaded with bulldozer, which required
highly specialized driving skills. The employer clearly failed to
properly supervise Limbaga in driving the prime mover. Limbaga
was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway.
Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise
Limbaga

and

condition.

in

**

ensuring

Facts

of

that
the

the

case

prime
reveal

mover
that

was

in

proper

when Ortiz,

the

driver of the truck, failed to give the Joana Paula bus the space
on

the

road

it needed,

the

latter

vehicle

scraped

its

rear

right side on the protruded bulldozer blade and the impact threw
the bus directly on the path of the oncoming truck. This made
plaintiffs-appellants/appellees conclude that the JoanaPaula bus
occupied its lane which forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to
swerve to its left and ram the front of the parked trailer.** To
sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must

concur:

(a)

damage

suffered
94

by

plaintiff;

(b)

fault

or

negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect

between

the

fault

or

negligence of defendant

and

the

damage

incurred by plaintiff.**The two (2) flat tires suffered by the

trailer and these two (2) tires were attached to one of the two
(2) I-beams or axles attached to the rear of the trailer which
axle is very near but behind the other axle and with the location
, it would have the other beam suffer the flat tires as it has to
bear the brunt of weight of the D-8bulldozer

95

PEOPLE vs. BABANGOL, et al.

G.R. No. 181422, September 15, 2010
FACTS
Four men were arrested through a buy-bust operation held on May
18, 1999 of the Service Support of the Philippine National Police
(PNP)

Narcotics

Group.

Though,

the

accused

denied

the

charge

claiming that the police only arrested, beaten and that they
would be charged in connection to drugs unless they paid up.
However, the RTC found all four guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced each of them to the penalties of reclusion perpetua and
fine of Php500,000.00. The accused appeal but CA affirmed the
RTCs decision. Two of the accused Babangol and Naranjo appeal to
SC.
ISSUE
Babangol

and

Naranjo

question

the

sufficiency

of

the

prosecutions evidence proving that there was really a buy-bust

operation, the custody and quantity of the substance shabu that
has been confiscated by the police and the conspiracy acted by
Naranjo (driver of the van used by the accused.
RULING
First, appellants claim that there was a switching of evidence,
failure of the police to apply fluorescent powder to the boodle
money and the prosecutor should have presented the informant to
prove that there was really a buy-bust operation that took place
however, the prosecution said those claims were not necessary to
prove the offense charged. Second, the custody and test of the
substance confiscated shabu was merely affirmed by the Forensic
Chemist that it was truly forwarded on the laboratory and the
sample

he

took

representative

for
of

testing

its

entire

was

logically

contents.

presumed

Lastly,

to

that

be
the

prosecution failed to proved beyond reasonable doubt that the

96

accused Naranjo was acted in conspiracy with the other accused

since he had not done an overt act in pursuit of the crime. That
only Babangol only carried the bag of Shabu to the pretend buyer.
Wherefore the SC modified the CAs decision on November 14, 2006.
The

court

ACQUITS

accused-appellant

Cesar

R.

Naranjo

of

the

charge for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt and ORDERS his immediate release from detention.
The Court also orders the release of the KIA Besta Van with plate
number UUA 480, which the police confiscated as a result of this
case, to its registered owner, Cecillia L. Naranjo.
Finally, the Court Affirms in toto the judgment of conviction
against accused-appellant Arnel Babangol.

JACINTO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
FACTS
Entrapment by the NBI with marked money on Aug 21, 1997.
The trial of the three accused went its course and, on October 4,
1999, the RTC decided that:
The Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita
Busog

De

Valencia

Rivera

and

Jacqueline

Capitle

guilty

of

qualified theft.
The

three

appealed

to

the

CA

and,

on

December

16,

2003,

Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which reads,

thus: the decision of the trial court is modified, in that:
(a) Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor
medium.
(c) Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.

97

Partial

Motion

for

Reconsideration

was

filed

only

for

petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not
charged in the information;
2.

Whether or not worthless check can be object of theft;

and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The petition is granted. The decisions are modified. Petitioner
is found guilty of an impossible crime and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the
costs.

PEOPLE vs. SOBUSA

G.R. No. 181083, January 21, 2010
FACTS
On May 23, 2000, AAA a 10 year old girl filed a rape case against
her step father Herminigildo Sobusa. She said that days before
the Holy week of the same year, she was raped by Sobusa in her
room. The following day she even told her papa that there are
bloodstains in her pillow and panty that was overheard by her
98

Tita Bebing who is the sister of Sobusa and told her to just keep
quiet. However, in May 2000 she told her two friends about the
incident who told her to tell it to her Aunt DDD. They reported
it to the barangay captain and the latter reported it to the
municipall hall and a warrant of arrest was issued for Sobusa.
AAA underwent medico legal with the findings of incomplete old
healed hymenal laceration at 10 & 12 o clock position with fungal
infection. The doctor said that this could have been inflicted on
the victim a month or more and could be caused by trauma which in
this case was through a forcible insertion of a stiff or hard
penis into the vagina of the victim.
Sobusa however claims that he did not rape AAA and voluntarily
surrendered to the police. He said that he could not have raped
AAA because he treats her as his own and that he works during
night time as a security guard. He claims that the case was only
instigated by the relatives of AAA's mother because they don't
like him and accuses him of being a drunkard and a gambler.
He was convicted for rape beyond reasonable doubt by the lower
court with a penalty of death and to pay damages that was later
on affirmed with modification by the appelate court giving him a
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE
Sobusa insists that the court a quo gravely erred in finding that
the guilt in him for the crime charged has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
The higher court affirmed the ruling on the following basis: (1)
AAAs credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) AAAs
positive identification of accused-appellant as the one who raped
her; (3) physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that
99

she was raped; and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAAs part in
filing the charge.

PEOPLE vs. TORPIO

G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004
FACTS
In the evening of October 11, 1997 Anthony went to the house
of Dennis and invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards
both left the house of named Porboy Perez the three proceeded on
the shoreline in a cottage; Anthony tried to let Dennis drink gin
and as the latter refused. Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and
mauled

him

several

times.

Dennis

crawled

beneath

the

table

Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 inch fan knife but did not
hit him Dennis got up and ran towards their home.
Upon reaching home, he got a knife alarmed by the action of
Dennis his mother shouted. Manuel his father tried to scold his
son and tried to confiscate from him the knife but failed to do
so, resulting Manuel incurring a wound in his hand. Dennis went
back to the cottage upon seeing Anthony , the latter ran towards
the creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him, when he was hit
Anthony ran but got entangled with a fishing net and fell on his
back

Dennis

them

mounted

on

him

and

continued

stabbing

him

resulting to latters death. After the stabbing Dennis left and

went to Camp Downes and slept there the next morning Dennis
voluntary surrendered himself to Boy Estrera a well known police
officer.
ISSUE
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted
in the immediate vindication of grave offense is appreciated?
100

RULING
The Supreme Court held that the mitigating Circumstance of
having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was
properly appreciated. Dennis was humiliated, mauled and almost
stabbed by Anthony although the unlawful aggression had ceased
when Dennis stabbed Anthony. It was none the less a grave offense
for

which

Dennis

may

be

given

the

benefit

of

mitigating

circumstance.
However,

the

mitigating

circumstance

of

sufficient

provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of

vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose
from one and the same incident, i.e. attack on the appellant by
Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating
circumstance.

PEOPLE vs. BI-AY JR.

G.R No. 192187, Dec. 13, 2010
FACTS
On December 26, 1996, at around 7:00 in the evening, victim
Rodrigo Claro, together with his son Baby Boy Claro, were in the
house of the victims father, Francisco Claro. While Rodrigo and
Francisco were talking with each other, accused Jorge Bi-ay, Alex
Lingasa, and appellant Eliseo Bi-ay, Jr. alias Gideon arrived.
Jorge Bi-ay, the eldest in the group, approached Francisco and
asked for coffee. Francisco readily gave coffee and the accused
Jorge requested the victim Rodrigo to serve coffee to his two

101

companions who were waiting outside, accused Alex and appellant

Eliseo, which Rodrigo acceded.
Rodrigo then went out of the house carrying the two (2) cups of
coffee, he noticed that his 10 year-old son, Baby Boy Claro, was
following him and told his son to stay behind. When he was about
to

proceed,

appellant

Eliseo

who

was

ahead

of

him,

suddenly

hacked him on the nape which caused him to lose his balance and
fall

to

the

ground.

Accused

Alex

followed

suit

and

stabbed

Rodrigo at the back by thrusting a bladed instrument. Accused

Jorge also went towards Rodrigo and stabbed him.
Witnessing the vicious assault on his father, Baby Boy Claro ran
and shouted to his grandfather for help who then went out from
his house with a bolo. Within ten (10) meters away, Francisco saw
appellant delivering hacking blows on his son who was then lying
on the ground face up, while accused Jorge and Alex immediately
withdrew

and

fled

as

Francisco

nearly

approached

them.

Thereafter, appellant also ran away after all of them took turns
in hacking the victim which caused his untimely death.
On

March

accused

27,
guilty

2003,

the

beyond

RTC

rendered

reasonable

doubt

decision
of

murder

finding
as

the

charged

qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to a penalty of

imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Rodrigo Claro.
ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of murder with treachery as aggravating
circumstance?
RULING
On July 16, 2009, the CA rendered a decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision, WHEREFORE, premises considered the
102

assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Negros Occidental,

finding accused-appellant Eliseo-Biay, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
is hereby directed to pay the heirs of Rodrigo Claro the amounts
of

P50,

000.00

as

moral

damages,

P25,

000.00

as

exemplary

damages, and P25, 000.00 as temperate damages in addition to the

P50, 000.00 as civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
Considering the circumstances he admitted that he delivered the
first blow on the unwary victim, he initiated the deadly assault
by hacking the hapless victim on the nape, causing the latter to
immediately lose his balance and fall to the ground, the Court
cannot hold the accused liable as a mere accomplice because his
active and direct involvement in the brutal killing of the victim
was too obvious. WHEREFORE, the July 16, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and

Maria Cristina Santos vs. Court of Appeals, Heirs of
Pacifico C. Mabasa
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
Facts
The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a
two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos
St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be
103

described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to

respondents herein.
As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondents property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is
approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t)
from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing
in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the
petitioners the second passageway is about 3 meters in width and
length from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about
26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter
wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length,
has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property
which is also along the first passageway. Petitioner Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such
a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then
that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Petitioner, Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed
said fence because of some other inconveniences of having (at)
the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants
were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners
Custodios and Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access
ingress and egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay the
104

Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000)

as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment
of the trial court with modification only insofar as the. grant
of damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied.
Issues:
Whether the grant of right of way to herein private respondent
Mabasa is proper.
Whether the award of damages is in order.
Held:
No. Herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo
granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners,
the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already
been laid to rest.
No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award
of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises
by reason of the closure of the passageway.However, the mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages
105

are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage

suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. (damnum absque injuria). In order that
a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it (damnum et injuria.)
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other
means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not
subject to any servitude. There was no easement of way existing
in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract.
The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the
said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial
court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after
payment of just compensation.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right
over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the
same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment
and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage
106

may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the

rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque
injuria.

107