Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 4
Presumption of Death
Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after
an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened. (n)
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years. (n)
Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall
recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property
that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either
fruits or rents. (194)
RULE 73
- In the case of an inhabitant, he files the petition in the place where he resided
at the time of his death.
a. Actual
b. With continuity
c. Physical presence
RULING:
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was
San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence
of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired
is retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement
of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are
essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently.
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been
in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to
whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appears to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who
took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to
the aforemention, opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had)
decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee
did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent,
Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A
España Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on
his (decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court
held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon City is "manifest" from
the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This
conclusion is untenable. lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had
been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very words of herein appellee.
It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and
followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective
treatment. It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a
place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge that one will never
again be able, on account of illness, to return home."
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San
Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit
2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was
conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the
decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B"
residence certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a
notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract
Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days
prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy
of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein
appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the
deceased by his first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that
occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were
false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the
decedent had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter,
shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the
presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as
regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As
a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
(Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The law which governs
Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may
be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues
that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound
and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Sec. 1
Does not provide for an exclusive jurisdiction
Testate proceedings shall be given precedence
Intestate Succession is subordinate to testate sucession.
Effect of improper venue: procedural rule only. It can be waived by
failure to raise it as defense.
Sec. 2
If death terminates the marriage, ACP/CPG will be liquidated in
settlement proceedings.
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property
shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
Sec. 3
The probate court has the power to issue processes and warrants
Execution of final judgment can be enforced under R39. Failure of
which is punishable by contempt.
RULE 74
Sec. 4 Persons who have been unduly deprived of their lawful participation
payable in money:
- The whole settlement is not nullified. Only his share..
The court shall issue an order that the settlement of debts and lawful
participation shall be executed against the bond.
After the lapse of two years, these persons shall be precluded from exercising
their right.
- this rule is not absolute. In case the person is a:
Minor
Incapacitated
In prison
- they can exercise this right within 1 year after the disability is removed.
The two year bar applies only if the partition is valid.
- contemplates that notice was sent to the heir called to participate.
- Publication is not the constructive notice contemplated. It is because it
pertains to the fact of partition which already took place.
To repeat, the general rule is that no one can give what he does not have — nemo
dat quod non habet. Hence, even if it be assumed that Amojido had bought the land in
good faith from the parties to the extrajudicial partition, only so much of their share
could be validly acquired by him, with the rest of the property remaining under the
ownership of the six excluded co-heirs In other words, Amojido became pro
indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who retained title to their
respective shares although he had possession of the entire property. The portion
pertaining to the herein appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an
implied trust for their benefit x x x.’
RULE 75
Mandamus is not a remedy for the person in custody of the will to produce
the same. One of the requisite, that is, that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, is lacking. The court can commit him to prison under
R75, Sec. 5.
RULE 76
“Interested person” – creditor of the estate
Antemortem probate – is easier to prove testamentary capacity
Jurisdictional facts: Study the contents
PROBLEM:
A petition for intestate settlement of estate was filed in the RTC of Rizal. Then a will
was found and a probate proceeding was commenced in RTC of Bulacan. The
granting of the petition dates back to the filing of the will.
Venue: Only procedural.
In case of lost or destroyed will – provisions will be in writing; certified by the judge
and sealed.
In this case Fidel Reyes was not outside the province, in fact he was then living in the
place where the case was pending trial. He, therefore, must appear in court and his
deposition cannot be taken. And so they contend that the lower court erred in admitting
his deposition instead of taking his testimony.
We believe, however, that the deposition may also be justified by interpreting section
11, Rule 77, in connection with Rule 18, section 4 (c), of the rules, relative to the taking
of the deposition of a witness in ordinary cases when he is unable to testify because of
sickness. Interpreting and harmonizing together these two provisions we may draw the
conclusion that even if an instrumental witness is within the seat of the court but
is unable to appear because of sickness, as in this case, his deposition may still
be taken, for a different interpretation would be senseless and impractical and
would defeat the very purpose which said Rule 77 intends to serve.
Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis
of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the
Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule
that “[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting
witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor
of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly
executed in the manner required by law.”[73]
RULE 77
The does not take judicial notice of foreign judgment.
Reprobate – serves as re-authentication of the will. It is when the local court
will acknowledge the probate as binding.
Our laws do not prohibit probate of wills made by foreigners abroad.
RULE 78
Principal Consideration:
- person’s interest on the estate: if he is benefitted by the distribution of the
estate. It should be a material and direct interest.
- Next of kin: relation with the decedent that he will be entitled to a share/
- The interest of the nominee must be clearly shown.
Article 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator for the payment of debts due at the
time of the testator's death does not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to
his will.
RULE 79
“interested in the estate”
common law spouse – is counted as an interested person as he/she is a co-
owner. (R147, FC)
- failure to indicate interest in estate is not a jurisdictional defect. However, it
may serve as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on lack of capacity
to sue.
Did not file a motion for termination of special administrator and prayed for
appointment as regular administrator?
- it is not proper. The appointment can only be the SA as the proper
procedure was not followed.
RULE 80
appointed by the probate court to preserve the estate until appointment of the
regular administrator.
“For any other cause” – denial of the power to appoint regular administrator
- until the questions causing the delay are settled.