In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO

ABADIA.SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA,

ET AL.G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954

Facts:
1. Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be the
last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was
executed on September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some
cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he
left no will, filed opposition.
2. The trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said
document is a holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testator’s death, such form
of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since
the new Civil Code is already enforced, and that to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic will
of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the case shall be considered and not the
time of its execution? NO!

Held:
1. No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in
court for probat e or when t he pet i t i on is deci ded by t he court
but at t he t i m e t he instrument was executed, as supported by Art.
795 of the new Civil Code.
2. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
3. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his
death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and
his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent
law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective
will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession.
4. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The
A.W. FLUEMER, vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved.
March 17, 1930 | GR 32636

FACTS: Petitioner Fluemer is the special administrator of the estate of

Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West
Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. Thus, petitioner submitted
a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code,
annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified to by the
Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied
the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:  Whether it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of

such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of
said will. YES! Need to prove the foreign law

RULING:  Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves
in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such
laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not
met.

There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as
provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from
the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No
evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed.
 Need to prove Virginia laws;
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only  due execution of will not
evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside
from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
established;
testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses  only testimony of petitioner is
subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the given  nothing given to prove na
law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses done with 2 witnesses, in presence
to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means. of testator an each other;
It was also necessary for petitioner to prove that Hix had his domicile in West
Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence introduced to
establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and testimony of
the petitioner.
 Probate of the William R. Giberson
G.R. No. L-4113
June 30, 1952

WARNING! CASE IS IN SPANISH LOL

Facts:

 Lela Dalton presented an application in the CFI of Cebu asking for the
legalization of a document, which was awarded in San Francisco,
California, purporting to be the holographic will of William Giberson, who
was a citizen of the State of Illinois, USA, a resident of Cebu and died in
Manila.
 Spring Giberson, son of the deceased, filed an opposition claiming that the
will is apocryphal, that it does not represent the true will of the deceased,
and that It has not been in accordance with the law.
 The trial court dismissed the application stating that under out existing
rules, only those wills that have previously been proved to be allowed in the
US, or any state or territory thereof, or any foreign country, according to
their laws, may be allowed to be filed or recorded in the proper court of first
instance in the Philippines, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the will of William Giberson can be authenticated in the

Philippines?NO

Ruling:

No. A will awarded outside the Philippines can be legalized and registered
 Dalton asks legalization of will In US
in the PH, provided that it was awarded in accordance with the laws of the country
where it was awarded. This is supported by Article 637 of the Civil Code, wherein it  Son of dead say its not in acc to the
was stated that wills authenticated and legalized in the US, or any state or territory law
thereof in accordance with the laws of that state, may be legalized and recorded in  TC denied bec not proved if allowed
the CFI of the province in which the testator has a real property or estate.
in US
RULE 78, — SECTION 1. Wills proved outside Philippines may be allowed here. —
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country,  Will outside of PH can be allowed
may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the here if in acc to the law of the
Philippines.
country it was awarded
SEC. 637. Wills proved outside islands may be allowed here. — Wills proved and
allowed in the United States, or any State or Territory thereof, or in a foreign state or
country, according to the laws of such State, Territory, or country, may be allowed,
filed,and recorded in the Court of First Instance of the province in which the testator
has real or personal estate on which such will may operate.

PAULA DE LA CERNA VS. MANUELA POTOT
G.R. No. L-20234      December 23, 1964
FACTS
1. Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will
and testament in the local dialect where they gave two (2) parcels of land to
Manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
2. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
RTC
1. The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the
testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of
joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil
Code of the Philippines
CA
1. The CA reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution
of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:
It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code)
prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of
will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used;
and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has
been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction,
there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions
thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon
vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the
provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming that the
joint will in question is valid."
ISSUE and DECISION
WON there is an exception to the prohibition on joint wills? Yes
 The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered
in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de
la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a
third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code).
 The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that
the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts,
and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939.
WON the joint will as valid in so far as to the wife? No. It must be re-examined and
there must be an adjudication de novo.
 It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife
was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo,
since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
 The holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one
prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question. Therefore, the undivided
interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate,
and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said
Gervasia.
 It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills, if in common
usage could not make them valid, when our Civil Codes consistently
invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws,
and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5,
Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
 A joint will was probated in 1939
 CFI: void; CA: allowed bec decision of
probate court is conclusive of its due
executon
 GR: Joint wills are not allowed
 Exc: if its admitted to probate by final
order of court of competent juris
(conclusive effect on the will)
Estate of Rodriguez
Testate Estate of the Late Bernabe Rodriguez: Aranigeo v. Antonio Rodriguez
et al.
(From 2016 UP Law Reviewer Sorry I can’t find the original case, I think it’s a CA
decision based on the citation: CA-G.R. No. 1627 -R, July 1, 1948; 46 Off. Gaz. But
I amended the digest from the reviewer to include decision of the SC which cited this
case.)

Petitioner, Martine Araniego, is the widow of the deceased testator Bernabe

Rodriguez. Respondents are the testator’s brother, heirs of his brother, and his niece.

Petitioner filed a petition for probate of Bernabe’s alleged will before the CFI of
Bulacan. Respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the will was obtained
through undue influenced exercised by Petitioner over the deceased. Respondents
also alleged that the deceased did not have the mental capacity to execute the will, as
such it was not actually his will. This is because the testator instituted Petitioner as
his universal heir. Petitioner, in turn, also instituted the deceased as her universal heir
in her separate will. In other words they were reciprocal beneficiaries in their
respective separate wills. Respondents argued that the testator and Petitioner violated
the prohibition on joint wills under the Civil Code, hence, probate must be denied.  Pet file probate; Resp oppose – no
WON the wills executed testators reciprocally making the other as beneficiary is mental capacity; undue influence; joint
a joint will prohibited by law? NO. will

NO. The Court of Appeals said that what the law prohibits under said article Article  No joint will here – reciprocal
669 of the old Civil Code (Art. 818 of the new Civil Code) is two or more persons
making a will conjointly or in the same instrument and not reciprocity in separate beneficiaries of each other ung spouses
wills. What is prohibited is the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either in SEPARATE WILLS
for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In other words, it is  What is prohibited is “make a will
making such will conjointly or in the same document that is prohibited. Here, the two
testators, who were husband and wife, instructed the other as universal heir in their
conjointly or in the same instrument”
respective wills, said wills are not conjoint because they are made in different
instruments. Hence, there is no joint will to speak of and the prohibition in the Civil
Code is inapplicable.
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward Christensen
January 31, 1963
Labrador J:
Facts:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among other things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount
of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable
to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of
the testator Edward E. Christensen.1
The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by
the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged... natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several... foreign elements are involved,
that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent apply, should be applicable.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable
Issues:
Whether the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution
should be governed by the Philippine Laws? Yes
1
"'12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the Income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/ or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may he possessed at my death and which
may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: * * *"... the executor
in his final account and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Ruling:
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties
in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
As to his citizenship, however, the court finds that the citizenship that he acquired
in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United
States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself
as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that Estate; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
'Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given places while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile.'
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate, and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" as used therein.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no
other than the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the case
at bar, the private law of the State of California.
Under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946
of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile."
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained, the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
the court should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of law rules law for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If the court must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained,
i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict of laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law
of the testator's domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while
the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The court therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
law, the domicile pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California .
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.  rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.  position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,  that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Facts:
Amos was born in Texas and was a citizen of the state. Amos has 5
legitimate children on his first wife, 3 on his second wife and 3 illegitimate
children. On Aug 5 1952, Amos executed a will stating that
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.
On July 1958, Amos died so the trust company accomplished the will and two
illegitimate children opposed stating that they are deprived of their legitime as
acknowledged illegitimate children. The Probate Court ruled in favour of the
trust company and ruled that the report of the trust company be final.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine Law shall govern.
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Ruling:
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
 Cayetano v. Leonides
129 SCRA 522 [1984]
Doctrine:
Article 16(2): However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Article 1039: Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent. 
The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the
intrinsic and extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national
and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire
estate to a complete stranger. Intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon
during probate of will. The attested will is still valid even if the compulsory
heir was deprived of his legitime because the decedent, at the time of his
death, was a citizen of US, and was governed by Pennsylvania law which
does not have a system of legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion can therefore
dispose of her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share in her
estate.  apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
FACTS:
1. Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios
C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
2. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate
of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
3. Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a
petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
 xxx alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of
her death xxx;
 that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while
temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila;
 that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;
 that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of
Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga
had declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the
former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
 that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties
of the estate located in the Philippines.
4. On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed
by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every
reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
5. Petitioner died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix
of his last will and testament. Cayetano, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court.
6. The respondent judge issued an order stating that the Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion is admitted to and allowed probate in
the Philippines, and appointed Nenita Campos Paguia as Administratrix
of the estate of said decedent.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was entitled to his legitime considering that he
is a compulsory heir? NO, the governing law is law of Pennsylvania
pursuant to Nationality Rule (Art. 16(2)). Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger.
HELD:

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
□ This contention is without merit.
□ Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
□ Therefore the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
□ Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide
for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to
a complete stranger
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter
to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
□ It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply.
□ This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
wherein we ruled:
 It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Xxx
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
□ As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law.
□ The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
□ However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
□ the records bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for
relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979.
□ There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe
otherwise.
□ The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence
when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no
denial of due process.
□ The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.
The issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
□ the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was
alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen
and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and
not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
□ Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the probate court in the petition for relief.
□ It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Parish Priest v Rigor

FACTS
Father Rigor died leaving a will naming as devisees the testator’s
three sisters. The will also contained a bequest to be given to the
nearest male relative who shall pursue an ecclesiastical career until
his ordination as priest. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator
claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs
believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer
the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.

ISSUE
Whether the testator’s nearest male relative who took the
priesthood after the testator’s death falls within the intention of the
testator in providing to whom the bequest is to be given.

RULING
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s
nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any
indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated to inherit, the
heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is
proper” (Art. 1025, Civil Code).Inasmuch as the testator was not
survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice lands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will was likewise