1|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
CASE LIST:
RULE 77:
1. Fleumer vs. Hix, 54 Phil 610
2. Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil 500
3. Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil 867
4. Leon and Ghezzi vs. Manulife, 90 Phil 459
5. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868, 8
June 2006
RULE 78:
1. Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil 212
2. Navas Sioca vs. Garcia, 44 Phil 711
3. Mercado v. Vda De Jaen, 64 Phil 75
4. Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil 416
5. Uy vs. CA, GR No. 167979, 16 March 2006
6. De Guzman vs. Limcolioc, 68 Phil 673
7. San Luis vs. San Luis, GR No. 133743,February
2007
8. Angeles vs. Maglaya, GR No. 153798, 2 September
2005
9. Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil 175
RULE 77:
ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATE THEREUNDER
I. A.W. FLUEMER vs. HIX.
Statement of Facts: The special administrator, A. W.
Fleumer, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix filed
petition for the probate of the purported last will and
testament of Edward Randolf Hix, deceased.Judge
Tuason of the Court of First Instance denied the
petitionA. W. Fleumer appeals the said decision. It is
alleged that since the will was executed in West Virginia
by a resident therein, West Virginia law should govern.
Statement of Issue: Whether or not the will may be
probated in the Philippines.
Ruling of the Court: The courts of the Philippines are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the
various States of the American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. Here the requirements of law were
not met. There was no showing that the book from
net
which an extract was taken was printed or published
under the authority of the state of West Virginia as
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure; nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original. In addition, the due
execution of the will was not established. The only
evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of
the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator
in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia
seems to require. It is to be noted that the application for
the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February
20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to
have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly
indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the
principal administration and West Virginia the
ancillary administration. However this may be, no
attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure,
for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will
said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia
has been requested. There is no showing that the
deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in
West Virginia.
II. SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY
Statement of Facts: On Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen
and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy,
Fookien province, China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and
9 children by the first marriage had with the late
Manuela T. Cruz and a child named Silvino by the
second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian
who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and after
hearing letters of administration were issued to
Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C.
Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15
October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed
and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the
late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of
the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and
before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After
2|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files,
records and documents of his late father a will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by
the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.
Statement of Issue: Whether or not the will executed in
Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines.
Ruling of the Court: The will executed in Amoy, China
cannot be allowed. Silvino was unable to adduce the
necessary proof under the Rules of Court in order to
probate the will in the Philippines, specifically:
a. The due execution of the will in accordance with
the foreign laws;
b. The testator had his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines;
c. The will has been admitted to probate in such
country;
d. The fact that the municipal court of Amoy is a
probate court;
e. the procedural law of China regarding probate
of wills.
III. MICIANO vs. BRIMO
Statement of Facts: Miciano, as the administrator of the
estate of Joseph Brimo, filed a petition for the partition of
the estate in accordance with the will of the deceased.
Andre Brimo, brother of the deceased opposed the
partition because the will itself was not executed in
accordance with the laws of Turkey, in violation of
Article 10 of the Civil Code. The trial court approved
the petition for partition, hence this action.
Statement of Issue: Whether or not the partition is valid.
Ruling of the Court: The Court decided that although
Andre Brimo opposed his brother’s intention to have
Philippine laws apply he was not deemed to have
contested the legacy, because the choice of law clause in
the will was contrary to law. Our laws apply the lex
nationalii of decedent to determine intrinsic validity of a
will and this law was purposefully disregarded by
decedent. The Court considered this clause as not
net
imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir even
if the testator should otherwise provide. Hence, Andre
Brimo can inherit.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws,
they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines.The orders appealed from are modified and
it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant
Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects
IV. LEON AND GHEZZI vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE
INSURANCE CO
Statement of Facts: The case involves the estate of Basil
Gordon Butler,formerly a resident of the Philippines,
died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will
which was duly probated in New York County and of
which James Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and
Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having
been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17,
1947. The will contained this residuary clause
bequeathing the remaining estate to Mercedes de Leon
who is to receive an amount sufficient for her current
needs. James Madison Ross was appointed as trustee.
Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life
Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada,
paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined
premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly
payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime.
De Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly
allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila
Office. To get hold of the entire amount, de Leon
presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with
Ghezzi as administrator. After having qualified, the
administratrix filed the motion to demand accounting
from Manulife which Judge Amparo has denied.
Statement of Issue:Whether or not De Leon can demand
accounting from Manulife.
Ruling of the Court: Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court provides:
3|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after
the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that
the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the
probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an
annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the
country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party
whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch
or agency of the company which holds the funds in its
possession, the agency's intervention being limited to
delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and
issued from the home office. There is no showing or
allegation that the funds have been transferred or
removed to the Manila Branch.
V. ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
Statement of Facts: Spouses Audrey and W. Richard
Guersey were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle.
When Audrey died, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard. The will was admitted to probate in Maryland,
U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor. The
court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta as ancillary
administrator. Audrey’s will was also admitted to
probate in the Philippines (CFI-Pasig). Later, Richard
married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon with whom he
has two children- Kimberly and Kevin. When Richard
died, he left a will bequeathing his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the
A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will
was admitted to probate in Maryland, U.S.A. Richard’s
will was then submitted for probate before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner
also filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate,
between Richard and Kyle. These were approved by the
trial court. Respondent sought annulment of the project
partition made arguing that since Audrey devised her
net
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should
be wholly adjudicated to him and since Richard left his
entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the
A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent. The Court
of Appeals annulled the questioned orders.
Statement of Issue: Whether or not the project of
partition filed by the ancillary administrator is valid.
Ruling of the Court: Petitioner’s failure to proficiently
manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to
the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable
law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence, the annulment
of project of partition was valid.
Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court states:
Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after
the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by
law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the
State of Maryland.
RULE 78:
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF
ADMINISTRATION, WHEN AND TO WHOM ISSUED
I. GUERRERO vs. TERAN
Statement of Facts: CFI of Albay appointed Maria
Muñoz as guardian for minors Maria Manuela and
Maria del Carmen Muñoz; Maria Muñoz gave the
required bond Maria Muñoz was not a resident of the
Philippine Islands at the time of her appointment. She
was removed as guardian – but still responsible for
mismanagement; from the time of her acceptance of
appointment up to the time of her removal Doña Maria
4|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon
the theory that her appointment was void because she
did not reside in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling of the Court: There is nothing in the law which
requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. (Civil Code took effect
August 30, 1950). Notwithstanding that there is no
statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to
the appointment of persons as administrators and
guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.
II. NAVAS SIOCA vs. GARCIA
Statement of Facts: “A probate court cannot arbitrarily
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse
to the administration of the estate of a deceased person;
but if the person enjoying such preferential rights is
unsuitable the court may appoint another person.” CFI
Samar appointed Jose Garcia, administrator of the estate
of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque. Navas Sioca is the
surviving spouse of the deceased and maintains that the
court erred in not appointing him administrator instead
of Jose Garcia. Lower Court based its ruling on the fact
that it appeared from the records that the appellant had
adverse interest in the estate of such a character as to
render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness
may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility
to those immediately interested in the estate.
Ruling of the Court: A probate court cannot arbitrarily
and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of
the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court
may appoint another person.
III. MERCADO VS VDA DE JAEN
FACTS: Gorordo is a retired bishop of Cebu. When he
died he left a will naming his heirs and executor. The
respondent De Jean is the sister of Gorodo who is named
as universal heirs including his nieces, Telesfora and
Cesorea Gorordo . The petitioner Fr Mercado was
named in the will as the executor and in his absence, Fr.
Espina (Mercado being the parish priest in San Nicolas,
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Cebu and Espina being the parish priest in Cebu
Central). The will was submitted for probate before the
CFI Cebu. It was allowed and duly probated. Fr.
Mercado, as the executor named in the will, was
confirmed by CFI Cebu and he filed a bond of 5000. The
Heirs opposed the order appointing Fr Mercado as
executor and prayed for suspension of said order.
HEIRS: They alleged that even if Fr. Mercado is named
as executor in the will, there is no need to appoint him
because the heirs are already of age and the estate has no
debts. Mercado is also incapable as executor because he
is partial since his parish, San Nicolas was named as one
of the legatees in the will.
ISSUE: WON the court is bound to appoint Mercado as
executor since he is the named executor in the will.
RUILING: Yes. Under Section 641 of Act no. 190 (An Act
Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Action and
Special Proceedings in the Phil – now Section 4, Rule 78),
once a will is probated, the court is bound to issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person so named as executor
of the will provided he accepts the trust and files the
required bond. While it may be true that such should not
be strictly interpreted, for the court may be deprived of
its power to appoint another should the executor so
named is incapacitated, it is also true that incapacity
must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary.
Fr. Mercado was found to be fit as an executor for the
estate. He further alleged that the parish of San Nicolas
is not the legatee but the poor people of San Nicolas.
When Gorordo chose Mercado as executor of his estate
after his death, he must have had good and sufficient
reasons and as such, his will must be respected.
IV. OZAETA vs. PECSON
Statement of Facts: Carlos Palanca died, leaving a will
named former SC associate justice Ozaeta, as executor if
General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify. Gen. Roxas
predeceased Palanca; Ozaeta filed petition for probate of
Palanca’s will, prayed that he be appointed
administrator. Heirs of Palanca opposed; Court
appointed Phil Trust Co. as administrator. Judge had
some personal issues regarding Ozaeta
5|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
Ruling of the Court: The choice of his executor is a
precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should
desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be
trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his
estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered
as a curtailment of the rights to dispose. And as the
rights granted by him will take effect from the time of
his death (Article 777, CC), the management of his estate
by the administrator of his choice should be made as
soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his
assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer.
It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of this court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application. It is the testator that appoints his executor,
as the question as to his peculiar fitness for such position
or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be
addressed to the discretion of the county judge.
V. UY vs CA
FACTS: Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on
August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok
Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly
S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy
(Petitioner). An intestate proceeding was instituted and
Hofileña was appointed as special administrator of the
estate of the deceased. Uy opposed the appointment so
the probate court revoked Hofilena’s institution as
administrator and the letter of admin. was given to
Wilson Uy. Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a
motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as
administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He
alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the
deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that
should be included in the estate. Johnny Uy was
appointed as co-administrator. Wilson Uy now asked
the court to order Johnny to bring into the estate
properties belongin to the deceased in which Johnny
complied. Wilson again moved for Johnny’s removal but
was denied by the probate court and CA.
CA: The appointment of private respondent was
justified; that the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrator.
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WILSON UY: The trial court cannot re-open the issue of
the appointment of an administrator without removing
the incumbent administrator. (bec. The letter of admin
was already given to him, appointment of Johnny cannot
be bec. there is res judicata)
ISSUE: WON the appointment of co-admin rules out the
order of preference in Rule 78, Sec 6.
RULING: No. There is no question that petitioner was
appointed as regular administrator of the estate of the
deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9, 1998. However,
private respondent in his motion to intervene sought to
be appointed as administrator as he is not only the
brother of the decedent but also a creditor who knows
the extent of the latter’s properties. Thus, the trial court,
while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed
private respondent as co-administrator of the estate.
In the instant case, the order of preference was not
disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing
petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as
co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and
petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it
alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report
regarding the estate under his administration.
Thus, petitioner’s argument that the trial court
cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an
administrator without removing the incumbent
administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings,
considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in
modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the
proceedings are pending in the same court and timely
applications or motions for such modifications or
revocations are made by the interested parties.
SUPPLEMENT: . Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may
be granted are as follows:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
6|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next
of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
The order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances.In Sioca v. Garcia,this Court set aside the order
of preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily
and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights
of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of
the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such
preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint
another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for
the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment
and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal
unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in
error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest
of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate. x x x.(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
VI. DE GUZMAN vs. LIMCOLIOC
Statement of Facts: Proceso de Guzman died without
leaving a will. Proceso married Agatona and had four(4)
children. When Agatona died, he married Angela
Limcolioc with no kids. CFI Rizal appointed Nicolasa de
Guzman, child, as judicial administratrix; Limcolioc
opposed.
net
Ruling of the Court: Preference of widow as
administrator is not absolute. The principal
consideration is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as such administrator. If there is another who
has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor becomes
untenable. Proceso acquired properties during 1st
marriage; none acquired during 2nd marriage; Children
of 1st marriage has more interest.
VII. SAN LUIS vs SAN LUIS
Facts: The case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968,
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued
a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos at Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time
of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration.
Held: The issue of Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced
by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code.
With respect to such issue, records of the proceedings of
the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
7|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin
to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters
of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An “interested person” has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent.
In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
net
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proven
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we
held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs.
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
VIII. ANGELES vs. MAGLAYA
Statement of Facts: Maglaya filed a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of his father –
opposed by Belen Angeles, father’s wife Francisco died
intestate leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a
building Petitioner opposed the petition; she wants to
be the administratrix of Francisco’s estate. Maglaya:
Angeles is not the daughter of Francisco because the
birth certificate was not signed by him; and Angeles is
not the only child of Francisco, they adopted Concesa
Maglaya (daughter) has not even presented a witness to
testify that her putative parents really held themselves
out to the public as man-and-wife – no legal
presumption of legitimacy which should flow from a
lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.
8|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO net

Statement of Issue: Whether or not the surviving

spouse is preferred as administrator of the estate of her
deceased husband.

Ruling of the Court: Petition of Angeles (wife) is

granted On the matter of appointment of administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. Issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a
next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Maglaya is not an interested party;
she did not prove her legitimacy nor acceptance of her
father.

IX. JOHANNES vs. HARVEY

Statement of Facts: Johannes, a married woman, died

intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements. Her husband
was named the administrator of her property by the
Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. Husband
resides in Singapore while brother in Manila. Her
brother was appointed by the CFI Manila as ancillary
administrator of her properties in Manila.

Ruling of the Court: CFI did not act in excess of

jurisdiction in naming the brother of the deceased as the
ancillary administrator of the estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile
as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in
both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction
of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. A grant of
administration does not have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no
authority in the United States. Ancillary letters should
ordinarily be granted to the domiciliary representative,
or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of
express statutory requirement the court may in its
discretion appoint some other person.