1981 OTA SolarPowerSatellites

Solar Power Satellites
August 1981
NTIS order #PB82-108846
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-600129

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword
The energy difficulties the Nation has faced over the past decade have given
rise to an increased awareness of the potential long-term, inexhaustible, or
renewable energy technologies. This assessment responds to a request by the House
Committee on Science and Technology for an evaluation of the energy potential of
one of the most ambitious and long-term of these technologies, the solar power
satellite (SPS).
In assessing SPS, OTA has taken into account the preliminary nature of SPS
technology by comparing four alternative SPS systems across a broad range of
issues: their technical characteristics, long-term energy supply potential, international and military implications, environmental impacts, and institutional effects.
The SPS options are also compared to potentially competitive future energy
technologies in order to identify how choices among them might be made. In addition, OTA developed a set of Federal research and funding options to address the
central questions and uncertainties identified in the report.
We were greatly aided by the advice of the SPS advisory panel, as well as by the
participants in three specialized workshops: one on alternative SPS systems, one on
public opinion, and another on competing energy supply technologies. The contributions of a number of contractors, who provided important analyses, and of
numerous individuals who gave generously of their time and knowledge, are
gratefully appreciated.
Director
...
Ill
Solar Power Satellites Advisory Panel

John P. Schaefer, Chairman
University of Arizona
Paul Craig
Jerry Grey
University of California
American Institute of Aeronautics

and Astronautics
S. David Freeman
John J. Sheehan
United Steelworkers of America
Graham SiegeI
Grant Hansen
Tennessee Valley Authority
SDC Corp.
Eilene Galloway
Russell Hensley
Aetna Life & Casualty
Consultant
Karl Gawell
Solar Energy Research Institute
Peter G laser
Maureen Lamb
Consultant
J. C. Randolph
Arthur D. Little, Inc.

Robert Uhrig
Florida Power & Light
Frank von Hippel

Princeton
University
Charles Warren
Attorney
University of Indiana
Workshop on Technical Options

John W. Freeman, Jr., Chairman
Rice University
Joe G. Foreman
Naval Research Laboratories
John D. G. Rather
The B.D.M. Corp.
Kenneth Billman
Electric Power Research Institute
Jerry Grey
and Astronautics
Fred Sterzer
RCA Laboratories
Hubert P. Davis
Eagle Engineering
Abraham Hertz berg

University of Washington
Henry M. Foley
Colurnbia University
Frank von Hippel

Princeton University
Gordon Woodcock
Boeing Aerospace Co
Workshop on SPS Public Opinion Issues

Ken Bossong
Citizens Energy Project
Leonard David
National Space Institute
Ben Bova
OMNI
Chris E If ring
Office of Technology Assessment
Clifflyn Bromling
Bromling and Associates
Joe Foreman
Naval Research Laboratories
Mike Casper
Carlton College
Jerry Grey
and Astronautics
Earl Cook
Texas A&M
Skip Laitner
Community Action Research Croup
of Iowa, Inc.
Maureen Lamb
Consultant
Jenifer Robinson
Louis Slesin
Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
Workshop on Energy Context of Solar Power Satellites

Clark Bullard, Chairman
University of Illinois
Peter Drummond
McDonnel-Douglas Astronautics
William Metz
Consultant
Charles Baker
Argonne National Laboratory
Lessly Goudarzi
International Energy Associates,
Limited
David Morris
Institute for Local Self Reliance
Piet Bos
Electric Power Research Institute
Glen Brandvold
Sandia National Laboratory
Clifflyn Bromling
Bromling & Associates
Paul Craig
University of California
iv
Kenneth Hub
Argonne National Laboratory
Jerry Karaganis
Edison Electric Institute
John Lamarsh
Polytechnic Institute of New York
Kenneth Ling
Applied Solar Energy Corp.
James Moyer
Southern California Edison
Larry Ruff
Brook haven National Laboratory
Frank von Hippel
Gordon Woodcock
Boeing Aerospace Co.
Solar Power Satellites Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA
Energy, Materials, and International Security Division
Richard E. Rowberg, Energy Program Manager
David Claridge, Project Director (until January 1980)
Ray A. Williamson, Project Director (from January 1980)
Adam Wasserman
Stefi Weisburd
Administrative Staff
Marian Grochowski
Lisa Jacobson
Lillian Quigg
Edna Saunders
Yvonne White
Contributors
Clifflyn Bromling
Arlene Maclin
Alan Crane
William Metz
Contractors and Consultants

Eric Drexler
International Energy Associates, Ltd.
John Furber
David Morris
Institute for Local Self Reliance
Mark Gersovitz
Jerry Grey
Barry Smernoff
Smernoff & Associates
OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer
John Bergling
Kathie S. Boss
Debra M. Datcher
Joe Henson
Acknowledgments
OTA thanks the following people who took time to provide information or to review part or all of the
study.
Martin Abromavage, Argonne National Laboratory
Edwin Beatrice, Letterman Army Institute of
Research
Richard Beverly and William Brown, Raytheon

Tom Bull, Office of Technology Assessment
Daniel F. Cahill, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Don Calahan, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration
Ernest L. Morrison, National Telecommunications

and Information Administration
Fred Osborne, Sunsat Energy Council

Steven Plotkin, Office of Technology Assessment
John Richardson, National Academy of Sciences
Michael Riches, U.S. Department of Energy
Donald Rote, Argonne National Laboratory
Charles Rush, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration
Stephen Cheston, Georgetown University

Stephen Cleary, Mfedical College of Virginia
P. Czerski, National Research Institute of Mother
Richard Santopietro, U.S. Department of Energy

Carl Schwenk, National Aeronautics and Space
and Child, Poland

Steven Doyle, Office of Technology Assessment
Lewis Duncan, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
William Erickson, University of Mary/and
Harold A. Feiveson, Woodrow Wilson School,
Zorach Glaser, Bureau of Radiological Health
Richard Setlow, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Charlotte Silverman, U.S. Public Health Service
David Sliney, U.S. Army Environment/ Hygiene
Anita Harlan, L-5 Society

John Hooper, Sierra Club
Wayne Jones, Lockheed Corp.
Don Justesen, Veterans Administration
Fred Koomanoff, U.S. Department of Energy
John Logsdon, George Washington University
Simon V. Manson, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Richard Marsten, Office of Technology

Assessment
Administration
Agency
Marcia Smith, Congressional/ Research Service
Gerald Stokes, Pacific Northwest Laboratory

A.R. Thompson, National Radio Astronomy
Observatory
Kosta Tsipas, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology
Paul Tyler, Armed Forces Radiological Research
Institute
A.R. Valentine, Argonne National Laboratory

Peter Vajk, Science Applications, Inc.
Margaret White, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
John Zinn, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Contents
Chapter
1.
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Issues and Find ngs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
4.
Policy Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
55
5.
6.
Alternative Systems
for SPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
SPS inContext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.
The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Environment and Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Institutional Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
2.
3.
8.
9.
A.
B.
c.
D.
E.
Page
23
Alternatives to the Reference System Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 265

Decentralized Photo voltaic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................269
Global Energy Demand Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...271
Environment and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......275
Examples of international Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........289
Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....293
Chapter 1
Contents
Page
Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Energy Context . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
......................
International and Military Imp ications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

....................................
Public Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Systems and Costs. . . . . . . . . .
Environment and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Space Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...............................
14
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Characterization of Four Alternative SPS Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Summaryof SPS Environmental Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The solar power satellite (SPS) concepts envision using the constant availability of sunlight in space to generate baseload electricity
on Earth. Orbiting satellites would collect
solar energy and beam it to Earth where it
would be converted to electricity. Three major
alternative systems have been suggested.
Microwave transmission. Solar radiation

would be collected in space and converted to microwaves. Microwave energy
would be beamed to a receiving antenna
on Earth where it would be converted to
electricity.
Laser transmission. Solar radiation would
be collected in space and converted to infrared laser radiation. The lasers would
beam power to an Earth receiver.
Mirror transmission.
Orbiting mirrors
would reflect sunlight directly to central
locations on Earth. Terrestrial solar receivers would convert the resulting 24hour illumination to electricity.
Since SPS would be a major future energy

system with diverse potential impacts and implacations, this assessment of SPS technology
is interdisciplinary. It includes the study of SPS
interactions with society, the environment, the
economy, and other energy systems. in addition, because space is an international realm
and energy is a global need, this assessment
also undertakes a broad look at the international aspects of SPS.
CURRENT STATUS
Too little is currently known about the technical, economic, and environmental aspects of SPS
to make a sound decision whether to proceed
with its development and deployment. I n addition, without further research an SPS demonstration or systems-engineering verification
program would be a high-risk venture. An SPS
research program could ultimately assure an adequate information base for these decisions. However, the urgency of any proposed research effort depends strongly on the perception of future electricity demand, the variety and cost of
supply, and the estimated speed with which
the major technical and environmental uncertainties associated with the SPS concept can
be resolved. For instance, if future demand
growth is expected to be low it may not be necessary to initiate a specific SPS research program at this time, especially if more conventional electric-generating technologies remain
acceptable. If this is not the case or if demand
growth is expected to be high, SPS might be
needed early in the 21st century, and a timely
start of a research effort would be justified.
Should it be decided not to start a dedicated
SPS research effort now, it may be desirable to
designate an agency to track generic research

which is applicable to SPS, to review trends in
electricity demand, and to monitor the progress of other electric supply technologies. Such
a mechanism could provide the basis for periodic assessment of whether to begin an SPS research program. Information relevant to SPS
could be derived from other research programs, microwave bioeffects, space transportation, laser, and photovoltaic development
appear to be the most critical technical issues.
However, it is unlikely that such generic
research programs by themselves would adequately answer all of the high-priority questions on which SPS development decisions depend
If a dedicated SPS research effort is started
now, the level of effort chosen would, to a
large degree, determine the time it takes to obtain the information needed for a development
decision. An effort set at $5 million to $10
milIion per year could be sufficient to gather
the minimum necessary information while minimizing the risk of insufficient or untimely information. A $20 million to $30 million per
year effort could gain the maximum necessary
3
4 Solar Power Satellites
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Microwave concept
Photo credit: Painting by Frank G. Ellis, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
Laser concept
Photo credit: National Aeronaut/es and Space Administration
Mirrored concept
SOURCE: K. W. Billman, Space Orbiting Light Augmentation Reflector Energy
System: A Look at Alternative Systems, SPS Program Review,
June 1979.
search program is instituted, it should investigate those areas most critical to SPS economic, technical, and environmental feasibility Particular attention should be given to
studying and comparing the various technical
alternatives; but the feasibility of SPS also ultimately depends on its social, political, and institutional viability. Thus, a research program should
continue to explore these aspects of SPS development and deployment as well. The following
are the major stages such a program wouId
have to go through:
SPS Program Steps
information at the earliest possible time. It

reduces the risk of not generating enough information in time to make an adequate development decision. Whatever the level, if a re-
Concept feasibility stages

Basic research
Component testing
Concept definition
Development stages
Systems engineering
Demonstration satellite
Deployment
Ch. 1Summary 5
ENERGY CONTEXT
Even if it were needed and work began now,
a commercial SPS is unlikely to be available
before 2005-15 because of the many uncertainties and the long Ieadtime needed for testing and
demonstration. Therefore, SPS could not be expected to constitute a significant part of electricity supply before 2015-25. By that time, the
United States will be importing very little
foreign oil. Consequently, SPS cannot reduce our
dependence on imported oil in this century.
However, if efficient electric vehicles or other
electric end-use technologies are developed by
about 2010, electricity from SPS or other
sources could substitute for synthetic liquid
fuels generated from coal or biomass.
Along with other electric generating technologies, SPS has the potential to supply several
hundred gigawatts of baseload electrical
power to the U.S. grid by the mid-21st century.
However, the ultimate need for SPS and its
rate of development wiII depend on the rate of
increase in demand for electricity, and the
ability of other energy supply options to meet
ultimate demand more competitively. S P S
would be needed most if coal and/or conventional nuclear options are constrained and if demand for electricity is high.
An aggressive terrestrial solar and conservation program that could lead to an electricity
demand level of only 8 Quads electric (Qe)* in
2030 (equal to current consumption) would
make the development of SPS and other large
new centralized generating technologies less
urgent in the United States. In any event, coal
could continue to fuel the greatest share of
U.S. electrical needs well into the 21st century,
provided no barriers to its use become evident.
Coal, conventional nuclear, terrestrial solar in
its many forms, and geothermal usage could
*A Quad is equal to 1 quadrillion Btu. It is equivalent to the
energy contained in 500,000 barrels of oil per day for 1 year, and
is also approximately the electric energy produced by a 33,500MW generator running without interruption for a year As used in
this report, Quads electric (Qe) of demand refer to the energy
equivalent of electricity at point of use Primary energy input at
the generating source of electricity IS somewhat more than three
times these figures
satisfy the entire domestic electricity requirement for demands totaling 20 Qe (2.5 times
current level) or less in 2030. If demand is
higher than 20 Qe, then presumably one or
more of the following, SPS, breeders, and/or
fusion will be needed. Electricity demand will
be strongly affected by the degree that efficient technologies for using electricity can be
developed. Such technologies can have the effect of lowering the overall cost of electricity
compared to competing energy forms.
If generation from coal on a large scale
proves to be unacceptable, domestic electrical
consumption of 8 Qe or less could still be met
by nuclear, geothermal, and terrestrial solar
(central pIant and onsite) technology. For demands up to about 20 Qe, SPS could compete
with terrestrial solar, breeders, and/or fusion
for a share of the centralized baseload market.
If electricity demand exceeds 20 Qe, it will be
difficult to satisfy that demand without vigorous development of al I renewable or inexhaustible forms of generating capacity. For
these higher demand levels, SPS, breeders, and
fusion could all share in supplying U.S. electricity needs. A 30 Qe (3.8 times current consumption) total demand wouId create a market
potential for up to 6 Qe of SPS-delivered energy (225,000-Mw-installed generating capacity
at 90-percent capacity factor). *
Upper Range of Possible SPS Use* *
Electric demand
in 2030 (Qe]
75
20.0
30.0
SPS capacity (CW]

With coal
Without coal
0
0-30
0-60
100-200
100-200
100-200
*Current U.S. generating capacity is about 600,000 MW. Current demand represents about 45 percent of this capacity operating 100 percent of the time,
**Coal is used as the swingfuel for our analysis because it has
the largest resource base of any of the current forms of centralized, electric generating technologies It is expected that conventional nuclear would be available but its smaller resource base
would prevent it from having the large effect on generation-mix
choices that coal does It is assumed that breeders, which would
greatly extend the nuclear fission resource base, would be comparable to SPS and fusion in terms of its rate of market penetration (ie, 5 to 10 GW/yr)
6 Solar
Power Satellties
SPS is designed to provide baseload electricity. By contrast, except for ocean thermal energy conversion, terrestrial solar electrical generation is intermittent. Because our energy
future will require a mix of baseload and intermittent generating technologies, without storage capability, terrestrial solar would not compete directly with SPS. However, the development of inexpensive storage, if achieved,
could enable terrestrial solar electricity generation in all its forms-wind, solar thermal, and
solar photovoltaicsto assume some share of
baseload capacity.* These technologies are less
complex, have fewer uncertainties, and are
considerably nearer to commercial realization
than SPS. Furthermore, they have the flexibility to be introduced into the electrical grid in
*The percentage share of baseload capacity which would be
feasible for these technologies to assume would depend on their
geographical location and the time of year (see ch 6)
Photo
credit:
EPA-DocumericaGene
small increments as needed to meet demand

increases on a local scale.
Even if inexpensive storage is not available, onsite generating technologies could compete indirectly with SPS. Total need for baseload
power will decrease if a significant portion of
total electrical demand can be met by a combination of dispersed technologies such as
solar photovoltaics, wind, and biomass at costs
that are competitive with centrally generated
electricity. Low demand for centrally generated electricity would consequently reduce
the need to introduce new, large-scale electrical technologies such as SPS, except as
replacement capacity.
As an energy option for the first half of the 21st
century, the potential electrical output and
uncertainties of SPS are comparable to fusion.
These energy options will proceed along different development paths. Except for a laser
system, the basic SPS technologies have been
proven technically feasible. Research would
be needed to develop low-noise microwave
tubes; high-efficiency, low-mass photovoltaics;
efficient continuous-wave lasers; low-mass
mirrors; and space construction and transportation capabilities. Although the fusion community is confident that fusion is feasible,
energy breakeven, the production of more
energy than is put into the fusion process, has
Daniels
Photo credit: Texas Power & Light
Trojan nuclear powerplant on the Columbia River

near Prescott, Wash., 1972
Martin Lake electric generating plant in east Texas
Ch. lSummary
not been achieved. For both SPS and fusion, an

economic generating plant would still have to
be developed and demonstrated.
Both energy options are designed to produce baseload central station power in units
from 500 to 5,000 MW. For both, development
cost is high. For fusion, much of the manufacturing infrastructure for the balance of plant,
i.e., other than the fusion device itself, is in
place. Most of the supportive infrastructure
for SPS, including the industrial plants and the
transportation system, would have to be developed.
INTERNATIONAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

There could be important economic and political advantages to developing SPS as a multinational rather than a unilateral system. These include cooperation in establishing legal and
regulatory norms, shared risk in financing the
R&D and construction costs, improved prospects for global marketing, and forestalling
fears of economic domination and military
use. Although a multinational effort would
face inevitable organizational and political
difficulties, the strong potential interest of
energy-poor, non-U. S. participants in increased
electrical supplies could help make a multinational venture more feasible than a unilateral
one by the United States. GIobal electricity demand may quadruple by 2030, and will be especially strong in developing countries. Western Europe and Japan wouId be likely partners
for a joint project. Depending on the size and
expense of the system used, a number of the
more rapidly developing but less developed
countries might also be interested in participating at lower levels of involvement.
The Soviet Union is carrying on an aggressive space program that may give them an independent capacity to develop SPS, but little
is known about their long-range space or
energy plans. Real or perceived competition
with the Soviet Union could spur a U.S. commitment to SPS.

The development of fleets of launch and transfer vehicles (for SPS), as well as facilities for living
and working in space, would enhance this Nations military space capabilities. Such equipment would give the possessor a large breakout potential for rapid deployment of personnel and hardware in time of crisis, though for
nonemergency situations the military would
prefer to use vehicles designed specifically for
military purposes. SPS itself could be used for
military purposes, such as electronic warfare or
providing energy to military units, but is technically unsuited to constitute an efficient
weapon. Weapons-use of SPS would be prohibited by current bilateral and multilateral
treaties. The satellite portion of SPS is vulnerable to various methods of attack and interference but the likelihood of its being attacked is
only SIightly greater than for major terrestrial
energy systems. The military effects of SPS will
depend largely on the institutional framework
within which it is developed; international involvement would tend to reduce the potential
for use of SPS by the military sector,
SYSTEMS AND COSTS

The optimum SPS system has not been identified. A National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Department of Energy (NASA/
DOE) microwave reference system* was devel-
*See chs 3 and 5 for a description of the reference system
oped to provide a basis for review and analysis

but was not intended to represent the best
possible system. An optimum system should be
able to deliver power in smaller units (about
1,000 MW or less), use smaller terrestrial
receivers, and cost less to develop than the
reference system. Alternative systems may use
lasers or mirrors to transmit solar energy from

space to Earth. Variants of the reference system or other completely different systems may
offer certain improvements; each will need full
study before choosing a system for development.
Current overall cost estimates for the SPS and
its major components are highly uncertain. The
assessments of up-front costs range from $40
billion to $100 billion. The most detailed estimates have been made by NASA for the reference design. These call for a 22-year investment of $102.4 bilIion (1977 dolIars) (including
transportation and factory investment costs) to
produce the first 5-GW satellite, with each additional satellite costing $11.3 billion. The
costs for most improvements to the reference

design, or for alternative systems, are less certain due to the less developed state of nonreference technology. Preliminary studies indicate that the total reference system costs are
likely to be significantly higher. On the other
hand, alternative systems may well be cheaper
than the reference system. The total costs
estimated by NASA include major elements,
such as space transportation and photovoltaic
cells, whose development is likely to proceed
regardless of SPS; these costs should not be
charged solely to SPS. With the possible exception of fusion, the up-front costs for SPS would
be significantly higher than competing baseIoad electric generating systems. Apportioning
the various investment costs and management
Characterization of Four Alternative SPS Systems
Scale
Satellite size
Number of satellites
Power/satellite
Mass
Land use rectenna site
2
k m 1,000
MW
Energy
55 km2
60 (300 GW total)
5,000 MW
5 x104 tonnes/satellite; 0.1 kW/kg
174 km2 (including buffer)
x 60=10,440 km2
35
18 km2
Not projected
1,500 MW
Less mass than reference/O. 1 kW/kg
50 km2
Electricity
Fairly centralized
23 mW/cm2 Gaussian
distribution
5 km2
Not projected
500 Mw
Less mass than reference/O.05 kW/kg
0.6 km2
50 km2
916 (810 GW total)
135,000 MW
2 x 105 tonnes mirror system 2 kW/kg
1,000 km2
33
1.2
7.4
Electricity
Less centralized
Unknown
Electricity, onsite generation.

Less centralized
Unknown (10 mW/cm2 at edge)
Electricity, light
Highly centralized
1.15 kW/m2 (1 Sun)
Atmosphere
Transmission
Effluents
Electromagnetic
Interference
Bioeffects
National security
weapons potential
Ionosphere heating might affect telecommunications

Possible effects include alteration of magnetosphere (AR+), increased water content;
formation of noctilucent clouds; ionosphere depletion
Tropospheric heating might modify weather over smaller area; problems with clouds?
LEO orbit, smaller size, smaller launch vehicles
RFI from direct coupling, spurious noise, and harmonics, Impacts on communications,
satellites etc from 245 GHz Problem for radio astronomers (GEO obscures portion of
sky always) optical reflections from satellites and LEO stations WiII change the night sky
If visible light IS used there may be problems

for optical astronomy if Infrared IS used may
Increase airglow optical reflection from LEO
satellite.
Problem for optical astronomy, optical reflechens and Interference from beam change
night sky in vicinity of sites
Microwave bioeffects midbeam could cause thermal heating, unknown effects of long
term exposure to low-level microwaves Ecosystem alteratlon? Birds avoid/attracted
to beam?
Direct beam ocular and skin damage ocular

damage from reflections? Other effects? Birds
flying through will burn up? If visible WiII
birds avoid? Ecosystem alterations?
Psychological and physiological effects of 24hour illumination not known. Possible ocular
hazard if viewed with binoculars? Ecosystem
alteration
GEO gives a good vantage point over hemisphere
Direct weapon: as ABM, antisatellite, aimed at Indirect: night illumination psychological

terrestrial targets
possible weather modification
Provides a lot of power m space platform for surveillance, jamming
Requires development of large space fleet with/military potential
Vulnerability
Satellites may need self defense system to protect against attack

Size and distance strong defenses
International
Will require radio frequency allocation and orbit assignment

Smaller parcels of energy make system more
flexible
Meet environmental and health standards?
smaller SOLARES systems, e g , IO GW/site would be possible and probably more desirable
b
c
$l02 billilonNASA estimate+ncludes Investment Costs

Estimates byArgonneNational Laboratory, Office of Technology Assessment,
SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.
u.s. Congress
Indirect: power killer

satellite, planes space platform
Laser defend self, best, LEO more accessible
Less ground sites; a lot of mirrors-redundancy; individual mirrors fragile; ground sites
still produce power in absence of space
system
LEO more accessible to U S S R and high-latitude countries, smaller parcels of energy make
system more flexible
10 . Solar Power Satellites
responsibilities between the public and private

sectors, and among potential international par-
ticipants, would be an essential part of SPS development.
PUBLIC ISSUES
Public opinion about SPS is currently not
well-formed. Discussion of SPS has been limited to a small number of public interest
groups and professional societies. In general,
those in favor of SPS also support a vigorous U.S.
space program, whereas many of those who oppose SPS fear that it would drain resources from
small-scale, terrestrial solar technologies. Assuming acceptance of a decision to deploy SPS,
public discussion is likely to be most intense at
the siting stage of its development. Key issues
that may enter into public thinking include
environment and health risks, land-use, military implications, and costs. Centralization in
the decisionmaking process and in the ownership and control of SPS may also be important.
From the standpoint of public perceptions, the
siting of land-based receivers could be an
obstacle to the deployment of SPS unless:
the public is actively involved in the siting
process;
health and environment uncertainties are
diminished; and
local residents are justly compensated for
the use of their land.
Reference System Rectenna/

Washington, D. C., Overlay
SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment.
Offshore siting of receivers could minimize

potential public resistance to SPS siting.
ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH

Many of the environmental impacts associated
with SPS are comparable in nature and magnitude
to those resulting from other large-scale terrestrial energy technologies. A possible exception
is coal, particularly if CO2 concerns are proven
justified. While these effects have not been
quantified adequately, it is thought that conventional corrective measures could be prescribed to minimize their impacts. However,
several health and environmental effects, which
are unique to SPS and whose severity and likelihood are highly uncertain, have also been identified. These include effects on the upper atmosphere from launch effluents and power
transmission, health hazards associated with
non ionizing radiation, electromagnetic interference with other systems and astronomy, and
radiation exposure for space workers. More research in these areas would be required before
decisions about the deployment or development of SPS could be made. Little information is currently available on the environmental impacts of SPS designs other than the
reference system. Clearly, environmental
assessments of the alternative systems will be
needed if choices are to be made between SPS
designs.
Too little is known about the biological effects
of long-term exposure to low-level microwave
Ch. 1Summary . 11
An artists concept of an offshore antenna that would receive microwave energy beamed from
a large space solar power collector in geosynchronous orbit
radiation to assess the health risks associated

with SPS microwave systems. The information
that is available is incomplete and not directly
relevant to SPS. Further research is critically
needed in order to set human-health exposure
limits. Currently, no microwave population exposure standard exists in the United States.
The recommended limit for occupational exposure is set at 10 mW/cm 2 in the United
States, 1,000 times less stringent than the present U.S.S.R. occupational standard. Public exclusion boundaries around the reference design have been established at one one-hundredth of U.S. occupational guidelines. It is anticipated that future maximum permissible
U.S. occupational standards will be lower by a
factor of 2-Io; population standards, if established, may well be lower than the occupa-
tional standards. Even more stringent microwave standards couId increase land requirements and system cost or alter system design
and feasibility. In Iight of the widespread proliferation of electromagnetic devices and the
current controversy surrounding the use of
microwave technologies, it is clear that increased understanding of the effects of microwaves on living things is vitally needed even if
SPS is never deployed.
Exposure of space workers to ionizing radiation
is a potentially serious problem for SPS systems
that operate in geosynchronous orbit (CEO). Recent estimates indicate that the radiation dose
of SPS reference system personnel in CEO
would exceed current limits set for astronauts
and could result in a measurable increase in
Summary of SPS Environmental Impacts

System component
characteristics
Power transmission
Occupational health
and safety
Public health and safety
Environmental
impact
Microwave
bIonospheric heating could

disrupt telecommunications.
Maximum tolerable power
density is not known.
Effects in the upper
ionosphere are not known
Tropospheric heating could
result in minor weather
modification.
bEcosystem: microwave bioeffects (on plants, animals,
and airborne biota) largely
unknown; reflected light
effects unknown.
b
Potential interference with
satellite communications,
terrestrial communications,
radar, radio, and optical
astronomy.
bEffects of Iow-level
Higher risk than for .
public; protective
chronic exposure to microclothing required for
waves are unknown.
Psychological effects of
terrestrial worker.
microwave beam as weapon. Accidental exposure to
high-intensity beam in
Adverse aesthetic effects
space potentially severe
on appearance of night sky.
but no data.
Lasers

modify weather and spread
the beam.
Ecosystem: beam may
incinerate birds and
vegetation.
Ocular hazard?
laser as weapon are
possible.
on appearance of night
sky are possible.
Ocular and safety

hazard?
bTropospheric heating
could modify weather.
Ecosystem: effect of 24hr light on growing
cycles of plants and circadian rhythms of animals.
b potential interference
with optical astronomy.
Ocular hazard?
Psychological effect of
24-hr sunlight.
Adverse aesthictic effects
sky are possible.
Ocular hazard?
Ground cloud might pollute

air and water and cause
possible weather modification; acid rain
probably negligible.
b Water vapor and other
launch effluents could
deplete ionosphere and
enhance airglow. Resultant disruption of communications and satellite
surveillance potentially
important, but uncertain.
b possible formation of
noctilucent clouds in
stratosphere and mesosphere; effects on climate
are not known.
Noise (sonic boom) may

exceed EPA guidelines.
Ground cloud might affect
air quality; acid rain
Accidents-catastrophic
explosion near launch
site, vehicle crash, toxic
materials.
Space workers hazards:

ionizing radiation
(potentially severe)
weightlessness, life
support failure, long
stay in space,
construction accidents
psychological stress,
acceleration.
Terrestrial workers
hazards: noise, transportation accidents.
b Potential interference
with optical astronomy,

some interference with
radio astronomy.
Mirrors
Transportation and
space operation
Launch and recovery
HLLV
PLV
COTV
POTV
Ch. 1Summary
13
Summary of SPS Environmental ImpactsContinued

System component
characteristics
Occupational health
and safety
Environmental impact
bEmission of water vapor
could alter natural
hydrogen cycle; extent and
implications are not wellknown.
b
Effect of COTV argon ions
on magnetosphere and
plasma-sphere could be
great but unknown.
Depletion of ozone layer
by effluents expected to
be minor but uncertain.
Noise.
Terrestrial activities
Toxic material exposure.
Measurable increase of
air and water pollution.
Land-use disturbance.
Occupational air and

water pollution.
Toxic materials exposure.
Noise.
Solid wastes.
Solid wastes.
Exposure to toxic
materials.

Noise.
Construction
Measurable land
disturbance.
Measurable local increase
of air and water pollution.
Measurable land
disturbance.
Noise.
Measurable local
increase of air and water
pollution.
Accidents.
Receiving antenna
bLand use and siting

Waste heat and surface
roughness could modify
weather.
bLand usereduced
property value, aesthetics,
vulnerability y (less land
for solid-state, laser
options; more for reference
and mirrors).
Waste heat.
High-voltage
transmission lines
(not unique to SPS)

bEcosystem: bioeffects of
powerlines uncertain.
b Exposure to high intensity Exposure to high
Mining
Land disturbance
(stripmining, etc.).
Solid waste generation
Strain on production
capacity of gallium
arsenide, sapphire, silicon,
graphite fiber, tungsten,
and mercury.
Manufacturing
a
b
EM fieldseffects
uncertain.
impacts based on SPS systems as currently defined and do not account for offshore receivers or possible mitigating system
Research priority.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
intensity EM fields
effects uncertain.
modifications.
cancer incidence. However, there are a large

number of uncertainties associated with quantifying the health risks of exposure to ionizing
radiation. More research would be required to
reduce these uncertainties and to identify and
evaluate system designs and shielding techniques that would minimize risks at an acceptable cost. In addition, acceptable SPS radiation limits would have to be determined. If
CEO SPS systems are to be considered, an
assessment of the health risks associated with
space radiation is a top priority.
The potential for interference with other users
of the electromagnetic spectrum could constitute
a severe drawback for the microwave option.

Satellite communications and optical and
radio astronomy would be seriously affected.
The effects on radio and optical astronomy
would be the most difficult to ameliorate. The
minimum allowable spacing between geosynchronous power satellites and geosynchronous
communications satellites is not well-known.
The optical interference effects of either the
mirror or laser transmission options would be
of great concern to ground-based astronomers.
Any of the SPS options would alter the appearance of the nighttime sky. Some may find
this esthetialIy objectionable.
SPACE CONTEXT
The hardware, experienced personnel, and industrial infrastructure generated by an SPS project
would significantly increase U.S. space capabilities and, in conjunction with other major
space programs, could lay the groundwork for
the industrialization, mining, and perhaps the
settlement of space. NASA is likely to play a
major role, especialIy in the initial stages of development. Non-SPS programs could be aided
by accelerated development of transportation
and other systems; on the other hand, they
could be harmed by the diversion of funds and
attention to SPS. An SPS research and development program would be in accord with current
space policy that calIs for peaceful development of commercial and scientific space
capab i I i t i es
Given the current absence of long-term program goals for the U.S. civilian space program,
it is difficult to predict the effects of an SPS
project on NASA plans or on private-sector capabilities These effects will need to be carefully considered.
Chapter 2
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
INTRODUCTION
As the United States and the world have begun to face the realities of living with a limited
supply of oil and gas, and the political uncertainties that accompany impending scarcity,
the search for reliable, safe means of using the
radiant energy of the Sun has intensified. Solar
radiation is already used in many parts of the
Nation for direct space heating and for heating
water. It can also produce electricity by photovoltaic and thermoelectric conversion. However, nearly all terrestrial solar collectors and
converters suffer from the drawbacks of the
day-night cycle. On Earth, sunlight is only
available during daylight hours, but energy is
consumed around the clock. In the absence of
inexpensive storage, nighttime and cloud cover limit the potential of terrestrial solar technologies (with the exception of ocean thermal
energy conversion) to supply the amounts of
energy required for use in homes, businesses,
and industries. By placing the solar collectors
in space where sunlight is intense and constant, and then beaming energy to Earth, the
solar power satellite (SPS) seeks to assure a
baseload supply of electricity for terrestrial
consumers.
Several radically different versions of SPS
have been proposed, most of which will be described and analyzed in this report. In the most
extensively studied version, a large satellite
would be placed in the geosynchronous orbit
so that it remains directly above a fixed point
on the Earths Equator. Solar photovoltaic
panels aboard the satellite would collect the
Suns radiant energy and convert it to electricity. Devices would then convert the electricity to microwave radiation and transmit it
to Earth where it would be collected, reconverted to electricity, and delivered to the electric power grid. An alternative concept envisions using large orbiting reflectors to reflect
solar radiation to the ground, creating immense solar farms where sunlight would be
available around the clock. Laser beams have
also been proposed for the energy transmission
medium. These concepts may have significantly different economic prospects, as well as dif-
ferent degrees of technical feasibility. In addition, they would affect the environment and
political and financial institutions in different
ways.
The first serious discussion of the SPS concept appeared in 1968. 2 During the next few
years several companies conducted preliminary analyses with some support from the Advanced Programs Off ice of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 3
In May 1973, the Subcommittee on Space
Science and Applications of the House Science
and Astronautics Committee heId the first congressional hearings on the concept.4 Following
those hearings, NASA began a series of experiments in microwave transmission of power at
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. In 1975, NASA
created an SPS study office at the Johnson
Space Center that performed several additional systems studies. A number of papers
were published, s culminating in an extensive
report that established most of the basis for
the Department of Energys (DOE) reference
system design. 6
In the beginning it had been assumed that
NASA would be the Federal agency with prime
responsibility for satellite power stations.
However, the Solar Energy Act of 1974 clearly
placed the responsibility for all solar energy
R&D aimed at terrestrial use under the jurisdic1
P E Claser, The Future of Power From the Sun, lntersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference (l ECEC), IEEE publication 68C-21 -Energy, 1968, pp. 98-103,
2 P E Glaser, Power From the Sun: Its Future, Science 162,
NOV 22, 1968, pp. 857-886,
P E Claser, O. E, Maynard, J. Mockovciak, and E, L, Ralph,
Feasibility Study of a Satellite Solar Power Station, Arthur D.
Little Inc , NASA CR-2357 (contract No. NAS 3-16804), February
1974.
Power From the Sun via Satellite, hearings before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U S House of Representatives, May 7, 22, 24,1973.
5Wlll lam J. Richard, Geosynchronous Satellite Solar Power,
ch, 8 of So/ar Energy for Earth: An A /AA Assessment, H. J. Kill ian,
G L Dugger, and J. Grey (eds.), AlAA, Apr. 21, 1975, pp. 59-71.
(Also see abridged version in Astronautics and Aeronautics,
November 1975, pp. 46-52.)
ln(tlal Technical, Environmental, and Economic Evaluation
of space solar Power Concepts, report No. j SC-11568, VOIS. I
and II, NASA, Aug. 31, 1976.
17
tion of the Energy Research and Development another round of hearings, 2 and eventually
Administration (ERDA). ERDA set up a Task passed by the full House. No Senate bill was inGroup on Satellite Power Stations, and in No- troduced. A similar bill,13 reintroduced in 1979,
vember 1976 recommended two options for was passed by the House on November 16,
conducting a joint ERDA/NASA 3-year SPS 1979, but again died in the Senate.
concept development and evaluation proThe DOE/NASA Concept Development and
gram, one costing $12 million and one $19 mil14
established to idenEvaluation Programwas
lion. ERDA elected to pursue a median
tify and evaluate the possible technical, encourse, and proposed a 3-year, $15.5 million efvironmental, social, institutional, and economfort which began in fiscal year 1977, the SPS
ic aspects of the SPS concept. It has generated
Concept Development and Evaluation Proa broad range of reports that reflect this ingram.
tent. 5 In order to have a fixed technical basis
ERDAs efforts were given impetus by two for the study, DOE and NASA developed two
congressional hearings, one held in January versions of a reference satellite power sta1976 by the Subcommittee on Aerospace Tech- tion system, based on extensive studies undernology and National Needs of the Senate taken by two NASA contractors. 16 17 Although
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee 8 the reference system represented the best
and one held in February 1976 by two subcomchoice based on the information available at
mittees of the House Committee on Science
the time, it was not intended to be the last
and Technology.9
word in systems definition; the multitude of
other options that have been proposed since
When DOE was created in 1977, it estabalso need to be evaluated before ultimately
lished a special Satellite Power System project
settling on a baseline system design.
office in the Office of Energy Research to complete the Concept Development and EvaluaOTA was requested by the House Committion Program. Its final report was released on
tee on Science and Technology to pursue an
December 1, 1980.0
independent study to assess the potential of
the
SPS system as an alternative source of
The SPS research, development, and demonenergy. 8 Hence, this study primarily adstration bill, which was introduced in the
dresses the benefits and drawbacks of SPS as
House of Representatives on January 30, 1978,
an energy system. It also identifies the key
reflected a desire by a number of Members of
Congress to accelerate the evaluation of SPS
and to introduce a more ambitious technology
Solar Power Satellite, hearings before the Subcommittee
verification effort. It was reported out by the
on Space Science and Applications and the Subcommittee on
Advanced Energy Technologies and Energy Conservation ReScience and Technology Committee after
7
Robert A. Summers (chairman), Final Report of the ERDA
Task Croup on Satellite Power Station, report No. ERDA-76/l 48,
November 1976.
Solar Power for Satellites, hearings before the Subcommittee on Aerospace Technology and National Needs of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U S. Senate, J an, 19,
21,1976, GPO stock No, 66-608-0, 1976
Solar Satellite Power System Concepts, hearings before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, Feb. 20,1976 (No 67)
Satellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings, DOE/E R-0085, November 1980,
Ronnie Flippo, Solar Power Satellite Research, Development, and Demonstration Program Act of 1978, H .R 10601, J an.
30,1978.
search, Development, and Demonstration of the Committee on

Sc[ence and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr
12-14, 1978 (No, 68), CPO stock No. 28-155-0, 1978,
Ronnie Flippo, Solar Power Satellite Research, Development, and Evaluation Program Act of 1979, H R. 2335, Feb. 22,
1979
Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program Reference System Report, U S. Department of
Energy report No DOE/E R-0023r October 1978.
sSee the extensive set of references in note 10
C Woodcock, Solar Power Satellite System Definition
Study, Boeing Aerospace Co., Johnson Space Center (contract
No NAS 9-151 96), pt. 1, report No. DI 80-22876, December 1977,
pt 111, report No D18024071, March 1978
C Hanley, Satellite Power System (SPS) Concept Definition, Rockwell International Corp., Marshall Space Flight Center, (contract No. NAS 8-32475), report No. SD78-AP-0023, April
1978
Letter of request to OTA from the House Committee on
SC Ience and Technology, Aug 8,1978
Ch. 2Introduction
uncertainties of the various SPS concepts and

related needs for R&D.
Although SPS would be an energy system it
is unique in being a major space system as
well. It would therefore require a large new
commitment to the development of space
technology. Hence, this report also addresses
the relationship of an SPS program to other
space programs.
OTA has divided the assessment into four
major areas: 1) SPS technical alternatives and
economics, 2) issues arising in the public debate, 3) institutional and international questions, and 4) the programmatic context, i.e.,
the place of SPS within our national energy
and space programs. A number of working
papers were written to provide data for these
areas. OTA also convened three workshops to
refine and amplify the data presented in several of the working papers: 1) SPS Technical
Options and Costs, 2) SPS Public Opinion
Issues, and 3) The Energy Context of SPS.
SPS technical options and costs. The major task of the workshop was to assess the
DOE/NASA reference system from a technical perspective and to study alternatives. It discussed the key uncertainties of
each major system or subsystem that has
been suggested in SPS literature and
chose four generic systems for further
evaluation in later workshops: 1) the reference system, 2) a solid-state variant of
the reference system, 3) a laser system,
and 4) a mirror system.
SPS public opinion issues. Participants
with experience in analyzing and responding to a variety of public interests and
concerns met to identify the major issues
that could affect the public perceptions
of SPS. The workshop was not an exercise
in public participation. Rather, it sought a
79
range of viewpoints from participants

who have a sense of the issues, the political players, and public attitudes involved.
The energy context of SPS. SPS will succeed or fail in competition with other energy supply options and in the context of
national and global demand for electricity. This workshop developed criteria for
choosing between technologies and compared the major future alternative renewable or inexhaustible sources of baseload
electrical power. Participants discussed
the many factors that wouId affect future
electricity demand and compared breeder
reactors, fusion, terrestrial solar thermal,
and solar photovoltaic baseload options.
They also discussed the potential role of
dispersed photovoltaic systems in meeting
part of the Nations electrical needs.
Because the SPS concept would use a complex future technology about which there are
many uncertainties, this assessment is fundamentalIy different from an assessment of current technology. While it is thought to be technically feasible, many of the details are uncertain; economic projections or possible environmental effects based on them are also uncertain, sometimes by more than an order of
magnitude. Hence at this point OTA must be
satisfied with identifying the key uncertainties
of SPS and, where applicable, suggesting alternate strategies for resolving them. The study
also analyzes the major institutional and international issues that accompany decisions
about SPS, i.e., how it may affect national
security, the international energy market, the
utilities industry, and how an SPS project
might be financed and managed. Although a
definitive treatment of any of these issues
must wait for the future, this report attempts
to lay the foundation for further consideration
of SPS.
Chapter 3
ISSUES AND FINDINGS
Contents
Page
Technical Options .. .... . . . . . . . , . . . 23

Microwave Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Laser Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Reflected Sunlight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
SPS Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
SPS and the Energy Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
SPS ls Not Likely To Be Commercially
Available Before 2005-15 . . . . . . . . . . 3 0
SPS Would Not Reduce U.S.
Dependence on lmported Oil . . . . . . . 32
Potential Scale of Electrical Power. ,... 32
Electricity Demand Would Affect the
Need for Solar Power Satellites. . . . . . 32
Comparison to Other Renewable
Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Utilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Nontechnical Considerations . . . . . . . . . 35
Ownership and Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
International implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
National Security Implications. . . . . . . . . . 38
Public Issues... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Environment and Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Electromagnetic Compatibility . . . . . . . . . 48
The Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Space Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Page
Terrestrial Communications and

Electronic Systems . . . . . . . . . . .
Effect on Terrestrial Astronomy
and Aeronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
50
52
LIST OF TABLES
Page
TableNo.
l, Characterization of Four Alternative SPS
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
2. Major lssues Arising in SPS Debate . . . . . . . . 42
3. Summary of SPS Environrnental Impacts. . . . 43
4. SPS Systerns Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
LIST OF F GURES
Figure No.
Page
1 The Reference System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

2 The Solid-State Variant of the Reference
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 The Laser Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 The Mirror Concept (SOLARES) . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Reference System Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

6. The Number of Geosynchronous
Satellites as a Function of Time . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7. The SPS Brightness Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
TECHNICAL OPTIONS
What technical options might be available
for SPS?*
A number of technical options for the solar
power satellite (SPS) have been proposed. Because SPS is a developing technology, the specific design parameters of each of these approaches are evolving rapidly as research continues. Hence no single option is completely
defined, nor are there detailed systems studies
of any designs other than the National Aeronautics and Space Administration/Department
of Energy (NASA/DOE) reference system
that uses microwaves for transmitting energy
from space to Earth. The reference design is
the basis for the NASA/DOE environmental, societal, and comparative assessments. The two
other major SPS variants depend on laser transmission of power from space and on reflected
sunlight.
Microwave Transmission
The Reference System Design
The reference system satellite conceptual
design consists of a 55 square kilometer
( k m2)** flat array of photovoltaic solar cells
located in the geostationary orbit 35,800 km
above the Earths Equator (fig. 1). The cells
convert solar energy into direct-current (de)
electricity that is conducted to a 1-km diameter microwave transmitting antenna mounted
at one end of the photovoltaic array. Microwave transmitting tubes (klystrons) convert the
electrical current to radio-frequency power at
2.45 gigaHertz (GHZ), and transmit it to Earth.
A ground antenna receives the electromagnetic radiation and rectifies it back to direct
current; hence its designation rectenna. The
direct-current (de) power can be inverted to
alternating-current (ac) and stepped up to
*See ch. 5.
**Equivalent to about 13,600 acres
high voltage. It would then be either rectified

to dc and delivered directly to a dc transmission network in the terrestrial utility grid or
used as conventional ac power. The rectenna
covers a ground area of 102 km 2 and would require an exclusion area around it of an additional 72 km2 to protect against exposure to
low-level microwaves. The beam density at the
center of the rectenna is 23 milliwatts per
square centimeter (mW/cm 2). The beam is
shaped in such a way that at the edge of the exclusion area it reaches 0.1 mW/cm2.
For the given set of design assumptions for
the reference system, i.e., beam density, taper,
and frequency, the maximum power per transmitter-receiver combination would be 5,000
MW. Except for a small seasonal variation in
output due to the variation of the Suns distance from the Earth, and short periods of
shadowing by the Earth near the time of the
spring and fall equinoxes, each reference system satellite could be expected to deliver the
maximum amount of power to the grid approximately 90 percent of the time. This power
level was selected by NASA/DOE for the reference system in the belief that it would provide energy at the lowest cost. 1 n subsequent
discussions it is used to consider the impact of
the reference system design on utilities and
their systems; however, the power level could
be set at any value permitted by the design
constraints.
The reference system, which was developed
to provide a base for further studies and is now
several years old, is far from an optimum
microwave system and could be substantially
improved. In addition, alternative concepts
that depend on laser transmission or passive
reflection of sunlight each offer certain
specific benefits over the microwave designs.
Because none of these alternatives are as well
defined as the reference system, they are
discussed here in more general terms.
23
Figure 1 .The Reference System
Array
structure
Solar cell array
Transmitting antenna subarray

DC-RF
power amps
Antenna waveguides
SOURCE: C. C. Kraft, The Solar Power Satellite Concept, NASA publication No. JSCp14898, July 1979.
Laser Transmission
The Solid-State Variant

Using solid-state devices that convert electricity from the satellites solar array directly
to microwave power would be a possible alternative to the reference systems klystrons.
Such devices might have a longer working lifetime and require less mass in orbit; when coupled with photovoltaic cells in a sandwich
design, they would also allow for a much larger
transmitting antenna (the entire surface area
of the solar cells would, in effect, be the antenna), smaller earthside antennas, and lower
power delivered to Earth per satellite (i.e.,
about 1,000 MW per rectenna). In combination, these effects would make it possible to
position rectennas closer to the cities, which
would be the major users of SPS generated
power, than would the reference system
design.
Solid-state devices are now in the very early
stages of being evaluated for SPS application.
It is still unclear whether they would be able to
reach the efficiency and cost goals that would
be necessary for SPS.
Lasers constitute an obvious alternative to

microwaves for the transmission of power over
long distances. Compared with microwaves,
lasers have a much smaller beam diameter;
since the aperture area of both transmitting
and receiving antennas decreases as the square
of the wavelength, light from an infrared
wavelength laser can be transmitted and received by apertures over 100 times smaller in
diameter than a microwave beam. This reduces the size and mass of the space segment
and the area of the ground segment. Perhaps
even more important, the great reduction in
aperture area permits consideration of fundamentally different systems. For example:
It would become possible to use low Sunsynchronous rather than high geostationary orbits for the massive space power
conversion subsystem (a Sun-synchronous
orbit is a near-polar low Earth orbit that
keeps the satellite in full sunlight all the
time while the Earth rotates beneath it).
The primary laser would then beam its
Ch.3 Issues and Findings 25
Figure 2.The Solid-State Variation of the Reference System
Reflected sunlight
cell
Solid-state
amplifier
panel
Solar array/microwave antenna

sandwich panels
SOURCE: G. M. Hanley, et al., Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Concept Definition Study First Performance report No. SS D 79-0163, NASA MSFC
contract No. NAS8-32475, Oct. 10, 1979.
power up to low-mass laser mirror relays

in geostationary orbit for reflection down
to the Earth receiver. This arrangement,
while complex, would considerably reduce the cost of transportation, since the
bulk of the system would be in low Earth
orbit rather than in geostationary orbit. It
also could be built with smalIer transportation vehicles than the reference systems planned heavy lift launch vehicle
(HLLV).
A laser system might be able to operate
efficiently and economically on a smaller
scale (100 to 1,000 MW). Thus, it would
offer the flexibility of power demand
matching on the ground, making possible
higher degrees of redundancy and a
smaller and therefore less costly system
demonstration project.
83-316 0 - 81 - 3
The potentially small size of the receiving

station would make it possible to employ
multiple locations close to the points of
use, thereby simplifying the entire ground
distribution and transmission system.
Laser power transmission would avoid the
problem of microwave biological effects
and would reduce overall interference
with other users of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
A laser SPS would suffer from three important disadvantages:
Absorption of laser radiation. Infrared r a -
diation is subject to severe degradation or

absorption by clouds. A baseload system,
unlike the microwave option, would require considerable storage capacity to
make up for interruptions. Multiple re-
Figure 3.The Laser Concept (One Possible Version)

1Solar power satellite
Relay unit(s)
Ground site
Synchronous r e l a y s
Occulted
power
satellites
Sun
Ch. 3Issues and Findings
27
ceivers at different locations to achieve

some redundancy are also possible, but
expensive (seeUtilities, ch. 9).
reach the efficiencies and reliability necessary

for an SPS.
Efficiency. Current high-power, continuous-wave lasers are only capable of very

low overall power conversion efficiencies
(less than 25 percent). Converting the
beam back into electricity is also inefficient, though progress in this area has
been rapid. The relatively undeveloped
status of laser generation and conversion
means that considerable basic and applied research would be needed to determine the feasibility of a laser SPS.
Reflected Sunlight
Health and safety hazard. The beam intensity would be great enough to constitute a
health and safety hazard. Preventive
measures could include a tall perimeter
wall, and/or a warning and defocusing
system.
Several types of continuous wave lasers currently exist. Of these, the most highly developed and most appropriate laser for SPS would
be the electric discharge laser (EDL). At present, EDL models have achieved only modest
power levels and relatively low efficiencies
when operated in a continuous mode.
Another future option that has been considered is the solar-pumped laser. In this device,
concentrated sunlight is used directly as the
exciting agent for the laser gases. Although a
solar-pumped laser has been built and operated successfully at NASA Langley, it would require considerable basic research, development, and testing before it could be a realistic
prospect for SPS.
Free electron lasers (FELs) offer another
possible means of transmitting power from
space. These new devices are powered by a
beam of high-energy electrons which oscillate
in a magnetic field in such a way that they
radiate energy in a single direction. Although
the FEL has been demonstrated experimentalIy, it is too early to predict whether it would
Instead of placing the solar energy conversion system in orbit, large orbiting mirrors
could be used to reflect sunlight to groundbased solar conversion systems. Thus, the systerns space segment could be much simpler
and therefore cheaper and more reliable.
One such system would consist of a number
of roughly circular plane mirrors in various
nonintersecting Earth orbits, each of which
directs sunlight to the collectors of a number
of ground-based solar-electric powerplants as
it passes over them. Conversion from sunlight
to electricity would occur on the surface of the
Earth.
In one approach, (the so-called SOLARES
baseline concept) about 916 mirrors, each 50
k m2 in area, would be required for a global
power system projected to produce a total of
810 gigawatts (GW) (more than three times current U S. production) from six individual sites.
This is not necessarily the optimum SOLARES
system. It was selected here to demonstrate
the magnitude of power that might be
achieved with such a system. However, a number of different mirror sizes, orbits, and ground
station sizes are possible. A more feasible option would be a lower orbit system (2,100 km)
to supply 10 to 13 GW per terrestrial site. One
of the principal features of the SOLARES concept is that it could be used for either solarthermal or solar photovoltaic terrestrial plants.
The fact that energy conversion would take
place on the surface of the Earth keeps the
mass in orbit small, thereby reducing transportation costs.
However, a major disadvantage of such a
mirror system would be that the entire system
would require an extremely large contiguous
land area for the terrestrial segment (see table
4, p. 47). As with the laser designs, transmission
through the atmosphere would be subject to
Figure 4.The Mirror Concept (SOLARES)
Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Administration
SOURCE: K. W. Billman, Space Orbiting Light Augmentation Reflector Energy System: A Look at Alternative Systems,
SPS Program Review, June 1979.
reduction or elimination by cloud cover. It

would also illuminate much of the night sky
(see issue on electromagnetic interference) as
seen by observers within a 150-km radius of the
groundsite center.
SPS Scale
As presently conceived, the reference system is a large-scale project that has the potential of delivering hundreds of gigawatts of elec-
trical power to the United States or to other

countries. However, its very scale is seen by
many as a serious drawback to deployment.
The utilities here and abroad would find it
hard to accommodate power in 5,000 MW
blocks (see Utilities, ch. 9), and the space
transportation system needed to build and
maintain such a massive system would be very
expensive. Thus, it is of considerable interest
to investigate ways in which the scale of the
various components, and of the system itself,
couId be reduced to a more manageable size.
29
The laser system would offer the potential

for the most substantial reductions, both in
overall system size and in the size of the first
demonstration project. This reduction in scale
might also bring with it a concomitant reduction of costs. There are also a number of possible ways in which to reduce the physical scale
of portions of the microwave system. However, economies of scale tend to drive microwave systems to sizes of 1,000 MW output or
more.
The most detailed cost estimates have been

made by NASA for the reference system (fig. 5):
$102.4 billion to achieve the first complete
reference system satellite, and $11.3 billion to
construct each satellite thereafter.
SPS would require a massive industrial infrastructure for space transportation and construction and for related terrestrial construction, comparable in scale to that developed for
existing ground-based coal and nuclear systems.
Figure 5.Reference System Costs

(dollars in billions)
These estimates included the costs of the entire transportation system, the costs of establishing the launch sites and construction facilities in low-Earth and geosynchronous orbits,
as well as all of the component development
Space transportation. The reference system assumes the construction and use of a
large third-generation, shuttle-type transportation system. Construction of a single
reference system satellite (silicon photovoltaics) would require approximately 190
flights of an HLLV. However, launch vehicles somewhat larger than the current
shuttle, but smaller than the HLLV, are capable of operating with less load per flight
but with many more flights and might be
more economical. I n addition, an intermediate size vehicle would be more appropriate for other uses in space. No other
currently planned space project envisions
using vehicles the size of an HLLV.
Space construction. SPS would require
construction bases in low Earth orbit and,
for some designs, at geostationary orbit. It
might be possible to achieve substantial
cost reductions by constructing the satellites in low Earth orbit and transporting
them to geostationary orbit, rather than
by constructing them in geostationary orbit.
costs
Although the costs of many SPS components
have been estimated by a number of different
agencies, it is not yet possible to establish
them with any reasonable level of confidence.
NASA estimates 1977 dollars.
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
costs. However, they do not include interest on

the invested capital or the potential use of SPS
facilities for other space or terrestrial projects.
According to one possible development scenario generated by NASA (see fig. 24, p. 93), including interest of 10 percent per year more
than doubles the development cost of SPS.
By using a smaller capacity transportation
system (assuming more flights per satellite),
and apportioning the development costs of
generic space technology among all the space
programs that benefit from it, it might well be
possible to deploy a single reference satellite
for $40 billion to $50 billion, or roughly onehalf of the above estimate.
Other systems might cost more or less than
the reference system, depending on the state
of development of the alternative technologies (see table 1). For example, since lasers
would need considerable development before
they would be suitable for use in a laserpowered SPS, they would be likely to be more
expensive to develop than the microwave
transmitter of the reference system; however,

some of the development cost could conceivably be borne by other laser applications,
e.g., directed energy weapons or inertial fusion. The cost of a laser demonstration satellite might well be less than the reference system demonstrator. Because of the relatively
low mass and ease of construction and operation of a SOLARES system, it may prove to be
much more attractive than other alternatives.
Cost estimates suggest that if the cost of terrestrial photovoltaics can reach the goals implied by reference system estimates, the costs
of a total SOLARES system would be less than
the reference system. More exact costs for the
SPS await further information on the details of
the preferred system. Whatever system might
be chosen, it is clear that the startup costs
would be in the tens of billions. How much of
this cost would have to be borne by the U.S.
taxpayer depends on the breadth and depth of
industrial and international interest in the development of SPS (see ch. 7).
SPS AND THE ENERGY FUTURE

How could SPS flt into the U.S. energy future
(2000-30)?*
SPS will ultimately be accepted or rejected
in the full context of future electrical demand
and supply technologies. It would compete
with other renewable or inexhaustible energy
sources such as hydro, wind, terrestrial solar,
ocean thermal energy conversion, fusion, fission breeder, and geothermal. Their technologies are all quite different; some serve a
demand for baseload, some for peaking or
intermediate needs. Together, they would constitute a mix of technologies designed to supply the full range of electrical needs for the
United States. SPS must be considered in light
of its potential contribution to this mix, as well
as of future electrical demand.
*See ch. 6, Energy section.
SPS Is Not Likely To Be Commercially

Available Before 2005-15
Experience with other new electric generating technologies indicates that new technologies take from 30 to 45 years to become a
significant source of electrical capacity in the
utility grid. SPS is unlikely to constitute a major exception to this rule of thumb. If a decision to develop SPS were made, some 15 to 25
years of development, engineering, and demonstration would be needed to reach a commercial SPS. However, because of the many
uncertainties surrounding SPS, it is not yet
possible to make a development decision. If,
after considerable further research a decision
is made in the next decade to proceed with
SPS, then it could be commercially available in
the period between 2005 and 2015. Several
years of operational testing beyond that would
Table 1.Characterization of Four Alternative SPS Systems

Solid state
Reference design
Information matrix
Laser system
SOLARES
(baseline)a
costs
R&D
Demonstration
Construction
Operation
Dollars/kW
$400 million
$102 billion DDT&E (one sateilite)
$11,5 billion/satellite
$200 million/yr-5GW
$2,900 -19,000/kWc
More R&D needed than reference system

b
More R&D needed than reference system
Relatively simple technical lower cost
Smaller, demonstration with shuttle?
billion, demonstration with shuttle?

$1,300 billion for 810 GW total system
Higher ground conversion cost
$1,500/kW (probably low)
$44
Unit cost lower, smaller rectenna

Greater reliability, long lifetime
$1 ,800 -3,000/kW (probably low)
$3 billion satellite (0,5 GW)

25 million/yr-satellite (0.5GW)
$6,000/kW probably low)
55 km2
60 (300 GW total)
5,000 MW
5 X104 tonnes/satellite, O 1 kW/kg
174 km2 (including buffer)
x 60=10,440 km 2
35
18 km2
Not projected
1,500 MW
Less mass than reference/O 1 kW/kg
50 km2
5 km2
Not projected
500 MW
Less mass than reference/O .05 kW/kg
2
0.6 km
135,000 MW
5
2 x 10 tonnes mirror system 2 kW/kg
2
1,000 km
33
1,2
7.4
Electricity
Fairly centralized
23 mW/cm2 Gaussian
Electricity
Less centralized
Unknown
Electricity, onsite generation.

Less centralized
Unknown (10 mW/cm2 at edge)
Electricity, light
Highly centralized
1.15 kW/m 2 (1 Sun)
Scale
Satellite size
Number of satellites
Power/satellite
Mass
Land use rectenna site
2
km 1,000 MW
Energy
distribution
50 km2
916 (810 GW total)
Atmosphere
Transmission
Effluents
Electromagnetic
interference
Bioeffects
National security
weapons potential
Ionosphere heating might affect telecommunications

Possible effects include alteration of magnetosphere (AR+); increased water content;
formation of noctilucent clouds; ionosphere depletion
Tropospheric heating might modify weather over smaller area; problems with clouds?
LEO orbit, smaller size; smaller launch vehicles
RFI from direct coupling, spurious noise, and harmonics: impacts on communications,
satellites etc from 245 GHz Problem for radio astronomers (GEO obscures portion of
sky always) optical reflections from satellites and LEO stations WiII change the night sky
If visible light IS used there may be problems

for optical astronomy; if Infrared IS used may
Increase airglow optical reflection from LEO
satellite
Problem for optical astronomy, optical reflections and interference from beam; change
night sky in vicin of sites
Microwave bioeffects midbeam could cause thermal heating unknown effects of longterm exposure to low-level microwaves, Ecosystem alteration? Birds avoid/attracted
to beam?
Direct beam ocular and skin damage ocular

damage from reflections? Other effects? Birds
flying through WiII burn up? If visible will
birds avoid? Ecosystem alterations?
Psychological and physiological effects of 24hour illumination not known Possible ocular
hazard if viewed with binoculars? Ecosystem
alteration
GEO gives a good vantage point over hemisphere
Direct weapon: as ABM, antisatellite, aimed at Indirect: night illumination psychological

terrestrial targets
possible weather modification
Provides a lot of power in space platform for surveillance, jamming
Requires developement of Iarge space fleet with/militarv potential
Indirect: power killer

satellite, planes space platform
Laser defend self, best, LEO more accessible
Vulnerability
Satellites may need self defense system to protect against attack

Size and distance strong defenses
International
LEO more accessible to U.S.S.R. and high-lahtude countries, smaller parcels of energy make
Will require radio frequency allocation and orbit assignment
Smaller parcels of energy make system more system more fiexible
flexible
Meet environmental and health standards?
asmaller saLAREs systems, e g 10 GW/sde would be possible and probably more desirable
b$loz bllllonNASA estimatemcludes Investment costs
cEst(mates by Argonne National Laboratory, Office of Technology Assessment, U S Con9ress
SOURCE Offlceof Technology Assessment
Less ground sites; a lot of mirrors-redundancy; individual mirrors fragile; ground sites
still produce power in absence of space
system
be needed before utilities developed enough

confidence in SPS to invest in it for their use
(see ch. 9).
SPS Would Not Reduce U.S.

Dependence on Imported Oil
Currently the biggest energy problem facing the Nation is dependence on unreliable
sources for imported oil. This dependence will
persist for the next two decades, since our
domestic supplies will continue to decline. We
now produce about 10 million barrels per day
(bbl/d) of petroleum liquids and this will likely
fall to 4 million to 7 million bbl/d by 2000. The
supply of abundant domestic energy resources
such as coal, solar, uranium, and natural gas
can increase but not enough to offset the decline in oil. Over this period our best opportunity for reducing dependence on imports will
be conservation, which has the potential of
cutting current dependence by more than 50
percent. However, the real problem will be the
substantial reduction in availability of world
oil for export to the United States. The total
amount of oil available is not likely to exceed
the current level of 52 million bbl/d and may
be as much as 15 percent below this level. Further, overall world demand will likely be higher
because of increased needs by less developed
countries (LDCS), including oil producing countries. As a result, the United States will find it
necessary to reduce imported oil dependence
considerably by 2000. This reduction will be
even more marked past 2000, when we can expect synthetic fuels from all sources to make a
substantial contribution. Since the SPS will not
be able to make a significant contribution until well past 2000, it cannot be expected to substitute for foreign oil. However, the satellite
could eventually begin to substitute for coalfired powerplants since coal, too, is a finite
fuel, and regardless of the outcome of the CO,
controversy, use of it for electric production
will eventually (though probably not for the
next 100 years) be reduced and reserved for
nonenergy needs, i.e., for plastics, synthetic
fiber, etc.
Potential Scale of Electrical Power

The reference system is designed to deliver 5
GW (5,000 MW) of power to each rectenna. If a
60-satellite U.S. fleet were completed, the SPS
couId deliver a total of 300 GW, an amount
nearly one-half the current total U.S. generating capacity. Converted to energy at a capacity factor of 90 percent, a 60-satellite system
would produce about 8 Qe/yr, more electrical
energy than we currently consume from all
supply sources (7.5 Qe). An international fleet
of satelIites could achieve a much greater capacity than this by placing more satellites in
geostationary orbit. A SOLARES-type system
could achieve an even greater generating
capacity on an international scale.
other proposals, such as the laser system
and variants of the microwave system might be
economical in somewhat smaller unit sizes
(500 to 1,000 MW). Precisely how much total
energy they might supply is less clear, however. For example, a laser system supplying
power in 1,000 MW units would need 300 such
satellites and ground receivers in order to
equal the capacity of a 60-satellite reference
system.
Electricity Demand Would Affect the

Need for Solar Power Satellites
The level of electricity demand in the United
States and the world will greatly affect the
time that new centralized electric generating
technologies, such as SPS, might be needed.
The demand for electricity could vary considerably over the next several decades. For
the United States, current forecasts show a
range in possible electrical demand from less
than todays level of 7.5 Qe end-use to more
than 30 Qe by 2030. The demand level will be a
major determinant of the rate at which new
electric generating technologies need to be
introduced. At the lowest levels, all of our
baseload capacity could easily be supplied by
hydro and coal or nuclear for well into the 21st
Ch. 3Issues and Findings 33
century provided C0 2 buildup does not preclude increased coal use. At high demand
levels, however, it is unlikely that any one
technology could provide all the needed baseIoad capacity and several possibilities would
be needed. In this case, development of SPS
may be attractive, even assuming successful
development of fusion or breeder reactors.
An emerging factor that will strongly affect
electricity demand is the success in developing
demand technologies that use electricity very
efficiently. It is likely over the next several
decades that the price of electricity will come
close enough to other forms of energy (synthetic fuels, direct solar, etc.) that the relative
efficiencies of the end-use equipment will determine which energy form is the cheapest.
Therefore, electricity demand could grow considerably if such things as very efficient space
and water heat pumps, electrochemical industrial processes, and high-capacity storage batteries are developed. If these are not forthcoming and the conventional ways of using energydirect combustion of liquid and gaseous
fuelscontinue to be most prevalent, then
electricity demand in the United States wilI not
increase rapidly if at al 1. Therefore, the eventual need for solar power satellites and other
central electric technologies would be determined as much by the development of efficient electric demand technologies as by its
economics relative to other electric energy
technologies.
Comparison to Other
Renewable Options
Ultimately the United States and the world
will choose or reject SPS as an energy supply
option on the basis of comparative costs as
well as environmental and social impacts. OTA
has generated a number of criteria for the
choice of energy technologies and compared
SPS with other renewable or inexhaustible options (fusion, nuclear breeder, terrestrial solar
thermal, and solar photovoltaic) on the basis
of those criteria (see table 16, p. 11 6). What
emerges from such comparisons is that if the
research, development, demonstration, and
testing (RDD&T) costs and the estimated cost
per installed kilowatt can be lowered significantly, SPS could compete with the alternatives on an economic basis. SOLARES, for
instance, might already be economical compared to conventional nuclear. SPS technical
uncertainties are much higher than for the
breeder, but lower than for fusion. Social costs
are extremely difficult to determine, but if
research demonstrated the microwave and
Ionizing radiation hazards to be low, SPS couId
substitute low-risk environmental hazards for
the high risks of coal or nuclear as well as contribute to an expanded space program. It
wouId take longer to commercialize than terrestrial solar or breeder, but less than fusion. I n
competition with other technologies, overall
demand for electricity, and the timing of the
commercial introduction of SPS vis-a-vis other
options wilI be crucial.
UTILITIES
Would SPS be acceptable to the utilities?*
The major factors that would affect the utilities decision about SPS technology are cost,
reliability, unfamiliarity with space systems,
and institutional questions. Only demonstration, and successful experience with an operational SPS over several years, would assure the
utilities that it is a viable technology for their
use. If the microwave systems were as reliable
*See ch 9, The Irnpl;cat;ons for the Utility /ndustry section
and available as their designers suggest they

could be (90 percent or more), the utilities
would welcome them for baseload generation,
assuming their size and costs were also appropriate. The laser system might be of interest to
the utilities if it could be used to repower existing thermal facilities. The suggested unit size
of the laser system (500 to 1,000 MW) would fit
welI into the present size mix of terrestrial
powerplants. A mirror system with its highly
centralized, energy producing facility (10 to
100 GW) would be too large for the present

size mix, but would offer the potential for
some flexibility in energy production. Direct
electricity and hydrogen generation are both
possible in a SOLARES-type energy park. However, because the SPS would be an integral
part of the utility grid, it would impose certain
constraints on grid dispatch management. The
physical requirements of the rest of the utility
grid would in turn impose constraints on the
design of SPS. Integrating SPS into the grid involves several difficult system problems.
Microwave Transmission.
Stability. Because a microwave SPS is an
electronic system, not a mechanical one,
any power fluctuations due to beampointing errors or to large-scale component failure would be rapid (the order of a
second or less). The rest of the grid would
only be able to respond relatively slowly
(minutes), creating difficulties in controlling the frequency of current and overall
power levels in the grid. The importance
of this difficulty is directly dependent on
the size of the SPS contribution. The
smaller the output from a satelliterectenna combination, the easier it will be
to control. Some, if not all of this drawback of the microwave system could be
alleviated by including short-term battery
storage to act as a buffer between the SPS
rectenna output and the grid. The stability
of the grid would not then depend on the
stability of the microwave mode of transmission. However, buffer storage would
increase system costs. The optimum
amount of storage that might be needed
has not been determined, but cost estimates range from 0.5 to 5 percent of the
total system costs.
Load following and variations of SPS power. The rectenna output would vary seasonally depending on the distance of the
Earth from the Sun. The amount of the
variation, and the rate at which SPS power
changes, would in principle pose no technical problem for the grid.
Because any satellite that lies in a geostationary orbit experiences eclipses (1 to
72 minutes) around the equinoxes (March
21 and September 21) when the Earths

shadow falls across the satellite, a reference system satellite would suffer power
interruption. A number of satellites would
be eclipsed at one time. The rate at which
the eclipsing occurs would cause the SPS
power to fall at a rate of about 20 percent
per minute, much faster than the utility
grids are expected to be able to respond.
This could be alleviated by shutting the
satellite down slowly in advance of the
shadow, with a consequent extra small
loss of SPS power for the period, or by
including buffer storage as suggested
above. If daily load curves maintain their
current shape, the eclipse would occur
near the daily minimum (local midnight),
necessitating less backup capacity than
wouId otherwise be the case.
In principle, SPS could be designed to
follow the daily load, but because of its
high capital costs it would be uneconomical to do so. It is designed to deliver
continuous, baseload power. Hence the
burden of following any shifts in load
would be placed on conventional terrestrial intermediate load units in the utility
system.
Microwave beam positional errors. The
beam could be centered on the rectenna
by means of a pilot beam directed towards the satellite antenna from the
center of the rectenna. Because the signal
would take about 0.2 seconds to sense a
position error and correct the pointing of
the beam, the antenna output would be
subject to a potential frequency variation
of about 5Hz (5 cycles/see). Power variations of tens of megawatts from this
source could make utility grid manage
ment extremely difficult. Weather fronts
could adversely affect the position of the
beam, but the resultant power variation
would be slow. Again, buffer storage
could be used to alleviate these difficulties.
Because the difficulties posed by each of

the above factors increase with size, the
utilities might not find the single 5,000-MW
unit proposed by the reference system accept-
able even in the future. Although nuclear, fusion, or coal energy parks having about 5,000
MW total capacity have been proposed, they
would be composed of several smaller units,
each of which are only about 1,000-MW capacity. In addition, in planning for overall system
reliability, utilities generally use the criterion
that no single unit in the system can account
for more than 10 to 15 percent of the total
system. Thus, in order to place a 5,000-MW
unit in the grid, the grid should have a total
system capacity of 33,000 to 50,000 MW. At
current rates of electrical growth (3.2 percent
per year), only the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), the countrys largest utility, will have a
grid large enough to accommodate a 5,000MW SPS in 2000. TVA currently has a capacity
of 23,000 MW, but it has stopped construction
on several new powerplants because of slower
demand growth. A national power grid might
alleviate the problem of utility grids being too
small to accommodate a 5,000-MW SPS.
Laser Transmission. From the utilities perspective, the most serious difficulty facing
laser transmission is absorption by clouds.
Although in a few locations in the country it
appears to be technically possible to switch
from a cloud covered area to one that is cloudfree, utilities would have little incentive to
construct the extra facilities to accommodate
such switching unless the economic benefits
were commensurate with the expense of the
extra facilities. In general, the various sites are
unlikely to be all in the same service area, further complicating the ability of the utility to
follow the load.
Mirror Reflection.
Reflection of sunlight from space suffers
from the same disadvantage as that of the
laser option: the reflected beam could
easily be degraded or occluded by cloud
cover. it has been suggested that the additional radiant energy might be enough to
dissipate clouds, but this might have
detrimental environmental effects and
alter weather patterns over a wide region
around the energy park.
As conceived in the baseline case, the
mirror system would require large energy
35
parks capable of producing more than 100

GW. Smaller parks of 10 GW might also
be possible. Even the relatively smaller
parks would necessitate major changes in
current utility operation and load management. Among other changes, such
parks would necessitate building an extensive new network of major transmission
lines to distribute electrical power from
remote receiving areas to end-users.
In principle, all of the technical problems
for the different systems are resolvable at
some cost. However, they would require considerable further study and testing as well as a
close look at the system economics.
Nontechnical Considerations
In addition to the technical difficulties that
SPS can be expected to face, there are a
number of potential institutional barriers to
SPS acceptance by U.S. utilities:
SP5 as a space system. The current utility

management and regulatory infrastructure is much more receptive to the terrestrial renewable or inexhaustible options breeder reactor and fusion for
baseload, and solar thermal and solar
photovoltaic for intermediate and peaking loads.
Regulatory framework. Utilities are currently regulated on a State or local basis.
SPS could be expected to hasten the move
towards greater centralization of the regulatory process (i.e. Federal level). A
SOLARES-type SPS, because of its large
centralized energy parks, would make a
high degree of centralization mandatory.
However, other SPS modes may also lead
to more centralized regulation, particularly if the SPS were constructed and managed by a federally chartered monopoly
(see Ownership and Finance) or Government agency.
Nuclear powerplants are currently regulated at the Federal and State level for
health, safety, and environmental impacts. However, their effect on the rate
structure is regulated at the State and
local level. An SPS corporation might lead

to Federal involvement in setting rates for
power as well as regulating SPS technology. The utilities and local regulatory
agencies could be expected to resist any
pressures toward greater Federal involvement in what has traditionally been their
province.
Ownership and Finance

Electric utilities currently face a serious
problem raising the capital necessary to install
new generating capacity. Because of this, and
because they lack launch and space construction capability, they are unlikely to own or
operate the space segment of an SPS system
directly; they could more easily be responsible
for the ground receivers. This raises the question of how domestic SPSs would be financed
and managed.
The central issues are: 1 ) the degree and kind
of government involvement; and 2) how to differentiate between the R&D and construction/
operation phases.
Government involvement. The arguments

for Government financing and ownership
wouId be that the high fronnt-end costs and
high-risk long pay-back times inhibit private sector investment, and that lack of
competition would necessitate Government ownership. Certain aspects of TVA
or NASA could provide possible guidance
for SPS ownership and operation.
On the other hand, it can be argued that
direct Government involvement is contrary to American preference for private
enterprise, that centralized control would
lead to inefficiencies, and that U.S. Government ownership would make military
participation far more likely. Furthermore, it is feared that Government investment in SPS would drain resources from
other energy technologies that need
Federal support. A Government-chartered
but privately owned and operated company similar to Comsat, or a regulated
private monopoly such as AT&T, might be
preferred. Since the United States is party
to international law that requires national

governments to bear the responsibility for
space activities, even when carried out by
nongovernmental entities, some degree of
Federal supervision and involvement will
be required in any case.
R&D and operating phases. Raising private
capital would be especially difficult during the research, development, and demonstration phase. A successful prototype
demonstration would probably be necessary to attract private investment. If SPS
is judged to be a feasible energy option,
prototype development is likely to require
Federal funding, perhaps via taxes, similar
to the Interstate Highway System trust
fund, or through Space Bonds. After
that, it is likely that Government loans or
guarantees would be required, at a minimum. At some stage the technology could
be turned over to the private sector. Instances of such practices have included
nuclear reactors, first developed for military use in submarines; and telecommunications technology, funded by NASA and
then turned over to Comsat and commercial carriers. Clarification of current patent provisions for NASA and other Government research contracts would facilitate such transfers. Upcoming examples
that should be examined for their applicability to SPS are the Space Shuttle,
which has been developed by NASA but
may eventually be turned over to private
enterprise, due to restrictions on NASA
operation of commercial ventures; the
newly established U.S. Synfuels Corp.,
which is intended to provide money for a
variety of private synthetic fuels ventures;
and the European Space Agencys (ESA)
Ariane launcher, which will be operated
by a private consortium called Arianespace. Private joint ventures, such as
Satellite Business Systems or the Alaska
pipeline consortium, are another possible
way to establish a Solarsat Corp. for the
construction and operating phases.
A combination of the suggested models, involving different degrees of Government and private financing, may be more
feasible than any of the specific models

mentioned. Providing for a smooth transition between public and private investment phases would be an important concern. A critical consideration should be
37
the ability of an SPS organization to attract foreign capital and to involve foreign participants at early stages of development. (See International Implications.)
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
What are the international implications of
solar power satellites?*
Development and construction of an SPS
system would necessarily involve a number of
international dimensions. At a minimum, current and future international treaties and
agreements, especially those dealing with the
allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum,
would require consultation with foreign states
and multinational organizations. Beyond this,
there may be good reasons to consider an active multilateral regime to regulate, build,
and/or operate the SPS.
International organizations, multinational
corporations, and domestic interest groups will
all be involved in SPS decisions. However, due
to the SPSs cost, benefits, and military/foreign
policy impacts, which would directly affect
the vital national interests of other nations involved, such decisions will ultimately be made
at the national level by political leaders.
Economic lmpact. If successful, the SPS
promises to deliver significant amounts of
electricity y. Estimates of future global electricity demand by the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) indicate
that, even with low rates of economic growth,
electricity usage will increase by a factor of 4
over the next 50 years. Regional variations in
growth rates will be considerable, with
developed countries increasing at a much
slower rate than developing ones. Recent
studies for the United States that take into account marked reductions in usage rates, such
as the National Academy of Sciences Energy
in Transition 1985-2010 indicate that demand
in the developed countries may remain con*See ch. 7.
stant or rise only SIightly over the next 30 years.

On a global scale, this might indicate a rise less
than that predicted by IIASA. Meeting this demand will be particularly difficult in energyscarce areas such as Western Europe, Japan,
and much of Latin America, Africa, and South
Asia. Countries in these regions will be
especially interested in SPS development.
Noneconomic Impact. -The noneconomic
effects of SPS would influence the decisions of
the major space powers, the United States and
the U.S.S.R. The prestige of such a major space
and energy accomplishment would be considerable. The military advantages of high-capacity launch vehicles and a large energy-producing platform in high orbit would be significant,
even if SPS were not used for direct military
purposes.
The United States and the U.S.S.R. both
have extensive conventional energy sources
oil, coal, oil shale, and uranium. Thus, neither
country can be expected to develop an SPS
unilaterally unless unpredictable obstacles to
the use of coal and/or nuclear power develop.
SPS is therefore likely to be pursued in conjunction with foreign partners who contribute
capital and expertise and buy completed satellites. Both Western Europe and Japan, who
have extensive space programs and a history of
cooperation with the United States, would be
probable partners. Soviet secrecy and military
domination of their space program makes international cooperation on their part unlikely.
International Cooperation. Experience with
multilateral organizations suggests that estabI The global estimates cited in Energy in Transition, however,
are similar to I IASAS; a rise of three to five times in electricity
consumption by 2010. See Energy in Transition, National
Academy of Sciences, 1979, p. 626.
Iishing and running a successful international

venture would be difficult. Reconciling the different interests of the participants regarding
overall system design, decision making, and
allocation of contracts and financial returns
would be time-consuming and might compromise timely and efficient results. The example
of Intelsat suggests the importance of strong
national support by interested parties, of
independent corporate management, and a
profit-incentive. However, it is unlikely that an
agency modeled on Intel sat could be duplicated today for SPS. In particular, the role of
LDCs would be greater and could be disruptive
unless North-South conflicts can be kept from
dominating day-to-day decisions. Strong
leadership by the United States and the Organization of Economic Cooperative Development partners would be required to maintain an effective program.
International Law. International law currently requires allocation of satellite frequencies and geostationary positions by the international Telecommunication Union (ITU). If
SPS were to interfere with global communications, this could be a major obstacle to gaining
ITU approval. ownership and control of the
geostationary orbit has not been completely
resolved, and attempts by equatorial states to
claim sovereignty over it could hamper development of any geostationary SPS. The proposed Moon Treaty, which calIs for an international regime based on the principle of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, provides a
precedent for international control over space
resources, and may affect plans to construct
SPS from lunar materials. In each of these
cases it can be expected that future LDCs will
seek to gain leverage over any SPS regime by
controlling access to space. Accommodating
LDC interests in a manner compatible with SPS
development may be difficult or politically impossible; the precedent set by the uncompleted Law of the Sea negotiations should be
carefulIy considered.
Military Impact. The military uses of an SPS,
especially for directed-energy weaponry,
would be restricted by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty and by provisions in the
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space banning weapons of mass
destruction in orbit. Although SPS would not
lend itself to efficient use as a weaponssystem, * objections to the SPS on military
grounds, and demands for inspection and/or
redesign to preclude military uses, can be expected. Multilateral development would alleviate many such problems.
Foreign Interests.To date, space agencies
and private firms in foreign countries such as
England, France, West Germany, and Japan,
along with ESA, have expressed interest in SPS.
Most foreign studies have focused on regional
applications; technical and operational studies
have been done almost exclusively in the
United States. Soviet interest has been expressed for several years, with several technical papers published, but no details are
known. Third World interest has been informal
and cautiously favorable. Future discussion at
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and other international bodies will be forthcoming. Any further
U.S.-sponsored study of SPSs must take into
account international participation in SPS
development, and demand for SPS power, in
order to evaluate properly the feasibility of
SPS programs.
.
See ch 7, Military Uses of SPS section
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

What are the national security implications
of SPS?*
*For extended discussion see ch, 7
The military importance of SPS would derive

from its very large size, its geostationary orbital position (for certain designs), and its ability to provide tremendous amounts of power.
Aside from the important result of reducing
the user states dependence on imported

energy, SPS would be strategically significant
as a target, as the catalyst for new space
transportation and construction capabilities,
and as a possible weapons-system.
Vulnerability. A full-scale SPS system
wouId constitute a high-value target for enemy
action. Whether an SPS would in fact be
targeted in the event of hostilities will depend
above all on how crucial it is to a countrys
electrical supply. Can SPS power be made up
from other sources? Is the attacker vulnerable
to a counter-attack in kind? Best estimates are
that an SPS system would be unlikely to constitute more than 10 to 20 percent of total
generating capacity, in the countries that use
SPS, over the next 50 years. Holding SPS to this
percent would make it possible to replace SPS
power from conventional reserve capacity.
However, usage could be much higher in specific regions or industries. A widespread national grid could alleviate the threat of SPS
outages. In general, SPS would be no more
VuInerable than other major energy systems.
SPSs could be attacked in a number of ways:
1) by ground-launched missiles carrying nuclear or conventional warheads, 2) by orbiting
antisatellite platforms, 3) by ground- or spacebased directed-energy weapons, 4) by strewing
debris in the satellites path, and 5) by interfering with or redirecting the SPSs energy
transmission beam.
The large size of most SPS options would
make it difficuIt for conventional explosives to
do serious damage. Lasers would likely be
more effective. Strewing debris in geosynchronous orbit would destroy a reference
system SPS, but also affect many other targets,
including friendly and neutral spacecraft.
Beam interference would be less damaging
and would require special preparation to protect against. Nuclear weapons could damage
SPSs by direct blast, and also by the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect, which might
overload the satellites electrical systems a
large (1 megaton or more) nuclear explosion
could damage a photovoltaic SPS at ranges up
to hundreds of kilometers.
39
The use of nuclear weapons outside of a major nuclear exchange would carry great dangers of escalation. Any attack, nuclear or conventional, would depend on perceptions of
whether SPS is considered part of national territory and how leaders would react to such a
provocation. The analogy to ships on the high
sea suggests that an SPS in orbit might be considered fair game even short of full-scale war.
Attacks on SPS would also be affected by
whether the SPS was manned; destroying an
unmanned craft might be undertaken as a relatively unprovocative demonstration of will. At
present, neither the United States nor the
U.S.S.R. has the ability to attack objects in
geosynchronous orbit, but both are working on
various antisatellite devices and there appear
to be no insurmountable obstacles to their
development.
Defense of space craft is possible through:
1) maneuverability, 2) hardening, and 3) antimissile defenses.
The SPS would be too large and fragile to
evade attack. Hardening against explosives or
EMP bursts would add significantly to weight
and costs, and could not be effective against a
determined attack. Stationing missile or satellite defenses on a geostationary SPS, whether
directed-energy weapons or antimissile missiles, would be feasible due to the power
generated by the SPS and its position at the top
of a 35,800-km gravity well. However, such
weapons would have unavoidable offensive
capabilities and would therefore invite attack.
Defense of civilian SPSs could probably be
best done by independent military forces, on
the ground or in space, rather than by turning
the SPS itself into a space-fortress.
Receiving antennas or (for the mirrorsystem) PV parks would make unattractive
targets due to their large size and redundancy;
they would certainly be no more vulnerable
than other generating facilities. It should be
noted that the SOLARES system could continue to produce power, albeit at approximately one-fifth rated capacity, by operating on
ambient sunlight even if the space mirror
system were destroyed.
Military Uses. The military usefulness of an

SPS stems from: 1) the launchers and other facilities used to construct the satellite portion;
2) the energy beams used by the SPS to transmit power; and 3) its strategic orbital location.
HLLVS or other transportation and construction systems would be perhaps the most direct
military benefit of SPS. These could be used by
the military to build large space platforms for
communications, surveillance, or weaponry.
Such activities might be disguised by being
carried out during SPS construction, but it is
unlikely that they could escape detection by
interested parties. Development of such systems would be most important, and destabilizing, in providing a break-out capacity for
rapid emergency deployment of military satellites by fleets of SPS construction vehicles.
Laser beams built as part of SPS, or more
militarily efficient weapons placed on the SPS
but not used in transmitting electricity, could
be used as strategic weapons. In recent years
both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have
undertaken large programs to develop directed-energy weapons for use against satellites and/or international ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). However, a geostationary SPS is
35,800 kilometers distant from low-flying
ICBMs. This distance complicates tracking and
requires very high beam intensities. Much
greater effectiveness can be achieved by
weapons placed in lower orbits. However, a
geostationary SPS could play a role in supplying power to remotely located directed-energy
platforms. A laser SPS in low Sun-synchronous
orbit, of course, would represent a much
greater military potential than one in geosynchronous orbit.
Use of SPS, even indirectly, for ABM purposes is currently prohibited by the 1972 ABM
Treaty. A militarily effective SPS would be a
major factor in strategic planning and would
likely be a subject of arms-control negotiations
between interested states. Provisions for direct
inspection, or design specifications to reduce
an SPSs military usefulness, could be negotiated to reduce the various threats it poses.
Such provisions might be needed even if SPS

would not be militarily useful, but was nevertheless perceived to be a military or political
threat.
Using an SPS directly against targets on the
ground would ease tracking requirements.
High-energy lasers (H EL) or particle-beams
could conceivably be used to destroy quickly
tactical targets such as ships, planes, or oil
refineries without jeopardizing ones own personnel or risking the use of nuclear weapons.
However, SPS lasers used for energy transmission would probably not make effective
weapons without considerable modification.
SPS could also be used to supply electrical
power to military units in remote areas, and
perhaps even directly to ships or planes.
SPS could serve as a platform for certain
surveillance and communications needs. Because of its power, it might be especially
suited for conducting jamming and electronic
warfare operations.
SPS platforms, because of their size and
facilities, would be likely to serve as multipurpose space bases similar to major seaports. If
military units used SPS for resupply or rest and
recreation, it might be difficult to separate
military from civilian uses, or to convince outside observers that SPS was not a military
threat.
Any such direct uses of SPS would be determined by the way in which future SPSs are
built and managed. Construction by an independent multinational enterprise would reduce any states ability to use an SPS for military purposes; conversely, unilateral development would enhance it. Use of SPSs as
weapons platforms by future superpowers
would invite considerable foreign criticism,
especially if such attempts interfered with
their electricity-generation function. A sudden
diversion of SPS power to the military in time
of crisis could lead to domestic and/or foreign
electricity shortages, resulting in legal or
diplomatic protests.
41
PUBLIC ISSUES
The SPS debate: what are the issues arising in
the public arena?*
While public awareness of SPS is growing,
most discussion has been confined to a small
number of public interest groups and professional societies. In general, many of the individuals and groups who support the development of SPS also advocate a vigorous space
program. The L-5 Society has been a particularly vocal SPS supporter and views the
satelIite system as an important stepping-stone
in the colonization of space, a goal to which
the society is dedicated. The SUNSAT Energy
Council, a group formed to promote interest in
SPS, believes that it is one of the most promising options available for meeting future global
energy and resource needs. Professional associations such as the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (1 E E E), have supported continued research and evaluation of the concept.
Many opponents of SPS are concerned that
it wouId drain resources from the development
of terrestrial solar technologies. The Solar Lobby and other public interest groups argue that
compared to these ground-based solar options,
SPS is inordinately large, expensive, and comSee ch 9, Issues Arising in the Public Arena section
plex, and that it poses greater environmental

and military risks while precluding local decisionmaking. Many opponents also maintain
that all future energy demand can be easily
met with existing and future terrestrial energy
technologies; there is little need to develop
SPS, especially in view of the formidable costs
to initiate the technology and the highly uncertain cost of the product. The Citizens Energy
Project (CEP) has been an active lobbyist
against Government funding of SPS and has
coordinated the Coalition Against Satellite
Power Systems, a network of solar and environmental organizations. Objections to SPS have
also been raised by individuals in the professional astronomy and space science communities who see SPS as a threat to the funding
and practice of their respective sciences. In the
future, it is conceivable that antinuclear, antimilitary and tax groups could also join the opposition.
Public opinion about SPS can be influenced
by a multitude of factors; concerns articulated
today may not be as important in the future. In
addition, in much of the current public discussion, SPS is treated as a U.S. system alone. If
SPS were to be developed on an international
basis, the flavor of present opinion could
change. Currently, debate about SPS focuses
on the question of R&D funding. This and
other issues are highlighted in table 2.

How would SPS affect human health and the
environment?*
As an energy system operating both in space
and on Earth, SPS involves some rather diverse
and unique environmental issues (see table 3).
While one advantage of SPS is that it would
avoid many of the environmental risks typically related to conventional energy options
such as nuclear and coal, it would also
generate some unconventional environmental
*See ch. 8.
83-316 0 - 81 - 4
effects which are poorly understood at present. The resolution of the uncertainties
associated with these effects is critical to the
assessment of the environmental acceptability
of SPS. More research is needed to understand
and quantify these impacts and to investigate
modified system designs that would minimize
environmental risks. At present, there are three
major areas of concern.
1. Bioeffects of Electromagnetic Radiation.
The effects of exposure to SPS power transmission and high-voltage transmission lines
Table 2.Major Issues Arising in SPS Debatea

Pro
R&D funding
. SPS is a promising energy option
. The Nation should keep as many energy options open as
possible
An SPS R&D program is the only means of evaluating the merit
of SPS relative to other energy technologies
SPS R&D will yield spinoffs to other programs
SPS is a very high-risk, unattractive technology

Other more viable and preferable energy options exist to meet our
future energy demand
SPS would drain resources from other programs, especially terrestrial solar technologies and the space sciences
No matter what the result of R&D, bureaucratic inertia will carry a
Government program too far
cost
SPS is likely to be cost competitive in the energy market
. Cost to taxpayer is for R&D onIy and accounts for smalI portion
of total cost; private sector and/or other nations will invest in production and maintenance
. SPS will produce economic spinoffs
SPS is unlikely to be cost competitive without Government subsidy

Like the nuclear industry, SPS would probably require ongoing
Government commitment
Projected costs are probably underestimated considerably
The amount of energy supplied by SPS does not justify the cost
Environment, health and safety
SPS is potentialIy less harsh on the environment than other

energy technologies, especially coal
SPS risks to humans and the environment are potentially greater

than those associated with terrestrial solar technologies
Major concerns include: health hazards of power transmission and
high-voltage transmission lines, land use, electromagnetic interference, upper atmosphere effects, and skylab syndrome
Space
Space is the optimum place to harvest sunlight and other

resources
SPS could be an important component or focus for a space
program
. SPS could lay the groundwork for space industrialization and/or
colonization
. SPS would produce spinoffs from R&D and hardware to other
space and terrestrial programs
International considerations
One of the most attractive characteristics of SPS is its potential

for international cooperation and ownership
. SPS can contribute significantly to the global energy supply
. SPS is one of the few options for Europe and Japan and is well-suited to meet the energy and resource needs of developing
nations
An international SPS wouId reduce concerns about adverse
military implications
SPS is an aerospace boondoggle; there are better routes to space

industrialization and exploration than SPS
SPS is an energy system and should not be justified on the basis
of its applicability to space projects
SPS could represent a form of U.S. of industrial nations energy

imperialism; it is not suitable for LDCs
Ownership of SPS by multinational corporations would centralize
power
Military implications
The vulnerability of SPS is comparable to other energy systems
SPS has poor weapons potential
As a civilian program, SPS would create little military spinoffs
Centralization and scale

Future energy needs include large as well as small-scale supply
technologies; urban centers and industry especially cannot be
powered by small-scale systems alone
. SPS would fit easily into an already centralized grid
Future energy demand
Future electricity demand will be much higher than today
High energy consumption is required for economic growth
SPS as one of a number of future electricity sources can contribute significantly to energy needs
. Even if domestic demand for SPS is low, there is a global need
for SPS
arguments mainly focus on the SPS reference sYstem

Spinoffs to the military from R&D and hardware would be significant and undesirable
Vulnerability and weapons potential are of concern
SPS would augment and necessitate a centralized infrastructure

and reduce local control, ownership, and participation in decisionmaking
The incremental risk of investing in SPS development is unacceptably high
Future electricity demand could be comparable to or only slightly
higher than todays with conservation
The standard of living can be maintained with a lower rate of
energy consumption
There is little need for SPS; demand can be met easily by existing
technologies and conservation
By investing in SPS development, we are guaranteeing high energy
consumption, because the costs of development would be so great
43
Table 3.Summary of SPS Environmental Impacts

System component
characteristics
Power transmission
Microwave
bIonospheric heating could

density is not known.
ionosphere are not known.
modification.
b
Ecosystem: microwave bioeffects (on plants, animals,
effects unknown.
b
potential
interference
Occupational health
and safety
b Effects of Iow-level
Higher risk than for

chronic exposure to micropublic; protective
waves are unknown.
clothing required for
terrestrial worker.
microwave beam as weapon. Accidental exposure to
on appearance of night sky.
but no data.
with
satellite communications,
astronomy.
Lasers

the beam.
Ecosystem: beam may
vegetation.
b
potential interference
radio astronomy.
Ocular hazard?
laser as weapon are
possible.
sky are possible.
Ocular and safety

hazard?
Mirrors
could modify weather.
Ecosystem: effect of 24hr Iight on growing.
cycles of plants and circadian rhythms of animals.
b potential interference
wit h optical astronomy.
Ocular hazard?
24-hr sunlight.
A d v e r s e esthetic e f f e c t s
sky are possible.
Ocular hazard?

bWater vapor and other
surveillance potentialy
important, but uncertain.
possible f o r m a t i o n o f
noctilucent clouds in
are not known.

exceed EPA guidelines.
materials.
hazards:
ionizing radiation
stay in space,
acceleration.
Terrestrial workers
hazards: noise, transportation accidents.
Transportation and
space operation
Launch and recovery
HLLV
PLV
COTV
POTV
Space workers
44
Table 3.Summary of SPS Environmental ImpactsContinued

System component
characteristics
Occupational health
and safety
bEmission of water vapor
could alter natural
implications are not wellknown.
b
plasma-sphere could be
great but unknown.
by effluents expected to
be minor but uncertain.
Noise.
Mining
Land disturbance
(stripmining, etc.).
Solid waste generation.
capacity of gallium
and mercury.
Toxic material exposure.

Land-use disturbance.

water pollution.
Noise.
Manufacturing
Solid wastes.
Solid wastes.
Exposure to toxic
materials.

Noise.
Construction
Measurable Iand
disturbance.
Measurable land
disturbance.
Noise.
Measurable local
pollution.
Accidents.
Receiving antenna
bLand use and siting.

weather.
Land
bLand use and siting.

bEcosystem: bioeffects Of
powerlines uncertain.
Exposure to
High-voltage
transmission lines
(not unique to SPS)
usereduced
Waste heat.
property value, aesthetics,

vulnerability (less land
opt ions; more for reference
and mirrors).
b
high intensity b Exposure to high

intensity EM fields
EM fieldseffects
uncertain.
effects uncertain.
almpacts based on SPS systems as currently defined ancl do not account for offshore receivers or poss!ble miti9atin9 sYstem modifications.
bResearch priority.
(HVTL) on humans, animals, and plants are

highly uncertain. The existing data base is incomplete, often contradictory and not directly
applicable to SPS. While the thermal effects of
microwave radiation (i. e., heating) are wellunderstood, research is critically needed to
study the consequences of chronic exposure to
low-level microwaves such as might be experienced by workers or the public outside of
the receiver site. The biological systems that
may be most susceptible to microwaves
include the immunological, hematological
(blood), reproductive, and central nervous systems. The DOE SPS assessment has sponsored
three studies of the effects of low-level microwaves on bees, birds, and small mammals. No
significant effects have been observed, but the
experiments are far from complete. More research is vitally needed to expand the experimental and clinical data base, and to improve
theories which may facilitate the extrapolation
from animal studies to assessments of human
health hazards.
It appears that the United States will establish a microwave standard in the near future
that is more stringent than the present occupational 10.0 mW/cm2 voluntary guideline (the
new occupational standard at 2.45 GHz will
probably be 5.0 mW/cm2), thereby approaching the standards in other countries (e. g.,
2
Canada: population 1.0 mW/cm , occupa2
tional 5.0 mW/cm ; U. S. S. R.: population
0.001 mW/cm2, occupational 0.01 mW/cm2).
This does not have an immediate impact on
SPS Iand use for the reference system, since it
is designed to produce less than 1.0 mW/cm 2 at
the rectenna boundary and less than 0.1 mW/
cm 2 outside the rectenna boundary. Nevertheless, establishing population standards that are
more stringent couId mean more land for each
buffer zone and could affect system design
(power density and beam taper) as well as
public opinion.
With respect to spaceworkers, exposure to
ionizing radiation (including that from the
radiation belts, galactic cosmic rays, and solar
flares) would be a health hazard unless steps
are taken in future planning to minimize dose.
Studies are needed to determine acceptable
45
exposure limits. Research is needed to determine more precisely the expected dose rates,
the types and energies of ionizing particles,
and the effectiveness rate of various types and
thicknesses of shielding. The results will determine the number of spaceworkers, the duration of the stay, the mass needed in orbit (for
shielding), and space suit and system designs.
All of these impacts may strongly affect SPS
costs and feasibility.
For SPS systems other than the microwave
designs, very little assessment of the health
and safety effects has been conducted. The
power density of a focused laser system beam
could be sufficiently great to incinerate some
biological matter. Outside the beam, scattered
laser light could constitute an ocular and skin
hazard. More study would be needed to quantify risks, define possible safety measures and
explore the effects of long-term exposure to
low-level laser light.
The light delivered to Earth by the mirror
system, even in combination with the ambient
daylight, would never exceed that in the desert
at high noon. The health impacts that might be
adverse include psychological and physiological effects of 24 hour per day sunlight and
possible ocular damage from viewing the mirrors, expecialIy through binoculars.
2. Effects on the Upper Atmosphere. Atmospheric effects result from two sources: heating
by the power transmission beam and the emission of launch vehicle effluents. While the
most significant effect of the laser and mirror
systems is probably weather modification due
to tropospheric heating, ionospheric heating is
most important for the microwave systems
operating at 2.45 GHz. Of most concern is
disruption of telecommunications and surveillance systems from perturbations of the ionosphere. Experiments indicate that the effects
on telecommunications of heating the lower
ionosphere are negligible for the systems
tested. As a result, a few researchers have suggested that microwave power densities of up
to 40 to 50 mW/cm2, or two times the level
assumed for the reference design, could be
used before significant heating would occur.
46
The largest uncertainty is related to heating

and nonlinear interactions in the upper ionosphere. To investigate the heating effects in
this region, more powerful heating facilities
would be required.
The atmospheric effects resulting from the
emission of rocket effluents from SPS space
vehicles are of concern because of the unprecedented magnitude and frequency of the
projected SPS launches. In the magnetosphere,
construction of the SPS reference system as
presently designed would lead to a dramatic
increase in the naturally occurring abundance
of argon ions (from the electric propulsion
system proposed for orbital transfer) and
hydrogen atoms. While several possible effects
have been identified, including enhanced airglow and Van Allen belt radiation, and altered
atmospheric electricity and weather, the likelihood and severity of these effects are highly
uncertain.
The injection of water vapor at lower altitudes would significantly increase the water
content relative to natural levels. One possible
consequence is an increase in the upward flux
of hydrogen atoms through the thermosphere.
Another consequence of increasing the concentration of water in the upper atmosphere
might be the formation of noctilucent clouds
in the mesosphere. While global climatic effects of these clouds appear unlikely, uncertainties remain.
The injection of rocket exhaust, particularly
water vapor, into the ionosphere could lead to
the depletion of large areas of the ionosphere.
These ionospheric holes could degrade telecommunication systems that rely on the ionosphere. While the uncertainties are greatest for
the lower ionosphere, experiments are needed
to test more adequately telecommunications
impacts and to improve our theoretical understanding of chemical-electrical interactions
throughout the ionosphere.
In the troposphere, ground clouds generated
during liftoff could modify local weather and
air quality on a short-term basis.
Additional experiments and improved atmospheric theory are needed to understand
and quantify the above impacts under S P S

conditions. In addition mitigating steps such as
trajectory control, alternate space vehicle
design, and the mining of lunar materials need
to be assessed. Atmospheric studies would
play a major role in the choice of frequency
for power transmission.
3. Land Use and Receiver Siting. Receiver
siting could be a major issue for each of the
land-based SPS systems. Offshore siting and
multiple use siting might each alleviate some
of the difficulties associated with dedicated
land-based receivers, but require further study.
There are two components to the siting issue:
technical and political. Tradeoffs must be
made between a number of technical criteria:
1) finding geographically and meteorologically
suitable areas; 2) finding sparsely populated
areas; 3) keeping down the cost of power transmission lines and transportation to the construction site; 4) siting as close to the Equator
as possible (for GEO systems) so as to keep the
north-south dimension of the receiver reasonably small; 5) coordinating receiver sites
with utility grids and the regional need for
electricity; 6) the cost of land; and 7) ensuring
that the receivers are sited away from critical
and sensitive facilities that might suffer from
electromagnetic interference from SPS, e.g.,
military, communications, and nuclear power
installations. In addition, for the reference and
SOLARES systems, as presently designed, large
contiguous plots of land would have to be
located and totally dedicated to one use (table
4). The laser options might require less land
area per site, but a greater number of sites to
deliver the comparable amount of power.
It is clear that the choice of frequency,
ionospheric heating limits, and radiation
standards could have an impact on the land requirements. Further study is needed to understand fully the environmental and economic
impacts of a receiver system on candidate sites
and to determine if enough sites can be
located to satisfy the technical requirements.
In addition the plausibility of multiple uses
(e.g., agriculture or aquiculture), offshore
siting (especially for land-scarce areas such as
47
Table 4.SPS Systems Land Use

SPS system
Reference . . . . . . . . . . .
Solid statec . . . . . . . . . . .
Laser Id. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laser lId. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mirror I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mirror Ilf. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For comparison
Washington. . . . . . . . . . .
New York City. . . . . . . . .
Chicago. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
aR~~t~nna at 34. latitude ~over~ a 117 km,
k m2 /site
174
50
0
40
1,000
100
km2/1,OOOMW
Number of sites Total land area(km2 )

for 300,000 MW
for 300,000 MW
35.0
33.0
1.2
80.0
60
180
600
600
-29
30
9.6
10,400
9,000
360
24,000
2,200
2,880
m2/MW-yr
1,233 b
1,163 b
42-51e
2,819-3,382 e
261-313 e
338-406 e
174.0
950.0
518.0
e(lipitical area, Mi~r~~ave power
density at edge of rectenna is 1.(J mw/cm2, If an exclusion boundary is set at 0.1 mW/Cm ,
2
then the total land per site is approximately 174 km . J. B. Blackburn, Sate//ire Power System
HCP/R-4024-10, October 1978 does not include land for mining or fuel transport.
bThe values for the reference and solid-state designs assume a 30-year lifetime and a caPacitY
cThe solid-state sandwich design is described in G. M. Hanley et al., Satellite Power Systems
ternational Report No. SSD79-0163, NASA MSFC Contract NAS8-32475, October 10, 1979.
dLaser 1 and Laser II are two laser systems considered by DOE Both deliver the same amount of
2
(SPS) Mapping of Exc/usion Areas for Rectenna Sites, DOE/NASA Report

factor of 0.9
(SPS) Concept Definition Study, First Performance Review, Rockwell inpower but the
beam of Laser I is more narrow (and hence
rllore
intenSe)
than that of Laser Il. See C. Bain, Potential of Laser for SPS Power Transmission, October 1978, Department of Energy, HCPIR-4024-07.
eThe values for the laser and mirror systems assume a 30-year lifetime and CapaCitY factors of 0.75-0.9.
fMirror I system parameters are defined by SOLARES baseline system and Mirror II system for low (1 ,100 km) orbit
gThe SOLARES baseline system is designed to deliver 81O GW to 6 sites; 2 SOLARES basellne sites actually provide 270 GW.
the Northeast United States, Europe, and

Japan) and possible receiver siting in other nations, with their particular environmental constraints, need to be explored.
The regional political problems may be
more severe than the technical ones, especially in light of past controversies over the siting
of powerplants, powerlines, and military radar
and other facilities. While the construction
and operation of receivers might be welcomed
by some communities on the basis of economic benefit, others might oppose nearby receiver siting for a number of reasons, including: environmental, health and safety
risks; fear that the receiver would be a target
for nuclear attack; fear of decreased land
values; preference for an alternate use of the
land; objection to the receivers visibility; and
for rural Americans, resistance to the intrusion
of urban life.
It is essential that many of the environmental uncertainties be diminished and that the
effects are shown to be, at worst, comparable
to those of alternate inexhaustible energy
sources, before commitment to the development of SPS because:
1. environmental effects may be identified
for which there are no acceptable mitiga-
tion strategies or for which mitigation is

too costly to make SPS competitive; and
2, they have a great bearing on the system
design, e.g., choice of frequency, power
level and distribution may be determined
by the results of bioeffect and atmospheric studies and these may in turn control hardware design, cost, and land use.
If an SPS program is pursued, the assessment
of environmental risks should receive the
highest research priority. Some studies such as
bioeffects research may require substantial
time to complete; the resolution of environmental uncertainties could affect the development schedule of SPS. Much of the environmental research needed in the assessment of
SPS is applicable to other studies and would be
valuable whether or not an SPS program is
undertaken. Conversely, many of the environmental questions associated with SPS are
also being addressed in other generic research programs such as those investigating
microwave bioeffects and upper atmosphere
physics. The delineation of which environmental risks are most important would, to a large
extent, depend on the specific design concepts
that showed the greatest promise.
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY
How would SPS affect other users of the
electromagnetic spectrum?*
Whether SPS were to be eventually deployed as a microwave, laser, or mirror system,
it would affect some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Other users of the spectrum would be concerned about the nature of
potential detrimental effects, whether they are
amenable to amelioration and, if so, what the
costs would be. A microwave system would be
the most problematic because communications of all sorts share this general portion of
the spectrum. In addition, a wide range of
other electronic devices (e. g., sensors, computers) are susceptible to microwave interference.
The Public
Deploying SPS would markedly change the
visual appearance of the night sky. A set of
reference system satellites equally spaced
along the Equator would appear as a set of
bright stationary stars whose total effect for
observers on longitudes near the middle of the
set and for all latitudes along these longitude
lines would equal the Moon at about quarter
phase. Nonstationary satellites such as an LEO
deployed laser or mirror system would create
the effect of bright moving stars. The effect
of such satelIites on the night sky has not been
calculated. However, it could be expected to
equal the overall effect of the 60-satellite set
of reference satelIites.
Some observers might well enjoy the sight of
manmade stars added to the night sky.
Many, especially those in countries who failed
to benefit from the generated power, might
strongly resent the intrusion on the celestial
landscape.
Space Communications
All artificial Earth satellites use some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum for comSee ch. 8
munication. Some also use the spectrum for

remote sensing. All would be affected in some
way by SPS.
Geosynchronous Satellites. These would be
most strongly affected by the microwave systems. They could be expected to experience
microwave interference from noise at the fundamental SPS frequency (e.g., 2.45 Ghz for the
reference design), spurious emission in nearby
bands, harmonics of the fundamental SPS frequency, and from so-called intermodulation
products. All radio frequency transmitters generate such noise and receivers are designed to
filter out unwanted effects. However, the
magnitude of the power level at the central
frequency and in harmonic frequencies for a
microwave SPS is so great that the possibility
of degrading the performance of satellite
receivers and transmitters from these spurious
effects is high.
In addition to the direct effects from microwave power transmissions, geosynchronous
satellites could also experience multipath interference from geostationary power satellites due to their sheer size. In this effect, microwave signals traveling in a straight line between CEO communications satellites would
experience interference from the same signal
reflected from the surface of the power
satelIite.
The sum of all these effects would result in a
limit on the distance that a geosynchronous
satellite must have from the SPS in order to
operate effectively. The minimum necessary
spacing would depend directly on the physical
design of the satellite, the wave length at
which it operated, and the type of transmission
device used (i.e., klystron, magnetron, solidstate device).
Since a microwave SPS would have to share
the limited resource of the geostationary orbit
with other satellites, the value of the minimum
spacing has emerged as one of the most critical issues facing a geostationary SPS. However, in the absence of a specific design, it is
impossible to characterize the exact form and
nature of the interference. Additional information is essential to calculate the minimum re-
quired spacing. In addition, even if the design

parameters were known accurately, the theory
of phased arrays is insufficiently developed today to predict the minimum distance. Estimates of the minimum necessary spacing
range from 1/2 to 10. The lower limit would
probably be acceptable. However, a minimum
spacing much greater than 10 would result in
too few available geostationary slots to allow
both types of users to share the orbit unless
many communications functions could be accommodated on a few large space platforms.
0
At present, some 80 satellites share the

geostationary orbit worldwide, and by 1990
that number is expected to increase significantly (fig. 6). Even though improvements in
technology will lead to a reduction in the total
number of satellites necessary to carry the
same volume of communications services,
total service is expected to rise dramatically.
1985
1970
1975
1980
1985
Year
SOURCE: W. L. Morgan, Comsat Technical Review, 10 vol. 1,1980.
49
At present the minimum spacing for domestic

geostationary satellites is 40 in the 4/6 GHz
band and 30 in the 12/14 HGz band. At these
spacings, a maximum of 90 4/6 GHz band satellites and 120 12/14 GHz band satellites could
theoretically coexist at geostationary altitudes, in the absence of SPS. Current research
activity in the 20/30 GHz band is likely to lead
to much greater capacity and smaller spacings
for that band by the time an SPS might be
deployed. But even with these and other unpredictable advances in communications technology in space and on the ground, competition for geostationary orbit slots is likely to be
high.
The laser and mirror systems in low-Earth orbit are unlikely to interfere with geosynchronous satellites except in the relatively improbable event that one of the mirrors passes precisely between the geosynchronous satellite
and its ground station, and even that interruption would be for so short a time as to pose no
serious problem.
Other Satellites. In addition to geosynchronous satellites operating at the same altitude
as the CEO SPS, there are numerous military
and civilian satellites in various low-Earth orbits that might pass through an SPS microwave
beam. Such satellites could in principle protect themselves from adverse interference
from the SPS beam by shutting down uplink
communications for that period, and improving shielding for data and attitude sensors,
computer modules, and control functions.
Whether this action would be feasible depends
on the particular mission the satelIite is to perform. For some remote sensing satellites, a
shutdown could mean loss of significant data.
It would not be feasible for the SPS to shut
down for the few seconds of satellite passage.
It might also be possible for many satellites to
fIy orbits that will not intersect the SPS beam.
Figure 6.The Number of Geosynchronous

Satellites as a Function of Time
1980
1990
The laser and mirror systems might interfere

with nongeosynchronous satellites by causing
reflected sunlight to blind their optical sensors
or by passing through communications beams.
Of the two systems, the mirror system would
cause the most problems because of the size

of the mirrors and their orbital speed. To date,
no one has calculated the possible adverse effects due to this cause.
Deep Space Communications. Because
deep space probes generally travel in the plane
of the solar system (known as the ecliptic),
they would be especially affected by a geostationary microwave SPS. A microwave SPS
would effectively prevent ground communication with the probe when the latter happens to
lie near the part of the ecliptic that crosses the
Equator. This interference is especially serious
for deep space vehicles because it is essential
to be able to communicate with them at any
time for the purposes of orbit control and for
timely retrieval of stored data.
It would be possible to avoid such interference by establishing a communications
base for deep space probes in orbit. As we
penetrate deeper into space, this may be advisable for other reasons. If not, such a communications station would effectively add to
the cost of the SPS.
Terrestrial Communications and

Electronic Systems
Both civilian and military terrestrial communications, radar, sensors, and computer
components would suffer from a number of
possible effects of a microwave beam. Direct
interference can occur from the central frequency or the harmonics. In addition, scattered and reflected radiation at these frequencies from the rectenna, and rectenna emissions
could cause additional interference problems
for terrestrial receivers. At the very least,
rectennas would have to be located far enough
from critical sites such as airports, nuclear
powerplants, and military bases to render
potential interference as small as possible. In
addition, equipment would have to be redesigned to permit far better rejection of unwanted signals than is now necessary. This appears to be feasible given enough time and
funds for the electronics industry to respond.
Effect on Terrestrial Astronomy

and Aeronomy
None of the proposed SPS systems benefit
astronomical research except insofar as they
would indirectly provide a transportation
system and construction capabilities for placing large astronomical facilities in space. The
detrimental effects would vary depending on
the system chosen. The impacts of a microwave system are likely to be severe for both
optical and radio astronomy. An infrared laser
system is likely to have fewer detrimental effects on both forms of astronomy, and the mirror system would have its most serious effect
on optical astronomy.
Optical Astronomy. Diffuse reflections
from the reference system satellites would
cause each to be as bright as the brightest
phase of the planet Venus, and produce a diffuse halo of light around it. Because the
satellites appear to remain stationary along
the celestial Equator, a system of 15 to 60
satellites would meld together to block observation of very faint objects along and near the
Equator for telescopes located on Earth between the longitude limits of the satellites (fig.
7). Some major non-U. S. telescopes would be
affected as well. Telescopes in orbit, such as
the U.S. Space Telescope scheduled to be
launched in 1984, will travel in nonequatorial
orbits and therefore would not be affected
significantly by a reference SPS except to
require increased pointing and control complexity on the Space Telescope.
The effect of diffuse reflections from an
LEO-based laser SPS could be expected to be
much less of a problem for observations of objects near the Equator because the laser portion of the satellite system would be constantly in motion. Thus, no part of the sky would be
permanently blocked from view. The relay
satellites located in geostationary orbit would
subtend a very small angle as seen from the
surface of the Earth. Though they would be
visible as small points of light, they would be
considerably fainter than the geostationary
Figure 7.The SPS Brightness Profile
40
20
200
40
60
51
moving patches of diffuse light that would

completely disrupt the observation of faint objects that lie in the direction of the satellite
paths. Thus, astronomers would need to remain outside a 30()-km diameter circle surrounding the site in order to avoid this
problem.
80
Declination
Note: This figure shows the predicted brightness of the sky as a result of a
60-satellite SPS system along the meridian at local midnight for Kitt Peak
National Observatory at the vernal equinox. The calculation of this profile
is based on an assumed 4 percent diffuse albedo
SOURCE: Workshop on SPS Effects on Optical and Radio Astronomy,
DOE/Conf 7905143, P. A. Ekstron and G M Stokes (eds.).
satellites of the reference system and would

not interfere with optical observations. However, large moving satellites would present optical astronomy with another observational
obstacle. Scattered Iight from them would vary
in intensity as the satellite passes near a
celestial object of interest, making calibration
of the nearby background light very difficult.
The laser satellite would interfere with infrared
astronomy studies involving wavelengths near
the transmission wavelength of the beam. Photometry and spectrometry experiments would
be severely compromised during any brief orbital period when the relay satellite passed
within a few degrees of an observing telescope.
The mirror system, which would involve a
number of large, highly reflective moving mirrors in low Earth orbit, would have very serious
effects on optical astronomy. While the
precise effect has not been calculated, it
would render a large area (a circle of radius
150 km) around the ground stations unacceptable for telescopic viewing. Because of diffuse
reflections from the atmospheric dust and
aerosols that are up to 3 km above the ground
station, the individual mirrors would create
Radio Astronomy. Radio astronomy would

suffer two major adverse affects from microwave systems: 1 ) electromagnetic interference
from the main SPS beam, from harmonics,
from scattered or reflected SPS signals, and
from reradiated energy from rectennas; and 2)
additional sources of thermal noise radiation
in the sky that have the effect of lowering the
signal-to-noise ratio of the radio receivers.
Studies by terrestrial radiotelescopes of faint
radio objects near the Equator would be impossible. Neither the laser nor the mirror
systems would contribute to the first effect;
however, they would raise the effective
temperature of the sky background. Low-level
measurements such as scientists now routinely
conduct to measure the amount of background radiation from the primordial explosion of the universe would thus be impossible
from terrestrial bases. Thermal microwave
radiation from the satellites would exceed
present standards for radio interference at
nearly all wavelengths.
Space basing of radio telescopes, especially
on the far side of the Moon, would eliminate
the impact of SPS and other terrestrial sources
of electromagnetic interference. However,
such proposals, though attractive from the
standpoint of potential interference, are
unlikely to be attractive to astronomers for
many decades because of their high cost and
the relative inaccessibility of the equipment.
Optical Aeronomy. Much of our knowledge
of the upper atmosphere is gained by nighttime observations of faint, diffuse light. Some
of the observations that are made today must
be carried out in the dark of the Moon. The
presence of satellites equal in brightness to a
quarter Moon would effectively end some
studies of the faint airglow and aurora. Other
observations would be severely limited in
scope.
52 . SoLar Power Satellites
SPACE PROGRAM
How would development of the SPS affect
our civilian space program?*
If pursued, an SPS program would be the
largest and most ambitious space program
ever undertaken. SPS development could provide: 1 ) new capabilities for future space ventures; 2) spinoffs for civilian and military use,
in space as well as other areas; 3) a political
and programmatic focus for the civilian space
program; and 4) potential furtherance of U.S.
domestic and foreign policy goals.
An SPS program would require the development of a high-capacity space transportation
system, the construction of large space structures, and perhaps the deployment of manned
space bases. I n addition, an extensive industrial infrastructure would be needed to support
these activities. The hardware, knowledge, and
facilities generated by such a program would
significantly increase our overall space capabilities and lay the groundwork for future industrialization, mining and, perhaps, the colonization of space.
Direct technological spinoffs can be expected in the development of improved large
space platforms, energy transmission devices,
ground illuminating systems, high-efficiency
solar celIs, and Iife-support systems.
Conversely, SPS development will benefit
from prior developments in space technology,
most notably in space transportation and
systems for automated construction of space
structures.
An important consideration is the extent to
which an SPS program wouId serve as the
focus and driving-force for the space program
as a whole. In the 1960s, the U.S. civilian effort was centered on Apollo; in the 1970s on
the Space Shuttle. However, in 1978, the Carter
*For extended discussion see ch. 6
administration stated that: it is neither feasible nor necessary at this time to commit the
United States to a high-challenge space engineering initiative comparable to Apollo. In
the absence of a long-term goal such as SPS,
some have predicted that future space efforts
wouId lag, or become overwhelmingly military
in nature. On the other hand, there is concern
that an SPS commitment would draw resources from or otherwise interfere with other
space activities, leading to an unbalanced effort. In addition, for SPS as well as other less
expensive programs, the annual appropriations
procedure for NASA often results in budgetary
and programmatic uncertainty; development
of SPS would require long-term financial planning and long-term commitment to the project.
In addition to its use as a source of electrical
power, the SPS should be judged by whether it
is in accord with national interests as reflected
in national space policy. The NASA Act of
1958 (as amended), states that space activities
should be for peaceful purposes, and can be
undertaken in cooperation with other countries, to further the general welfare and
security of the United States. In 1978 the
Carter administration, in its October Fact
Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy, reaffirmed
these goals while emphasizing the practical
and commercial benefits of the civil space program. A civilian-run SPS program open to international participation would further current
space policy goals.
Involvement by NASA in SPS operation
might require a change of NASAs current
charter, which restricts the direct operation of
commercial ventures. Currently, DOE has
prime responsibility for solar energy research,
while NASA is responsible for the U.S. civilian
space program. An SPS program would require
extensive cooperation between the two agencies; if this caused difficulties, a separate
agency or some other organizational alternative might prove preferable.
Chapter 4
POLICY OPTIONS
Chapter 4
POLICY OPTIONS
Because the solar power satellite (SPS) is a
new energy concept, much of this assessment
has Ied across previously uncharted territory.
SPS has potential for supplying a portion of
U.S. electrical needs, but current knowledge
about SPS, whether technical, environmental,
or sociopolitical is still too tentative or uncertain to decide whether SPS would be a wise investment of the Nations resources. Further
research and study, based on the findings of
this and other assessments, 2 would be needed
in order to formulate such a decision properly.
The kind and pace of a research program, if
one is to be conducted, will be determined by
perceptions of when development decisions
need to be made.
Decisions about SPS development involve
an important tradeoff. I n time, more can be
learned about the context within which SPS
would operate. Furthermore, in view of this
studys analysis of future U.S. electricity demand and the availability of alternate energy
sources (see ch. 6), domestic need is not likely
to be high enough for SPS before 2015-25.
Therefore, development and deployment decisions do not have to be made before the
1990s. However, action should be taken in a
timely manner. Since the development of a
major energy and space system may take more
than 20 years, a decision about whether to
develop SPS will probably need to be made
before the end of the century. The development of SPS may need to be started as early as
1990, if high-growth projections for electricity
seem plausible at the time. If an SPS development program is eventually initiated, the Nation must also decide whether it wishes to pursue SPS as a unilateral or as an international
venture. The tasks before the United States in
this decade are to determine how much and
what kinds of information are needed in order
to make a sound decision sometime in the next
Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings, SPS C o n cept Development and Evaluation Program, DO E/E R-0085,
November 1980.
National Research Council Report of the Committee on Satellite Power Systems, June 1981
decade. The Nation must also decide when to

proceed with a research program and at what
pace.
Figure 8 represents a series of possible decision points for SPS. If research on SPS finds no
impediments to continued pursuit of SPS, the
first in the series of development decisions
couId occur sometime between 1990 and 2000.
By that time, the factors that relate to energy
demand and supply and space transportation
will be much clearer than they are today. The
United States will have had about 10 years of
experience with the space shuttle and with initial testing of space platform components.
Planning and perhaps testing will have begun
for a second-generation space transportation
system. The resuIts of the Nations long-term
energy conservation efforts will be felt and
assessed, and electricity demand projections
for 2000 and afterwards will be better defined
than currently possible. Further, a decision
about the breeder may have been made and
the potential of the fusion, energy storage, and
terrestrial solar technologies may be more certain.
The results of continued tracking of the international, institutional, and public opinion
factors relevant to SPS will also contribute to
the decision. In particular, the international
communitys future energy needs and supply
potential will be better known, as well as its
willingness to cooperate in a multinational
development program.
Finally, the results of research related to SPS
wilI be available and can be used to support or
reject a decision whether to proceed with SPS
development. Some of the needed research is
generic in nature, and will be done in other
programs whether or not SPS is developed.
Among others, these include most of the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations
(NASA) activities in space transportation,
space structures, photovoltaics, materials and
humans in space, as well as the Department of
Defenses (DOD) and the Department of
Energys (DOE) laser programs. To some extent
55
56
Figure 8.SPS Program Phases and Decision Points

Program level
(funding)
Demonstration
......
Systems
engineering,
space testing
Research,
component
testing
CDEP
No program
DP 2
DP 1
DP 1
DP 3
DP 2
No program No program
Research Research
. Initiate development
they also include work done in the terrestrial

photovoltaics (DOE) and microwave bioeffects
(the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, etc.) programs. However, many needs are directly
related to SPS technology and therefore will
DP
3
No program
Research
Continue systems
engineering
Demonstration
DP
DP 4
Time
4
No SPS
Research
Systems
engineering
New demonstration
Deployment
eventually require a research program specifically funded for SPS.

In order to make an informed decision about
the SPS, information about three different
types of factors will be needed:
Ch. 4Policy Options
1. Contextual, independent factors. These

are factors that are independent of SPS
but which will markedly affect the need
for SPS or the ability to conduct the project:
Future U.S. and global electricity demand. If demand is relatively low, the
need for a new, capital-intensive energy
system will be low as well. If future demand is very high, there could be a
commensurate need for SPS. Conservation, increased end-use efficiencies, and
the expansion of dispersed electrical
generation could all affect overall demand for centralized electricity.
Cost, kind, and availability of alternative electricity sources. If other potential future electric energy sources
turn out to be more expensive than a
projected SPS, then SPS may be desirable even if electricity demand is relatively low. On the other hand, the development of other technologies might
preclude the need for SPS. The status of
breeder and fusion technologies, the
cost of terrestrial solar and the advisability of expanding the use of coal
will all affect the need for SPS.
U.S. and global space capabilities. A
rapidly expanding space program with
extensive experience and capabilities
would make an SPS program much
more feasible than would a low-level
program. The experience with the shuttle and other space vehicles will shed
light on space transportation capabilities and costs.
Although an SPS research program is not
likely to be affected by these factors, they will
have a great effect on an SPS development
decision. Each of the factors needs to be
tracked, studied, and continually reevaluated
for its impact on an SPS decision. Projections
of these factors 10 to 20 years in the future will
have to be made as well, and amended as more
information becomes available. Because these
factors are of universal interest, such studies
need not be funded by a specific SPS program;
they will be investigated by other energy and
space programs.
83-316 0 - 81 - 5
57
Sometime in the next decade, the contextual

framework for the future of SPS may be known
well enough to make an informed decision
about the need for SPS. As time goes on, a narrowing of future projections will occur and
knowledge of these factors will be integrated
into the overall decision about SPS.
2. Contextual,
semi-independent
factors.
These are the factors that arise largely
from the public perceptions and international and institutional framework of SPS.
Though they are markedly diverse in content, they have the unifying feature that
they will each affect an SPS research program only slightly but an SPS development program rather strongly. They will
need to be tracked, studied, and evaluated as any SPS research program progresses. They also possess the characteristic that there is no point at which one
can say that enough is known about them.
Rather, a development decision must take
them into account as factors that must be
considered in Iight of what is known about
them at the time.
International interest and involvement

in SPS. The worldwide community will
be interested in SPS for its potential to
provide energy. They will also be concerned about the effects it may have on
the use of the geostationary orbit, military and national prestige implications,
how it may affect communications, and
how it may affect the appearance and
use of the night sky. They may also be
interested in joining with the United
States in multinational development of
SPS. Hence, it will also be important to
explore possible modes and means of
international cooperation.
Institutional framework. A main concern of any SPS program would be to

continue to study the institutional
structures that now exist in the utilities
industry, the financial community, and
Government, and to identify the major
factors that could influence the course
of SPS development and affect its
feasibility.
Public opinion issues Public perceptions and public involvement are important components of any publicly
funded program. Dissemination of information and sharing of research
results would be essential to the SPS
program, even in the research phase. It
would also be important to continue to
solicit responses from segments of the
public that would be especially affected, either positively or negatively,
by SPS development.
3.Technical factors specific to SPS. Knowledge about these factors can be gathered
or generated by deliberate effort. Answers
to specific questions in this group will
have an immediate effect on SPS development decisions. The kind, quantity, and
quality of the information as well as the
time at which it can be available are partly dependent on the level of funding. Four
general categories of this sort of information are evident:
Environment and human health:
microwave and laser bioeffects,
high energy particle and ionizing radiation effects on humans in space,
ionospheric effects due to microwave transmission,
land-use impacts,
offshore rectenna environmental effects,
launch vehicle exhaust effects on atmosphere, and
weather modification from mirror
systems.
General system studies:
alternate systems (identify which
areas need further research, and possible testing of components),
component and system costs, and
comparison of alternate systems.
Component testing and evacuation:
Klystrons/magnetrons/solid-state devices,
high-powered, continuous-wave lasers (EDL, solar pumped, FE L),
SIip ring designs,
deployable, large-area, lightweight
space structures,
space charge effects, and

photovoltaic design and testing.
Space construction and space transportation:
evaluate best transportation scheme
for demonstration and
evaluate best construction scheme.
information from all three sorts of factors
will set the framework and determine the appropriate time for development decisions. It is
important to emphasize that a decision not to
develop SPS depends on the same information
as a decision to proceed with SPS. If further
research finds no major technological impediment to proceeding with SPS and the combination of supply alternatives and demand needs
indicate that it would be prudent to proceed
with the next stage, the program could enter
the engineering verification phase where various systems are tested and a demonstration
system chosen. This would set the stage for the
next decision point.
[f it were possible to make a decision to proceed with the project early in the process (i. e.,
during the research phase) the various phases
could overlap considerably. For instance, the
early stages of demonstration could begin
before the engineering verification phase is
entirely complete. Some economic benefits
might accrue from such a procedure. However,
because of the very high front-end costs for
SPS, any proposal to proceed with development will need to be scrutinized very carefully
to be sure it is cost effective. That will
necessitate more time and study in the verification stage than might be true for a less
costly technology, making it less likely that the
various phases will overlap.
SPS research could proceed at different
rates and along different lines, depending on
the level of funding that is made available. The
following presents two different policy options. One is characterized by zero funding for
specific SPS research; the other by a sliding
scale of funding. They do not exclude one
another, i.e., pursuing one option today would
not necessariIy exclude changing to a different
option as time proceeds and information
Ch. 4Policy Options
grows. For example, it could be considered

prudent to begin with no specific funding for
SPS and proceed to allocate a few million
dollars per year after a few years. Conversely,
a vigorous funding pace may produce results
quickly enough so that from the standpoint of
those factors that are amenable to research, a
development decision could be made before
1990. But because the independent factors are
unlikely to be known well enough before 199o,
research funding might then be reduced to a
lower level to keep the program going pending
a decision based on the independent factors.
Option A:
No specific funding for an SPS program.
Although it would be nearly impossible to
pursue an SPS program without specifically
allocating funding for it, this option would not
necessarily mean terminating all interest in
SPS. A zero level option could be followed by
designating an agency (e.g., NASA or DOE) to
track generic research that is applicable to
SPS, as well as monitoring and coordinating international interest in SPS. One possibility is to
set up a high-level advisory committee to serve
this latter function. As in the other option,
periodic reevaluation of the potential of SPS
would also be needed, in this case to decide
whether specific funding should be instituted
or the program terminated altogether.
The rationale behind option A is to keep SPS
alive as part of our arsenal of possible energy
supply options without making a serious commitment at this time. It has the advantages
that the risk of premature funding is greatly
reduced, as well as the upfront costs. The
longer the country can wait before funding a
program directed towards SPS research, the
more likely it is that other programs will have
generated helpful data for SPS.
On the other hand, there is little margin for
error in such an approach. If, under option A,
inadequate information is generated, the SPS
option might be neglected or foreclosed at a
time of future decision; or, if the independent
factors indicate a strong need for SPS, then an
expensive crash program of research to resolve
the questions specific to SPS may be neces-
59
sary. in addition, appropriating no specific

funding for SPS carries with it the risk of
discouraging future international cooperation,
or of allowing other countries to take the lead
in SPS development. A final problem with option A is that the agency designated to track
SPS may find it very difficult to allocate its
financial resources for SPS without some specific allocation in its budget (even though
small).
What could be learned from such an option?
Other Federal and non-Federal programs are
currently exploring issues that are related to
SPS development. By tracking this generic research, information of great value to the development decision could be gathered and
analyzed.
Microwave bioeffects.The proliferation of

microwave devices at various frequencies
makes research into this important area
mandatory whether there is an SPS program
or not. FDA, EPA, and DOD are studying
microwave bioeffects.
Photovoltaics DOE maintains a strong terrestrial photovoltaics program. Together
with private industry and university projects,
this program is studying some aspects of
photovoltaics that are of great interest to
SPS. However, because terrestrial photovoltaic systems have vastly different needs and
constraints than space photovoltaic systems, additional research would probably be
needed for SPS.
Space-related activities. NASA, DOD, and
the European Space Agency (ESA) are pursuing programs in space transportation, space
structures, humans in space, and space photovoltaics by designing and building the
shuttle, advanced expendable launch vehicles, space lab, a 25 kW space power supply,
etc.
Laser programs. High-powered, continuouswave lasers are currently in an early stage of
development. Some of the research on high
energy pulsed lasers being pursued by the
DOD for weapons applications and by DOE
for fusion studies will be relevant to the SPS
laser concept. Universities and other research labs are studying high-powered, con-
tinuous-wave lasers. This research would be

directly applicable to a laser SPS.
Alternateve energy sources. The resuIts of
R&D, prototype construction, and operation
of other electricity sources, including solar
thermal, breeders, ocean thermal energy
conversion, and fusion, will be of great importance in determining future need for SPS.
However, many issues directly pertinent to
SPS cannot be answered by generic research
programs. For instance, while microwave bioeffects experiments are being performed in
generic research programs, the number of
studies on low-level, long-term exposure to SPS
frequency microwaves is small. To gain information directly relevant to SPS, some specific
SPS funding will be needed.
Option B:
Funding of $5 million to $30 million per
year.
This option is designed to gather the necessary information before a development decision is needed. It minimizes the risks of not
gaining the sufficient and timely information
necessary for a rational decision.
This program would, like option A, make as
much use as possible of generic research. It
would extend the generic research into areas
specific to SPS by making small amounts of
funding available for expanding generic programs essential to the SPS development decision. It would also initiate research that is not
being done in generic programs and explore
ways in which to pursue some of this research
jointly with other nations. In addition, it would
track and study the various semi-independent
factors (international, institutional, and public
opinion) which would also have a profound effect on SPS decisions. It would actively seek
and encourage international cooperation in
SPS research.
Table 5 summarizes the most important research and study needs and gives a very rough
estimate of what it would cost to do each item.
The starred items are ones that could be pursued in the context of a few million dollars of
funding per year. The most critical issues relate to the environmental and health area,
since they are the most important in determining the feasibility of SPS. However, they could
also take the longest to resolve. Some component testing and studies of alternative systems
could receive high priority. The amount of
funding which would be made available would
depend on an evaluation of previous research
findings and the state of projected supply and
demand for electricity in the 21st century.
It may be prudent to start at a low level of
funding and later accelerate research that is
specific to SPS as well as make greater funding
available for SPS related generic studies.
Another possibility is to actively solicit funding for projects of joint international-U. S. interest, perhaps by offering to match foreign
funding for research projects undertaken outside the United States, but which are of interest to U.S. planners. An accelerated research program ($30 million per year) could include some component testing in space as welI
as at the Earths surface. It could also include
at least one shuttle mission (post 1985) and
some space-related experiments on other shuttle flights. It would seek to answer the major
environmental and health and safety questions
before 1990 and also conduct extensive systems studies. If these concerns are seen to pose
no impediments, accelerated funding would
provide the quickest way of entering a development phase.
Making funds available for SPS-specific research should ensure that enough information
is eventually available in order to make a rational development decision. This approach
also has the advantage that it could provide
for extensive international cooperation early
in the research phase before seeking more extensive financial and managerial cooperation
in any subsequent development or construction phase. This would spread the decision to
proceed or drop SPS development to other
countries as well.
However, a higher level of spending ($30
million or so per year), here and abroad, would
make it more likely that an entrenched SPS
constituency would form, giving the program
momentum and making it harder to stop; more
information may not make a program easier to
Ch. 4Policy Options
terminate. Under such conditions, our understanding of SPS technology may outstrip our
knowledge of future electricity demand. It is
also possible that support for a given mode of
Expansion of generic research

Estimated
to SPS-specific needs
cost
Environmental and human health

Microwave
bioeffects
$5 million to
Research/study area
$10 million
SPS-dedicated projects
Estimated
costs
Quantify SPS risks.

$2 million
Epidemiological microwave
studies.
Laboratory studies of long-term

exposure to low-level
microwaves at 2.45 GHz.
Determine possible nonthermal
effects, and dose-response
relationships, establish
extrapolation laws.
Ionospheric studies
Atmospheric studies
Track and augment observa-
Study of ionospheric scaling

laws.
$2 million
tions of the atmospheric

effects of launch effluents
from the shuttle, other expendable launch vehicles and
high altitude rockets.
Ionizing radiation
Space
Electromagnetic
interference
Refine and test ground

cloud models. Study
meteorological and air
quality impacts.
$0.3 million to
$5 million
Determine the nature and

effect of ionospheric depletion, especially in
$0.5 million
lower ionosphere. Utilize

other rocket launches and
observe the effects on
representative telecommunication systems.
Track and augment existing
studies of effects of ionizing
radiation on humans.
Study shielding methods.
61
transmitting power will develop too early and

close out SPS options which are uncertain in
the near term but which may have more longrun potential.
Table 5.Summary of Research and Study Needs
Ionospheric equivalent
$10 million
heating. Upgrade Arecibo
facility. Study SPS
equivalent heating in
upper atmosphere. Test
scaling laws and effects
on representative telecommunication systems.
Experiments to test
$1 million
effects of SPS
effluents on magnetosphere and to
increase understanding of
that region.
Quantify and study SPS
effects on the hydrogen
cycle, and formation of
noctilucent clouds.
Study effect on local
climate of SOLARES-type
system using an array of
ground heaters or a solar
pond.
*Studies of possible
weather modification,
beam scattering
and spreading.
Identify transportation
scenarios that
minimize impacts.
$2 million to
$3 million
Track and augment existing
$0.2 million
programs examining the risks
and protection measures for
humans in space.
Study potential electromag$2 million
netic interference and design
mitigating techniques. Improve
theory of phased array.
$1 million
Investigate antenna
patterns of klystron,
magnetron, solidstate devices (see below),
their noise levels, and
out-of-band harmonics.
Table 5.Summary of Research and Study NeedsContinued

Expansion of generic research
to SPS-specific needs
Research/study area
Estimated
cost
Offshore receiver studies $0.5 million

Land use studies
$2 million
Environmental
impacts of
receiver siting
General system studies
Laser system
Mirror system
Alternative microwave
Develop a reference
laser system
*Develop a reference
mirror system
*Develop alternative
microwave systems
*Perform a true comparative study between SPS
alternatives using common technology and cost
basis.
Component testing and

evaluation
Microwave
Continue solid-state device
improvement, study noise,
transmission
interference problems
Test intermediate power
magnetron, high-power klystron
Solar thermal
conversion
. Photovoltaics
Extend research to low mass,
thin film cells for space
Lasers
Improve efficiency of EDL

lasers, develop cooling mechanisms for space lasers
. Mechanical
components
Estimated
costs
SPS-dedicated projects
Mirror
Research priority.
$3 million to
$6 million
$2 million
$0.5 million to
$1 million
$0.5 million to
$1 million
$1 million
Develop solid-state
$2 million to
phased array
$10 million
Study alternative micro- $.3 million to
wave devices, such as
$1 million
photoklystron
$1 million
$2 million
$3million to
$10 million
Adapt optimum
photovoltaics for SPS,
i.e., low mass, high
efficiency, radiation
resistant
Build solar pumped
lasers
Laser optics
$2 million
$1 million to
$3 million
$0.1
(feasibility studies)
$0.3
Study means of
$0.3
constructing slip ring
and rotating joint
*SOLARES mirror materials
structures
Develop prototype mirror $0.5
design for shuttle launch
of a single SOLARES
mirror
million to
million
million
million
Chapter 5
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOR SPS
Contents
Page
Microwave Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The Reference System.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Laser Transmission.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Laser Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Laser Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Laser-Power Conversion at Earth . . . . . . 82
The Laser-Based System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Mirror Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
The Mirror System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Space Transportation and Construction
Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 89
Space Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
SPA Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Reference System Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Alternative Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Solid-StateSystem . . . . . . . . . . .
The Laser System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Mirror System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
96
96
96
97
LIST OF TABLES
Table No.
Page
6. Projections for Laser Energy Converters

in 1981-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7. 500 MWe Space Laser Power System. . . 85
8. Laser Power Station Specification. . . . . 85
9. SOLARES Baseline Systerm . . . . . . . . 88
10. Research $370 Million . . . . . . . . . . 93
11. Engineering $8 Billion . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
12. Demonstration $23 Billion . . . . . . . 93
13. SPS lnvestment $57.9 Billion . . . . . . . 94
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No.
Page
9 Solar Power Satellite Reference

System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10 Satellite Power System Efficiency
Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11 Major Reference System Program
Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
12 The Retrodirective Concept . . . . . . . . . 69
13 Power Density at Rectenna as a
Function of Distance From the
Beam Centerline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14 Peak Power Density Levels as a
Function of Range From Rectenna . . . . 70
15 SPS Space Transportation Scenario . . . 73
16 The Solid-State Variant of the Reference
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
17 lndirect Optically Pumped CO/CO 2
Mixing Laser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
18 The CATALAC Free Electron Laser
Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1 9 Optics and Beam Characteristics of
Two Types of Laser Power Transmission System (LTPS) Concepts. . . . . . 82
20. The Laser Concept. . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 84
2 1 Components of the Laser Concept . . . . 84
22. The Mirror Concept (SOLARES) . . . . . . 87
23. Reference System Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
24 How Cost Could Be Allowed. . . . . .
93
25 Elements and Costs, in 1977 Dollars, for
the Baseline SOLARES System . . . . . . . 97
26 Sensitivity of the SOLARES Mirror
System to Variations in System
Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Chapter 5
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOR SPS

A variety of systems have been proposed for
collecting, transmitting, and converting solar
power from space. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages, its benefits and drawbacks. Each alternative system would use one
of three transmission modes microwave,
laser, or optical reflectorto transmit power
to Earth where it is collected and converted to
electricity or some other highly useful form of
energy. Each system would use numerous subsystems to collect and convert energy in space
or on the ground. This chapter wiII characterize the alternative systems and subsystems and
discuss their potential for generating power
from space. It will also describe four representative systems that serve as the technical
basis for discussion of the environmental, insti-
tutional, and public acceptance issues in the

chapters that follow.
In order to estimate reliably and fully the
range of costs and potential technical uncertainties for a given solar power satellite (SPS)
option, it would be necessary to subject it to
the same detailed analysis that the reference
system has undergone during the last 5 years.
Unfortunately, this analysis has not been accomplished for the alternative systems. Hence,
detailed comparisons between systems will not
be possible. At this stage it is possible only to
compare the major features of each technology and note the uncertainties that should be
addressed as conceptual development of the
various alternatives continues.
MICROWAVE TRANSMISSION
Because the atmosphere is highly transparent to microwaves, they constitute an obvious
candidate for the SPS transmission mode. In
addition, microwave technology also is wellknown and is used today in a number of space
and terrestrial communications and radar applications. Microwave power transmission was
first demonstrated experimentally in 1964,
and tested in 1974.2 3
The Reference System
4 56
The reference system was selected by the

Department of Energy/National Aeronautics
1). F Degenford, M D. Sirkis, and PV H Steir, Ttle Reflecting
Beam Waveguide, I E EE T r a n s a c t i o n s 0 1 M i c r o w a v e T h e o r y
Technology MIT-72, July 1964, pp 445-453
Richard M Dickinson, Evaluation of a Microwave HighPower Reception-Conversion Array for Wireless Power Transmission, Jet Propulsion Laboratory Technical Memorandum No
33-741, Sept 1, 1975
~R i chard M Dick InsOn, Microwave Power Transmitting
Phased Array Antenna Research Project Summary Report, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory publication No 78-28, Dec 15, 1978
Department of Energy, Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program Reference System Report,
report No. DOE/E R-0023, October 1978
C. C. Kraft, The Solar Power Satellite Concept, NASA publication No JSC-14898, July 1979
and Space Administration (DOE/NASA) as a

basis for study. It consists of a large planar
array of photovoltaic celIs located in the geosynchronous orbit 35,800 km above the Earths
Equator (fig. 9). The cells convert solar energy
into direct-current (de) electricity that is
conducted at high voltage to a phased-array
microwave transmitting antenna mounted at
one end of the photovoltaic array. Klystron
amplifiers convert the dc electricity to highvoltage radio-frequency power that is then
radiated to Earth by slotted waveguides. A
receiving antenna (rectenna) on the ground
reconverts the electromagnetic radiation into
electric current and rectifies it into dc. After
being converted to high-voltage, low alternating current (ac), the power can then be
either delivered directly to the conventional ac
grid or converted back to dc at high voltage
and delivered to a dc transmission network.
The amount of power delivered to the grid
by each reference system rectenna has been
bR O Piiand, SPS Cost Methodology and Sensitivities, The
S o l a r Power Satellite Program Review,
DOE/NASA Conf-800491, July 1980.
F/na/ Proceedings of the
65
Figure 9.Solar Power Satellite Reference System
Solar power satellite reference system
Solar cell arr

Transmitt
ty
SOURCE: C. C. Kraft, The Solar Power Satellite Concept, NASA publication No. JSC-14898, July 1979
set at 5 gigawatts (GW)or 5,000 megawatts

(MW). The microwave transmission frequency
was chosen to be 2.45 gigahertz (GHz). Maximum microwave power density at the center
of the rectenna (on Earth) was set at 23
milliwatts per square centimeter (mW/cm2),
and the maximum power density at the edge of
the rectenna was set at 1 mW/cm2 (one-tenth
the current U.S. recommended occupational
limit). The reference design assumes that all
materials would be obtained from Earth, and
that the system lifetime would be 30 years with
no residual salvage value.
The area of the satellites photovoltaic array
would be approximately 55 square kilometers
(km 2); the diameter of the transmitting antenna
1 km. The total in-orbit mass of the complete
system, including a 25-percent contingency
factor, would be either 51,000 or 34,000 metric
tons (tonnes), depending on whether silicon or
gallium arsenide photovoltaic cells would be
used.
The system is designed to deliver baseload,

i.e., continuous 24-hour power to the electric
grid. However, some variations in delivered
power would occur. A seasonal fluctuation in
output due to the variation of the Suns distance from Earth would cause variations in
both incident insolation and photovoltaic cell
temperature, the latter producing a consequent change in efficiency. In addition, around
the spring and fall equinoxes the Earths
shadow would occult the SPS, resulting in a
short period each night for about 6 weeks at
local midnight (about 75 minutes maximum, at
the equinoxes) where no solar radiation impinges on the satellite and therefore no power
could be delivered to the grid (see ch. 9 for a
discussion of this effect).
Subsystem Description
ENERGY COLLECTION AND CONVERSION
Two photovoltaic concepts were considered
for the DOE/NASA reference system. One uses
Ch. 5Alternative Systems for SPS . 67
Figure 10.-Satellite Power System Efficiency Chain

57.81 GW
11.58 GW
10.50 GW
9.46 GW
10.79 GW
10.29 GW
9.79 GW
Ga
Ga
71.77 GW
(Solar)
63.18 GW
70.81 GW
Si
62.34 GW
Ga
Si
9.08 GW
8.50 GW
8.50 GW
8.18 GW
6.58 GW
5.79 GW
5.15 GW
6.96 GW
6.72 GW
Si
9.08 GW
overall efficiency = 6.970/. Ga

7.06% Si
MPTS efficiency = 63.00/.
Abbreviation: Ga indicates the gallium-alum aluminum-arsenide option, Si the silicon option.

SOURCE: Department of Energy, Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program: Reference System Report, DOE report No.
DOE/ER-0023, October 1978.
single crystal silicon converters that would

receive sunlight directly; the other uses
gallium-arsenide (GaAs) photovoltaic cells illuminated directly and by mirrors in a 2:1 concentration ratio.
Silicon cells, currently used in all solar
powered spacecraft, have the advantages of
an extensive manufacturing base, abundant resource materials, and lower cost per cell, as
well as an R&D program in DOE aimed at major cost reduction for terrestrial cells. However, silicon cells in space suffer degradation
from radiation effects and from high-operating
temperatures, and hence would probably require periodic annealing of the array surface
(possibly by laser or electron beam techniques)
or the development of silicon cells less affected by ionizing radiation.
Gallium-aluminum arsenide photovoltaic
cells have several advantages over silicon
cells: low mass per unit area, resistance to thermal and radiation degradation, and higher efficiency. They have the disadvantages of relatively high cost, the limited production availability of gallium, and a smaller technology
base than for silicon cells. Because of these
latter characteristics, these cells would be
used in a 2:1 concentration ratio in the reference system, trading the relatively expensive
cells for less expensive Iightweight reflectors
to concentrate sunlight on the cells.
The structure that supports the solar cells
would be an open-truss framework made of
graphite-fiber reinforced thermoplastic composite (fig. 9). Because the solar array must be
oriented toward the Sun and the transmitting
antenna toward the Earth, a massive rotary
joint is essential in order to provide the necessary mechanical coupling. Sliprings about
400 m in diameter would be used in conjunc-
Figure 11 .Major Reference System Program Elements

GEO
COTV
construction
depot
Space
freighter
SOURCE: R. O. Piland,
Review, DOE/NASA
Cost Methodology and Sensitivities, The Final Proceedings of the Solar Power Satellite Program
1980.
tion with the rotary joint in order to transfer

electric power from the array to the antenna.
POWER TRANSMISSION AND DELlVERY
The power transmission and delivery system
for the reference system design is common to
both photovoltaic options. It is composed of
three major elements: the transmitting antenna, the rectenna, and the substation.
The selection of the microwave transmission
frequency was based on tradeoffs between atmospheric attenuation and interactions with
the ionosphere as well as the sizes of the
antenna and rectenna. The optimal frequencies were found to be between 1.5 and 4 GHz.
The reference frequency was selected to be
2.45 GHz, which lies in the center of the international Industrial, Scientific, and Medical
(ISM) band of 2.4 to 2.5 GHz.
The size of the antenna is determined by the
transmission frequency, the amount of heat it
is feasible to dissipate at the antenna, the
theoretical limits of ionospheric heating, and
the maximum power densities chosen at
ground level, i.e., at the rectenna. 7 For the
Raytheon Corp., Microwave Power Transmission System
Studies, report No, ER75-4368, contract No NAS3-I 7835, December 1975.
reference system, these design considerations

resulted in a l-km diameter antenna. It would
be constructed of 7,220 subarrays each containing from four to thirty-six 70-kW klystron
power amplifiers connected to slotted waveguides for transmitting power to Earth. KIystrons were chosen because their technology
and operating characteristics at low power
levels are well-known. However, they require a
cooling system (probably heat pipes). Klystrons
of 70-kW continuous power rating have not
been built and tested at this frequency, so their
characteristics are not known in detail.
Each of the more than 100,000 klystrons in
the antenna must be properly adjusted or
phased to provide a uniform power beam
and to point it. This adjustment is especially
critical at the very high, gross power level of
the SPS beam. Were the antenna a totally rigid
array of amplifiers precisely fixed in space, the
adjustment could be accomplished once and
for all just after the antenna is fabricated in
space. However, because it would be desirable
for the antenna to be relatively flexible it
would be necessary to use an active system of
phase control, a so-called adaptive electronic
control in which a pilot beam, installed in the
center of the rectenna and pointed toward the
Ch. 5Alternative Systems for SPS 69
satellite, establishes a phase reference or

standard clock against which the individual
klystrons compare and adjust their phases (fig.
12).8
An important safety feature inherent in this
system is that loss of the pilot beam from the
rectenna would eliminate all pointing and
phase control. Without the pilot beam, the
klystron subarrays would immediately lose
synchronization with one another and al I focus
would be lost, resulting in the spreading of the
William C Brown, Solar Power Satellites Microwaves Deliver the Power, Spectrum, June 1979, pp 36-42.
Figure 12.The Retrodirective Concept
beam to very low power (0.003 mW/cm2). The

transmission system would therefore require
continual ground-based guidance to keep it
operating as a coherent beam. By incorporating relatively well-known anti jamming
techniques in the pilot-beam generator, deliberate or accidental diversion or misuse of
the SPS beam could be prevented.
The parameters of the microwave beam are
of critical importance in assessing the environmental impacts of the SPS. The peak
power density at the transmitting antenna is
calculated to be 21 kW/m2. By the time the
beam reached the upper atmosphere it would
have spread considerably and the intensity
reduced to 23 mW/cm2, a power Iimit that was
set because theoretical studies suggested that
at higher power densities, nonlinear instabilities could appear in the F layer of the ionosphere (200 to 300 km) as a result of the interactions between the beam and the electrically
charged particles in this region. Recent experimental studies indicate that the limit in the
lower ionosphere might be able to be set much
higher, thereby making it possible to decrease
the size of the antenna and/or rectenna significantIy.
With these design constraints, a theoretical
beam power distribution was conceived resulting in the radiation pattern at the rectenna
shown in figure 13, on which are noted the
present U.S. recommendations for public exposure (10 mW/cm2) and the current U.S.S.R.
occupational guideline (0.01 mW/cm2).
In the retrodirective-array concept, a pilot beam from the

center of the rectenna establishes a phase front at the
transmitting antenna. Central logic elements in each of the
antennas 7,220 subarrays compare the pilot beams phase
front with an internal reference, or clock phase. The phase
difference is conjugated and used as a reference to control
the phase of the outgoing signal. This concept enables the
transmitted beam to be centered precisely on the rectenna
and to have a high degree of phase uniformity. If this phasecontrol system fails, the beam would automatically be
defocused, dropping the power density to 0.003 mW/cm2 ,
an intensity acceptable by current standards. This feature
has been referred to as the fail-safe aspect of the
microwave transmission system.
SOURCE: William C. Brown, Solar Power Satellites: Microwaves Deliver the
Power, Spectrum, June 1979, pp. 36-42.
The off-center peaks in figure 13 are called

sidelobes; the level of intensity shown is a
consequence of the 1-km antenna aperture
(which is optimized to minimize orbital mass)
and the projected cumulative antenna errors.
The first sidelobe would have a peak intensity
of 0.08 mW/cm2, less than one-hundredth the
current U.S. occupational exposure recommendation, about 8 km from the beam centerline; the intensity at the edge of the reference
system rectenna (5 km from the beam centerline) would be 1 mW/cm2one-tenth the U.S.
occupational exposure guideline.
Impacts on the Upper
w Cordon, and L M Duncan,
A t m o s p h e r e , Astronautics and Aeronautics, July/August 1 9 8 0
70
Figure 14.Peak Power Density Levels as a

Function of Range From Rectenna
USA standard
10
5
1.0
10
10
10
0.01
4,000
2,000
8,000
6,000
Radius from boresight (km)
0.005
I
o
I
1,000
I
2,000
1
3,000
I
4,000
5,000
Radius from boresight (miles)
0.001
0
5,000 1 0 , 0 0 0
15,000
20,000
Ground radius, m
Grating lobe spikes occur every 245 km for the 18-m subarrays used on simulations although only two grating lobes
are shown. The SPS 10-m subarrays have grating lobes
every 440 km.
SOURCE: Department of Energy, Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program: Reference System Report, DOE
report No. DOE/ER-0023, October 1978.
SOURCE: Department of Energy, Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program: Reference System Report, DOE
report No. DOE/ER-0023, October 1978.
In addition to the relatively strong sidelobes,

the finite size of the antenna subarrays and
their projected misalinements would produce
much weaker grating lobes, which for the
reference system would occur at 440-km intervals from the rectenna. The integrated intensity of these grating lobes, even for hundreds of
operational SPSs, would be well below even
the U.S.S.R. public-exposure guideline, as
shown in figure 14.
The rectenna design is quite insensitive both

to the angular incidence of the microwave
beam (within 100, and to variations in phase or
amplitude caused by the atmosphere. Hence,
rectennas would be interchangeable; the same
satellite could power different rectennas, as
long as they were equipped with the appropriate pilot beam needed for phase control of the
transmitting antenna. The reference rectenna
would be composed of billions of dipole an-
tennas placed above a transparent wire grid.

The microwave energy received by each dipole
would pass through a rectifier circuit that
would convert it to dc power at high current
and low voltage. Several more conversions
would be necessary to condition the power for
the grid. The received power would first be
converted to ac and then transformed to highvoltage low-current 60-cycle ac power and
then either fed into ac transmission lines for
delivery to the users or reconverted to highvoltage dc for transmission, a relatively new
transmission technology.
Estimates of overall rectenna conversion efficiency run from about 80 to 92 percent, and
the extreme simplicity and repetitive-element
construction of the electrical components
would facilitate mass production at extremely
low unit cost. Reliability of the rectenna
should be extremely high, because each component would be ultrareliable and could operate redundantly. Hence replacement would be
necessary only after a large number of individual failures.
None of the substation equipment involves
technological advances beyond those that are
projected through normal development by the
electric utility industry. The major concern
that has been expressed is the large scale of
the minimum individual power unit. Current
grid control systems are quite adequate to handle near-instantaneous switching of single
power units as high as 1,300 MW. Single unit
variations of 5,000 MW could present major
control difficulties to the utilities as they currently operate 10 11 (see ch. 9 for a detailed
description of utilities interface problems).
SPACE CONSTRUCTION
The mass and physical size of the space segment needed for an operational 5-GW satellite
power station are larger by several orders of
magnitude than any space system heretofore
launched and therefore require careful conJ. G. Bohn, J. W. Patmore, and H W Faininger, Satellite
Power Systems: Utility Impact Study, EPRI AP-1 548 TPS 79-752,
September 1980.
11 p j, Donalek, a n d J. L. WhYsong, Utility Interface Requirements for a Solar Power System, Harza Engineering Co ,
DO E/E R-0032, September 1978
sideration of the transportation options. The

basis for all projected Earth-to-low-orbit
transportation concepts is the current U.S.
space shuttle, scheduled to become the operational mainstay of the U.S. (and much of the
worlds) space program.
Of the many possible shuttle derivatives and
other new transportation prospects, 12 NASA
selected four different types of vehicles to supply the four basic transportation functions:
carrying cargo between Earth and lowEarth orbit (LEO),

carrying personnel between Earth and
LEO,
transferring cargo between LEO and the
geosynchronous orbit (CEO), and
transferring personnel between LEO and
CEO.
The designs of these four vehicles, called respectively, the heavy-lift launch vehicle
(HLLV), the personnel launch vehicle (PLV), the
cargo orbital transfer vehicle (COTV), and the
personnel orbital transfer vehicle (POTV), are
based on existing technology, although all
would require considerable development before reaching operational status. 13 14 15 16
Both the HLLV and the PLV would utilize
fully reusable flyback boosters similar to those
originally considered by NASA in early shuttle
designs in the late 1960s. Both boosters would
employ methane-oxygen rocket engines for
(vertical) takeoff and airbreathing (turbofan)
engines for flyback to base for horizontal landings. The HLLV orbiter would use oxygenRobert Salkeld, Donald W Patterson, and Jerry Grey (eds ),
Space Transportation Systems, 1980-2000, VOI 2, AlAA Aeroipace Assessment Series, A IAA, New York, 1978
G Woodcock, Solar Power Satellite System Definition
Study, Boeing Aerospace Co., Johnson Space Center contract
No NAS9-I 5196, pt 1, report No D180-20689, June 1977; pt 11,
report No D180-22876, December 1977, pt I I 1, report No
D180-24071, March 1978
C Hanley, Satellite Power System (SPS) Concept Definition, Rockwell International Corp., Marshall Space Flight Center, contract No NAS8-32475, report No SD78-AP-0023, April
1 378
15
Gordon R Woodcock, Future Space Transportation Systems Analysis Study, Johnson Space Center contract No.
NAS9-I 4323, Boeing Aerospace Co. report No DI 80-20242-1
(three volumes), Dec. 31,1976
Donald P, Hearth (Study Director), A Forecast of Space
Technology 1980-2000, NASA SP-387, January 1976.
hydrogen rockets essentially identical to those

of the current space shuttle, and then glide
back to base much like the shuttle does. Unlike the shuttle, it would be fully reusable; it
would have no disposable external propellant
tank.
The PLV orbiter would be very much like the
current space shuttle, but would employ a passenger-carrying module in the payload bay.
Like the shuttle, it would also use a disposable
external propellant tank, but a somewhat
smaller one. It couId carry 75 passengers, plus
the normal shuttle crew.
A fleet of COTV, all reusable, would make
the round trip from LEO to CEO, carrying the
cargo payloads up to CEO and returning
empty to LEO for reuse. They would be propelled by efficient but slow electrostatic
engines. Using low-thrust electric propulsion
would require very long trip times, of the order
of 4 to 6 months. The bases for selecting this
propulsion option were essentially minimum
cost and ready availability of the argon propellant and other materials. Such long trip
times, although suitable for cargo, are clearly
not acceptable for personnel, so a high-thrust
propulsion approach was chosen for the
POTV. The design utilizes a basic oxygenhydrogen propulsion stage now undergoing
research evaluation at NASA as part of its Advanced Space Engine program. It employs
essentially the same level of technology as
that used in the current space shuttIe main
engine. It could carry up to 160 people from
LEO to CEO and back, or 98 tonnes (480 manmonths) of consumables from LEO to CEO.
Because it would be impractical to launch a
full-sized power satellite by single launch vehicle, a strategy for constructing the satellite in
Earth orbit would be necessary. The basic
space construction strategy selected for the
reference system is to launch all materials,
components, and people to staging areas in
LEO (fig. 15). The COTVs, because of their
large solar arrays, would be assembled in LEO
as well. The main construction base would be
located in CEO, although not necessarily at
the eventual geostationary-orbit location of
the operational SPS. Hence the LEO staging
area would serve as the transfer point for all

materials and personnel both up to CEO and
back down to Earth. Alternative strategies
have been considered, some of which will be
discussed later.
The principal factor that governs the cost
and effectiveness of in-space construction is
generally accepted to be the productivity of
the construction crew and cost, and requirements for shielding. The replacement of some
crew by automated equipment is therefore a
major consideration in alI construction strategies or scenarios, e.g., effort has already been
devoted to automatic beam-building systems. 17 The use of teleoperators and robot manipulators for assembly of large structures has
also been considered. The current growth of
technology in these areas is extremely rapid, 8
and incorporation of such techniques would
almost certainly benefit all aspects of SPS construction. Despite the wide range of construction options, estimated personnel requirements for them are approximately the same:
750 & 200. 19
GROUND-BASED CONSTRUCTION ,
Building the rectenna, although a very large
and relatively unique structure, nevertheless
would involve far fewer uncertainties than
constructing the space segment. A detailed
analysis 20 of both the basic structure and
construction aspects concluded that the primary structural material should be galvanized
or weathering steel rather than aluminum
(which is more scarce and requires a higher
energy cost to produce).
SYSTEM OPERATION
An active control system would be needed
both to keep the satellite in the proper orbit
Denls j Powell and Lee Brewing, Automated Fabrication of
Large Space Structures, Astronautics and Aeronautics, October
1978, pp 24-29
8 Antal K Bejczy, Advanced Teleoperators, Astronautics
and Aeronautics, May 1979, pp. 20-31
W H Wales, SPS Program Review Transportation Perspective, I n The Final Proceedings of the Solar Power Satellite Program /?ev/ew, DOE/NASA Conf-800491, July 1980
O Feaslbil ity Study for Various Approaches to the Structural
Design and Arrangement of the Ground Rectenna for the Proposed Satellite, NASA contract No. NAS-I 5280, Bovay Engineers, In{ , M a y 1 9 7 7
Figure 15.SPS Space Transportation Scenario
SOURCE: W. H. Wales, SPS Program Review Transportation Perspective, in The Final Proceedings of the Solar Power Satellite Proqram Review, D O E / N A S A
Conf-800491, July 1980.
(stationed above the rectenna) and to maintain

the solar arrays orientation to the Sun. The
mass of the necessary control system is estimated at 200 tonnes; its average electric power
consumption would be 34 MW.
Because of its low coefficient of thermal expansion and relative stiffness, a graphite composite structural material was selected for the
reference system in preference to the aluminum alloys so widely used in aerospace structures. Although a complex engineering problem and, furthermore, one not readily subject
to testing at an adequate scale prior to deployment in space, it does not appear likely that
dynamic stability would cause any major unexpected problems in either performance or
83-316 0 - 81 - 6
costs, partly because of the predictability of

the space environment as compared, for example, with the uncertain environment in which
aircraft structures must be designed to operate, and partly because of the extensive body
of applicable design, testing, and operational
experience with high-performance aerospace
structures. However, questions of dynamic instability resulting from Iow-probability occurrences such as major meteor strikes or aggressive military action would have to be evaluated.
Orientation of the transmitting antenna relative to that of the solar array would be maintained via the large rotary joint. Physical aiming of the antenna itself would be accom-
74
plished by gyroscopes, which would feed control signals to the mechanical-joint turntable
so that it could follow the antenna pointing requirements. However, mechanical pointing of
the antenna would not have to be performed
with high accuracy, since the electronic phasing and pointing of the antenna subarrays
would be insensitive to angular deflections of
the antenna of upto100.
In addition to the equipment for satellite
station keeping and attitude control, it would
be necessary to provide routine maintenance
of both the space and ground segments. Potential maintenance problems in the space segment, in addition to the expected routine replacement of components, include the effects
of solar wind, cosmic rays, micrometeoroids,
and impacts by station-generated debris. Aside
from the solar wind and cosmic radiation effects on solar cells, which would require active
annealing of the silicon cells, none of these effects would appear to introduce significant
maintenance problems or costs, based on extensive past and current experience with operational satellites powered by photovoltaic
celIs.
Repair and replacement of the solar blankets and more than 100,000 70-kW klystrons in
the transmitting antenna are estimated to require a crew of from 5 to 20 people at the
geostationary orbit construction base,21 along
with the necessary transportation, support,
and resupply (e. g., station-keeping propellant)
services.
Maintenance requirements of the rectenna
and substation are also primarily associated
with repair and replacement of their biIIions of
components. Although a certain degree of redundancy is built into the system, a maintenance crew would still be required to replace
storm-damaged rectenna sections and routine
failures of both rectenna and substation equipment.
Technical Uncertainties of
the Reference System
Although most observers accept the basic
scientific feasibility of the SPS system con2
DOE, op cit
cept, there are many technical uncertainties

associated with the reference system. This section identifies specific issues or problems in
the reference system that would be of importance in formulating decisions concerning the
research, evaluation, development, demonstration, and deployment of satellite power
stat ions.
Performance. A major issue in the reference

system design is the tremendous scale of the
satellite. The level of 5 GW (net output
power) is based on scaling assumptions that
could be subject to considerable change
(e.g., the transmission frequency, the antenna and rectenna power densities); multiple rectennas served by a single satellite also
constitute a potential variation.
The overall efficiency of the entire system

would be subject to considerable variation
either up or down, and would be a key factor
in all cost and technology tradeoffs. Although all system elements would involve
known technology, there is considerable uncertainty about how their efficiencies might
add up when assembled together.
Powerplant lifetime, assumed to be 30 years

for the reference system, could actually be
greater or less depending on a number of
economically interrelated factors (e. g., ease
of replacement of damaged components,
sudden technological advances in component efficiencies, etc.) This would affect all
economic projections, even allowing for
high-discount rates.
The total mass in orbit, one of the critical

parameters in assessing costs and launchrelated environmental impacts, depends on
a number of factors stilI subject to considerable variation. The power CoIlection/conversion system is an obvious factor; the reference systems two photovoltaic options are
indicative of the significance of that tradeoff. The antenna mass is also important.
Prospects for revising the reference-systems
100:1 ratio of rectenna-to-antenna area
could have major impact on the overall system cost and performance. The 25-percent
contingency factor is another major factor
subject to revision if R&D mature.
Ch. 5Alternative Systems for SPS
SPS would require an extensive program of

research and testing of the numerous satellite
and terrestrial components of the system
before planning for a demonstration satellite
could be completed. In addition, substantial
improvements in components and overall technology would have to occur before the SPS
could meet the performance specifications of
the reference system. However, the current
reference system does not constitute a preferred system. It is, perhaps, technically feasible but certainly not an optimum design. It was
chosen by NASA/DOE as a model and a reference to be used in the assessment process. As
such it has the inherent I imitation that as new
information becomes available the design becomes progressively obsolete.
The following items summarize the major
technical uncertainties for the reference system and suggest possible ways to alleviate
them.
. Photovoltaic cells. The reference system
specifies a silicon solar cell efficiency of
17-percent and a mass of 2 grams per peak
watt (g/Wp). Current space-rated single
crystal silicon cells operate at 12- to 16percent efficiency. However, they are
about nine times as massive (18 g/Wp) as
called for in the reference system and
they cost about $70/Wp (1980). The reference system assumes a cell cost of about
$0.17/Wp. Although the issue of costs will
be addressed in more detail in a separate
section, it is clear that meeting all three
goals for the silicon cell blanket would
present manufacturers of current cell
technology with an extremely difficult
task. Normal advances in cell production
techniques would readily result in the
necessary efficiency increase. However,
the burden of achieving a nine times
reduction in weight along with a reduction in costs of a factor of 400 makes it
highly unlikely that an SPS could be built
using single crystal silicon cells.
If efficiency-mass-cost goals were met,
there would still be the problem of cell
lifetime in space and the related problem
of the feasibiIity of annealing the surface.
75
Silicon cells are subject to serious degradation by high energy electrons and protons in the solar wind released by solar
flares. One study estimates that the accumulated particle damage would degrade the output from the cells by 30percent during the 30-year nominal life of
the satellite. The resulting damage could
be repaired periodically by annealing the
cells by either a laser or an electron beam.
The beam would sweep across the surface
of the cells and heat them briefly to several hundred degrees centigrade. Very little is known about either process in the
laboratory and nothing at ail about how
they would work in space or how much
energy they would use to anneal the surface of the photovoltaic cells. However,
experiments have shown that annealing
by electron beam is much more efficient
than laser annealing.23 Because no longterm studies have been done, the suitability of silicon cells for extended duration space applications is in question;
however, they have demonstrated excellent performance over a period of
about 10 years in operating spacecraft.
GaAs cells appear to be a more realistic
candidate for a reference-type satellite,
though they have received much less attention than the silicon cells. GaAs cells
reach higher efficiencies and can operate
at higher ambient temperatures than silicon cells. Laboratory models of GaAs
cells have reached efficiencies as high as
18 percent. 24 Because of their currently
higher unit cost, the GaAs array would
probably require refIectors to concentrate
the Suns rays on the cells and thereby
reduce the required cell area. Aluminized
Kapton has been suggested as a reflective
material because of its low thermal coefficient of expansion and low mass density.
2
*C R Woodcock, SPS Silicon Reference System, The Fina/
P r o c e e d i n g s of the Solar Power Sate//ite Program Review,
DOE/NASA Conf-800491, July 1980,
B E. Anspaugh, J. A Scott-Monck, R. G. Downing, D W.
Moffett, and T. F Miyahira, Effects of Electrons & Protons on
Ultra Thin Silicon Solar Cells, J PL contract No, NAS7-1OO.
lbld
Here, again, whether Kapton and GaAs

cells can maintain their integrity over the
30-year design lifetime of the satellite is
unknown. Considerably more study would
be needed to determine the feasibility of
this option.
Space charge and plasma effects. Because
of the high voltages associated with operation of the klystrons, electrical charge
buildup in the satellite components could
cause arcing and subsequent failure of
certain components.
Rotary joint/slip rings. Although the basic
technology of building a rotary joint and
an associated slip ring (for electrical continuity) is well-known, considerable uncertainty surrounds their construction and
operation on the scale of the reference
satellite in a space environment. Because
it would operate in a gravity-free environment, the design demands would be different than they are for terrestrial designs.
Klystrons. Current klystrons last about 10
years, but these are tubes especially selected for their long life characteristics
and they operate at much lower power
levels than the 70 kW required of reference system klystrons. High-power klystrons do exist, but they operate in a pulsed
mode, not continuously as the reference
system klystrons would have to. The antennas phased array control system
would need considerable development
and testing. Although pilot beams have
been used in other applications, and the
technology is therefore known, it is
unclear whether the power beam would
leave the ionosphere sufficiently unaffected to allow for undisturbed passage of
the pilot control beam.
Although harmonics and other noise
produced by the klystron or alternative
transmitting device would seem unlikely
to affect the natural environment adversely, they could cause radio frequency interference for communications systems (see
the discussion of ch. 8). This problem
might be severe and wouId need extensive
study, but most experiments could be carried out in ground-based testing. Alter-
natives to the klystron may provide better

noise and harmonic control (see section
on alternatives below).
Space transportation. The problems inherent in developing the capability to transport SPS components to LEO and CEO are
those of extending a mature technology,
i.e., there is sufficient understanding of
the problems to be faced that there is little doubt that the appropriate vehicle
could be developed. The most important
question is whether the necessary massive
loads could be transported for sufficiently
low costs, i.e., would reusable vehicles
prove economic? In this area, much can
be learned from experience with the shuttle
I n addition to economic concerns, there
are additional technical questions relating
to environmental effects that would require study. For instance, can the launch
vehicles fly trajectories that would keep
the effects of ionospheric contamination
to a minimum? Would it be possible to
substitute other technologies for the
argon ion engine proposed for the reference system (see ch. 8).
Construction, operations, and maintenance. There are unresolved questions
about the productivity of humans and machines in the space environment. Some
automated equipment has been built and
tested on Earth, but considerable development would be needed to choose the best
ratio between automated and human
tasks.
Alternatives to the Reference

System Subsystems
One of OTAs goals is to explore the possible
alternatives to the reference system. Some options improve specific components of the reference system. Others would require significant redesign of the overall system. This is
because the reference system is composed of a
number of interlocking components, some of
which depend heavily on the other elements of
the system. Thus, a radical change in one component might require numerous other system
changes in order to create the most efficient

overall design.
A number of alternative subsystems and systems were considered in the process of electing the reference system design. Advances
have been made in some components that
were previously rejected. In addition, consideration of some of the above-mentioned technical uncertainties has engendered new designs that could alleviate these uncertainties
or resolve some of the technical problems encountered in the reference system.
The following summary lists a number of
subsystem options that could be considered as
alternatives to the reference system. A more
detailed discussion of each can be found in appendix A.
Solar thermal power conversion. Either a
Brayton- or Rankine-cycle engine offers
higher efficiency energy conversion than
photovoltaics. However, they currently
suffer from limitations on the means for
heat rejection.
Thermionic,
magnetohydrodynamic
or wave energy exchanger technologies
might eventually find use in combination
with the Rankine or Brayton cycle.
Photovoltaic alternatives. Materials other
than silicon or gallium arsenide may eventually prove more viable for use in the
SPS. Currently none of the other obvious
options meet the projected standards for
efficiency, low mass, materials availability, etc., that would be needed for satellite
use. Different sorts of concentrator systems are also of interest, as is the possibility of using single cells or a combination of cells that respond to a wide portion of the solar spectrum. A possible approach would be to use a combination of
al I these variations.
Alternative microwave power converters.
Several devices other than the klystron
have been considered for converting electricity to microwaves and transmitting
them to Earth including the magnetron,
which offers the principal potential advantage of cost and low noise, and the
solid-state amplifier whose reliability
could be very high and mass low.
Photoklystron. This device, which is stilI in

the very early stages of study, both converts the sunlight directly to microwave
power, and transmits it. If successful, it
could replace both photovoltaic cell and
amplifier.
Offshore rectennas.
For highly populated
European and U.S. coastal areas, rectennas mounted in the shallow offshore seabeds offer some advantages over long
transmission lines from suitable landbased rectennas.
THE SOLID-STATE SYSTEM

Two system approaches using solid-state
devices have been considered for the SPS. The
most direct of these simply replaces the kylstrons and slotted waveguides in the reference
system by solid-state amplifiers and dipole
antennas maintaining essentially the same
basic configuration as that of the reference
system (fig. 9); the second approach completely revises the satellite configuration by integrating the antenna and solar array in the
Earth-facing sandwich configuration, using a
movable Sun-facing mirror to illuminate the
solar array (fig. 16). A number of alternative
sandwich configurations have been explored
but at the moment the configuration of figure
16 seems to be the best.25
Another related subsystem option uses the
multibandgap photovoltaic cells discussed
earlier, possibly in conjunction with selective
filtering to reduce solar-cell temperatures.
When such cells are utilized in the sandwich
configuration of figure 16, they offer considerable potential mass reduction. A recent preliminary case study26 compared sandwich-type
systems such as that of figure 16 employing
single-bandgap GaAs photocelIs similar to
those of the reference system but having higher concentration ratios (CR) with optimized
multibandgap photovoitaics. Such a configuration would result in an approximate W-percent increase in power delivered per kilogram.
G M Hanley, et al , Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Concept
Deflnitlon Study, First performance Review, Rockwell international report N O
SSD79-01 63, NASA MSFC contract No
NAS8- )2475, Oct 10, 1979
~bl bld
78
Figure 16.The Solid-State Variant of the Reference System
Sunlight
Reflected sunlight
Detail of solar cell
blanket panel
Solid-state
amplifier
panel
Microwave
power to
Earth
Solar array/microwave antenna

sandwich panels
SOURCE: G. M. Hanley, et al., Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Concept Definition Study, First
No. SSD-79-0163, NASA MSFC contract No. NAS-8-32475, Oct. 10, 1979.
Performance
Review,
Rockwell
International
report
LASER TRANSMISSION
Lasers constitute an alternative to microwave transmitters for the transmission of
power over long distance.27 They offer the fundamental advantage that at infrared wavelengths, energy can be transmitted and received by apertures over a hundred times
smaller in diameter than the microwave beam.
This obviously would reduce the size and mass
of the space transmitter and the land-area requirement of the ground receiver. But perhaps
even more important, the great reduction in
aperture area would permit consideration of
fundamentally different systems. For example:
W H
power
Satellites: The Laser Option, A s t r o n a u t i c s a n d A e r o n a u t i c s ,

March 1979, pp. 59,67,
The use of low Sun-synchronous rather

than high geostationary orbits for the massive space power conversion subsystem
might be possible. (A Sun-synchronous orbit is a near-polar low orbit around the
Earth that keeps the satellite in full
sunlight all the time while the Earth rotates beneath it.) In this suggested system,
the laser would beam its power up to lowmass laser mirror relays in geostationary
orbit for reflection down to the Earth
receiver, an arrangement that might considerably reduce the cost of transportation, since the bulk of the system mass is
in LEO rather than in GEO. However, system complexity would be increased due
to the need for relay satellites.
Because the mass of the laser transmitters

would not dominate the satellite, as does
the reference-system microwave transmitter, laser satellites would not benefit nearly so much by large scale as the reference
system satellites. The resulting smaller
systems would improve the flexibility of
terrestrial power demand matching, provide high degrees of redundancy, permit a
smaller and therefore less costly system
demonstration project, and might even
preclude the need for ultimate development of an HLLV.
The small size of the receiving station
would make it possible to employ multiple locations close to the points of use,
thereby simplifying the entire ground distribution and transmission system. It
would also open up the possibility of
repowering existing powerplants, regardless of their size, simply by replacing their
steam generating units with laser-heated
boilers and/or superheaters.
The most important technical disadvantages

of laser-power transmission are the very low
efficiencies of present laser-generation and
power-conversion methods, low efficiency of
laser transmission through clouds and moisture, and the relatively undeveloped status of
laser power-system technology in general.
The laser system would consist of three
distinct elements: the laser-generation subsystem, the laser-to-electric power-conversion
subsystem, and the laser beam itself.
Laser Generators
Although the laser has become a well-known
and widely utilized device in industry, the
high-power continuous-wave (CW) laser generators needed for SPS are still in the
advanced-technology or, in many cases, the
early research phase.28 However, the technology is improving dramatically as exemplified
by the growth of laboratory-demonstrated conversion efficiencies (input power to laser
28j Frank Coney bear, The Use of Lasers for the Transmission
of Power, in P r o g r e s s in Astronautics, vol. 61, A IAA, N Y ,
)ui~ 1978, pp. 279-310
79
beam) from about 1 to nearly 50 percent during the past decade.

Of all the currently operating CW lasers,
only the electric discharge laser (EDL)29 seems
a feasible alternative for the SPS. The gas dynamic laser (CDL) suffers from very low efficiency if used in the closed cycles necessary
for space (i.e., the gas supply must be circulated, cooled, and reused). Chemical lasers require a continuous propellant supply that
makes them also unsuitable for long-term use
in space.
High-power density at 50-percent conversion
efficiency levels has been achieved for EDLs,
but only in the open-cycle mode for short time
periods. The closed-cycle systems needed for
SPS have yet to be tested, even in the laboratory. In theory, they should achieve high efficiencies in that mode as well, but considerable
improvement in the available technology
would be required to reach the necessary
goals.
In addition to using improved designs of currently operating lasers, several advanced concepts have been suggested. Of these, the solarpumped laser and the free electron laser (FEL)
seem most promising for the long term.
Solar-pumped lasers. Figure 17 illustrates

the concept of a solar-pumped laser. The
energy contained in sunlight directly excites a combination of gases confined between two mirrors, which subsequently
lase and transmit the captured energy.
It suffers the drawback that because only
a part of the solar spectrum is useful in exciting any given Iasant gas, its conversion
efficiency is likely to be fairly low. However, elimination of the need for a separate electric power-generating system,
and the consequent reduction in mass and
complexity, could more than compensate
for this drawback. Further, in comparison
with other laser systems, the solarpumped lasers efficiency need be only as
good as the combined power-generating
G W Kelch and W. E. Young, Closed-Cycle Gasdynamic

Laser Design Investigation, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, NASA
Lewis Research Center report No CR-135530, Jan 1,1970.
Figure 17. Indirect Optically Pumped CO/CO Mixing Laser

2
Q SEP
Ps
solar
SOURCE: R. Taussig, P. Cassady, and R. Klosterman, Solar Driven Lasers for Power Satellite Applications, in Firra/ Pro
ceedings of SPS Program Review, Department of Energy, p. 267
system and laser generator of other laser

systems (about 7.5-percent for a photovoltaic-powered carbon monoxide (CO)
EDL 30).
Although the information exists to determine the applicabiIity of solar-pumped lasers
to SPS, adequate studies have not been done.
There is as yet little or no realistic basis for the
mass, efficiency, and cost projections proposed by several authors. 31 32 33 34
R. E. Beverly, Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Laser Studies
Technical Report, Vol. 1, Laser Environmental Impact Study,
Rockwell International SSD-80-0119-I, August 1980
W. S. Jones, L. L. Morgan, J. B, Forsyth, and J Skratt, Laser
Power Conversion System Analysis: Final Report, Vol. I l, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., report No LMSC-D673466, NASA
report No. CR-1 59523, contract No NAS3-21 137, Mar 15, 1979
32
Claud N Bain, Potential of Laser for SPS Power Transmission, report No R-1 861, PRC Energy Analysls Co , DOE contract
No. EG-77-C-01-4024, September 1978
3JJohn D. G. Rather, New Candidate Lasers for Power Beaming and Discussion of Their Appl icatlons, I bid,, pp. 313-332.
34
Daryl J. Monson, Systems Efficiency and Specific Mass Estimates for Direct and Indirect Solar-Pumped Closed-Cycle HighEnergy Lasers in Space, ref 105, pp 333-345
Free-Electron Lasers (FEL)

An FEL is powered by a beam of high-energy
electrons oscillating in a magnetic field in such
a way that they radiate in the forward direction (fig. 18). A number of pulses reinforce the
stored light between the mirrors, generating a
coherent laser beam. The high-energy density
of the relativistic electron beam is theoretically capable of producing very high-power
density lasers, and the emitted frequency is
tunable simply by changing the electron
energy.
Although efficiencies are theoretically projected to be quite high (around 50 percent for
the combined FEL and storage ring35), it is not
known whether such efficiencies could be
reached in practice. In addition, the system
mass per unit power output and the ability to
5John W Freeman, William B. Colson, and Sedgwick Simons,
New Methods for the Conversion of Solar Energy to R. F. and
Laser Power, in Space Manufacturing ///, Jerry Grey and
Chrlstlne Krop (eds ) (New York AlAA, November 1979).
Figure 18.The CATALAC Free Electron Laser Concepts
SOURCE: R. Taussig, P. Cassady, and R. Klosterman, Solar Driven Lasers for Power Satellite Applications, in Final Proceedings of SPS Program Review, Department of Energy. p. 267
scale to the size and power levels of a laser

SPS are impossible to predict reliably at this
time. 36
Laser Transmission
As in the case of microwave transmission,
the fundamental parameter that governs much
of laser transmission performance is the frequency (or wavelength). At ultraviolet or visible wavelengths, absorption losses in the atmosphere are higher than for infrared wavelengths. The wavelength also affects the efficiency of the laser power absorption and conversion equipment.
At the wavelengths of CO or CO, EDLs, (5 to
10 microns), the primary mechanism of beam
attenuation is molecular absorption. Scattering by molecuIes or by aerosols in clear air is
relatively unimportant. Attenuation of the
beam by aerosols under hazy or cloudy conditions is quite significant and can completely
block the beam if the clouds are thick enough.
Although it is apparently possible to burn a
hole through thin clouds,37 the attenuation of
energy is appreciable, and because clouds are
seldom stationary, the laser would continually
encounter new water droplets to vaporize.
s Beverly, op. cit.

37
E. W. Walbridge, Laser Satellite Power Systems, Argonne
National Laboratory report No AN L/ES-92
Transmission of the laser beam through the

atmosphere is also affected by a phenomenon
called thermal blooming; i.e., heating of the
atmosphere that causes it to act Iike a lens and
distort the laser beam. Scientists are currently
divided on the significance of this issue and
opinions range from assertions that it is a major factor 3 8 to suggestions that it could
be avoided altogether by selecting the transmitting wavelengths carefully.39 Considerable
classified research is now being carried out on
this effect in connection with laser-weapons
research. Some of this work might be applicable to SPS use, though in general the military
lasers are pulsed, not CW systems. The difference could be critical and should be studied
carefulIy.
With regard to laser optics, it is important to
develop components capable of low-loss, highpower-density transmission and reflection of
laser light.40 It appears that adequate technology for SPS systems has a high probability
of being available within the next 20 to 30
years, due primarily to advances being made in
current military laser research and technology
programs.
Jones, et al , op cit
Beverly, op. cit
Baln, op cit
40
Transmission options for SPS lasers are

essentially of two types: a narrow, highly concentrated beam or a wide, dispersed beam (fig.
19). Advantages of the narrow beam are the
reduced land area needed and the smalI size of
the ground power-conversion system; problems include potential environmental and
safety impacts of the high-intensity beam, concerns over military uses, and the need for sophisticated high-temperature receivers and
power-conversion equipment. Advantages of
the dispersed beam are its less severe environmental impact, the possible use of low-performance optics, and simplicity of low-powerdensity receiving systems. Disadvantages include relatively high atmospheric dissipation,
larger land area required and the large mass of
Earth receptors. It is probably too early to
make an informed selection between the two
options, but the narrow-beam approach appears to offer the principal benefit compared
to reference-system microwave transmission.
A final concern is the ability to point and
control the beam to make sure it would always
remain within the designated receiver area and
to shut it off instantly should it stray. The
adaptive-optics approach to beam control
(e.g., phased-array) such as would be used for
the microwave beam, appears adequate to
provide the necessary pointing accuracy and
to ensure safety, since any loss of phasing control would cause loss in coherence of the sev-
eral lasers making up the beam, and each

beam by itself would transmit far too little
power to cause any problems. Adaptive optics
systems are being studied for use in military
directed energy weapons and look promising.
It should be emphasized that the overall system constraints might be quite different for
the large CW lasers needed for SPS than for
pulsed military examples.
Laser-Power Conversion at Earth

Several approaches are possible for converting high-energy-density laser radiation to useful electric power. The technology of laser
energy converters is relatively new, but progress has been rapid. Laboratory models have
achieved conversion efficiencies of 30 to- 40
percent and designers project eventual efficiencies of 75 percent for some versions. Table
6 summarizes the available technology and
projects future potential efficiencies. 42
The Laser-Based System

Lockheed 43 has generated one possible laser
system (fig. 20) that utilizes power satellites in
4Claud N Bain, Power From Space by
ered Lasers In Space, A s t r o n a u t i c s a n d
March 1979, pp 28-40
(;eorge L e e , S t a t u s a n d S u m m a r y o f
sion, In P r o g r e s s in A s t r o n a u t i c s , VOI 61
1978 pp 549-565
4Jones, et al , op clt
Figure 19.Optics and Beam Characteristics of Two Types of

Laser Power Transmission System (LPTS) Concepts
Optics
Optics
m
SOURCE: Claud N. Bain, Potential of Laser for SPS Power Transmission, report No. R-l WI,
PRC Energy Analysis Co., DOE contract No. EG-77-C-01-4042, September 1978.
Laser, in High-PowA e r o n a u t i c s , vol. 17,

L a s e r E n e r g y ConverAl AA, N Y , July
83
Table 6.Projections for Laser Energy Converters in 1981-90

1981-90
Current
Photovoltaics. . . . . . . . . . . .
Heat engines . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thermionics . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30% efficiency
megawatt power levels
wavelengths below 1 micron
Piston engine: Otto or diesel cycles
50% efficiency
1-10 k W
wavelengths near 10.6 microns
40% efficiency
1-10 kW
Photochemical cells . . . . . .
Photoassisted dissociation of water

15Y0 efficiency
Optical diodes . . . . . . . . . . .
Evaporated junction arrays

not ready to convert power
45% efficiency
wavelengths below 1 micron
Turbine
75% efficiency
wavelengths near 5 microns
50% efficiency
wavelengths near 5 or 10 microns
Photoassisted dissociation of water
30% efficiency
Evaporated junction arrays
50% efficiency
respond to wavelengths from UV to
over 10 microns
SOURCE: George Lee, Status and Summary of Laser Energy Conversion, in Progress in Astronautics, vol. 61, AlAA, N. Y., July 1978, pp. 549-565.
low Sun-synchronous orbit and relay satellites

(laser mirrors) both in LEO and CEO. One geostationary relay serves each power satellite.
Based on an analysis of five candidate systems
in three power ranges, Lockheed selected a
CO, EDL powered by a wave energy exchanger
(EE) binary cycle and a similar binary cycle for
ground power conversion.
the significant difference in space basing (i. e.,

LEO rather than CEO) which it presents compared to the reference system. Because of the
significant uncertainties present in the laser
systems concepts and the relative lack of technology base for laser devices, the optimum
laser system would undoubtedly look rather
different from any system so far devised.
The specific 500 MW system selected is diagramed in figure 21; hardware details of the
power satellite appear in table 7, and the Over- .
all system characteristics are summarized in
table 8.
A laser system that used photovoltaic arrays

to collect and convert the Suns energy would
suffer from the fundamental difficulty that the
overalI efficiency of the system wouId be quite
low compared to projected reference system
efficiency .45 The major limiting factors are the
projected efficiencies of the laser itself (50 percent for an EDL), the atmospheric transmission (84 to 97 percent), and the conversion efficiency of the terrestrial receptor (40 to 75 percent). When multiplied together with the
higher efficiency of other system components,
they result in an overall efficiency of 17 to 36
percent after photovoltaic conversion of sunlight to electricity to power the laser. When the
efficiency of the solar cells (17 percent) is
taken into account, the overalI system efficiency falls to only 2.8 to 6 percent compared to
the projected reference system efficiency of 7
percent. Although this decrease would con-
A major potential advantage of the laser

system is that it could be demonstrated via a
subscale 500-kW pilot program using the space
shuttle to deliver the power and relay satellites
into LEO orbits.
Other laser systems are possible. For example, Rockwell 44 has investigated a geosynchronous laser SPS powered by photovoltaic
ceils and using 20 to 24 100-MW CO EDL
lasers. The CO laser was chosen because it has
greater overall efficiency and is lighter than a
C 02 laser.
This study will use the LEO-based C02 laser
system in its subsequent analysis because of
*Beverly, op. cit.
45D0E, op. cit.
Ground site
SOURCE: W. S. Jones, L. L. Morgan, J. B.
and J.
Laser Power Conversion
Analysis: Final Report, Vol.
NASA report No. CR-159523, contract No.
137, Mar. 15, 1979.
Co., report No.
Lockheed Missiles and Space
Figure 21 .Components of the Laser Concept

Synchronous relays
Occulted ,
Power
SOURCE: W. S. Jones, L. L. Morgan, J. B.

and J.
Laser Power Conversion System Analysis: Final Report, Vol. 11, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.,
report No.
NASA report No. CR-159523, contract No.
137, Mar. 15, 1979
Table 7.500 MWe Space Laser Power System
Unit efficiency (%) . . . . .

System efficiency (%) . .
Collector
Solar cavity
85
85
86
73.1
Power in (MW). . . . . . . . .
7,913
Power out (MW). . . . . . . .
6,726
Orbital weight (kg) . . . . . 242,850
Space
transmission
Unit efficiency (%) . . . . .
95
System efficiency (%) . .
10.8
Power in (MW). , . . . . . . .
899
Power out (MW). . . . . . . .
854
Orbital weight (kg) . . . . .
6,726
5,784
517,750
Power
generation
and
conditioning
EE/binary
cycle
73.5
53.7
5,784
4,251
1,326,330
Space relay
Laser
93.1
50.0
4,251
3,958
717,660
Spacecraft,
structure,
radiators, etc.
23
11.5
3,958
910
1,809,000
128,653
Spacecraft 4,108
98.7
11.4
910
899
97,811
Telescope (2)
89,812
Structure 94,433 Beam reduction
5,379
Radiators 6,032
Phasing array
1,539
Stabilization
Optical train 1,181
24,080
Atmospheric
transmission
Ground
receiver
Thermal
cavity
85
9.1
845
718
96
8.7
718
690
98
8.5
690
676
99
10.7
854
845
105,438
Transmitter 44,703
Receiver 46,729
Optical train 945
Spacecraft 5,900
Radiators 5,762
Structure 1,023
Miscellaneous 376
Transmitter aperture
and optical train
Binary
cycle
75.5
6.5
676
510
Electrical
generation
98
6.3
510
500
SOURCE: W. S. Jones, L. L., Morgan, J.B. Forsyth, and J. Skratt, Laser Power Conversion System Analysis: Final Report, Vol. 11, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.,
report No. LMSC-D673466, NASA report No CR-159523, contract No. NAS3-21 137, Mar 15, 1979.
Table 8.Laser Power Station Specification

Solar power collected (MW). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7,913.0
Collector diameter(m). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2,710.0
Electrical power to laser(MW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3,958.0
Laser power output (MW) (20 lasers
at 45.5 MW each). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910.0
Transmitter, aperture diameter (m). . . . . . . . . . .
31.5
Secondary mirror diameter (o). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.0
Transfer mirror size (m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.0 x 4.2
Mirror reflectivity (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99.85
Optics heat rejection (MW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11.8
2
Radiator area (m ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2,656.7
Mirror operating temperature (C) . . . . . . . . . . .
200.0
SOURCE: W. S. Jones, L. L., Morgan, J. B. Forsyth, and J. Skratt, Laser Power
Conversion System Analysis: Final Report, Vol. 11, Lockheed
Missiles and Space Co., report No. LMSC-D673466, NASA report No.
CR-159523, contract No. NAS3-21137, Mar 15, 1979.
stitute a potential problem for the laser

system, it must be emphasized that many other
complex factors (e. g., the smaller terrestrial
receivers, or lower mass in GEO), might compensate in complex ways for lower efficiency.
When added up, the combination might make
the laser system more acceptable overall than
the microwave systems. b
Abraham Hertzberg and Chan-Veng Lau, A High-Temperature Ranklne Binary Cycle for Ground and Space Solar AppIications, m Radiation Energy Conversion in Space, K W,
Billman (cd,), P r o g r e s s in Astronautics and Aeronautics, vol. 61
(New York, AlAA, July 1978), pp 172-185.
86 .
Solar
Power
Satellites
MIRROR REFLECTION
Instead of placing the solar energy conversion system in orbit as in the reference SPS,
several authors have suggested using large orbiting mirrors to reflect sunlight on a 24-hour
basis to ground-based solar-conversion systems. 4 7 4 8 4 9 5 0
Typically, this option would use plane mirrors (fig. 22) in various nonintersecting lowaltitude Earth orbits, each of which directs
sunlight to the collectors of several groundbased solar-electric powerplants as it passes
over them (the so-called SOL ARE S concept).
Each mirror would be composed of a thin
film reflecting material stretched across a supporting structure made up of graphite-reinforced thermoplastic. As they pass within
range of the terrestrial receiving station, the
mirrors would acquire the Sun and the ground
station nearly simultaneously. They would
maintain pointing accuracy by means of builtin reaction wheels.
increasing the orbit altitude and mirror size,

which increases the size of the illuminated
ground circle and thereby permits the use of
larger ground stations.52 The orbiting mirrors
themselves could probably be quite large (up
to 50 km each) with very low mass density53
and still maintain their required optical surface flatness in the presence of disturbing
forces.
A mirror system would offer the following
potential advantages:
Two typical limiting cases have been identified from among several alternatives. 51 one
wouId use a 1,196-km circular equatorial orbit
(O 0 latitude) serving 16 equatorial ground stations each generating about 13 CW (baseload,
with minimum storage) and another 6,384-km
40 -inclination circular orbit serving four 375
GW ground stations at 300 latitude. Additional
ground stations in each case (to accommodate
demand growth) could be achieved simply by
47
H e r m a n n Oberth, Wege zur Raumschiffahrt, OldenburgVerlag, Berlin, 1929; also see Ways to Spaceflight, NASA technical translation TT F-662
48
Krafft A Ehricke (for example), Cost Reductions in Energy
Supply Through Space Operations, paper IAF-A76-24, 27th lrrternationa/ Astrorraut;ca/ Congress, Anaheim, Calif , Oct. 10-16,
1976.
K, W. Billman, W, P Gilbreath, and S W Bowen, introductory Assessment of Orbiting Reflectors for Terrestrial Power Generation, NASA TMX-73,230, April 1977
K, W. Billman, W. P. Cilbreath, and S W Bowen, Orbiting
Mirrors for Terrestrial Energy Supply, in Radiation Energy Conversion in Space, K, W, Billman (ed ), Progress in Astronautics
and Aeronautics Series, VOI 61 (New York Al AA, July 1978), pp
61-80
K. W. Billman, W. P. Gil breath, and S W. Bowen, Solar
Energy Economics Revisited: The Promise and Challenge of Orbiting Reflector for World Energy Supply, DOE SPS Program
Review, June 8,1979.
The space segment would be simple and

of low mass. It would consist only of
planar reflective thin-film mirrors.
It would minimize the need for large-scale
space operations, since recent designs
allow terrestrial fabrication and packaging with automatic deployment i n space.
The system would be modular and highly
redundant, i.e., there would be many identical mirrors capable of mass production.
The mirrors would operate at low-orbit altitudes, thus not requiring the CEO transportation system of some other alternatives.
It would eliminate the need for developing microwave- or laser-transmitting technology.
The mirrors would reflect ordinary sunlight, thus eliminating many of the potential damaging environmental effects due
to laser or microwave transmission.
It could be used for a variety of terrestrial
uses where enhanced 24-hour sunlight
wouId be useful. SOLARES couId increase
the solar product fivefold over the same
system operating on ambient sunlight.
Demonstration would be very inexpensive
compared to laser or microwave options.
2K W Billman, Space Orbiting Light Augmentation Reflector Energy System: A Look at Alternative Systems, SPS Program
Review, June 1979.
ghtweight Structures for Space
John M Hedgepeth, Ult[
Power, in Radiation Energy Conversion in SpaceJ K W, Billman (ed ), Progress in Astronautics and Aeronautics, vol. 61 (New
York Al AA, j uly 1978), pp. 126-135.
Ch. SAlternative Systems for SPS 87
Figure 22.The Mirror Concept (SOLARES)
SOURCE:
W. Bill man, Space Orbiting Light Augmentation Reflector

Review, June 1979.
On the other hand, mirror systems would

possess the following potential disadvantages:
They would require a large number of satellites each with individual attitude control. Maintenance might be expensive and
difficult to accomplish.
-.
System: A Look at Alternative Systems,
The mechanisms needed to keep the mirrors pointed accurately might be complicated.
The mirrors might cause unwanted weather modifications around the ground stations (see below and ch. 8).
Scattered light from the mirrors and the

light beams in the atmosphere would interfere with astronomical research (see
ch. 8).
The large power production per site (10 to
135 GW) and necessary centralization of
the electrical supply from them would not
be attractive to the utilities (see ch. 9).
The large area of the receiving sites (100
to 1,000 km2) would be likely to make
land-based siting extremely difficult if not
impossible from a sociopolitical standpoint (see ch. 9).
The Mirror System

The baseline Mark 1 SOLARES 54 design
(table 9) would require a total mirror area of
nearly 46,000 km2. If each mirror were 50 km 2,
about 916 of them would be necessary for a
global power system that would produce a
total of 810 GW from six individual sites, or
about twice 1980 U.S. electric generation. It
was chosen for comparative purposes because
it demonstrates the potential for large scale
energy output that might be achieved with mirrors. It is by no means the optimum SOLARES
system. A low-orbit version (altitude 2,000 km)
with 15 smaller ground stations (10,000 to
13,000 MW output) might be more feasible or
desirable. One of the principal features of the
SOLARES concept is that it could be used for
any energy use where enhanced sunlight would
be used to advantage. By using many more
smaller mirrors, the mass per unit area could
be minimized, and the total mass in orbit for
the entire baseline system then becomes about
4X105 tonnes. Thus, the entire SOLARES
baseline system would require only the same
mass in space as eight 5,000 MW reference system satellites.
Several Earth-based energy production
methods currently under development might
be used in conjunction with orbital reflector
systems: 1 ) photovoltaic arrays of varying sizes
are projected for commercial deployment in
the late 1980s, and 2) solar-thermal electric
54
Billman, et al., Solar Energy Economics Revisited. The
Promise and Challenge of Orbiting Reflector for World Energy
Supply, op. cit
Table 9.SOLARES Baseline System

configuration:
Space system
4,146km inclined orbit, 45,800km2 total mirror area
Ground system
6 sites with DOE 1986 goal solar cells @ 15% efficiency
11 0/0 overall system conversion efficiency, ~~-circle
area = 1.168km2 each, 135 GWe each
Impact:
Total system would produce 3.24 times current U.S. con2
2
sumption, total area = 84 x 84km (52 x 52 mi )
Baselined costs (in 1977 dollars)
Implementation schedule
5-year development, design, test, and evaluation (DDTE)
2-year manufacturing and transport fleet facilities
preparation
6-year space and ground hardware construction
System complete about 1995
Direct costs estimate (billions of dollars)
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ..$ 47.30
Hardware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885.65
Total direct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... .$932.95
Indirect costs estimate (billions of dollars)
15% contingency on direct costs ... ... ... ... .. $139.94
43.80
Design, development, test, and evaluation . . . . . .
Interest a :
23.58
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.26
DDTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.01
Total indirect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .$349.59
Total cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . $1,282.54
Indirect cost factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....1.38
Installed cost per rated output ($/kWe) b . . ...........1,508
Capacity factor(%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......95
1995 O&M costs:
Fixed ($/kW-y). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........3
Variable (mills/kWh). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........2
Levelized capital cost (mills/kWh) C . .................27.2
Levelized O&M cost (mills/kWh) d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5
Levelized busbar energy cost (mills/kWh) e . . ..........31.6
Comparison baseload power systems (CIRCA 1995):
Conventional coal/nuclear mixf
Levelized busbar energy cost (mills/kWh)e . . .......45
Ambient sunlight photovoltaicf g
Levelized busbar energy cost (mills/kWh). . .......115
a4Y@ first year, 8% per annum until positive cash flow after Year 11.
blncludes all direct costs, 157 contingency, interest during implementation at
8% per annum.
c15% fixed charge rate 30 years at 60/0 annual inflatiOn.
d30 years at 6% annual inflation,
e15y& fixed charge rate.
fsee text; these d. not include their historically eXtenSive R&D costs that are
Included, in SOLARES costing.
91Jses same terrestrial costing algorithm as SOLARES
cost factor of 1.37.
that results in indirect
SOURCE: K. W. Billman, W. P. Gilbreath, and S. W. Bowen, Solar Energy Economics Revisited: The Promise and Challenge of Orbiting
Reflector for World Energy Supply, DOE SPS Program Review,
June 8, 1979.
plants should become commercially feasible

in selected locations about the same time, possibly also for repowering of existing coal- or
oil-fired fossil-fuel plants with solar boilers.
Much of the economic disadvantage of both
types of solar-electric powerplants is associ-
ated with the energy storage needed to allow

them to serve as intermediate or baseload
plants. Should these plants prove to be even
marginally successful, relieving their storage
needs by keeping them I it for 24 hours a day by
sunlight from orbiting reflectors would enhance the attractiveness of these terrestrial options.
The various benefits of a mirror system must
be weighed against the percentage of time the
ground-based energy production facilities
would be obscured by clouds, smog, fog, and
other atmospheric obstruct ions. However,
there is some evidence that the concentrated
sunlight provided by the orbiting mirrors
would tend to disperse water-based obscurations such as clouds and fog, as a consequence
of the accelerated evaporation produced by

the high-intensity solar radiation.
If the orbiting mirrors can disperse clouds of
moisture around the SOLARES ground station,
what effects may they have on the climate
nearby? Large orbiting mirrors have been suggested for use in climate modification, 56 but
their possible detrimental side effects have not
been studied (see ch. 8). However, even if
reflected sunlight could be shown to have a
salutary effect on certain regions of the Earth,
there is no reason to believe, without further
study, that regions whose weather patterns
could benefit from enhanced sunlight would
necesssariIy coincide with the SOLARES
ground stations.
*I
Ibid
Bekey and J E Nagle, Just Over the Horizon in Space,

and Aeronautics, May 1980.
Astronaut/es
SPACE TRANSPORTATION AND CONSTRUCTION ALTERNATIVES

Space transportation and construction (with
the possible exception of SOLARES) are common to all the options. NASA contractors who
developed the transportation, construction,
and assembly plan for the reference system
devoted considerable effort to the process
of winnowing out a host of alternative approaches. Nevertheless, several other construction/assembly schemes have been proposed for
various phases of SPS program development.
If feasible, they would mostly serve the purpose of reducing costs by using technology
developed for other programs or by reconfiguring the reference system scenario. Because
transportation costs are a significant percentage of any systems cost (see section on costs
below), it would be important to explore these
alternatives fulIy.
Transportation
Transportation strategy in the early development phase and engineering verification is to
use the shuttle or an upgraded shuttIe to their
maximum capacities. In these, as well as later
demonstration and production phases, using
83-316 0 - 81 - 7
shuttle size vehicles at high launch rates could

be cheaper than developing and using larger
launch vehicles (see section on costs). Perhaps
the most obvious approach is to upgrade the
shuttle-based space transportation system to
perhaps five times the capability (i.e., total
mass to space in a given time as represented by
payload size, launch rate, and turn-around) of
the present shuttle.57
The need to conduct relatively sizable experiments, and possibly prototype or demonstration projects in geostationary orbits rather
than in low-Earth orbits, would pose a serious
transportation problem. Current space-shuttle
upper stages, or orbital transfer vehicles, are
not capable of carrying large payloads to geostationary orbit and are not able to support
any servicing operations there, since these
units are not reusable.
Several innovative approaches have been
suggested that circumvent the need for developing new vehicles. One such approach employ; an in-orbit propel ant processing facility
7 Salkeld, et al,, op. cit.
90 Solar
Power Satellites
built into one of the shuttles big throwaway

propellant tanks to convert water into hydrogen and oxygen the best propellants for highperformance rocket engines. The water required as the feedstock for this process would
be carried into LEO as an offload on every
space shuttle flight whose payload is less than
the maximum shuttle capability. The hydrogen
and oxygen, after being liquefied and stored in
the propellant processing facilitys tank, are
then used as the propellants for a reusable lowthrust space tug whose principal component
is also a leftover shuttle propellant tank. The
tug, which replaces the cargo orbital transfer
vehicle of the reference system, would carry
SPS prototype or demonstration hardware up
to CEO. Although such a system is rather completely defined,58 considerable technology advancement and development would be required, e.g., for the in-orbit electrolysis and
liquefaction plants, the space-tug-development, and the system logistics and integration.
Cost estimates have not yet been released.
Nevertheless, this concept represents an interesting suggestion for eliminating the development of a major new (or upgraded)
launch vehicle just for an SPS demonstration,
thereby reducing the up-front costs of any
sizable SPS prototype or demonstration project.
Another scheme would use an electromagnetic propulsion device 59 called a mass
driver to provide orbital transfer thrust instead of the chemical-rocket-powered space
tug. The mass driver is simply a solar-powered
linear electric motor, which derives its thrust
by accelerating chunks of waste mass (e.g.,
chopped-up or powdered shuttle propellant
tanks) into space at high exhaust velocities. 60 61
Since it uses electricity, its energy could come
directly from the Sun via photoelectric conver58
Central Dynamics Corp (Convair Dlvlslon), Utilization of

Shuttle External Tank in Space, unpublished presentation, j une
1978.
5~F, Chiiton, B, H ibbs, H. Kolm, G K ONeill, and J. phil lips,
Electromagnetic Mass Drivers, in Space-Based Manufacturing From Nonterrestrial Material s, G K C)Neil I (cd.), Progress in
Astronautics and Aeronautics, vol. 57 (New York AlAA, August
1977), pp. 37-61.
bochllton, et a]., Mass-Driver Application s, ibid , PP . 63-94.
Gerard K ONeill, The Low (Profile) Road to Space Manufacturing, Astronautics & Aeronautics, March 1978, pp. 24-32.
sion. This concept is far more ambitious than

the in-space propellant processing scheme; furthermore, it depends on a device that, although tested extensively on Earth in experimental high-speed trains and in the laboratory,
has yet to be demonstrated at the scale and acceleration levels required by the orbital transfer application. A modest research effort on
this concept is currently being supported by
NASAs Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology.
The production phase of the SPS program
would present a number of opportunities for
transportation alternatives that could not only
reduce production costs, but could also mitigate environmental and other impacts. Because of the high proportion of total space segment construction costs (both nonrecurring
and recurring) taken up by transportation,
many of the proposed innovations center on
alternatives to the family of four transportation vehicles selected for the reference system.
The most direct approach to transportation
cost reduction would be to improve the HLLV,
since it absorbs the bulk of transportation
development and operations costs. The most
likely technological alternative appears to be
the use of fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit
(SSTO) vehicles. 62 Very advanced winged
SSTO vehicles that could reduce LEO payload
delivery costs to the order of $1 5/km are projected as becoming practical in the last decade
of this century, provided sufficient demand
exists. 63
For orbital transfer the personnel and cargo
orbital transfer vehicles selected for the
reference system probably represent the best
available technology in the two principal options: chemical and electric propulsion.
Alternatives for routine high-mass payload
hauling might include solar sails, laser propulsion, and various forms of electric propulsion
other than the ion (electrostatic) rocket described for the reference system, e.g., elec62
Beverly Z. Henry and Charles H Eldred, Advanced Technology and Future Earth-Orbit Transportation System s, in Space
Manu(actur;ng Facilities //, jerry Grey (ed ) (New York: Al AA,
Sept 1, 1977), pp 43-51
lbld
tromagnetic (plasma) thrusters or the mass

driver discussed above. None of these options
has been studied in enough detail to make
choices about them at the present time.
Space Construction
As currently designed, the space component
of the reference system would be constructed
in CEO. However, it may be more cost effective to build the necessary facilities and
satellites in LEO and transport them to CEO
fully constructed. Such a scenario would reduce the number of personnel needed in CEO
as well as lower the total mass that must be
transported there.
Introducing one of the LEO scenarios (i. e.,
laser or mirrors) would open up significant
changes in the construction and transportation
option for the SPS. Even a change in one major
component of the reference system satellite
could alter the ways in which the transportation and construction components are configured. For example, if the photovoltaic cells
were to be replaced by solar thermal conversion systems, it would be attractive to construct satellites in LEO and transport them to
CEO on their own power because they would
suffer less from passage through the Van Allen
radiation belts.
Of all the alternative options for SPS construction in the production phase, the prospective use of nonterrestrial materials is perhaps
the most innovative and, ultimately, capable
of the maximum potential return on investment.
The basic premise of the nonterrestrial materials option is that the cost, energy and materials requirements, and environmental impact
of lifting the enormous cumulative masses
needed to establish and operate a system of
many satellite power stations off the Earth can
be markedly reduced by utilizing first lunar
materials, and eventually materials obtained
from asteroids. The fundamental physical principle that supports this premise is that it takes
over 20 times as much energy to launch an object to geostationary orbit from the Earth as it
does from the Moon, and the situation for as-
teroidal materials could be even more favorable. The primary drawback is the high upfront cost of establishing the necessary mining base on the Moon and the space-based facility needed to construct and assemble the
SPS. Hence, it is not likely that nonterrestrial
materials would be used in the prototype,
demonstration, or even the early phases of SPS
production. However, if a commitment is
made to produce a large-scale SPS system in
CEO, the lunar materials supply option could
well be less expensive than the Earth-launched
option (including payback of the initial investmerit) . 64 It has been argued that by bootstrapping the operation (i. e., using nonterrestrial
material right from the beginning, not only to
build the SPS but to build all the necessary
facilities as well), there is no need for any new
launch-vehicle development (a major element
in the up-front investment); i.e., the present
space shuttle can provide all the Earth-launch
space transportation needed to implement an
operational multi-SPS network. 65
Decisions on the nonterrestrial materials option clearly hinge on the results of current and
projected SPS technology studies and experiments. Sufficient research on the two technological factors unique to nonterrestrial materials developmentthe mass driver (both for
lunar materials transfer and for in-space propulsion) and lunar materials mining and processing capability should be done so that a
decision to proceed with either the Earth or
nonterrestrial materials options could be properly made. Other study and research requirements for the nonterrestrial materials option
include system analyses (including design of
an SPS that maximizes the use of lunar materials), more intensive searches for appropriate
Earth-approaching asteroids, and establishing
capabilities for the host of space operational
functions needed for other space programs.
As is clear from the preceding discussion, it
is difficult to establish a priori alternatives to
construction, assembly, and transportation,
Davld L Akin, Optimization of Space Manufacturing Systerns, in Space Manufacturing ///, Jerry Grey and Christine Krop
(eds ) (New York. AlAA, November 1979)
b50Nelll, op cit
since each of the SPS alternative options

would call for a different approach. General
guidelines can be identified, minimizing
transportation and construction costs during
the evaluation, development, prototype, and
demonstration phases by: 1) utilizing a phased,
step-by-step approach (e. g., ground-based experiments, only then followed by dedicated
space experiments); 2) maximizing use of the
essentially developed space shuttle; 3) maximizing the common utilization of technology

and development efforts by other programs
having related requirements (e.g., large communications antennas and other large space
structures, spacecraft power generation, control and transmission, etc.); and 4) developing
new transportation vehicles and construction
hardware only when economically necessary.
SPS COSTS
Figure 23.Reference System Costs
(dollars in billions)a
Although knowledge of the overall costs of

an SPS program will be essential to making a
decision about developing the SPS, current
cost estimates are inadequate. Todays projections are based on extrapolations from current
technology and in most cases assume major
advances. Thus, the technical uncertainties of
the concept are too great to provide a firm
basis for economic analyses. Here, as in most
other areas, it is only possible to develop the
foundation for future analysis that would seek
to reduce the current uncertainties.
Reference System Costs

The most detailed cost estimates have been
made by NASA66 for the reference system (fig.
23). According to these estimates, which are
based on detailed hardware specifications and
associated transportation and industrial inf restructure, achieving the first complete
reference system satellite will require an investment of $102.4 billion over a 20-year
period. Figure 24 illustrates one estimate67 of
how the costs could be allocated over time.
Each additional copy of the satellite and associated terrestrial facilities would cost $11.3
billion. Expenses are divided into the following
phases:
Research $370 million. This phase of SPS

development (table 10) is by far the smallest, constituting less than 0.4 percent of
the total SPS program. About half of these
bbPiland, op. cit.

Woodcock, Solar Power Satellite System Definition Study,
op. cit.
NASA estimates1977 dollars.
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Table 11 .Engineering$8 Billion
Figure 24. How Cost Could Be Allocated
SPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Test article hardware . . . . . . . . . . .
LEO base (8 man) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manned orbital transfer vehicle. . .
Shuttle flights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shuttle booster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Management and integration . . . .
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Millions
of dollars
$ 370
210
2,400
Percent
of total
1,200
5
3
30
15
870
2,900
61
36
1
11
$8,000
NOTE: Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding errors.

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Table 12.Demonstration$23 Billion

o
Years
Table 10.Research$37O Million
Power generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Power transmission . . . . . . . . . . . .
Structures and control. . . . . . . . . .
Space construction . . . . . . . . . . . .
Space transportation . . . . . . . . . . .
System studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Research flight test . . . . . . . . . . . .
Millions
of dollars
$ 79
40
22
25
20
19
165
Percent
of total
21
11
6
7
5
5
45
Demonstrator:
DDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pilot production facilities . . . . . . .
Shuttle DDT&E and fleet . . . . . . . .
Construction:
DDT&E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Space operations (4 years
operations, construct bases,
and demonstrations) . . . . . . . . .
Personnel orbital transfer vehicle
(DDT&E and hardware). . . . . . . .
Electric orbital transfer vehicle
(DDT&E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Demonstration rectenna . . . . . . . .
Management and integration . . . .
$370
costs are chargeable to the development

of the transportation system.
Engineering$8 billion. This part of the
program (table 11) contributes the complex engineering knowledge necessary for
creating a useful space structure. The
work includes developing an engineering
test article in LEO, capable of generating
1 MW of power. It is the direct precursor
to the demonstrator and provides the testing ground for constructing and using collector and transmitting subarrays, a rotary
joint and satellite attitude control.
Demonstration $23 billion. This phase of
the reference program (table 12) culminates in a 300-MW satellite and the asso-
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOURCE:
Millions
of dollars
Percent
of total
$2,700
2,500
400
3,000
12
2
13
3,100
3,000
13
13
2,800
12
1,700
1,800
1,800
200
8
8
1
11
$23,000
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
ciated rectenna and ground facilities to

collect and disperse electrical power to
the grid. The demonstrator requires a second generation shuttle and orbital transfer vehicle to provide the transportation
capabiIity to GEO.
Investment$57.9 billion. By far the
largest percentage (57 percent) of the nonrecurring costs of the reference system are
devoted to this phase (table 13). In addition to providing for the transportation
and construction capabilities for the
space component, it also includes the
costs ($7.8 bill ion) for developing the terrestrial factories needed to produce satellite components.
Table 13.SPS lnvestment$57.9 Billion

Millions of
dollars
Heavy lift launch vehicle . . . . . . . .
$16,600
Development. ... ... ... ... .. .$10,500 18%
Fleet (6 boosters, 7 orbiters) ... $ 6,100 11 0 /0
Electric orbital transfer
Vehicle (21 x 284). . . . . . . . . . . . .
6,000
Construction bases . . . . . . . . . . . .
17,200
Development. ... ... ... ... ... $ 4,300
8 %
Hardware and launch ... ... .. .$12,900 22%.
SPS development . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2,200
Ground-based factories
(klystrons, solar cells, etc.) . . . . .
7,800
Launch and recovery sites. . . . . . .
7,300
Program management and
integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
800
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$57,900
Percent
of total
29
30
4
13
13
1
Though these are the best estimates currently

available, they suffer from an unavoidable
lack of specific engineering details, as well as
from insufficient manufacturing experience
for most of the system components. Moreover,
in some areas, (e. g., klystrons, slip ring, phase
control) current technology is inadequate to
define solutions to engineering problems.
Thus, the estimates could eventually turn out
to be high or low. The DOE SPS Cost Review 68
examined five different elements of the SPS
reference design and concluded that the projected costs are based on optimistic assessments of future technological and manufacturing capabilities.
Rectenna support construction. Projected

costs were found to be low by a factor of
3 to 5. Automated production might
reduce costs to a level more in keeping
with the reference system estimates, but
significant advances over todays methods would be needed.
Graphite fiber-reinforced thermoplastic.
Currently used for golf clubs, fishing rods,
and for any other use where low weight
and high stiffness are required, this is the
recommended material for the satellite
truss work. The proposed structures are
insufficiently defined to specify the costs.
Estimates of future costs for the materials
*J. H. Crowley and E J. Ziegler, Satellite Power Sy5tems (SPS)

Cost Review, DOE/TIC-11190, MaV 1980
alone vary by a factor of 30 ($40 to

$1 ,250/kg).
Photovoltaic cells. GaAs cell cost estimates are extremely optimistic given the
Breakcurrent state of technology.
throughs will be needed to reach the
design goals for mass, efficiency, and
costs. Silicon cell cost estimates are less
optimistic but will still require significant
simultaneous reductions in mass and cost
and an increase in efficiency to achieve
the SPS goal (2 g/W, $0.17/Wp, and 17percent efficiency).
Slip ring. It is not well enough defined to
appraise the slip ring components or their
operational capabiIity.
Satellite electrical systems. The degree of
detail is insufficient to judge the credibility of the cost estimates of the subsystem.
Thus, the $102.4 billion estimate of front

end costs and the $11.3 billion estimates for
each satellite may be an optimistic estimate of
SPS costs.
On the other hand, if unexpected breakthroughs were to occur in space transportation, rectenna or satellite technology, the costs
of the reference system could be lower than
now estimated. Since NASA estimates already
assume some technological breakthroughs
(e.g., in solar cell production, space construction, rectenna construction), they are more
likely to be low than high. In either case, the
estimates reflect a troublesome feature of the
reference system the high costs that are necessary to demonstrate the feasibility of the SPS
(about $31 billion). A further $71 billion would
be needed to build and use a single reference
system satellite (investment of $57.9 billion
and a first satellite costing $13.1 billion).
Because the initial costs have a direct bearing
on financing the project, they are more fully
discussed in chapter 9.
A number of opportunities exist for reducing
SPS development expenses. Some involve pursuing alternative concepts; others, revising the
reference system. Because the reference system is by no means an optimal design, improvements could lead to significant cost
reductions. Common to all potential systems
would be the division of SPS development into

the phases outlined above: research, engineering verification, demonstration, and investment, with increasing commitment of resources in each successive phase. For microwave and laser systems, space transportation
and construction would constitute a high percentage of the system costs in all phases. It is
in these areas that there would be a high
potential for reducing overall costs.
The precise costs of an SPS program would
also depend strongly on the nature and scope
of national and global interest in space. If
commercial ventures in space grow at a strong
enough rate (e. g., for telecommunications satellites, space manufacturing, etc.), the current
shuttle and its related technology would be inadequate, and pressures would be strong for
developing expanded space capabilities. The
explosive growth of the domestic airline industry since the 1930s has been suggested as
the appropriate model to use to investigate
this eventuality. 69
Much of the technology and experience
needed for space construction (manned LEO
and GEO bases, large-scale antennas, studies
of space productivity, etc. ) and space transportation (manned and unmanned orbital-transfer
vehicles, shuttIe boosters, HLLVS, etc.) of SPS
would be developed for other programs as
well. Of these, the SPS program should bear
only its share. By charging only those costs
that are unique to SPS to the SPS program, its
front end costs would be reduced by a significant amount. Seen in this light, the massive
space capability needed for mounting an SPS
program would be less of an anomaly (given
the future evolution of space technology),
and SPS would need to shoulder fewer of the
development costs for this capability.
There is also the possibility that a percentage of the investment phase could be shouldered by private investment, thereby reducing
the burden to taxpayers. This would be all the
more likely to happen in a milieu in which
C, R. Woodcock, Solar Power Satellites and the Evolution
of Space Technology, AIAA Annual Meeting, May 1980.
70
1 bid.
private investment in space is strong for other

reasons. Under these combined circumstances,
the total risk to the U.S. taxpayer would be
substantialIy reduced.
One interesting option for reducing transportation costs of a CEO SPS would be to
assemble the satellite in LEO and send it to
CEO under its own power. This might be
particularly applicable to the demonstration
phase of the reference program, since it would
avoid the need for premature investment in an
expensive manned geosynchronous construction/assembly facility.
Whatever their potential savings, all of these
possibilities could only be evaluated after the
proper scale of a demonstration satellite had
been determined. This decision, in turn, would
depend on considerable terrestrial and spacebased testing, some of which will take place in
other space programs (see ch. 5).
Because the HLLV would be used later on in
the production phase of the reference SPS absorbs the bulk of transportation costs, it is of
considerable interest to find less expensive
ways of transporting mass to space. Some of
the alternative high-capacity transportation
vehicles have been discussed earlier in this
chapter. The heavy Iift launch vehicles achieve
their cost reductions by economies of scale. It
has been suggested that smaller vehicles,
perhaps only slightly larger than the current
space shuttle, could be used instead of the
much larger HLLV.71 The smaller vehicles
would use higher launch frequencies to
achieve the same or better benefits. According
to this proposal, the minimum-cost individual
payload necessary to launch as many as five
reference SPS satellites to orbit is about 50
tonnes (compared to the Shuttles 30 tonnes).
The prospects for employing routine airlineIike launch practices opens a whole new approach to the logistics of major space manufacturing enterprises as well as providing
potential cost reductions for SPS.
R. H Miller and D. L. Akin, Logistics Costs of Solar Power

Satellites, Space So/ar Power Review, VOI 1, pp. 191-208,1980.
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS
Systems other than the reference system
might be more or less costly, depending on factors such as the achievable efficiency, the
mass in orbit, and the state of development of
the alternative technologies that make up
these systems. At present, these alternatives
are much less defined and their costs accordingly even more uncertain than the reference
system costs. The following discussion summarizes available cost data and the greatest cost
uncertainties of the alternative systems.
The Solid-State System
The unit cost of the solid-state devices is unknown. However, the semiconductor industry has considerable experience in producing
large numbers of reliable solid-state components at low cost, and the learning curve
for such production is well-known. In principle, it should be possible to make a realistic
prediction of costs when the appropriate device or devices are well characterized.
Solid-state efficiencies. Present efficiencies
are much lower than for the klystron. Current research is aimed at increasing their
operating efficiency (to reach at least 85 percent).
Mass in space. Current estimates of the mass
per kilowatt of delivered power 72 suggest
that the mass in space would be higher than
that of the reference system making the
transportation costs higher as well.
Since many components of the solid-state

system are shared with the reference system
(e.g., the graphite fiber reinforced thermoplastic support structures, the photovoltaic arrays, the rectenna design, etc.), it would be
possible to generate realistic relative costs if
the above uncertainties are reduced.
7
*G. Hanley, Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Concept Definition Study, vol. 1, Rockwell International SSD-8O-O1O8-I, October 1980.
The Laser System

The largest unknowns for the laser system
are the efficiency, specific mass and the cost
of the transmitting lasers themselves. This is
because the technology of high-power CW
lasers is in a relatively primitive state (current
CW lasers achieve outputs of 20 kw or greater,
operated in a so-called loop move, i.e., the
Iasant is recirculated). Space lasers for SPS
would have to operate at much higher outputs
(megawatts) and at higher efficiencies (i.e., 50
v. 20 percent) for current lasers. Concepts such
as the solar pumped laser and the free electron
laser are completely untried in a form that
would be appropriate to SPS. Therefore their
costs are even more difficult to ascertain. In
general it can be said that the cost of the
system would be tied to the overall efficiency
of the system and the amount of mass in
space, but considerable study and some development would be needed to make suitably
reliable projections.
Transportation. The laser systems that have

been explored project higher mass in orbit
than for the reference system, which may
drive the cost of the laser system up. However, if a substantial portion of this mass is
in LEO rather than in CEO, the overall transportation costs might not exceed the transportation costs of the reference system and
could turn out to be lower.
Demonstration. Because the laser system is

intrinsically smaller it should be possible to
mount a demonstration project for considerably less than for the reference system.
Terrestrial component. The ground stations

would have to have a certain amount of redundancy in order to accommodate laser
transmission when cloudy weather obscures
one or more receivers. The precise amount
of redundancy would depend on the particular location and would include extra transmission lines as well as extra ground
receivers.
The Mirror System

Figure 25 summarizes mirror system cost
estimates for the SOLARES baseline case 73
based on the DOE 1986 cost goals for photovoltaic cells. These up front cost estimates,
which include contingency and interest on the
borrowed money, lead to an estimated levelized busbar energy cost of 31 mills/kWehr
compared to 1990 estimated costs of nuclear/
coal mix of 45 mills/kWehr. I n comparison, a
strictly terrestrial system of photovoltaics pro73
et
Solar Energy Economics Revisited: The
Promise and Challenge of orbiting Reflector for World Energy
Supply,
cit.
97
ducing the same overall output computed on

identical
assumptions would cost 115
m i I Is/k Wehr.
Since electricity production from the mirror
system would depend heavily on the use of terrestrial solar photovoltaic or solar thermal
systems, cost variations of either conversion
system would have a strong effect on total
system costs. Figure 26 summarizes the effect
of varying several system parameters on the
cost of electricity delivered to the busbar in
the SOLARES system. The three most sensitive
parameters are solar cell efficiency, solar cell
cost per peak kilowatt and total space cost
Figure 25.Elements and Costs, in 1977 Dollars, for the Baseline (photovoltaic
conversion, 4,146 km, inclined orbit) SOLARES System
Solar cells
NOTE: Total costs are proportional to the areas of the circles. Interest and contingency constitute 33 percent of the total SOLARES costs.
SOURCE: K. W. Billman, W. P. Gilbreath, and S. W. Bowen, Space Reflector Technology and Its System Implications AlAA paper 79-0545,
AIAA 15th Annual Meeting and Technical Display, 1979.
Figure 26.Sensitivity of the SOLARES Mirror

System to Variations in System Parameters
% Variation of parameters
SOURCE: Ken Billman, W. P. Gilbreath, and S. W. Bower, Space Reflector
Technology and Its System Implications AlAA paper 79-0545 AlAA
15th Annual Meeting and Technical Display, 1979,
(transport, construction, mirrors in space). A

cost over-run of about 2 times (to $1,000/pk
kWe) could be tolerated before a busbar cost
of 45 milis/kWehr wouId be reached. Similarly,
a space system total cost over-run of a factor
of 4.25 could be tolerated. Finally, because of
the projected high energy production per unit
of mirror mass in space, a twenty-three-fold increase in space transport cost (or $1 ,380/kg)
would still result in a production cost of 45
mills/kWehr. For comparison, the charge for
transporting mass to space by means of the
space shuttle is estimated to be between $84
and $154 (1975 dollars).
74
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space
Transportation Reimbursement Guide, JSC-11-802, May 1980
Chapter 6
SPS IN CONTEXT
Contents
Page
Energy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......101
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 101
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,101
Determinants of Demand. . ..........102
Energy Supply Comparisons . . . . . . . ...104
Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131
The Effects of SPS on Civilian Space
Poilcy and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . .135
Space Policy. . . . . .................135
Current and Projected Space Projects. . .137
Institutional Structures. . ............139
indirect Effects and Spinoffs. . ......139
Table No.
16. Description of Milestones of Major

Breeder Programs . ................116
17. Summary Assessment. . ..........,.125
18. Major Environmental Risks. . ........127
19. Terrestrial and Space Insolation
Compared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128
20. Terrestrial Insolation at Different
Latitudes and Climates . ............129
21. Costs of Onsite Photovltaics. . ......131
22. Range of Energy Demand in 2030,....132
23. Upper Range of SPS Use . ..,........135
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Figure No.
Table No.
Page
14. Criteria for Choice, , . ..............105
15. Characteristics of Five Electrical
Technologies.. . . .................110
Page
Page
27 Recent and Projected Solar

Photovoitaic Prices. ., . . . + . . . . . . ...114
28 Levelized Lifecyle Cost of Electricity ..124
29 Quarttified Health Effects. . .........126
Chapter 6
SPS IN CONTEXT
ENERGY
Introduction
Because of its long development Ieadtime,
solar power satellites (SPS) will not be available to any extent before the early part of the
next century and will therefore do very little to
relieve our dependence on imported oil. SPSs
primary use would be to replace old powerplants and meet any new demand for electricity. Consequently, the potential value of
the SPS must be determined in competition
with other future electricity sources and in the
context of U.S. and global electricity demand.
This chapter examines this topic in detail by
looking at the future demand for energy, and
electric power in particular, in the United
States, and the various supply options that
could compete with the SPS. Global energy demand and the SPS in a worldwide context is examined in chapter 7.
Overview
The U.S. energy future can be divided into
three time periods according to the supply options that will be available. These periods are
roughly the next 10 years (near term), from
1990 to approximately 2020 (the midterm or
transition period), and beyond 2020 (the long
term). Although these boundaries are not hard
and fast, they roughly define periods in which
particular energy supply forms will dominate.
Near Term
In the near term, there will be no significant
change from our current reliance on oil, natural gas, and coal. Currently about 92 percent of
our Nations energy supply comes from these
fuels. About one-quarter of the total is imported (almost all in the form of oil). Because
of finite suppIies, overalI consumption of these
liquid and gaseous fossil fuels must eventually
be reduced. However, the most important goal
over the next decade is the reduction of oil imports in order to avoid the severe economic
problems that would result from potential supply interruptions and to improve the U.S. trade
deficit. To do this, concentration must be
placed on lowering demand growth by increasing the efficiency of energy use, and switching
to the use of more abundant domestic fuels.
Of the two, improving energy efficiency will be
the major new source of energy because of the
much longer Ieadtime needed to bring on new
fuel supplies such as coal and nuclear. Domestic oil and natural gas can be developed
more quickly, but it is not likely that they will
contribute to reducing oil imports since both
will probably decline in production for the
decade. A recent OTA technical memorandum estimates a 25-to 45-percent drop in U.S.
oil production by 1990. Thte use of nuclear
energy will increase, but at a slower rate than
in the 1970s. Finally, solar and biomass energy
production will grow rapidly during the 1980s
but the absolute magnitude will be low compared to oil imports. Therefore, although an increase in the amount of coal, solar, biomass,
and possibly nuclear energy sources is expected, they will probably not be able to contribute enough by themselves to relieve the
pressures caused by U.S. dependence on imports.
Transition Period: Midterm
In the period from 1990 to 2020, substantial
supply shifts will occur. Although the period
will begin with heavy dependence on coal, oil,
and natural gas, it will end with a much greater
reliance on renewable and inexhaustible energy resources. U.S. dependence on imported oil
will almost surely come to an end if for no
other reason than that the availability of oil on
the world market will have dropped substantially. World oil production may drop as much
as 20 percent by 2000 and fall off sharply
thereafter. The dominant fuels during this
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, World
Petroleum Availability, 1980-2000, technical memorandum, October 1980, OTA-T M-E-5
101
period are likely to be coal (for synthetic fuels,

direct combustion, and electricity generation),
natural gas, and possibly conventional nuclear. During this period, strong growth of renewable and inexhaustible sources such as
solar and biomass can be expected. Uranium is
a small enough resource that conventional
nuclear must be considered a transition energy
source. However, the supply of coal appears to
be substantial enough to play a major role well
into the 22d century. Whether these fuels contribute significantly beyond the midterm depends on the successful resolution of their
short- and long-term environmental and safety
questions.
It is also during this period that SPS and
other long-term candidates such as breeder reactors and perhaps fusion may begin to reach
commercial status. The transition period will
be the time when a number of long-term technologies will compete with one another for a
role in the future on the basis of economics
and public acceptance. This competition will
also depend heavily on the relative economic
efficiency of different ways of using energy, as
will be discussed below.
Long Term
In the long term, the United States and the
world will be almost totally fueled by inexhaustible energy sources. Although rapid
growth of sources such as the SPS during the
first decades of the century may be seen, it will
not be until the middle of the next century that
they could become as commonplace as coal,
electric, or even nuclear plants are today.
It is not clear which renewable and inexhaustible sources will dominate. It may be
that small-scale, onsite solar systems coupled
with an extremely energy-efficient economy
will be the ultimate future. It may also be that
a mix of technologies such as onsite solar,
biomass, fusion and/or SPS will be used.
However, the choice will be made in the transition period and will be based primarily on the
projected costs of competing supply systems
and demand technologies.
Determinants of Demand
SPS would fit most easily into a high electric
growth future. Such a future is contrary to recent low growth trends. In fact, many conservation initiatives have been directed at reducing the use of electricity because of the high
energy losses at powerplants. Nevertheless,
changes in relative fuel prices and gains in the
efficiency of electric generation and use could
dramatically change the picture.
The energy technology choices the United
States and the world will make in moving
through the three periods described above will
be primarily dictated, as always, by relative
costs. Until recently the dominant factor determining the development of energy technologies has been the type of resource and its
availability. The abundance of oil and natural
gas, and the ease with which it could be
transported and burned, dictated the development of most of the energy-using equipment currently in existence. Some of this
equipment could have been powered more efficiently by electricity, but this advantage was
often dwarfed by the cost advantage these
fuels had over electricity. However, many applications such as electric motors can be made
significantly more efficient, reducing the fixed
cost penalty.
In the past few years the relative prices of
these energy forms have changed because of
the rapid increase in oil and natural gas prices.
Current average electricity prices are about
twice that of oil and four times that of natural
gas. In 1960, the ratio of electricity to oil and
natural gas prices was 7 to 1. Even though the
costs of new powerplants are rising rapidly,
those of electricity will probably rise more
slowly than oil and natural gas, primarily
because of the relative abundance of coal and
uranium. It is even possible that synthetic fuels
from coal and biomass may be more expensive
than electricity from coal, particularly as
newer, more efficient coal combustion technologies are introduced.
The total cost to the energy user also includes the cost of the energy consuming equip-
Ch. 6SPS in Context
ment. Electric powered equipment is often

cheaper than gas or oil fired counter parts.
This advantage will become increasingly important as the prices of oil and gas narrow the
gap with the price of electricity.
The implication of these effects is that electricity may become the cheapest energy form,
when both supply and demand are considered,
for many applications that could use a multiplicity of energy forms. The reason is that the
price differential between electricity and the
other energy forms (liquid and gaseous fuels,
direct solar, etc.) will likely be small enough
that it could be overcome by cheaper and
more efficient electric end-use technologies.
Some of these, such as heat pumps for space
and water heating, are already in use, while
others, such as inexpensive electrochemical
processes and long-life storage batteries, require further development, [f such development is successful and electricity does become
the cheapest energy form for most uses, then
electric demand growth could become quite
rapid even though total energy demand may
grow very slowly or not at all.
If this holds, solar power satellites will have
an easier market to penetrate than if the electric utilities continue their recent slow growth.
Thus, the fate of SPS rests as much on the ability to create energy efficient electrical end-use
technologies as it does on the relative economics of other electric generatin g technologies. One caveat must be added, however. If
demand technologies for fuels keep pace with
the efficiency improvements of electric demand technologies, such dramatic switching
may not occur.
Electric Demand Technologies
To see if such a future is technically possible
a closer look is taken at current and potential
uses of electricity. Because of electricitys
unique properties it has been used for
specialized tasks such as lighting because of
the high temperature needed to excite the visible spectrum. Here, electrical energy is converted to visible electromagnetic radiation as
well as to heat. Nearly 60 percent of all electricity is used to perform mechanical work
103
through the use of motors. Electricity is also

used for industrial electrochemical processes
such as in aluminum and steel production, for
specialized induction-heating applications and
for microwave and infrared furnaces. A small
but crucial amount is used to power the Nations electronic systems. Finally, electricity is
used in the crudest form possible, namely for
direct conversion to heat.
Although these uses are more varied than for
the other major fuels, they account for less
than 12 percent of the total end-use energy demand in this country. The other 88 plus percent
is direct combustion to provide direct heat,
steam and mechanical drive. As indicated, for
electricity to penetrate this latter market it will
be necessary to make technical advances to
give electricity a cost advantage at the end-use
that can compensate for its higher cost at the
production point.
To do this requires making use of the special
character of electricity as an energy form.
Electricity is a high-quality fuel (thermodynamically work that is heat at infinite temperature). Therefore, it can be used for any
kind of mechanical work or it can be converted to heat at any temperature. The best
known example of the latter property is the
heat pump for space heating. This is now being
applied to water heating and certain drying applications with a substantial reduction in
energy use over electric resistance heating and
apparent cost advantages over solar.
In the industrial area, there is considerable
potential for increased use of electricity. For
instance, in steel making it can be used for the
plasma-arc process and direct-electrolytic reduction of iron. Although these processes have
been arourd for several years, technical development is still needed. In a nearer term application, the direct reheating of steel by high,
pulsed electric currents could result in a significant reduction in fuel use compared to
direct-fired processes, and also reduce material loss by eliminating oxide formation that
occurs with direct firing. In other areas advances have been seen recently in the efficiency of electric motors that are now competitive
with steam drives in many applications such as
mechanical presses for metal forging. A more

speculative but very interesting area is the use
of laser or microwave radiation to drive industrial chemical reactions, instead of heat.
In ground transportation the principal problem is the development of long-lived, lightweight, reliable storage batteries. EIectric
drive using motors with precise solid-state
speed control can be made very efficient, as
has been demonstrated on many of the worlds
railroads. Advances have recently been made
in battery technology but the general feeling is
that ideal batteries are at least a decade
away.
The industrial sector is presently only 13percent electrified, while the transportation
sector only uses a negligible amount of electricity. Thus, these are the markets that electricity must penetrate to become the dominant
energy form. However, some new technologies
have the potential to reduce industrial demands without creating new markets for electricity. In the chemical industry, for instance,
biogenetic methods of feedstock synthesis
could replace thermochemical methods, reducing fuel usage without substituting electricity. About half the present industrial electric demand could be offset by cogeneration, a
technology that is not strictly a demand technology but which could nevertheless reduce
electricity needed from the grid. I n the transportation sector, battery research as a key to
electric vehicles must compete with the efficiency improvements possible with highmileage advanced vehicles using synthetic or
biomass-derived liquid fuels. The buildings
sector is already the most heavily electrified
and some electric technologies, such as common appliances, are nearing saturation.
The achievement of highly efficient, electric
demand technologies would change not only
the balance of fuels now used but also the sectoral usage patterns of electricity, with
dramatic growth in the industrial and transportation sectors, and less in the buildings sector
which has shown the greatest postwar growth
in electric demand.
Conclusion
It is likely that as technologies using electricity are improved or new efficient uses are
found, improvements will be made in using
other future nonelectric energy sources such
as biomass and direct solar. While all of these
developments are many years away, it is this
environment in which the SPS will compete.
The success or failure of these new electric
technologies will have a great deal to do with
determining whether or not a market exists for
SPS as well as the other large-scale, electricgenerating technologies.
Energy Supply Comparisons

Introduction
Comparisons with other energy technologies, both current and future, are a critical
part of assessing a proposed new energy technology. A host of criteria, only some of which
are readily quantifiable, is available for comparison purposes. Costs, environmental impacts, scale, complexity, versatility, safety,
and health risks are some of the more important factors of choice that ultimately determine the relative desirability of a given energy
technology. For technologies currently in
place these factors are generally well known.
For future technologies they are more often
only poorly known. Nevertheless, choices
among future energy technologies must be
made, either in the R&D phase, or, later, in the
marketplace.
Criteria for Choice
Whenever decisions to proceed with or halt
the development of a given technology are
made, it is important to lay out the framework
of choice, to develop a set of criteria by which
one may judge the relative benefits and drawbacks of different technologies. In addition to
providing a basis for choice, such a list can
also help to identify the essential distinctions
between technologies and highlight areas that
will need further R&D.
Table 14 lists 32 criteria developed in an
OTA workshop that are often used in compar-
Ch. 6SPS in Context 105
Table 14.Criteria for Choice

Plant description
1. Scale of power output (range in megawatts)
2. Power output in relation to load profile (baseload,
intermediate, peaking)
3. Versatility (other output besides electricity)
4. Complexity (high, medium, low) and maintenance
requirements (controllability)
5. Reliability (percent of time available to the grid)
6. Nominal capacity factor (percent time operating)
7. Material requirements
8. Labor requirements
9. Land requirements
10. Construction Ieadtime (years)
11. Lifetime (what are key determinants)
costs
12. Opportunity costs of RD&D (dollars and people)
13. Net energy ratio
14. Operating costs (cents/kWh)
15. Capital costs ($/kW)
16. T&D costs (cents/kWh)
17. Decommissioning costs
Impacts
18. Institutional (organization and ownership) impacts
19. Safety and health risks (magnitude and distribution)
20. Environmental risks (magnitude and distribution)
21. National security risks of normal or unintended use
22. Military vulnerability
Deployment consideration
23. Time period to commercialization
24. Geographic location; location of plant with respect to
load centers
25. Compatibility with other technologies and utility grid
Other
26. Probability for success (high, low, medium)
27. Initial demonstration requirements (large or small)
28. Resource constraints (domestic, international)
29. Risks/impacts of RD&D failure (chance it may become
prematurely obsolete)
30. Relative uncertainties to be resolved by RD&D (e.g.,
sensitivity of efficiency to design parameters)
31. Is it a viable example for rest of world?
32. Nature of R&D process (public, private, classified)
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment
ing electrical generating technologies. Most fit

into four broad categories: plant description,
costs, impacts, and deployment considerations. These criteria establish a context for
evaluating the SPS in relation to other future
energy technologies.
Five Future Energy Technologies
In the timeframe that the SPS would be most
likely to play a role in the U.S. energy future,
the other energy sources that are likely to
contribute wilI be predominantly the renewable and inexhaustible ones. OTA has chosen
to study the SPS in comparison to terrestrial
83-316 0 - 81 - 8
solar thermal technologies, terrestrial solar

photovoltaics, advanced fission (the breeder),
and fusion. If the health and safety problems
of coal are satisfactorily solved, it could also
be a major electric supply technology in the
period that SPS could become available. In addition, there may also be a component of conventional nuclear power still operating in the
second and third decades of the 21st century
(the timeframe after 2010 that is most likely for
SPS deployment).
The data that OTA generated for these technologies are supplemented by the electrical
supply comparisons which Argonne National
Laboratory made for the Department of
Energy (DOE/SPS) assessment program. 3 DOE
chose to study conventional and advanced
coal technologies, light water reactors, liquid
metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) breeders
fusion, the reference system SPS, and terrestrial photovoltaics operating in a peaking
mode. Their data will be discussed along with
the results that OTA obtained. Coal and conventional nuclear power will be presented first
to provide a reference for the future energy
technologies in the discussions that follow.
THE COAL BENCHMARK
The coal resources of this country are
almost incomprehensibly large. Even if production were to triple, in that case coal would
serve about half the present U.S. energy needs,
known recoverable reserves would not be exhausted until late in the next century. Estimated additional reserves could take this
production well into the 22d century. Thus, for
all practical purposes, the supply of coal is inexhaustible.
Unlike any other long-term energy source,
coal can be exploited with known, proven
technology at costs that are competitive now.
Advanced coal technologies such as combined-cycle gasifiers and magnetohydrodynamics, are not vital to coals future but could
M E Samsa, SPS and Alternative Technologies Cost and
Performance Evaluations, T h e F i n a l P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e S o l a r
Power Sate//;te Program I?ev;ew, CON F-800491 (DOE), 1980.
P r o g r a m A$$e$sment Report S t a t e m e n t o f F;nd/ngs, SPS C o n cept and E valuation Program, DO F/E R-0085, 1980
improve the efficiency and economics of coalfired electric power. Thus, of all the options
for large-scale, long-term production of electricity, coal is the least uncertain technologically and economically and it is appropriate
to view it as a benchmark for evaluating the
others, including SPS.
bers, but also because the equipment in use

has generally shown disappointing reliability.
However, current systems appear to be considerably better than early designs, so utilities
can, if they are careful, be confident that their
equipment will function reliably and effectively.
Technological and economic criteria are not

the only alternatives to consider. Any energy
source must have generally acceptable health
and environmental impacts. Coal evokes depressing memories of scarred landscapes, suffering miners and smokey skies. Today, this
reputation is no longer deserved. Modern coal
mining and combustion techniques, when
properly applied, have reduced virtually all
these objectionable impacts to the point where
damage is clearly a small fraction of what it
once was.
The regulatory approach has been to ensure

that the impacts are controlled to the point
where it is clear that known damages are
sharply reduced. As mentioned above, it appears that this goal has been achieved. As
more information is gained, it is possible that
control can be loosened without increasing the
risk. For instance, new data on the damage
caused by sulfur oxides and sulfates, and better data on the long range transport and chemical transformation of these and other pollutants might allow more selectivity in emissions
control. Thus, the costs of controlling impacts
may be reduced rather than increased in the
future. Such a reduction would improve coals
competitiveness with nuclear power or SPS,
unless some of the unproven risks are confirmed.
The actual future of coal, however, is much

less certain than its potential. Issues arising
when expanded mining and use are considered
can be divided into three categories: interruptions, control costs, and risks. These will be
discussed in some detail because if coal does
not realize its potential, the reasons will probably be found here.
Interruptions are intermittent events that
prevent scheduled plans from being fulfilled.
Strikes by miners and transportation breakdowns are obvious examples. Opposition by intervenors that prevent facilities from being
built might be included here. These factors
cant be completely eliminated, but proper
planning can reduce disruption. The major
long-term effect is to deter potential users
from turning to coal if they have other options
and are concerned about the reliability of the
coal supply.
The cost of controlling coals negative impacts is high. Reclaiming surface mined lands
and reducing the emissions of combustion
have received the most attention. For instance,
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 have
required the use of the best available control
technology for limiting emissions of sulfur
oxides. Utilities have been concerned not only
because of the expense of the flue-gas scrub-
There are three major risks to long-term coal

combustion that could limit expansion or
make it much more expensive: public health
effects, acid rain, and carbon dioxide (C02).
Coal combustion pollutants have been linked
by statistical analyses to tens of thousands of
deaths per year. These studies are highly controversial and have been neither proven nor
disproven. If they are generally accepted, considerable reduction of sulfur and nitrogen
oxides would probably be necessary. This
reduction would probably call for greater use
of coal cleaning before combustion, combustion modifications and higher efficiency fluegas desulfurization systems. Such changes
would be expensive but unavoidable if the
public demands cleaner air because of concerns over health risks.
The documentation for damage by acid rain
is better than for public health effects, but is
still not conclusive. Acid rain is evidently
caused by the same pollutants suspected in the
public health issue, but the scientific under-
standing of pollutant transport and chemical

conversion is poor. Furthermore, while acidification of certain lakes and streams is strongly
suspected, extensive damage to terrestrial ecosystems is only surmised. If this damage is
proved and found too costly, the remedy
would be the same as for public health effects.
However, it must be emphasized that proof of
damage is insufficient. The pollutants must be
traced back to their source in order to know
where to implement controls. Otherwise ineffectual or overly expensive control strategies
may be implemented.
The final risk, excessive CO2 released to the
atmosphere, is by far the most intractable. The
adverse impacts that have been suggested
dwarf those of any other human activities with
the possible exception of nuclear war, The C0 2
produced by burning fossil fuels and clearing
forests accumulates in the atmosphere. Some
of the CO2 that is produced is absorbed in the
oceans, but the dynamics of the CO2 balance
are not well-understood. The concentration in
the atmosphere is increasing by 5 percent per
year since 1958. C0 2 is transparent to most of
the incoming sunlight that warms the Earth.
Normally much of this is radiated back to
space in the form of infrared radiation, but
CO, tends to absorb and block this longer
wavelength radiation. This mechanism, the
greenhouse effect, is an essential ingredient in
maintaining the proper temperature balance
on the Earth. However, if sufficient quantities
of CO2 are added to the atmosphere, additional heat will be trapped to warm the Earth
significantly.
A number of studies of atmospheric CO 2
levels predict that concentration will rise to
two to eight times todays level in the 21st and
22d centuries. While there is continuing discussion about the effects of this buildup, the majority of the scientific community agrees that
the probability of global warming and other
climate changes is sufficiently high to warrant
exceptional attention. 4 Changing climate patterns, even if they turned out to be ultimately
beneficial, would cause enormous disruption,
especially with agriculture. At least 10 years
4
0ffice of Technology Assessment, U S Congress, The Direct

Coal, OTA-E-86, 1979
Use of
will be required before enough is known to

make intelligent decisions about the significance of the effects of increased CO 2 in the
atmosphere. The contribution of fossil fuel
combustion to the CO2 buildup, the results of
this buildup on the heat balance and climate,
and the effects of climate changes must all be
studied extensively. At some point, however, it
may be necessary to limit coal combustion in
order to limit CO2 emissions since it is highly
unlikely that any practical means of removing
CO 2 from the flue gases will be devised.
In summary, as far as we can tell now, coal is
capable of supplying most of the electric
power this country is likely to need for many
generations. The effects of the release of extra
CO, to the atmosphere are sufficiently in
doubt that other options must be prepared in
case they are required. However, until we
know that it constitutes a serious problem the
development of other options must be justified
on the basis that they will be cheaper or more
attractive in some other way than properly
control led coal.
CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR
Conventional nuclear plants totaling 55,000
MW of power are now operational and another
106 reactors totaling 118,000 MW are either on
order or under construction.5 This is a substantial base for the nuclear technology, but it is
questionable whether it will be fully realized
or expanded because of public opposition,
licensing problems, financial uncertainties,
and eventualIy resource Iimitations.
Public opposition has been especially visible. While public opinion polls still show support for nuclear energy, this support has been
weakened for several reasons. Low-level radiation release and other problems with routine
operations contribute to public concern. Public support has also eroded because of continued lack of a suitable site and demonstrated
means for nuclear waste disposal. Further mishaps such as the accident at Three Mile Island
could condemn the technology in the eyes of
many who now reluctantly accept it. Finally,
Department of Energy, U S Central Stations Nuclear Generating Units, r September 1980
the possibility that nuclear energy could contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation disturbs many, though it is debatable whether
renunciation of the nuclear option by the
United States would materially reduce this
risk.
Most of these problems, except proliferation, can be ameliorated by improved technology, procedures, and regulations. But if improvements
are not made quickly, public
opinion could swing against nuclear power in
the United States as it has on occasion in other
Western democracies (e.g., Sweden and Austria). Even if opponents remain in a minority,
they can find many opportunities to trouble
the industry through legal actions, regulatory
appeals and ballot initiative. None of these
may kill a particular project, but they could
discourage utility executives from choosing
the uncertainty and frustration associated with
nuclear power as long as they have other options such as coal.
Utility decisionmakers also have to consider
licensing and financial uncertainties. At present, many design criteria for nuclear plants are
so poorly defined that it is virtualIy impossible
to get a new reactor licensed. This problem
may be resolved over the next few years, but
recent trends have not been reassuring. For instance, a review now underwayto determine
if fundamental changes in reactor designs are
necessary to contain melted fuel cores in case
of severe accidents is expected to last several years.
Some regulatory rulemaking problems stem
from a lack of conclusive data. Others appear
to reflect the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions lack of a clear picture of what it wants
to accomplish and how to do it. Both types of
uncertainties have to be resolved before the
utilities wiII consider ordering many more reactors.
Utility companies also face uncertainty concerning both the capital available to build
plants and the risk of a long-term shutdown.
The cost of a new nuclear plant is now close to
Office of Technology Assessment, U S Congress, Nuclear
Powerp/ant Standardlzat/on, OTA-E-1 34, April 1981
$2 billion. Not many utilities can raise that

much capital, even when the projected costs
of power at the busbar are favorable. Even
now, many plants are being built as joint ventures by several companies. A continuation of
high interest rates could delay many plans for
capital-intensive projects. And after an expensive reactor starts operation, the utility bears
an additional economic risk due to the possibility of unplanned shutdowns. The Three Mile
Island (TMI) accident and the Browns Ferry f ire
led to lengthy shutdowns that forced huge expenditures by the owner utilities, which then
had to generate or buy expensive replacement
power. The present financial difficulties of the
owner of Three Mile island, General Public
Utilities, illustrate how critical this concern
will be for other utilities.
Availability of fuel will eventually be a
serious constraint if conventional reactors are
used in the midterm to long-term future, without a shift to advanced nuclear breeders. The
Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy
Systems (CONAES) estimated that enough uranium exists in this country to fuel at least
400,000 MW for the lifetime of the reactors (40
years). This would allow the construction of
another 227,000 MW of capacity. If ordering of
new reactors resumes in 1985 and continues at
the rate of 10 reactors per year, the last one
wouId be ordered in 2008. Because of retirements, by 2050 nuclear power would be back
to near its present level. Peak energy output
under this scenario would be about 5.6 (end
use) Quads in 2015. However, discovery rates
for uranium ore and imports and exports of
uranium could change the total availability in
an unpredictable way.
The greatest single long-term uncertainty
facing the industry is the future electricity
growth rate, just as it is for the SPS. Over the
next several decades, moderately high growth
rates might require much more nuclear power,
but as discussed in this chapter, the growth
rate may be more modest. However, low
growth need not preclude nuclear, and might
f nergy In Transition, Committee on Nuclear and Alternative
Energy Systems (CONAES), National Academy of Sciences,
VVashlngton, D C , 1979
enhance the attractiveness of nuclear compared to other future central power options,
such as SPS, that require large deployments to
justify the development cost.
Nuclear energy can have a future if its problems are addressed effectively and decisively.
To some extent this is happening. The accident
at TM I has revealed weaknesses in reactor
plant design and operator training, to which
the industry and the NRC are responding with
initiatives such as the Institute for Nuclear
Power Operations and the Nuclear Safety
Analysis Center. As a result of the events in the
past 2 years, both regulators and utilities seem
more conscious that extreme safety is in everyones interest.
Whether these measures will ensure safety
in the future and enhance the industrys public
image without pricing the technology out of
reach is still an open question.
FIVE FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
The following discussion summarizes the
salient characteristics of the four central
renewable or inexhaustible energy technologies that have been chosen for comparison
with the SPS. While each of these alternatives
is compatible with centralized electricity production in a utility application, they are not
equally applicable for baseload power production. Photovoltaics and solar thermal sources
vary over the course of a day and the season in
a fashion that makes them well-suited for
peaking applications. Fusion, the breeder and
SPS would work most efficiently producing
constant power 24 hours per day, so they are
naturally suited for baseload power production. The applicability of photovoltaics and
solar thermal can be broadened to cover intermediate and possibly baseload applications
by the addition of storage capability, but over
the next 10 to 20 years there may be little
cause to do so, for two reasons. The first is that
the most cost-effective application of solar
thermal and photovoltaic systems is likely to
be as fuel savers until all the oil and gas-fired
generating facilities have been retired from
utility systems. Second, electric storage is far
more versatile and cost effective for a utility if
it is not restricted for use with a single plant. A

recent study by the National Academy of
Sciences concludes that when wind, photovoltaics, or solar thermal is used in a utility
system, it is typically not desirable to have
dedicated storage but wiser to provide the
backup energy from the grid. Except for a
small amount of storage to handle short-term
variations of sunlight in solar thermal applications, the conclusion that dedicated storage is
not appropriate for terrestrial renewable electric technologies is generally well-accepted.
Currently, electrical generation is fueled
largely by oil, natural gas, coal, fissionable
material, and stored water. For the time period
when the SPS is most likely to find applicability, there may not be as great a diversity of
energy supply technologies connected with the
utility grid as is now enjoyed; hence terrestrial
solar technologies may be used in a different
mode than the one that seems most desirable
now (i. e., peaking or intermediate). It is also
desirable to compare all the future electric
technologies on a common basis. For this
reason, OTA has prepared cost estimates for
solar thermal and photovoltaics operating in a
baseload mode. Because photovoltaics also
possess the unique property among these
future energy systems of being modular on a
very small scale, its use in a dispersed mode
both connected to the electric grid and independent of it will be discussed in a separate
section. In the future, it would be also worthwhile to compare SPS to an energy scenario
composed of a number of dispersed solar technologies working in complementary fashion.
The following discussion will give the major
characteristics, cost sensitivities and uncertainties, factors affecting deployment, and
foreseeable impacts of the different renewable
and inexhaustible energy sources. First, a short
summary of each technology will be given, followed by comparisons. Table 15 presents the
relevant characteristics of each of the 5 technologies in matrix form.
*Energy Storage for Solar Applications, Committee on Advanced Energy Storage Systems, National Academy of Sciences,
1981
Table 15.Characteristics of Five Electrical Technologies

Criteria
Fusion
Plant description
500-1,500 MW
Scale of power
output
Power output in Baseload
relation to load
profile
Breeder
SPS
500-1,500 MW
1-100 GW (lasers
smaller)
Base load
Baseload
Versatility
Also large-scale, hightemperature process

heat; synfuels, production of fissile
materials
Also large-scale, lowtemperature process

heat; synfuels; production of fissile
materials
Complexity
Reliability
High
Between 0.6 and 0.75
Medium
Same as LWR (fuel
cycle reliability?)
Nominal capacity 0.6 to 0.75

factor
Same as LWR
Photovoltaics
Solar thermal
10 kW to greater
10 kW-100 MW
than 100 MW
Peaking, intermediate, Peaking, intermediate,
baseload (with storbaseload (with storage
age, but expensive at
expensive)
high-capacity factor)
Cogeneration?
Centralized, limited ver- Also cogeneration,
high-temperature proc- satility. Some military
connection and
ess heat
relevance to space
colonies and space
manufacturing
Low
Lowest
High
No good reason to
Between 0.6 and 0.9,
Greater than 0.9 ( = 1think its worse than
Iike other steam
time for repair)
plants
steam technologies.
Between 0.6 and 0.9
(laser-exception)
Without storage: 0.2 to Without storage: 0.2 to
Between 0.6 and 0.9
0.25. With storage:
to 0.9
Can design around,
common material, sophisticated processing
Few and skilled for
space construction,
less skilled for receiver construction
Same as LWR
Comparable to other
centralized solar
systems; 6.5
acres/MW or less
5 to 12 years (including Similar to other centralized technologies,
licensing)
5 to 12 years
Greater than 30 years
Greater than 30 years;
(replace steam
design like other
generator;
systems, but limited
experience
$40
billion to $100
$10 billion to $15
billion (?)
billion to achieve first
operating satellite
l-year payback
2- to 20-year payback
UP
0.25. With storage:
U P
to 0.9. Also depends

on region
Plentiful, domestic
materials, like nuclear
Design specific, can

None
design around; stay
away from specialized
alloys
Like LWR
Like LWR
Plentiful, domestic
materials; need to
build manufacturing
industry
Moderate to large, decentralized larger
Land
requirements
Same as LWR. Less

than 1 acre/MW (including fuel cycle)
5 to 10 acre/MW
10 acre/MW incremental addition could

be zero
Construction
Ieadtime
5 to 12 years?
5 years for 1OO-MW

plant
Short; minimum 48
hours for 7 kW
Lifetime

(first wall material)
Costs of RD&D
$20 Billion to $30
$1 billion to $2 billion
Net energy
balance
Operating costs
Unknown
Low $0.5 billion plus

$0.5 billion to $1.0
billion
Almost no fuel costs.

Same as LWR, but
less confidence
1 to 2/kWh
Capital costs
$2,000 to $2,500/kW;
$1,500 to $2,000/kW
Material
requirements
Labor
requirements
lower for a 5-GW plant

T&D costs
Same as any central

system
Same as any central

system
Decommissioning costs
Minor
Minor
Moderate to large,
decentralized larger
0.3 to 1.5/kWh; low as 1 to 4 percent of capital 1 percent; $20/kW/yr;

costs; $40 to
less for centralized
percentage of
delivered cost
$60/kW/yr
$1,500 to $17,000/kW
$1,500 to $3,000/kW
$2,000 to $3,000/kW
(peak) ($1.60 to
$2.20/PW) (without
storage)
Similar or greater than Centralizedsame as Centralizedsame as
other central systems other systems; decen- other systems; decen(reliability). Need to
tralized is negligible
tralized is negligible
consider outage problem
Push out of orbit. Small Negligible
Negligible
at 4-percent discount
rate over 30 years
Impacts
Institutional impacts (ownership)
Similar to present
Similar to present
institutional structure institutional structure
Requires new management organization; international involvement possible
Decentralized medi- Decentralized medium to high impacts;

urn to high impacts;
centralized similar
centralized similar
to present infrato present infrastructure
structure
Ch. 6SPS in Context
111
Table 15.Characteristics of Five Electrical Technologies (continued)

Criteria
Fusion
Breeder
SPS
Fuel cycle? Same as

Microwave bioeffects
PWR (higher power
uncertain; ionizing
radiation in GEO
density, lower
pressure)
Environmental
Small for routine opera- Small for routine opera- Upper atmosphere effects uncertain
risks
tion
tion
Not efficient weapon
Significant weapons
National security Designs other than
but transportation caimplications
hybrid less significant Proliferation potential
pabilities significant
than breeder Military
Same as any central
Same as LWR
Slightly greater than
other central powervuInerability
ized powerplant
plants, depends on
space capability of
other nations
Safety and health Safer than PWR
risks
Deployment
Solar thermal
Photovoltaics
Small
Low; possible safety
hazard with decentralization in event of fire
Small
Low possible manufacturing risk of PV
None, possible benefits None, possible benefits
of exporting benign
of exporting benign
technology are good
technology are good
Low
Low
considerations
Time to commer- 30 years plus

cialization
Geographic Ioca- Low population area
tion with respect to load
centers
Compatibility
Good
with other technologies and
utility grid
Other
Probability for
commercial
success
Demonstration
requirements
Resource
constraints
Risks of RD&D
failure
(Developed) 15 to 20
Long (greater than 20
years domestic (Iicen- years)
sing)
Low population area
Low population, no
water needed; mixed
Good
High
Moderate cost for 500 Large cost (0.3 to 1

to 1,000 MW. About $1 GW)
billion
Manageable
None
Small (1OO-MW
aggregate of 2 to 3
demos)
Small
Small (community sysSmall
Technology is here, but Highbig program;

public views regarding depends on program
waste?
size (wait until HLLV
available)
High
Small
Negligible
Negligible
Small (O&M costs)
Cell costs
Proliferation? for developed countries

only?
Yes, if t works
Easier to digest in
small to moderate
chunks
Much public money

spent, remainder
might be private, but
for regulatory uncertainties
Public funds for

RDD&T. Then private
capital
High
Large, but not as large

as SPS
High, but for next 10

years little risk, $20
billion
Relative
High, complex
uncertainties
Is it a viable ex- Yes
ample for the
rest of the
world?
Nature of RD&D Magneticpublic;
process
inertial classified
Decentralizedvery
Decentralizedvery
close; centralized
close; centralized
S. W.-less than or
S. W.-less than or
equal to other sysequal to other systems. Geographic detems. Geographic dependence high
pendence high
Penetration may be Iim- Goes down with higher Goes down with higher
percentage penetrapercentage penetraited to 20 percent.
tion; negligible probtion; negligible
Competes with other
lems
technology. Nothing
obviously unsolvable
High
Low to medium
None
Between 5 and 10 years Decentralized5 years;

centralized 10 years
Low to medium
tems are medium)
Easier to digest in
small chunks; need
manufacturer capacity, but good example
Needs to be demonNeed not be demonstrated by Government strated by Governwith private particiment, large private
contribution
pation; industry will
develop
1. Central Solar Thermal. Solar thermal

technology is the oldest of the technologies
under study. It may also be the one that is
nearest to commercial application, since a
pilot plant is already under construction in this
country. The concept involves simply collecting concentrated solar radiation to heat a
working fluid in a central receiver (boiler),
which in turn drives a turbine to generate electricity. It has the versatility to provide either
electricity or process heat (steam) for industrial applications.
Two generic systems have been proposed for
the solar thermal approach: line-focus and
point-focus systems. In the line-focus scheme,
the Suns radiant heat is reflected and focused
by parabolic trough mirrors onto tubes containing the working fluid. The working fluid is
pumped to a central site where it may be used
to drive an irrigation pump, produce hot water
or steam for a factory, or produce a combination of heat and electricity for a small community. The line-focus approach is also
favored for process heat applications such as
enhanced oil recovery, but is not being actively considered by DOE for central electric
applications.
In the point-focus or power tower system,
a field of reflectors (called heliostats) is
focused on a central receiver atop a tower in
the center of the field. Although there are
several designs, a heliostat is basically a flat
reflective surface mounted on a computermonitored gimbal that allows it to automaticalIy track the Suns course across the sky. The
heliostat/power tower approach is being pursued by DOE as a central generating system,
though not exclusively so. * It can be used for
electrical generation either in a stand-alone
system or as a method for repowering existing
fossil-fueled power stations. The place of solar
thermal in a utility system whether it serves
as a peaking, intermediate, or baseload unit
depends on the storage capability of the solar
thermal plant. Without any auxiliary storage,
*In
1980, DOE initiated six major studies of the applications of

the power tower to a variety of industrial heat demands, ranging
from low-quality steam for uranium leaching to high-temperature steam for reforming methane to ammonia,
its effective capacity factor will be about 23

percent in a location such as the southwestern
United States. Addition of a modest amount of
storage (sufficient for 3 hours of extended
operation per day) will increase the capacity
factor to about 40 percent and make it possible for the plant to supply part of the lateafternoon electric consumption peak that occurs in many utilities. Because it is desirable to
smooth out the effects of short periods of
cloud cover, it is likely that the technology will
incorporate at least a small amount of thermal
storage (up to 1 hour). Solar thermal plants
could be made to operate in a baseload mode
with the addition of a large amount of storage,
but this increases the systems conversion loses
and raises the overall cost per kilowatt installed. Solar thermal will, therefore, probably
be better suited for intermediate or peaking
uses since its daytime availability corresponds
closely with the peak of the electricity load
profile in many areas.
Solar thermal plants will be intermediate in
scale between todays coal or nuclear plants
and small onsite generators. They can be expected to be deployed relatively quickly perhaps within 5 years for a 100-MW plant.
The technical feasibility of solar thermal
technology is established. Engineering questions remain about the materials to be used in
the design of the central receiver. What is at
stake in making the technology commercially
viable is whether plants can be produced economically. The single most important factor is
the cost of heliostats, which accounts for
about one-half the cost of solar thermal designs. Present cost estimates range from $1,000
to $3,000/kW of capacity installed.
Much of this high cost reflects the cost of
materials. Savings realized from future automated production techniques are built into
these projections. Thus, the economic viability
of solar thermal technology depends on attaining heliostat cost goals.
The research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) costs associated with the solar
thermal development are expected to be in the
range of $0.5 billion to $1 billion. In addition
to continuing tests and studies to reduce heliostat costs, R&D for efficient and cost effective
storage methods, improved receiver designs
and transport fIuids are also needed.
2. Solar Photovoltaics. This technology is the
newest of the terrestrial solar options under
study and it is conceptually the simplest, since
it converts sunlight directly to electricity
without any working flu ids, boilers or generators. Because the essential elementa semiconductor wafer or cell is modular at a
very small size, the technology has a versatility
in scale of deployment that surpasses any
other option. Photovoltaic (PV) cells have
already proved feasible in small-scale applications for both space and terrestrial purposes.
However, central PV systems have not been
tested yet, even in a pilot plant size. Because
the technology is so intrinsically modular, the
R&D program is not geared to the demonstration of a series of prototype plants but to the
improvement of the cost and performance
characteristics of the celIs.
A variety of different semiconductor materials is being developed for possible use in central PV systems. When sunlight falls on wafers
of these materials, it produces a direct current
of electricity. The efficiency of this process
depends on many semiconductor properties,
and how well those properties match the wavelength spectrum of sunlight. Typically, the
materials produce a direct current (DC) voltage
level of about 0.5 volts. Some of the more
promising PV developments include the four
technologies discussed below.
The single cell silicon technology is the
most highly developed, and its introduction dates back 23 years to the beginning
of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) space program. Its
properties are well understood and cells
sold commercially for small-scale applications routinely achieve efficiencies of 10
to 13 percent; experimental cells have
achieved 15 percent and the theoretically
probable maximum is 20 to 22 percent.
The single most important barrier to commercial use is the high production cost,
even though costs have dropped and performance improved over the past decade
in line with DOE projections. Further cost
reductions to ($95/m2) $0.70/peak watt)
and performance improvement to 13.5percent efficiency are the DOE goals for
1986.
The cadmium sulfide/copper sulfide technology is another approach that is commercialIy available and holds promise for
improvement. This material can be used
in thin films because of its high absorbance of sunlight, with a reduction in
fabrication costs and materials requirements. Experimental cells have achieved
efficiencies of 9 percent, with limited
lifetime. Improved cells have the potential for cost reductions to $10/m 2 at 10percent efficiency. A number of other
cadmium sulfide technologies are under
study for thin film and standard cells.
The gallium arsenide technology is
another alternative that has achieved efficiencies up to 24.5 percent in experimental cells. The material can be fabricated in
thin films (with experimental efficiencies
to 15 percent) and can withstand concentrated sunlight at high temperatures. Its
major disadvantage is that commercial
production is still some time away and
costs remain much higher than for singlecrystal silicon.
The polycrstalline and amorphous silicon
technologies have the potential for orders

of magnitude cost reductions compared
to the single-crystal silicon technology,
but the experimental cell efficiencies
have so far only reached 9 to 10 percent.
(The probable maximum is estimated to
be at least 15 percent for the amorphous
technology in thin film cells.) These technologies are not limited to silicon, but are
currently being investigated along with
other novel materials concepts.
All the technologies discussed above are
candidates for use in flat-plate arrays of cells
that absorb unconcentrated sunlight. Gallium
arsenide is also an example of a high-efficiency material that can be used with a con-
174
Solar
Power
Satellites
centrating system. Concentrating systems involve different tradeoffs and are further from
commercial viability than flat-plate systems.
Both line- and point-focus collectors are under
consideration for PV concentrating systems.
Costs of concentrating systems can in principle
be low, since the receiving area needs only to
be covered with a thin reflective sheet, but the
technology is not developed enough to make
project ions yet.
Up to half the cost in a flat-plate design terrestrial solar photovoltaic plant today is for
the cells themselves. Other requirements for a
complete plant are materials for packaging
and supporting arrays of celIs, support structures, cabling to connect the arrays and
modules, and power conditioning equipment
to convert the DC voltage to alternative current compatible with the utility grid. About 300
cells would be combined into one panel, 30
panels into one array, and 10,000 arrays into
one module supplying 25 MW of peak power.
A central plant might produce 200 MW from 8

modules. Storage could be added to extend the
capacity factor of the plant, at additional
system cost. As discussed in the introduction
to this section, the economic merit of
dedicated storage for utility-based PV systems
has been seriously questioned.
The pace of technological breakthroughs in
PV technology is impressive. Today singlecrystal silicon cell arrays cost 15 percent of
what they did in 1974, as can be seen in figure
27. It is on further orders-of-magnitude cost
reductions that both terrestrial and SPS PV
systems depend. Such price reductions are
common in the semiconductor industry for
products with large markets (e.g., digital
watches, hand calculators, and now hand computers), but they are nearly unheard-of in the
energy industry. Therefore, planners familiar
with conventional thermal and nuclear energy
technology sometimes find them difficult to
accept. The goals for the DOE PV program are
Figure 27. Recent and Projected Solar Photovoltaic Prices
30
Ch. 6SPS in Context
for array prices of $2.80/peak watt in 1982,

$0.70 in 1986, and $0.15 to $0.40 in 1990 (all in
1980 dollars). At the 1990 level, complete systems are expected to cost $1.10 to $1 .80/peak
watt.
Although significant breakthroughs have occurred in the past 5 years, the principal thrust
of PV research is still directed toward the identification, selection, and engineering refinement of the cheapest possible semiconductor
materials. A concomitant part of this effort is
the development of suitable mass-production
techniques (now being most intensively pursued for single-crystal silicon and cadmium
sulfide) to open the way for mass market
penetration. It is upon the outcome of this
two-pronged effort (development of cells and
development of better manufacturing techniques) that the success of central terrestrial
PV plants will depend.
The time-scale for commercial readiness of
central terrestrial PV plants could be as short
as 5 years or as long as 15 years. The balance of
a central PV plant uses familiar building
materials and readily available power-handling
equipment. Once arrays are available, plant
construction Ieadtime should be short. According to the DOE program, commercial
readiness could occur in the early 1990s. If the
RD&D program for PV cells is accelerated this
date could be earlier; on the other hand, slippage in the schedule for cell development
could delay commercial introduction.
Subsequent deployment of central PV systems would be paced by the rate of growth of
national manufacturing capacity for PV cells.
To achieve substantial penetration of central
PV in the time period of 1990 to 2010 will require an aggressive program for PV manufacturing plants. It is possible that decentralized PV centralized terrestrial and SPS
energy systems could all be competing for the
output of the PV industry during this period.
3. Advanced Fission (Breeder Reactor). Conventional reactors use uranium ore very inefficiently because only a small fraction of the
uranium is tapped for energy. Natural uranium
consists of two isotopes 99.3 percent U-238
115
and 0.7 percent U-235. Only the U-235 is usable

directly in a conventional reactor. With conventional reactors, uranium resources would
be exhausted relatively rapidly by an expanding nuclear energy base. Breeder reactors on
the other hand, can extract 100 times as much
energy from a ton of uranium ore and thus extend the nuclear energy resource by several
centuries.
In a breeder, the core of the reactor is surrounded by a blanket of the type of uranium
not burnable in conventional nuclear plants.
This uranium captures neutrons escaping from
the chain reaction in the core and is transmuted into plutonium, a premium v a l u e
nuclear fuel. In this fashion, a breeder
breeds new fuel that is extracted from the
blanket, converted into fuel rods, and later
burned in the same or another reactor. An advanced breeder will produce about 10 percent
more fuel than it burns. A different fuel cycle
could use thorium in the blanket. Thorium is
an element similar to uranium, but it cannot be
used directly as a fuel. In the blanket, it
transmutes to U-233 which is a good fuel.
Breeders may also be distinguished by the
different types of coolants used to carry heat
from the core to the generating side of a
nuclear plant. Because the interconnections
between the core and the generators are quite
complex, requiring considerable engineering
refinement, the choice of coolant defines conceptually different types of breeders as much
as or more than the choice of fuel. Early in
its program, the United States emphasized
breeders with liquid metal (usually molten
sodium) coolants and the reactor concept that
evolved the liquid metal fast breeder or
LMFBR has become the reference system for
breeder research in other countries, representing more than 95 percent of the dolIar effort
devoted worldwide to breeders. Thirteen reactors using the LMFBR concept have been built,
the most successful being the French Phenix
reactor, and seven countries with major
breeder programs (table 16) have all emphasized the LMFBR type. Alternatives are helium
gas, molten salt coolants, and water.
Table 16.Description of Milestones of Major Breeder Programs

France
Reactors
Rapsodie (24 MWt)
Phenix (250 MWe)
Super Phenix (1,200 MWe)
Federal Republic
of Germany
KNK-I (58 MWt)
KNK-11 (58 MWt)
SNR-300 (300 MWe)
SNR-2 (nominally 1,600 MWe)
1. 1960GFK, Karlsruhe project
begins
2. 1964Design study for 1,000 MWe
LMFBR
3. 1966SNEAK startup
4. 1975SNEAK experiments for SNR
300
5. 1967INTERATOM F.R.G. and
BENELUX cooperation
begins
6. 1972KNK-I goes critical
7. 1976KNK-11 goes critical
8. 1969SNR-300 safety report
9. 1970SNR-300 company established
10. 1971SNR-300 revised safety report
11. 1972SNR-300 sodium fuel pumps
tested
12. 1973SNR-300 construction begins
13. 1974SNR-300 steam generators
and IHX test
14. 1975SNR-300 specification of fuel
and cladding
15. 1980SNR-300 goes criticala
16. 1974SNR-2 company established
17. 1976SNR-2 preliminary designa
18. 1981 SNR-2 construction beginsa
Japan
Joyo (100 MWt)
Monju (300 MWe)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1967-Joyo conceptual design

1969Joyo safety evaluation
1970Joyo construction begins
1977Joyo goes critical
1968Monju preliminary design
1969Monju conceptual design
1973Monju safety evaluation
1978Monju construction begins
-10. 1986Demo plant begins

-11.1991 Demo plant goes critical
-12. 1988Commercial plant 1 construction begins
critical
-14.1991 Commercial plant II construction begins
critical
as~h~dl~ as of 197& In 1980, the SNR program currently in flux. SNR-301) designed but not yet licensed. SNR-2 not Yet designed. Entire Pro9ram will sli P substantially,
but the new schedule is not known at this time.
SOURCES: France: U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, The LkfFBR Program In France, ERDA 76-14, March 1976; M. D. Chauvin, The French
Breeder Reactor Program, 1976.
Federal Republic of Germarty: U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, The /_ J14FBR Program in Germany, ERDA 76-15, June 1976.
Jepem Report of Ad Hoc Study Committee organized by Japanese Government Science and Technology Agency, October 1977.
SOURCE: International Energy Associates Limited, 1980.
United Kingdom
Reactors
DFR (60 MWt)
PFR (250 MWe)
CFR (commercial size)
1. 1953first nuclear power program

begins
2. 1964second nuclear power program begins
3. 1963DFR goes critical
4. 1984-PFR construction begins
5. 1972PFR goes critical
U.S.S.R.
United States
Clementine (25 kWt)
EBR-1 (1.2 kWt)
Fermi (200 MWt)
EBR-11 (16.5 MWe)
Clinch River (375 MWe)
Fast Flux Test Facility
(equivalent of 160 MWe)
PLBR (commercial size)
CBR (commercial size)
1. 1946Clementine goes critical
2. 1951EBR-1 goes critical
3. 1963Fermi goes critical
4. 1966Fermi shuts down
5. 1983 -EBR-II goes critical
6. 1971SEFOR (U.S. and F. R. G.)
goes critical
BR-5 (10 MWt)

BOR-60 (60 MWt)
BN-350 (1 ,000 MW)
DN-600 (600 MWe)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1958BR-5 goes critical

1965BR-5 operates full core
1969BOR-60 goes critical
1973BN-350 goes critical
1973BN-600 construction begins
1979BN-600 goes critical
19751,600 MWe reactor design
underway
Ch. 6SPS in Context
117
Table 16.Description of Milestones of Major Breeder Programs (continued)

United Kingdom
aThi~ ~a~ the IJ,S, program in 1978, Currently there ,~ no planned

ing pattern for 2 years.
United States
U.S.S.R.
pLBR schedule, penal Ing final ~eclsions on CRBR. CRBR iS in Construction, but has been in a hold-
SOURCES: United Kingdom: Prepared by IEAL from compilation of U.K. documents.

United Statas: U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, .LIquKI k4efa/ Fast Breeder Reactor Program, January 1977; U.S. Energy Research and
Development Administration, The LMFBR Program in France, ERDA 76-14, March 1976; Ford Foundation, Nuc/ear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the
AJuc/ear Energy Po/icy Study Group, 1977. Note on U.S. program: Items 9-15 refer to the program as it stood in April 1977, The plan and schedule has been in
revision since then, but it is not yet available.
U. S. S. R.: United States Nuclear Power Reactor Delegation, Report of the ~Jnited States Nuclear Power Reactor Delegation Visit to the U. S. S. R,, June 1-13,
1975, 1975.
SOURCE: International Energy Associates Limited, 1980.
As a source of centrally generated electricity, the breeder has been proven feasible at the
pilot plant scale and at an intermediate
scale but awaits demonstration at commercial
scale that is the 1,000-MW size of new conventional reactors. Its operating characteristics are expected to be similar to a conventional (light water) reactor, except that it will
have higher thermal efficiency and therefore
less thermal pollution. Breeders may also in
principle be used for industrial process heat.
The Russian breeder BNR-600 produces electricity and desalinated water.
The technology was demonstrated at a pilot
plant scale in the United States in 1963, when a
10-MW reactor named EBR-II started producing electricity in Idaho. Between the 1960s
and 1970s, technical leadership shifted from
the United States to France. The Phenix which
has produced electricity for more than 5 years
at Marcoule, France, demonstrated successful
scaling from 10 to 250 MW, but suffered some
technical problems that required the plant to
shut down for more than a year. Its breeding
rate is considered too slow for commercial use,
and some components (especially steam gen-
erators) are not extrapolatable to commercial

size. France, together with the Federal
Republic of Germany and Italy, is now building a 1,250-MW reactor incorporating an improved design Superphenix at CreysMalville. Due to go critical in 1985, it will be
the first commercial prototype breeder.
The time until commercialization of the
breeder is 5 to 20 years depending on which
breeder technology (French or U. S.) is meant.
On the face of it, commercial readiness will
occur in 1985, assureing success of the Superphenix. After that, France plans an aggressive
program of breeder deployment, starting a new
plant every 2 years for the rest of the century. *
The French central utility (EdF) has already
ordered the first two of these commercial
plants. Progress on the U.S. plant comparable
to the Phenix (the Clinch River breeder) has
stalled, and its technology is outmoded in
some respects. Some argue this intermediate
plant step should be skipped to go to a commercial-size or nearly commercial-size plant.
*A reevaluation of these plans is apparently underway in

France following the recent election
The Ieadtime for constructing a conventional

nuclear plant in the United States is 12 years
and design and construction of a full-scale
breeder prototype under the same ground rules
could take 15 years. Thus, U.S. breeder technology could be commercialized sometime in
the 1990s, depending on the development sequence.
The major difference between the French
and American technologies is whether the
reactor vessel uses a loop or pool method
of bathing the core with Iiquid sodium coolant.
The pool method is simpler, has more thermal
inertia, and is considered by the French to be
an added safety factor. The loop method is
more similar to conventional reactor technology and has been tested on an intermediatescale U.S. breeder used for fuel development
(the FFTF). Britain and France espouse the pool
approach; the United States and Japan use the
loop method; and the Soviet Union and the
Federal Republic of Germany are testing both.
In principle, a U.S. utility could order a
Superphenix reactor now for delivery in the
early 1990s and in that sense the breeder
could be said to be commercially available
already. But no utility would invest in a central
nuclear plant without reasonable assurance it
would be reliable and could be Iicensed in this
country. The licensability of the French technology is an open question.
The RD&D cost of commercializing the
breeder is uncertain because the national
policy for 1976-80 was to not deploy the
breeder. It is also dependent on the demonstration strategy chosen (i. e., whether to go
straight to a commercial prototype). Estimates
made by the U.S. program managers in 1975 of
$10 billion to $15 billion for commercial demonstration should stilI apply.
The obstacles that the breeder program
must overcome before commercialization are
not primarily technical. There is little doubt
that a strong breeder RD&D effort could result
in a reactor that utilities could order in a few
decades. The questions are economic and institutional and generic to nuclear power. For
the purposes of this discussion, the economic
questions are less important. Unless the

breeder costs are so high that it is uneconomic
compared to other options, the major concerns
are related to light-water reactors. These will
not greatly affect the SPS decision.
Deployment of the breeder is predicated on
the continued expansion of light-water reactors. The problems facing the industry are
complex and difficult as discussed in the section on conventional nuclear reactors above. If
these problems are not resolved, the fission option will be foreclosed, at least as a major
energy source. Fusion may also be threatened.
The breeder exacerbates some of these problems. Proliferation of nuclear weapons will be
considerably harder to control if breeders are
worldwide articles of commerce. While this
might not have a direct bearing on a utilitys
decisionmaking process, the safeguards implemented to prevent diversion might be quite
onerous, and public opinion could be hostile.
Health and safety issues will be important
because of the plutonium and the operating
characteristics of the reactor. Waste disposal
will not be qualitatively different, but the vastly greater potential of breeders to produce
waste make the problem greater, especially if
disposal sites are difficult to find. While these
problems, individually or collectively, need
not be overwhelming, they can all adversely affect a utilitys inclination to order a nuclear
pIant. As long as a utility has a choice within a
reasonable economic range, it is likely to
select the less controversial options. Thus,
while breeders could in principle supply all the
electric power needed in the 21st century, they
may in fact supply Iittle or none.
4. Fusion. Of the future energy sources
considered here as competitors to the SPS, fusion is the furthest from realization. Fusion
consists of nuclear reactions that are created
by bringing together light nuclei at speeds
great enough to exceed their mutual repulsive
force. The result of this reaction is the creation
of nuclear energy that is carried off by neutrons and/or charged particles, depending on
the nature of the reactants. In order to create
this reaction it is necessary to: 1 ) raise the
temperature of the fusion fuel to very high
Ch. 6SPS in Context
levels and, 2) confine the fuel for sufficient

time. The criterion to be met by these two conditions is that more energy is released by the
nuclear reactions than is used to heat and confine the fuel that is in a wispy, gaseous form
(plasma).
Since the fusion reaction would be rapidly
cooled by the reactor walls, containment by
solid materials is not possible. Such an approach would quench the plasma. This difficulty, incidently, would also make a fusion
reactor easier to turn off, making it safer than
fission. Two alternate approaches are being
taken: using a magnetic field in one of many
possible shapes that have been proposed,
(magnetic fusion); and using a laser or ion
beam to produce a miniexplosion of the fuel in
solid form so that confinement occurs by the
inertia of the fuel (inertially confined fusion or
ICF). The second approach draws on nuclear
weapons work for some of its research and is
partially classified. The discussion to follow
will center on the magnetic approaches.
Among different magnetic confinement conceptsor types of magnetic bottles the
leading contender is a toroidal shape called
the tokamak, after the Russian acronym given
by its inventors. As a reactor, it would be considerably more complex than a conventional
powerplant. The mixture of deuterium and
tritium fuel planned for use in first-generation
fusion reactors burns at a very high temperature, 100 million 0 C. The natural current in a
tokamak system is not sufficient for heating
the fuel that hot, so additional and complex
heating systems are required. The fusion core
will be large enough that electrical losses in
the magnets would be a significant drain on
the output of the plant, unless superconducting magnets are developed specifically for fusion applications. Other complexities arise
from the fuel requirements and operating requirements. Any fusion system must breed half
its fuel (the tritium component), and tokamak
systems currently under development must
operate in a pulsed (few hour) mode rather
than a continuous power mode.
These factors make fusion more complex
than either conventional reactors or breeders.
119
Particular difficulties in understanding the

behavior of the fusion fuel in its very hot
(plasma) state explain why scientists have had
so much difficulty making progress in fusion
research (which began in 1954).
Fusion is unique among future energy technologies because it has not yet been proven
technically feasiblethat is to say, no controlled fusion reaction has yet operated in a
self-sustaining fashion or produced electricity
even on a small scale. It has a broad range of
potential applications, e.g., electricity production, high temperature process heat, synthetic
fuel production, and fissile fuel production.
The fusion community can point to a recent
string of successful experiments as evidence
that fusion is on the verge of a scientific
breakthrough. One of the goals is breakeven, meaning the achievement of positive
net energy production. DOE expects breakeven to be achieved before 1985, and a recent
review by the research oversight board of
D O E9 concluded that fusion was ready to
move from the research stage to the engineering development stage. Nevertheless, the
weaker understanding of the principles of controlled fusion compared to other energy technologies means that more emphasis is necessarily being placed on basic research. Consequently, the engineering-related considerations that influence commercial readiness and
acceptabilitythat is the technical, economic, and environmental factors are more
uncertain than for breeders, solar thermal, PV
or SPS.
Despite the high degree of uncertainty,
much more can be said about the engineering
features of fusion than was possible a few
years ago, based on a set of thorough and
detailed engineering studies. Using the tokamak as a reference system, a powerplant is
likely to be in the range of 500 to 1,500 MW,
with 1,000 MW being the nominal planning
size. A tokamak fusion reactor would operate
as a baseload plant, with capacity factors, construction Ieadtimes, plant lifetimes, land,
labor, and materials requirements similar to
9ERAB Report (DOE), 1980
conventional nuclear plants. The high-technology core would constitute a substantially

larger percentage of the total plant than for
conventional (or breeder) nuclear plants, and
fusion would have some unusual maintenance
problems that arise from the character of the
fusion reaction itself. Since the nature of the
fusion core must be considered hypothetical
until technical feasibility is proven, the economics of fusion is perhaps the most uncertain
characteristic at this time. Two different engineering studies prepared at the University of
Wisconsin 10 and Argonne National Laboratory put the busbar costs at 75 and 44 mills/
kW respectively (in 1980 dollars).
Because of the special character of fusion,
estimates of the timetable to commercial readiness vary widely. A recent survey of opinion
found the majority of estimates to fall between 2000 and 2025, with some as early as
1990 and a few extending to the 22d century or
never. 2 It appears unlikely that fusion will be
commercialized before 2010 the earliest IikeIy date for SPS and the present DOE program
is on a schedule calling for demonstration in
2015, with the dates 1995 or 2000 considered
possible at increased cost. The DOE program
calls for two steps after breakeven in 1985, the
first a fusion engineering demonstration in
1990 that produces thermal power but no electricity. Pending success with this plant, a fusion demonstration plant would be started by
about 2000, that could produce 500 to 1,000
MW of electricity. However, more steps are
likely to be needed prior to commercialization. Fusion research is in such an early phase
vis-a-vis other technologies that it is difficult to
determine reliably the path to commercial
fusion.
To be commercialized, fusion must also find
public acceptability. From an environmental,
health, and safety standpoint, the principle advantage of fusion over fission power is that
O NUWMAK A Tokamak Reactor Design Study, Fusion Englneerlng Program, Nuclear Engineering Department, University
of Wisconsin UWFDM-330, March 1979
1
Argonne National Laboratory, Start;re
Chase Delphi Study on Fusion, First Round Results, Chase
Manhattan Bank, September 1979
there is no conceivable possibility of a runaway reaction. But first-generation fusion

plants will use relatively large quantities of
tritium, a radioactive gas harmful to humans.
Advanced fusion fuel cycles would greatly
reduce the quantity of tritium that must be
handled. To make fusion safe, the problem of
handling industrial quantities of tritium without routine small emissions will have to be
solved. There will also be a substantial waste
disposal problem, because the first wall of
the containment chamber for magnetic systems will have to be replaced every few years
due to radiation damage. Since the replaceable wall may be up to 1-m thick, the quantity of waste could be high, measured in the tens
or hundreds of tons per reactor per year. This
material will be highly radioactive and wilI present a long-term waste disposal problem,
though the radioactivity will not be as longIived as conventional fission reactor wastes.
The amount and lifetime of radioactive
material can possibly be reduced substantially
by using other materials for the first wall
without changing the nature of the fusion reaction. Analogous changes for fission reactors
are not possible since the waste material
generated is an inherent part of the fuel element. Finally, fusion carries some proliferation
risk because the energetic neutrons of the fusion reaction comprise a high quality source
for producing weapons material. It is conceivable that unless proper safeguards are
developed, a world full of fusion reactors
could be highly proliferation prone. However,
there are many other technologies that are
available or could be available for the same
purposes earlier, more readily, and more
cheaply than fusion.
To a degree, fusion may also inherit the
public acceptance problems of nuclear fission.
Fusion is a different technology, with fewer intrinsic risks but greatly increased complexity.
But since it is a nuclear technology, even if it
turns out to be relatively benign compared to
fission, it may remain associated with conventional nuclear power in the public mind.
The greatest uncertainty in the development
of fusion remains the physics associated with
breakeven. Although many of these uncertainties can be resolved by small experiments

costing on the order of $1 million to $10
million, complete resolution will still require a
few large sophisticated experiments, costing in
excess of $1 billion. It should be noted,
however, that the nature of the fusion reactioc
is such that a demonstration reactor wouId require very little increase in scale or cost from
these large experiments. The total cost to develop fusion to the stage of commercial
viability depends significantly on the cost of
this hardware and is projected by DOE to be
$20 billion to $30 billion. If more than two major steps are needed before a commercial prototype can be built, the cost will be somewhat
higher.
5. Comparisons of Central Electrics. -Because
each of these future electric technologies is
designed for use in a central plant mode, they
are best compared in the context of a utility
companys needs. If each of the different technologies were at the same stage of development, comparison based on projected power
costs would be the most powerful and appropriate method of analysis, particularly if all
were close to commercial maturity. But the
five are at quite different states of technical
maturity so much so that even the definitions used for commercial maturity used in
the different programs may be qualitatively
different. Lacking information that may take 5
to 20 years to acquire, a close look was taken
at other characteristics, with particular attention to propertiessuch as complexity, health
effects, and safety which past experience has
shown to be closely related to both capital and
operating costs<
After costs, the most important issue the
utilities must consider in deciding to risk
capital on a particular investment in a generating technology is the way in which a plant is
expected to function and its associated impacts. Can the proposed technology be successfully integrated in the grid and meet the
associated requirements for reliability and
capacity? These issues are discussed for the
SPS in chapter 9. This section will highlight the
83-316 0 - 81 - 9
factors most important for the other central

base load technologies.
Scale of Power Output. Plants must be
designed on a scale that can be readily integrated into the existing grid at the time of deployment. Using the rule of thumb that no one
plant should comprise more than 10 to 12 percent of the systems capacity to guarantee integrity of the grid during a plant failure, the
largest plant that could be presently accommodated by a single utility in the United States
would be 2,500 MW, and that only by the Tennessee Valley Authority. (See ch. 9. for a
discussion of this issue.) Cooperative agreements among utiIities on the same grid can expand the maximum acceptable size. Current
baseload plants generate from 500 to 1,300
MW. Both fusion and breeder plants are planned to fit closely within this range. Very large
powerplants (greater than 1,500 MW) were the
rule in fusion planning several years ago, but
encouraging new research results coupled with
new interest in smaller powerplants allowed
fusion engineering designers to direct efforts
toward conceptual designs in line with present
powerplant scales. Larger plants would mean
improved economies of scale for the breeder
(as it would for fusion), but for utility compatibility reasons (as well as licensability), the
projected size of the breeder has also been
kept below 1,500 MW.
Solar thermal and solar PV pIants achieve
their economies of scale at much lower outputs100 to 200 MW maximum. Both can
function economically at still smaller scales.
Photovoltaics are modular and economic at a
few kilowatts or less.
Only the reference system SPS appears to
have economies of scale that make it impractical at a size that can be accommodated by
the present utility systems. Whether it could be
accommodated in future utility systems depends on the growth of future electric demand. Smaller microwave systems or a laser
system would fit the utility grid more readily.
Reliability and Capacity Factor. Prior to
the demonstration of a technology, both its
capacity factor and its projected reliability are

subject to considerable uncertainty. However,
it is expected that breeders will operate much
as conventional light water reactors do today,
with capacity factors of 60 to 75 percent and
forced outage rates (that is, unplanned shutdowns) of less than 15 percent.
The steam and electric generation parts of
fusion plants are expected to be similar to conventional reactors and breeders. But the fusion
core will be much more complex than the
nuclear parts of a conventional or breeder
plant. One indication of this is that the fusion
core is expected to represent a much larger
fraction of the plant investment (50 v. 10 percent for nuclear). Because of the vast uncertainties surrounding the actual operating
characteristics of fusion technology, it is impossible to predict what capacity factors and
forced outage rates are likely to be. It is clear
that to compete with breeders or light water
reactors, fusion should be just as reliable and
capable as they are.
Solar thermal is a steam technology, with a
balance of plant that will be similar to, though
smaller than, that for a conventional baseload
plant. The solar-thermal part will be chiefly
vulnerable to failure of the heliostats or the
boiler. The heliostat fields could have tracking
or maintenance problems, the boilers could
have materials and integrity problems due to
the high solar flux. Nevertheless, it is projected
to operate with reliability similar to other
steam technologies 60 to 90 percent.
Solar PV is the simplest technology, without
steam systems or moving parts or (necessarily)
high solar flux, if flat plate systems prove most
economic. Because it is simple, the reliability
of solar PV is expected to be very high (greater
than 90 percent). There may be unsuspected
durability problems with some solar PV cells,
however. Although PV are an intrinsically simple technology, it currently has higher material
and manufacturing costs than other alternatives. Both solar thermal and solar PV have
an inherent limitation of plant capacity factor,
due to the daily and yearly variation of ambient sunlight, which differs with latitude and
climate. In the Southwestern United States, the

capacity factor of a plant without storage
would be 23 to 25 percent. Storage for a solar
thermal or solar PV plant redistributes the collected energy to other times of day, but does
not appreciably change the amount of energy
CoIIected per year per acre of plant area.
The SPS would circumvent the 25-percent
capacity factor limitation of terrestrial solar
plants by being exposed in space to direct
sunlight 24 hours per day all year (except for
brief, predictable eclipses if located in geostationary orbit, or unpredictable cloud cover if a
laser or mirror system). The question with SPS
is not solar capacity but availability. As with
fusion, it is impossible to predict just how
reliable the SPS wouId be. As a system it is very
complicated, involving a massive transportation system, untried satellite technology, and
large ground systems. Reliability factors as
high as 95 percent have been predicted for the
operation of the satellite and rectenna combined, 13 but they have not taken into account
the entire SPS system, including maintenance
and repair. Research on transportation and
space platforms will provide considerable insight into the expected reliability of the
satelIite.
Complexity. Given the extreme range of
physical requirements for a sustained, controlled fusion reaction, fusion is clearly the
most complex technology under consideration, requiring a plasma hotter than the core of
the Sun, powerful large superconducting
magnets bigger than any yet built, and
materials problems in a radiation environment
more severe than that of the breeder. The
reference system SPS is less complex than fusion, since it uses more nearly proven technologies. Nevertheless, the overall engineering
and logistics problems of the SPS could make
it an undertaking that approaches the complexity of fusion when all the technical hurdles
are considered. It should be noted, for in-
SPS/Utlllty Grid Operations, sec 14 of Boeing Corp , rep o r t No D 180-25461-3
stance, that the SPS as it is described in the

reference system could only begin to be
assembled as a system after major breakthroughs in two other technologiesspace
transportation and PV are achieved.
The breeder is considerably less complex
than either the SPS or fusion, but is more complex than conventional nuclear systems. The
main potential difficulties are the nuclear
properties of the breeder core, the peculiarities of the liquid metal coolant, and the potential difficulties of the breeder fuel cycle.
Although these factors are incremental additions to the complexity of a nuclear pIant, they
are the driving factors behind the projections
that the breeder will cost 25 to 100 percent
more than a light water reactor (LWR).
The solar thermal plant is also a steam
system that has much of the complexity of
other steam systems, such as coal or nuclear,
mitigated by the reduced size of the plant and
the modularity of the heliostat field. There
may be special problems in having a central
plant boiler at the top of a tall tower, but solar
thermal plants appear to be less complex than
nuclear, fusion or SPS technologies. Their complexity may be comparable to current baseIoad coal technologies.
Central PV plants have by far the least complexity of the alternatives discussed here, for
two reasons. First, the basic technology is simple, modular, and should be manufactured
cheaply if the experience with mass-produced
semiconductor products holds as expected.
Second, the additional technology needed for
a central plant is electrical rather than mechanical or thermal, and is already proven at
the appropriate scale.
Costs. The cheapest acceptable technologies available in any future time period will
be the ones deployed, so cost is the most important and most problematic factor. Two
aspects of technology cost will be discussed.
The busbar cost is the cost at which truly commercial versions of the various electric technologies will produce power. The opportunity
cost is the total cost of RD&D for a technology
from inception through the construction of a
commercial prototype pIant. It is the cost of

lost opportunities in other areas for which the
money could have been spent. A component
of the opportunity cost is the cost of the commercial prototype itself, which is the demonstration cost.
The busbar cost is the actual cost of producing electricity with a technology when capital
costs, fuel costs (if any) and operation and
maintenance costs have been considered. For
current technologies, these costs are wellknown and therefore detailed comparisons between technologies are possible. However,
even for current technologies the task can be
difficultwitness the debate over whether
coal or conventional nuclear is cheaper. For
future technologies, the task is much more uncertain. Therefore, cost estimates of delivered
electricity are of Iittle use in deciding between
technologies in early development stages. Furthermore, technologies reach commercialization at different times. Therefore, cost estimates for one technology are more reliable
than for another, with the most fully developed technologies having the most thoroughly tested cost data. For example, coal
plant costs are well known, but breeder costs
are less so, and fusion costs are much less so.
Though it is a current technology, the future
costs of PV for onsite, central, or SPS plants,
depend strongly on the future costs and efficiencies of PV cells and are consequently uncertain as well. A final note on busbar cost estimates is that as a technology matures, the
projected cost may fall (as has happened with
computers) but much more often rises. The
maturation effect of costs during R&D has
been particularly borne out in aerospace and
energy technologies.14 15
Although busbar cost estimates are useful in
the research phase to identify cost sensitivities
and indicate preferred research directions to
reduce costs, they become crucial at the
U S G e n e r a l A c c o u n t i n g o f f i c e , N e e d f o r Improved
Reporting and Cost Estimating on Major Unmanned Satellite
lroject~, PSAD-75-190, 1975.
F W Merrow, S W Chapel, and C Worthing, A Revtew of
(-ost E ~tlmatlon in New Technologies Impllcatlons for Energy
Irecess Plants, R-2481-DOE, Rand Corp , 1979
deployment phase. The DOE prepared cost

estimates for coal, light water reactors, coal
gasification systems using combined cycle
systems, LMFBR breeders, peaking terrestrial
PV plants, fusion and the SPS (fig. 28). The
figure indicates the high and low ends of the
range of estimates for each technology in
2000. It shows that capital costs do indeed increase with complexity, rising steadily for coal,
LWR, LMFBR, fusion, and SPS systems. Costs
are also relatively high for the terrestrial PV.
Although it is an unlikely circumstance, the
chart indicates that alI could cost the same in
2000.
all cases), and the assumption of baseload

operation for each technology. As noted
above, these numbers may be indicative but
are Iimited in their use because the uncertainty
range represented by the range of costs means
different things for each different technology.
Factors that are small contributors to the
estimated costs may have uncertainties that
are substantial (such as nuclear waste disposal
costs) but are difficult to identify and measure.
Finally, baseload operation is not necessarily
the most attractive operating mode for solar
thermal and solar PV though it provides a basis
for comparison.
OTA prepared estimates that considered

these future electric technologies including fusion (but not combined cycles), in terms of
their busbar costs in 2010. The resuIts are given
in table 17, using common financial considerations, equal capacity factors (65 percent in
RD&D Costs. One of the most difficult

tasks in choosing the wisest course for RD&D is
to maintain the proper balance between the
risks and the potential payoffs associated with
a particular line of research. The goal is to
minimize the risk and maximize the payoff. In
energy research, the risk is associated with the
expenditure of RD&D funds for a project that
could conceivably fail. The hoped-for payoff is
cheap energy. The associated RD&D funds required to pursue some of the future electric
options under consideration are so great that it
is Iikely that not al I can be pursued at an optimum rate. By according priority to some, opportunities for payoffs from others will be
foregone.
P r o g r a m A s s e s s m e n t R e p o r t s t a t e m e n t o f f i n d i n g s , SPS
Con-
cept and Evaluation Program, DOE/E R-0085, 1980
Figure 28.Levelized Lifecycle Cost of Electricity
As the matrix of table 16 makes clear, SPS

wiII have the highest front-end costs by a considerable margin, followed by fusion and the
breeder. The solar thermal and solar PV systems will have lower RD&D costs, in the range
of $0.5 biIIion to $2 billion.
Levelized generation cost (1978 mills/kWh)
SOURCE: Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings, SPS Concept and Evaluation Program, DOE/E R-0085, 1980.
The costs of the breeder will be largein

the range of $10 billion to $15 billion
assuming the United States does not change
the present policy of developing domestic
rather than foreign technology. But this figure
is nevertheless comparable to the front end
costs of other centralized energy technologies.
Cumulative RD&D for light water reactors, for
instance, is estimated to have total led $10
billion. Fusions costs will be the same or
somewhat higher, estimated at $20 billion to
$30 billion, including a commercial prototype
Ch. 6SPS in Context
125
Table 17.Summary Assessment
Technology
Prospective
Relative
economic-cost
range a (1 980 $) environmental
(mills per kWh)
costs
Scientific
Engineering/
technical
Commercial
Satellite power system . . . . . . .

Solar photovoltaic with storage
Solar thermal with storage. . . .
Breeder reactors . . . . . . . . . . . .
80-440
65-86
62-89
58-73
Unknown
Negligible
Negligible
Substantial
Proven b
Proven
Proven
Proven
Unproven
Proven
Proven
Proven
Unproven
Unproven
Proven
Fusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44-75C
Unproven
LWR-201O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58
Proven
Proven
LWR-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
Moderatesubstantial
Moderatesubstantial
Proven
Commercial
readiness
(year)
2005-2015
Late 1980s
Late 1980s
2000
?
Operational
aPlant starting in 2010.

bEnvironmental impact still unknown, other aspects generallY accepted.
CN ote this range reflects differences between two studies estimates (footnotes 1 Cl and 11 On p 120).
aMassive scale-up of known technologies.
SOURCE: OTA working paper.
plant. Fusion and the breeder may thus compete with each other for R&D funds.
The costs of the SPS will be substantially
higher than for any of the other options, at an
estimated figure of $40 biIIion to $100 bilIion. 7
The high number assumes all space development and pIant investment costs are allocated
to the SPS (see ch. 5), while the lower number
assumes the total cost but allocates $60 bill ion
to other space programs that could benefit
from the same technical capability.
The SPS RD&D cost is so high that commitment to it could foreclose fusion or the
breeder. As such, a decision at some point in
the future to commit to the SPS would be a
decision with potentially far-reaching consequences.
In fact, the SPS is the first proposed energy
option whose RD&D costs enter the budgetary
range that has previously been limited to very
high-technology, high-cost national defense
programs such as the MX missile system. That
system, as proposed, will cost $34 billion to
$50 billion. Thus, from a policy point of view,
the SPS is qualitatively different from any
other proposed long-range energy solution.
Institutional Impacts. Neither fusion nor
fission requires much that is new institutionally because their size, health and environ men170TA Workshop on Technical OptIons, December 1979
tal impacts, and operating structure are similar

to current LWR technology. As technologies
used in the centralized mode, the solar technologies will not require different institutional
attention than do any other peaking or intermediate plant. As dispersed plants, they are
likely to be subject to a much different regulatory regime 8 and utility structure that encompasses a much broader technological scope
than is now the case.
SPS, however, because it is a space system
requiring very high capital investment, would
likely involve an institutional structure very
unlike those in use today in the utility industry
(see ch. 9). The main point is that the utilities
are unlikely to want to invest directly in
satellites, or perhaps even rectennas. It will
create far fewer regulatory and capital problems for the utilities for them to buy power
from a single SPS corporation and incorporate
It directly into their grid. A national S P S
monopoly would necessarily be federally, as
welI as internationally regulated (see ch. 7).
National Security Risks. Both of the nuc I ear technologies u rider consideration
(breeders and fusion) can be used to generate
weapons material and therefore they carry
some risk of increasing nuclear weapons proliferation. The terrestrial solar technologies
.
Technology
Office
of
Assessment r
U.S. Congress,
Decentralized Electric Energy Generation Systems, upcoming
report, fal I 1981
seem to have purely beneficial national security effects, however. They can be exported and
used around the world for peaceful purposes.
Because they would be used in relatively small
units, they would be much less vulnerable than
any larger unit and less of a military risk for a
country selling the technology.
SPS would have indirect military potential,
largely from the technology that would be
developed for space transportation and space
construction. However, the system itself would
serve as a poor weapon. The question of vulnerability of an SPS system to nuclear or other
attack is a different issue. On the whole it is Iittle more vulnerable than any of the larger terrestrial electricity options (see ch. 7).
Economic Risks of RD&D Failure. In
general, the risks of failure are tied directly to
the opportunity costs for the different central
electric technologies. Therefore, the risks are
higher for fusion and SPS than for any of the
others. However, the financial risks of failure
may be mitigated if some of the RD&D costs
are recoverable for other uses. For example,
the space spinoffs from developing the SPS
could be significant (an upgraded shuttle,
space platform technology, an orbital transfer
vehicle technology, high powered microwave
or laser transmission devices), which would
reduce the economic risks. Here, as in the
strictly research phase of an SPS program, it is
very important to be cognizant of other space
and energy programs that could benefit from
dollars spent on SPS research and vice versa.
Safety and Health Risks. OTA pursued no
independent study of health and safety risks of
the five technologies. This assessment has
therefore relied on the work of Argonne National Laboratory that was funded by the SPS
office of DOE. 9 The reader is referred to its
report for a comprehensive treatment of the
problem (see also app. D). The Argonne study
attempted to quantify risks in terms of the
number of fatalities that would occur per year
for a specified plant output (see fig. 29). Some
of the issues are unquantifiable, and for the
Figure 29. Quantified Health Effects

77
10.0
Operation and
maintenance, public
Operation and
maintenance, occupational
Construction, mfr.
LWR CG/CC LMFBR CTPV SPS MCFusion

& cc
SOURCE Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings, SPS Concept
and Evaluation Program, DOE/ER-0085, 1980.
SPS and fusion, most of the issues are in this

category. The difficulty of quantifying issues
for SPS and fusion is a function of the uncertainties about the final configuration these
technologies will take as well as the lack of experience with them upon which to base estimates of fatalities. This is an area that needs
considerable further study, not only for SPS
but in every other comparative study of energy
technologies. The major needs are to put all
the data on as common a basis as possible and
to quantify risks where they are currently unquantified (see ch. 8 for a summary of SPS
health and safety risks).
Environmental Risks. As with health and
safety risks, OTA attempted no independent
analysis and has relied on the comparative
assessment study of Argonne National Laboratory. 20 Table 18 summarizes the most important environmental effects for each of the
technologies under study, plus coal. The nuclear technologies have been grouped together
because their effects are common to all the
nuclear technologies.
L J H abegger, J R G a s p e r , a n d C D B r o w n , H e a l t h a n d
SafttV Pr~~llmlnary
(G R Woodcock, Solar Power Satellites ~nd the Evolution

of Space Technology, presented at A I AA Meeting, May 1980
Comparative
Assessment
of
t h e SPS a n d
O t h e r F ntrgy Alternatlve~, DOE report No DOE/E R-0053, April

1 98()
Ch. 6SPS in Context . 127
Table 18.Major Environmental Risks

Coal
Air pollution
Atmospheric changes
(CO 2 , particulate)
Esthetic deterioration
Land use
Nuclear
Catastrophic events
Land use
Thermal discharge waste
disposal
SPS
Atmospheric changes
Bioeffects from microwaves,
lasers, reflected light
Electromagnetic disturbance
Land use
Other factors. How well would SPS compete with other baseload electric technologies? This question can ultimately be
answered only in the context of overall demand for electricity, considerations that are
taken up at the end of this chapter. However, if
demand for electricity is such that SPS may be
needed to supply a portion of that demand,
then the competitive position of SPS vis-a-vis
the other technologies will depend primarily
on its being cost competitive, and presenting
comparable health or environmental hazards
to the other technologies. Other utility concerns such as its reliability and rated capacity
factor have direct and obvious economic impacts that are subsumed in the condition of its
being cost competitive. It is too early to tell
whether SPS can compete effectively. What is
clear, however, is that factors beyond the
scope of control of an SPS program may determine more effectively whether SPS is competitive than the important concerns over
costs or health and environmental effects. The
effects of reduced coal useage are examined
below. However, before the United States
needs to decide whether it is prudent to continue or expand coal burning (c 2000), it must
make a decision about the use of breeder reactors (c 1990). If we institute a strong breeder
program, then SPS is less likely to be needed
than otherwise, simply because breeders are
apparently cheaper to build and operate than
the SPS. They have the further competitive advantage that they strongly resemble LWRS,
both in operating characteristics and in health,
safety and environmental impacts.21 Thus, utilities are more Iikely to purchase breeders than
to take on a brand new technology whose maE. P Levine, et al , Comparative Assessment of Environmental Welfare Effects of the Satellite Power Sytem and Other
Energy Alternatives, DOE report No DOE/E R-0055, April 1980
jor resemblance to terrestrial technologies is

the fact that it produces electricity. However,
perhaps more important is the fact that
breeders could play a significant role in supplying electricity 10 to 20 years before the SPS,
thus giving them an automatic competitive advantage.
Although the fusion program has not yet
proven that it is possible to generate more
energy than is fed to the fusion process, the fusion community is confident that the production of electricity from fusion is a matter of
continued R&D. The costs are more uncertain
than for SPS. However, fusion has a strong
followlng inside and outside the fusion community. Furthermore, the utilities are already
actively pursuing fusion studies. Therefore, if
fusions costs turn out to be competitive with
SPS, it too may be chosen over SPS because it
has a strong following and because beyond the
first wall, it is similar to other nuclear options
in the way in which it generates electricity.
However, it may not be capable of making a
significant impact on the supply of electricity
untiI welI after SPS, i.e., not until 2030 or later.
Because several proposed versions of the
SPS are designed to use PV cells, a terrestrial
PV system constitutes an obvious comparison
to the SPS. The satellite or SOLARES ground
site would receive continuous sunlight. A terrestrial system, however, receives constantly
varying sunlight. Table 19 compares the peak
and total annual insolation in space, at a
SOLARES ground station and in Boston and
Phoenix for an optimally tilted flat-plate, nontracking solar collector. Therefore, a terrestrial
PV in Phoenix the size of a reference system
rectenna would, in theory, be capable of producing as much electricity on a yearly basis as
the reference satellite. However, the output of
Table 19.Terrestrial and Space Insolation Compared

Peak insolation (per
square meter)
1.3 kW
Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SOLARES GND Station (29 latitude). . . . . . . . .
1.3 kW
0.8 kW
Boston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.0 kW
Phoenix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equivalent rectenna area for reference
system35 latitude. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Average annual
insolation (per
square meter)
11,800 kWh
9,734 kWh
1,430 kWh
2,410 kWh
Area needed to produce 1,000 MW

(per continuous output on Earth
(17-percent efficiency cells)
28 km2
10
6
44
26
km2
km2
km2
km2
.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,
such a central terrestrial system would be subject to short-term and seasonal variations in
output due to fluctuations in insolation
brought out by cloud cover. This effect is illustrated in table 20 for the Boston and
Phoenix areas. The daily insolation for the
month of December is 28-percent less than for
the average month, resulting in 28- percent less
PV output for the same sized array. Phoenix,
by contrast, experiences average insolation
values only 14 percent lower than the average
in July, its month of lowest insolation.
Decentralized Electrical Generation
Although technologies that are capable of
producing electricity in a dispersed mode may
not be direct competitors of centralized
technologies, they will compete for a percentage share of overall electricity supply in this
country and the world. In 1977, the residential
sector of the electrical market constituted 36
percent of this Nations demand for electricity.
If a significant portion of this demand as well
as part of the demand for commercial and industrial consumption can be met by dispersed
technologies such as solar PV, wind, and
biomass at costs that are competitive with centralized electricity, then the demand for centrally produced electricity will drop. Low demand for centrally produced electricity will in
turn reduce the need for new, large-scale
generating technologies and place them in a
poor competitive position with respect to
proven technologies. Thus, it is of considerable
interest to investigate the role that dispersed
electrical technologies may play in the Nations energy future.
Dispersed modes of generating electricity

are first and foremost attractive in remote
regions where the electricity grid has not yet
penetrated. It is in these areas where windmills
and PV, with storage, are now being installed
even though their cost is high relative to the
price of grid-supplied electricity.
As experience with these technologies
grows, and their price decreases due to deeper
market penetration and increased commensurate production, they are likely to penetrate
areas that are now served by the utilities. Such
a shift will be aided by the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) that
requires utilities to purchase electricity from
renewable-based powerplants at their avoided
cost of power. To date, State regulatory commissions have established prices that are equal
to, or higher than, the retail price of electricity.
If this practice should continue into the mid1980s, onsite electrical generating systems will
not only provide energy for their owners use,
but will become income generators as well.
This shift will be further aided by the attractiveness of modular units that allow a homeowner or community to become relatively selfreliant and independent of large-scale generating systems over which they have little control.
Additionally, onsite systems can be erected
rapidly and incrementally, allowing a close
match of supply to local demand. Under such
conditions, it can be expected that there would
be a rapid increase in demand for small-scale
systems.
The role of dispersed electrical generating
technology in the Nations electrical supply is
Ch. 6SPS in Context
129
Table 20.Terrestrial Insolation at Different Latitudes and Climates

Boston: Latitude 42.2
kWh/m
kWh/m 2/month
Jan.
Feb.
3.4
104
3.7
104
Mar.
4.1
126
Apr.
4.0
119
May
4.4
135
June - J u l y
4.3
4.6
129
142
Aug.
4.4
137
Sept.
4.4
131
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
4.1
126
3.0
90
2.8
85
Total insolation per year 1,430 kWh/m2

Average daily insolation:
3.9 kWh/m2
Phoenix: Latitude 33.3
Jan.
2
kWh/m /day
kWh/m 2/month
6.0
184
Feb.
7.0
195
Mar.
7.4
228
Apr.
7.5
225
May
6.6
204
June
6.2
186
July
5.7
178
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
6.2
185
7.0
218
7.3
227
6.7
200
6.0
185
Total insolation per year 2,414 kWh/m2

Average daily insolation:
6.6 kWh/m2
SOURCE: Solar Photovoltaics: Applications Seminar, Planning Research Co
the subject of another OTA study that will

discuss the full array of dispersed electrical
technologies: wind, PV, and biomass. How
ever, because much of the technology for constructing space-rated solar cells will be applicable to terrestrial applications and vice
versa, this report explores the possible role of
dispersed PV systems in filling part of this
countrys electrical needs in the time frame of
the SPS.
Dispersed Photovoltaic Systems. The most
important single characteristic that makes PV
of considerable interest for dispersed uses is
their relative insensitivity to economies of
scale for generating electricity because PV are
modular, allowing considerable flexibility in
their location. Economies of scale are very important in their production, however. The present high cost of PV (about $7/peak watt) is
largely due to a very small production capacity. About 4.5 MW (peak) of terrestrial capacity
were produced globally in 1979, by only a
dozen manufacturers. Demand exceeds supply, however, even at $7/peak watt and thus
the market will surely expand, especially
as new manufacturing techniques allowing
cheaper PV are developed. All indications are
that continued reduction in price in line with
DOE cost goals will accelerate the demand for
PV cells for all applications and in particular
for dispersed systems that are either con-
nected to the utility grid or stand alone.

Meeting this cost goal is important for the SPS,
which in the reference design, is highly sensitive to PV array costs (34 percent of satellite
costs).
The total penetration of PV and other decentralized energy technologies into the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors of the
energy economy will depend on a number of
interrelated factors in addition to cost. The
following summary indicates the most important ones.
Average Available Sunlight. The best

areas for dispersed PV are the same ones
where centralized applications are most
plausible, i.e., in desert climates such as
the Southwestern United States. However,
the variation of regional average insolation across the continental United States
is less than a factor of two. Changes from
year to year are considerably less. Both effects are smaller than variations in energy
consumption and price patterns. Thus,
regional or annual insolation variations
are not likely to be a strong determinant
of PV penetration. This will be even more
true in areas where biomass and wind
systems can work in complementary
fashion with PVs.
Storage. Advances in storage technology

could have a significant effect on the market penetration of PV systems, particularly for remote and stand-alone applications. It is generally agreed, however, that
low-priced storage, if it is ever developed,
is a decade or two away.
The Use of Centralized Photovoltaic Systems. Using PV for peaking or intermediate generating capacity will enhance
the development of low-priced PV cells
and the auxillary equipment (mounting
panels, inverters, etc.) and speed the introduction of dispersed PV systems to
marginal areas (i. e., areas where the centrally generated electricity is cheaper than
onsite generation).
Conservation. Conservation has already
resulted in important reductions in percapita energy use. In the Washington,
D. C., area for example, use of electricity is
increasing by only 1.4 percent a year, 22 a
sharp contrast to the 7 percent yearly increase in consumption that was common
in the mid-1 970s. Continued price increases for energy will increase the desire
to conserve energy and make the total
needs of a residence, for instance, much
less. The Virginia Electric Power Co., for
example, reports that in its service area
all-electric homes, used about 24 MWhr/yr
in the mid-1 970s, but consumed only 19
MWhr for 1979,23 a 20-percent drop. Decreases in total consumption make it
more likely that PV systems can be sized
to meet the needs of the residential sector<
Other Dispersed Sources of Electrical
Power. The acceptance of wind and biomass for dispersed electrical generation,
or as substitutes for electricity, may enhance the desire for photovoltaics as individuals and the utilities become accustomed to working with dispersed sources.
However, if other sources failed to make a
significant impact because they were expensive or because they didnt work well,
?>wfa5h;ngton Post, Mar 25, 1981, P D-9

Washington Post, June 23,1980, p B-1
they could have the opposite effect on the

use of PVs.
Cost of Photovoltaics. Single-crystal
silicon cells are highly energy intensive.
Thus, the energy cost of producing them is
high, and if energy prices increase, the
cost of the cells will be higher than the
DOE goals. New production techniques
for amorphous silicon or other materials,
however, may lead to less energy intensive cells, and the problem could be
avoided.
Reliability y. One of the major reasons for
preferring centralized power generation is
the high reliability of electrical service.
Dispersed systems must be reliable in
order to capture a significant portion of
the electricity market. The PV themselves
are extremely reliable. However, the associated equipment is subject to a higher
failure rate. Market penetration will
therefore depend on a highly reliable
product and effective, timely service to
repair failures.
Institutional Effects. PURPA regulations
wiII enhance the use of dispersed-systems.
If these regulations are retained and if
they are carried out effectively on the
local level, then they will be effective in
speeding the introduction of dispersed
electrical capacity. However, a number of
negative effects (e. g., low reliability, high
costs, etc.), could cause such regulations
to be repealed if they are found to work
inefficientIy.
In summary, it can be said that the future of

dispersed electric systems, and PV in particular, is subject to considerable uncertainty.
If cost goals are met, and the effect of the
other factors is positive overall, then dispersed
electrical systems could make a significant
contribution especially in a future in which the
demand for electricity is relatively low. As
table 21 illustrates, the cost per kilowatt-hour
for grid-connected PV systems, though subject
to considerable uncertainty, is competitive
with baseload systems. By combining several
different kinds of dispersed sources of electricity (e.g., wind, PV, and biomass), the prospects for dispersed PV sales becomes even
Ch. 6SPS in Context
131
Table 21.Costs of Onsite Photovoltaics (1980/kWh)

Industry
Household
Without storage
Boston
Roof replacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flat on roof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Columns on roof or ground . . . . . .
NOTE:
3.0
3.9
8.3
Phoenix
1.8
2.3
4.9
With storage*
Phoenix
Boston
9.0
9.9
14.7
7.O
7.6
10.4
Without storage
Boston
Phoenix
8.O
4.7
With storage*
Boston
18.9
Phoenix
12.9
These costs were developed assuming photovoltaic arrays costing $35/m2 and 17-percent efficiency in space (18 percent on ground). Further details of the
assumed systems can be found in app. B.

a 80-percent capacity backup generator,
Assumed
stronger than when used alone. As in the case

of the baseload technologies, these figures
must be seen as indicative of the range of costs
that may be attained and should not be used as
a basis for comparison at this time. Considerable development wilI be needed to determine whether the various cost goals can be
met.
Implications
Introduction
The discussions just completed illustrate
that the future of the SPS, assuming it can be
developed technically, depends on a variety of
factors. These include the future demand for
electricity and how SPS compares with other
supply technologies. There are two questions
to be answered: 1) is the SPS necessary at all?
2) if so, when do we need it? The section on demand showed that future electricity needs are
highly uncertain and are dependent on technological developments that can profoundly influence the costs of various end use technologies. The section on supply contained discussion of several technologies that would compete, partially or completely, with the SPS to
supply electricity for the long term. The section gave criteria for choosing between these
technologies and the range of uncertainty
about their potential success. From the discussion it is clear that a variety of factors beyond
purely technical success will determine which
supply technology(ies) wiII emerge.
To see this more clearly, OTA chose three
hypothetical U.S. energy futures in order to examine possible future supply mixes. They were
chosen to span a wide range of possible elec-
tricity demand scenarios for 2030. The lowest

assumes no change from our present end-use
demand for electricity, the highest uses the
1979 Energy Information Administration (E IA)
high projection for 2020 extrapolated to 2030,
and the mid-level is halfway between. These
futures were chosen as an exercise to illustrate
the way various technologies might be used
and the constraints placed on this selection.
OTA does not treat these demand levels as
forecasts of what will occur, but as a plausible
range of future end-use demand.
The extremes of the three scenarios are
characterized by zero growth in electricity demand for the low scenario, and an average
growth of 2.8 percent per year for the high
scenario from 1980 to 2030. The growth in the
high scenario is not steady, however, but starts
at 4.1 percent in the 1980-95 time period, and
declines to 1.9 percent by the end of the scenario in 2030.
The low scenario represents a conservationoriented energy strategy, in which the increases in industrial output and residential and
commercial space are offset by improved efficiency of electricity use for industrial processes and drives, and residential and commercial heating, air conditioning, lighting, and appliances. The end-use electricity level in the
low scenario, taken from the CONAES scenario A, assumed electricity demand at a constant level of 7.4 Quads for 1980 to 2010, and
extrapolated the same constant level to 2030.
That level is very close to the actual end-use
electrical consumption in 1979 which was 7.6
Quads. The total primary energy consumption
in the CONAES scenario A is 74 Quads, compared to actual use in 1979 of 78.9 Quads.24
The high scenario represents a major expansion of the use of electricity in all sectors. The
scenario is taken from the E 1A Series C projection from the Long-Term Energy Analysis Program. The total primary energy use in this
scenario is 169 Quads. The scenario projects a
major shift in residential fuel use, with electricity supplying 60 percent of all residential
needs and 55 percent of residential heating.
(Water and space heating alone are projected
at 8 Quads end-use electricity in 2020.) Electricity is expected to provide 70 percent of the
commercial energy demand in 2020. In this
project ion, EIA forecasts that the industrial
sector wilI grow faster than any other sector,
and that industrial use of electricity will triple
or quadruple by 2020. Total energy use in the
industrial sector in the scenario is 63 Quads in
2020. Electricitys share of the industrial
energy sector rises from 11 to 20 percent. The
dominant supply technologies in the scenario
are coal and nuclear, with coal providing 60
percent, nuclear 33 percent, and hydro and
other renewable the remainder. The E 1A scenario was extrapolated to 2030, using the same
electric growth rate as assumed in 2010 to
2020, namely 1.9 percent. According to the extrapolation of this scenario, the total energy
use in 2030 is 196 quads and the total electricity use is 30.2 Quads (end use).
The middle scenario is chosen to be the midpoint between the high and low scenarios at
each of the decades projected. The end-use
figures for each of these three scenarios are
given in table 22.
OTA does not suggest these demand levels
as forecasts of what will occur. These futures
24[ner~y jn Trans;tjon,
OP c I t
Table 22.Range of Energy Demand in 2030

Scenario
High . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
End-use electrical
(Quads)
30.2
18.8
7.4
Primary total
energy (Quads)
196
135
74
were chosen to illustrate the way various technologies might be used and the constraints
that might be placed on their selection.
To characterize the mix of supply technologies possible under these scenarios, a number
of questions was addressed. Among these
questions were the numbers and kinds of technologies that would contribute to the supply
mix under the various scenarios, the maximum
reasonable SPS contribution under each scenario, the most likely technologies to replace
SPS were it not deployed, and the relative implementation rates of the various technologies
under different demand conditions. The exercise carried the simplifying assumption that
one technology could be substituted for
another These questions cannot be answered
precisely, but their discussion leads to interesting insights into the potential role of SPS.
Low-Demand Future
For this case, end-use energy demand for
electricity is selected to be 7.5 Quads (todays
level). A zero electric growth future is likely to
be the result of substantial conservation
probably resulting from high energy prices
and the failure to develop end-use technologies that use electricity at a lower net cost
than technologies using liquid or gaseous fuels
and direct solar. The principal feature of this
future is that electricity demand can be satisfied without SPS, fusion or breeder reactors.
The supply potential of coal, hydro, ground
based solar (including wind) and conventional
nuclear would be more than sufficient to meet
demand Even if coal were to be phased out
due to negative findings about the CO, buildup, its share could probably be absorbed by
other sources. Zero growth in electricity demand gives the nation considerable time for
developing new technologies.
In this situation utilities would only need to
replace retiring plants. Therefore they would
have considerable latitude in choosing technologies. Further, a zero growth rate would not
favor large plants because they would add too
much capacity at one time. Therefore, smallscale, dispersed technologies may play a major
role in this future. If any of the new tech-
Ch. 6SPS in Context
nologies under discussion are introduced they

will have to appear in relatively small increments in order to maintain system reliability. For example, one could expect SPS to provide no more than 1 to 2 Quads at any given
time to the 7 to 8 Quad total. This would act
strongly against an SPS the size of the reference system since it would only require 7 to
15 units of 5,000 MW at a 90-percent capacity
factor to supply this much energy. Therefore
deployment of any SPS would depend on an international demand for electricity and/or the
development of much smaller units than the
reference system (perhaps on the order of 500
MW). A similar argument could be made about
fusion and breeder reactors, although current
development plans show the size of eventual
commercial plants to be 1,000 MW or less.
In summary, a scenario that shows little or
no increase in electricity demand for the next
several decades does not appear to be attractive for accelerated SPS development, particularly of the reference system. At the same time,
development of other central, baseload supply
options ultimately competing with SPS could
also be slowed. The choice among these, if
needed at all, would primarily depend on
which ones could most economically be developed in smaller sizes.
Middle Demand Future
In this case net electricity demand reaches
about 20 Quads in 2030 representing about a 2percent growth rate per year that is close to
that which the Nation is now experiencing.
Although this is about 2.5 times current electric energy demand, it too could be met without using the SPS, fusion or the breeder reactor. For example if two-thirds of the 20 Quads
were produced by coal, it would require a tripling of present yearly production, which is
within the Nations capability. Current estimates of domestic uranium reserves are sufficient to supply another 6 Quads in 2030. In addition, a major contribution from terrestrial
solar (wind, onsite PV) can be expected to help
meet increased intermediate and peak load
demands that coincide with solar peaks (space
heating and cooling). If growth continues past
133
2030, this mix may be insufficient. Yearly coal

production could probably not be expanded
too much beyond this (tripled) level without
straining other sectors of the economy, and by
2030 the Nation may be near its uranium resource limits. Therefore, to ensure supply
beyond 2030 and to replace retiring nuclear
plants, some level of new, centralized technologies would probably be needed.
If coal and conventional nuclear remain acceptable, it is not likely that all three of the
major centralized technologies under development would be needed. The contribution they
could make by 2030 would be small because of
the time needed to bring them on line and the
fact that they would be starting from a zero
base sometime near 2010. A 10-percent contribution to 20 Quads would require anywhere
from 60,000 to 100,000 GW, depending on
capacity factor. Unlike the low demand future,
this would allow SPS units of up to 5,000-MW
size to be added if continued growth past 2030
is expected. A 2 percent per year growth rate
means about 0.4 Quad/yr added at that time.
This could be supplied by three SPS plants per
year at the reference design size, in addition to
baseload units to replace retired pIants. This is
stiII a small enough increment that smaller SPS
pIants appear to have an advantage. In addition, this demand increment is still not too
large to rule out its being met by onsite solar,
wind, and centralized solar. All have much
lower energy densities than fusion or breeders,
however, and eventually their contribution will
be limited by available area. About 25 m2 are
required to supply a continuous kilowatt of
solar electricity assuming PV conversion efficiencies of 20 percent. The entire 0.4 Quad
could be supplied by about 125 mi 2, not an
unreasonable area.
If coal is not acceptable because of C0 2
then there will have to be a substantially larger
contribution by the newer technologies. In this
case it is plausible that all three, plus substantial ground based solar, would be needed.
Such a replacement could be achieved with
these new technologies but it would be a
sizable effort. If coal supplied just half of the
electricity in the case discussed above, about
10 Quads of new electric energy would have to

be found, requiring 300 to 500 GW. If new
plants were on the order of 1,000 MW in size, a
construction rate of 15 to 25 per year would be
needed assuming they were first available in
2010. Under this future of constrained coal,
then, there would appear to be sufficient demand for al I technologies to be introduced at a
rate that would pay for their development in a
reasonable period. Also, it is not Iikely that any
one technology wouId be relied upon to supply
the entire 10 Quads at the end of this 20 year
phasing-in period. An even three-way split, for
example, would mean that SPS would supply
about 100 to 150 GW by 2030.
High-Demand Scenario
This future assumes a final demand for electricity of 30 Quads (about four times the current level), meaning a growth rate of about 2.8
percent per year. At that rate, about 0.8
Quad/yr would be added in 2030. If one
assumes an increase in net conversion efficiency from todays 29 to about 35 percent and
an increase in capacity factor from 42 to 55
percent, then this total demand could be met
by an installed generating capacity about
three times todays figure. Efficiency and
capacity factor will almost certainly have to
increase if a 30-Quad demand is to be met.
Total system capacity would be in the range of
1,200 to 2,400 GW (1,800 GW at 55-percent
capacity factor).
To be able to supply this much electric
energy, all technologies would probably be
needed. Further, larger plants are likely since a
demand increment of 0.8 Quad/yr would require about 40,000 to 50,000 MW of new capacity per year. Therefore, addition of plants
ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 MW would not
cause any significant short- or long-run overcapacity problems. Because of the large
amount of capacity needed, conventional nuclear and coal will probably be able to supply
only about two-thirds of the total (i. e., about
1,200 GW) before they reach the limits discussed above. Thus, about 600 GW must be
supplied by hydro, ground based solar, geothermal, and some combination of SPS, fusion
and breeders. Breeders are likely to supply the

bulk of this by 2030, provided they are acceptable, since they are the closest to commercial
readiness. Even so, as much as 200 GW of SPS
could be needed by 2030. The SPS development would have to be accelerated if it is to
meet a goal like this. The same holds true for
fusion, which could also be required to supply
around 100 GW by 2030.
The mix of technologies will be determined
substantially by constraints such as environmental concerns, capital, land and water availability, materials Iimitations and labor requirements. For example, limited water would favor
SPS and ground-based solar PV. Limited capital, however, would favor the least capitalintensive technologies such as coal and act
against the SPS. In any event, these constraints
will be very important at this demand level
because of the large number of powerplants
needed
If coal must be phased down or eliminated
then even larger demands will be put on the
new technologies. For example, if coal and
conventional nuclear couId only meet onethird of the demand, an additional 600 GW of
capacity would be needed. In this case it is
probable that an all-out breeder program
would be needed. This should not affect the
SPS in fact, more satellites may be needed
but it could actually reduce fusions contribution since it is a competing nuclear technology. The terrestrial, onsite solar contribution
will have to be large in either case but is very
unlikely to be able to supply even one-half of
the 30 Quads. Even 20 percent of the demand
would require a very large deployment of PV
systems nearly 400 GW of dispersed generating capacity.
Conclusion
The size of future electric demand will be
the major determinant in the amount of SPS
capacity installed, assuming successful development and competitive price. Table 23
shows estimates of the upper range of SPS
capacity available for each future for the case
of fulI coal development and coal phaseout.
Table 23.Upper Range of SPS Use (in GW)

Future (Quads)
With coal
7.5
20.0
30.0
0
0-60
100-200
Without coal
0-30
100-200
100-200
In addition to determining the upper range

of the contribution of SPS the demand level
and rate of growth will also determine the
preferred unit size. For the low scenario,
smaller plants would be preferred since overcapacity problems caused by adding too much
at once would probably more than offset gains
made by any economy of scale. For the upper
future, however, for even the largest SPS proposed plant size, it is unlikely that too much
can be added at once for any reasonable con-
struction schedule. The mid scenario, however,

gives somewhat ambiguous results, although
the smaller size SPS systems appear generally
to be more desirable.
For the first two scenarios it is unlikely that
alI three major, centralized supply technologies will be needed simultaneously, even if
coal cannot be used. Onsite, dispersed solar
will be able to make up a larger percentage of
the needed capacity and could eliminate the
need for any new centralized technology in the
low demand case. In all cases, coal can be the
dominant source and continue in that role for
several years past 2030. Finally, as the demand
for electricity increases, decisions about capacity mix will become more and more dependent on physical and labor constraints because of the sheer size of the capacity requirements.
THE EFFECTS OF SPS ON CIVILIAN

SPACE POLICY AND PROGRAMS
The effects of SPS development on the U.S.
civilian space program would be great, though
their precise type and magnitude would depend on the kind of SPS built, the overall
speed of the development program and the
status of space capabiIities at the time. An SPS
program would stimulate more rapid development of space transportation, large-structure
assembly and manned-mission capabilities,
and automated operations. SPS development
would also have a bearing on national space
policy and institutional structures, both Government and private sector. The following
discussion will examine four areas: 1) space
policy, 2) current and future space projects, 3)
institutional structures, and 4) indirect effects
and spin offs.
Space Policy
The Nations space policy is a reflection of
broad national goals. The principles guiding
the U.S. civilian program were first enunciated
in the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space
Act, and have been periodically reaffirmed
with minor modification and changes of emphasis. The 1958 Act states that activities in
space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind, to promote the
general welfare and security of the United
States The Act specifies that civilian activities shall be directed by NASA, and military/defense operations by the Department of
Defense. The specific aims of the space program include: expansion of knowledge, improvement of space transportation, the preservation of the role of the United States as a
leader in aeronautical and space sciences,
and cooperation with other nations. NASA was
established to plan, direct and conduct
aeronautical and space activities. 25
These general goals and this framework
have been reaffirmed subsequently, most
recently in the Directive on National Space
Policy and the White House Fact Sheet on
Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as Amended,

in
Space Law, Selected Basic flocuments, Senate Committee on
Commer[ e, Science, and Transportation; U.S. Government Printing Of flee, 1978; pp 499-503
136
U.S. Civil Space Policy, both issued in 1978. In

these documents the Carter administration
committed the United States to increase scientific knowledge, develop useful commercial
and Government applications of space technology, and maintain United States leadership in space technology. Establishing and
maintaining satisfactory relations between the
civil and military programs was recognized as
a priority issue, and the National Security
Council was charged with providing coordination for all Federal agencies involved in space.
Cooperation with other nations, including joint
programs and the development of a stable
legal regime allowing all nations to use outerspace for peaceful purposes, were emphasized
as important goals. The investment and direct
participation of the private sector in space activities was addressed in the context of remotesensing systems. NASAs responsibilities for
the operation, as opposed to research, development, and testing, of applications systems have yet to be clarified.26
The U.S. civil space program can thus be
said to have an ongoing set of policy goals:
scientific increasing knowledge,

political maintaining U.S. preeminence,
and
economicdeveloping useful commercial applications.
It also has a continuing policy framework:
separation of civil and military programs

(with various mechanisms for coordinating different efforts),
cooperation with foreign countries and
agencies, and
separation of NASA R&D and prototype
development programs from commercial
applications (an unclear relationship).
Would an SPS program alter the basic thrust

of U.S. policy? I n terms of goals, an SPS program would be primarily an applications effort
for commercial purposes, and hence would
26
Description of a Presidential Directive on National Space
Policy, j une 20, 1978, and White House Fact Sheet, U.S. Civil
Space Policy, Oct 11, 1978, in Space law, pp 558-564.
further the economic goals that have been emphasized in recent policy proclamations.
The political end of U.S. preeminence in
space, though no longer stressed as strongly as
during the Apollo program, would also be
served by commitment to an SPS. (This
assumes that the project would be successful;
failure of such a high-visibility effort could be
extremely damaging to U.S. prestige. International cooperation might tend to mitigate this
danger. )
The SPS program would not be focused on
increasing basic scientific knowledge, but
much of the research and experimentation required would provide some scientific gains; in
addition, the infrastructure for SPS (e. g., platforms, transportation vehicles) could be used
for a multitude of scientific projects in space.
There is some danger, though, that focusing
the national space program on such a major
applications project as SPS would divert resources and attention, at least temporarily,
from scientific missions.
The effects of SPS on the U.S. policy framework will depend on how it is financed and
managed. Civil-military relations could be
altered. Although the SPS is not technically
suited to be used as a weapons system, much
of SPS technology and infrastructure, especialIy the transportation vehicles, would have
military uses (see ch. 4). Furthermore, it is
unlikely that a project with the scope and impact of SPS could be approved by Congress
without at least the tacit consent of the Department of Defense (DOD). In the foreseeable
future, DOD requirements for aerospace expertise and facilities will be great, and SPS may
be seen as a competitor for scarce resources
unless direct defense benefits can be realized.
Although an SPS program would not be run by
the military, it might be necessary for the civil
and miIitary sectors to be more closely coordinated than has previously been the case.
Foreign cooperation and joint ventures
might be encouraged not only by the desire to
improve international relations but by more
direct economic considerations. (see ch. 7).
These considerations would be strong enough
to provide for a greater degree of shared

responsibility than in any equivalent U.S. program to date, unless U.S. military involvement
proves an insuperable obstacle. International
participation might be such that the project
could no longer be run as a U.S. venture with
limited foreign cooperation, but would become a truly multinational effort with no
dominant U.S. role.
The relation between public and private
participants would be a major issue in any SPS
program. Policy in this area has not been clearIy established, though there is precedent for
detaching applications projects, such as satellite communications and Landsat, from NASA
after development is completed. NASA has
conducted all U.S. civilian launches on a
reimbursable basis; it is unclear what would
happen if private firms wished to build and/or
launch their own vehicles, as has been suggested for the shuttle. If, as is presently the
case, a Federal SPS program were managed by
DOE or some other agency besides NASA,
NASA might be responsible for only a limited
part of SPS development and NASA restrictions and policies might not apply.
Current and Projected Space Projects

SPS would be strongly affected by current
space programs and capabilities, and in turn
might also determine what many of those programs would be. However, since an SPS development decision is unlikely to be made before
1990, and may not be possible until 2000, (see
ch. 4), SPS will not shape NASA projects conducted during the next decade (though it may
affect long-range planning).
Historically, NASA has devoted the major
portion of its resources to a single major project, first the Apollo lunar-landing program,
and then the Space Shuttle. However, there are
currently no plans for a similar centerpiece
project to follow the Shuttle; the White House
Fact Sheet asserted explicitly that: it is
neither feasible nor necessary at this time to
commit the United States to a high-challenge
space engineering initiative comparable to
Apollo. Instead, present plans call for a
83-316 0 - 81 - 10
number of smaller scale operations and scientific missions centered around use of the Shuttle and other components of the Space Transportation System (STS). The lack of a single,
clear, overriding project goal for the civilian
space program has been criticized for squandering NASA and contractor capabilities, and
leaving the United States without a visionary
and profitable use for the new transportation
capabilities under development. This problem
will undoubtedly be addressed during the
1980s, but jurisdictional and philosophical
differences, as well as budgetary constraints,
may make consensus difficuIt to achieve.
For the next 5 years, NASA plans to concentrate on a number of areas: those most directly
relevant to SPS include:
1. Transportation and Orbital Operations:
Transportation efforts will concentrate on
meeting shuttle schedules but also include other elements of STS: the inertial
upper stage, for placing payloads in geosynchronous orbit ( C E O ) ( u n d e r d e v e l opment by the Air Force); Spacelab, for
manned and unmanned experimentation
(joint program with ESA); development of
orbital transfer vehicles such as an electric orbit transfer vehicle (EOTV); systems
to handle payloads outside of the Shuttle;
and free-flying platforms. Each of these
programs will be important for improving
our capability to move and work in space,
and hence directly relevant to SPS. The
key element is the Shuttle, which must
work and work well if these projects are to
proceed during the 1980s. Delays in Shuttle operations, or in building additional orbiters, will not only retard these projects
but also might prevent SPS-specific research flights as envisioned in one of the
policy Options from taking place in the
late 1980s (see ch. 4).
2 I m m e d i a t e A p p l i c a t i o n s : In this area,
space processing experiments to be conducted on Spacelab could be important in
determining the proper kinds of materials
for SPS construction, as well as prospects
for direct processing of raw materials in
orbit. Communications and remote-se ns-
ing development will involve work with

microwave transmission, lasers, and mirror systems, as well as detailed studies of
the upper atmosphere, 27 which will b e
vital in determining the environmental effects of launch effIuents and energy transmission beams.
3. Solar Radiation:The Solar Maximum Mission (launched February 1980) and the upcoming International Solar Polar Mission,
scheduled for 1983, will study solar radiation and its effects on the near-Earth
space environment. Such information
could be important in designing SPS solar
cells and in adding to our knowledge of
the effects of radiation on SPS workers:
ionizing radiation in CEO is a potentially
serious obstacle to human effectiveness
and could be decisive in determining the
optimal mix between automated and
human-controlled operations.
4 Humans in Space: The studies of Shuttle
crew performance as well as specific
Spacelab experiments will provide a basis
for determining the long-term effects of
weightlessness and cramped quarters, and
for designing appropriate equipment to
improve manned performance. 28
The above projects are already underway
and are those for which funding or explicit
planning are in place. NASA has also outlined
other, longer term plans that would be important to SPS. NASAs Office of Space Transportation Systems long-term goals are predicated
on the assumption that the growth of U.S.
civilian space programs in the 1990s will probably continue to be moderate and evolutionary, rather than rapid or Apollo-like,
and that space projects will increasingly have
to demonstrate significant economic return or
perform essential services to obtain approval.
The specific goals are: 1 ) routine operation of
the STS by the mid-1 980s; 2) routine operation
of unmanned large low-Earth orbit (LEO) platforms by the mid-1980s; 3) a permanent
manned facility in LEO for research, construcZ7N~t10nal Aeronautics and space Adm Inistration, ~AsA frogram P/an, F;sca/ Years 1987 Through 7985, 1980, p
*a Ibid, pp 3-5
107
tion, and operations, by the end of the 1980s;

and 4) a permanent facility in GEO, eventually
manned, by the late 1990s. Meeting goals
wouId involve:
augmenting the Shuttles thrust, perhaps

via a Iiquid booster;
developing EOTVs, such as the low-thrust
ion-propelled Solar Electric Propulsion
System (SEPS) for service to geosynchronous orbit;
equipping the Shuttle and its modules
with a 25-kW add-on electrical power system; and
carrying-on a ground and space-based effort to fabricate and assemble precision
structures in orbit .29
All of these projects could have direct bearing on SPS and on any future decision to proceed with SPS development. Some of the
longer term aims, such as SEPs, might overlap
with an SPS development program, that would
provide a strong impetus for their completion.
NASA is not the only body with plans for
space. DOD goals, though largely classified,
include large platforms, orbital microwave
radars, and space-based lasers. DOD requirements couId drive NASA projects such as Shuttle thrust augmentation, or lead to separate
development of SPS-useful equipment.
Other long-range projects have been suggested by many individuals and organizations,
in and out of government. In the transportation area, these include very large fully
reuseable launchers; laser-propulsion; 30 Iightsails, to power low-acceleration transfer
vehicles or deep-space missions; 31 and massdrivers to lift material off the lunar surface, or
as a solar-powered propulsion system for
space vehicles. 32 Other than the building of
full-scale permanent colonies, SPS is the
largest space project proposed to date, in
21 b[d Pp
190-205
(l A Hertz berg, K Sun, W Jones, L a s e r A i r c r a f t , A s t r o n a u t i c s
and Aeronautics, March 1979 p 41
K Eric Drexler, Spinoffs To and From SPS Technology: A
Preliminary Assessment, OTA Working Paper, June 1980, p. 9
2(, ONeIll, G Driggers, B. 0Leary, New Routes to Manufacturing In Space, A s t r o n a u t i c s a n d A e r o n a u t i c s , O c t o b e r
1980 Pp 4 6 5 1
Ch. 6SPS in Context
terms of expense, returns, timeframe, and

amount of people and materials placed in orbit; if developed it would be a spur to all forms
of cheaper space transportation.
SPSs effect on space projects would depend
to some extent on the type of SPS that would
be developed, the size of each unit, and the
size of the entire system (as well as the scope
and type of space program in place at the
time). A geosynchronous microwave SPS similar to the reference design would require extensive transfer vehicle capacity and hence
lead to accelerated development of EOTVs,
chemical-powered personnel vehicles, and
manned GEO construction stations. A laserSPS in LEO, on the other hand, would require
relatively little LEO to GEO transfer capacity.
A mirror-system might need even less upgraded Iift or construction capacity in order to
be fully deployed (see ch. 5).
A large SPS system consisting of many satellites would tend to have greater economies of
scale, leading to the development of more and
different sorts of vehicles, and greater massproduction and automation. In-orbit processing of lunar or asteroidal raw materials would
also be feasible only if a very large system
were built, to justify the front-end costs of
lunar mining and orbital processors.
Institutional Structures
Would an SPS program require a change in
current national institutions? The completed
SPS Concept Development and Evaluation
Program 33 was a joint DOE/NASA effort, with
DOE providing most of the management and
NASA providing technical support. A decision
to have further SPS research, development,
and demonstration efforts managed by DOE
would likely prove awkward, since the bulk of
the up-front development costs would be for
space systems; hence DOE would have to pass
most of its SPS funding to NASA, or attempt to
develop its own contractor relations and inhouse space capability, which would be timeSatellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings, November 1980, DO E/E R-0085
139
consuming and wasteful. SPS would require a

much clearer and stronger coordinating mechanism than currently exists for national space
programs, since not only NASA and DOE but a
number of other departments and agencies
would be involved. 34
Extensive NASA involvement in SPS would
require clarification of NASAs appropriate
role in commercial applications ventures, and
perhaps modification of NASAs charter. Both
underlying policy i.e., to what extent NASA
shouId operate applications systems, such as
Landsat and communication satellitesand
specific procedures for turning over patents,
technology, and hardware to private industry
or other Government agencies, have been subject to continuing controversy. *
It is probable that a separate public or
quasi-governmental body would eventually be
set up, outside of NASA and DOE, to manage
an SPS program. Such a decision would be influenced by, among other things, the desired
mix of public and private funding, and the
degree of international involvement. Possible
forms such a body might take are discussed in
chapter 9, Financing Ownership and Control,
and in chapter 7.
Indirect Effects and Spinoffs

There would be three kinds of indirect effects of SPS development:
technology and hardware developed for

SPS that could have other uses (and that
otherwise would not be developed or
wouId be developed at a much slower
pace),
uses of the SPS itself other than providing
terrestrial baseload electric power (and
that would otherwise not be provided for),
and
economic/technological changes and basic shifts of national attitudes
SPS developed technologies and hardware:

Most, though not all, of these spinoffs would
relate to space capabilities. We have already
[J( )1 re[)ort o n \ PS .1 nd G o v e r n m e n t dgenc
In press
Ief
*See
O T A a s s e s s m e n t , S p a c e Policy and Applications, i n
preparation
seen that NASAs transportation plans include

many elements directly useful to SPS, which
SPS development would tend to accelerate or
modify. Although the reference system calls
for heavy-lift launch vehicles able to carry 400
tons to LEO, and a 5,000-ton payload EOTV,
the exact types of vehicles needed cannot yet
be specified. The proper mix between size,
numbers, and types of vehicles depends on
many unknown factors, including the type of
system, its location, and the number of satellites to be built.
The combination of improved and cheaper
transportation, robotics and teleoperation,
possible new construction materials (such as
graphite composites), and human expertise,
would make possible many commercial space
activities. Large communications platforms,
scientific and industrial research facilities,
processing plants for chemical and raw materials these are a few possibilities. Past experience teaches that commercial exploitation
follows in the wake of the development of new
capabilities, and cannot be accurately foreseen. 35
Space industrialization could be greatly
enhanced by the use of extraterrestrial raw
materials. SPS could lead to lunar or asteroidal
mining by fostering the development of transport and robotics capacity, as well as by providing a major market for processed products
such as aluminum, steel, silicon, and oxygen.
The most detailed studies have examined mining the lunar surface, and launching raw
materials to orbiting processors via an electrically powered mass driver. Others have suggested mining or capturing a small asteroid,
preferably a carbonaceous-chondrite asteroid
rich in carbon and high-grade iron/nickel ore. 36
Establishing such facilities, which might be
done in the later stages of SPS development,
could considerably reduce the costs of
transporting material to high orbits.
On the ground, SPS would require largescale automated production of solar cells;
5 Woodcock, op cit , p 12
3Drexler, op. cit , pp 10-11
some of this technology could also be used for

ground-based solar projects.
Space or ground-based industries using SPSdeveloped technology or hardware could, at
least temporarily, compete with SPS for scarce
resources. A mechanism for allocating priorities might have to be established to resolve
competing claims.
Alternative SPS uses; Depending on the electromagnetic environment (i.e., on the type of
system used and the amount and type of
shielding available), the SPS platform, whether
in (GEO or LEO, could be used as a station for a
variety of communication and remote-sensing
equipment. A GEO SPS wouId be especially
useful, due to the relatively small number of
positions available. Remotely operated optical
astronomy devices could be placed near or on
SPS as a way of escaping the interference
faced by Earth-based telescopes. Given a large
amount of space traffic associated with increasing industrial and military space flights,
the SPS station could become a focal point for
local storage, refueling, and rest and relaxation
for crews a kind of spaceport. Living quarters
for maintenance crews and construction
workers could be expanded and upgraded into
occasional (and, initially, very high-cost)
tourist accommodations.
SPS electricity could be used in orbit, either
at the satellite itself or at remote sites
equipped with receiving antennas, to provide
power for industrial activities. Processing,
especially of extraterrestrial raw materials,
could require large amounts of electrical
power that might be more efficiently supplied
by a central SPS than by building specific electrical capacity.
Some SPS designs, especially the mirrorsystems, might produce enough power to be
used for local climactic modification. This
would require more precise understanding of
weather systems than is now available. Orbital
mirrors have also been suggested as a way of
providing nighttime illumination of cities
and/or of cropland to enhance growth. 37
Woodcock, op cit
Ch. 6SPS in Context . 141
Special mirror surfaces that reflect only

specific wavelengths would need to be developed for such purposes.
Generic economic and social effects: A successful SPS could be instrumental in provoking
an economic upsurge by stimulating new production in the aerospace and energy industries, and new industries altogether in space
fabrication, solar cells, antenna construction,
and so on. Specific technical advances necessary for SPS and Iikely to provide economic
spinoffs have been mentioned. The likelihood
of a revolutionary new product, comparable in
effect to the transistor or microchip, resulting
from SPS is unpredictable. Estimates of the aggregate economic and technical effects of
large research and engineering projects, such
as Apollo or nuclear reactors, vary enormously. Some credit a large portion of the U.S.
economic vitality and technical leadership in
the 1960s, especially increases in research,
engineering, and project management skilIs, to
Federal investments in the Space program .38
8 Drexler, op clt , pp 8-9
SPS might prove equally stimulating. Others

argue that these resources would have been
available anyway, and could have been used in
more efficient ways.
Arguments about long-term social vitality
aIso often revolve around the Apollo experience. The optimism and vision that
characterized
the
Apollo
decade
are
con-
trasted with the pessimism, uncertainty, and

sense of limits of the post-Apollo 1970s. Skep-
tics, however, argue that Apollo represented a

misguided effort to escape from more pressing
social and political problems, and that the
space program lost public support when this
became apparent39 (see ch. 9). Whether the
United States will regain some of its former enthusiasm for large high-technology projects
wiII depend partly on the success of current efforts, such as the Space Shuttle, and on the
magnitude and type of benefits that such projects offer.
Klaus Helss, New Economic Structures for Space In the

I Ightlei, Astronautics ancf Aeronautics, January 1981, p 17
CHAPTER 7
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES
Contents
Page
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......145
Use of SPS Launchers and Construction

Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171
Military Uses of SPS . ...............172
ownership and Control. . . . ..........173
Degree and Kind of Global Interest in SPS .146

Economic Interest. . ................146
Noneconomic Interest . .............153
Legal Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...154
Status of the Geosynchronous Orbit. . . .155
Environmental Considerations . . . . . . . .156
Military and Arms Control Issues . .. ...156
Common Heritage and the Moon Treaty. 158
Advantages and Disadvantages of
Multinational SPS. . ..............159
Unilateral Interests. . . . . . . . . ........160
Multilateral Interests . . . . . . . ........162
Possible Models . ..................163
National Security implications of Solar
Power Satellites. . ................167
Vulnerability and Defensibility. . ......168
Current Military Programs in Space .. ..170
Foreign Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174

Europe
.
........................174
Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174
. . . . . . . . 175
Japan
Third World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175
Study
Recommendations
............175
LIST OF TABLES
Table No.
24. Primary
Page
Energy Demand. . ..............146

25. End-Use Electricity Demand . ...........147
26. Amount of Global Installed Capacity ., .. ..147
27. SPS Market in 2020/2025. . ..............151
Chapter 7
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION
The development of solar power satellites
(SPS) requires consideration from the perspective of its international implications. First, as a
space technology SPS would operate in a
global medium, outside of any national territory, which is subject to international law embodied in existing treaties and agreements.
Secondly, as a major energy project the SPS
would affect supply and demand for what is by
far the largest commodity traded on international markets, one that is of vital interest to
all countries. Thirdly, because of its tremendous cost and technical sophistication an SPS
system could have a strong effect on the economies of states involved in its construction.
And finally, development of an SPS and of the
launchers needed to build and maintain it may
give its builders significant military and/or
economic leverage over other states.
This chapter will look at the SPS primarily
from a political perspective, because in the
final analysis SPS development will depend on
national efforts, instigated by national leaders,
paid for in large part by public funds. The
United States is the only country in which
there is any likelihood that there would be
significant private-sector responsibility for SPS
decisions. The importance of national efforts
would be especially crucial in the near future
when SPS projects are in the R&D and prototype construction phases.
Actors. If SPS is developed, Government
involvement would be guaranteed because
SPS would affect vital national interests in a
number of areas, e.g., external security, prestige and influence, and economic growth.
Energy policy in itself has become a central
component of national planning in most countries.
Nonstate actors would be involved as well.
On the international level these include global
organizations such as the United Nations and

its specialized agencies; multilateral groups
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and OPEC;
and regional groupings such as the Common
Market and the European Space Agency (ESA).
On the substate level there are numerous interests, including those of private companies,
public utilities, and governmental agencies,
that often conflict and that seek to influence
national decisions. Furthermore, the role of the
large multinational corporations in international relations is in some areas very great and
often independent of direct government control
However, for the SPS, national decisions and
interests are likely to predominate. Although
the rise of energy as a major global concern
has led to the formation of numerous international organizations (such as the International
Energy Agency) and to intense discussion of
the global dimensions of energy prices and
shortages, the overall impact has been to place
decisions about energy consumption and production more and more firmly in the hands of
national governments. In general, it seems that
the role of the state in furthering peace and
security, stability, prestige, and economic wellbeing has not been supplanted by other entities.
Forecasting. B e c a u s e S P S i s a p r o j e c t
which, if pursued, will not reach fruition for at
least 20 years, assumptions must be made
about future political and economic developments. Since radical changes are by definition
unpredictable, these will be unavoidably conservative. In general, it is assumed that the
basic political and socioeconomic alinements
of todays world are likely to continue. In the
past, fundamental realinements of the international political structure have often been the
145
146
result of major wars or of deep-seated alterations in political and social expectations,

neither of which can be confidently predicted.
Even relatively small shifts in public support
for various programs can have large effects; in-
creasing skepticism in American and European

attitudes towards the space program and
nuclear energy in the Iate 1960s and early
1970s, for instance, has decisively affected
our current space and energy capabilities.
DEGREE AND KIND OF GLOBAL INTEREST IN SPS

National and regional interest in the SPS will
stem from an evaluation of the ways an SPS
system would affect all the components of national interest outlined above. The degree and
kind of interest shown will vary from nation to
nation. In deciding what institutional structure
to use for SPS development, it is crucial to
take these various foreign interests into account. In this case, interest can be divided
somewhat arbitrarily into economic and noneconomic components. The economic interest
in SPS would be focused on SPSs ability to
provide electricity, and hence on the local demand for electricity over the time SPS becomes
available.
Noneconomic concerns
would include prestige and national security
interests.
Economic Interest
A recently completed study by the international Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA), Energy in a Finite World, 1 provides the
most up-to-date projections of long-range
future global energy demand. The IIASA study
uses a global model with several different
scenarios, broken down on a regional basis.
We will present the high and low estimates to
give the entire range of predictions; it should
be noted that the lower estimates are closer to
those of some recent U.S. studies, such as
Energy in Transition 1985-2010, by the National
Academy of Sciences. 2 (See app. C.) In general
the slowdown in gross national product (GNP)
growth over the past several years, and the
sharp rises in oil prices in 1979, have caused
Energy in a Finite Worid, A Global Systems Analysis, Energy
Systems Program Group, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co,, 1981).
Energy in Transition 1985-2070 (Washington, D. C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1979).
recent energy forecasts to be much lower than

those of only a few years ago. Since OTA
believes that IIASAs analysis may tend to
overestimate future energy demands (see app.
C), especially in the advanced industrialized
countries, the following figures should be used
with some caution.
The IIASA projections for primary energy
demand are based on an integrated model in
which supply and demand are matched on a
global basis (see table 24). (See app. C.)
Historically, the rate of growth in electrical
demand has been approximately twice as high
as that of total energy demand. IIASA predicts
that it will remain higher, but by a factor of 1.4
instead of 2.0.3
Currently,
electricity
accounts for an
average of 11 percent of global end-use
energy, ranging from 6.5 percent in developing
countries to 12 percent in the OECD. By 2030,
IIASA expects this figure to rise to 17 percent
(in both high and low scenarios), with developing countries using 13 percent and OECD 21
percent, reflecting an annual increase in usage
of 2.6 percent (low) to 3.4 percent (high). 4
Finite World, op. c it , p. 482.
Ibid
Table 24.Primary Energy Demand (Quads)
2000
2030
High
Low High Low
OECD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146.8 200.3 224.5 266.3 393.4
SU/EE (Soviet Union,
E. Europe) . . . . . . . . . . 55.0 98.9 110.3 149.4 219.1
Developing . . . . . . . . . . . 37.7 107.0 148.9253.8 453.1
Global Total. . . . . . . . . . .239.5406 .2503.7669.5 1,065.6
1975
S6URCE:
Energy in a Finite World; conversion to Quads done by the Office of

Technology Assessment.
Ch. 7The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites
Electricity use is affected by many factors,

including changes in end-uses, (such as heat
pumps or electric cars), saturation of demand,
and the cost and availability of fuel (see ch. 6).
Table 25 shows the IIASA figures for end-use
electricity demand.
Assuming 70-percent load factors and 15percent losses in transmission and distribution,
IIASA estimates for installed generating capacity in 2030 are shown in table 26.
Although the IIASA report is pessimistic
about the possibility of extensive use of alternative energy sources, such as fusion or
ground-based solar, by 2030, it points out that
a breakthrough in fusion or solar-cells would
change the supply and cost of electricity drastically. Cheap photovoltaics might encourage
a shift towards a hydrogen economy, with
electricity produced in high-insolation desert
areas being stored and transported as hydrogen. 5
Barring such developments, future baseload
electrical demand will be met overwhelmingly
by coal and nuclear sources (see app. C). IIASA
also predicts that coal will be used extensively
for producing liquid fuels, especially in coalrich regions such as North America and the
I bid., p. 163.
Table 25.End-Use Electricity Demand (Qe)

1975
OECD . . . . . . . . . . .
SU/EE . . . . . . . .
Developing. . . . . . .
Global Total . . . . . .
..
12.5
. . . . . 3.9
. .
1.8
. .
18.2
2030
Low
High
35.3
15.5
23.3
74.1
50.2
25.4
41.3
116.9
SOURCE: .Errergy in a Finite Wor/d, p. 659. These numbers should be taken as

approximations, since they are based on IIASA estimates of the per.
cent of end-use demand that will be met by electricity. For graphic
presentation, see Energy, p. 481.
Table 26.Amount of Global

Installed Capacity (GWe)
1975
1,600
SOURCE:
2000
Low
3,550
2030
High
4,390
Energy in a Finite World,p. 483.
Low
6,320
High
9,845
147
Soviet Union up to 55 percent of coal production in North America by 20306 (see app. C).
Regional Variations
In order to understand how different countries might view SPS, it is crucial to highlight
the major regional differences that will affect
demand for electricity. Foremost among them
is the question of regional or national selfsufficiency.
SELF-SUFFICIENT AREAS
In the 50-year time-frame considered, it appears possible for three major consuming
regions North America, Soviet Union/Eastern
Europe, and China to achieve energy selfsufficiency. This would require rapid development of indigenous sources of North American
oil shale, tar sands, and Western coal; for the
Soviet Union, untapped oil, gas and coal reserves in Central and Eastern Siberia; for
China, development of oil and coal deposits
and expanded exploration in Western China. In
all three cases very substantial growth in
nuclear and/or solar, hydro, and other generating sources would also be required. With
the possible exception of U.S. and Soviet coal,
none of these regions is likely to export significant energy supplies, since indigenous
growth will absorb most new capacity even
under optimistic scenarios.
The costs of achieving regional self-sufficiency would be very high. Development of
North American oil shale and tar sands, for instance, on a scale sufficient to produce oil and
gas in quantities comparable to the large commercial oilfields of today, will cost hundreds
of billions of dollars. Such development will
also be dirty environmentalIy, involving extensive surface-mining, and hence expensive to
clean up and to regulate.
In the Soviet Union, currently the worlds
largest oil producer, finding the capital for major energy investments during the 1980s will
be difficult. Inefficiencies in central planning
practices are likely to be magnified as de-
bid , p 669,
mands for consumer goods and services increase.

Chinas energy production potential is not
well enough known to predict future supplies
with any certainty. Oil, coal, and oil shale are
known to be present in large quantities. Current modernization plans call for sizable
energy investments.
ENERGY-DEPENDENT AREAS
Regions without sufficient local resources
will include Western Europe, Japan, and large
portions of the (currently) developing world.
Western Europe and Japan can be expected to
invest heavily in nuclear plants, especially fast
breeders.
Unfortunately neither Western Europe nor
Japan is in a good position to exploit alternate
nonnuclear technologies to alleviate dependence on imported oil. Except for a relatively
small part of Southern Europe, average annual
insolation is lowonly 1,000 kWh/m 2 in Cent r a l E u r o p e , c o m p a r e d t o 2 , 5 0 0 k W h / m2 i n
Arizona. Hydroelectric resources are limited
and already extensively developed. There are
no large wooded areas to provide biomass, and
regional cropland in densely populated regions
is scarce.
It is likely that Western Europe and Japan
will try to develop assured foreign sources for
future needs. This may take the form of joint
development of capital-intensive North American energy projects, gaining through partial
ownership an assured source of supplies.
Foreign interest in U.S. coal, including investment in mines and shipping facilities, has accelerated since the 1979 rise in oil prices. 8
However, it is unlikely that national policy in
the United States and Canada will permit
extensive ownership of energy resources by
foreign countries or enterprises, or significant
exports of nonrenewable fuels, even to friendly
countries. Though the size of the capital requirements may allow for foreign participation, it will not be enough to alleviate EuroK. K. Reinhartz, An Overview of European SPS Activities,
Firta/ Proceedings of SPS Program Review, Department of Energy,

April 1980, p. 79.
8
See The Coal Ships, Washington Post, Oct. 13,1980, p, 1.
pean or Japanese shortages. Investment in or

legal control of foreign assets provides little insurance against price rises or expropriation,
when the local government is so inclined.
The underdeveloped energy-poor regions
vary greatly in their levels of development and
their degree of energy dependence. In virtually
all cases oil-price rises have seriously hampered economic growth. 9 In some instances
the increases have spurred development of indigenous sources nuclear plants in Brazil,
Argentina, a n d I n d i a ; b i o m a s s i n B r a z i l ;
numerous small-scale hydro and solar projects
suited for decentralized generation. It is in the
less developed countries (LDCs) that the greatest proportional surge in energy demand and
electrical usage will come over the next 50
years, rising from 12 percent to 31 to 35 percent of global electrical demand (see app. C).
Decentralized systems can be effective in
regions without developed utility grids and
where demand is for small units for domestic,
agricultural, and light industrial use. But the
baseload power needed for extensive growth
and modernization will be expensive and in
short supply.
ENERGY-EXPORTING AREAS
Current energy-exporters include OPEC
members as well as a few non-OPEC oil producers, such as Mexico, Malaysia, and the
Soviet Union. Over the next 50 years, many
current oil-surplus states will cease to export,
due to increased domestic consumption and/or
decreased output. The time and rate at which
current oil production in exporting countries
will diminish depends on the rate of consumption as well as future discoveries. IIASA
predicts only small increases in exporting
country production through 2030, with demand increases being met primarily by coal
liquefaction a n d u n c o n v e n t i o n a l o i l s . T h e
report emphasizes that: The energy problem, viewed with a sufficiently long-term and
global perspective, is not an energy problem,
strictly speaking, it is an oil problem, or, more
See Energy in the Developing Countries, World Bank, August

1980, pp 3-6
I bid , p 44.
precisely, a liquid fuels problem. 11 A s d e mand grows over the next 50 years, the ability
of countries to import such fuels to make up
for local shortfalls will dwindle, and prices will
rise sharply.
In summary then, the 50-year forecast is for
an increase in demand for energy of some
three to four times, and an increase in demand
for electricity of some four to six times with
rates being somewhat higher in the currently
developing regions. These forecasts are based
on a declining rate of growth in GNP, averaging some 2.7 percent (in the low scenario) to 3.7
percent (high scenario) per year. (Compared to
a global average of 5 percent from 1960 to
1975.) In general, energy scarcity will cause
higher prices, reducing demand and increasing
supply. The question is whether future supplies
will be so high cost as to force a radical change
in Iiving standards and growth rates. Maintaining a moderate rate of growth in the developed
countries and a somewhat higher growth rate
in the developing world to provide for population increases as well as the prospect of real
increases in living standards will place demands on energy resources that guarantee that
energy costs will consume a larger proportion
of national income than in the past. IIASA
predicts an increase of 2.4 to 3.0 times in the
proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)
spent on energy. Even if IIASAs projections
prove to be on the high side, future energy
sources can expect to be competitive within a
very high-cost ceiIing.
SPS Contribution
SPS could begin to provide electricity by
2010-20 and could be a substantial source of
new power within the selected 50-year period.
None of the global projections to date has considered the possible impact of an SPS system
on future energy scenarios. The rise in electrical consumption is expected to be met by
large increases in coal-fired generators and
nuclear plants. However, there are serious
problems with both methods.
Coal, like oil, is abundant only in certain
areas. Unlike oil, it is expensive to ship comII
Fjnjte wor/d,
Op. cit., P 653
149
pared to the cost of mining (because of its

bulk), especially overseas and in areas without
extensive rail Iinks, While oil and gas are
suitable for small-scale household use, coal is
expensive to store, and prohibitively dirty to
use (especially in urban areas). And increased
burning of coal could have disastrous environmental consequences, including acid rain and
global temperature increases (see ch. 6). IIASA
predicts a 10 to 1.50 C average increase,
through 2030, depending on high or low growth
rates,
Nuclear plants are characterized by widely
publicized environmental dangers. Even if
these can be resolved, public opposition to
nuclear power, as well as the rapidly increasing
costs of building new nuclear capacity, have
already delayed the production of nuclear
generators, especially in the United States
(where alternative fuels are more readily
available than in many other countries). Furthermore, the spread of nuclear technology,
especially breeders, into more and more parts
of the world will almost inevitably make it
easier for more states to manufacture nuclear
weapons. Since uranium is concentrated in
scarce deposits, largely in North America, the
Soviet Union, and parts of Africa, many areas
will be inclined to depend increasingly on
breeders. The safeguards and restrictions set
up by the United States to prevent proliferation have been only partially successful when
the main reason for building reactors has been
prestige-they will be even less effective as
energy needs make nuclear plants essential.
For these reasons, SPS may be attractive as
an alternative to other methods of generating
electricity. In addition, unpredictable factors
such as a major nuclear accident or the failure
of alternative energy sources could spur interest in the SPS. SPS would by no means replace
coal or nuclear power within the next 50 years,
but could reduce otherwise excessive reliance
on these technologies.
Economic acceptance of an SPS system
would depend on several factors. Overall costs
of delivered power will be crucial; these must
be competitive with other systems. Perhaps
equally important would be the division of
these costs between developers, owners, and

users and the way these are shared between
participating countries. Development of an
SPS system would require large amounts of
capital and a high level of technical/engineering expertise. There are three distinct areas
with capital and expertise: 1 ) North America; 2)
the rest of the OECD countries (i.e., Western
Europe and Japan); 3) the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Assuming that extensive cooperation between the Soviet Union and other
countries is unlikely (see p. 161), the two possible collaborators have somewhat different interests. North America has the requisite technical/industrial capacity in space transportation and related areas, but is potentially
energy rich, while Europe and Japan have increasing expertise in aerospace and face continued large energy shortfalls. If the future interest of these possible participants were estimated, North American interest would rate as
potentially moderate to high and West European and Japanese (along with some other industrialized areasSouth Korea, Taiwan,
South Africa, Australia) as potentially very
high. In North America, capital and interest in
SPS would be competing with coal and synfuel
development, as well as nuclear energy; in the
rest of OECD, primarily with nuclear development. In general, development of technologies
using renewable or inexhaustible fuel sources,
(such as SPS, but also fusion, ground-based
solar, and biomass) would be preferred to
depletable ones.
The possible cooperative mechanisms for
SPS development and operation will be discussed later (see Advantages and Disadvantages of Multinational SPS, pp. 159-163). It is
important here to see that potential SPS users
with limited initial capital and expertise to
contribute to an SPS system might need special incentives to participate in buying SPS
power. A major economic consideration for
such SPS users might be the lack of direct and
indirect spinoffs f r o m S P S p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
Ground-based antenna construction would require large amounts of unskilled labor, but
would provide few technical or managerial
posts. The capability to participate directly in
building and deploying the satellite portion of

the system is probably beyond the reach of
most of the present LDCs over the next 50
years, so that relying on SPS power might be
seen as undercutting efforts to develop an indigenous energy infrastructure. Payments to
foreign companies for such power would be a
drain on scarce foreign exchange reserves compared to development of local resources,
which cause ripple effects in the economy.
User governments would be sensitive about
depending on a foreign high-technology energy
source, even if costs and other aspects are
favorable.
What is the potential global market for SPS?
To date, only the studies by Maurice Claverie
and Alan Dupas have attempted to estimate
this in any detail. Their recent papers 12 present
a possible methodology for making SPS projections. Unfortunately, their results are based on
energy demand projections completed in 1976
and 1978 that are now considered to have considerably overestimated future electricity demand 13 14 (see app. C).
From these projections Claverie and Dupas
estimate the maximum demand for large electric powerplants (LEPP) (see map in app. C),
and calculate SPS demand assuming either 10percent or 50-percent market penetration by 5
gigawatt (CW) SPSs (see table 27).
Even allowing for the high estimates of the
energy projections used, the Claverie-Dupas
calculations must be considered very rough
upper estimates of future demand; in particular, cost comparisons with alternative sources
were not taken into account. Claverie and
Dupas attribute much of SPSs potential attractiveness to environmental and political
factors rather than strict cost advantages. 15
*M Claverie a n d A . Dupas, Preliminary Evaluation of

Ground and Space Solar Electricity Market in 2025, 29th IAF
Congress, October 1978; The Potential Global Market in 2025
for Satellite Solar Power Stations, May 1979; Possible
Limitations to SPS Use Due to Distribution of World Population
and World Energy Consumption Centers, 31st IAF Congress,
September 1980
Edison Electric Institute, Economic Growth in the Future
(New York McCraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 215-234
World Energy Conference, Wor/cf Energy Demand (New York:
IPC Science and Technology Press, 1978)
5Claverle and Dupas, Potential Market, op cit., p. 4.
Table 27.SPS Market in 2020/2025 (G We)

10% of New LEPP
CWEa
WECb
OECD. . . . . . . .
135
75
SU/EE. . . . . . . .
40
Developing . . .
50
85
Global . . . . . . .
275
200
50% of New LEPP

CWR
WEC
685
365
260
195
430
435
1,375
995
*WR - Case Western Reserve.

bWEC. World Energy Conference.
SOURCE: Adapted from Claverie and Dupas,
Potential G/oba/ Market, p. 4.
Within the limits of this study the ClaverieDupas estimates using the IIASA projections
cannot be duplicated. However, by using
IIASAS estimates of installed capacity in 2030,
a rough estimate of global demand can be
made. We can assume that 20 percent of capacity will be reserve, to guard against
outages, and that of the remaining 80 percent,
65 percent will be baseload. Moreover, if we
accept Claverie and Dupas estimate that 10
percent of world demand will be met by decentralized sources, then the global estimate of
the maximum possible demand for installed
baseload capacity in 2030 would be: 80 percent (peakload) x 65 percent (baseload) X 90
percent = (approximately) 47 percent of total
installed capacity. 1 6 Using the IIASA estimates
(tabIe 26) of 6,320 (low scenario) to 9,845 (high)
GWe, then we get 2,970 to 4,627 GWe as the
potential demand for baseload capacity.
The amount of new capacity supplied by
SPS would depend on the percent met by SPS
as opposed to alternate generating sources. If
we assume 10-percent market penetration
there would be demand for 295 GWe (low) to
465 GWe (high); if market penetration were as
high as 50 percent (which is not probable, at
least by 2030) there would be demand for 1485
to 2315 GWe. However, it should be noted that
conventional generators built from 1990-95 on
will still be in operation by 2030; since SPS
would not be available until 2010-15, the new
capacity market will be considerably smaller
than the total demand.
The number of satellites this demand represents would depend on their size; estimates
See: SPS-The Implications for the Utility Industry,
working paper for OTA workshop, July 1980, p, 12,
151
range from 5 GW down to 0.5 GW (see ch. 5).

Development of smaller sizes would greatly
improve the market penetration of SPS by mitigating two serious obstacles: the large size of
reference rectennas, a n d t h e p r o b l e m s o f
inserting large blocs of power into utility grids.
Rectenna size in the 5 GW reference design
is 10 x 13 km at 350 N., including a 2 km buffer zone. Reducing the size of the design to 1.5
GW would necessitate a receiving antenna
only 6.5 X 5.5 km, lowering costs and making
siting more feasible. In European demand
centers, mostly located from 450 to 650 N.,
rectennas would need to be much larger.
Given Europes high population densities,
many experts have suggested placing rectennas offshore in shallow North Sea waters. 1 7
Similar problems would be faced in the Northeastern United States, Japan, Eastern China,
and India. Though apparently feasible, placing
rectennas offshore would add considerably to
their cost.
Even more important, a reduction in size
would enable SPSs to be used by smaller utility
grids, since utilities in developed countries do
not generally make use of single generating
units supplying more than 15 percent of the
utilitys total capacity, because of the need to
ensure against generator failure (see ch. 8).
Conversely SPSs, even in less than 5 GW units,
may be a spur to integration of utility grids in
order to make use of the SPSs large power increments. Currently, there is widespread integration of national grids in both Eastern and
Western Europe. Western Europe has an interconnected high-voltage network, with routine
commercial exchanges of power, which is coordinated by organizations such as the Union
pour la Coordination de la Production et du
T r a n s p o r t d e l E l e c t r i c i t y . 18 In Eastern Europe, Comecon has established an integrated
150-GW grid including all of Eastern Europe
and the Ukraine.
7P Q Collins, Potential for Reception of SPS Microwave

Energy at Off-Shore Rectennas in Western Europe, Fina/
Proceedings, p. 529.
Arnaldo M, Angelini, Power for the 80s: A Challenge for
Western Europe, Spectrum, September 1980, p. 44.
152
Successful integration of national grids is

possible only where there is an expectation of
long-term stable relations with neighboring
countries. Unfortunately, though LDCs could
benefit greatly from regional interconnections,
such expectations are rare in developing
regions where integration may be necessary to
accommodate large blocs of power, and to
share the costs of building expensive rectennas. Countries and regions with a successful
history of cooperation in other areas would be
most likely to join together for SPS integration
as well.
In many developing regions, where the bulk
of the population lives in rural areas, the
feasibility of large centralized power plants is
reduced by a lack of costly infrastructure,
especially transmission l i n e s a n d e n d - u s e
capabilities. In such an environment decentralized generating capacity is preferable to
SPSs or other large plants. It has been sugg e s t e d19 that such countries may be able to
make use of large amounts of electricity for
producing liquid fuels, such as methanol, directly from the basic elements; such fuels can
be easily integrated into economies that currently depend on kerosene or wood for cooking and heating. However, using electricity in
this fashion would not be economically feasible. Methanol can be produced from coal at a
projected cost of $0.50 to $1 .00/gal. But at
5q/kWhr, the cost just to separate from water
the amount of hydrogen necessary to make a
gallon of methanol also lies between $0.50 and
$1.00. There would be the further expense of
providing the necessary carbon (which could
be provided from carbon dioxide taken from
the atmosphere). However, producing methanol from biomass or from coal (in which the
hydrogen, carbon, and oxygen necessary to
manufacture methanol are already present)
would be far more cost effective. A more
reasonable need for SPSs might be for energyintensive uses such as desalination of seawater or fertiIizer production. 20 These projects
might be coordinated on a regional basis.
J. Peter Vajk, Doomsday Has Been Cancelled, Peace Press,
1978,
ZD. Criswell, P. Glaser, R. Mayor, et al., The Role of Space
Technology in the Developing Countries, Space So/ar Power
Review, vol. 1,1980, p. 99.
Geographical location may also be an important factor to developing countries. If the

SPS were located in geostationary orbit, it
would cost more to beam power to areas
located far north or south of the equator.
Europe, as we have seen, is at a disadvantage;
the Soviet Union is in a similar position.
Equatorial and tropical states, on the other
handmost of them LDCswould be in better positions to build small-size rectennas.
Cheaper power could be an incentive to industrial development and foreign investments.
In addition, an equatorial position is optimal
for launching payloads into orbit, since the
Earths rotational speed at the equator (approximately 1,000 mph) is higher than at other
places on the Earths surface. Spaceports for
sending up SPS construction material might
profitably be located near the equator, providing benefits for the countries in which they
are placed in the form of rents, infrastructure
investments, and training of local administrators and technicians.
Earlier it was assumed that the Soviet Union,
barring some radical change in its political and
social institutions, would not participate in a
cooperative SPS venture, except with its East
European allies. As a major space power, the
Soviet Union has the ability to go it alone,
though without a global market for its product
the costs would be considerable. The Soviet
Union has a number of economic reasons to
consider an SPS system, including its increasingly remote and expensive conventional
energy resources, and the large investment it
has put into its space program (currently estimated at some 1.5 to 2 percent of GNP, compared to 0.3 percent in the United States 2 1 ) .
The large distances involved in providing electricity to many areas within the Soviet Union
are an incentive to develop a system in which
power can be sent directly to the area being
served, without transmission lines and without
transporting fuel long distances, The Soviet
Union has a penchant for big projects, especially when competing with the West. However, currently there is no firm indication that
Walter A McDougall, The Scramble for Space, Wi/son
Quarter/y, fall 1980, p. 81.
Ch. 7The lnternational Implications of Solar Power Satellites
the Soviet Union intends to proceed with an
SPS.
Noneconomic Interest
Any SPS system would have numerous noneconomic aspects relating to national prestige
and security, and different national and regional interests can be expected to conflict.
There are three separate arenas in which
such confIicts might arise.
Within OECD
Although cooperation between the United
States and other OECD allies is probable, there
would likely be a high degree of competition
centered around economic interests. Control
of any joint program, the division of responsibilities between countries, and the apportionment of economic benefits to be gained from
contracts let during R&D and construction, are
all potential problem areas. In the case of SPS,
the industries involved aerospace and energyare high-prestige ones in which many
countries wish to develop independent capabilities. Fear of economic and technological
dominance by the United States, or of U.S.
failure to follow through on program commitments, may be a spur to accelerated development of European or Japanese launch vehicles
and construction facilities. The ESAs Ariane
expendable launcher program has been largely
motivated by worries about such dependence,
especially by France, Arianes prime mover.
Japan has announced plans for a new generation of launchers, and non-OECD countries
such as Brazil and India have built sounding
rockets and satellites. Increased competition
with the United States can be expected over
the period of SPS development. 22
East-West
Development of an SPS by the Soviet Union
would have major international consequences.
Since Sputnik, each side has reacted to the actions and statements of the other. Although
space successes may no longer be seen as
proof of the superiority of one social system to
22
1 bid., pp. 71-82.
83-316 0 - 81 - 11
153
another, as Khrushchev used to claim, they are

still a vehicle for peaceful competition, and a
way of impressing allies and potential allies
with individual achievements. Because of its
scope and visibility, the SPS would be a major
symbol of successful efforts in advanced technology. Visibility here is meant literally: 23 a
completed SPS, even in geosynchronous orbit,
would be easily visible to the naked eye. The
impact of such an effort would be direct and
great. It is unlikely that the Soviets could allow
a U.S. or Western SPS to go unchallenged. If
they felt they could not compete successfully,
they would be likely to try to block construction by emphasizing environmental dangers or
supporting Third World demands for shared
control over orbital positions. On the other
hand, a Soviet SPS effort would encourage
U.S. projects by acting as a spur to public
opinion and raising fears of Soviet ascendancy.
North-South
Many Third World states would be antagonistic to SPS development, insofar as control
of the system rests with industrialized countries, West or East. These states would be concerned about increased economic and technical dependence on the North, and the
limited opportunities for meaningful participation in an SPS system. The SPS could be
charged with diverting funds from development projects and with increasing the gap between the developed and underdeveloped
worlds. International forums such as the
United Nations and its specialized agencies
could be used as foci for investigations of any
proposed SPS systems and for discussion of
legal measures to bloc them or to give the
LDCs various sorts of leverage.
Many developing countries have invested
heavily in industries such as steel and oil refining in part because of the prestige value of
such large and advanced sectors. Energy production is a prominent examplewitness
atomic reactors and hydroelectric projects
such as Egypts Aswan Dam. The SPS could be
resented because it is unavailable to LDCs;
*See Jerry Grey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow & Co.,
1979), p 225
only the receiving antennas could be built on

home territory with local resources. Conversely, large amounts of scarce capital might be
spent trying to buy an SPS (if they are for sale)
and the lift capacity to service it in an attempt
to keep up with the advanced countries.
The South is by no means monolithic, and,
if SPS were built, many states would be potential supporters, some because of the benefits
o f l e s s e x p e n s i v e electricity a n d o t h e r s
because of the prospects for future participation. The most likely supporters of an SPS
would be energy-poor countries with a rapidly
developing urban-industrial base, such as
Brazil, Argentina, Kenya, Turkey, India, and
South Korea. Any system that reduces Western
imports of OPEC oil reduces pressure on prices
and means less expensive supplies for
vulnerable LDC importers. It has been argued
that firm plans for building an SPS would of
themselves put a cap on oil price rises by
sending a signal to exporters that Western imports will drop in the future. z
Z4HOuSe committee on science
The oil-exporting states are in a special position. An SPS would by no means eliminate oil
demand and may prove beneficial by helping
to reduce pressure on exporters to increase
production to satisfy rising export needs.
Countries with large populations and relatively
small reserves, such as Nigeria, Indonesia,
China and Malaysia, may view SPS as insurance against the upcoming depletion of their
oil supplies and may choose to invest some of
their current earnings in the hope of long-term
gains. On the other hand, exporting countries,
especially those with long-term reserve potential such as Saudi Arabia, have no immediate
use for an SPS and may be tempted to side
with other LDCs for political and cultural
reasons in attempts to put pressure on the
West for greater LDC control. Soviet support
for such measures could cause the SPS to
become a highly polarized issue in which the
Soviet bloc and the nonalined states seek concessions from the West a not uncommon
phenomenon in recent international affairs.
and Technology, SpS Hearings
on Ff. f?. 2335, 96th Cong., March 1979, pp 132-180,
LEGAL ISSUES
The United States and other space-capable
states are currently bound by a number of
agreements that would affect SPS developm e n t . 25 Much of existing international law has
been formulated at the United Nations (U. N.)
by the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS). COPUOS has been in existence
since 1959, when it began with 24 members. It
now has 47, with membership expanding as
international interest in space matters has increased. COPUOS decisions have been made
by consensus rather than by outright voting. 2 6
25
See Stephen Gorove,
SPS lrrternatjona/ Agreements,
DOE/NASA contract No, EG-77-C-01-4024, October 1978; Carl Q.
Christol, SPS International Agreements, DOE/NASA contract No
EG-77-C-01-4024, October 1978.
2Eilene G a l l o w a y , C o n s e n s u s DeCISiOrlrnaklrlg of
UNCOPUOS, )ourna/ of Space Law, vol. 7, No. 1
The most important and comprehensive of

the currently applicable agreements, all of
which have been ratified by the major space
powers, is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and other Celestial Bodies . In 1979, COPOUS
agreed on a final version of a new treaty, the
so-called Moon Treaty, which has so far not
been signed by the United States or other major powers. The Moon Treaty applies to the
Moon and other celestial bodies, but not to
Earth orbit. In addition to COPUOS, important
decisions on frequency allocations and orbital
positioning are made by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized U. N. agency.
Ch. 7The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites . 155
As a new arena of human exploration, legal

norms with respect to outer space have had to
be defined. This has been done through a gradual process shaped by actual usage, the extension of existing law, and the explicit adoption
of common principles and regulations.
The outstanding international legal issues
that might affect SPS development are:
1. the status of the geosynchronous orbit,
and the source of jurisdiction over the
placement of satellites;
2. provisions against environmental disturbances;
3. the military uses of space and arrtrol implications; and
4. issues relating to the -
facilities and ber
tion of the
kind p
and Western Europe as legally and scientifically untenable. Control over the orbit by a
few states would prevent free and equitable
access to a crucial position by space-capable
countries.
T h e e q u a t o r i a l c l a i m m u s t b e SPP - -- context of various attempts by tr
to gain leverage over ec~ activities otherwise o seven Bogota sig~ Ecuador, lnd~~
(Brazil
is
., torums
..Y of special
Y u . . .dl
..~ct ~eiimitation bei Ider the jurisdiction of the
, y ing u n d e r n e a t h t h e a r e a c o n d-and outer space has never been de,led. I n r e c e n t y e a r s a n u m b e r o f s t a t e s
located on the Equator have claimed jurisdiction over the geosynchronous orbit on the
grounds that it is not part of outer space but
is determined by the Earths gravitation, and is
a limited natural resource requiring national
control. In December 1976 eight equatorial
countries issued the Bogota Declaration asserting their position and laying claim to the
orbital segments lying over their respective territories.
The equatorial states claims have been rejected by the majority of other nations
including the Soviet Union, the United States,
27space Law se/ected
Basic Documents,
Government Printing Office, 1978, p 26
2d
cd,,
U.S
geosynchronous use
..pport among many counlikely to be discussed further when
~~ considers the definition of outer
Ace next year, 28 and when the ITU convenes
a special administrative radio conference on
orbital use in 1984 or 1985.
Even if parts of the orbit cannot be appropriated by sovereign states, there is still the
problem of allocating positions and of deciding competing claims to scarce orbital slots.
The question here is part technical and part
legal: How much space is there, and what constitutes infringement? This is dependent on the
state of technology, since infringement is
not so much a problem of two or more objects
trying to occupy the same place as of electromagnetic interference between nearby satellites (see ch. 8). SPS satellites would not only
be very large but would, especially if using
microwaves, radiate a great deal of energy at
radio frequencies. Each SPS would have to be
allocated a position and frequency to miniSee Gorove, SPS Agreements, op. cit., pp. 14-21; and Delbert
Smith, Space Stations: /nternationa/ Law and Po/icy, Westview
Pre~s, 1979
156
mize interference with a rapidly growing

number of satellites (see ch. 8). Many spectrum
users have worried that SPS operation would
disrupt communications and sensing tasks,
others that the initial SPSs would use up the
available electromagnetic space, preventing
exploitation by latecomers. Since the acceptable limits vary with the size and type of SPS
used, the size and type of future communications satellites, and advances in transmission technology, it is impossible to say at
this time how many SPSs could be built without unacceptable interference.
reallocation clearly has considerable support

among have-not states. Established users such
as the United States remain opposed to a priori
assignment of slots and frequencies. Again, the
ITU debate is part of LDC attempts to gain
leverage. SPS development could be affected
by attempts of disaffected states to block
development by denying frequency allocations, or by making consent contingent on concessions by states with the most interest in
Allocation of frequencies and positions has

to date been the province of the ITU, whose
1973 convention states that stations must be
established and operated in such manner as
not to cause harmful interference of other
members, or of recognized private operating
agencies, or other duly authorized operating
agencies which carry on radio services, and
which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations. 29 Whether the
ITU would have jurisdiction over noncommunications satellites such as SPSs is unclear. 30 In
November 1979, at the ITUs World Administrative Radio Conference, the United States
raised the question of allocating a frequency
position for future SPS testing; the proposal
was referred to a specialized study group for
evaluation and future decision.
The 1967 treaty states, in article VI 1, that

each state is internationally liable for damage to others caused by its activities in
space. 32 The 1973 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects amplifies on these responsibilities. 33
Allocation decisions by the ITU have been

characterized by debate over the first-come
first-served tradition, whereby first users have
priority in the use of frequencies and orbital
slots. Newly space-capable states as well as
LDCs and others who intend to develop such
capabilities in the future have urged, since
1971, that all states have equal rights to frequencies and positions, and the ITU has called
both the radio spectrum and the geostationary
orbit limited natural resources that should
be most effectively and economically used. A
number of LDCs have proposed that space be
reserved for their future use. Since there is no
legal basis for permanent utilization or ownership of positions, the possibility of future
SPS. 31
Environmental
Hence, SPS developers might face lawsuits

or other forms of grievance if the SPS damaged
the global or local environment. The extent of
various environmental effects is unknown and
in need of further research (see ch. 8). Even if
operation of any one SPS had no effect outside
of the state making use of it, designing a
globally marketable system to meet widely
varying national standards could add significantly to costs. The possibility of large Iawsuits
could make insurance expensive or impossible
to procure; large risks in the nuclear industry
made it necessary for the Federal Government
to provide insurance, and similar provisions
might have to be made for SPSs.
Military and Arms Control Issues

The 1967 treaty commits states not to place
in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction (art. IV) and in
general to carry on activities in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security
and promoting international cooperation and
understanding (art. III).34 The 1977 Conven3 Ibid , pp. 21-33,
Space Law, op. cit., p. 28.
Ibid , pp. 49-69.
lbld , p. 26.
32
zgspace Law, Op. cit., P 87

3oGOrove, op. cit., PP. 27-33.
Considerations
Ch. 7The International implications of Solar Power Satellites 157
tion on the Prohibition of Military or Any

Other Hostile Use of EnvironmentaI Modification Techniques prohibits the activities implied, with environmental modification techniques defined as any technique for changing the dynamics, composition or structure of
the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere and atmosphere. (art. 11).35 These
general principles obviously allow for criticism
of some SPS designs as having weather modification potential, requiring restrictions or
redesign to reduce such effects. Whether an
SPSs microwave or laser capabilities would
class it as a weapon of mass destruction and
hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty is
unclear, but it is very likely that such charges
would be made in the event of SPS deployment. Development of an SPS might entail renegotiation of relevant treaties or special system design to minimize its usefulness as a
weapon.
Military satellites for communications and
remote sensing are currently used by several
countries, and presumably use of the SPS platform for such purposes would not constitute a
change in accepted practice. The Soviet Union
has tested antisatellite satellites on several occasions, and the United States and Soviet
Union have conducted informal talks (currently suspended) on limiting antisatellite
weapons. The Soviet Union has complicated
matters by stating that it considers the Space
Shuttle an antisatellite system, an unacceptable proposal for the United States. 36 U.S. Air
Force involvement in the shuttle program and
Department of Defense (DOD) plans for military missions provide Soviet negotiators with
their rationale. Insofar as the Soviet Union is
making this argument for bargaining purposes
in the absence of a similar Soviet system
(similar to Soviet proposals to ban atomic
weapons in the period when it lacked its own
and to prohibit satellite reconnaissance in the
early 1960s) such a charge could also be made
against heavy lift launch vehicles (HLLVs) used
jSAgreernent Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Ce/estia/ Bodies, pts, 1 and 2, U.S Government Printing Off ice, May 1980, p. 256.
Soviets See Shuttle as Killer Satellite, Aviation kVeek and
Space Teclmo/ogy, Apr. 17,1978, p. 17
for shuttle construction. In the absence of

their own SPS program, obstructionist tactics
by the Soviet Union could be expected.
Although unlikely, use of the SPS for
directed-energy weaponry, either directly, or
as a source of energy to be transmitted to
remote platforms, or for tracking, would be
regulated by the 1972 Anti- Ballistic-MissiIe
(ABM) Treaty between the United States and
the US.S.R. Article V of the treaty states that
each party undertakes not to develop, test, or
deploy ABM systems or components which are
sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile
land-based.
Use of the SPS for ABM purposes would
hence be banned. Since any laser or microwave SPS is potentially capable of being so
used, the Soviet Union (or the United States if
the tables were turned) would undoubtedly insist on assurances and inspection provisions to
prevent such developments. The ABM treaty
provides for inspection and verification by
national-technical means, i.e., by remote
surveillance. Onsite inspection has historically
been refused by the Soviet Union, although the
1967 treaty, and the Moon Treaty, include
provisions for mutual inspection of lunar and
celestial facilities. SPSs would need to be
monitored by Earth- and space-based reconnaissance means.
Although the ABM treaty is of unlimited
duration there has been considerable sentiment in the United States for its abrogation or
renegotiation in order to provide a defense for
Americas increasingly vulnerable land-based
I C B M S .37 Abandonment or substantial change
in the treaty might allow for development of
directed-energy weapons in conjunction with
an SPS system. Renewed negotiations may
have to take SPS development into account,
perhaps by specifying SPS designs that make it
unusable as a weapons system. An SPS that
used lasers as its energy-transmission medium
would be particularly destabilizing and it is
p o s s i b l e t h a t a r m s control considerations
would prevent such a system from being built.
-
See Carries Lord, The ABM Question, Commentary, May
1980
758
Common Heritage and the Moon Treaty

The 1967 treaty states, in article 1, that The
exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall
be the province of all mankind. 38 The draft
version of the Moon Treaty adds (art. IV). Due
regard shall be paid to the interests of present
and future generations as well as to the need
to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and
development in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations. 3 9 The exact meaning of
these provisions is unclear, beyond a negative
duty not to interfere with the activities of other
states or to harm their interests. A positive interpretation that would impose on space
powers the obligation either to permit other
countries to use the formers space vehicles or
to share the financial benefits of its space activities, 40 has been made by some LDCs but
has not received widespread support. Since
1958, U.S. policy has been to encourage international cooperation. U.S. launch capabilities
have been available to all countries, on a reimbursable basis, for peaceful and scientific purposes.
In 1970, A. A. Cocca of Argentina proposed a
draft treaty in UNCOPUOS which provided
that the natural resources of the moon and
other celestial bodies be the common heritage of mankind. This terminology was borrowed from similar language used in the Law
of the Sea negotiations in 1967 for regulating
seabed resources that lie outside of national
jurisdiction.
In the course of the Law of the Sea negotiations (not yet concluded) common heritage,
has come to mean common ownership, by
mankind as a whole (art. CXXXVII), 14 w i t h
commercial exploitation to be regulated by a
yet-to-be-formed international regime which
will distribute part of the returns among participating countries. In 1970, the United States
3aSpace Law, op. cit., p. 25
39 Agreement,
Op, Cit., pts. 1
voted for a declaration of principles that

prohibited activities incompatible with the international regime to be established.42 Until
the regime is more clearly defined, it is impossible to tell whether current activities will
be incompatible or not. The effect of this
climate of uncertainty and of the possibility
that future regulations may make mining unprofitable has been to keep sea-bed mining
consortia several of which were formed in
the 1970sfrom proceeding with the large
capital investments needed for commercial exploitation.
Article Xl of the draft Moon Treaty provides
for a regime (to be established sometime in the
future) with the following provisions:
1, The Moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind . . .
5. States parties to this agreement hereby
undertake to establish an international
regime, including appropriate procedures,
to govern the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible . . .
7. The main purposes of the international
regime to be established shall include . . .
(d) an equitable sharing by all States
Parties in the benefits derived from
those resources, whereby the interests
and needs of the developing countries,
as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either
directly or indirectly to the exploration
of the Moon, shall be given special
considerate ion. 43
Moon Treaty opponents have argued that
the treaty, like the proposed Law of the Sea,
would delay or prevent commercial investment in space activities, and would in any case
substitute a state-run international body for
private enterprises. 4 4 Because of the already
developed technology for deep-sea mining
(most of it U.S.), the Law of the Sea negotiations have become absorbed in detailed discussion of the regime to be established, while
and 2, PP 88 -89
Smith, op. cit., p. 92.

Agreement, op. cit., pts. 1 and 2, p 74
Agreement, op cit , pt. 3, August 1980, pp. 295-307

Agreement, op cit , pts. 1 and 2, pp 91-92,
See 1-5 Memorandum in Agreement, op cit., pp. 377-378
in the Moon Treaty such details have been left

to the time when exploitation of lunar or other
celestial resources is about to become feasible. The eventual outcome of the Law of the
Sea may have an important bearing on the
shape of a future outer space regime.
Since the Moon Treaty would not apply to
objects in Earth orbit, SPS would not be directly affected. However, the Treaty could have
several indirect effects. First of all, in several
scenarios large-scale SPS construction beyond
an initial demonstration system is economically feasible only if the satellites are built from
lunar or asteroidal material (see ch. 5). Such
prospects would be dependent on a regime
such as is envisioned in the Moon Treaty,
which would have to grant permission to mining companies to extract minerals and build
facilities.
Secondly, it can be argued that solar energy
is a celestial resource under the jurisdiction of
the proposed regime, and that SPSs (and other
space-craft) must be granted permission to use
i t .4 5 Though such an argument is unlikely to
find general acceptance, it could be used by
interested states to try and gain additional
leverage.
Thirdly, adoption of the Moon Treaty would
provide a powerful precedent that could affect the evolution of a future SPS project. It
would legitimize developing countries claims
to receive benefits on a par with states that
have actually invested in launch or construction facilities, and give impetus to arguments
that the geostationary orbit is a common
159
heritage resource requiring explicit allocation

by an international body.
In the course of the Moon Treaty negotiations the United States was a consistent supporter, along with virtually all the Third World
participants, of the common heritage provisions, while their most persistent opponent was
the Soviet Union. 4 6 The U.S.S.R. did not accede
to these provisions until 1979. While the
United States generally interpreted common
heritage in such a way as to allow for some degree of private unilateral commercial development, the Soviet Union expressed fears
that the treaty would lead to an unacceptable
suprastate body. The Soviet position was that
such a body would infringe on the sovereign
rights of states. The Soviets have also opposed
allowing private or nongovernmental bodies to
engage in space activities. Both the 1967 treaty
(art. Vl) and the proposed Moon treaty (art.
IXV) provide for state supervision of and responsibility for the activities of nongovernmental entities. This state-centric approach
is typical of Soviet attitudes in international
negotiations.
As a result of concerns generated by the Law
of the Sea negotiations, as well as antitreaty
lobbying by pro-space organizations such as
the L-5 Society, U.S. support for the draft
Moon Treaty has been limited. U.S signature
has been discussed in the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, and by
a special interagency committee chaired by
the State Department. Prospects for U.S. approval currently appear to be slight.
Conversation with Eilene Galloway, September 1980,
Agreement, op. cit., pts 1 and 2, pp 27-38
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF

MULTINATIONAL SPS
No matter what country or organization
were to build an SPS, it is clear that construction would involve some cooperation with and
accommodation of the interests of other states
and regions. However, from the point of -view

of any national government and to a lesser
degree of private corporations as wellit
would be preferable, other things being equal,
760
to build the SPS as a strictly national venture

and to own and operate the system on a unilateral basis.
Unilateral Interests
From a corporate viewpoint, it is much
easier to do business within a country than to
do so across national boundaries. Multinational ownership or control would complicate
decisionmaking, r e d u c e f l e x i b i l i t y , a n d i n troduce a multitude of political strains that
any company would prefer to avoid. To the extent that foreign markets are attractive, the
company wouId prefer to retain domestic ownership and to sell completed units abroad,
minimizing foreign entanglements.
From the point of view of governments that
might consider investing in SPS, the desire to
do so alone would be very strong, for reasons
of prestige, security, and economics. At present only the United States and the Soviet
Union could even consider such a unilateral effort. In the longer term, however, it is conceivable that a European consortium or
perhaps even a single European statemost
l i k e l y F r a n c e could also undertake such a
project. So could Japan, with possible cooperation from China, South Korea, and other
regional powers with technical expertise and
financial resources.
Is it likely that the United States or the
Soviet Union would build an SPS in the near
future? Such a program would be undertaken
only if there were serious doubt that alternative energy sources will be available in the
future, or that their costs will be acceptable.
This would have to mean that the C0 2 and environmental problems of large-scale coal use
were seen to be acute and imminent, or that
nuclear reactors were deemed unacceptable
due to a major accident and public disapproval. In addition, alternatives to the SPS
such as fusion, ground-based solar cells, and
possible other future technologies, would have
to fail to fill the gap (see ch. 6). In the event of
some such crisis SPS studies must be sufficientIy advanced to provide very high assurance
that such a system would work. Given this
combination of events, and if cooperation with

foreign governments or corporations is rejected because of fears that it might slow
down the project or otherwise reduce its
domestic usefulness, it is possible that a
unilateral effort would be undertaken.
There are several other factors that might increase the attractiveness of a unilateral crash
project similar to the Manhattan or Apollo programs. Three requirements for such decisions
are: 1 ) a crisis, requiring immediate action,
which threatens basic national interests; 2) the
existence of a workable plan to resolve the
crisis; 3) decisive leadership by persons in positions to implement such plans. In the Manhattan and Apollo cases, the crises involved
challenges to national interests that placed a
premium, not only on developing the atomic
bomb or the ability to go to the Moon, but on
doing so first.
The SPS would have important economic,
prestige, and security implications. Unilateral
development by the Soviet Union or the
United States would provide a strong impetus
for the other to do so as well, as long as the
project could also be justified on other
grounds. The strength of this impetus would
depend on the state of future U.S.-Soviet relations. In the 1950s nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems were seen as vital to the existence of the state; the space programs of the
1960s as symbolic of each states social and
economic superiority. It is unlikely that the
SPS would be as crucial to East-West competition as these earlier technologies, unless the
SPS or the launchers needed to build it become vital elements of military systems. For
the reasons given in the next section, Nationa/
Security Implications of SPS this is possible
but unlikely. Hence an equivalent desire to
build the first systeman SPS race- is improbable.
Within the United States certain interests
would favor unilateral as opposed to multilateral development. Businesses likely to benefit
from development, such as aerospace indus
.
]ohn 1 ogsdon, The Decision To Go To rhe Moon (Cambridge,
M,tss Ml T Press, 1970), p 181
tries or large construction firms, might prefer a

unilateral effort that would provide them with
most or al I of the contracts, as well as the prospect of foreign sales. However, others might
fear that a unilateral development would discourage foreign buyers. Some utilities and oil
companies might oppose an SPS altogether if
it competes with energy sources in which they
have already invested. Since unilateral development would almost undoubtedly mean a
government-dominated and financed project,
such businesses would be likely to argue that
the SPS is unfairly competitive and to demand
compensation.
In the Soviet Union there is no private sector
and hence no question of public v. private
development. Though it is possible that nonCommunist states such as India and France,
both of whom have engaged in cooperative
space projects with the Soviet Union before,
might participate in small ways, it would be
unprecedented for the Soviet Union to engage
in extensive joint planning or operations with
nonallied states. Such cooperation in sensitive,
high-technology areas involving space capabilities, which in the Soviet Union are run by
the armed forces and considered top-secret
military programs,
is especially unlikely.
Hence an international SPS program is not a
real option for the Soviet Union, given its present political and economic institutions.
Within both the United States and Soviet
Union, the military may argue for a unilateral
program in order to enhance SPSs military
usefulness, which would be destroyed if sensitive information had to be shared among
neutral partners or partners who could not be
trusted not to reveal technical or other details
to unfriendly states. In the United States,
resistance to military involvement is likely to
be strong, partly to avoid foreign charges of
aggressive intent, and also to prevent possible
military interference in the projects efficiency, as with the Space Shuttle.48 However, given
the militarys role in the Soviet space program,
The price for Air Force support of Shuttle funding in Congress was substantial redesign of the original Shuttle model, lowering performance and increasing costs See Jerry C rey, Enterprise (New York: William Morrow & Co , 1979), pp. 66-68.
161
such arguments are likely to be less telling

there than in the United States. Although various Soviet ministries would seek a say in SPS
development, none has the technical or managerial competence to displace the military in
such a project. 49
In the United States, the Government sponsors two largely separate space programs, a
civilian one run by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), and a military one run by the Department of Defense.
Both draw extensively on expertise and experience from a large number of private firms.
While an SPS project in the Soviet Union could
not help but be dominated by the military, a
U.S. project, even one run by the Government,
could be shared between the military, Government-civilian, and private sectors. Various
combinations could be developed to provide a
desirable mix between public and private, milit a r y a n d c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s .50 In the past,
Government-sponsored projects that might
provide guidance and precedent for an SPS
program have included the Panama Canal, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Interstate
Highway System. (See ch. 9, Financing, Ownership, and Control. ) What is important is the
flexibility available to U.S. planners, a flexibility not found in the Soviet Union, which, if a
multinational effort is preferred, makes it
possible to accommodate international partners on various terms.
Both Western Europe and Japan have more
urgent requirements for reliable energy supplies than the two current space powers. The
impetus for SPS development wouId be similar
to that for the United States, but the need is
more imminent, and the costs of alternatives,
in the absence of indigenous fossil fuels, are
higher. Could an SPS be built in an acceptable
period without extensive U.S. assistance
(assuming Soviet assistance is improbable)?
See Soviet Space Programs 1977-7975, vol. 11, ch, 2, Organization and Administration of the Soviet Space Program,
August 1976, pp. 63-82.
For discussions of these issues, see Peter Vajk, 5PS Financ;al/Management
Scenarios, D O E / N A S A c o n t r a c t N o . EG7 7 - C - 0 1 - 4 0 2 4 , O c t o b e r 1 9 7 8 , H e r b e r t Kierolff, SPS F;nanc;al/Management
Scenarios, D O E / N A S A c o n t r a c t N o . EG77-C-01 4024, October 1978.
162
The requisite technical and financial base is

available; strong aerospace industries exist; national and multilateral space programs, such
as the European Space Agency (ESA), are in
place. However, both ESA and Japan lack the
depth of U.S. industrys aerospace expertise,
its worldwide tracking and relay networks, and
above all experience in and development of
manned space-vehicles. The most sophisticated non-American launch vehicle is ESAs
Ariane, which is still being test-flown and is
scheduled to begin commercial operations in
1982. 5 The Ariane is a high-quality three-stage
expendable booster, but it is far smaller than
the large U.S. Saturn rockets used for the
Apollo program. And it is far behind the U.S.
Space Shuttle in capabilities, payloads, and
cost effectiveness (at least to LEO). Since the
Shuttle itself is too small and expensive for
full-scale SPS construction, ESA is at least two
generations of vehicles away from being able
to develop an SPS unilaterally. Producing the
requisite lift capabilities in an independent
program would be extremely costly and timeconsuming.
It is clear that any unilateral SPS program
depends on a dramatic and unpredictable increase in the sense of urgency about medium
and long-term energy supplies. Even if such an
increase were to occur, such efforts would be
very expensive for any one country or region to
undertake, especially since crash programs are
necessariIy more expensive than ordinary ones;
money is traded for time.
Multilateral
Interests
There are three reasons why interested parties may wish to abandon their preference for
autonomy in favor of an international effort.
These are: 1) to share the high costs and risks;
2) to expand the global market; 3) to forestall
foreign opposition and/or promote international cooperation.
costs
The exact costs of developing, manufacturing, and operating a SPS are unknown; N A S A
Edward Bassett, Europe Competes With U.S. Programs,
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar 3,1980, p, 89.
estimates a 22-year, $102 billion program for

the reference design. 52 (See ch. 5, Costs. ) Although the R&D costs would be much lower
than construction costs, they would be the
hardest to finance, and the ones where international cooperation would be most valuable.
The number of satellites needed for a global
system would clearly be much larger than for a
U.S. system alone. However, the R&D/prototype costs are essentially the same whether the
system is unilateral or multilateral. Since the
very long 30-year period of investment before
payback is the projects weakest link, it would
be desirable to spread these costs between a
large number of possible investors. And by
widening the available pool of capital and expertise, an international effort would have less
of an inflationary impact on resources, thus
keeping costs down.
However, it should be realized that an international consortium, whether involving private
firms or government agencies, will tend generally to increase the overall costs. Under the
best of circumstances there are costs associated with doing extensive business across
borders, with coordinating efforts in different
languages and geographic areas, and with balancing the divergent national interests of
foreign partners. Without careful management
and a high degree of cooperation from the
states involved, these extra inefficiencies can
eliminate any advantage gained from internationalizing the project. The experience of European collaborative efforts has been that costs
rise as the large number of participants increases the managerial superstructure and
project complexity .53
The Global Market
We have previously discussed the SPSs potential global market. An international venture
may improve the marketing prospects of the
system. First of all, potential users and buyers
wouId be less concerned about becoming dependent on a particular country or corporation, which may infringe on national sov.
5
*K Ierolff, op. cit., pp. 4-5
5 JTestlmony of Dr. Wolfgang
F i n k , /nternationa/ Space Ac-
tivities, 95th Cong., November 1978, U.S. Government Printing

Office, p 12
Ch. 7The lnternational Implications of Solar Power Satellites
ereignty. Many states, especially LDCs, are

concerned about such a situation, particularly
with regard to U.S. firms. Over the past 15 to
20 years, LDCs have made great efforts to gain
indigenous control over local industries and
resources, often resorting to nationalization
and expropriation. The accumulation of financial and legal expertise by LDC governments
means that future dealings with foreign firms
will be more cautious and equitable than in
the past. Also, it is often politically more feasible for a neutral or nonalined state to deal with
an internationally controlled consortium than
with a U.S. or Japanese or West European firm,
especially when internal opposition to such
relationships is strong.
A consortium that offered direct participation and ownership to a large number of
states would improve its marketing position
even more. Such participation/ownership, even
if on a small scale, would help to familiarize
members with the organizations operation
and finances, and assure potential buyers that
they were not being deceived. A financial
stake would provide an incentive to see that
the system worked efficiently and was suited
for the needs of a variety of users.
Widespread participation by many countries
with different financial stakes and energy requirements would also present a host of problems. Even small investors could be expected
to lobby for a proportionate share of the
benefits, including profits and contracts, and
for a say in policy and management decisions.
Investors with similar interests can be expected to band together. Often, small-stake
participants with less to lose are willing to use
any available forum to further ideological or
economic interests unrelated to the business at
hand. A balance must be struck between the
advantage of open participation and the danger that such participation could undermine
the organizations credibiIity and competence.
163
pants would use their leverage for concessions

in unrelated political or economic areas. However, mere participation would not forestall
opposition. If member interests are not mutually compatible, opposition is only moved
from without to within. The best check on internal obstructionism would be for the major
participants to indicate their willingness to go
it alone, if necessary, rather than allow internal
obstacles to destroy the project. Since organizations quickly develop their own constituencies, w i t h i n a n d w i t h o u t g o v e r n m e n t s ,
which have an interest in maintaining the organization, a credible threat to go it alone must
be backed up by national leaders and by investment in the requisite systems.
Possible Models
Intelsat,
Inmarsat
How might such an organization be constructed, and what are the types of problems
that might be faced? Here it is helpful to look
at historical examples of international organizations in the space and energy fields. We
will look briefly at Intelsat and Inmarsat; at
cooperative efforts in nuclear power; and at
the European Space Agency (ESA).
Of existing bodies, Intelsat and its nearrelative, Inmarsat, have been mentioned most
often as possible models for an international
SPS project. Intelsat is attractive because it
has been efficient and profitable, and because
it has succeeded in including a large number of
participating states.
Forestalling Opposition,
Promoting Cooperation
Intelsat was founded in 1964, largely at the

prompting of the United States, to provide international satellite telecommunication services. The initial agreement provided for joint
ownership and investment in proportion to the
use of the system by each participating country, and for renegotiation in 5 years to take account of experience and new developments. 5 4
At first, Intelsat was dominated by the United
States through its semipublic participant, Comsat; LDC participation was minimal, and the
Because of the importance of the SPS and

the size of the financial stake involved, major
SPS participants could expect that nonpartici-
Jonathan Galloway, The Po/;t;cs and Technology of Sate//;te

Communications (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972),
p 75
764
Soviet Union and East Bloc countries refused,

to join, preferring to establish a separate organization, Intersputnik. The permanent agreements reached in 1971 reduced Comsat control
and made it easier for low-use countries to participate. In 1979, Intelsat had 102 members,
with the U.S. share being 24.8 percent. 55 ( S e e
app. E.)
Inmarsat is designed to provide positioning
and maritime services between ships and shipto-shore. Organized similarly to Intelsat, it is
expected to begin operations in 1981, leasing
its initial satellite services from lntelsat. 5 6 (See
app. E.)
Though Intelsat has functioned relatively
smoothly and has shown a good return on invested capital, serious disagreements between
participants have arisen. Many of these disagreements have revolved around the allocation of procurement and R&D contracts,
with member countries competing for prestigious and high-value shares. Given the predominant position of U.S. aerospace firms,
much of the pressure has been for equitable
shares for European and Japanese companies.
However, some participants, especially LDCs
and others without indigenous aerospace capabilities, have objected to distributing contracts on a geographical or political basis,
charging that it drives up costs. 57 Non-U. S. contract shares have risen over time (23 percent of
Intelsat 5, the latest model satellite, is foreign
built), 58 and future use of ESAS Ariane launcher and purchase of European communication
satellites may raise this significantly. (See app.
E.)
Above all, Intelsat came into being through

the. dominant interest and investment of a
single participant, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . U . S .
determination to institute a global communication satellite system was due in large part to
the Kennedy administrations desire, at a time
when the Soviet Union seemed superior in
manned and unmanned space capabilities, to
achieve a space success before the Soviets that
would pay off in terms of global prestige and
the furtherance of U.S. national interests. The
1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act
which established NASA proclaimed that
space activities should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind. 5 9
In addition to the scientific and commercial
benefits, improved international communication was seen as a foreign policy plus for the
United States, that would involve other states
as participants under U.S. leadership. The
technology for such activities was well advanced and judged to be superior to that of the
Soviet Union.
The centralized management structure thus
created, combined with U.S. technical leadership and its status as the largest single user of
the system, gave Intelsat initial national support that was vital in allowing it to operate efficiently and with a minimum of delays. The
promise of future renegotiations placated
those, such as France, who objected to the initial phase of U.S. dominance. By contrast, the
establishment of Inmarsat, despite its close
adherence to the Intelsat model, took 4 years
of negotiations and some 9 years before the
start of actual operations.
Comsat Annual Report 1979, p. 23.

Operating Agreement on Inmarsat, 1976; in Space Law,
p. 445.
Szjoseph N, pelton, G/oba/ c o m m u n i c a t i o n s %te//jte po/icY:
At the outset of Intelsat negotiations in

1963, and even at the time of renegotiation in
1969-71, the U.S. position vis-a-vis Europe and
the Third World was much stronger than it has
been since or is likely to be again, not only in
space technology but in general economic performance and military strength. This acrossthe-board preeminence made palatable-a U.S.
position that would today probably not be
tolerated.
Intelsat, Politics, anci Functionalism (Mt Airy, Md.: Lomond

Books, 1974), p. 76.
alntelsat Being Readied for November Launch, Aviation
Week and Space Technology, Oct. 27,1980, p 51.
5National Aeronautics and Space Act, 1958; in Space Law,

p 499
What do the Intelsat and Inmarsat model

tell us about a possible lntersunsat? The
relatively smooth functioning of Intelsat is
largely a result of its initial organization, which
had certain peculiarities not likely to be repeated in the future.
55
In the foreseeable future, U.S.-European

equivalence in technical and economic capabilities and the increased self-confidence of
the Third World countries, who were effectively excluded from the initial Intelsat arrangements, will make a repeat of the U.S. position
impossible. With regard to an SPS, the United
States would not necessarily be the largest
user, nor would it have a monopoly on engineering expertise. And the political impetus
provided by Soviet competition, which was
vital to the formation of Comsat and Intelsat,
is likely to be missing or muted.
The swift and effective establishment of lntelsat depended on several other factors. One
was the prior existence of international and national entities dealing with global communications. Bodies such as the ITU provided technical background and legal precedents for
dealing with communication satellites, and national telecommunications agencies had long
experience with short-wave and cable transmissions. No such equivalent exists for the SPS.
The initial costs of Intelsat were comparatively low; as of 1980 (through 16 years of
operation) a total of somewhat over $1 billion
had been invested in R&D and procurement. In
addition, the basic research had already been
done, and paid for, by the United States; it was
a proven technology with a predictable market. The SPS would be several orders of magnitude more expensive, would take decades to
produce, and is far riskier. One consequence
of communication satellites low costand
the existence of established communication
entitieswas that the basic decisions, both at
the beginning and later on, were made by expert bodies with little public awareness. 6o This
prevented sharp polarization and allowed
negotiators to give and take without risking
outcries at home. SPS negotiations would not
take place in this atmosphere. As one observer
notes, An SPS is not likely to come into being
through the nonpolitical activities of technical
agencies . . . Decisions about SPS at the international level will be made . . . by the political
leaders of major nation-states in the context of
OPelton, op. cit., p. 44
165
international political debate. 61 The large size

and importance of SPS contracts would create
strong pressures for geographical allocation;
here the experience of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) may be more relevant than that of Intelsat.
The above is not meant to dismiss Intelsats
experience. Valuable lessons from Intelsat are
the importance of corporate-style independent
management; weighted voting by investment
share and usage; and interim arrangements
that allow a project to begin work and gain experience before establishing a permanent
structure. And the positive example of Intel sat
and the experience gained in its operation will
prove helpful in the future.
Other Models
Besides Intelsat, with its distinctive combination of state and designated-entity participation, there are other possible models for
international cooperation, including: 1) jointventures by privately or Government-owned
multinational corporations, on the model of
Aramco, or the recently formed Satellite
Business Systems, jointly owned by Comsat,
IBM, and Aetna Insurance, 2) state-to-state
agreements coordinating national space programs, such as ESA and its predecessors, ELDO
and ESRO; 3) international agreements on the
development and use of atomic power, such as
Euratom; 4) U.S. bilateral arrangements between NASA and foreign agencies or companies.
PRIVATE CONSORTIUM
Agreements for joint financing and management by nationally based companies can provide extensive informal coordination across
boundaries and facilitate the raising of capital
on diverse financial markets. (See ch. 9, Financing, Ownership, and Control. ) Two major difficulties would face such an attempt. From the
companys viewpoint the very high initial investments and the uncertain legal and regulatory constraints would inhibit commitment
without government guarantees. Many disjohn Logsdon, International Dimensions of Solar Power Satellites Collaboration or Competition? July 1980, p 3.
cussants have concluded that public sector financing would likely be essential for any SPS
project. z From the state perspective, especially outside the United States, there would be reluctance to rely on private sector development
and control of energy supplies, as well as
potential antitrust problems (especially in the
United States) caused by a concentration of
companies.
ESA
Within Western Europe there have been
ongoing efforts to coordinate national space
programs so as to compete with the United
States and the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s
two organizations were founded: ELDO (the
European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization), aimed at designing and
building a European launch vehicle (the
Europa rocket); and ESRO, (European Space
Research Organization) to conduct basic research. Both groups, and especially ELDO, suffered from a lack of direction and from
divergent national interests. 3 Allocation of
contracts was based on the principle of fair
return; contributions to the organization were
in proportion to each states GNP, and contracts were supposed to be let in similar ratios.
This produced intense disagreements and
delays, exacerbated by cost increases which
had to be allocated evenly among the participants.
In the late 1960s Europe began to pay increased attention to the so-called technology
gap between it and the United States. In 1967,
J. Jacques Servan-Schreibers book The Americean challenge polemicized the U.S. economic invasion of Europe and aroused a popular interest in technology comparable to the
Sputnik aftermath in the United States. 6 4 I n terest in joint space efforts increased; the
failure of ELDO to produce a reliable Europa
rocket was heavily criticized, with France and
Germany claiming their willingness to produce
it on their own.
*See Vajk and Kierolff for further discussion
3 See Mihiel Schwarz, European Policies on Space Science
and Technology 1960-1978, Research Policy, August 1979, pp.
205-242,
Henry Nau, Nationa/ Po/itics and /nternat;ona/ Technology
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 55
The late 1960s also produced strong pressures, as in the United States, for projects with
economic payoffs, rather than abstract research or prestige programs. After Apollo, the
United States began to look for ways to reduce
the costs of its proposed Space Transportation
System. One way was increased cooperation
with Europe. While France remained suspicious that such offers were designed to forestal I independent European programs, Germany welcomed NASA proposals for joint development as a way to gain access to U.S. technology and to use of the Space Shuttle. Hence,
whiIe France continued to emphasize launcher
development, Germany turned to production
of Spacelab for NASA.
In 1973, ESRO and ELDO were joined together as the 9-member European Space Agency. Its major projects to date have been: 1) the
Ariane launcher, a $1 billion effort which is 64percent French financed and flown from
Frances
in Guiana, South
spaceport
America; 65 and 2) Spacelab, an $880 million
project, 55-percent German financed, being
built in West Germany. Other ESA projects
have included regional remote sensing, meteorological, and maritime satellites, and a regional communications satellite (L-Sat) being
developed under the guidance of Great Britain. 66
The formation of ESA has not eliminated
intra-European difficulties and the problem of
coordinating national programs. A report in lnteravia charges that individual states are tiring of the paper-passing and consensus-seeking
that is involved in getting programs started and
keeping them alive within the framework of an
international civil-service organization. One
resuIt may be a turn towards commercial alternatives. With the completion of Ariane a new
firm called Arianespace has been formed,
made up of European industries, banks, and
the French National Space Agency, to market
the launcher commercially and in competition
The French Space Effort, Interavia, June 1979, p, 508.
Edward Bassett, ESA Planning New Telecommunications
Satellite, A v;ation Week and Space Technology, Dec 31, 1979,
p 12
European Space Programs: An Industrial Plea for Integrated
Effort,ll Interav;a, August 1979, p. 785,
with the U.S. Space Shuttle. 68 If successful,

Arianespace will provide an example of how
an internationally financed and developed
spacecraft can be turned over to a commercial
operating group, which could be a model for
similar development of the SPS. However, allin-all the history of European collaboration
provides more dont's than dos for a
future SPS effort.
NUCLEAR POWER
International nuclear cooperation is the
only model that compares with the SPS in its
financial and political scope, though the
security aspects of nuclear power are largely
unique. Like SPS, nuclear power is a baseload
electricity source requiring large investments
and a high degree of technical competence,
with widely perceived environmental dangers.
The overall picture of nuclear cooperation
shows a field where development and operation, though expensive, is not prohibitively so,
and where considerations of national prestige
and security are extraordinarily high. Have
countries have had Iittle reason to promote the
spread of nuclear technology, except as a profitable export or a form of foreign aid. The expense of initial development has been justified
as a military necessity (as in the U.S. submarine
reactor program). Cooperation is largely motivated by the need for agreed-on international
standards and regulations to prevent accidents
and inhibit proliferation. Strictly economic or
energy-supply considerations have played a
small role, except as window-dressing, while
political and competitive needs have been the
prime movers. Nuclear development in Third
World countries, such as Brazil and India, has
New Commercial Organization to Take Ariane Responsibility, Aviation Week and Space Technology Apr. 7,1980, p. 45,
167
been especially motivated by noneconomic

considerations. 69
Development of an SPS should not suffer
from the extreme obstacles to positive cooperation faced in the nuclear field: the military
uses would be less important, the costs much
higher, and the economic need greater. The intense politicization of nuclear development
shows an extreme case of the forces that can
come into play during the development of a
major new technology.
U.S. BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
The United States has been very successful
in establishing useful bilateral arrangements
with foreign governmental agencies and organizations, such as ESA.
NASA has been empowered to enter into exchanges of information and services, in coordination with other
parts of Government, such as the State Department. NASA has provided launch services,
technical assistance, a n d r e m o t e s e n s i n g
(Landsat) imagery to a large number of foreign
customers. The network of relationships built
up over the years could be helpfuI in promoting a multilateral SPS. Direct bilateral cooperation with major potential partners in
Europe and Japan might be the best way to initiate foreign cooperation and create a climate
conducive to the expansion of the enterprise,
especially in the initial less expensive R&D
stages. Such agreements would take substantially less time to negotiate than regional or
global ones.
June Sabato and Jairam Ramesh, Atoms for the Third
World, Bu//et;n of Atomk Scientists, March 1980, p. 39.
Stephen M. Shaffer and Lisa R. Shaffer, The Politics of international Cooperation: A Comparison of U.S. Experience in
Space and Security, Monograph Series in Wor/d Affairs, vol. 17,
book 4, University of Denver, 1980, pp. 15-26.
Go rove, op. cit., p. 50,
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

The potential military aspects of an SPS will
be of major concern to the international community and to the general public. There are
fears that the satellite will be vulnerable to

attack, or that it may be used for offensive
weapons (see ch. 9, Public Opinion). Such con-
cerns may be decisive in determining the pace

and scope of SPS development, and the mode
of financing and ownership that is used. There
are three basic aspects to consider: 1) SPS
vulnerability and defensibility; 2) the military
uses of SPS launch vehicles and construction
facilities; and 3) direct and indirect use of SPS
as a weapons system or in support of military
operations. Of these it is the second, the extensive capability of new launchers and large
space platforms, that will constitute the most
likely and immediate impact.
Vulnerability and Defensibility

There are two main segments of any SPS, the
ground receiver and the satellite proper. Since
reference-system rectennas or mirror-system
energy parks would be very large and composed of numerous identical and redundant
components, t h e y w o u l d b e u n a t t r a c t i v e
targets; the smaller antennas of other designs
would be slightly more vulnerable. The satellite segment would be vulnerable in the ways
outlined below, but in general no more so than
other major installations. Its size and distance
would be its best defenses.
Would SPS Be Attacked?
The reasons for attacking a civilian SPS
would be that it is expensive and prestigious,
not easily replaceable, and that it supplies an
essential commodity, baseload electricity. In
determining whether to target an SPS in the
event of hostilities, the crucial consideration
would be how much of a nations or regions
electricity is supplied by SPS. In most
developed countries, utilities maintain a
reserve of approximately 20 percent of their
total capacity, i n o r d e r t o g u a r d a g a i n s t
breakdowns and maintenance outages. If SPS
supplied no more than the reserve margin, its
loss could be made up; however, given an SPS
system consisting of many satelIites particular
regions or industries would be Iikely to receive
more than 20 percent. Making up for losses
would require an efficient national grid to
transfer power to highly affected areas.
Increased use of high voltage transmission
lines and other measures should increase U.S.
ability to transfer power. However, in many

countries, especially LDCs, SPS losses might
not be easily replaceable since SPSs, if used,
would be likely to provide more than 20 percent of total capacity on a national basis.
An attack on SPS would also depend on
other factors. If the attacker relies on its own
SPSs, it may fear a response in kind. If the
satellites were owned by a multinational consortium the attacker might be hesitant to offend neutral or friendly states involved. If they
were manned it is unclear whether permanent personnel would be required for SPS the
attacker might be reluctant to escalate a confIict by attacking manned bases.
The unprecedented position of the SPS,
located in orbit outside of national territory,
gives rise to uncertainties as to how an attack
would be perceived and responded to. If the
SPS is seen as analogous to a merchant ship on
the high seas, attacks would be proscribed
unless war were declared and outer space were
proclaimed a war zone. Otherwise, any attack
would be tantamount to a declaration of war.
In practice, however, experience has shown
that attacks on merchant vessels have not
caused an automatic state-of-war, though they
have often played a crucial part in bringing
one about.
It is more likely that the SPS, because of its
function and/or its stationary position (for certain designs), would be perceived as similar to
a fixed overseas base or port rather than a ship.
An attack would then be taken more seriously,
especially if lives were lost. It will be important for national leaders to clarify what status
an SPS would have, particularly in times of
crisis. A low priority assigned to SPS could encourage enemy states to attack it as a way of
demonstrating resolve or as part of an escalator response short of all-out war.
How Could SPS Be Attacked?
There are essentially five ways the satellite
portion of an SPS could be destroyed or damaged: 1) ground-launched missiles; 2) satellites
or space-launched missiIes; 3) ground or spacebased directed-energy weapons; 4) orbital
Ch. 7The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites 169
debris; 5) disruption or diversion of the energy

transmission beam.
for lasers or microwaves cannot be presently

predicted.
A missile attack from the ground on a geosynchronous SPS would have the disadvantage
of lack of surprise, due to the distances involved and the satellites position at the top of
a 35,000 km gravity well; missiles would take
up to an hour or more to reach, geosynchronous orbit. An attack from prepositioned geosynchronous satellites would be faster and less
detectable. However, a laser or mirror SPS in
low orbit could be reached from the ground in
a matter of minutes. Lasers or particle beams,
which might be used to rapidly deface the
solar celIs or mirrors rather than to cause structural demage, would have virtually instantaneous effect.
A missile attack with a conventional warhead might be difficult due to SPSs very large
size and redundancy. The most vulnerable
spot on the reference and other photovoltaic
designs would be the rotary joint connecting
the antenna to the solar cell array. Laser
transmitters would be more vulnerable due to
their smaller size, though they would also be
easier to harden. Attackers would be tempted
to use nuclear weapons, either directly on the
satellite, or at a distance. I n space a large (one
megaton or more) nuclear blast at up to 1,000
km-distance could cause an electrical surge in
SPS circuitry (the electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
effect) sufficient to damage a photovoltaic
S P S 72 (though it would have no effect on a
mirror-system). Such an attack would be particularly effective against a large SPS system,
as it could destroy a number of satellites
simultaneously. However, like an orbital debris
attack, it has the problem of damaging all
unhardened satellites indiscriminately within
the EMP radius. Furthermore, any use of
nuclear weapons would constitute a serious
escalation of a crisis and might not be considered except in the context of a full-scale
war.
Placing debris in SPSs orbital path, but moving in the opposite direction such as sand
designed to degrade PV cells or mirrors
would have the disadvantage of damaging
other satellites in similar orbits, and of making
the orbit permanently unusable in the absence
of methods to sweep the contaminated areas
clean. The relative ease and simplicity of this
method, however, could make it attractive to
terrorists or other technically unsophisticated
groups. Any explosive attack could have
similar drawbacks, although since the resultant debris would be traveling in the same
direction as most other satellites (which move
with the Earths rotation) the ensuing damage
would be SIight.
If technically feasible, disrupting SPSs
microwave or laser transmission beam, either
by interfering directly with the beam or its
pilot signals, or by changing its position so that
it misses its receiving antenna, would be a
highly effective way to attack the SPS. Since
the effects would be temporary and reversible,
such an attack might be favored in crisis situations short of all-out war. Disruption using
metallic chaff would be ineffective against a
microwave beam, due to its very large area.
Laser beams could be temporarily deflected by
clouds of small particles or by organic compounds that absorb energy at the appropriate
frequency. Electronic interference possibilities
83-316 0 - 81 - 12
Could the SPS Be Defended?

Defense of orbital platforms can be accomplished in three ways: 1) evasion; 2) hardening
against explosive or electronic attack; 3) antimissiIe weaponry.
All of the SPS designs being considered
would be too large and fragile to evade an
incoming attack. SPSs may be equipped with
small station-keeping propulsion units but not
with large engines for rapid sustained movement.
Hardening against explosive or debris attack
wouId require rigid and heavy plating. Such efforts would be prohibitively costly, except
perhaps for a few highly vulnerable areas.
*Peter Vajk, On the Military Implications of Satellite Power
System s, Linco/rI Proceedings, April 1980, pp. 506-507
170
Hardening against EMP bursts or electronic

warfare would require heavier and redundant
circuitry as well as devices to detect and block
jamming attacks. I f i n c o r p o r a t e d i n S P S
designs from the beginning, these might be
sufficiently inexpensive to justify inclusion.
Different designs may differ in their vulnerability to such attacks the photoklystron
variation, for instance, would be less susceptible to EMP than the reference design.
Antimissile weaponry, whether in the form
of missiles or directed-energy devices, could
be placed on the SPS to defend against missile
and satellite attack. Though potentially highly
effective against incoming missiles, such
weapons would be useless against long-distance nuclear bursts or remote lasers. Furthermore, they would have unavoidable offensive
strategic uses against other satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and
would hence invite attack. For these reasons
major defensive systems are unlikely to be
placed on civilian SPSs. Attacks would be
more effectively deterred by political arrangements and by the use of separate military
forces.
Who Would Attack?
In most instances an attack could only be
carried out by a technically sophisticated nation with its own launchers and tracking systems. Threats by such a space-capable power
against other space-capable powers say by
the U.S.S.R. against the United Statesare
possible in the context of a major crisis or actual war where the attacker is willing to risk
the consequences of its actions. Threats
against inferior or nonspace-capable states,
such as SPS-using LDCs, might be made at a
much lower crisis threshold.
It is unclear which states will be capable of
projecting military power into space over SPSS
lifetime. It is possible that technical advances
will allow even small countries to purchase
off-the-shelf equipment enabling them to attack an SPS, in the way that sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are now widely
available to attack airplanes. However, it is
more probable that, over the next 50 years,
such capabilities will remain in the hands of

the larger developed nations (including a
number of countries that can be expected to
enter this category in the future).
The state of technology obviously bears on
the question of whether terrorists or criminals
could attack an SPS. Politically motivated terrorists are generally strong on dedicated manpower, not technical expertise. The SPS would
be a symbolic high-visibility target, but terrorists would be more likely to attack SPS
launch-vehicles, which would be vulnerable to
simple heat-seeking missiles, than to threaten
the SPS directly.
However, a believable threat of direct attack by terrorists or small powers could be a
spur to defensive measures such as hardening
or antimissiIe devices, which wouId not stop an
attack by a major power but might be effective
against lesser threats.
Sabotage of the SPS through the construction force, either for political purposes and/or
for ransom, could not be ruled out. Careful
screening of
workers who
construction
would be few in number can be expected,
along with supervision while in orbit. The unavoidable conditions of life and construction
in space would make it difficult, especially at
first, to smuggle explosives or sabotagedevices into orbit. However, a major expansion
into space involving large numbers of personnel would, in the long run, provide opportunities for sabotage that probably cannot now be
foreseen.
Under current conditions any installation, in
space or on the ground, is vulnerable to longrange missiles, or to dedicated terrorist groups.
Reasonable measures to mitigate threats to
SPS should be undertaken, but the dangers
themselves cannot be eliminated.
Current Military Programs in Space

At present a number of nations use space for
military purposes. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d
Soviet Union operate the bulk of military satellites, but China, France, and a few other countries also have military capabilities. The preva-
Ch. 7The International implications of Solar Power Satellites 171
lent uses involve satellites in low and high orbits for communications and data transmission, weather reporting, remote surveillance of
foreign territory and the high seas, and interception of foreign communications. The crucial character of these satellites, especially in
providing information on strategic missile
placements and launches, is such that any
future war between superpowers will undoubtedly include actions in space to destroy
or damage enemy satelIites. 73
For these reasons both the United States and
the U.S.S.R. are working to develop antisatellite (A-sat) weapons. The Soviets have in the
past tested killer satellites c a p a b l e o f
rendezvousing with objects in orbit and exploding on command. 75 The United States
has not yet tested A-sat weapons in space but
is developing a sophisticated orbital interceptor designed to be launched from an F-15
fighter. Neither system is capable of reaching
geosynchronous
satelIites
without being
placed on larger boosters, but such development is probably only a matter of time.
The United States and U.S.S.R. have held informal talks in the past on limiting or banning
A-sat weapons; the most recent such discussion took place in June 1979. These talks have
been complicated by Soviet claims that the
Space ShuttIe is an A-sat system. The talks are
currently on hold.
An outgrowth of A-sat concern has been the
rapidly increasing interest, on both sides, in
laser and particle-beam weapons. Although
some have predicted that such weapons couId
be deployed within a few years (especially
lasers, whose technology is more advanced
73
Clarence Robinson, Space-Based Systems Stressed, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 25.
74Soviet Space Programs 1977-1975, VOI 1, staff report for Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1976, pp. 424-429.
75
Craig Covault, New Soviet Antisatellite Mission, Aviation
Week and Space Technology, Apr. 28,1980, p. 20,
Craig Covault, Antisatellite Weapon Design Advances,
Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 16, 1980, pp.
243-247
77
See articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology of July
28, 1980; also Richard Burt, Experts Believe Laser Weapons
Could Transform Warfare in 80s, New York Times, Feb. 10,
1980, p. 1.
than particle beams), most experts say that, if

at all feasible, they will not be available until
the end of the decade.
High-energy lasers and particle beams are
desirable because of their speed and accuracylight speed for lasers, an appreciable
fraction of that for particle beamsmaking
them ideal for attacking fast-moving targets
such as satellites and incoming missiles. They
may be deployed on naval vessels, antiaircraft
positions, and in space. Space-based directedenergy weapons could theoretically attack
satellites at great distances up to a thousand
miles since their beams would not be attenuated and dispersed by the atmosphere.
Most importantly, they could also be used to
engage attacking ICBMs, providing an effective ABM capability that would radically
change the strategic nuclear balance. Such
uses depend on attaining very accurate aiming
and tracking, and extremely high peak-power
capabiIities.
Use of SPS Launchers and

Construction Facilities
The most important military impact of SPS
development would likely be military use of
SPS launchers and construction facilities. In
order to build an SPS it would be necessary to
develop a new generation of high-capacity
reusable lift vehicles to carry men and
materials from the ground to low orbit. A second vehicle, such as an EOTV, would probably
be used for transportation to geosynchronous
orbit.
In addition, techniques and devices for constructing large platforms and working effectively in space would have to be developed,
along with life support systems and living
quarters for extended stays in orbit.
Improved and cheaper transportation would
allow the military to fly many more missions,
orbiting more and larger satellites and servicing these already in place. New construction
techniques would enable large platforms for
communications,
surveiIlance,
and/or directed-energy uses to be rapidly deployed. The
military would have the further option of flying manned or unmanned missions.
broad area (see ch. 5, Electromagnetic Compatibility).
Without SPS, advanced launch-vehicles and

construction devices may not be built or, at
best, be done so much less quickly. The military may hence have a strong interest in participating in their development, as they have
with the Space Shuttle. Whether the military
would actively support the SPS in order to
benefit from such developments might depend
on whether they think SPS funding would
direct resources away from other military programs.
Certain laser designs would be sufficiently

powerful and focused to cause some immediate damage to people and structures, but
would not be optimally designed for weaponsuse. An SPS would use a continuous laser
rather than the high peak-power pulsed lasers
needed for military missions. For such uses, increased focusing of the beam would be reas well as appropriate tracking
quired,
mechanisms. If so equipped, a laser SPS could
be used directly against satellites and ICBMs,
and also against targets on the ground such as
ships, planes, and oil refineries. Such uses
would be greatly facilitated if a laser SPS were
placed in low orbit, with energy relayed to the
ground via geosynchronous mirrors. Since a
sun-synchronous SPS in low-Earth orbit would
of necessity pass directly over many different
countries (including the Soviet Union), it could
be seen as potentially more threatening than a
geosynchronous satellite that remains fixed
above one spot. A geosynchronous laser might
have difficulty tracking low-flying ICBMs and
satellites, due to its position 35,800 km from
the target.
An ongoing SPS construction project with a

high volume of traffic into space could provide opportunities for the military to disguise
operations or incorporate them in normal SPS
activities. Such a possibility would likely cause
any unilateral SPS project to be closely monitored by foreign observers.
The most significant use of a fleet of
military-capable SPS launchers and crews
would be in providing a break-out capability
whereby, in time of crisis, large numbers of
communications and surveillance satellites,
antisatellite weapons, or directed-energy platforms could be placed in orbit on short notice.
This would be similar to the way a national
merchant shipping or air cargo fleet is viewed
as a military asset, and often supported in
peacetime because of its strategic significance. Fear of such uses might be a spur to the
development of antilauncher weapons, analogous to attack submarines or merchant raiders.
Military Uses of SPS

Direct Use of SPS
The energy transmission beams of the SPS
could have direct military uses. A microwave
system in geosynchronous orbit would not
generate a beam intense enough to cause
direct damage to people or installations; it
might be enough to cause minor irritation or
panic if used against populated areas. An intense microwave beam might be used to interfere with short-wave communications over a
Since the key requirement for directedenergy weapons is a large power supply, any
SPS that generates electricity directly [i.e., any
design except the mirror-system) can be used
to power such weapons. These weapons could
be built into the SPS platform or placed at a
distance in lower orbits and supplied by lasers
from the SPS. The question is whether relatively small directed-energy weapons can be
designed with autonomous power supplies,
perhaps from nuclear reactors. Since weapons
used against ICBMs must be capable of firing a
large number of very rapid bursts in order to
engage a fleet of 1,000 or more missiles, it may
be that SPS power, if available, would be the
most efficient and economical way to supply
future laser or particle-beam platforms.
Direct use of the SPS in this way would of
course make attack in time of war inevitable.
Extensive defensive armament would have to
Ch. 7The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites 173
be built in; the offensive weaponry could also

be used to defend against missile attacks.
Any testing, deployment, or use of directedenergy weapons in space is presently prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty and other space
treaties. A proposed SPS would probably be a
topic of future arms control negotiations to
clarify and limit its military implications (see
discussion on pp. 156-1 57).
Indirect Military Uses
In addition to these direct uses, a laser SPS
could be used to supply power to military
units, providing increased mobility to ground
forces that could dispense with bulky fuel supplies in remote and roadless areas. Given adequate tracking capability it might even be possible to supply mobile units such as ships,
planes, or other satellites equipped with
thermoelectric converters, increasing their
range and allowing them to carry more armaments or cargo. 78
A geosynchronous SPS is at an advantageous position for numerous communications
and positioning uses, military as well as
civilian. Its large size would make it easy to
attach equipment to it; the militarys need for
redundancy makes it convenient to use all
available platforms, as does future crowding
of geosynchronous positions. Operation of a
microwave SPS, however, could interfere with
communications uses unless switched off.
SPSs power and position might make it
suitable for electronic warfare uses, such as
jamming enemy command-and-control links.
This would require the addition of specialized
equipment.
The mirror designs use reflected sunlight
rather than energy transmission beams. However, it has been suggested that the reflected
light could be used for weather modification
or for nighttime battlefield illumination. The
See Michael Ozeroff, SPS Military Implications, D O E / N A S A
report, October 1978, pp. 13-1 6; also A Hertz berg, K Sun, and
W. Jones, Laser Aircraft, Astronautics and Aeronautics, March
1979, p. 41,
energy levels are not high enough, in current

designs, to change weather patterns significantly (see ch. 8, Environment). Such use would
be prohibited by the 1980 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Techniques.
Nighttime illumination could be significant,
especially in cases of guerrilla warfare or urban terrorism where attacking forces rely on
darkness and surprise as equalizers. However,
fragile Solares mirrors could probably not be
adjusted quickly enough to deal with sudden
military developments; rapid deployment of
mirrors by the military for specific uses would
probably be more effective.
Ownership and Control

Any of the military uses discussed clearly depend on who owns, operates, and builds the
SPS system. If SPSs are unilaterally owned by
national governments, their military use is far
more likely than if run by private enterprise or
by a multilateral consortium. Fears of military
involvement could be an incentive to establishing a multinational regime to operate or
regulate SPSs, and to prohibiting militarily effective SPS designs.
A key question would be who has effective
control over SPSs in a time of crisis. If a private
SPS consortium, having its own launchers and
crews, has a monopoly on SPS control and
expertise, then governments might be hardpressed to take over SPSs on their own. A
limited defensive capability would help to
deter any
national takeovers.
However,
governments m i g h t s t i p u l a t e t h a t i n a n
emergency they be allowed to commandeer
SPSs for defense purposes.
A nongovernmental owner can be expected
to resist any attempts to use SPSs for military
functions rather than supplying electricity to
commercial users. The threat of Iawsuits or
diplomatic protests at electricity interruptions
caused by military preemption might help to
deter such actions.
174
- Solar Power Satellites
FOREIGN INTEREST
Interest in SPS has been expressed outside of
the United States, especially in Europe but also
in J apan, the Soviet Union, and some developing countries.
Europe
The first significant European study of SPS

was done in 1975 by a German firm under
contract from West Germanys space research organization.
In England, the Department of Industry

funded a study, completed in early 1979,
that led to a further effort by British
Aerospace to investigate the implications of
SPS for British industry.
In France, the work of Claverie and Dupas

on global demand for SPS has already been
mentioned.
The ESA began SPS assessments in 1977,

publishing a-number of papers in the ESA
Journal of 1978. Ruth and Westphal performed a study in 1979, 80 w h i c h e x a m i n e d
offshore sites for rectenna placement, and in
1980 a major report on ground receiving stations was published by Hydronamic B.V. of
the Netherlands. 81 In 1978, Roy Gibson, then
director of ESA, said ESA was intensely interested in SPS, 82 and ESA has supported a
group within the IAF for SPS investigation.
In June 1980, an International Symposium
on SPS was held at Toulouse, France, with
representatives from many European countries and agencies. 83
In general, the European studies have focused on the European requirements for possible contributions to an SPS system. Little
K. K, Reinhartz, An Overview of European SPS Activities,
in Firra/ Proceedings of the SPS Program Review, U.S. Department
of Energy, July 1980, pp. 78-88.
80J. Ruth and W. Westphal, Study on European Aspects of
SPS, ESA report No CP(P) 1266.
A. R. Bresters, Study on Infrastructure Considerations for
Microwave Energy G round Receiving Station, Hydronamic Project, p, 495, November 1980
*In Jerry Grey, The Internationalization of Space, Astronautics and Aeronautics, February 1979, p 76
83
See Peter Glaser, Highlights of the International Symposium on Solar Power Satellites, July 1980,
detailed work on the system proper has been

done outside of designs to reduce the size of
rectennas; European participants have relied
on U.S. projects for technical information.
Suspension of NASA/ DOE research efforts due
to lack of fiscal year 1982 funding will have an
adverse effect on foreign studies and has led to
great disappointment among foreign SPS experts. 84 A major difference between U.S. and
European efforts is that while in the United
States SPS has attracted interest from energy
experts and the DOE, European studies have
been the exclusive province of organizations
involved in space research .85
Soviet Union
The Soviets have initiated no major known
studies of SPS, though there have been unverified claims of a Soviet SPS project. It is impossible to tell with certainty what the degree
of interest or expertise is; U.S. experts feel the
Soviets are relying on Western reports and are
far from developing the launchers, microwave
transmission expertise, and advanced solar
cells necessary to consider an SPS. 86 R e c e n t
signs of interest include a paper entitled
Satellite Power Stations published by scientists from M.V. Lomonosov State University,
M o s c o w i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 7 .8 7 88 At the 30th
Congress of the IAF in Munich, September
1979, the Solar Power Bulletin reported that:
Although the Soviets were reluctant to disclose their level of commitment to a solar
power satellite program, Chief Cosmonaut
Beregovoy commented that if the United
States puts up an SPS first, we will congratulate you, and if ours goes up first, we will
expect congratulations from you. 89
Conversation with Jerry Grey, of the Al AA, Oct. 15,1980.
K K Relnhartz, op cit., p 80
Conversations with James Oberg, Johnson Space Center,
and Charle\ Sheldon I I, Congressional Research Service, September 1980
5ovlet fpace Programs 1971-/975, VOI 1, staff report, Library
of ( ongres~, 1976, p 529
See statement of Peter Claser In House Hearings on SPS, 96th
Cong , March 1979, p 218
5pace \o/ar Power Bu//etin, Sunsat Energy Council, February
1980, p 1
Japan
The Japanese have expressed interest and
funded studies within the National Space Development Agency, though no permanent office for SPS exists. Japanese interest in space
exploration and industrialization is strong and
includes plans for several new series of
Launchers. go
Third World
Information about SPS has been spread to
the Third World by discussions at COPUOS
James Harford, Japan Showcases Crowing Space Prowess,
Astronautics and Aeronautics, December 1980, pp. 120-125.
175
and by sessions on SPS at international conferences such as those of the IAF. Reaction has
generally been cautiously optimistic. At the International Symposium in Toulouse, Dr. Mayur
of Indias Futurology Commission claimed:
There is no conflict between small scale
technologies and the SPS. Dr. Chatel, former
Chief of the UNs Office of Science & Technology, proposed an international working
party to coordinate national programs and perform assessments. The SPS has been placed
on the agenda of the upcoming U.N. energy
conference in Nairobi in the summer of 1981.
Glaser, o p c i t
STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
It is crucial to continue updating long-term
projections as new information becomes available about developments in the space and
energy fields. Close attention should be paid
to: 1 ) future global electricity demand under
various scenarios and on a detailed regional
basis; 2) evaluation of the impact that possible
external events wars, oiI embargoes, widespread famine couId have on U.S. and European energy needs; 3) the feasibility of a
unilateral SPS System given a global market,
including estimates of profitabiIity; 4) monitoring of Law of the Sea negotiations and the resulting international regime with special attention to the implications for the Moon Treaty
and other space agreements; and 5) weapons
development and foreign military space programs, and arms-control negotiations.

U.S. energy and space experts often tend to
pay little attention to the foreign implications
of their programs. Since SPS is a system that
may make sense globally but not domesticalIy,
neglect of the international dimension could
lead to an unjustified foregoing of SPS development. In making plans for future R&D programs, attention should be paid to involving
and informing potential partners as well as to
considering the ways in which a global system
might differ, technologicalIy and institutionalIy, from a domestic one.
Chapter 8
Contents
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
....179
Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...182
Power Transmission Effects on the
Atmosphere and Weather ...182
Atmosphere
.
.
.
.
.
.183
Space Vehicle Effects.. . . . ..187
Electromagnetic Interference . ......190
Terrestrial Activities. . .......196
Receiver Structure: Weather
Modification . . . . . . . . .. ....205
Health and Ecology . . . . . . . . ........207
Terrestrial Effects . . . . . ........207
ionizing and Nonionizing Radiation
Defined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........209
Space
Environment.
.
.
..
....221
42 M i c r o w a v e E x p o s u r e L i m i t s .
43 Research Needs To Help Reduce
Uncertainties Concerning Public
Health Effects Associated With
.212
Exposure to SPS Microwaves Power

44
45
46
47
48
49
.213
Densities and Frequency. .
.217
SPS Development . . . .
Estimated Sound Levels of HLLV
launch
Noise
.
.
. .220
Representative Noise Levels Due to
Various Sources . . . . . . . . .220
Community Reaction to HLLV Launch
Noise~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .221
Sonic
Boom
Summary.
.
.221
Types of Radiation Found in the
Different SPS Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . .223
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Table No.
Page
28. Summary of SPS Environmental

Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....180
29. Major SPS Environmental
Uncertainties . . . . . . . . .
....,.182
30 Power Transmission Impacts. . . . . . . .184
31 SPS Space Transportation Vehicles. ...188
32 Exhaust Products of SPS Space
Transportation Vehicles . . . ......189
33 S p a c e V e h i c l e I m p a c t s , . . . . . . . 1 8 9
34 Summary of Electromagnetic Effects. .192
35. SPS Systems Land Use. . . . . . ......198
36. Summary of Land Requirements. .. ...199
37. Summary of Environmental Impacts of
Rectenna Construction and Operation
at a Specific Study Site . . . . . 203
38. Summary of Materials Assessment
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......205
39, Annual Environmental Effects of SPS. .206
40. Terrestrial Health and Ecological
Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......208
41. Characteristics of Exposure to
Reference System Microwaves . . . . . . .211
30. R e g i o n s o f t h e A t m o s p h e r e . . . . . 1 8 3
31. Examples of SPS Microwave
Transmission Effects on the
Ionosphere and Telecommunication
Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184
32. Summary of SPS Atmospheric Effects, .188
3 3. Receptor Site Protection Radius as a
Function of the Perimeter laser PowerDensity Level. . , . . . . . . . . .197
34. Microwave Power Density at Rectenna
as a Function of Distance From
Boresight. . . . . . , . . . , . . .197
35. Rettenna/Washington, D.C. Overlay. . .198
36. Offshore Summary Map . . . . . . . . .200
37. Satellite Power System Societal
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201
38. Regional Generation and
Rectenna Allocations . . . . . .202
39. The Electromagnetic-Photon Spectrum, 209
40. SPS Microwave Power-Density
Characteristics at a Rectenna Site. .. ..211
41. Comparison of Exposure Standards . .. 216
42. Program Funding. . . . . . . . . . . .216
43. Factors Pertinent to Space Worker
Health and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 222
Chapter 8

INTRODUCTION
As a large-scale energy system operating in
both the space and terrestrial environments,
the solar power satellite (SPS) is unique. And
because it is a new concept, our understanding
and experience of a number of the environmental impacts associated with SPS are limited. The great uncertainties surrounding these
effects make comparisons between SPS and
other energy technologies especially difficult.
While one advantage of SPS is that it would
avoid many of the environmental risks typically associated with conventional energy options such as coal and nuclear, it also would
generate uncommon environmental effects
that presently cannot be quantified or compared to those of other powerplants. The large
uncertainties also tend to provoke public debate. In light of past controversies over the
siting of powerplants, transmission Iines and
other facilities, it is clear that environmental
issues could play a key role in public consideration of SPS (see ch. 9).
This chapter will outline the environmental
and health impacts of SPS that are currently
thought to be most important. It will identify
research needs and highlight areas of controversy. As with other aspects of SPS, the environmental effects have been evaluated most
fully for the reference system. Some of this
data is also applicable to the other SPS technical options, d i f f e r i n g o n l y i n e x t e n t o r
degree, but information on the full range of
their environmental effects is limited.
At the current stage of development, SPS environmental studies can play an important role
in determinin g concept feasibility, technical
design, and cost. For example, bioeffects research might influence the choice of frequency which, in turn, couId determine hardware
design and Iand use. Thus, many of the effects
currently identified might be minimized by appropriate choices of design. However, it is also
possible that one or more risks might be identified in the development process that could
not be reduced to an acceptable level without
jeopardizing the economic or technical viability of the SPS concept.

The SPS environmental effects and the cost
of reducing them must be viewed in the context of energy technologies, energy needs,
other space activities, and the incremental
effect on human health and the environment.
Preliminary comparative assessments indicate
that, in general, those health and environmental impacts of the reference system SPS
that can presently be quantified would probably be no more severe than for other largesc aIe
technologies
electricity
generating
although the uncertainties for SPS are
high). 1 2 3 4 I n fact, when compared to coal,
SPS would be an order of magnitude cleaner
(see app, D). However, if an SPS program is
pursued, further comparative analysis between
energy options would be required as more is
learned about the unquantifiable impacts that
could not be incorporated in the present
studies A good portion of this chapter discusses these latter effects for SPS.
The discussion in this chapter relies heavily
on the data and analysis generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) 5 and the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS). 6 7 The reader is
-.
11 j H a b e g g e r ,
J R Gasper, a n d C D B r o w n , Hea/th and Safetv Pre/lrnlrtary Cor-nparatlve Assessment of the Sate//ite Power
$vstem / SPS) and Other Energy Alternatives, DOE/NASA report
No DO I IF R-0053, April 1980
CI t Newsom and T D Wolsko, Pre/irnfnary C o m p a r a t i v e AsSCJS smen t o t Land Use for Satellite Power Systems and A Iternatl .te
F /ectrlc
t nergy
Technologies,
DOE/NASA report No
[ )OE I R-0058, April 1980
D A Kellermeyer, C/imate and Energy: A Comparative Assessment of the SPS and Other Energy A /ternatives, DOE/NASA report
No DO} F R-0500, January 1980
F P L e v i n e , M J Senew, and R R Clr[llo, C o m p a r a t i v e
Assessment of Environmental Welfare Issues Associated With the
\ate//lte Power System and Alternative Technologies, DOE/NASA
r e p o r t ho [)OE/E R - 0 0 5 5 , A p r i l 1 9 8 0
5Envlronmenta/ Assessment for the Sate//ite Power System Concept Development and Evacuation Program, DOE/NASA report
No DOt /E R-0069, August 1980
Comrnlttee o n S a t e l l i t e P o w e r S y s t e m s , N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h
( ounc!l O p e n
Committee
Meetings
Jan
31-Feb
1,
1980,
Apr
910, 1980, j U Iy 1-2, 1980, Oct 1-2, 1980

( H l>odge (rapporteur),
Workshop on Mechanisms Under/y179
780
referred to the DOE documents for more detailed discussions. While those studies have
not identified any environmental reasons not
to continue with SPS development, it is very
evident that much more study and research
(continued from p. 179)
Ing Effects of Long-Term, Low-Level, 2450 MHY Radiation on
P e e p / e , o r g a n i z e d by the National Re\ear( h (-ouncil, C o m m i t t e e
o n Satel I Ite P o w e r
S y s t e m s , E nvlrontmental Studms floard, N a
tlonal Academy of Sciences, July 17-17, 1980
would be required before decisions could be

made regarding the environmental viability of
SPS. What is not clear is how long it might take
before our confidence in the resolution of
some environmental impacts such as microwave bioeffects would be high enough to
make development or deployment decisions.
As table 28 illustrates, there is a great diversity of environmental and health impacts. Of
Table 28.Summary of SPS Environmental Impacts

System component
characteristics
Environmental
Power transmission
Microwave
Public health
and safety
impact
b lonospheric heating could

density is not known
ionosphere are not known
mod if i cat ion
b
Ecosystem: microwave bioeffects (on plants, animals,
effects unknown
b
potential interference with
satellite communicant ions,
Occupatlonal health
and safety
bEffects of low-level
Higher risk than for
public; protective
chronic exposure to microclothing required for
waves are unknown
terrestrial worker
microwave beam as weapon Accidental exposure to
Adverse esthetic effects
on appearance of night sky
but no data
astronomy
Lasers

the beam
Ecosystem: beam may
vegetation
potential i n t e r f e r e n c e
radio astronomy
b
Mirrors
Ocular hazard?
laser as weapon are
possible
Adverse esthetic effects
sky are possible
could modify weather
Ecosystem: effect of 24hr light on growing
cycles of plants and circadian rhythms of animals
bpotential interference
with optical astronomy
Ocular hazard?
24-hr sunlight
Adverse esthetic e f f e c t s
sky are possible
Ocular hazard?

probably negligible
b
Water vapor and other

exceed EPA guidelines
probably negligible
bSpace workers hazards:

ionizing radiation
stay in space,
Transportation and
space operation
Launch and recovery
HLLV
PLV
COTV
Ocular and safety

hazard?
Ch. 8Environment and Health
181
Table 28.Summary of SPS Environmental ImpactsContinued

System component
characteristics

surveillance potentially
important, but uncertain
bpossible formation O f
noctiIucent clouds in
are not known
b
Emission of water vapor
could alter natural
implications are not wellknown
b
plasmasphere could be
great but unknown
by effIuents expected to
be minor but uncertain
Noise

materials
Mining
Land disturbance
(stripmining, etc.)
air and water polIution
Solid waste generation
capacity of gallium
and mercury
Toxic material exposure

air and water pollution
Land-use disturbance
Manufacturing
Solid wastes
Construct ion
Measurable land
disturbance
of air and water pollution
Receiving antenna

major impact
weather
High-voltage
transmission lines
(not unique to SPS)

major impact
bEcosystem: bioeffects of
powerlines uncertain
POTV
Occupational health
and safety
acceleration
Terrestrial workers
hazards: noise, transportation accidents
al mpacts based on sps systems as currently

b
Research priority.
defined

water pollution
Toxic materials exposure
Noise
Solid wastes
Exposure to toxic
materials
Measurable land
disturbance
of air and water pollution
..
bLand use reduced
property value, esthetics,
vulnerability (less land
options; more for reference
and mirrors)
b
Exposure to high light intensitity
EM fieldseffects
uncertain
Toxic materials exposure

Noise
Noise
Measurable local
pollution
Accidents
Waste heat
b Exposure to high
intensity EM fields
effects uncertain
and do not account for offshore rece!vers or possible mitigating sYStem rnodificatlons
182
most concern are: 1) the biological effects of

electromagnetic radiation produced by the
power transmission and distribution systems;
2) the atmospheric effects of electromagnetic
radiation and launch effluents and the resulting impacts on telecommunications and air
quality; and 3) the land requirements and siting
considerations for ground-based receivers. The
greatest environmental uncertainties are Iisted
in table 29.
The first part of the chapter will deal with
the potential environmental impacts resulting
from the construction and operation of SPS
systems. These and other effects will then be
addressed in the second section as they pertain
to human health and ecosystems. Detailed discussion of a number of impacts is found in appendix D.
Table 29.Major SPS Environmental Uncertainties

Reference and solid-state systems
Microwave bioeffects Low-level, chronic exposure

Launch effluent effects
Ions in the magnetosphere
Natural hydrogen cycle
Ionospheric depletion
Noctilucent clouds
Microwave heating of the ionosphere
Effects on telecommunications
Land use
Laser system
Laser bioeffects
. Tropospheric heating
Launch
effluents
Land use
Mirror system
Weather
modification
Land use
Biological
and psychological effects of 24-hr light
Systems comparisons
SOLi~~E Of~c;of Technology Assessment
ENVIRONMENT
One of the consequences of constructing
and operating an energy system in space is that
the extent of the environment that is directly
affected by the system is much broader than
for Earth-based powerplants. For example,
both the transmission of SPS power and the injection of launch effluents will directly affect
every layer of the atmosphere. The purpose of
this section is to discuss the state of knowledge
of the predominant environmental impacts of
SPS, especially those that are fairly unconventional and to outline areas where further research would be needed. Biological effects,
i.e., human health and safety and ecological
impacts, are deferred to the second part of the
chapter.
The two major environmental concerns at
the present time are: 1 ) the effect on the atmosphere of the transportation and power
transmission systems; and 2) electromagnetic
interference with communications systems
and astronomy. 8 With respect to the former,
the effluents emitted from the launch vehicles
8Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, Satellite
Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program,
DOE/NASA report No DO E/E R-0085, November 1980
couId deplete portions of the ionosphere, alter

the natural hydrogen cycle and magnetosphere dynamics and modify weather and air
quality near the launch site. The effects of the
power transmission system on the atmospb
are a function of the frequency of the
For the laser and mirror systems, the mo~
nificant potential impact is heating of
near-Earth atmosphere, which might alter
weather. If the microwave beam were to alt
the ionosphere, i t c o u I d d i s r u p t t e l e c o m
mu n i cat ions.
In order to understand clearly these and the
other more conventional environmental impacts described in this chapter, it is worthwhile
to review the properties and structure of the
atmosphere as illustrated in figure 30 and discussed in box A.
Power Transmission Effects on

the Atmosphere and Weather
Current SPS designs transmit energy to Earth
using microwaves, lasers or reflected light.
Since the atmospheric effects of power transmission are highly frequency dependent, each
183
Figure 30. Regions of the Atmosphere

Solar radiation excites, disassociates and ionizes atmospheric constituents. The ionosphere in particular is a region of marked abundance of free
electrons and ions. The properties of the ionosphere vary with latitude,
time of day, season and solar activity. When electromagnetic waves enter
the ionospheric plasma, they will be refracted and slowed down. Depending on the frequency of the incident wave and properties of the ionosphere,
the wave can be totally reflected. It is this phenomena that makes many
radio frequency communication systems possible.
100
10
Regions of the atmosphere

SOURCE:
Program Assessment Report, Statement of
Satellite Power
Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/NASA
November 1980
Report,
of these will be discussed separately. Table 30

summarizes the impacts of most concern.
Microwaves
mosphere. While attenuation of the microwave beam by clouds and rain in the troposphere could cause a slight modification of
cloud dynamics and precipitation, 9 a b s o r p t i o n
As the beam from a microwave satellite

traveled towards Earth, it would heat the atop
Table 30.Power Transmission Impacts

Microwaves
Upper ionosphere telecommunications effects unknown;
experiments and improved theory are needed
Lower ionosphere impacts are thought to be negligible
for a number of telecommunications systems; scaling
laws must be verified and effects on telecommunication
systems operating in the 3 MHz to 20 MHz range must be
tested
The maximum power density for which telecommunications effects are insignificant is not known and must be
determined
Tropospheric heating is not thought to be significant
Lasers
Thermal
blooming in the troposphere may degrade the
beam
Tropospheric heating may cause increased cloud formation, turbulence and weather modification
Effects
on the mesosphere, stratosphere, and thermosphere and continental cloud distribution and albedo
are thought to be inconsequential
Reflected light
Weather
modification in vicinity of ground sites is possible, but unquantified
. Photochemistry of the ozone layer is not thought to be affected
of microwave energy is most important in the

ionosphere. Of particular concern are the effects of ionospheric heating on telecommunication systems that rely on the ionosphere to
transmit and reflect radio waves. Changes in
the ionospheric properties due to heating can
degrade (or in some cases, enhance) the performance of telecommunication systems by
absorbing or scattering the radio signals (see
fig. 31). Specifically, these effects could result
in losses, fading, and scintillation of the electromagnetic signals. It is also possible that the
SPS pilot beam itself could be affected by the
heated ionospheric layers.
In the course of the DOE assessment several
experiments were conducted to test the extent
of heating and the effect on telecommunications in the lower ionosphere. These experiments demonstrated that while heating does
occur the effects are not serious for the tele-
Figure 31 .Examples of SPS Microwave Transmission Effects on the Ionosphere

and Telecommunication Systems
F-region
ion
SOURCE:
Prograrn Assessment Report, Statement of Findngs, Satellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/NASA Report, DOE/ER-0085, November 1980
communication systems tested. Some researchers have even suggested that the proposed power density of 23 mW/cm 2 could be
doubled without significant impact to telecommunications in the lower ionosphere.
However, more research is needed in order to
determine the power density threshold in the
lower ionosphere, and for this the power density of the existing heating facilities will have to
be increased. Additional study is also required
to ascertain the effects in the lower ionosphere
on telecommunication systems that operate at
frequencies greater than 3 MHz (i.e., 3 to 100
MHz) range. In addition the effects of multiple
microwave beams need to be determined.
Our knowledge of upper ionosphere (F region) heating is less advanced than in the D & E
regions. Few underdense experiments (i. e., the
beam travels through the region as opposed to
being reflected, which is termed an overdense
condition) to simulate SPS heating have been
attempted. Recent experiments 2 suggest that
ionospheric irregularities can be created when
the Platteville heater operates in an underdense mode and that these irregularities induce scintillations in very high frequency satelIite-to-aircraft and satellite-to-ground transmission links. Further work would be required,
however, to establish whether scintillations
would occur if SPS heated the upper ionoPresently, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s c a l i n g
sphere.
models that would extrapolate these results to
SPS conditions in the F-region are very uncer-
IOEnvironmental Assessment for the Satellite Power System

Concept Development and Evaluation Program Effects of ionospheric Heating on Telecommunications, DOE/NASA report No
DO E/ ER-10003-Tl , August 1980
1W E
Gordon
and
Duncan,
Reviews
of
Space
ence SPS Impacts on the Upper Atmosphere, Astronautics

A e r o n a u t i c s , VOI 18, No 7,8, July/August 1980, p 46
S C I-
and
185
tain. In order to test these theories, the groundbased heating facilities will have to be upgraded
In sum, it appears that effects on telecommunications in the lower ionosphere would
probably be negligible, but more study of the
upper ionosphere effects is needed. By making
the heating facilities more powerful, the following research can be conducted:
Lower ionosphere: verify scaling theory;

and test additional telecommunication
systems (e. g., V H F , U H F , s a t e l l i t e - t o ground)
Upper ionosphere: refine and verify Fregion scaling laws and ionospheric physics and then test effects on representative
telecommunications systems for SPS
equivalent heating.
Lasers
The most significant potential environmental effects associated with the SPS laser system
appear to be local meteorological changes and
beam spreading due to tropospheric heating.
Tropospheric heating would result from

energy absorption by aerosols and molecules
and from the dissipation of receptor waste
heat. Attenuation by scattering from molecules and by absorption and scattering from
aerosols would be greatest for short wavelengths. Thus scattering would be only significant for visible wavelength lasers, while aerosol effects become important to infrared lasers
only under hazy or overcast conditions.
S Basu, A L, J o h n s o n , J A Klobuchar, a n d C M R u s h , P r e liminary Results of Scintillation Measurements Associated With

Ionosphere
Heating
Power Satellite,
and
Possible
Ceophysica/
August 1980, pp 609-612
83-316 0 - 81 - 13
Implications
for
the
Solar
R e s e a r c h L e t t e r s , VOI 7, No 8,
The absorption of laser energy would lead to

a process called thermal blooming, in which
a density gradient acts as a gaseous lens that
186
can spread, distort or bend the laser beam. 1 3

The severity of the thermal blooming would be
a function of several parameters, including the
frequency and intensity of the laser, the wind
velocity, atmospheric density, absorption and
altitude. Laser wavelengths that have high atmospheric transmittance would be less likely
to suffer from thermal blooming. Thermal
blooming could also degrade and spread the
beam. It is clear that if spreading did occur it
would be less critical for the space-to-Earth
SPS beam than for Earth-to-space transmission
(i.e., laser pilot beam) that would be deflected
earlier in its path.
Tropospheric heating would be likely to induce meteorological alterations. It is unlikely
that global climate changes could result since
the absorption of laser energy would be less
than the typical natural variations of the atmosphere; it would take the deployment of
200,000 to 400,000 laser systems before the
global climate might be affected. The potential local weather effects include changes in
wind patterns, e v a p o r a t i o n o f s e c t i o n s o f
ground fogs and clouds and elevated temperatures. None of these effects are expected to exceed those associated with conventional nuclear powerplants o f c o m p a r a b l e p o w e r
rating. 5 The most significant potential impact
would be updrafts above the receptor site,
which might induce cloud formations (a problem for the beam) and severe turbulence in the
lower troposphere. Increased turbulence is not
necessarily an adverse effect; the upward convective air movement would promote vertical
mixing and the dispersal of waste heat. 16 H o w ever, the turbulence could present a hazard to
aircraft that flew in the affected region. For
this and other reasons, it has been suggested
that aircraft be restricted from flying through
transmission areas. 7
The laser beam would be capable of boring
holes through thin clouds and fog by evaporatPower Systems (SPS) Laser Studies,
ReportLaser Environmental Impact Study, VOI 1,
13R E Beverly, Sate//ite
Technical
R o c k w e l l I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p o r t N o SSD
80-0119-1
ing the water from aerosol droplets. After passing through the beam, the cloud fog would
recondense. Portions of noctilucent clouds in
the mesosphere might also be vaporized. The
possible environmental consequences, such as
alteration of the continental cloud distribution
or albedo, would be slight but research would
stiII be needed.
Preliminary analysis indicates that the potential impacts in other atmospheric regions
would be negligible. 18 I n t h e s t r a t o s p h e r e ,
ozone would not be affected for wavelengths
greater than 1 micron. Possible perturbations
of the plasma chemistry by the laser beam in
the mesosphere and thermosphere are believed to be small and inconsequential, since
the interactions would be confined to the laser
beam volume; ionospheric heating would also
be negligible. However, research would be
needed in order to validate this conclusion.
In the near term, environmental studies
could concentrate on the following areas:
Thermal blooming increase theoretical
understanding and refine models; investigate enhancement of thermal blooming by clouds; study transmission and thermal blooming as a function of laser frequency, time of year, and receptor altitude and location.
Induced cloudsstudy the extent and
consequences of induced clouding.
Reflected Light
The mirror system would reflect about 0.8
k W / m 2 of light to Earth, somewhat less than
the illumination due to the Sun. 2 0 The primary
atmospheric effect of this additional light
would be tropospheric heating. Coupled with
the sensible heat release at the energy conversion site, the weather might be measurably
modified as convection, cloud formation, and
.
t Li Wa Ibrlclge, La$er %te//lte
f>ower ~y$tem~, A r g o n n e N a -
t Iona I I aboi-atory, AN L E S-92, January 1980

lltk erly, op clt
K W BI I I m a n ,
W P G Ilbreatll,
and S W
Ibid
I nergy 1 c onornlcs Orbltlng Reflector~ t o r
Slbld
[bid
Ibid.
I+o;t h1~ ,]nd $tI// Beautlfu/ A4acro-Fngineerlng
Bowen,
World
Energy,
Solar
In
Revisited, F P
D a v i d s o n , et al (eds ) ( B o u l d e r , Colo A m e r i c a n A$soclatlon for

I he A(ivancement o f S c i e n c e , We>tvlew Pre\$, 1980), P P 2~3-3 J9
rainfall above the site are increased. While no

assessment has been made of the magnitude or
consequences of this potential impact, the
weather effects of other heat islands of the
same scale, such as New York City that releases about 0.6 kW/m 2 of heat, can be used
for comparison. Weather impacts on a global
scale are not anticipated since the mirror
system would add less than 0.015 percent to
the normal solar heat input. 22 Large-scale computations on weather models applicable to the
mirror system size are needed to quantify the
effects for different locations. Additionally,
the heating effects of the orbiting refiector
system could be simulated on the ground,
using solar heated ponds or other means
without the need for a demonstration satellite
and hence at a relatively low cost and at an
early time. 23
Once the potential weather impacts are
more clearly understood, the system design
and economics could be reevaluated to accommodate possible environmental concerns.
For example, one might redesign the system to
reflect less Iight to Earth or use heat dispersion
devices on the ground and in space to reject
the heat into areas that would have the minimal impact. Dichroic mirrors in space for example, could selectively reflect to Earth only
those wavelength bands that would be converted with highest efficiency at the receiving
site. It may also be found that the weather
modification induced by the mirror system
heat is actually beneficial to the receiving region by preventing cloud impingement over
site.
In addition to tropospheric heating, other
possible environmental impacts have been
suggested. The mirror system beam might perturb the photochemistry of the atmosphere,
particularly the ozone layer. However, preliminary analysis indicates that the effect
would be negligible. 24 Further study is needed
to confirm this finding and to investigate the
1
187
potential photochemistry effects if dichroic

mirrors were used in space. 25
More detailed study is required before reasonable comparisons can be made between
the mirror system and the other SPS technical
options. Research priorities include:
weather modeling and large-scale computations applicable to large mirror system size,
the effects of dichroic mirrors on the systems environmental impacts, and
possible ground-based experiments to
simulate mirror system heating.
Space Vehicle Effects*

There are two major environmental effects
associated with the space transportation segment of SPS: the injection of rocket exhaust
products into the atmosphere (see fig. 32) and
noise generated at the launch site (see Health
and Ecology). The severity of these impacts
would depend on the size and frequency of
launches, as well as the composition of rocket
fuels and fIight trajectory.
Assessment of the potential SPS effects on
the atmosphere is hampered by the unprecedented scale of SPS transportation requirements as well as an incomplete understanding
of the atmosphere. The reference design, for
example, requires that a heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV), five times larger than the Saturn V,
be flown one to two times per day for 30
years.) The other reference system space vehicles and launch schedules are shown in tables
31 and 32.
The effects of SPS exhaust products on the
atmosphere are also uncertain because much
of our theory and experience with the effects
of launch effluents stem from the space shuttle, which uses solid-fuel boosters. Since the
SPS HLLV would be fueled with liquid propellants, the composition and distribution of the
Kenneth f31 I I man, E PR 1, Private ( ommun I( atlon
K BII I m a n , W P G Ilbreath, S W Howen, S o l a r t ner,gy Revlslted W Ith Orbit Ing Ref Iector$, N A 5A, A me\
f311 I man, private commun Icatlon
BII I man, G Ilbreath, and Bowen, S o l a r
Op (-It
E n e r g y F conom I( ~,
- 1+1 I In)(i
n, private ( ommu n 1( at Ion
J(t ,1 1)1) [ ) tor (l(~ta I Is

/ II L ~r(]nm(~n(,]/ ! >~c~~ment for the $ate//Itc P o w e r iy~tem
( ( )n( f>p( 1 )fII f]/oprrrcnt ,] nc] F ~ .I /[Ia (Ion Prcj#r,]m, [JOE E R-()()()!),
A[lgu\t 1)80
188
Figure 32.Summary of SPS Atmospheric Effects
Alteration of
satellite environment
Alteration of plasmaspheric
and magnetospheric
populations and dynamics
LEO to GEO
Orbit transfer
people carrier> chemicals
cargo carrier > ions
The major space vehicle impacts of the reference system are identified in table 33. Presently, the greatest uncertainties are associated
with four potential effects 27 (treated in more
detail in app. D):
I n the magnetosphere, the emission of
ions from COTVS and POTVS would substantially increase the ambient concentrations of these particles. Because of our
poor understanding of the complex dynamics and composition of this region,
potential impacts can be identified, but
the likelihood and severity of these effects are highly uncertain. Possible effects
include enhancement of Van AlIen belt radiation and changes in magnetospheric
and plasm aspheric dynamics that could
perturb ionospheric electricity, tropospheric weather, and satellite c o m m u n i cat ions.

Ionospheric
depletion
o
SOURCE:
reference system launch effluents would differ

from that of the shuttle.
Environmental Assessment for the Satellite Power System Concept

Development and Evaluation Program, DOEI/R-0069, August 1980.
Pro~r,]m
As~e\\ment
Report, $tatement o F~ndin,q\, op clt
Table 31 .SPS Space Transportation Vehicles

Name
Heavy-lift
launch vehicle
(HLLV)
Personnel
launch vehicle
(PLV)
Cargo orbittransfer vehicle
(COTV)
Personnel orbittransfer vehicle
(POTV)
Function
Transport
material
between Earth
and LEO
Transport
personnel
between Earth
and LEO
Transport
materials
between LEO
and GEO
Transport
personnel
between LEO
and GEO
Propellants
Launches b
per year
Operating
altitude (km)
Main exhaust
products c
375
375
375
0-57
57-120
450-500
C 02 , H2 0
H 2 0, H2
H 2 0, H2
30
0-500
CH4/O2 (stage 1)
H 2/02 (stage 2)
H2 /O 2 (circularization/deorbit)
Details not
available
(probably same
as HLLV)
Argon
H 2 / 02
H 2 / 02
30
500-35,800
Ar+ plasma
H 2O, H2
12
500-35,800
H 2O, H2
.
%HJOZ: liquid methanelliquid oxygen
HJOZ: liquid hydrogenlliquid oxygen.
bAssuming construction of two (silicon option) 5-Gw satelliteslyear.
CCOZ: carbon dioxide
HzO: water
H,: hydrogen
Ar + : argon ion.
SOURCE:
C 2 , H2 0, H2
Environmental Assessment for the Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/ER-0069, August 1980,
Ch. 8Environment
and Health 189
Table 32.Exhaust Products of SPS Space Transportation Vehicles a

Altitude
range
(km)
Atmospheric
region
Troposphere
0-0.5
0.5-13
13-50
50-80
80-125
LEO d
LEO
GEO d
477-GE0
Stratosphere
Mesosphere
Thermosphere
Exosphere
Source
HLLV, PLV
HLLV, PLV
HLLV, PLV
HLLV, PLV
HLLV, PLV
HLLV, PLV
POTV
POTV
COTV e
Total
mass
(t) c
Mass of specific emission products (t)

C0
260
1140
1210
199
6502850
3027
758
2031
33
460
153
985
co
117
513
546
90
H 2O
260
1140
1210
450
1960
443
443
147
0
H2
13
57
61
19
71
1
11
6
0
Ar +
985 f
aMass emissions per flight.
bpLV emissions would be ~hemi~all~ similar t. those of the l+LLV, but are not Otherwise determined at ttlls time. The numbers shown are emissions Of the HLLV OIIiy
ct = metric ton = 1000 g.

dLow earth orbit (LEO) is at 477 km; geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) is at 35,800 km
eln addition t. mass emissions, the argon plasma en~lnes of the COTV would inject a significant
amount of energy into this altitude range. Also ar90tl pla.sllla el19illeS
would be used for satellite attitude control and stationkeeping control at GEO; these em Isslons are unknown at present and have not been included.
fAr+ mass for the silicon Photovoltalc cell option For the gallium aluminum arsenide Opt!on, the Ar+ mass Would be 212 t.
SOURCE:
Environmental Assessment for theSatell)te Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program,
DOEIER-0069, August 1980.
Table 33.Space Vehicle Impacts
The injection of water vapor in the upper

atmosphere would significantly increase
the water content relative to natural levels. One possible consequence is an increase in the upward flux of hydrogen
atoms through the thermosphere. If an
accumulation of hydrogen results, the
dynamics of the thermosphere and exosphere could be affected. Satellite drag
could also be increased. Models of the
natural hydrogen cycle are needed to
quantify and simulate the effects of SPS
on global scale.
The injection of rocket exhaust, particularly water vapor, into the ionosphere
could lead to the depletion of large areas
of the ionosphere. These ionospheric
holes could degrade telecommunication
systems. While the uncertainties are
greatest for the lower ionosphere, experiments are needed to test more adequately telecommunications impacts and
to improve the theoretical understanding
interact ions
of
chemical-eIectricaI
throughout the ionosphere.
Another consequence of increasing the

concentration of water in the upper atmosphere might be the formation of noctilucent clouds in the mesosphere. While
global climatic effects of these clouds are
thought unlikely, uncertainties remain,
especially with respect to the persistence
Troposphere
Ground
cloud nuclei and heat could have a measurable
effect on weather
N O emissions are small compared to typical powerplant,
but in conjunction with ambient concentration could exceed projected EPA standards
X
Stratosphere and Mesosphere

Emission of water vapor may cause noctilucent clouds
in the mesosphere; climatic effects would probably be
small, but uncertain
a
. Water and N O are not expected to significantly alter
ozone, but uncertainties remain
Ionosphere
a
Formation of large ionospheric hole in F-region from

water and other effluents should not adversely affect HF
telecommunication signals over distances significantly
larger than the ionospheric depletion, impacts on other
telecommunications systems are not known; more
studies are needed; long-term depletion around launch
trajectory possible
a
D&E region effects are poorly understood; impacts on

telecommunications from depletion of the ionosphere
are possible
Possibility of enhanced airglow and Perturbation of Van

Allen belts, but likelihood is-unknown
Thermosphere and Exosphere
a
in water content might alter the natural

hydrogen cycle and affect the dynamics of the region
Large increase
Plasmasphere and Magnetosphere

Argon ions and
hydrogen atoms might enhance Van
Allen belt radiation, generate ionospheric electric currents that would interfere with public utilities, modify
auroral response to solar activity and affect weather and
satellite communications, but probability and severity are
unknown
The effects of the satellite structures are thought to be
negligible or easily remedied
a
Research priorities.
790
of the clouds as a function of temperature.

The transportation system for other SPS options could be substantially different from that
for the reference system. For example, the mirror system and the bulk of the laser system
satellites operate in low-Earth orbit (LEO). The
magnetospheric effects associated with transporting materials to geostationary orbit (CEO)
would therefore not be a problem for these
systems. Environmental impacts are also determined by the frequency of launches, which
depends on the size of the vehicle, and the
total mass in orbit. For the same size launch
vehicle and total system power, it appears that
the mirror system, which is the least massive
per kilowatt of the four alternatives, would require the least number of flights, whereas the
laser system would require the most.
Other transportation scenarios have been
proposed (see ch. 5). With respect to the
reference system, some of the environmental
effects could be mitigated by changing the
flight trajectory of the HLLV, the rocket fuel of
the COTV or other transportation characteristics that present a problem. Laser propulsion,
for example, has been suggested as an option.
The tradeoffs associated with these design
changes would need to be studied as the SPS
concept evolved.
As an alternative to the HLLV, it has been
argued that economies of scale result from
increasing t h e n u m b e r a n d f r e q u e n c y o f
launches of a vehicle much smaller than the
proposed HLLV. 28 However, it is not clear how
the effects of more launches of a smaller
rocket compare to the impacts of fewer flights
of a larger one.
A very different approach in the construction of SPS wouId be the utilization of nonterrestrial materials. This could significantly
reduce the amount of terrestrial materials that
need to be transported to space, and hence
reduce the environmental impacts associated
with the frequent launch of transport vehiD
terns, In
Aklns,
Optlmlzation o f
Space Manufacturing Sy$-
Space Manufacturing From Non- Terre\ trla/ Materla/\, J
Grey and C Krop (eds ) (New York A l A A , N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 9 )
cles. 29 While the economics and technical

feasibility of this concept have been evaluated, the possible environmental impacts
have not been studied and require consideration
Electromagnetic
Interference
Each SPS transmission option, whether

microwave, laser, or mirror, has the potential
for affecting other users of the electromagnetic spectrum. In general, where such effects occur they will be detrimental to one user
or another, since most systems now depend on
the relative purity of the wavelength band they
use.
Sharing the same air or ground space is possible by operating at different frequencies and
at specified power levels. This is most obvious
for radio frequencies, where the frequency
band width and power levels at which systems
can operate are assigned by national agencies
working in accord with national and international standards. Where potential for interference occurs in the radio frequency spectrum, the power level and antenna characteristics of such interference are strictly regulated
in order to keep it below the available technologys ability to filter out undesirable effects.
The principle is to assure that electronic systems are compatible with one another, i.e.,
that interference from one system does not
degrade the overall performance of a second.
Because of the large amounts of power that
the microwave, laser, or mirror SPS systems
transmit through the atmosphere, and the extensive area covered by a full satellite deployment, potential interference effects would
be much greater than any other system which
now use the electromagnetic spectrum. They
would also be commensurately more difficult
to ameliorate. Affected parties would include
users of space and terrestrial communications
and sensor systems, radar systems, various terrestrial control devices, computers, radar and
radio telescopes, o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e s , a n d
.
J (irev,
$ate//lte
P o w e r $y~tem rechrrlca/ Optlons
a n d Eco-
non)l{ \ c o n t r a c t o r report p r e p a r e d f o r O T A , N o v 1 4 , 1 9 7 9
microprocessors. SPS systems using microwaves for power transmission would generate
the greatest potential interference because
communications systems and passive receivers
of alI sorts share this portion of the spectrum,
as well as other electronic equipment (e. g.,
computers, control devices, sensors) that are
susceptible to microwave energy. The reference system is designed to transmit at 2.45
GHz, the center of the Industrial, Scientific,
and Medical band (ISM).
This analysis focuses on the affected users
on an area-by-area basis. It is based on the
presumed characteristics of the three transmission options of table 34. However, it should be
emphasized, that the precise characteristics of
the transmission beams are as uncertain as
other details of the proposed alternative systems. Not only are the characteristics of the
systems and their components poorly known,
the theory is inadequate to extend known data
to other frequencies, angles, or distances.
Nevertheless, it is possible in most cases to indicate broadly the sources of potential interference and their effects on other users of
the spectrum.
Potential Affected Users of
the Electromagnetic Spectrum
SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
All artificial Earth satellites use some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, either
for communication, remote-sensing or telemetering data. All would be affected in some
way by the SPS.
Geostationary
satellites. These would be
most strongly affected by the microwave systems. They would experience microwave interference from the fundamental SPS frequency
(e.g., 2.45 GHz for the reference design) and
noise side bands, spurious emissions in nearby
bands, harmonics of the fundamental SPS frequency, and from so-called intermodulation
products. All radio frequency transmitters generate harmonics and minor spurious components in addition to the desired signals. The
unintentional outputs are fiItered to satisfy national and international regulations about
191
users.
compatibility with other spectrum
Receivers also generally include sufficient filtering to prevent degradation by the residual
undesired signals. However, the magnitude of
the power level at the central frequency and in
harmonic frequencies for a microwave SPS
would be so great that the possibility of degrading the performance of CEO and LEO satellite receivers is significant. Examples of serious interference include the 2.50 to 2.69 GHz
direct broadcast satellite band, the 7.3 to 7.45
GHz space-Earth government frequency slot,
and the S-band National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) space communications channel.
I n addition to the direct effects from microwave power transmissions, geostationary communications satellites may experience multipath interference from geostationary power
satelIites due to the latters sheer size. I n some
cases, microwave signals traveling in a straight
Iine between two communications satellites
wouId experience interference from the same
signal reflected from the surface of the power
satelIite lying between them. Communications
satelIite uplink channels would be degraded by
multi path interference from the SPS vehicle
during orbit periods when the SPS is at a lower
aItitude than the adjacent communications
satelIites.
These adverse effects would necessitate a
limit on the spacing that a geostationary satellite must have from a power satellite in order
to operate effectively. The minimum necessary
spacing would depend directly on the physical
design of the satellite, the wavelength at which
it operates, the type of transmission device
used (i.e., klystron, magnetron, solid-state
device), and the satellite antenna sidelobe
magnitudes, transmitted power, orbit perturbations, and intermodulation product frequency
distribution and amplitudes.
Because a microwave SPS as currently configured must share the geostationary orbit with
other satellites, the value of the minimum
John
Juroshek,
T h e SPS I n t e r f e r e n c e
Problem
Elec-
Final froceedlng~ ot the 5olar P o w e r Satellite P r o g r a m R e v i e w , C o n f

tronic S} ~tem Effects and Mltlgatlon Techniques, The
800491 f[lOE), pp
411-438
192
Table 34.Summary of Electromagnetic Effects

System
Affected systems
Spectral region
Mechanism/effect
Microwave
Microwave
Power
radiation at central
frequency (2.45 GHz or some
other choice)
Harmonics of central frequency
Spurious noise near central
M u I i path interference
Infrared
Thermal
radiation from
all satellite components
Terrestrial
Scatter in atmosphere, from

rectenna
LEO satellites
Radio astonomy receivers
Pass through SPS beams

Scatter from rectennas,
atmosphere
Direct interference
Direct interference
Direct interference
Direct interference
Scatter from rectennas
Two-beam interference
Deep
GEO
Radio
GEO
Radio
GEO
space communications
satellites
astonomy receivers
satellites
astronomy receivers
satellites
Radio astronomy receivers

Infrared astronomy receivers
All wavelengths
(reflected sunlight)
Diffuse
reflections
Specular reflections
Glints
Optical telescopes
Direct interference (raised

background). Satellite
appears as spurious source
Satellite appears as
spurious source
Sky background increased.

Portions of sky obscured.
Laser
Microwave
No discernible
effect
Infrared
Central beam radiation
. Thermal radiation from all
components
All wavelengths
(reflected sun/ight)
Diffuse
reflections
Glints
None
Infrared receivers near
terrestrial receiver
Radio astonomy receivers

appears as spurious source
Optical telescopes
Probably no effect
Mirrors
Microwave
No
discernible effect
Infrared
Thermal
radiation from all
components
All wavelengths
(reflected radiation)
Specular
reflection to
terrestrial station
Diffuse reflection
Glints from structural

components
None
Radio astronomy receivers

as spurious source
Optical telescopes near

terrestrial station
Optical astronomy
General sky brightening

Sky background obscured
around satellite
Effect probably small
necessary spacing has emerged as one of the

most critical issues facing a geostationary SPS.
However, in the absence of a specific design, it
is impossible to characterize the exact form
and nature of the potential interference pa-
rameters that are needed in order to calculate

the minimum required spacing. In addition,
even if the design parameters were known accurately, the theory of phased arrays is insufficiently developed at present to predict the
minimum spacing with any accuracy. Estimates range from 0 to 10 . 31 The lower Iimit
would probably be acceptable. However, a
minimum spacing much greater than 10 would,
result in too few available geostationary slots
to allow both types of users to share the orbit
over the continental United States.
In 1980, some 80 civilian satellites shared
the geostationary orbit worldwide, and by 1990
that number is expected to increase substantially. Even though improvements in technology will lead to a reduction in the total number
of satellites necessary to carry the same
volume of telecommunications services, total
service demand is expected to rise dramatically. At present the minimum spacing for
domestic geostationary satellites is 40 in the
6/4 GHz communication band and 30 in the
14/12 GHz band. At these spacings, a total of
90 6/4 GHz band satellites and 120 14/12 GHz
band satellites could theoretically coexist at
geostationary altitudes, in the absence of SPS.
Additional satellites could use other frequency
bands without interfering with the above satellites, though this would ultimately be limited
by the station-keeping capability of the various satelIites. Multiple use platforms represent
one possible option to reduce contention over
orbital spaces.
The laser and mirror systems in LEO would
not interfere substantially with geostationary
satellites. Even in the unlikely event that such
a satellite were to pass precisely between a
geostationary satellite and its ground station,
the time of passage as well as the apparent size
of the occluding power satellite would be so
small as to cause only a slight diminution of
the signal.
Other satellites. In addition to geostationary

satellites that would operate at the same
altitude as the GEO SPS, there are numerous
remote sensing, communications, and navigation satellites in various LEOs that may
pass through an SPS microwave beam. Proposed high-Earth orbit (HEO) satellites
would also be affected because of shadE Morrison, et al ,
SPS Effect$ on L[ ~) a n d GE() Sate//ite$,
N T I A p u b l i c a t i o n (In pres$)
193
owing in the path from orbit to terrestrial

station by the large SPS vehicles, and
receiver interference thresholds that could
be exceeded by the unintentional emissions
from the SPS platforms. They use a range of
optical and microwave sensors, particle
detectors, computers, and communication
devices. Although the optical sensors are not
damaged by a microwave beam, increased
device noise can result in microwave interference in related parts of the satellite. A
number of shielding and filtering techniques
are available to ameliorate potential interference. These would need to be tested for
specific satellite and deployment scenarios.
Such satellites could protect their uplink
communications receivers from adverse interference by shutting down for that short
period (a few seconds) during SPS power
beam traversal, or it might be feasible for
the SPS to shut down for the satellite
passage. For short-term SPS shutdown,
high-capacity battery storage would have to
be Included in the ground segment (see ch. 9,
sec B). This shutdown presents a severe control problem (reduce power, start up again),
as well as serious network load transfer complexities. It may also be possible for some
satellites to fly orbits that would not intersect the SPS beam. For example, satellites
traveling in an equatorial orbit at altitudes
lower than 1,000 km would not intersect SPS
beams directed to rectennas at 350 latitude
or greater. Computer and processing/control
circuit functions can be protected by improved module shielding and interconnection noise filtering.
The laser and mirror systems might interfere
with nongeostationary satellites by causing
reflected sunlight to blind their optical sensors
or by occluding communications beams. Of
the two systems, the mirror system would be
W H Grant, E 1 M o r r i s o n , J r
Impa[ t of SPS O p e r a t i o n s
and
Davis,
T h e EMC
The
Program Review,
o n I.ow E a r t h O r b i t S a t e l l i t e s ,
I inal Pro( eeding~ of the Solar Power Satellite

Conf -80(M91 (DOF ), pp 411-434
P K ( h a p m a n , E ncounter$ B e t w e e n SPS P o w e r Beams and
[he F\na/ Proceedings of the Solar

Power \,]te//lte P r o g r a m R e v i e w , C o n f - & 1 0 0 4 9 1 ( D C ) E ) , p p
Satel Iitei In 1 ower Orbits,
4284 W
794
most problematic because of the large size of

the mirrors and their orbital speed. To date, no
one has calcuIated the possible adverse effects
due to this cause.
Deep space communications. Because deep

space probes generally travel in the plane of
the solar system (known as the ecliptic), they
would be especially affected by a geostationary microwave SPS. As seen from the
Earth, the ecliptic crosses the Equator in two
places. A microwave SPS would effectively
prevent ground communication with the
probe when the latter happens to lie near the
part of the ecliptic that crosses the Equator.
This interference is especially serious for
deep space vehicles because it is essential to
be able to communicate with them at any
time for the purposes of orbit control and
for timely retrieval of stored data. The
susceptibility problem is more serious than
normal satellite communications links because of receiver sensitivities and the low
signal-noise ratios i m p o s e d b y t h e l o n g
distances from Earth station to probe.
It would be possible to avoid such interference by establishing a communications

base for deep space probes in orbit. As we
penetrate deeper into space, this may be advisable for other reasons. Such a communications station would effectively add to the cost
of the SPS.
mit far better rejection of unwanted signals

than is now necessary. This appears to be technically feasible; primary concerns would be
modifications to the shielding of sensitive circuitry. The initial estimate of the cost of modifying terrestrial electronic equipment is in the
range of 0.1 to 5 percent of the unit cost (approximately $130 million for the 1980 estimate
of the inventory of susceptible equipment).
The EMC evaluation program determined
that most terrestrial electronic equipment
would be unacceptably degraded by SPS interference for power levels possible within a 50to 75-km distance of a rectenna site. The most
sensitive equipment, such as high capacity
satellite terminals and radio astronomy receivers would be adversely affected at distances of 100 to 200 km.
Mitigation techniques have been evaluated
for radars, computers and processors, sensors,
and muItichannel terrestrial microwave communications. With the exception of the most
sensitive receivers, modifying shielding and
grounding procedures and using rejection
filters in radar and communications receivers
would allow most systems to operate with the
SPS interference levels expected at the rectenna site boundary. Special mitigation techniques for more sensitive systems involving interference cancellation methods have been
considered, but they must be tested to determine the range of protection possible.
TERRESTRIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND ELECTRONICS
Both civilian and military terrestrial telecommunications and electronic equipment
wouId suffer from a number of possible effects
of a microwave beam. Direct interference can
occur from the central frequency and harmonic emissions. In addition, scattered and
reflected radiation from the rectenna and
structure intermoduIation
products could
cause additional interference problems for terrestrial receivers. At the very least, rectennas
would have to be located far enough from critical sites such as airports, nuclear powerplants,
and miIitary bases to render potential interference as small as possible. In addition, most
equipment would have to be modified to per-
EFFECT ON TERRESTRIAL ASTRONOMY

AND AERONOMY
None of the proposed SPS systems could
benefit astronomical research except insofar
as they would indirectly provide a transportation system f o r p l a c i n g l a r g e a s t r o nomical facilities in space. Their detrimental
effects would vary depending on the system
chosen. The impacts of a microwave system
would likely be severe for both optical and
1 Morrl\on, SPS S u s c e p t i b l e Systems C o s t F a c t o r s lnvest111 ent 5 u (m m a ry and M It I gat Ion Cost I nc rernent E st I ma tes, I n
l)res~
P A t kstron and C
I)ower ~y~tem~ (SPS)
( ont 7 ) 0 5 1 4 1 (DOE)
Stokes, Work$hop o n
Effects on Optical
and
Radio
S a t e l l i t e
Astronomy,
Ch. 8Environment and Health 195
radio astronomy. An infrared laser system 3 6

would have fewer detrimental effects on both
forms of astronomy than the reference system.
The mirror system would have its most serious
effect on optical astronomy.
Optical astronorny. For the reference system, diffuse reflections from the satellite
structures would cause the greatest degradation for terrestrial telescopes. Because
they appear to remain stationary along the
celestial Equator, reflected Iight from a system of 15 to 60 satellites would meld together to block observation of faint objects
over a large portion of the sky near the
Equator for telescopes located between the
longitude limits of the satellites. Some
major foreign, as well as most domestic observatories would be affected. Observations
of bright objects would be possible, but degraded in quality. In addition, reflected light
from the LEO construction base could be expected to interfere with observations of
faint sources in its vicinity. Telescopes in
orbit, such as the U.S. Space Telescope, to
be launched in 1984, will travel in nonequatorial orbits and therefore would not be
affected significantly by a reference system
SPS. The danger of pointing directly at a
geostationary satellite will increase the complexity of the telescope-pointing mechanism. Astronomical photometry and spectrometry instrumentation, and high resolution telescope tracking systems would be
degraded if located within 50 to 60 km of a
rectenna site. The EMC evaluation program
indicated the necessity of improving sensor
and sensitive circuit shielding, and maintaining a minimum separation distance of 50
to 60 km between rectenna sites and telescopes using sensitive electronics to remove
SPS induced degradation.
The effect of diffuse reflections from a
laser SPS in LEO could be expected to cause
fewer problems for observations of diffuse
objects near the Equator because the laser
collection and transmission satellite would
be constantly in motion. Thus, no part of the
C Baln, Potential of Law for 5P$ P o w e r rran$ml$~lon, SPS

CDEP, October 1978
sky would be permanently blocked from

view. The relay satellites located in CEO
would not be Iikely to interfere with optical
observations. However, large moving satellites would present optical astronomy with
another observational obstacle. Scattered
light from them would vary in intensity as
the satellite passes near a celestial object of
interest, making calibration of the nearby
background radiation very difficult if not
impossible. Photographic exposures of faint
celestial objects may last from 1 to 3 hours
and individual photographs cannot be
added effectively. The laser satellite would
interfere with infrared astronomy studies involving wavelengths adjacent to the transmission wavelength of the beam.
The mirror system, which would involve a
number of large, highly reflective moving
mirrors in LEO, wouId have very serious
effects on optical astronomy. While the precise effect has not been calculated, it would
render a large area around the ground stations totally unacceptable for telescopic
viewing. Because of diffuse reflections from
the atmospheric dust and aerosols above the
ground station, the individual mirrors would
create moving patches of diffuse light that
would preclude studies of faint objects that
lie in the direction of the satellite paths.
Radio astronomy. Radio astronomy would
suffer two major adverse affects from microwave systems: 1) electromagnetic interference from the main PS beam, from harmonics, from scattered or reflected SPS signals,
and from reradiated energy from rectennas;
and 2) increasing the effective temperature
of sky noise background, which has the effect of lowering the signal-to-noise ratio of
the radio receivers. Studies of faint radio objects near the Equator would be rendered
impossible. In addition, rectennas would
have to be located more than 200 km from
radio observatories and in terrain that would
shield the observatories from reradiated
microwave energy. Also of concern to radio
astronomers is the possibility that expected
failures of the klystron or other microwave
emitting devices would resuIt in spurious
noise signals that would further disrupt
radio astronomy reception.
196
Neither the laser nor the mirror systems

would contribute to the first effect. However,
they would raise the effective temperature of
the sky background. Low-level measurements
such as scientists now routinely conduct, for
example, to measure the amount of background radiation from the primordial explosion of the universe would thus be extremely
difficult if not impossible from terrestrial stations. Many other types of sensitive radio
astronomy observations would be seriously
degraded.
The susceptibility of radio astronomy receivers results from their high sensitivity, and
the wide range of observing frequencies in the
microwave spectral region. Mitigation techniques effective for other electronic equipment are only marginally useful because of the
sensitivity factor and associated dynamic
range. A preliminary review of interference
canceling techniques indicates that this
method has a high probabiIity of providing rejection of SPS signals to a level that would
allow rectenna sites to be located within a 100to 150-km range from radio astronomy facilities. Detailed design and testing at a radio
astronomy receiver is necessary because of the
unique aspects of integrating a canceler function into such complicated and sensitive
receivers.
Space basing of radio telescopes, especially
on the far side of the Moon, would eliminate
the impact of SPS and other terrestrial sources
o f e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c interference. However,
such proposals, though attractive from the
standpoint of potential interference, are unlikely to be attractive to astronomers for many
decades because of their high cost and relative
inaccessibility.
Optical aeronomy. Much of our knowledge

of the upper atmosphere is gained by nighttime observations of faint, diffuse light.
Some of the observations that are made today must be carried out in the dark of the
Moon. The presence of satellites whose integrated brightness is equal to a quarter
Moon would effectively end some studies of
the faint airglow and aurora. Other observations would be severely limited in scope.
Terrestrial Activities
The terrestrial environment would be affected by SPS in a number of ways. The construction and operation of receivers could
alter local weather, land use, and air and water
quality. The mining, manufacturing, and transportation associated with SPS could also
adversely affect the environment. 37
Land Use and Receiver Siting

Land use and receiver siting are important
issues for SPS, especially from a political
perspective (see ch. 9, Issues Arising in the
Public Arena).* This is due in part to the
microwave and mirror system land requirements for large contiguous areas for receiving
stations and transmission lines. In siting
receivers, tradeoffs wouId have to be made between a number of parameters such as the topography and meteorology of the candidate
locations, local population density, land and
transmission line costs, electromagnetic interference, and electricity demand, as well as
environmental impacts. The construction and
operation of SPS receivers wouId have measurable effects on the ecology, soil, air and water
quality, and weather of the receiver area. 3 8
Since many of these impacts are site-specific,
an extensive program wouId have to be carried
out in order to locate and assess each proposed site.
The severity and extent of the environmental impacts of SPS ground receivers and transmission lines would also depend on which SPS
system is deployed. For example, as shown in
table 7, the baseline mirror system (1) would
deliver power to a few, extremely large sites,
whereas the laser system might be designed to
5ate//lte Power S y s t e m , C o n c e p t t3evelopment and Eva/uatlon P r o g r a m , r e f e r e n c e s y s t e m r e p o r t , D O E / E R - 0 0 2 3 , O c t o b e r

1978
The
based
majority
receiver
of
sites
remarks
made
In this section pertain to land-
a s specif]ed b y t h e t e c h n i c a l s y s t e m s ad-
ciressed In this report It
IS
Important
to
note,
however
~hore r e c e p t o r sltlng t h a t m a y alleviate s o m e
of
the
t h a t offproblems
,) ~soc Iated with land-based s Ites IS a I so possible
fnbjronmental Assessment for the Satelllte Power System

( oncepf lleve/opment and Eva/uatJon Program, DOEE R-0069,
Augu~t 1980
generate the same amount of power at a great

number of sites, each of which is two to three
orders of magnitude smaller than the mirror
sites. Smaller mirror system (1 1) sites are also
possible.
For safety purposes, buffer zones would be
established around each site. For the laser
design, the infrared power density at the edge
of this zone would be 10 mW/cm 2 (see fig. 33).
As shown in figure 34, the microwave power
density at the edge of the reference system exclusion boundary would be 0.1 mW/cm 2. If microwave standards become considerably more
stringent, SPS land requirements could increase. For example, if the power density at
the edge could not exceed 0.01 mW/cm 2 (the
Soviet standard), then each site would require
almost 1,700 km 2 of land. 39
197
Figure 34.Microwave Power Density at Rectenna

as a Function of Distance From Boresight
2.45 GHz
50
23 mW/cm2
10
5
1.0
In addition to land for receivers, about 20 to

8 5 0 k m2 would be needed for launch facilities. 40 This could be made available through
expansion of the Kennedy Space Flight Center
J B B l a c k b u r n ,
for
Mapping of
Power
DOE/NASA
Report
HCP/
R-4024-10, October 1978
.01
Figure 33. Receptor Site Protection Radius as a
Function of the Perimeter Laser Power-Density Level
.005
10
.001
o
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Ground radius, m
SOURCE Satellite Power System, Concept Development and Evaluation Program, reference system report, DOE/ER-0023, October 1978.
10
1 0 - 3
10
10-
10
10
Perimeter power density, W/cm2
Power Systems
ReportLaser Environmental
SOURCE: R. E. Beverly, Satellite
Rockwell International report, SSD 80-0119-1.
Laser
vol.
in Florida, although environmental considerations might preclude this option. Transmission

line, mining, and transportation land uses are
not considered in table 35. More analysis is
needed to determine these impacts and to explore tradeoffs between centralized and dispersed electricity systems with respect to
transmission line siting. In table 36, the SPS reference system is compared to other electricity
powerplants.
198
Figure 35. Rectenna/Washington, D.C. Overlay
The taper of the solid-state power-transmission

system makes offshore siting particularly attractive. A few preliminary technical studies
have been conducted, including an offshore
rectenna siting study, 42 (see fig. 36). However,
little attention has been paid to the environmental ramifications of offshore siting. Areas
of special concern include the effects on
weather and ecosystems from thermal release
and the effects of microwaves on aquatic life
and birds that might be attracted to the
receiver
Land-use problems might also be alleviated
by innovative receiver designs that would permit multiple land use under the receivers, such
as crop agriculture, biomass production and
aquaculture.43 Again, however, until the biological effects of microwaves and reflected
sun Iight are better understood, the environmental impacts and hence viability of these
ideas are largely unknown.
Washington , D C
Some of the environmental, societal and institutional problems associated with land-use
and receiver siting might be remedied by siting
receivers in shallow offshore waters. For some
land-scarce areas such as New England and
Europe, this concept is particularly desirable.
.
4
J Freeman, et al , So/ar
Stur/y, contract report No
P o w e r Sate//ite Of f$frore Rectenna
NAS 8-33023,
prepared for Marshall
$pace Flight (-enter, May 1980

i]tellite Power $y\tem [5PS]
Rectenna $Itlrrg A vallablllty and

Ll~~trlhurjon of Nor-n jna//y E/jglb/e Sites, DC) E/E R-10041-TI O, Novem ber 19 8 0
Crey, [Jp c It
Table 35.SPS Systems Land Use
SPS system
Reference . . . . . . . . . . .
Solid statec . . . . . . . . . . .
Laser Id. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laser Ilf . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mirror If . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
For comparison
Washington. . . . . . . . . . .
New York City. . . . . . . . .
Chicago. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
k m /site
km /1,000MW
Number of
sites for
300,000 MW
174.0
50.0
0.6
40.0
1,000.0
35.0
33.0
1.2
80.0
7.4
60
180
600
600
- 29
Total land area

(km z)
for 300,000 MW
10,400.0
9,000.0
360.0
24,000.0
2,200.0
m 2/MW-yr a
1,280
1,230
44-35 e
2,960-3,550 e
274-329 e
174.0
950.0
518.0
a These nlt~ are presented for ~O~ParlSOn with table 36, The values for the reference and solid-state designs assufrle a so-year lif@tirne and a capacity factor Of ().9.
b Rectenna at 34o latitude covers a $jkrn x lskrll (1 ITkrnt) elliptical area, Microwave power density of edge of rectenna is 1.0 mW/cm2. If an exclusion boundary iS Set at
0.1 mW/cm2, then the total land per site is approximately 174 kmz (2 km extra on each side for buffer zone). J. B. Blackburn, Sate//ire Power System (SPS) Mapping of
Exc/usion Areas for Rectenrra Sites, DOE/NASA report No. HCP/R-4024-10, October 1978, Does not include land for mining or fuel transport.
C The solid-state sandwich design is described in J Grey, safe//j~e power sys~em ~ecffrrjca/ op~lo~s and Economics, contractor report prepared fOr OTA, NCrV, 14, 1979.
d Laser 1 and Laser 11 are two laser systems considered by DOE, Both deliver the same amount of power but the beam of Laser I iS more narrow (and hence more intenSe)
than that of Laser Il. See C. Bain, Potentia/ of Laser for SPS Power Transmission, SPS CDEP, October 1978.
e The values for the laser and mirror systems assume a 30-year lifetime and Capacity faCtOrs of 0.75-09
f Minor system parameters are defined by SOLARES System as described in K. Blllman, W P Gllbreath, S. W. Bowen, Solar Energy Revisited With Orbiting
Reflectors, NASA, Ames,
g The SO LARES system is designed to deliver 810 GVV to 6 sites; 2 SOLARES sites actually ~)rovlde 270 GW,
199
Table 36.Summary of Land Requirements

Purpose
Construction
Plant
CG/CC
Quantity
Fuel
Disposal
Transmission
7.2-150 m21MW-yr
5 m21MW-yr
30 yr
c
1,800-4,520
m2/MW-yr
30 yr
c
300 m21MW-yr
(480 km)b
30 yr
c
Duration
Location
c
c
FBC
Quantity
5.2-16.8 m2/MW-yr
1.4 m2/MW-yr
Duration
Location
c
c
30 yr
c
c
c
c
c
L WR
Quantity
57-174 m2/MW-yr
31 m2/MW-yr
4 m2/MW-yr
Duration
30 yr
1 06 years
Location
30-40 yrs
(20 m2/MW-yr
permanent)
c
225-1000
m 2/MW-yr
(480-1600 km) b
30-40 yrs
LMFBR
Quantity
76-133 m2/MW-yr
200 m2/MW-yr
(80 km)b
Duration
Location
c
c
30 yr
c
5 m2/MW-yr
(plant lifetime) and
.25 m2/MW-yr
(permanent)
c
c
c
c
30 yr
c
c
c
300 m2/MW-yr
(assume same as
combined cycle)
30 yr
c
.
TPV
Quantity
Duration
Location
neg 1d
neg 1d
300-3,000
m2/MW-yr
(480-4,800 km)b
c
c
600-3,800 m /MW-yr
(depending on cell
efficiency and
capacity factor)
30 yr
Southwest
N Ae
NA
N Ae
NA
30 yr
c
STE
Quantity
2,260-6,650 m2/MW-yr
neg1 d
neg1 d
Duration
Location
c
c
30 yr
Southwest
NA
NA
NA
NA
300-3,000
m2/MW-yr
480-4,800 km)b
30 yr
c
OTEC
Quantity
neg1
neg1 d
neg1
Duration
Location
c
c
N Ae
N Ae
N Ae
NA
20-850 km2
(launch)
1,480 m21MW-yr g
(rectenna) f
neg1 d
neg1 d
30 yr
Florida?
30 yr
c
N Ae
NA
NA e
NA
SPS
Quantity
Duration
Location
approximately the Sum
of plant and transmission requirements.

bDist ance to load center.
cData lacking; some categories are discussed I n test
A
NA
300 m2/MW-yr
(480 km)b
30 yr
c
300-1,000
m2/MW-yr
(480-1,600 km)b
30 yr
c
N A-Not applicable
flncludes buffer zone, rectenna proper OcCIJpleS about 501. Of total.
9Assuflles 200 krnz per rectenna site.
Negligible.
SOURCE: D. E. Newsom and T. D. Wolsko, Prelirnmary Cornparatwe Assessment of
DOE/NASA report No. DOE/ER-0058, April 1980.
Land Use ~Or Satelhte Power Systems and Altemafive E/ecmc Energy Technologies,
200
Figure 36.Offshore Summary Map
Offshore siting study - dark areas are not eligible for rectenna siting
SOURCE:
Satellite Power System

1OO41-TIO, November 1980.
If SPS is to be deployed on a multinational

scale, the siting constraints may be different
from those in the United States. This is especialIy true with respect to microwave exposure
standards, which in some countries are more
stringent than in the United States (see Health
and Ecology, Microwaves). The environmental
standards of other nations and their effects on
SPS siting requirements need to be explored in
more detail.
A siting study for the continental United
States has been conducted for the reference
system to determine if 60 candidate sites can
be found. The United States was divided into
grids, each approximately the size of a rectenna. Grid squares were eliminated from consideration if they violated a set of absolute
exclusion variables that included inland waters, high population density areas, marshlands, military reservations, habitats of endangered species, N a t i o n a l r e c r e a t i o n a r e a s ,
B.
and B A
Satellite Power System
Proceedings of the
Siting Study, in
Power
Program Review, Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA
report No Conf -800491, July 1 9 8 0
of
Atomic Energy Commission lands, and unacceptable topography. Sites were also excluded
if they were found within a specified distance
from military installations, nuclear powerplants and other facilities that might suffer
from electromagnetic interference with the
SPS microwave field.
In figure 37, ineligible grids were marked
with an x. In this first exercise 40 percent of
the United States remained eligible. After the
application of additional potential exclusion variables that were categorized as having
an unknown or adverse, but potentially correctable impact (e. g., agricultural lands and
flyways of migratory waterfowl), 17 percent of
the United States remained eligible. In general,
the greatest number of eligible sites was found
in the West, Southwest, and in the northern
regions of the Midwest; the least number of eligible sites occurred in the Mid-Atlantic States,
where 3 to 10 percent of the land was eligible
(31 to 83 grids, depending on the criteria for
eligibility). The exclusion variables that had
the greatest incremental effect in rendering
land ineligible included topography, popula-
Figure 37.Satellite Power SystemSocietal Assessment
SOURCE: Satellite Power Svstem (SPS)

1OO41-TIO, November 1980.
tion and electromagnetic compatibility (absolute variables) as well as private agricultural

lands, flyways, and Federal dedicated and protected lands (potential variables).
The siting study also revealed an important
point about the siting of smaller rectennas.
Smaller site sizes could increase the likelihood
that sites identified as eligible (in the first
application of absolute exclusion variables)
would remain so upon closer examination in a
validation process. However, they would be
unlikely to make previously excluded grid
squares eligible. Therefore, it was concluded
that smaller rectenna size (i. e., one-fourth or
one-half the rectenna area) would not make a
substantial difference in the siting process. 45
The effects of eliminating isolated sites were
also considered on the assumption that local
variations and the problems associated with
public or private land acquisition would make
siting more difficult in areas that did not contain a large number of adjacent eligible grid
and
squares. By imposing the constraint that eligible sites had to fall within a 3 x 3 grid pattern,
the amount of eligible sites dropped dramatically, especialIy in the Mid-Atlantic region and
the Southeast. A less restrictive requirements
of 2 x 2 grid patterns produces a considerably
less drastic result.
The siting results (from the application of
absolute variables) were then correlated
with the distribution of projected electrical
d e m a n d . 46 Based on one projection of future
electricity demand, it was concluded that the
only potential site scarcity would occur in the
Mid-Atlantic region (see fig. 38). In most other
regions there wouId be about 100 times more
eligible grids than required sites. Scarcity of
large load centers relative to allocated rectennas could be a problem in sections of the Midwest and West.
A prototype environmental assessment was
conducted for a rectenna site in the California
desert (Rose Valley, 250-km north of Los
A
*This was also an important constraint for the siting of offshore

Ibid
83-316 0 - 81 - 14
of Nominally Eligible Sites, DOE/ER-
Relationship
of
Eligible
Areas
to
Projected
The Final Proceedings of the Solar Power

P r o g r a m R e v i e w , Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA report No
D e m a n d , in
-800491, July 1980
202
Figure 38.RegionaI Generation (2000) and Rectenna Allocations
18.40/o
600
Note: This
is based on the EIA Leap Series C (1978) protection of electricity the year 2000 which assumes a 4 10/.
growth rate per year from 1977-1995. See chapter VI or discussion on alternative electricity growth rates
SOURCE. A.
of
Power Satellite Program
Areas to Projected Elect

Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA
Angeles). The major environmental impacts

(excluding microwave effects) and possible
solutions are summarized in table 37.
The assessment emphasized that large
amounts of contiguous land area must be completely committed to the project, totally
displacing existing land use and completely
altering the existing natural environment. investigators also noted that after the site
boundaries are selected, there is no flexibility
in the siting of individual rectenna structures,
so that areas particularly sensitive to SPS impacts could not be avoided. To alleviate adverse effects, they recommend that land areas
ype Environmental Assessment of the Impacts of Siting
and Constructing a Satellite Power System
Ground Receiving Station
DOE/NASA report No DOE/E R-O072, August
1980
Proceed/rigs
Demand,
No conf -800491, July 1980
much larger than the minimum requirements

be located in the site selection process. In addition, the study recommends that: 1) rectenna
panels be light and open to allow passage of
sunlight and rain; 2) natural characteristics of
the site be considered in the panel and diode/
dipole design, e.g., taking account of possible
attraction birds and rodents might have to the
panels for resting or nesting; and 3) the design
minimize the use of materials.
Finally, investigators note that the siting of
receivers in the Southwestern United States
will be especially hampered by land-use conflicts with other energy sources, archaeological
sites and military programs. In particular it is
pointed out that 15 percent of the California
Conservation Area is reserved for defense purposes.
Table 37.Summary of Environmental Impacts of Rectenna Construction and

Operation at a Specific Study Site
Technical area
Air quality and climatology
Noise
Geology and soils
. No significant air quality

impacts.
Unknown, but possibly
significant microclimateic
effects at or near ground
surface
Substantially elevated
noise levels, but in
areas with low population density,
Possible impacts on
noise-sensitive
species.
. No significant impact.
Hydrology and water quality
Rectenna operation
Rectenna construction
. Probable standards
violation for nitrogen
oxides, particulate,
and hydrocarbons.
No
climatic impacts.
Geologic impacts less

important than
geologic constraints.
Study area very active
seismically, but within
normal range for
southern California.
Soils impacts significant: large disturbed
area, compaction,
wind/water erosion.
Soils constraints: diversity of soils types
implies variability in
engineering properties
(e.g., shrink/swell
potential, corrosivity
to metals/concrete).
Project requirements:
2-14 x 106 m 3
(depends on dust
suppression methods
used).
Meeting
project needs
from groundwater
would lower water
table 0.2-1.5 m/yr;
would reduce underflow to adjoining
valley, could lower
water level in nearby
lake; might contaminate usable water
through hydraulic connection with unusable
ground water.
Mitigation
Adequate dust suppression
program during construction
would mitigate particulate
impacts.
. Extending construction
schedule would reduce
emission peaks for hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides.
Pending further research,
project modifications might
be needed for ground surface microclimate impact
Improved noise control

technology by construction
time frame for vehicles,
equipment, and processes
would mitigate impacts.
During construction, noisesensitive habitats should be
avoided to maximum extent
possible during breeding
and nesting seasons.
Seismicity has potential

for facility destruction
or loss of efficiency
(alinement v. satellite).
Soil
productivity impacted
for project life: depends
on extent and degree of
constructionphase and
ongoing operations disturbance.
. Thorough seismic and soils

studies required as part of
site-specific engineering.
Careful
soiI-stabilization/
age/erosion-control
programs required.
. Project requirements minor

unless major revegetation
program undertaken.
Revegetation could require
27 x 106 m 3 /yr
for 3 yr, that could
cause water table
drawdown.
Careful soil stabilization/

drainage/erosioncontrol program required.
Ground water withdrawal
impacts could be
alleviated by importing
water from outside
study area.
Proper sewage control
program necessary during
construct ion to prevent
water quality degradation).
204
Table 37.Summary of Environmental Impacts of Rectenna Construction and

Operation at a Specific Study Site-Continued
Technical area
Land disturbance
would completely
modify sites
floral communities.
Possible indirect
impacts on flora from
hydrologic changes,
air and water
pollutants, and
personnel activities
No
endangered
species present
at Rose Valley/
Coso; one rare
species present.
Flora
Fauna
Land use
Impacts similar to
construction phase.
Microclimate
changes at
ground surface a key
issue for severity
and potential for
mitigation of floral
impacts.
Impacts similar to
construction phase.
Impacts closely
related to fIora
impacts.
Microclimate changes
at ground surface
a key issue for
severity and potential
for mitigation of
fauna impacts.
Land disturbance
would completely
modify site faunal
communities.
Possible indirect
impacts on fauna
from hydrologic
changes, air and
pollutants, personnel
activities, and loss
of feeding areas
for nearby fauna.
Surface water
sources for
migratory water
and land birds
would be lost
(Playas) and
jeopardized (Little
Lake).
One protected species
(Mohave ground
squirrel) found in Rose
Valley.
Total
Same as construction
phase
displacement
of existing site
uses (e. g.,
farming grazing,
recreation).
Minor loss of
mineral resources
(cinder, pumice).
Minor indirect
(growth-related
impacts.
Potential land
acquisitior/use
conflicts with Navy
(China Lake NWC),
energy (geothermal),
wilderness,
archaeological
resources, native
American use and
access to cultural
and religious sites.
Mitigation
Rectenna operation
Rectenna construction
Reestablishment of
preexisting fIora
problematic; major
and difficult revegetation
program required.
Careful placement of
ancillary facilities necessary
to minimize impacts
on sensitive habitats.
Careful
planning,
design and construction/
operations practices
necessary to minimize
indirect impacts (e.g.,
water quality degradation).
Reestablishment of
preexisting fauna
problematic; closely
linked to strategy
and success of
floral mitigation.
Careful placement of
ancillary facilities
needed to minimize
impacts on sensitive
habitats.
Careful planning,
design, construction,
O&M practices, and
construction scheduling
needed to avoid
indirect impacts
and to avoid
sensitive habitats
during breeding and
nesting seasons.
Major impacts could

not be mitigated.
It might be possible
to achieve joint
use of rectenna
sites but this
remains speculative.
SOURCE: Prototype Environmental Assessment of the Impacts of Siting and Constructing a Satellite Power System (SPS) Ground Receiving Station (GRS), DOEINASA
report No. DOE/ER-0072, August 1980.
Receiver Structure: Weather Modification
205
cant than those associated with nuclear plants

of comparable power. 50
Other DOE studies have investigated the potential of the rectenna for modifying local
weather. They indicate that the surface roughness and albedo of the rectenna structure and
the waste heat generated by rectenna operation (750 MW per site) would have a small, but
detectable impact on regional weather and clim a t e . 4 8 4 9 In particular, rectennas would perturb the average surface heat exchange by
about 10 percent. SPS land-use changes could
alter temperature (on the order of 10 C), cloud
density and rainfall. However, it is important
to note that these effects would be no greater
than those attributable to other nonindustrial
urban activities. For example, the waste heat
generated by typical coal and nuclear plants
range from 750 to 6,000 MW. The waste heat
rejected at laser receptor sites, would also produce weather effects that would be less signifi-
The construction and operation of SPS

couId strain supplies of some critical materials, as shown in table 38. The most serious
problems arise for the solar cell materials (e. g.,
gallium, gallium arsenide, sapphire, and solar
grade silicon) and the graphite fiber used for
the satellite structure and space construction
facilities of the reference system. 51 It appears
that the silicon SPS systems pose less serious
problems than the gallium arsenide option, but
this may be due to the immature state of gallium arsenide technology. The most serious resource strain for the galIium arsenide system is
gallium; for the silicon option, large amounts
of electricity might be needed to produce the
cells.
48
Environrnerrta/ Assessment for the Sate//ite Power System
Concept Development and Evaluation Program, op cit.
Proceedings of the Workshop on Meteorological Effects of Satellite Power System Rectenna Operation and Related Microwave
Transmission Prob/ems, Aug 23-25, 1978, DOE/NASA report No
Conf -7808114, December 1979
OBasu, Johnson, Klobuchar, and Rush, op clt

R R Teeter and W M jamieson, P r e l i m i n a r y Materia/s
Assessment for the Sate//ite Power System (SPS), DOE/NASA
report No DOE/E R-0038, January 1980
Resources
Table 38.Summary of Materials Assessment Results
Parameter
Percent
supplied as
byproduct
Threshold valuea . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 0 %
Gallium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A
Graphite fiber. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sapphire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silicon SEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gallium arsenide. . . . . . . . . . . .
Electricity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arsenic/arsenic trioxide. . . . . .
B
Kapton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oxygen (Iiq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silica fiber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B
Silver ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Glass, borosilicate . . . . . . . . . .
Hydrogen (Iiq) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mercury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mercury ore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Petroleum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tungsten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
World
production
growth
rate
10%
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
SPS
percent of
demand
100/0
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
Note: A signifies problem of serious concern

B signifies problem of possible concern.
aparameter Value above Which a potential problem exists. Materials in this table exceeded these values
SOURCE: R. R. Teeter and W. M. Jamieson,
Net
percent
imported
Percent
world
resource
consumption
cost
$Ikw
50%
B
B
B
B
200%
$50/kw
A
A
A
A
B
B
where an A or B is recorded.
Prelimlrrary Materials Assessment for ttre Satellite Power System (SPS), DOEINASA report No. DOE/ER-0038, January 1980.
206
Most of the resource constraints identified

stem from limitations in production capacity
rather than exhaustion of reserves. SPS could
compete for graphite composite with the automobile industry and, depending on its time of
introduction,
with terrestrial photovoltaic
technologies and the electronics industry for
semiconductor materials. The demand by SPS
for a few materials such as gallium, tungsten,
and mercury could also increase U.S. depende n c e o n f o r e i g n sources. Further analysis
wouId be required to determine the severity of
the resource limitations identified for the
reference system and possible measures that
wouId circumvent them.
While no assessment has been made of the
material requirements for any of the other SPS
technical options, a few observations can be
made. The solar celI, graphite, and transportation materials that are problematic for the
reference design might also be used in the
three other options. The solid-state design calls
for silicon or gallium arsenide devices in the
transmitting antenna as well as in the solar collector. While the solid-state satellites would be
smaller than the reference design, the solidstate material needs per unit energy would be
greater. Therefore, if the reference design were
to strain supplies of semiconductor materials,
the solid-state variant most certainly would tax
them as well (assuming that both systems deliver the same total amount of power and use
the same materials). The laser and mirror systems would require slightly less photovoltaic
material per kilowatt of delivered electricity
than the reference system. The quality of the
photovoltaics material used in the mirror
design might be different than the reference
materials however, since in the mirror system
they would be placed on the ground. AII of the
systems would require graphite for structures,
and fuels for space transportation. Further
analysis is required in order to compare the
material requirements o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
designs to the reference system. Moreover, the
effect on SPS material requirements of using
nonterrestrial materials (lunar soil contains
aluminum, titanium, iron, silicon, and oxygen)
and developing space processing and industrial capacity needs to be investigated.
Mining, Manufacturing, and Transportation

The minerals extraction, materials processing, manufacturing, and transport activities
associated with SPS could result in a measurable increase in air and water pollution and
sol id wastes. 52 For example, the potential environmental impacts of mining include water
pollution from leaching and drainage modifications, air pollution from fugitive dust and
land disturbance from strip mining, subsidence
and spoil piles. Manufacturing would produce
stack emissions, process effluents and solid
wastes. In table 39, order-of-magnitude estimates have been made of some of the environmental impacts resulting from these reference
system activities. The incremental domestic
processing of materials required for SPS can
also serve as a rough guide to increased pollution levels.
While these exercises help identify the
potential scope and extent of environmental
impacts, a thorough and quantitative assessment is presently lacking. However, it is
anticipated that most impacts would be conventional in nature and could probably be
minimized by methods currently used in industry 5 There is no information on similar effects
/rfj[o/ I I)(I I nvlronrrrent,]/ A >je~smerrt ot the /rrrpactj ot fi(lng
,2 n(l ( on\ [ rj 1 f t /nLJ ,] S<l tcI//l te Power \ yj tern / $ P$ / (; ro~in(/ Recel t
Ing }t,It IoII (, R i/, DC) E NASA repot-t No DOE E R-()()72, Augu\t
1 ()~()
I Ibid
Table 39.Annual Environmental Effects of SPSa

(mining, processing, manufacture,
and ground-based construction)
Air pollutants
Percent U.S. totalc
Particulate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sulfur dioxide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carbon monoxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hydrocarbons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nitrogen dioxide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nonrecoverable waterd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solid
wastee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.8%
0.04
0.05
0.05
0.005
0.24
0.70
Land requirementsf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.12
aBaSed on ~~ earl Ier SPS cJeSlgrl assumes two satellites and rectennas are built
~~%~e~rlnlng, processing and fabrication
C
U. S totals In 1973
dEor ~ropellant manufacture, launch pad COatln9, Coflstructlon.
eFrOM dun-tin urn and steel processes.
fFor ,eCtenna Sites as fraction of tc)td us. kind area
SOURCE Adapted from Env/ronmenta/ Assessment for the Sate///te Power
System Concept Development and Evaluation Program, D O E / E R 0069 August 1980
due to the other SPS technical systems. Studies

should be conducted as the design parameters
become more clear. Analysis would also be
207
needed to determine the incremental effect of

SPS on the environment relative to other electricity generating faciIities.
HEALTH AND ECOLOGY

Human health and safety could be affected
by launch and space activities, mining, manufacturing, and transport, and the construction
and operation of SPS receiving antennas and
powerlines. These effects and the public
concern about them are likely to be most
pronounced closest to launch and receiver facilities. Long-term exposure to low-level electromagnetic radiation from SPS power transmission and distribution is a critical issue,
involving potential health effects about which
very Iittle is known. For SPS space workers, exposure to ionizing radiation is of the utmost
concern. Other important terrestrial impacts
are shown in table 40. While the effects of
some SPS activities such as mining and manufacturing are fairly conventional and could
be routinely assessed, the uncertainties of
other health and ecological impacts, such as
exposure to microwaves, are great. When experimental data does exist it is rarely directly
applicable to SPS. Furthermore, extrapolation
from experimental animal to human health
and safety standards is tenuous and uncertain
without a good theory on which to base the extrapolation. For other impacts, such as exposure to ionizing radiation, it is not clear if
existing standards should apply to SPS. More
stringent standards can strongly influence SPS
design, cost, and social acceptability. Ecological effects of SPS are also extremely uncertain
as little attention has been paid to this complex area.
This second part of the chapter will identify
the health and ecosystem impacts that presently appear most significant. The first section
will address the bioeffects of terrestrial activities on the public, SPS workers and ecosystems. In the second section, the implications for the health and safety of SPS space
workers will be discussed. With the exception

of power-transmission effects, most of the
health and safety risks described here pertain
to the reference system only. There is not
enough information on the personnel requirements, industrial activities and environmental
impacts to treat adequately the other technical options. It is assumed that many of the
effects would be similar to those of the reference system, varying only in intensity and
degree. It is important to note that some of the
impacts identified for the reference system
could be minimized or avoided by worker
training, protection devices, or changes in the
system design, but the effect of these measures
on concept feasibility and cost need to be
examined in more detail.
Terrestrial Effects
The primary sources of potential health and
ecological effects are electromagnetic radiation from the power transmission and distribution systems and noise and pollution from
launches, mining, manufacturing, and construction (see table 40). The risks to the terrestrial worker are usually greater than to the
general public because of the increased frequency, duration, and intensity of occupational exposure to certain hazards (although
occupational exposure could be more easily
controlled by protective devices). Estimates of
SPS hazards have in many cases been extrapolated from other technologies, such as the
space shuttle. Risk analysis would improve as
the system design becomes more clear. However, the major uncertainties associated with
some effects (e. g., electromagnetic radiation)
rest in the state of biophysical knowledge and
not SPS specifications.
208
Table 40.Terrestrial Health and Ecological Impacts
Electromagnetic Radiation
Microwaves
Effects of public and ecosystem exposure to low levels
uncertain
Occupational
exposure higher; may require protective
clothing
Over the last few decades, the development

and proliferation of technologies that utilize
electromagnetic radiation has been astoundingly rapid and widespread. However, there is
a growing concern about the biological consequences of exposure to the radiant energy
these devices employ. Terrestrial life as we
know it has evolved in response to a very
specific spectral distribution, diurnal and
seasonal cycle, and intensity of solar and terrestrial radiation. It is possible that the alteration and enhancement of the ambient electromagnetic environment brought about by
modern technologies could have a profound
impact on b i o l o g i c a l e n t i t i e s a n d h u m a n
health.
Laser Light
Hazard to people and other living organisms directly ex
posed to beam
Hazard to slow airplanes, birds, and insects flying
through the beams
Reflected light (mirror system)

Ocular effects not expected to be significant; potential
hazard with binoculars not known
. Psychological impacts on public, effects on the
photoperiod of plants and circadian rhythms, and navigation of wildlife are unknown
Reflected light (from reference system)
Plants and animals would probably not be unduely affected, but many effects are uncertain. The human eye
could be damaged if SPS reflected light were viewed for
too long or with magnifying devices.
High-voltage transmission lines

Effects
of public and ecosystem exposure to electromagnetic fields not well demonstrated but still uncertain (not unique to SPS)
Noise
Without
preventative measures, construction noise from
certain machinery could exceed occupational standards;
no significant public or ecosystem effect is anticipated
Launch noise and sonic booms couId present problems

for public and ecosystems. Workers would wear heavy
protective devices
Air Pollution
Without preventative measures, construction of rectennas couId violate standards for certain emissions such as
hydrocarbons and particulate
Mining, manufacturing, and transport emissions are expected to be comparable to industrial and energy producing processes (except coal)
Launch
effluents are not thought to exceed emissions
standards unless ambient levels are high but studies
must be refined
Effects on ecosystems are unclear
Water Pollution
Construction
and revegetation could deplete or contaminate local water, depending on site
Onsite
facilities would be needed to treat polluted water
at launch site
Safety
Risks to public, workers, and ecosystems from the handling and transport of toxic and explosive materials such
as rocket propellants
Occupational risk of catastrophic explosion or launch accident higher than that for public and ecosystems
SPS would increase the local levels of nonionizing radiation (see fig. 39) in a few areas of
the spectrum, e.g., microwaves, infrared laser
light, or reflected sunlight from the powertransmission system .54 The distribution of
power from the receiving site via transmission
lines would also increase exposure to very low
frequency or static field radiation at some
locations. Light reflected from the surfaces of
space structures and vehicles would be visible
from Earth. Space workers involved in the construction and operation of SPS could also be
exposed to high levels of nonionizing and
ionizing radiation in space.
MICROWAVES
There is not enough relevant data currently
available to assess reliably the biological risks
to humans, plants, and animals exposed to SPS
microwaves. The data base that does exist is incomplete, often contradictory and usually not
d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o S P S .55 I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
P Lorraln a n d D R C o r s o n , E/ectrornagnetic Fie/ds a n d

Waves (San Francisco W.H Freeman, 1970)
5 sprel;m ,nar y fn v;ronmenta/ Assessment for the Sate//ite power
5 4
System [SPS) Revision 1, DOE/NASA report No DOE/E R-0036,

January 1980
Figure 39.The Electromagnetic-Photon Spectrum
Bolometer
Sparks
Lamps
Thermopile
Hot bodies
Magnetron
Klystron
Crystal
Travelling-wave
tube
Electronic
circuits
Electronic
circuits
AC generators
209
there is a lack of information on the bioeffects

of chronic exposure to microwaves at lowpower densities. Data is presently lacking on
empirical dose-response relationships at these
low levels as well as on the theoretical mechanisms of interaction between Iiving organisms
and microwaves. Improved theory would facilitate extrapolations (which are currently tenuous and oversimplified) from experimental
animal data to the prediction of human bioeffects.
This knowledge is also required for the quantification of SPS microwave risks, without
which no useful assessment of the SPS microwave concepts can be made, If an SPS program is pursued, the study of microwave bioeffects should receive top priority. Microwave
research and future microwave standards
could play a large role in determining the
design and feasibility of SPS systems.
SPS microwave risks. The SPS reference system microwave environment is illustrated in
figure 40. Table 41 presents the public, occupational, and ecosystem exposure levels.
Since the power densities emitted by the
solid-state system are lower as a function of
distance from the rectenna center than the
reference system, they will not be specificalIy addressed here.
No quantitative risk assessment for SPS

workers has been performed or is currently
possible. Occupational exposures would need
to be controlled by adequate protective clothing and shielding, dosimeters (all of which are
not presently available), and possibly changes
in system design.56 The extent of the necessary
protection has yet to be determined. For occupational exposure engendering the greatest
risks, (e. g., space workers and terrestrial personnel working above the rectenna) it might be
necessary to shut off or defocus the micro-
wave beam if other protective measures prove

insufficient. Additional research would be required to clarify the risks and protective
criteria for short-term exposure. Possible synergisms between the space environment (e. g.,
ionizing radiation, weightlessness) and microwaves must be explored as well as the plausibility of simultaneously shielding microwaves
and ionizing radiation (see Space Environment). It is also imperative that understanding
of the long-term effects improve substantially
(see below) before a reliable occupational
safety threshold can be determined. In addition, possible disparities between SPS microwave levels and occupational standards in this
and other countries (see table 42) should be addressed, especially if SPS were to be a multinational system. The effects on system cost
and feasibility of implementing protective
measures, complying with safety standards,
and reducing the risks of long-term effects will
need to be analyzed.
Public and ecosystem exposure to SPS microwaves is presently of greatest concern. It
has been estimated that the 60 satellite reference system would raise the ambient microwave level in the continental United States to
a m i n i m u m o f 1 0 -4 m W / c m 2 . 5 7A l t h o u g h n o t
directly comparable, this level is two orders of
magnitude greater than the median population
exposure to FM radiowaves. 58 (Ambient microwave and radio frequency levels are inturn 10 6
times greater than natural levels of solar and
terrestrial radiation.) It therefore appears that
the general population and ecosystems would
be exposed to levels significantly higher than
current background microwave radiation.
The health risks of chronic exposure to
microwaves, especially at these low levels (i. e.,
.
lbld
R A Tell and E D Mantiply,
56prOgram
A Ssessment Report,
Statement of
F;nd;ws,
Population
Exposure
to
VHF
and U H F Broadcast Radiation in the United States, Proc. IEEE,

oP c It
68(1 ) 6-12, 1980
Ch. 8Environment and Health . 211
Figure 40.SPS Microwave Power-Density Characteristics at a Rectenna Site
Power denisity is
rectenna center
0.02 mW/cm2
10 km
13 km
at 35@
0.1 mW/cm2 at rectenna
site exclusion boundary
SOURCE: Enwrorrnrenta/
August 1980
Assessment for the Sate///te Power System Concept Development and Eva/uat/on
Program, DOE/ER-0069,
Table 41 .Characterization of Exposure to Reference System Microwaves
Outside buffer zone

Airplane flying through beam
Public
Terrestrial
workers
Rectenna field
Space workers
Ecosystems (plants,
wildlife, airborne
biota)
Under
rectenna
Transmitting antenna
Rectenna field:
Outside buffer
Inside buffer
Rectenna field: above
rectenna
Between 10-4 mW/cm 2 and 0.1 mw/cm2

Less than 23 mW/cm2 (shielding)
Up to 23 mW/cm2 (may be higher if reflections
occur)
Up to 2.2 W/cm2
Less than 0.1 mW/cm2
Between 0.1 mW/cm2 and 1.0 mW/cm2
Up to 23 mW/cm2
SOURCE: Environment/ Assessment for the Sate//ite Power System Concept Development and Eva/uat/on Program, DOE/ER-0069, August 1980.
212
Table 42.Microwave Exposure Limits

Frequency (G Hz)
a
United States . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S.S.R.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Canada C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . .
Poland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sweden d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.01-100
0.3-300
1-300
0.3-300
0.3-300
0.3-300
Occupational (mW/cm2)
10.0
0.01
5.0
0.01
0.2
1.0
aThi~ is a ~uid~li~ ~nlY and is Ot ~nf~~C.abl~; the ~tarldard~ i the united Kingdom, German Federal
Occupational duration
Public (mW/cm2)
No limit
Workshift
8 hours
8 hours
10 hours
8 hours
None
0.001
1.0
0.0001
0.01
1.0
Republic, Netherlands and France are similar to that Of the U.S.
guideline; ANSI will probably recommend 5 mWlcm2 as a new occupational exposure limit. ANSI and EPA are presently considering a new population limit.
bo,l mwlcmz for rotating antennas.
ccanada is proposing a 1 ITrw/cITIz limit at 10 tdHz to 1 GHz requency.
d5 mwlcm~ at o.01 to 0.3 GHz for 8 hours.
SOURCE: Adapted from L. David, A Study of Federal Microwave Standards, DOEINASA report No. DOEIER-1OO41-O2, August 1980.
less than 1.0 mW/cm2) cannot be analyzed with

the current data base. While appreciation for
the complexities of the interaction between
microwaves and biological systems (see app.
D) has grown in recent years, the state of
knowledge, particularly with respect to lowpower microwaves, is immature and incomplete; hence, no assessment for SPS can be
conducted at this time. However, a DOE review of the existing scientific literature identified the biological systems that might be
most susceptible to microwaves. 59 For the public and ecosystems outside of the rectenna,
DOE tentatively concluded that effects on the
reproductive systems would be small; risks to
special populations (e. g., people taking medication, children, older and pregnant people,
etc. ) and effects on behavior would be uncertain and effects on the immune and blood
systems appear unlikely. No cancer, development or growth effects would be expected.
Again, however, the data base on low level
chronic exposure that supports these conclusions is incomplete and more research would
be required to satisfactorily assess potential
effects.
For ecosystems (and SPS workers) at the
rectenna site, effects on physiology, behavior,
development, reproduction and the thermoregulatory, immune and blood systems might
b e p o s s i b l e .60 Of particular concern are the
effects on insects and birds that might fly
59A. R. Valentine, Environmental Assessment Overview, In
The Final Proceedings of the Solar Power Satellite Program Review, Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA report No Conf -800491, July
1980.
I bid
through the beam. Birds in flight are often near

their thermal Iimit and exposure to microwaves might result in thermal overloading.
DOE has initiated three laboratory studies to
test the effects on bees, birds, and small
animals at SPS frequency and power densities.
(See app. D.) While no significant effects have
been observed to date, the research is far from
completed.
Research needs. A workshop organized by

the National Research Council (NRC) recently identified the principal research priorities
for the bioeffects of exposure to low-level
SPS microwaves. 63 These are listed in table
43. Basically, three kinds of laboratory
studies are needed:
1 animal laboratory experiments to establish effects empirically as well as doseresponse relationships;

2 studies of mechanisms of interaction at
different levels of biological organization
(e.g., atoms, molecules, cells, organs); and
3. improvement of dosimetry, instrumentation and models.
While limited resources might dictate that
these studies be carried out only at the SPS
reference system frequency and power densities, it is clear that research at many frequencies and power densities would help to
elucidate the fundamental mechanisms of
interaction that allow extrapolations to be
made between frequencies, irradiance and
blEnvlronmental
Assessment for the Satellite Power System
Concept l)evelopment and Evaluation Program, op cit
Zlbld
Dodge, op cit
Table 43.Research Needs To Help Reduce Uncertainties Concerning Public Health Effects Associated With
Exposure to SPS Microwave Power Densities and Frequency
Local or general thermal effects
Long-term experiments at power densities< 0.1 mW/cm2

at whole body, organ, and organelle levels, testing for biological endpoints such as alteration of enzyme reaction
rates and cell membrane confirmational changes.
Studies of basic physical interactions of electromagnetic

fields with molecular components of living tissue, to develop models of biological effects or phenomena. (For example, biophysical experiments are required to determine the role of microwaves at SPS frequencies and intensities at the molecular level and their action on ionic
conductivity. Any responses, biological, biochemical, or
physical, should be investigated from the point of view of
alteration of enzyme reaction rates, and cell membrane
phase transitions and confirmational changes.)
Better dosimetry techniques for calculating and measuring (such as a probe that could be used within an
organism to measure in a nonperturbing way) internal
field patterns.
Interactions with drugs or other chemicals
Repeat selected experiments showing effects (including

the potential of microwaves as a cocarcinogen), using
carefully controlled dosimetry and statistical analysis.
Develop and test hypotheses to explain effects.
Long-term dose-response experiments at power densities around 0.1 mW/cm 2 and with a larger number of
drugs at whole body, organ, and organelle levels.
Immunological effects
Repeat selected Russian research at 1 to 500 mW/cm2

levels; repeat selected U.S. work to validate it.
Mechanistic and molecular biological experimentation.
Long-term studies, particularly autoimmune response.

..
Effects on calcium ion efflum in brain tissue

Studies to determine bioeffects using 2450 MHz as the
carrier frequency or studies to determine whether the
power density windows are carrier-frequency dependent.
Studies to establish the interaction mechanism (the interaction site) of the modulated fields and ELF fields on
calcium ion efflux.
Studies to determine whether the phenomenon will occur
under the modulation and power characteristics expected of the SPS microwave beam.
Studies to determine whether the calcium ion efflux
phenomenon correlates with Russian and East European
findings of neurological/behavioral decrements in people
and animals exposed to low levels of microwaves.
Experiments to determine whether other ionssodium,
potassium, magnesiumare similarly affected.
Effects on organized structures
Studies of changes in behavioral responses under
simulated SPS conditions, using behavioral tests (such
as time-based schedules of reinforcement) that are both
sensitive and reliable measures of such effects.
Studies of long-term effects.
Neurological and blood-brain barrier experiments at low
levels.
D e t e r m i n e t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l a n d physiological
significance of behavioral responses.
Molecular level studies on biological relaxation times.
Consideration of long-term animal experiments at 2,450
MHz to evaluate, if possible, whether there is any trend
toward life shortening in animals.
SOURCE: C H. Dodge, (rapporteur), Workshop on Mechanisms Under/y/ng Effects of Long-Term Low-Level, 2.450 MHZ Rad/at/on on Peep/e, organized by the National
Research Council, Committee on Satelllte Power Systems, Environmental Studies Board. National Academy of Sciences, July 15.17, 1980
species. It may also be possible that frequencies other than 2.45 GHz would be used for
SPS. If a much different frequency were used,
however, low-level microwave research would
have to be done at that frequency as well,
because different frequencies cause different
responses,
In addition to laboratory experiments, epidemiological studies are also needed. 64 It has
been argued that such studies are currently of
limited usefulness; they are very expensive, difficult to accurately document (i.e., it is difficult to determine the dose to which individuals are exposed) and may overlook important
biological endpoints. 65 In addition they have
Office of Science and Technology Policy, A Technica/ /7eview of the Biological Effects of Non-lonlzlng Radiation, W a s h ington, D C , May 15, 1978
65paul Tyler, Armed Forces R a d i o l o g i c a l
private
communication,
July 30, 1979
Research
Institute,
limited usefulness for exposure to low levels of

microwaves because the variability of the response is small and might be masked by other
effects. It is also not clear how many people
would need to be observed. Nonetheless a
coordinated program of prospective epidemiology (as opposed to retrospective studies
that rely on medical records many years after
exposures) and laboratory research is essential
to bridging the gap between biological effects
observed in a laboratory animal and human
health standards.
Special attention must also be paid to effects on ecosystems. To date, nearly all studies
have been conducted in a controlled laboratory environment on a relatively few species.
Virtually nothing is known about the effects of
microwaves on a complete ecosystem and no
studies have been performed that even ap-
preach the projected time scale of SPS operation (i.e., 30 to 100 years). With respect to SPS,
it must be determined if animals and airborne
biota would be attracted to the beam or would
avoid it. What impact would microwaves have
on the navigational systems of birds and insects (as well as aquatic life for offshore
rectennas)? What effect would exposure to
microwaves have on the productivity of plants
and their susceptibility to drought? How would
SPS affect the local food chain? The effects on
micro-organisms, such as bacteria, fungi, and
algae should be invest igated. 66
Standards Institute (ANSI) which in 1966

recommended a maximum permissible exposure of 10 mW/cm 2, averaged over any 6minute period (1 O to 100 GHz). 70 This rationale also forms the basis of the current
U.S. occupational guideline (which in 1975
was ruled advisory rather than a mandatory
standard) as promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) which adopted the ANSI recommendation in 1971. Presently, there is no official
recommendation for general population exposures in this country.
Microwave standards. The biological consequences of exposure to low-level microwaves are poorly understood because of
inadequate and sporadic support of microwave bioeffects research in general and
because the bulk of research performed in
this country has focused on the bioeffects at
levels of 10 mW/cm 2 or greater. 67 This emphasis stemmed from a belief that the only
biologically significant damage from exposure to microwaves is due to heating. In
fact, occupational guidelines developed in
the 1950s through the Department of Defense and its contractors in response to concerns about exposure of radar personnel
were based on biological injuries (e. g.,
cataracts, burns) from acute exposure to
microwaves on the order of 100 mW/cm 2. It
was concluded that humans could well tolerate exposures to power densities 10 times
smalIer 68 (i. e., 10 mW/cm 2) without suffering
serious or permanent damage. 69 This reasoning was accepted by the American Standards
Association (now the American National
The reasoning underlying the U.S. guideline

is currently in dispute and OSHA and ANSI are
72 73
The
considering new r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
confIict centers around the assumption that
only thermal effects result from exposure to
microwaves. While it is generally acknowledged that exposure to microwaves of 10
m W / c m 2 or greater will result in heating, the
effects and consequences of exposure to lower
power densities are controversial. Experiments
documenting behavioral and neural changes
and the enhancement of calcium efflux from
brain cells 74 in particular have suggested the
existance of other effects at power densities
b e l o w 1 . 0 m W / c m2 . These phenomena are
thought by some to result from direct interactions with the electromagnetic field rather
than as an indirect consequence of heating.
Some of the mechanisms that have been postulated for non ionizing radiation include:
1. distortion of the shapes of individual

molecuIes or rearrangement of a group of
molecules that might transiently or per-
..
G a n d h i , Blohazarcf~ ot M i c r o w a v e Beams F r o m Prc~-
0 P
p o s e d Satel Ilte f]ower St~tlon~,
f nergy Tccfrno/oKlc\,
n 1 ~ea /th
/rnp/lcatlon$ of New
W N Rom and V [ A r c h e r (eds ) ( A n n A r -
bor, MI( h Ann Arbor Scien{ e Publ l~her~ I n( , 1980)

7P T y l e r , O v e r v i e w o f Radlatlon Rtsear( h Past, fresent a n d
Future,
n B Io/oHIca / / ffec ( $ 0 f Nom Ion IZ
Inx Racf Ia t Ion, P Tyler
(ecf ) (New York Academy of Science\, annal~, VOI 2 4 7 , 1 9 7 5 )

R Bower\, et al , (
erly H
ommun~catfon~
for a Mof)I/e $ocrety ( B e v -
I Is, Ca I If \age PLI bl I cat Ion\, 1978) ( Bel I [ aboratorles and
G e n e r a l F Iectrl[ rec ommencfeci () 1 nlW ( m and 1

re~pect Ively as maxr m um perm I\\ I ble expofure I Im Its
N H Steneck, H j C o o k , A j Vancfer, a n d C 1
Origln$ of U S Safety Standard\ tor Microwave
$c/cnce, VOI 208, pp 1230-1237, j une 1 ], 1980
() rnW/cm
)
Kane, T h e
Kadlatlon,
L David, A Study of Federal Microwave Standards, D O E I

NASA report No DO E/E R-10041-02, August 1980
7
General Accounting Office, Efforts by the Errvironrnenta/ Protection Agency to Protect the Public From Environmental NonIon\zrng Radiation Exposures, Washington, D C , Mar 29, 1978
A W (;uy, Non-l onlzlng Radiation. Doslmetry and lnteractlon, I n Non-Ionizing Radiation, proceedings of a Toplca I Symposium, Nov 26-28, 1979, The American Conference of Governmental I ndustrlal Hyglenlsts, I nc , 1980
Z R (;laser, Basis for the NIOSH Radiofrequency and Microwave Rad Iatlon Criterl a Document, In N o n - I o n i z i n g Radiation. proceedings of a Topical Symposium, Nov 26-28, 1979, The
American (-onference of Governmental I ndustrlal Hyglen ists,
Int , 1980
Dodge, Op clt
215
manently alter the function and replication process of a biological unit;75

2. reorientation of dipole molecules in the
microwave field and polarization of molecules that control membrane permeabiIity; 76
3. biological electromagnetic interference in
which the microwave field disrupts or enhances the transfer of biological information in the form of electromagnetic
energy between molecuIes and celIs; 7 7
and
4. field receptor interactions where neural
tissue acts as a receptor of weak fields. 78
microwave sickness has been isolated as a

distinct occupational disease in the U. S. S. R.
It has also been argued that the Soviet exposure levels are based on the occurrence of a
biological effect whereas the U.S. guideline
reflects levels of known biological damage
(with a safety margin). Moreover, it has been
claimed that the Soviet standard has been set
without regard to the practical feasibility of
meeting such low levels. It is further argued
that in any case the standards are not enforced, especially in the military sector,
although this would be difficult to substantiate.
The discussion o f l o w - l e v e l e f f e c t s i s
hampered by the experimental difficulties of
isolating the various possible mechanisms.
Most U.S. microwave experts acknowledge the
need for research on low-level effects, but remain skeptical about their biological significance, especially at the proposed SPS single
frequency of continuous radiation.
For many years the flow of information between East European and Western researchers
was restricted. Translation problems sometimes also contributed to misunderstandings. 83
This situation has improved considerably, and
attempts are being made in the United States
to replicate many of the low-level experiments
performed in other countries (although the
United States still has not sponsored any
clinical studies). Western literature is also
beginning to acknowledge the possibility of
behavioral response and selective sensitivity
of organs to low levels .84 Partly for these
reasons, it is anticipated that new ANSI guidelines will be established that are more stringent
than the present exposure levels (see fig. 41). At
the SPS frequency of 2.45 GH Z , the maximum
occupational exposure that is now being considered is 5 mW/cm2. * EPA is also considering
.
C H Dodge and Z R Glaser, Biomedical Aspects of Radio
The controversy over low-level effects has

been fueled by the disparity between U.S. and
U.S.S.R. research and exposure standards (see
table 14)the Soviet standard is three orders
of magnitude lower than the U.S. guideline.
Some U.S. authors have attributed the different standards to dissimilar research philosophies. 79 F o r e x a m p l e , m i c r o w a v e s t u d i e s
thought most valid by U.S. scientists are those
performed in a controlled laboratory environment, whereas Soviet researchers rely on clinical and subjective data as well. 80 In fact,
based on the complaints of radar personnel,
K D Straub, Molecular Absorption of Non-Ionizing Radiation in Biological Systems In The Ph yslca / Basis of Electromagnetic Interactions With Bio/ogica / Systems: Proceedings of a
Workshop, University of Maryland, june 15-17, 1 977, L Taylor
and A Cheung (eds ), US DHEW, 1978, report No [FDA) 78-8055,
Washington, D C , April 1978
A S Pressman, E/ectromagnet~c F)e/ds and Life (New Y o r k
Plenum Press, 1970)
lbld
D R Justesen, et al , Workshop on Radiation: Scientific,
Technological, and Soclologlcal Implications of Research and
on Biological Effects of Radio-Frequency E Iectromagnetic Radiations, In Proceedings of the 1978 Conference on U.S. Technical
Po/icy (New York. IEEE, 1979)
W C Milroy and S M Michelson, The Microwave Controversy, /nternationa/ journa/ of Envlronmenta/ Studies, VOI 4, p
123, 1973
D R J ustesen, Veterans Admlnlstratlon, private communication, J u Iy 16, 1979
Frequency and Microwave Radlatlon A Review of Selected Soviet, East F u ropean, and Western References I n Bio/ogica/ Effects
of E Iectromagnetic Waves: .Se/ected Papers of the USNC/URSl
Annual/ Meeting, L L Johnson and M Shore (eds ), Boulder,
COIO , October 1975, USDHEW, (report No (FDA) 77-8010/8011),
Washington, D C 1976
[1 Mlchaelson, In Symposium on the Bio/ogica/ Effects and
Health /mp/lcations of Microwave Radiation, S Cleary (ed ),
RI( hn~ond, 1969, USDHEW, report No BRH/DBE 70-2, 1970, pp
76-81
Frzemyslaw Czerskl, Department of Genetics, National Resear( h I nstltute of Mother and C h ild (Poland), private commu n icatlon Sept 5, 1979
C H Dodge and Z R Claser, Trends In Non-ionizing Electromdgnetlc Radlatlon Bioeffects Research and Related Occupational Health Aspects, Iournal of Microwave Power, VOI 12,
No ~ 1977, Pp 319-334
*Thl\ level has been criticized by the National Resources
Defense Councrl as being arbitrary and not found with any
recognition of possible nonthermal effects, see ch, 9, Pub/ic
/5 $11(?>
216
Figure 41 .Comparison of Exposure Standards
Figure 42. Program Funding
10
,00
SOURCE: A. W. Guy, Nonionizing Radiation: Dosimetry and Interaction, in

NonionizingI?adiationj Proceedings of a Topical Symposium, Nov.
26-28, 1979, The American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists, Inc., 1980.
the development of exposure guidelines for

the general population, although it does not
have the jurisdictional authority to enforce
standards. It is conceivable that future public
standards could be established at 1.0 mW/cm 2
o r b e l o w .8 5 T h e i m p a c t o f m o r e s t r i n g e n t
standards on SPS design and concept viability
should be addressed.
Agencies. At present, the study of the bioeffects of nonionizing radiation falls under the
jurisdiction of 13 Federal agencies. 86 The allocation of funds (currently about $15 million
per year) is shown in figure 42. The agencies
primarily responsible for regulation and the
establishment of microwave guidelines 87 i n *David, op. cit.
8bF;fth Report on program for Contro/ of Electromagnetic po/Iution of the Environment: The Assessment of Biological Hazards
of Nonionizing Electromagnetic Radiation, NT I A report No
79-19, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1979.
87
David, op cit
FY-77
$7.6 M
FY-78
$10.1 M
SOURCE: Fifth Report on Program for Contro/ of Electromagnetic Po//ution of

the Environment: The Assessment of Biological Hazards of NonionIzmg Electromagnetic Radiation, NTIA report No. 79-19, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1979.
elude the Department of Health and Human

Services (the Bureau of Radiological Health/
Food and Drug Administration, for example,
sets emission standards for electronic products
such as microwave ovens); the Department of
Labor (which sets occupational guidelines);
and EPA (which sets environment guidelines
for other Federal agencies).
The Federal effort has been coordinated at
various times by other Federal agencies, but a
clear, dedicated, well managed and adequately funded national program in microwave bioeffects research is currently lacking.
To some extent, the ineffectiveness of the
agencies responsible for the management of
the Federal program is due to lack of control
over the allocation of research funds .88 It is

also often the case that within each of the
research and regulatory agencies, microwave
research receives low priority on the agencys
agenda. jurisdictional ambiguities have
caused some agencies to take a limited approach to research and protection. Multiagency effort has also made public participation and education difficult.
Often, the most cohesive and vigorous research and evaluation of microwave bioeffects
take place in conjunction with one particular
technology such as a radar facility. This is not
always the best arrangement since in the past,
user agencies with vested interests have often
been responsible for the assessment of health
and environmental impacts. Moreover, fundamental research is needed in order to elucidate
the mechanisms of interaction; technoiogyspecific research is helpful but usually does
68
Tyler, op cit
217
not contribute significantly to basic understanding. In addition, long-term continuous

studies are needed and project-specific research is sporadic and unpredictable.
Nonetheless, unless the Federal research effort is consolidated into fewer agencies and
given greater support, it is likely that an SPS
program would be required to sponsor microwave bioeffects studies as it did in the DOE
assessment. If the current climate continues,
this research would not only gather information specifically relevant to SPS, but would
probably be quite fundamental in nature. If a
microwave SPS program is pursued, the development of SPS would entail the involvement
of the Federal agencies shown in table 4 4 .
State agencies might also be affected.
Conclusion.
DOE-sponsored microwave
studies stimulated thinking about the design of
microwave bioeffects experiments, tended to
clarify research needs and obstacles and con-
Table 44.SPS Development

SPS development phase
Basic research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Applied research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exploratory development . . . . . . . . . .
Technology development . . . . . . . . . .
Engineering development. . . . . . . . . .
Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commercialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Microwave aspect
Agency involvement
. . .. . .. - . . . . - .
- EPA, HEW/FDA, NASA
E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d p u b l i c h e a l t h e f f e c t s DOE,
evaluation MPTS technology
Conduct experiments and further define
DOE, NASA, HEW/FDA, Department of
health and safety risks of MPTS to
Labor/OSHA EPA
public, the environment and SPS
workers
Preliminary standards development
HEW/FDA, DO E/EV, EPA, HEW/FDA,
radiation exposure standards
Bureau of Radiological Health, Department
occupational health and safety
of Labor/OSHA
standards development
Final standards for MPTS chosen
HEW/FDA, DOE/EV, EPA, DOL/OSHA
occupational health and safety
standards finalization
Preparation of environmental impact
Council on Environmental Quality
Guidelines for health and safety
Department of Labor/OSHA
(worker) enforcement
Guidelines for public health and safety
HEW/FDA-Bureau of Radiological Health,
environmental impact statements
EPA, Council on Environmental Quality
Review guidelines for worker
health and safety
Review guidelines for public health
HEW/FDA, EPA
and safety
Enforcement of guidelines for
worker health and safety
Enforcement of regulations for
EPA
public health and safety
Enforcement of guidelines for worker
health and safety
Enforcement of guidelines for public
EPA
health and safety
SOURCE: L. David, A Study of Federa/ M/crowave Standards, DOE/NASA report No DOE/ER-10041 .02, August 1980.
83-316 0 - 81 - 15
tributed to an increased study capability.

While the results of these studies are useful,
the time and resource constraints of the SPS
assessment program precluded a thorough research agenda; in particular, no studies on
long-term exposure to low levels of microwaves could be initiated and little more could
be done to improve our theoretical understanding. In spite of the general acknowledgment by the microwave community of the
need for studies of chronic, low-level exposure,
practically no such studies are underway or
planned. Clearly, if many of the fundamental
questions about the bioeffects of microwaves
are to be resolved within the next one or two
decades, a more comprehensive, dedicated national research program will be needed.
LASER LIGHT
The biological risks associated with the laser
system have been assessed only to a very Iimited degree. The power density of the focused
laser system beam would be sufficiently great
to incinerate biological matter. Safety measures (such as a perimeter fence and pilot beam
system) would have to be devised in order to
avoid beam wandering and the direct exposure
of the nearby public and ecosystems. Less easy
to protect would be birds and insects flying
through the beam; without some sort of warning device they wouId be incinerated. 90 It is not
known if air-borne biota would be aware of the
beam, and if so whether they would be attracted to or avoid it. Siting studies should
consider migratory flyways and local bird
populations.
It has been suggested that aircraft be restricted from the power beam area. 91 While it
is not expected that jets and their passengers
would suffer any damage in traversing the
beam due to their high speed and infrared reflectivity, slower flying, less reflective aircraft
could be affected. More important, laser light
specularly reflected from an airplane would
present an ocular hazard to the public. 92 A
radar warning system might be devised to deBeverly, op clt
OWalbrldge, op clt
9 Beverly, op clt
92
Walbrldge, op clt
focus the laser beam if a plane did happen to

fly through it.
The primary risk to the public and nearby
ecosystems outside of the direct beam wouId
be due to laser light scattered from clouds,
dust and the receptor site. This spill over of
laser power (less than 1 percent) would necessitate establishing a buffer zone surrounded by
an opaque, talI fence. 93 As shown in figure 33,
it has been estimated that a protection radius
of 300 to 800 m wouId be required in order to
limit public exposure at the perimeter to 10
m W/cm a recommended maximum wholebody irradiance limit. 94 More research would
be needed to verify this exposure guideline
and to investigate the effects of chronic exposure to low level laser radiation. For visible
Iaser beams, the risk of ocular damage could
be increased at the receiving site if magnifying
devices were used. Prolonged occupational exposure at infrared power densities greater than
10
mW/cm2 would be of particular concern,
especially for the cornea. Workers at receiving
sites wouId probably be required to wear protective clothing and eye goggles.
Hazards outside of the site have not been
assessed. It is unlikely that wildlife or vegetation at the receptor site would survive. 95 T h e
etfects of the low level laser Iight on ecosystems outside of the receptor area are not
known It is possible that certain infrared sensitive Insects would be attracted to the laser
beam, but this requires further study .9
The bulk of research on the biological effects of lasers is not directly applicable to the
infrared lasers that have been suggested for
SPS Most studies have concentrated on the
effects on the eyes and skin of visible and near
infrared lasers in a puIsed mode. The standards
that have been promulgated pertain predominantly to short-term occupational exposure to
Beverly, op clt
[3 H Sllney, K W Vorpahl, a n d D C Wlnburn, Envlronnlenta I H ea Ith Hazards From H lgh-Powered I nfra red Laser DeV I <-e $ \rch Envlronmenta/ Ffea/th, VOI 30, April 1975, pp
174170
W~lhrldge,
lhl(i
op clt
219
lasers operating in a controlled indoor environment such as a laboratory or medical facility.

Few studies have examined the effects of
chronic exposure at SPS-like power densities
and under SPS environmental conditions. A
summary of known effects on the skin and
eyes is presented in appendix D.
fects would occur. Nonetheless, research

should be conducted in this area. The effects
of changing the night sky also need to be
studied for ecosystems both near and distant
from the site. Ecosystems could also be indirectly affected by weather modification induced by the mirror system.
REFLECTED LIGHT FROM THE MIRROR SYSTEM
LIGHT REFLECTED FROM REFERENCE SYSTEM
The light reflected by the mirror system to

Earth would be visible at night as a general
glow at up to 150 km from the receiving site.
The potential health impact of most concern is
ocular damage from either the scattered light
or from direct exposure to reflected light as
the mirror image sweeps across the Earth during orientation maneuvers. Since the CoIIective
intensity of all the mirrors at one site would be
equal to that present in the desert at noon, it
appears that the intensity of Iight would be too
low to be of danger to the observer. One investigation revealed that under the worst conditions (i.e., staring, no blinking) it would be
safe to view the mirrors directly for at least 2.4
minutes. No information is available regarding the ocular effect produced when an individual views the mirrors with a binocular or
telescope. The psychological effects of a 24hour day or aIterations of the sky near the
sites also needs to be studied.
The transportation vehicles, construction

and staging bases, and the satellite structure of
the orbiting satellite systems will reflect
sunlight, discernible on Earth. Some specular
reflections from reference system components
may be exceptionally bright due to their large
size, low altitude, and reflectivity. 1 o o M o s t
specular reflection would be restricted to
small, fast moving spots or glints as the
structures and vehicles change orientation.
The worst cases, which may exceed acceptable
limits, occur for reflections from the solar
panels of the OTVS while in LEO, and the back
of the solar panels in CEO. Diffuse reflections,
brighter than most stellar sources would make
the LEO OTV staging base visible during the
day It may be possible to reduce most of these
reflections by controlIing the orientation, surface curvatures, solar panel alignment and surface quality of the vehicles and structures.
Reflection of visible light from the components of other SPS technical options may be
similar to the reference system depending on
the orbit and size of transportation vehicles
and space structures.
The ecological impacts have not been assessed. It is known that the polarization, frequency and intensity of light as well as the
percentage of daylight hours influence the
behavior, navigation, and lifecycle of many
species of wildlife and vegetation; many
species have inherent biological clocks or circadian rhythms that are triggered by the diurn a l a n d s e a s o n a l v a r i a t i o n s o f s u n l i g h t .9 9
However, ecosystems in the area surrounding
the receiver site would be exposed to low
levels of incremental sunlight and so it does
not appear Iikely that significant biological ef97
Billman, private communlcatlon, op clt

*M T Hyson, Sunllght ReflectIons From a Solar Power Satellite or S O L A R E S Mirrors Should Not Harm the Eyes, In The Flr-ra/
Proceeding of the Solar Power .$atellite Program Review, Apr
22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA report No Conf -800491, July 1980
McGraw-Hi/l Encyclopedia of Science and Technology, V O I
10 (New York McGraw-Hill Book Co , 1977)
The effects on the public and ecosystems

have yet to be evaluated in depth. One study
found that the reflections from the reference
system would be bright but not dangerous to
the human eye 101 unless viewed for too long or
with a magnifying device. Studies would be
further needed to evaluate the ground illumination in terms of human exposure limits
and to explore any possible psychological effects While DOE has tentatively concluded
that plants and animals would not be unduly
(D [ Llemohn, D H Tlngey, and B R Sperber, Characterizat lorl of Reflected L Ight From the Space Power System, In The
Findl Proceed)ngb of the Solar Power Satellite Program Revfew,
Apr IL 25, 1980, DO E/NAsA report No Conf
I+v\on, op cIt
-800491, ) uly
1980
affected by the reflected light, ecosystem effects are largely uncertain. More research
would be needed to investigate how alterations of the day and night sky could influence
behavior, navigation, and Iifecycles of wildlife
and vegetation.
Noise
Noise is generated during rocket launches
and the construction of receiving stations.
With respect to the latter, the highest n o i s e
levels w o u l d r e s u l t f r o m h e a v y e q u i p m e n t
used to prepare the site and build the support
structure. The DOE prototype siting study concluded that it would be unlikely that significant noise-related impacts on the public and
most animals located 2 km or more from the
prototype construction site would occur. 0 2
For some machinery, occupational noise
standards would be exceeded. Mitigation
measures include ear protection devices, mufflers for machinery, and special insulation in
factories.
Very high noise levels would be associated
with launch vehicles during ascent and reentry.
Table 45 presents the estimated noise produced by the HLLV. Table 46 is exhibited for
comparison. A preliminary assessment indicates that the OHSA standard of 115 db(A)
would be exceeded within 1,500 m of the
launch pad, and the EPA guideline violated
within 3,000 m. 103 Using the Kennedy Space
Center as a prototype launch site, the study
) Protot ype Envlronmenta/ Assessment of the /mpacts of $Irlrrg
and Construct~ng a Sate//fte Power $ y~rem ( SP$) Ground /7ecelvIrrg Stat Ion (C RS), op c It
JEnvlronmenta/
Assessment for the \ate//lte Power System
Concept Development and Eva/uat/on Pro#ram, op clt
Table 46.Representative Noise Levels

Due to Various Sources
Source or description of noise
- Noise level (db)
Threshold of-pain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120
Riveter
95
Elevated train . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
90
Busy street traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70
Ordinary conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
Quiet automobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
Quiet radio in home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
Average whisper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
Rustle of leaves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Threshold of hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0
Assessment for tire Satelllte Power System Concepf

Development and Evaluatlorr Program, DO EIER-0069, August 1980
SOURCE Errv/ronrnenfa/
concluded that launch noise wouId not interfere significantly with speech (interruption for
2 minutes at 30 km twice a day), but that interference with sleep could occur 30 km from the
site Table 47 presents an estimate of the
number of people annoyed by the noise as a
function of distance. Sonic booms would also
be generated; pressure levels are shown for
HLLVs and PLVs in table 48. The HLLV sonic
booms would not cause injury but would invoke gross body movements and might interfere with sleep. It has been suggested that the
trajectories of launch vehicles should avoid
population areas.
The effects of noise on wildlife include startle responses and disruption of diurnal and
reproductive cycles that could be particularly
significant in endangered species habitats. It
has been suggested that wildlife would adapt
to the noise, but this is not clear. 04 While the
noise generated by the space shuttle is not expected to be serious, the effects of HLLVs
wouId be greater because of the increased fre
. .
Ibid
Table 45. Estimated Sound Levels of HLLV Launch Noise
Distance from launch pad

.
Sound level and duration
OASPL a (dB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A-level b [db(A)] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Duration(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
300 m
149
130
12
1,500 m
136
114
42
3,000 m
130
105
54
9,000 m
120
89
77
30,000 m
109
72
77
=
aOASPL: overall sound pressure level expressed In decibels (db) above the level corresponding to a reference pressure of 20 pa (pa= Pascal 1 N/m )
bA-ievei: Weighted average sound level over the frequency spectrum In accordance with the Performance of the human ear
SOURCE: Env/ronmenta/
Assessment for the Sate//lte Power System Concept Deve/opmerrf dftd Eva/uat/on Program, DOE/ER-0069, August 1980
Table 47.Community Reaction to HLLV

Launch Noise
Distance from launch point (m)
Percent of people highly

annoyed a
300 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1,500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30,000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
90
45
24
5
1
aBa~edon a24.hraverage of thenowe

SOURCE Env/ronmenta/ Assessment for the Sate///(e Power System Concept
Deve/opmentand Eva/uat/on Program DOE/ER-0069, August 1980
Table 48.Sonic Boom Summary (Pa)
Vehicle
Launch
Reentry
1 ,200
HLLV orbiter . . . . . . .
PLV booster. . . . . . . .
PLV orbiter. . . . . . . . .
770
190
140
140
70
HLLV
booster
SOURCE Env/ronmenfa/ Assessmentfor the Sate///te Power System Concept

Deve/opmenf and Eva/uat/on Program DOE/ER-0069, August 1980
quency and level of noise, due especially to

sonic booms.
Terrestrial workers would be exposed to
noise levels higher than the general public and
wouId require hearing protection. 105 P o s s i b l e
hearing damage and pyschological effects
should be studied in Iight of the unprecedented frequency and size of launches.
Other Risks
Quantitative studies are needed to determine SPS impacts on air and water quality and
the generation of solid wastes. It is currently
assumed that these impacts would be comparable to typical industries and powerplants (except coal) and that unusually high risks would
not be encountered by the public and terrestrial workers that could not be minimized or
corrected. )() The effects on ecosystems are
less certain.
DOE has concluded that acid rain from the
SPS launch ground cloud would be localized,
temporary and minimal. Because of the consequences of ozone depletion, i.e., a l-percent
)lbld
hlbld
decrease in ozone corresponds to a 2-percent

increase in biological h a r m f u l u l t r a v i o l e t
radiation that reaches the Earth, 107 the effects
of SPS on the ozone layer has been studied.
preliminary analysis concludes that the change
in ozone brought about b y S P S l a u n c h e f f l u ents would be negligible, but further study is
requ i red. 108
The deployment of SPS would also require
the mining, production, and transport of certain toxic materials. Some toxic materials such
as hydrocarbons could also be released from
fuel burning in the launch and recovery of
space vehicles. Rocket propellants such as liqu id hydrogen are of special concern because
they are toxic, flammable, and explosive. 109 A
spill of liquid oxygen would adversely affect
local ecosystems. However, no information is
available to quantify the exposure or risk to
the public, workers or ecosystems. An incremental increase in the risk of catastrophic explosions or fire is thought possible, especially
because of the large amount of fuels involved;
the occupational risk, of course, being considerably higher than that for the public.
Launch and recovery accidents are not likely
to have any more impact on the public than
conventional aircraft accidents, although it
has been suggested that flight trajectories
avoid populated areas. The noise and shock
waves from a catastrophic explosion of an
HLLV could possibly blow out windows and
doors in buildings up to 15 km from the launch
pad
Space Environment
Many space workers would be needed to
construct and maintain an SPS system. The
reference design, for example, requires 18,000
person-years in space; 112 workers would serve
ten 90-day tours over 5 years. Other SPS designs may have different personnel requirements, but they will not be specifically ad)} Hamer, Ozone Controversy, Editor/a/ Research Reports,
VOI 1, No 11, 1976
l bl[i
l bld
)1 bid
Ibid
Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, op clt
dressed here. The health effects of the space

environment are potentially serious, but highly
uncertain; experience with people in space is
limited to a few highly trained astronauts who
lived mostly in LEO for a maximum of a few
months. 113 NASAs current ground-based program as well as future activities with the space
shuttle and space operations center will yield
information relevant to SPS space worker
health and safety. DOE does not consider the
potential health effects an obstacle to continued planning and development of SPS, 114
but if this and other space projects are to be
considered, the health and safety of space personnel should be a high-priority research task,
The principal health and safety risks of the
space segment of SPS are illustrated in figure
43. Effects on the general health and safety of
space workers such as acceleration and
weightlessness are discussed in appendix D.
The most serious potential health risk of the
space environment is exposure to ionizing radiation. The types of radiation found in the
different SPS orbits are listed in table 49.
Exposure to radiation in CEO and in transit
between LEO and CEO are of most concern
because, under the reference system scenario,
workers spend approximately 91 percent of
Figure 43. Factors Pertinent to Space Worker Health and Safety

Space structure
High voltages
charging
Construction
Electric and
/
\
ce debris
eoroids
Transport
accidents
accidents
Construction
accidents
o
Space debris
Life
failure
p
Transport accidents
transport accidents
acceleration/deceleration
SOURCE Program Assessment Report Statement of Findings

DOE/E R-0085 November 1980
Satelltte Power Systems ;oncept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/NASA report No
Table 49.Types of Radiation Found in the

Different SPS Orbits
GEO
Radiation belts
Electronsdominant when shielding is less than
3gm/cm 2 aluminum
Bremsstrahlung produced by electron interactions with
shieldingdominant when shielding is greater than
3 gm/cm2 aluminum
Protonslow energystopped by minimal shielding
Galactic cosmic rays
Protons
Helium ions
High-energy, heavy ions
Solar
particle events i.e., particles accelerated to high
energies during a solar f I are
Protons
Heavy nuclei
Travel Between Orbits
Radiation belts
Bremsstrahlung radiation produced by electrons
Protons
LEO
. South Atlantic Anomaly
Protons
Electronslow energystopped by minimal shielding
SOURCE: Margaret R. White, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, private communication, Feb. 12, 1981
their time in the higher orbit where the radiation environment is the most severe. 115 In GEO,
except under the unusual circumstance of a
large solar flare, the major part of the radiation dose in the reference system would be due
to bremsstrahlung produced by the interaction
of high-energy electrons with the shielding
material. The biological effects of this kind of
radiation are reasonably well understood, and
innovative shielding might reduce this dose.
However, r a d i a t i o n f r o m t h e h i g h - e n e r g y ,
heavy ions (HZE) in galactic cosmic rays cannot be stopped by conventional shielding and
their biological effects are currently very
poorly understood. F r o m t h e o r e t i c a l c o n siderations and preliminary experiments it appears that they may be much more effective in
causing biological damage than other types of
ionizing particles. Thus, though they contribute a small fraction of the total radiation
dose in the reference system, they are of major
concern with regard to the health of space
w o r k e r s . 116
ionizing Radiation Risks to Satellite Power Systems [SPS)
Workers, LBL-9866, November 1980, advance copy
1M R White, Environmental Assessment for the Satellite
Power System, Non-Microwave Health and Ecological Effects,
DOE, in press (1981)
223
Estimates of the radiation dose for exposed

SPS space workers are uncertain. Few measurements have been made of the radiation fIux in
G E O . 117 It is also difficult to quantify the radiation levels at any one time because solar
storms that significantly increase the levels are
currently impossible to predict. Moreover,
there is considerable controversy over the
models that are used to estimate the amount
of energy absorbed in the human body as well
as the biological consequences of the absorbed radiation. 118 The most significant longterm effect of ionizing radiation is cancer.
Cancer risk depends on a number of factors including the total I-fetime dose-equivalent;
dose rate; duration of exposure; and the age,
sex,
and
susceptibiIity
of the exposed
person. 9
DOE has estimated that space workers for
the SPS reference design (which includes modest shielding 3 g/cm 2 aluminum for habitat
and work stations and 20 to 30 g/cm 2 for the
storm cellar, used during solar particle events)
would receive 40 reins per 90-day tour or 400
reins for the planned 10 tours. 120 This estimate
could be inaccurate (probably too high) by a
factor of 5 or 10.2 However, the biological impacts could actually be higher than this dose
wouId indicate if HZE bioeffects are taken into
account and/or a solar particle event occurs. I n
spite of the large uncertainties, it is almost certain that reference system exposure w o u l d e x ceed current Iimits for radiation workers as
recommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection and the International Commission
on
Radiological
Protection. 122 For
comparison, the general popuIation receives
about 0.1 rem/year on the average; 123 o c c u p a
7M~rgaret R White, L a w r e n c e B e r k e l e y L a b o r a t o r y , p r i v a t e
communlcatlon, Feb 12, 1981

Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, op. c It
1 1 Lyman, Hazards to Workers From Ionizing Radiation
In the S PS E nvlronment, in The Final Proceeding of the Solar
Power $ate//ite Program Review, Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA
report No Conf -800491, July 1980
J{)lonlzlng Radiation Risks to Sate//lte P o w e r .Systems (SPS)
WorLer>r op clt
Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, op clt
Zlbld
Committee on the Blologlcal Effects of Ionlzlng Radiation,
The F f fects on Populations of Exposure to Low Leve/s of Ionizing
Racflat/on (BE/R ///), N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f Sciences, 1980,
tvpesc rlpt edltlon
224
tional exposure l i m i t s ( f o r b l o o d t e r m i n g
organs) are 3 reins for 90 days and 5 reins over
1 y e a r ;1 2 4 a n d t h e N A S m a x i m u m r e c o m mended exposure limit (for bone marrow) for
astronauts is 35 reins for 90 days, 75 reins over
l-year period and 400 reins for Iife. 125 If space
worker careers were 5 years, with 90 days in
space alternated with 90 days on Earth, it
would be expected that for each 10,000
workers in space, between 320 to 2,000 additional cancer deaths in excess of normal cancer mortality would occur. 126 An issue critical
to SPS design and economics is whether the
radiation standards developed for astronauts
should be applied to SPS workers. 127
Risks could be reduced in a number of ways.
For example, the time per tour and the number
of tours per worker could be decreased. Robots and teleoperation could be used to reduce the number of people required in space.
It is also essential that accurate, quick and
rugged dosimeters be developed that monitor
the real-time radiation flux and energy levels
t o w h i c h e a c h i n d i v i d u a l i s e x p o s e d .128 i n struments would also have to be developed to
warn personnel in GEO of solar storms or other
unforeseen high radiation events so that they
can move to shelters. Considerable improvements in dosimeter technology are needed
since present devices are not very accurate
and take a long time to display radiation
levels. Shielding is also crucial Some of the
risks associated with the reference system

couId be reduced with additional or innovative
shielding. Analysis is needed to determine if
better shielding techniques can be devised that
would not incur a greater weight or cost penalty. Studies are also needed to examine to
what extent additional shielding mass will incrementally reduce risks of exposure to most
radiation (because secondary radiation can be
produced as the thickness is increased), 129 or if
shielding materials can be developed to stop
HZE particles.
DOE has concluded that as presently designed, the reference system construction
scenario is unacceptable. 130 Risks could be
reduced if personnel spent more time in LEO.
More study is required to improve the current
assessment and to explore the impacts on the
system Cost and feasibility of modifications of
the reference system in order to minimize ionizing radiation hazards.
I
24
W Schimmerling and S Curtis (eds ), Workshop on the Radiation Environment of the Satellite Power System (SPS], Sept 15,
1978, DOE, Conf -7809164, December 1979
1251b;d
2Whke, Environment/ Assessment for the Sate//ite power
System, Non-Microwave Health and Ecological Effects, op cit
*Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, op cit
2 Environmental Assessment for the Satellite Power System
Concept Development and Evacuation Program, op clt
n sum, research priorities include:

measurements of radiation flux in CEO.
This can be done with CEO satellites; the
space shuttle and space operations center
wilI provide data on LEO;
study of the bioeffects of HZE particles;
continued study of radiation bioeffects
and refinement of models;
improvement in dosimetry techniques and
shielding technology; and
for SPS, improved analysis of exposure
risk, and shielding techniques, consideration of exposure limits, and assessment of
the viability of workers in space: tradeoffs
between human health, system feasibility,
and economics.
12ProgrJm Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, op cit

l bld
Chapter 9
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Contents
Page
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Financing, Ownership, and Control .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Space and Energy Sectors . . . .
227
.., . . . . . . . . .
Government-Private Sector Relat ons
...
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 229
Phases of SPS Development. . .
.230
.
.
.
.
.
Possible Models . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
. 23.5
The Implications for the Utility Industry
.
.
. 235
I n t r o d u c t i o n
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 235
The Utilities Planning Process.
239
Engineering Implications of the SPS for the Utilities Grid . . .
243
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Regulatory Implications of SPS
. . .
245
. . . .
General Implications for the SPS
.
.
.
...
247
Issues Arising in the Public Arena
.
.
.
.
.
. 247
The
SPS
Debate
.
.
. . . . . . . . . . 258
Siting . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLES
Page
Table No.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
50. Characteristics of the SPS System
51.
Major
Grid
Contingencies
.
.
.237
52. Potential for Power Variations From the Reference System SPS . . . .241
53. Major Issues Arising in SPS Debate
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
54. Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of SPS Technical Options . . . 259
FIG U RE
Figure No,
44. Phases of R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Chapter 9
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
FINANCING, OWNERSHIP, AND CONTROL
The questions of who would finance, own,
and control a solar power satelIite (SPS), and to
what extent, are interrelated. As a project that
would involve the Nations space and energy
sectors, as well as several Government agencies, there are numerous issues to be considered regarding the proper allocation of risks
and responsibilities. The following discussion
will examine: 1 ) current policy and structure of
the space and energy sectors; 2) the relation
between Government and private-sector activities; 3) the importance of distinguishing between the different phases of SPS development and operation; and 4) possible historical
and hypothetical models for an SPS project.
Space and Energy Sectors

Space
I n the United States, space capabilities have
been primarily instigated and funded by the
Federal Government (with much of the actual
development and construction done by private
firms under contract to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)).
Launchers, launch facilities, and tracking networks are currently Government monopolies
that may be leased to private companies,
Government agencies, or foreign countries for
specified purposes. Only certain payloads are
built and owned by nongovernmental bodies.
Within the Government, NASA is responsible
for R&D of civilian space-systems that, when
development is completed and the operational
stage begins, are turned over to another part of
Government or to the private sector. Scientific
missions, such as deep-space probes, are run
by NASA, as are launch facilities such as Cape
Canaveral. Military and intelligence operations are largely separate even in the R&D
phases, with control exercised by the Department of Defense (DOD) or specific intelligence
agencies.
Energy
EIectricity is provided by public and private
utilities, which are regional monopolies regulated by State authorities. R&D and construction of generating equipmentturbines, nuclear reactors, switching gear is done by private firms, who sell to utilities. The utilities
operate and maintain equipment, build transmission lines, and market electricity to endusers Due to severe capital constraints and a
lack of expertise in space operations, utilities
are unlikely to own and operate SPS in the way
they currently do with other types of powerplants, though they may well be responsible
for the ground-receivers. In the case of SPS,
there is a question as to who would carry out
these various activities,
Although energy production in the United
States has traditionally been handled in a
decentralized manner by private industry, increased sensitivity to the importance of energy
issues since the 1973 oil embargo has led to
various attempts at formulating a national
energy policy, centered in the newly created
Department of Energy (DOE). DOEs scope and
responsibilities in areas such as basic research
and engineering have yet to be determined;
funding is being provided for projects in
photovoltaics, conservation, nuclear power,
synfuels, and other areas. DOE can be expected to have a prime role in any SPS project.
Government-Private Sector Relations

What would be the degree of Federal involvement with the SPS at different stages,
such as R&D, construction, and operation; and
in different areas, especially financing, transportation and transmission, and marketing?
The arguments for Federal involvement center around fears that the private sector will not
be able to undertake an SPS project, because
227
228
of the very high costs and risks, and the long

and uncertain payback period. There is also
concern that private-sector development, even
if economically feasible, might be detrimental
because of monopoly by a single firm or consortium, and environmental and international
policy considerations requiring public control.
Cost estimates for different SPS scenarios
are very imprecise; the most comprehensive
estimates have been done by NASA for the
reference design and calI for a total investment of $102 billion (1977 dollars) over 22
years for construction of the first 5-GW SPS,
i.e., before any return on investment (see ch. 5).
The key questions are whether the private sector can or would raise these amounts of
capital,
a n d h o w i n v e s t m e n t c o s t s and
management responsibilities might be shared
between Government and industry.
Though the reference figures are highly tentative, the general magnitude of the project
and its division into discrete stages are likely
to be similar regardless of what design is used.
None of the alternatives has been examined in
nearly the detail of the reference design, largely because the technologies are less well-developed. The following discussion will focus on
reference figures but should be applicable to
any SPS system of similar magnitude.
Difficulties With Private Involvement

A total investment of $40 billion to $100
billion over 22 yearswith additional much
larger investments to build a complete system would be unprecedented for private-sector financing of a single project.
Private capital can be raised by borrowing,
issuing bonds or stocks for sale to the public,
or from profits. Especially in the first years,
borrowed funds would be available, if at all,
only at prohibitively high interest rates. Stocks
and bonds would be unlikely to attract large
investors when profitabiIity Iies some 30 years
in the future. Both institutional investors and
large corporations allocate only a small proportion of their funds for high-risk long-term
projects; in some cases, such as pension funds,
there are legal limitations on high-risk invest-
ments. Uncertainty, whether technical, political, or economic wilI deter potential investors.
The incentives required to spur any private
interest would in themselves involve drawbacks. A company taking a major risk on SPS
would expect to be compensated by exclusive
patents and other guarantees, in effect with a
monopoly. Government regulation would have
to take risks into account by allowing a very
high rate of return, i.e., allowing the owners to
charge high rates for SPS electricity. A private
prices
monopoly
above-average
charging
could prove to be politically embarrassing.
An SPS system will require a great deal of
political support both locally, nationally, and
internationally: land-use conflicts, monopoly
considerations, environmental standards, tax
incentives, and radio frequency allocations are
a few of the political issues that SPS will need
to confront. Private development and ownership may be seen as leading to an excessive
concentration of power outside effective public control
Difficulties With Federal Involvement
Any large long-term project, public or private, dealing with advanced technology may
suffer from financial and management problems: lack of coordination between parts of
the program; inadequate supervision of contractors; financial and production bottlenecks
in specific areas that delay other parts of the
program; inaccurate initial estimates of costs
and completion times, and so on. However,
Government programs often have special constraints that need to be taken into account.
Without a profit motive and the discipline of
responsibility to owners and stockholders,
there is less incentive to reduce costs. Civil
service regulations can interfere with hiring
and firing and limit salary ranges, decreasing
flexibility and making it difficult to retain personnel Annual Government funding produces
uncertainties and leaves programs vulnerable
to political pressures and pork-barrel compromises. Government-funded R&D in the public domain requires special supervision, since
without the incentive of exclusive rights to
patents and processes, firms doing research
Ch. 9institutional Issues
may tend to inflate costs and draw out delivery

scheduIes. 1 Any extensive Government funding
could divert funds from other space, energy,
and R&D programs, whose backers might ask
for compensation.
Explicit Federal involvement may increase
the probability of military participation in
some or all SPS activities, complicating most
forms of international cooperation and
possibly leading to detrimental changes in the
SPS design or operating characteristics.
Finally, a federally financed or owned SPS
would increase centralized control over an important sector of the economy and would lead
to greater politicization of Americas energy
industry.
Phases of SPS Development

Federal v. private investment is not an
either/or proposition. I n general, Federal involvement would be necessary in the early
stages, and become increasingly less so,
assuming the system remains technically and
financially feasible, as the project becomes
operational. The basic problem is how to differentiate between the various and overlapping stages and ensure adequate management
and continuity throughout.
SPS development can be divided into successive stages (as described in ch. 5): research,
engineering, demonstration, and so on. Federal
financing and management of the research
and engineering phases might turn into a combined Federal-private program as more directly
commercial phases were undertaken. The
question is at what point and to what degree
private investors will be willing to enter the
project. On the one hand, investors would
prefer to see as much as possible paid for by
the Government; but early investors would
have an advantage in setting program priorities and establishing a dominant position.
Involvement of owners and operators at the
earliest possible stages would help to ensure
that the completed system is suited for comI Mark Cersovltz, Report on Certain E conornlc Aspects of the
SPS Energy Program, OTA ( ontrdf I No ()} 3-26700, 1980, pp
1719
229
mercial operation, that internal procedures

and structure are appropriate to private ownership, and that the transition from development
to operation proceeds smoothly.
The SPS would consist of a number of distinct systems, each of which must be developed separately and simultaneously: e.g.,
transportation, energy conversion and transmission, orbital construction, and ground stations launchers and solar cells, for instance,
may be useful and profitable regardless of
whether SPS is built or not. Should their
development be charged to SPS? If so, their
use and sale might help to offset the risks of
the program as a whole; on the other hand,
their development adds considerably to the
SPS cost. It can be argued that public funding
should be reserved for those parts of the project that private investors will not handle and
that segments with near-term commercial applications should be left to the private sector.
As in any complex program, there is the question of internal apportionment of risks and
benefits. Successful items can help to subsidize less profitable projects, provided funds
are transferable from one division to another,
allowing for risky high-return investments, but
also for Edsels.
In the case of SPS it is essential that each
component be developed on time and to the
proper specifications for the system as a whole
to function. Management must be given sufficient authority to produce appropriate products., even if particuIar divisions suffer; say, if
SPS solar cell designs are not optimal for
ground-based users. Major investors in a privately funded SPS wiII have their own particular interestaerospace companies in launchers, electronics firms in microwave hardware,
utilities in delivered power that could compromise the projects overall goals. Government supervision, whether by partial ownership, reguIatory oversight, or appointment of
d i rectors, may mitigate certain confIicts but is
no guarantee of smooth saiIing. Federal concern for a broadly conceived public interest
may be affected by a desire for continued control and supervision, or by the interests of particuIar agencies. For instance, DOD may place
230
emphasis on booster and LEO to CEO transport development for its use (see ch. 7),
perhaps affecting launcher design or the allocation of program funds. NASA may wish to
emphasize and prolong the R&D phase. Annual budget review may increase costs by creating uncertainty and requiring project managers to spend large amounts of time drawing
up and justifying annual budgets.
operates specific faciIities (on a cost-reimbursable basis) for research and launches.
Advantages. NASA is already in place, with

22 years of experience. It has well-established relationships with private contractors,
other parts of the Government, and foreign.
companies and Government agencies. It has
the technical and administrative expertise to
evaluate most of the major components of
the SPS, many of which interorbit transfer
vehicles, assembly and construction facilities are part of current NASA plans.
Disadvantages. Annual funding for NASA

projects creates difficulties in implementing
long-term plans that are likely to go in and
out of political favor. It also hampers
agreements with foreign firms and agencies,
that have had problems in the past when
NASA budget cuts have forced cancellation
of joint programs. Legislative changes to
permit ongoing funding would greatly improve NASAs position.
NASAs emphasis on R&D and prototype
development (NASAs ability to participate
in commercial ventures is unclear and subject to restrictions) could create problems in
developing a commercial product such as
SPS; NASA might have to relinquish control
after the demonstration phase. There is
often reluctance to complete R&D phases,
since completion means loss of the project.
Coordination with eventual users and owners may be underemphasized. Amending
NASAs charter to allow for beginning-toend development and operation would alleviate this problem, but might be harmful to
the agencys R&D mission.
The broad scope of NASA activities has
meant that, within and without the agency,
there have been conflicts over the relative
priority of scientific v. applications, or
manned v. unmanned missions. The SPS
could be criticized for diverting funds and
attention from competing programs; intraagency squabbling might interfere with the
project. Excessive concentration on SPS
could prevent NASA from accomplishing
other tasks, although many aspects of SPS
Possible Models
Perhaps the best way to further examine
possible financing and management scenarios
is through historical and hypothetical models
that might be applicable to SPS. In each instance there are several questions to be asked:
1) Is it complete: can this model support an
SPS program from start to finish, or is it applicable only to certain phases or components?
2) How are risks apportioned: who pays, and
who reaps the benefits of a successful project?
3] How efficient and flexible is it: can it adapt
to changing economic and technical circumstances, and can it attract support from a
variety of sources, particularly foreign investors?
Historical Models
NASA
NASA is an
independent
Government
agency with a general mandate to engage in
R&D and testing and to conduct launches for
civilian space activities. Although NASA has in
the past centered its efforts on high-visibility
manned projects, s u c h a s A p o l l o a n d t h e
Space Shuttle, it has also conducted major
programs
in telecommunications, remotesensing, and the sciences, such as the Viking
and Voyager interplanetary probes.
NASA is funded by general tax revenues appropriated annually by Congress. NASA funds
are overwhelmingly90 to 95 percent spent
on outside contracts with private firms, research centers, and other Government agencies, foreign as well as domestic. NASA itself
helps to set priorities and policies, oversees
and coordinates contractor performance, and
Ch. 9Institutional Issues . 231
development would be applicable to other

space activities.
Funding all, or even a large part, of the
SPS through general tax revenues would produce strong pressure for continued Government control. Since the risks are borne, involuntarily, by the general public, justification in the form of visible public benefits
may have to be provided. These benefits
couId take the form of electricity-rate reductions, tax-reductions, or other types of
returns. Turning SPS or SPS technology over
to private profitmaking firms may be unacceptable. Such a prospect could discourage
private interest; this difficulty is common to
all publicly financed ventures.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA)
TVA, the Nations largest utility, was established in 1933 to provide power for a region
that commercial utilities were not willing to
develop. Until 1959, TVA received annual
Federal appropriations; since then it has raised
capital by issuing bonds, the amount of which
is subject to congressional approval, as well as
by charging customers for its services. At that
time, TVA was forbidden from expanding its
service area, in order to avoid competition
with private utilities. In 1978 TVAs borrowing
authority was raised to $30 billion. 2 A T V A type independent authority, initially financed
by tax revenues and authorized at some point
to issue self-backed bonds, could be a possible
model for SPS development and operation.
Advantages. Initial
Federal financing
would allow for pursuit of R&D and prototype development. Adoption of TVA practices, such as the absence of civil service requirements, would free the authority from
certain Government inefficiencies. Issuing
bonds would subject the issuer to the financial judgments of investors and make the
risks of the project more palatable, since
much of the investment would be voluntary
rather than by congressional or executive
decision. The concentration of a newly
established authority on a single-project
wouId avoid the internal conflicts inherent
increasing the TVA Bond Celling, hearings before Senate
Environment and Publlc Works Committee, Feb 23, 1979
in having it undertaken by an established

agency.
Disadvantages. It is not clear at what point

private financing would become available
on a large scale, and hence how much must
be spent out of general taxes. The larger the
public part of the investment, the more
likely are t h e p u b l i c - i n t e r e s t p r o b l e m s
outlined previously.
Financing through bonds does not provide
for the type of accountability available
through congressional appropriation, or
through public ownership via the stock market Specific arrangements for public oversight, given the monopoly position of such
an entity, would have to be made. Ownership of patents and products generated by
public investment would have to be clarified, given the possibility of competition between private firms and the authority in the
latter stages of development and operation.
HIGHWAY TRUST FUND
Since 1956 the Federal Government has

spent over $7.5 bill ion (in current dollars) to
finance the Interstate Highway System and a
number of other road and highway programs.
The money for these investments has been
channeled through the Highway Trust Fund,
which receives revenue from taxes on gasoline
and diesel fuels, on heavy trucks, and other
sources. These funds are not spent by the
Federal Government, but apportioned to the
States to pay for their share of highway
systems.
The rationale for Federal financing was that
an improved road-system would aid the Nations defenses, as well as improve commerce
by decreasing transportation costs. The system
was planned on a national scale, but takes advantage of existing State highway departments
to implement the proposed network. No central construction or maintenance firm was
needed 3
The distinctive feature of the system is its
use of specific taxes on a commodity directly
related to the project. Through the tax on gasoPorter ( wheeler, Hjghwa y A \\[jtance Programs A Ffl\torlca/
~~erfpf,( ~lve, Congre$slonal Buclget Of flee, FebrUaw 1978
232
line and diesel fuel, transport users have contributed in proportion to their total transportation expenditure. An additional tax on
heavy commercial trucks has ensured that
large users, who were responsible for a high
proportion of maintenance costs, would contribute appropriately. Unlike tolls or direct
fees for highway usage, revenue could be collected before the roads themselves were completed. An analogous tax to finance a fund for
SPS might be levied on current domestic and
commercial electricity consumption (though
from a strictly financial point of view the tax
need not be directly related to energy congumption. )
Advantages. The use of a designated tax
provides more assured and predictable funding than general revenue taxes that need to
be reallocated on a yearly basis. By taxing
electricity consumption the costs would be
borne by the future beneficiaries of SPS. If
desired, taxes on other forms of energy
could also be imposed; all energy taxes
would have the added benefit of encouraging conservation. As private investment was
found, the tax could be reduced, or revenues
couId be spent elsewhere.
The size of the tax, if levied on electricity
alone, would not have to be large to generate significant revenue. A tax of 2 mills/kWh
would produce over $4 billion per year (at
current consumption rates) while raising
consumer costs by less than 5 percent.4
Disadvantages. A tax on electricity may

cause consumers to switch to other forms of
e n e r g y , h a r m i n g utilities Higher electricity
costs will inflate prices of electricityintensive products, such as alum inure.
The organizational framework to manage
the SPS will have the same difficulties as
other Government agencies, especialIy in
handling the transition to private ownership.
U.S. SYNTHETIC FUELS CORP.
The Synfuels Corp. was established in June

1980 with a specific mandate to produce the
equivalent of 2 million barrels per day of crude
P e t e r Vajk, SPS FInancIa/, Mandgernent 5( en,]rlo~, DO F c o n tract No EC77-C-01 -4024, October 1978, p ;6
oil by 1992. The corporation is instructed to do

so by, in decreasing order of preference: 1)
price guarantees, purchase agreements, or
loan guarantees; 2) loans; 3) joint ventures. The
corporations goal is to faciIitate private-sector
synfuel production, and to produce synfuels itselt only as a last resort. Initial funding was set
at $20 billion, with total funding of up to $88
billion envisioned. Funds are to be provided
from the windfall-profits tax on domestically
produced oil. 5
A possible SPS corporation would resemble
the Synfuels Corp. in being a high-cost energy
production plan with a specific goal and timetable It would differ in that it would involve
creating a single firm rather than funding numerous private enterprises.
Advantages. The Synfuels Corp. has the advantage of a discrete goal and timetable,
with maximum flexibility as to achievement.
The etmphasis on price and loan guarantees
to encourage rather than replace conventional financing arrangements should reduce the cost, assureing projects are successful. Direct Government control will be
avolded, unless no private ventures whatever are forthcoming.
Disadvantages. It is far too early to tell

whether the Synfuels Corp. will accomplish
Its goal, or wiII do so without exorbitant
costs Critics fear that an indiscriminatory
shotgun approach may result in funding
numerous uncompetitive ventures, in the
hope of finding one that works; while the
revenue taken from the oil companies in
taxes may prevent the development of additional fuel sources. The promise of easy
Government money and soft loans may discourage efficient financial and managerial
practices.
While the Synfuels Corp. can pick and
choose from a number of relatively welldeveloped and predictable projects, the SPS
Corp w o u l d h a v e t o g e n e r a t e i t s o w n
organization. The SPS Corp. couId not, especially at first, simply be a channel for funding to private firms, or for loan guarantees.
-- ---~ n(r~~ $~)( (/r/[y A et, Publ IC Law %9,24, 96th Cong , j une )(),
1 9 H ( ) ill [{
COMSAT
Comsat was founded in 1962 as a federally
chartered corporation to establish and run
satellite communications (see ch. 7). Comsat
did not receive direct Federal funding, but was
given the fruits of extensive and continuing
NASA research on telecommunications satellites, 6 as well as the right to use NASA launch
services on a reimbursable basis (which does
not reflect R&D costs). The Government retained a measure of control through Comsats
operating charter and by appointing board
members, who were initialIy divided between
Government, communications common carriers, and private investors. Capital was raised
by issuing stock, which from the outset was
well-received by investors. As of 1979, Comsat
stock was held overwhelmingly by noncommon carriers; 3 of 15 Board members were
Presidential appointees, the rest being elected
by stockholders.
Advantages. A Comsat-styled SPS corporation would be independent of direct Government control and free to operate as a private, profitmaking corporation. Government
supervision would be provided without the
need for onerous restrictions. Comsat has
been highly successful internationally via its
participation in lntelsat, and a Solarsat
corporation might find it easier to engage in
international activities than would a Government agency. Such an organization could
inherit the results of Government-financed
R&D and engineering with less of a political
outcry than if control were to be turned over
to established private firms such as aerospace or oil companies; Comsat was established in large part to prevent AT&T from
gaining a satelIite communications monopoly.
Disadvantages. Issuing
common
stock
would not suffice to raise capital for the
early development stages. The transition
from Government to private funding would
N A S A c o m m u n i c a t i o n s r e s e a r c h was p h a s e d o u t u n d e r t h e
N i x o n admlnlstratlon, which l o o k e d to Comsat a n d
the
private
sector to maintain U S preem Inence In commun Icatlon satel I tte
However, In 1 9 7 8 t h e C a r t e r admlnl~tratlon
reinstated NASAs leading role In communlcatlon> R&D, largely
to offset foreign government R&D effortj
technology
83-316 0 - 81 - 16
233
have many of the difficulties already mentioned.

PRIVATE JOINT-VENTURES
A private SPS project could be undertaken
either by an established firm, a new company,
or a joint-venture of existing companies and
financial institutions. For the reasons mentioned (high cost, uncertainty, long period
before payback, and too many eggs in one basket) no single firm, whether new or established,
i S Iikely to undertake SPS development unaided
A joint-venture or consortium is formed
when a single project or enterprise is of interest to several parties, no one of which is
wilIing to finance or manage it on its own, as
with the Alaskan pipeline. Or, companies may
be legally prevented from exercising sole ownership for antitrust reasons, while a single
system may be technically desirable. For instance, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required Comsat and IBM to add a
third partner (Aetna Insurance) when forming
Satellite Business Systems (SBS). In any consortium, partners are Iikely to have a particuIar
interest in the consortiums success above and
beyond immediate profitability. In SBSs case,
IBM Corp. and Aetna intend to be major
customers of the system, and IBM Corp. will
suppIy operating equipment. 7
Advantages. Potential major partners in an
SPS consortium would be: aerospace companies, oil/energy firms (including possible
emergent industries in photovoltaics, synfuels, or other energy sources); and electric
utiIities. A consortium that could draw on
the resources of firms in these major industries would find it easier to borrow money,
selI stocks and bonds, and use profits for
SPS investment. According to most estimates, the utility industry alone will be
spending hundreds of bilIions of dolIars over
the next 30 years to replace old generators
and build new capacity; an SPS project
wouId not constitute an unmanageable proportion of total industry investment,
.
( ourt Upholds SPS, Avlatlon Week and Space Technology,
Vldr 1 ( I 1980, p 22
234
Disadvantages. However, there would still

be difficulties in funding the initial phases.
While aerospace and electronics firms
wouId begin to benefit relatively early in the
project, oil/energy companies and utilities
(that have the bulk of the resources) will see
returns only towards the end. utilities in particular, as part of a publically regulated industry, will find it difficult to set rates so as
to raise funds for R&D or speculative purposes, as opposed to purchase of more established technologies. For instance, the $2
billion Great Plains coal gasification project
was to be financed by a surcharge on gas
rates charged by consortium members. Although DOE approved the rate hikes, customers s u c h a s G e n e r a l M o t o r s a n d
State officials protested against being asked
to subsidize synfuels investments. 8 The Federal district court then disallowed DOEs action, effectively blocking the project.
Consortia are more likely to arise in the investment and operation phases, when individual members interests are more clearly
defined, and risks have been reduced. The
very high costs and large size of a full-scale
SPS system, as well as the monopoly dangers
of a system under the control of single company, may make inter- or intra-industry consortia attractive.
Hypothetical Models
In discussing possible SPS financing scenarios, some writers have proposed completely
novel methods with no historical precedent.
Foremost among them are the Taxpayer Stock
Corp., a new form of Government financing;
and a private approach, the staging company. 9
TAXPAYER STOCK CORP.
Under this method, taxpayers would receive
shares in a public corporation, financed by
general tax revenues, in proportion to the percent of taxes used to finance SPS. Shareholders
could then trade their shares on the market, as
with any other corporation. Those who did not
Robert D Hershey, Gasification Plant Rising Amid Many

Snags, New York Times, Nov 17, 1980, p 1
For further discussion see Vajk, op clt , pp 32-40
wish to support SPS could sell their stock for

immediate returns.
Although such a scenario has the advantage
of diffusing SPS ownership, it is difficult to see
how SPS shares would retain their full value on
the market; if they did, funding via taxes would
not have been necessary in the first place.
Shareholders would instead be left with devalued pieces of paper, unless they are purchased
b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t with tax dollars to
maintain a reasonable price. This would
amount to a straightforward Government subsidy.
STAGING COMPANY
The staging company is essentially a bootstrap operation whereby sufficient revenues
are generated during the R&D phase to attract
further capital. The firm would invest its initial
funds in existing aerospace and high technology companies, gaining patent rights and new
technologyvia joint venturesas well as
conventional investment returns. The success
of the companys first investments, and its inwould attract further
creasing expertise,
speculative investors; the staging company is
in effect a mutual fund. Eventually, the company would begin to finance SPS R&D directly,
concentrating on those aspects with near-term
returns. At some point conventional financing
would become available for the investment
and operation phases.
Such an approach is unlikely, unless its first
investments turn out to be in budding Xeroxes
or IBMs, to raise the $33 billion estimated to
be necessary for the reference design R&D and
prototype phases. In 1978 Christian Basler
established International Satellite Industries,
Inc., to test his concept; it failed when neither
New York nor California would allow ISI stock
to be sold. 10
Conclusions
It is clear from the review of possible models
that there are many ways to finance the latter
stages of a successful SPS program, but that
(( onversatlon with Stephen Cheston, President, Institute for
the \oclal \clence Study of Space, December 1980
Ch. 9lnstitutiona/issues . 235
the initial phases would in all likelihood have

to depend on some sort of Federal funding.
Some combination of the suggested methods
may prove attractive.
In establishing an SPS organization, attention should be paid to several factors. First,
there should be provisions for stopping the
project if it becomes unfeasible. Large initial
investments wiII create considerable momentum, which may cause wasteful development
to continue unless authority is given to terminate. This is especially true for Government
enterprises.
Gersovitz, p 36
Second, at all phases careful attention must

be given to public policy concerns: environmental protection, regional interests, and military involvement. Private companies must not
think SPS can be developed in secrecy or without reference to a wide public environment
(see ch 8, Issues Arising in the Public Arena).
Third, early and continuous efforts should
be made to involve and inform potential international partners to attract investment aid,
forestall competition, and ensure that the
global market for SPS is kept in mind when
technical and managerial decisions are made.
A narrow focus on domestic concerns, by Government or industry, may jeopardize SPS unnecessarily. (see ch. 7, International Implications).
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UTILITY INDUSTRY

Introduction
The interest of the utilities in the SPS would
depend on technology related factors such as
stability and reliability, as well as those more
directly related to the economics of electricity
generation and distribution (i. e., siting, capital
investment and Government regulation). Each
of these factors would require more study as
more is learned about the various SPS alternatives. From what is now known, it appears that
the technical barriers to integrating SPS into
the utility grid are solveable, particularly if the
units of SPS generated power are of the order
of 1,000 MW or less. It is also apparent that for
the utilities to develop sufficient confidence in
SPS, one or more units would have to be tested
over time.
More troublesome are the economic risks of
SPS. When considering adding a new pIant,
utilities must plan far ahead of actual system
integration for the associated transmission
lines and other generating capacity (i.e., intermediate or peaking plants to supplement
the baseload powerplants). Failure of the SPS
to meet expected implementation deadlines
would result in severe economic loss for the
utiIity. The need for extensive trials and testing
of a new plant render it highly unlikely that the

SPS could become part of utility grids until
several years after a commercial prototype
were built. Although SPS could force some regulatory changes, there seem to be no strong
regulatory barriers to implementing SPS.
Table 50 summarizes the projected characteristics of the SPS that would be of interest to
the electrical utilities.
The Utilities Planning Process

The Current Situation
Because of the recent rapid rise of all energy
costs and subsequent efforts to conserve, the
utilities find themselves in an uncertain position for the future. In the past, the utilities experienced fairly steady, high peakload growth
rates, resulting in a correspondingly high rate
of growth (7 percent) of generating capacity, a
rate that leads to a doubling of capacity every
10 years. Recently, however, average peakload
growth has fallen sharply. Lower economic
growth rates and price-induced conservation
efforts have had a strong effect on consumption I n response, the average growth of installed generating capacity has also fallen. The
236
Table 50.Characteristics of the SPS Systems

System
The reference
system
characteristics
Solid-state sandwich
design
Laser system
Delivered power from each

satellite
Total
(at
system
the
of.
Implementation
Start
of
Lifetime
of
rate
deployment.
each
Transmission
busbar)
.
...
...
...
capacity
Rectenna
size.
satellite
frequency
Designed
...
factor
.
...
.,
...
5,000 MW
300 GW
2 per year for
30 years
A.D. 2000
30 years
2.45 gigahertz
(i.e , microwave)
90 percent
10 km x 13 km at
35 Iat. plus 1 km
1,500 MW
Not projected
500 MW
Not projected
2010-2020
(estimate)
30 years
2.45 gigahertz
2010-2020
(estimate)
30 years
10 microns (infrared)
Mirror system
(baseline SOLARES)15
135 GW (10 GW
possible)
810 GW over 6
7
2010-2020
?
Reflected sunlight
I.e.,
90 percent
6.5 x 5.5kw at 35 Iat.
70-80 percent
(estimate)
continuous
spectrum
?
36 meter diameter
39-km
diameter
Thermal
Thermal,
plus 1 km buffer
buffer
Terrestrial
conversion
mode.
Microwave dipole
antenna-rectifier and
inverters
Maintenance,
Major potential causes of

i
satelIite
eclipses
(max. 21/2 hr
Microwave dipole
antenna-rectifier and
inverters
Maintenance, ecilpses
Of SatelIite? (max 2 h r
near equinoxes)
conversion
photovoltaic
conversion
During any thick cloud
cover, maintenance
During any thick cloud

maintenance
near equinoxes)
1
Sa tellite Power System Concept Development and EvaluaDOE report No

tion Program Reference System Report
DOE/E R-0023, October, 1978
13
G. M. Hanley, et al , Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Concept
Definition Study, First Performance Review, Rockwell International Report No SSD79-0163, NASA MSFC contract No
NAS8-32475, Oct. 10, 1979
14
W. S. Jones, L L Morgan, J. B. Forsyth, and J P Skratt,
Laser Power Conversion System Analysis: Final Report, Vol. I l,
(Lockheed Missiles and Space Co , report No LMSC-D67 Mbb,

NA5A report No CR-1 7952 ], contract No NASA ;-211 37, Mar 1 ~,
1979
K W II II I man, W P G I I breath, and S W Bowen, Orbiting
Mirror\ t<)r Terre$trlal E nergv Supply, In Radlatlon F nergv Conver~lon in ~pacej Progre\s In A $tronaut~cj & Aeronauflc\ Serle\,
K W EIII lman (ed ), VOI bl (New York Al AA, July 1978), pp
(>1 ~lo
SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
U.S. total of installed electrical generating

capacity in 1978 and 1979 rose by an average
rate of 3.1 and 3.2 percent respectively, rates
that cause a doublin g of capacity every 22
years. Growth rates in some sections of the
country have been zero or negative in the
same time span.
As the high growth rate of electricity demand and subsequent expansion of the utility
industry has subsided, the industry has had to
rethink its posture with respect to adding new
capacity, I n addition to the uncertainties of
future demand, increasing costs for fuel, more
stringent environmental standards, public opposition to nuclear powerplants and technological changes are also affecting the planning
process. What is perhaps of most concern,
however, is the increasing difficulty private
utilities face in raising the large amounts of
capital needed for building new capacity or
replacing old, inefficient plants
In response, the utilities are placing more
emphasis on understanding the interaction be-
tween reserve margins, types of capacity, and

reliability requirements. They are also sharply
reducing the amount of new capacity, delaying
Installation of some plants, canceling others,
Although on average the difference between
total capacity and average annual load is
greater than ever before, some industry executives have expressed concern that these
pl,lnned reductions in generating capacity wi II
Ie,ive the United States seriously deficient if
the current trend towards lower growth of
peak demand reverses itself. others, generally
outside the industry, have suggested that increased conservation measures can bring the
need tor new generating capacity to zero or
lets, Ieavlng the industry, on the average, in
the posit ion of simply replacing or refurbishing
outmoded plants
Planning Process
U S generating capacity in 1980 was about
600 glgclwatts. * The peak load that this capaci . .
1 ~ IX< I ,1, i t t (c; w ] or IJOWpr I \ e(\u,1 I ( 01 ,()()() rmegc)w,itt \
ty is expected to serve is about 410 GW. To

meet this load, the generating capability is
composed of about 10 to 15 percent of peaking units, 20 to 25 percent of intermediate and
60 to 65 percent of baseload generating units.
A planning reserve margin of 20 to 25 percent
above peak demand is required to allow the
utility to continue to serve the customer when
any of the operating units fails and when unusual load peaks occur.
For a given utility system, the reserve is
related directly to the expected reliability of
the total system. Although the exact amount of
reserve needed is currently debated within the
industry, I b the rule of thumb that most utility
systems use to calculate their necessary reserve is that they must have no more than one
generating outage or failure to meet expected
demand in 10 years, a failure that may be as
short as a minute or as long as several hours. I n
practice, this criterion results in some days of
line voltage reductions and a few days of appeals to customers for conservation, but a very
low probability of outage in any one year.
A utility is not simply a set of generating
plants, transmission lines, and transformers. It
is a complicated interactive network in which
individual components affect each other
through an intricate set of feedback loops. A
failure in one part of the system may set off a
failure in another part. Adequate reliability is
ensured by building enough redundancy into
the system t o m e e t m o s t c o n t i n g e n c i e s ,
whether from system failure or from unexpected surges in demand.
The amount of redundancy required for a
given system depends heavily on the reliability
of the equipment in the system and the utilities experience with them. To calculate the
necessary reserve, the utilities generally use
several methods, the simplest of which, called
the contingency outage reserve criteria, will
serve to illustrate the most important features
of reserve planning.
A Kaufman, L T Crane, J r , B M Daly, R J Profozich, and

S j Bodily, Are the Electrlc Utllltles Gold Plated? committee
print, 96-1 FC 12 Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States House of Representatives, 1979
237
After projecting the peak load requirements

of the system, utility planners add an amount
of generating capacity equal to that which
might be unavailable because of scheduled
maintenance. System reliability will then be
achieved if sufficient excess capacity over and
above this amount is available to cover one or
more of the sorts of contingencies I isted in
table 51.17 This method tends to treat the
system in gross terms and does not generally
allow for important details of a given system
such as the variations of peak load throughout
the year or the percentage of time it will be
t apable of generating given levels of power at
tlifferent seasons. For this, a more sophist i( ated analysis would be needed.
Planning
for New Technologies
The SPS is one among many new technologies that the utilities are considering in planning for the future. These include regiona/
technologies such as ocean thermal energy
conversion and geothermal; intermediate or
peaking technologies such as wind, solar thermal and solar photovoltaic without storage;
,~nd baseload possibilities such as advanced
coal, breeder reactors and fusion. I n addition,
~ome utilities are considering grid connected
dispersed technologies such as solar thermal,
solar photovoltaics, wind, and fuel cells. Planning for such a mixed bag of technologies is a
complicated and time-consuming process. As
figure 44 illustrates, the time from the initial
conception of a new technology to actual integration into the utilities grid can be extremely long up to 40 years or more. Not only must
utility suppliers develop the components of
the individual technology, they must make it
technological Iy and economical Iy attractive to
Ibl(j
Table 51 .Major Grid Contingencies
1. Loss of the largest generating unit in the system

2.
3.
4.
5.
Loss of the two largest generating units in the system

A failure in the largest transmission facility in the system
A combination of the above
An error of a specific magnitude in load projection
SOURCE A Kaufman, L T Crane, Jr., B. M. Daly, R J. Profozlch, and S. J.

Bodily, Are the Electrlc Utilitles Gold Plated? colnmlttee print,
96-IFC 12. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United
States House of Representatives, 1979.
238
Figure 44. Phases of R&D
Reliability. Plants that are highly capital

intensive must operate at high capacity factors in order to minimize electricity costs.
Thus, numerous forced or unplanned shutdowns for a given plant would make its technology less desirable. In general, a new technology can be expected to sustain a higher
rate of forced or unplanned shutdown than
a more mature one. Current mature nuclear
plants and coal plants with scrubbers sustain
forced outage rates as low as 15 and 19 percent of their total availability respectively.
As the industry gains even more experience,
it wil I probably be able to reduce this rate
even more.
Ease of Maintenance. It is extremely important to be able to maintain and repair

components of the generating system quickIy and easily. Nuclear and fossil fuel plants
currently experience planned outage rates
of 15 and 10 percent, but utility experts
believe that these rates can be reduced by
several percent. Here again, mature technologies fare better than newer ones. However,
the percentage of maintenance doesnt tell
the whole story. The timing of the maintenance is also important. If it is possible to
plan maintenance during periods when electricity peak loads are lower, the adverse effect on the utility is thereby reduced.
1000
V) 100
G
s
10
1
10
30
20
40
Years
SOURCE: R L Rudman and C. Starr, 1978 R&D Plannlng for the Electric Utlllty
Industry, In Energy Techrro/ogy v G o v e r n m e n t I nstltutes, Inc ,
Washington
the utilities and, in addition, develop a large

supportive infrastructure. Thus, the vast bulk
of the time spent in the long chain of technology development is in the phases following
scientific feasibility newly conceived technologies are not I ikely to fill near-term supply
deficiencies.
Assuming that an engineering demonstration
of a new technology is successfu 1, its ultimate
fate would depend on several factors whose influence can only be seen dimly at the time
when scientific feasibility is proved. Comparative costs are a prime consideration, but
public acceptance, the complexities of the
technology, and the ease with which it can be
integrated into the existing utility infrastructure are also important (see ch. 6). The utilities
use some or all of the following criteria to
judge a new technology: 18
ECONOMIC CRITERIA
Cost to the User. Bus bar costs are important but an expensive long-distance transmission and distribution system may price a
technology that is otherwise competitive at
the busbar out of the market. This problem
could apply to any very large, highly central ized faci I ity.
R L Rudman and C Starr, R&D Plannlng for the Electrlc
Utility Industry, In f nergy Techrro/ogy V (Washington, D C
Government In$tltute$, I nc , 1 978)
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Here, fossil or other depletable energy
s o u r c e s wil I suffer in competition with renewable sources such as wind-, solar-, fusion-,
or breeder-generated fissile material. Further,
because the Sun or wind are more available in
some regions of the country than in others, terrestrial renewable technologies wil I vary in
their attractiveness.
SYSTEM CAPABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY
Control and Operating Characteristics. The

more stable a power system, the better.
Short-term transient outages must occur
under conditions that allow the utility grid
to accommodate them as a matter of
course.
1 bld
Ch. 9institutional Issues 239
Ability to Tolerate Abnormal Events. A s y s tem that is otherwise acceptable to the

utilities may fail to be adopted because it is
easily disturbed, i.e., small perturbations in
operating mode lead to wide swings of electrical output.
Iector would be based in space. Others are

characteristic of all large-scale baseload
technologies. In this section, we will proceed
through each technology, citing the most important effects each alternative will have on
the utilities.
Unit Rating. Although economies of scale

are very real in generating equipment,
smal Ier capacity units may often be desirable, because they are easier to repair and
replace than the large ones.
The Reference System
Environment/ Issues. Environmental impacts produce an economic cost that, while

often impossible to specify, have a strong effect on the acceptability of a given technology. I n addition, some technologies may
have environmental side effects that are
unacceptable no matter what price the uti I ity is willing to pay (e. g., the potential effects
of the addition of large amounts of carbon
dioxide to the atmosphere).
LICENSING
Licensing . . . is currently the largest single

issue facing al I new technologies. 2 The issues
that will affect the licensing procedure such as
siting, health and safety, and environmental
concerns must be identified and reckoned with
early in the development of the technology.
They also have a direct effect on the cost of a
technology.
Once a generating technology has proven its
commercial feasibility, it generally takes
another 20 years or so for it to be used
significantly. The complexity of the technology, institutional barriers, market growth
(housing, industry, etc. ) market initiative
(dispersed v. central use), and system size will
all have their effects on the rate at which a
given technology will penetrate the total utility market.
Engineering Implications of the SPS

for the Utilities Grid
T h e SPS w o u l d m a k e n u m e r o u s s p e c i a l
demands on the utility grids. Some are related
to the fact that the primary generator or coll bid
5,000-M W Capacity. Because of the grid

reliability requirements, the large size of the
reference system plant would limit the number of individual utilities or utilities systems
that could accommodate it. As a rule of
thumb, a utility generally will not purchase a
single unit that ~wou Id constitute more than
10 to 15 percent of the utilitys total
generating capacity. In other words, a
single plant must be no more than one-half
of the systems total reserve capacity of 20
to 25 percent.
If a utility could accommodate a first SPS
of 5,000 MW, it could accept another provided it met a less stringent application of
the penetration rule. In other words, the system would benefit somewhat by redundancy
of generating units provided there was a low
probability of both failing at once.
As an example, for a utility to accept a
50,000-MW satellite, it must have a system
capacity of 5,000/0.13 = 38,000 MW. This
exceeds the capacity of any single current
utility. Assuming current average rates of
growth of 3.2 percent for the industry, it
would exceed the capacity of all utilities
save TVA in the year 2000. It might, of
course, be possible for a group of several
utilities with the appropriate total capacity
and adequate grid interconnections to take
on 5,000 MW of power. According to the
rule for reserve capacity, for the group to
then assume another 5,000 MW, its total
capacity would have to be large enough for
the two satellites together to constitute 20
percent or less of a system capacity of
50,000 MW. The exact percentage any given
consortium of utilities would be willing to
~ J Donalek
a n d ) L Wtlysong, lJtillty I n t e r f a c e R e quirements for a Soiar Power System, Harza Erlglrleerlrlg CO ,

DOE contract No 31-109-38-4142, report No DO E/E R-0032, September 1978
accept would depend on its view of the

probability of two SPS units and another
unit or transmission line failing at the same
time (see table 52).
As an additional consideration, it should
also be noted that supplying 5 GW of reserve power from elsewhere in the system
would put a great strain on the dispatching
capability of the uti I ity.
Lack of Inertia in SPS Power Generation.

The frequency stability of a utility system is
directly related to the rotating mass or
mechanical inertia of its collection of
generators. It is, in effect, analogous to a
giant flywheel kept in motion by numerous
small driving elements on its rim. Just as a
flywheel adjusts only slowly to a sudden
removal or addition of individual driving
elements, the utility network takes several
seconds to adjust to the loss or gain of
megawatts of power. A generator added to
the system adds additional mechanical inert i a a s w e l l a s p o w e r . B e c a u s e t h e SPS
reference design wou [d add power but no
additional inertia, i.e., it might come on or
go off line virtually instantaneously, it
would create surges that would be difficult
for the system to accommodate. In order to
use SPS-generated power, the utilities would
have to develop new modes of ensuring frequency stability and control since the present operating mode depends implicitly on
the mechanical inertia of the system. One
possibility is to add short-term (15 minutes
to 1 hour) battery storage capacity to the
rectenna. Such an adjustment would add a
smal I amount to the cost of SPS power.
Variations in SPS. Rectenna power output
wou Id vary seasonal Iy because of the eccentricity of the Earths orbit. As currently
designed, the SPS would deliver 5,000 MW
when the Earth is at maximum distance from
the Sun. At its closest approach during the
northern winter, each rectenna will deliver
about 10 percent more power, or 5,500 MW.
However, because the variation has a yearIong period, it would be relatively easy to
adjust for it continual Iy.
Short-term variations would be much

more serious. Around the equinoxes, the
satel I ite wou Id I ie in the Earths shadow for a
short period each night around midnight.
These eclipses of the satellite would vary
trom a few seconds duration at the start of
the 31-day eclipse period to a fu I I 72 minutes
at the equinox and then decrease again to
zero. Because the antenna array wou Id requ i re a warmup period of 15 to 60 minutes,
outages at the rectenna would vary from 30
to 140 minutes. Because the eclipses would
be highly predictable and would occur at
midnight in late March and September when
loads are often low (typically 40 to 60 percent of the peak for summer peaking
systems), they wou Id be unlikely to constitute a problem for the systems reserve
capacity. * H o w e v e r , f o l l o w i n g t h e l o a d
swing during the shortest eclipses would
place a strain on the ability of the utility to
respond because of the need to replace
5,000 MW very rapidly unless storage were
[n place.
Without short-term storage, the rate at
which SPS power would decrease during an
eclipse would undoubtedly pose control
problems for the grid. As the satellite
entered the Earths shadow, it would lose
power at the rate of 20 percent per minute,
too fast for the grid to respond. In general,
the maximum power fluctuation a grid can
accommodate is about 5 percent per minute. However, it would be possible to shut
down the satellite at an acceptable rate
somewhat ahead of the eclipse.
The satellites and rectennas would require
replacement or maintenance of numerous
components (klystron amplifiers, solid-state
amplifiers, laser components, photocells,
dipole antennas, etc.) several times a year.
Normally the outages associated with
routine maintenance could be scheduled
during periods of low electricity demand
and are estimated 22 to constitute a loss of
* I he cfelmands on different utility systems vary regionally
Thu\, the truth of this statement must be examined on a reglonby-r(~glon basis
I Grev Satellite Power System Technical Options and Economics, OTA working paper, Solar Power Satelllte Assessment,
1974
Ch. 9institutional Issues . 241
120 hr/yr of SPS power. Assuming maintenance could be scheduled during eclipse
periods, the total time the satellite would be
unavailable due to maintenance could be
considerably less than this.
Boeing 23 h a s s u m m a r i z e d t h e v a r i o u s
losses of power to which the referenced SPS
might be subject (table 52). Conspicuously
missing, however, i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
satellite equipment failure. It will be of considerable interest to everyone concerned to
identify as many potential sources of
unp/anned SPS shutdown as possible.
Other possible variations in the amount of
transmitted power have to do with the mech-
anism for controlling the position of the

beam on the rectenna, which would be accomplished by a pilot beam directed from
the rectenna to the satellite in space. Because of the finite time of travel in space for
an electromagnetic signal, the time between
sensing a position error at the rectenna and
correction of it at the rectenna would be
about 0.2 see, causing an oscillation in
power output at a frequency of 5 Hz. Again,
the 5,000 MW nominal output would strain
the capabilities of the utility grid to follow
the resultant load variations if short-term
storage capacity were not made a part of the
SPS system.
2SPS/Utillty Grid Operations, sec 14 of DI 80-25461-3, Boeing Corp
Power Reception, Transmission, and Distribution. At the rectenna, the power collec-
Table 52.PotentiaI for Power Variations From the Reference System SPS
Source of power
variation
Range
percent
Spacecraft maintenance
Eclipse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
o-1oo
Eclipse with shutdown

and startup. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wind storm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Earthquake. . . . . . . . . . . .
F i r e i n rectenna s y s t e m . . . .
Meteorite hit of
spacecraft
equipment.
Rectenna e q u i p m e n t
failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Precipitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pointing error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ionosphere. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ground control
ecluir)ment f a i l u r e . . . .
Aircraf~ shadow. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total
Frequency of
occurrence
per year
2
62
0-1oo
Average
duration of
outage per
occurrence
minlyr .
2 X 3,600
3,376 total
71 maximum
per/occurrence
Average
Maximum yearly
Total
Time to
energy
power
maximum Scheduled
outage reduction
loss
hrlyr
GW hr power loss Yes No
GW
120
56.26
5
5
600
281.3
6 min
1 min
x
x
1 min
5 min
10 sec
30 min
100 ms
100 ms
lm
1s
Is
x
x
75-1oo
90-100
80-100
0.01
0.01
0.01
5,270
5,260
1,800
840
87.8
87.6
30
14
0.5
1
439
109.5
15
14
90-100
0.01
1,200
20
0.5
10
0.833
0.833
0.833
3.32
0.425
0.335
0.29
0.15
0.35
0.28
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.25
0.0005
0.06
0.0015
91.5-100
93.3-1oo
94.8-100
98.5-100
1
50
50
1
0.6
10
5,000
20
95-1oo
99.99-1oo
without shutdown/startup: 331 hour (3. iiYo)

without shutdown/startup: 362 hour (4.1 20/. )
3
20 m
1 m maxi
occurrence
20
1,030.8(2.350/~)
1,188.5(2.71 %)
SOURCE: SPS/Utiiity Grid Operations, sec 14, D180-25461-3, Boeing Corp.
0.3
1.25
0.3 s
1s
x
x
x
x
x
x
tion system would be divided up into units

of 320 MW or less. The loss of any one or
even a combination of several power blocks
would present few problems for the grid
because they would be relatively small compared to 5,000 MW. Transmission would be
over four to five 500 KV lines or eight 345
KV lines. The loss of one of the transmission
lines should not affect the stability of the
system or the operation of the SPS. In the
event of decreased load requirements, some
excess power could be absorbed by the
rectenna as heat. Sharp drops in power demand (e. g., an open circuit due, say, to a loss
of several transmission lines) might cause
overheating of the rectenna diodes if the
system were unable to dissipate the excess
power quickly enough. Hence, protective
measures would be required.
Maintenance of the dipole antennas and
rectifiers in the rectenna might present a major expense for the utility. Although the
mean time to failure is projected to be 30
years, 24 this would mean that on the average, 7 to 8 diodes (in the rectifier circuit)
could be expected to fail every second, zs
leading to an overall failure rate of 3 percent
per year. Increased quality control of the
manufactured components might mitigate
some of the replacement needs by decreasing the failure rate. This procedure, though
more expensive per unit, might be less expensive than replacing failed components.
Operating Capacity Factor. In order to
maximize capital investment, the SPS, if developed, should be operated as close to its
nameplate rating as possible, i.e., 5,ooO
MW. However, during periods of very light
load (e.g., at night during the spring and fall)
even current baseload nuclear and coal
units must sometimes be run at less than fu II
capacity in order to follow the load swing.
Such factors would make the real operating
R Andryczyk, P Foldes, j Chestek, and B Kaupang Solar
Power Satelllte Ground Stations, IEEE Spectrum, July 1979,
Satellite Power Systems Utility Impact Study, EPRI AP-I 548
TPS 79-752, September 1980 J C Bohn, j W Patmore, H W
Falnlnger
5A D Kotin, Satellite Power System (SPS) State and Local
Regulations as Applied to Satellite Power System Microwave
Recelvlng Antenna Faclllties, DO E-H CPIR-4024-05, 1978
capacity of the reference SPS less than its

maximum capacity, thereby causing it to be
more expensive.
Rectenna Siting. The land requirements for

the SPS reference system are large (see ch.
8). At 350 latitude the rectenna plus its exclusion area would cover an elliptical area
some 174 km2 in extent. By comparison, the
city of Chicago is 57o km2, and Washington,
D. C., 156 km2. Finding available land far
enough from population centers and military installations (to make potential electrointerference slight) and near
magnetic
enough to the load centers to make transmission costs acceptable would not be a
trivial exercise. Rectenna siting would involve the various regulatory agencies and
wou Id have to be addressed by uti I ities very
early in the overal I planning process.
Utilities in far northern latitudes would
generally find siting more difficult because
the necessary rectenna area and rectenna
exclusion area increases with increasing
latitude. Some of the most acceptable locations are in the Southern and Southwestern
United States where terrestrial photovoltaics and solar thermal devices will also be
most economic to operate. Offshore siting
wou Id also be possible, though this option
wou Id require extensive study.
The Solid-State Variation

The sol id-state sandwich appears to be more
economical to build and place in orbit in
s m a l l e r u n i t s ( a b o u t 1 . 5 GW),26 mitigatingautomatical [y problems arising from the control of 5 GW o f p o w e r f r o m t h e r e f e r e n c e
system I n addition, a smaller rectenna would
make it possible to place the rectenna closer
to load centers or in offshore locations.
Because it is a microwave system, it would
share the same stability problems that the
reference system wou Id experience.
Laser System
The laser system would present a different
set of challenges and opportunities for the
) h H a n I ev, op c It
utilities. Because it can generate electricity by

employing infrared radiation to heat a boiler,
it could perhaps be used to repower existing
coal, oil, or nuclear facilities. A ground-based
thermal collector would generate steam that
could be used directly to drive a turbine. In addition, the scale of the proposed satellite/
ground system (100 to 500 MW) would fit existing utility capacity quite wel 1. For cases where
the laser were used for repowering an existing
facility, no new transmission lines would be
needed.
On the other hand, several intrinsic Imitations of the proposed laser system would make
it difficult for the utilities to integrate it into
their grid:
Weather Limitations. Although lasers of

the overall power and power density of
the proposed laser system could burn
through light cloud cover, heavy clouds
would make it unusable. Thus, it would be
unsuitable in areas where clouds cover
the region for more than a few percent of
the year. It might be possible to use it in
regions where there are more receiving
stations than lasers to support them. Then,
if station A were covered by clouds, for
example, the laser feeding that station
could be redirected to station B that was
under no cloud cover. The resulting extra
laser radiation at station B could then be
used to generate more electrical power at
that station to compensate for the loss of
power at station A, assuming that B had
the necessary extra capacity. This arrangement could work wel I for selected parts of
the country, i.e., where the likelihood of
cloud cover forming simultaneously over
several stations was smal 1. However, since
cloudy conditions tend to occur over
large sections of the Nation at one time,
the practicality of this notion would be
limited.
243
energy or
used to
generate
electrical
perhaps, hydrogen. How it might be integrated
into existing uti I ities is unclear. As an electrical
system, it would require long transmission
lines leading from the energy parks to the
p o i n t of end use. However, hydrogen generated at the site could be transported by
vehicles to other destinations.
This concept appears to require a national
grid in order to make effective use of the large
generating capacity of the site (from 10 to 135
GW). Stability would be much less of a problem for SOLARE S than for the microwave system because of the large number of satellites
that would reflect sunlight, the inclusion of
storage in the system, and because of the independent blocks of ground-based photovoltalcs or solar thermal plants at the site.
The SO LARES proposal would be subject to
similar problems with clouds as the laser concept. However, the additional radiant energy
rnlght be great enough to dissipate clouds that
would form in the region. For this reason, large
mirrors have also been proposed for weather
mod i f I( at ion.27
Regulatory Implications of SPS28

Although this area has received only a cursory investigation at this time, it is clear that
the potential for new forms of financial support and management structures for the SPS
might engender new regulatory modes. I n general, the SPS is I ikely to lead to greater centralization of the Nations utility structure,
leading in turn to a strong need for coordination between neighboring Public Utility Commissions or perhaps to completely new structures for regulating utilities.
Local v. Regional Control
Mirror System
Utilities have generally entered into a

greater degree of cooperation with utilities in
other States than have their associated
regulatory agencies. This state of affairs will
A mirror system would be the most highly

centralized technology of the four alternatives. Its proposers envision a few energy
parks in which the increased daylight would be
Va)k, op clt
M Cer$ovltz, Report on Certain Economic Aspects of the
SP~ Energy Program, OTA Working Paper, SPS Assessment,
1980
244
Solar Power Sate//ites
have to change with increasing use of highcapacity generating units and greater grid interconnections. A move toward regional planning and control will likely also come about
because of the current disparity between
States in siting and other regulations, making it
more attractive for utilities to build in States
where regulations are not as stringent or to
purchase power from utilities that have a
surplus of generating capacity.
In order to regulate their processes, new regional regulatory agencies are likely to be set
up long before SPS could be part of the utility
grid, leading to greater grid interties. The int r o d u c t i o n o f a n SPS w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y
hasten the process because the larger the grid,
the more easily outages from a single rectenna
or a laser receiver could be handled. The
intermediate-scale sol id-state system would fit
into this kind of structure easily, but a larger
scale SPS such as the reference system or
SOLARES would necessitate an even more
widespread system than is now envisioned.
Although the laser system might be used to
repower
inter mediate-s i zed
generating
facilities, t h e e v e r p r e s e n t p o s s i b i l i t y o f
massive cloud cover would require system interties in order to make the most efficient use
of the available laser satellites.
Site Decisions*
Siting would be a major issue for each one
of the alternative technologies and would also
require the development of regional cooperation. A major question in SPS siting decisions is
who would have the control; local, State,
regional, or national entities? Currently, State
or local regulatory boards make the ultimate
decisions concerning plant siting. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency review these decisions.
Except for Federal or State land, the planning
for a 174 km rectenna would likely involve
several local jurisdictions, one more of whose
land use regulations may not be compatible
with an SPS rectenna. However, if the need for
SPS power were great, there might be adequate reason to supercede local regulations in
*See also chs 8 and 9, pt C
siting a rectenna. A single 5,000-MW rectenna

could serve a large population, one which is
very likely to be distributed across State I ines.
Coordination of regulatory authority could
come from voluntary interstate agreements or
from federally mandated regional planning.
The current debate about energy parks
would be instructive in identifying and resolving some of these issues. Along with this, the
trends toward regional izing economic control
on energy facilities and instituting a national
power grid could provide the institutional
framework for addressing siting issues for a
rectenna or SOLARE S energy park.
Rate Structure
The magnitude of the capital investment
that SPS and other future technologies would
require wou Id certainly cause some alteration
of the utility rate structure. Just what form
these alterations might take is currently
unclear because they depend heavily on the
form that the SPS companies would take and
how they might be f inanced.
For example, if the utilities were to own ind i v i d u a l SPS plants, they would wish to include their capital costs during construction
(current work in progress) in the current rate
base. Most States are presently unwilling to
allow this. However, the extraordinarily high
capital costs of other sorts of new generating
capacity may make this scheme a necessity.
(In the other hand, if SPS power were to be
bought directly from an SPS corporation and
sold to the customer, the concern about adding capital costs during construction to the
rate structure would be eliminated for the util-
ity regulatory agency and shifted to another

sector of the economy (though they would still
be reflected in busbar costs).
SPS Corporations and the Utilities.

Currently, the utilities purchase equipment
and knowhow from competing corporations
who build and service generating equipment.
Because of the scale of investment necessary
to supply the supportive infrastructure for
building an SPS, the SPS c o r p o r a t i o n m i g h t
requ i ring
monopoly,
wel I
evolve
as
a
monopoly-type regulation on the Federal level.

Whether generating plants or power are sold, it
is likely that the Federal Government wou Id be
heavily involved in the regulation of SPS rates
and in siting, reliability, and other aspects of
integrating the SPS into the utilities structure.
Such a state of affairs would be likely to lead
to a greater degree of centralization of the
electrical industry whether a national power
grid were instituted or not.
General Implications for the SPS

Centralization v. Decentralization
Two opposing forces currently affect the
utilities industries a move towards greater
centralization and an opposite trend towards
greater decentralization. On the one hand,
economies of scale, shared facilities, and the
benefits of regional planning make greater
centralization attractive. On the other, the
desire of individuals, communities, and many
companies for a greater degree of energy selfreliance for economic or social reasons suggests that the utilities will have to adjust to an
increased demand for grid-integrated dispersed systems. 29 The utilities are just beginning to
address these issues squarely. Market pressures may make dispersed units increasingly
more attractive (see ch. 5, Energy in Context) a t
the same time that the Federal Government
supports the development of new central technologies. The main issue for the utilities to address is how to accommodate both ends of the
scale in their planning.
Market Penetration
From the point of view of the utilities that
would either purchase SPS generated power
for distribution in a grid or purchase receiver
installations to incorporate directly into their
own systems, the ultimate total volume of SPS
generated power would depend on a number
of factors in addition to cost. Even if the
busbar cost of SPS electricity was highly competitive with other future options, SPS market
penetration could be limited by reliability
requirements and by the technical difficulties
D Morris and J Furber, Decentralized Photovoltalcs OTA
Working Paper, SPS Assessment, 1980
of grid-dispatch that we have already discussed.
Reserve Requirements. The criterion that

any two units (e. g., transmission I ine, generating plant, etc. ) in a utility system must constitute less than 20 percent of the total system capacity leads to a minimum size for
any single utility system for a given SPS
capacity (see Planning Process). Thus, two
5,000-MW plants could be accommodated
by a utility system with total capacity of
33,000 to 50,000 MW or greater. Smaller
utilities systems could accommodate app r o p r i a t e l y s m a l l e r SPS p l a n t s . B u t i n
making decisions about whether to proceed
with SPS or not, it is important to estimate
h o w m u c h t o t a l SPS c a p a c i t y t h e U . S .
utilities grid overall could accommodate.
The projected
total capacity of the
reference system is 300 GW. Could the utilities grid in 2030 or 2040 accommodate that
capacity?
Simply scaling up from the individual utility or utility grid, using the 20 percent
criterion, 300 GW total SPS capacity implies
1,500 CW total electrical capacity in 2030 or
2040, about 2A times current capacity.
It is clear that under these stringent conditions, a low electricity demand would preclude development of SPS from the utilities
point of view. The 20-percent requirement is
certainly overly stringent, since in effect, it
implicitly assumes that the entire SPS fleet
wou Id fail at one time (i. e., no reserve power
would be available from other utilities). On
the other hand, satellites that would be subject to eclipse (i. e., all those in geostationary
orbits) would be eclipsed in groups, not singly. For a few days around the equinoxes, approximately 18 satellites would be eclipsed
at once. * Roughly speaking this means that
a band of Earth some 1,250-miles wide in
longitude would suffer SPS power outage at
one time. Thus, there is a distinct limit to the
amount of lost generating capacity that
nearby utilities could supply during the
eclipse period. Utilities and their regulatory
commissions would only be I ikely to in-
A ~atelllte placed at each degree of longitude corresponds to

15 ~atel I ltes per hour of time
246
Solar Power Sate//ites
crease their proportion of SPS beyond the 20

percent or so of reserve capacity if they
were consistently able to draw power from
beyond the shadowed region, or if the
March/September night peaks are low
enough to offset this difficulty. In other
words, the larger the grid served by SPS the
smaller the reserve capacity that would be
required in any one region.
For the country as a whole then, a 20-percent penetration for the reference SPS or
any geostationary SPS must be seen as an
average limit. Utilities with appropriate
backup could accept more. Others, because
of their size, location, or special needs
would only accept less than 20 percent.
A 20-percent penetration of SPS would
constitute 120 GW in the low scenario and
about 490 GW in the high one. At a 90-percent capacity factor, the contribution of
e l e c t r i c a l e n e r g y f r o m SPS would be 3.2
Quads in the low scenario and 13 Quads in
the high scenario (44 percent of the total
electrical energy consumed in both cases).
Vu/nerabi/ity. Another aspect of SPS that

the utilities would certainly investigate in
comparison with other generating options is
its vulnerability to hostile actions~ (see ch.
7), and to unforeseen technical failure.
Of perhaps far more concern to the utilities would be any vulnerability to technical
failure (especially common mode failure) or
to human error. As noted earlier, the utility
grid would experience some difficulties in
adjusting to planned outages from the reference SPS. Unplanned ones would be far
more difficult to adjust for, though they are
a common feature of utility operation. The
potential for unplanned failure of any of the
alternative SPS options would only be fully
known if a decision is made to proceed with
one option and a full-scale demonstration
were built and tested extensively.
Perhaps the most technically sensitive
component of the satellite system is the
P Vajk, The Military Impllcatlons of Satellite Power Systems NASA/DOE SPS Program Review Meeting, April 1980, Lincoln, Nebr
beam-focusing apparatus. In the microwave

design, a pilot beam sent from the rectenna
to the satellite antenna would control the
phasing of the beam transmitters. With the
loss of the pilot beam, the SPS power beam
would quickly defocus, a safety feature that
would prevent accidental or intentional
wandering of the beam. The laser beam
would be controlled in a similar manner. It
would be important to design this apparatus
to be insensitive to minor perturbations in
operating mode, yet sensitive enough to
maintain its safety qualities. Orientation of
the reflecting mirrors of the SOLARES system would be entirely mechanical and
would be controlled by built-in thrusters. Because the mirror system would be highly redundant, the loss of one mirror would not be
catastrophic. It would also be essential to
design the SPS to be as free as possible from
human error. As the nuclear industry realizes, designing a technologically complex
system in which the potential for human error is small is a difficult and complex task.
Here again, experience with operating
systems wculd be essential to utility acceptance.
System Comparison
The most acceptable SPS option for the current utilities to pursue may be the solid-state or
a similarly sized microwave. It would provide
baseload power with minor weather interference at a scale more in keeping with current
uti I ity practice (i e., 1.5 GW). If future utility
systems develop the capability and the experience to handle larger increments of generating capacity, an SPS similar to the
reference system would be more acceptable,
though siting problems might be very great.
The laser and mirror concepts, though offering some interesting potential, suffer from
severe weather constraints. The possibility that
laser SPS could be used to repower fossil fuel
plant~ wou Id make it of particular interest in
regions of relatively low cloud cover. One of
the significant drawbacks of the mirror concept is that it wou Id require the utility and
overal I energy industry to make a radical
change from its current structure because of

its very high degree of centralization (10 to 135
GW per site). This would be particularly true
for an SPS system operating in other countries
where the grid system is either nonexistent or
very smalI (see ch. 7, International Issues).
Timing of Grid Integration.

If SPS followed the pattern of other new
energy technologies it would take a long time
to be integrated into the utilities structure. The
reference system scenario 31 suggests that the
first SPS could be deliverig power to the grid
in about 20 years time. But nuclear power,
which has been used for generating steam for
30 years, and became an active option for the
utilities in 1960 still constitutes only 9 percent
of the countrys total capacity (54,000 MW). *
In the face of this past experience, it seems
more Iikely that the demonstration and testing
phases of the SPS would be longer and therefore involve higher costs than can presently be
envisioned. The utilities are faced with providing reliable power to their customers. Looking at SPS from a utilities standpoint, it seems
highly unlikely that the first SPS would be part
of the utility grid before 2010.
This estimate is based on technology similar
to the reference system technology. Developing a laser SPS might take considerably longer
because we simply have less experience with
high-powered lasers. The SOLARES system
would be technically easier to build, but the institutional and political barriers to creating the
Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program Reference System Report, op clt
* Nuclear power actual Iy produce~ 13 percent of the electricity
sold
associated large energy parks could well slow

its development to beyond 2020.
Rate of Implemental ion

The reference system assumes additions of
10,000 MW per year to the grid. Assuming electricity demand makes feasible 10,000 MW additions to U.S. generating capacity, it is unlikeIy that the rate would begin at that high level.
Again, the utilities would want to have considerable experience with the first SPS before
they would be willing to invest in additional
units. Thus, it is more likely that the annual
rate of implementation would begin at less
than 5,000 MW on the average and build to
higher levels as utilities gain experience and
(onfidence in SPS.
Planning for SPS

Acceptance of SPS by the utilities would depend on a number of factors, not the least of
which would be utility involvement in planning
for SPS. But for the utilities to invest their time
and money in such an effort, they would have
to be convinced that it is worth their while.
Thus, SPS must be considered to be economicalIy, environmentally, and socially acceptable compared with the other future energy
options. Much depends on a comparative
analysis of the available options. And because
comparative assessment is necessarily a process carried out over many years, the utilities
must Involve themselves in all phases of that
process. A comparative assessment done today, though instructive, is as a snapshot compared to a motion picture. As we know more
about each technology in the comparative
group, the particular parameters will change,
leading to a reassessment of the desirability of
each technology.
ISSUES ARISING IN THE PUBLIC ARENA

SPS Debate
Public involvement in the development of
technologies has grown significantly in the last
two decades. Debate has focused on the environmental. health and safety. economic and
miIitary issues surrounding new technologies,

The supersonic transport, nuclear powerplants,
PAVE PAWS radar facilities and high-voltage
transmission Iines are examples of technologies that have been subject to recent public
controlversy. Since SPS wouId probably be a
248
federally funded technology (at least in the

research, development, and demonstration
RD&D phases) with long-term and widespread
ramifications, public input in the development
process is crucial, especially in the early
stages. Moreover, the potential effectiveness
of public resistance to technological systems,
and the publics interest in direct participation
makes public understanding and approval imperative for the development of SPS.
The assessment of likely public attitudes
towards SPS is difficult, however, because SPS
is a future technology. At present, public
awareness of SPS, while growing, is minimal.
Even if opinions about SPS were well-formed
today, it is likely that these attitudes would
change with time. Public thinking could be influenced by the other energy and space technologies, perceived future energy demand and
general economic and political conditions. 3 2
The state of SPS technology and estimated SPS
costs couId also be important determinants. In
addition, the degree of public participation in
the SPS decisionmaking process could play a
part in future opinions about the satellite.
Most public discussion on SPS has been confined to a small number of public interest and
professional organizations. OTA has drawn
heavily on the views of these groups because
they represent selected constituencies that
couId play a key role in influencing future
public thinking and motivating public action.
While OTA cannot determine whether or not
the public would ultimately accept SPS, these
interest groups can help identify the issues and
philosophical debates that may arise in the
future.
Interest Groups
A small number of public interest and professional organizations have expressed their
views on SPS. In general, many of the individuals and groups that support the development of SPS also advocate a vigorous space
program. SPS proponents, represented by organizations like the OMNI Foundation, view the
exploitation of space in general, and SPS in
Solar Power Satellite Public (lplnlon l~>ue~ Workshop, A
Summary, Feb 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment
particular, as important means in overcoming

terrestrial energy and resource limits. 33 To the
L-5 Society, which has been the most vocal SPS
lobbyist, the satellite system is a stepping
stone to the stars, 3 4 an important milestone
towards the societys goal, the colonization of
space Groups Iike the Aerospace Industries
A s s o c i a t i o n o f A m e r i c a 35 and the SUN SAT
Energy Council, a nonprofit corporation
established to explore the SPS concept, 36 37
believe that SPS is one of the most promising
options available for meeting future global
energy needs in an environmentally and socialIy acceptable manner. Professional organizations such as the American Institute of
A e r o n a u t i c s a n d A s t r o n a u t i c s 38 and the institute of EIectrical and EIectronics Engineers39
support continued evaluation of the concept.
Opponents of SPS characteristically support
terrestrial solar and appropriate technologies and are often concerned about environmental issues. The Solar Lobby 40 41 and the
Environmental Policy Center, 42 for example,
fear that an SPS program would drain resources and momentum from small-scale,
Iblcf
C Hen$on, A Harlan, and T Bennett, Concern$ of the L-5
Society About SPS, The Final Proceedings oi the ~olar Power
%te//lte Pro~ram Review, Apr ,22-25, 1980, DOE, Cent-800491,
jUIV 1 9 8 0 p 542
5
Aerospace
I n d u s t r i e s A$soclatlon, S t a t e m e n t s u b m i t t e d f o r
the record In
So/ar Power 5ate//lte, hearings before the Subcomm Ittee on 5pace Sc Ience and Appl lcatlon~, U S House of Representatlve~, Mar 28-30, 1979, pp 241-242
P (; Iclwr, Solar Power Satelllte Development The Next
Steps, Apr 14, 1978, In So/ar Power Sate//lte, hearings before the
Sub( omrnlttee on Space Science and Appl lcatlon~, U S House
ot Reprewntdtlves, Apr 12-14, 1978, No 68, pp 165-178
1I Freeman (ed ) Space .So/ar Power f3u//etln, VOI 1, No 1 and
2, SLJNSA T [ nergy Council, 1980
So/,?r Power $ate//ltes, AlAA Posltlon Paper, Nov 29, 1978,
prepared by the AlAA Technical Committee on Aerospace Power
Svstem\, ,]nd the AlAA Technical Committee on Space Systems
<H Brown, Statement on Solar Power Satellite Research,
Development, and Evaluation Program Act of 1979, In So/ar
P~jwer i.~re//lres, hearings before the Subcommittee on Space
S( Ience dnd Appllcatlons, U S House of Representatives, Mar
28- W, 1979, No 15, pp 4-8
(l tlzen \ E n e r g y Project, S o l a r P o w e r Satelllte$ N e w s Upd]te, Solar Power Satellite Fact Sheet, Coal ltlon Against Satelllte
Power \y\tems S t a t e m e n t ( n e w s l e t t e r s ) , 1 9 8 0
~ [)(>[ O$S, Solar Power Satellite, Sun T/me\, July 1 9 7 9 , p p
4.5
G C)e L o s s , t e s t i m o n y In $o/ar P o w e r Sate//lte, h e a r i n g s
before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Appllcatlons,
U S House of Representatives, Mar 28-30, 1979, No 15, pp
109-114
Ch. 9Institutional issues
ground-based, renewable technologies. They

argue that compared to the terrestrial solar options, SPS is inordinately large, expensive, centralized, and complex and that it poses greater
environmental and military risks. The Citizens
Energy Project has been the most active lobbyist against funding SPS and has coordinated
the Coalition Against Satellite Power Systems,
a network of solar and environmental organizations. 43 Objections to SPS also have been
raised by individuals in the professional
astronomy and space science communities
that see SPS as a threat to the funding and
p r a c t i c e o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e s .4 4 4 5
While there is a wide spectrum of support for
SPS in the advocates community, ranging
from cautious support of continued research
to great optimism about the concept viability
and deployment, almost all opponents object
to Government funding of SPS research, development, and deployment.
If the SPS debate continues in the future, it
is likely that several other kinds of groups
would take a stand on SPS. 46 For example, antinuclear groups could oppose SPS on many of
the same grounds that they object to nuclear
power: centralization, lack of public input,
and fear of radiation, regardless of kind. Antimilitary organizations might also object to SPS
if they foresaw military involvement. It is likely
that community groups would form to oppose
the siting of SPS receivers in their locality if the
environmental and military uncertainties were
not adequately resolved or if public participation in the siting process was not solicited.
Rural communities and farmers in particular
could also strongly oppose SPS on the grounds
that, like highways and high-voltage powerIines, it would intrude on rural life.
Issues
The issues that repeatedly surface in the SPS
debate are shown in table 53. It should be
Citizens Energy Project, op. cit.
Solar Threat to Radioastronomy, New Scientist, Nov. 23,
1978, p. 590.
sPeter Boyce, Executive Officer of the American Astronomical Society, prwate communication
Solar Power Satellite: Pubiic Opinion Issues Workshop, A

Summary, Feb. 21-22,1980, Office of Technology Assessment
83-316 0 - 81
17
249
noted that in most of the discussion, it is

assumed that SPS would be a U.S. project (at
least in the near term). If the question of SPS
were posed in an international context, it is
possible that the flavor of the following
arguments wouId be altered considerably. Currently, public discussion is focused on the
question of R&D funding. It is anticipated that
as public awareness grows, the environmental,
health, safety, and cost issues will receive
more public attention. Questions of centralization, military implications and the exploitation
of space could also be important.
R&D PROGRAMS
The primary purpose of an SPS R&D program in the near term would be to keep the
SPS option open. However, opponents argue
that it makes little sense to investigate this
complex, high risk technology when other
more viable alternatives exist to meet our
future energy needs. 4 7 In particular, they fear
that SPS would divert funds and valuable
human resources from the terrestrial solar
technologies, which they perceive as more environmentalIy benign, versatile, less expensive
to develop, and commercially available sooner
than SPS. 48 Opponents also argue that a Government R&D program for SPS would fall easy
prey to bureaucratic inertia, and that no matter what the results of R&D, the program
would continue because the investment and
attendant bureaucracy would be too great to
stop. 49 Moreover, opponents b e l i e v e t h a t
political inertia will be generated from the
relatively large amount of money that is
presently allocated to organizations with a
vested interest in SPS as compared to those
groups opposed to SPS. In addition, they are
concerned that studies evaluating SPS for the
purpose of making decisions about R&D funding do not compare SPS with decentralized
solar technologies; they argue that without this
kind of analysis, the public would be unwilling
to make a commitment to SPS funding.
K Bossong and S. Denman, A Critique of Solar Power Satellite Technology, INSIGHT, March 1980
48Cltlzens Energy Pro}ect, op. cit
Solar Power Satellite: Public Opinion Issues Workshop, A
$urrtrriary, Feb 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment
250
Table 53.Major Issues Arising in SPS Debate*

Pro
R&D funding
SPS is a promising energy option
The Nation should keep as many energy options open
as possible
An SPS R&D program is the only means of evaluating
the merit of SPS relative to other energy technologies
SPS R&D will yield spinoffs to ether programs
cost
SPS
is likely to be cost competitive in the energy
market
Cost to taxpayer is for R&D only and accounts for small
portion of total cost; private sector and/or other nations
will invest in production and maintenance
SPS
will produce economic spinoffs
Environment, heath, and safety
SPS is potentially less harsh on the environment than
other energy technologies, especially coal
Space
Space is the optimum place to harvest sunlight and
other resources
SPS could be an important component or focus for a
space program
SPS could lay the ground work for space industrialization and/or colonization
SPS would produce spinoffs from R&D and hardware to
other space and terrestrial programs
International considerations
One of the most attractive characteristics of SPS is its
potential for international cooperation and ownership
SPS can contribute significantly to the global energy

supply
SPS is one of few options for Europe and Japan and is

well suited to meet the energy and resource needs of
developing nations
An international SPS would reduce concerns about

adverse military implications
Military Implications
The vulnerability of SPS is comparable to other energy
systems
SPS has poor weapons potential
As
a civilian program, SPS would create few military
spinoffs
Con
SPS is a very high-risk, unattractive technology

Other more viable and preferable energy options exist
to meet our future energy demand
SPS would drain resources from other programs,
especially terrestrial solar technologies and the space
sciences
No matter what the result of R&D, bureaucratic inertia
will carry Government programs too far
SPS is unlikely to be cost competitive without Government subsidy

Like
the nuclear industry, SPS would probably require
ongoing Government commitment
Projected
cost are probably underestimated considerably
The amount of energy supplied by SPS does not justify
the cost.
SPS risks to humans and the environment are potentially greater than those associated with terrestrial
solar technologies
. Major concerns include: health hazards of power transmission and high-voltage transmission lines, land-use,
electromagnetic interference, upper atmosphere effects, and
(sky lab syndrome
SPS is an aerospace boondoggie; There are better

routes to space industrialization and exploration than
SPS
SPS is an energy system and should not be justified on
the basis of its applicability to space projects
SPS could represent a form of U.S. and industrial nations energy imperialism, it is not suitable for LDCs
Ownership of SPS by multinational corporations would
centralize power
. Spinoffs to the military from R&D and hardware would

be significant and undesirable
. Vulnerability and weapons potential are of concern
251
Table 53.Major Issues Arising in SPS Debate* Continued

Con
Pro
Centralization and scale
Future energy needs include large as well as smallscale supply technologies; urban centers and industry
especially cannot be powered by small-scale systems
alone
SPS would fit easily into an already centralized grid
Future energy demand
. Future electricity demand will be much higher than
today
. High energy consumption is required for economic
growth
SPS
as one of a number of future electricity sources
can contribute significant y to energy needs
Even
if domestic demand for SPS is low, there is a
global need for SPS
a
SPS would augment and necessitate a centralized infrastructure and reduce local control, ownership, and
participation in decisionmaking
The incremental risk of investing in SPS development is

unacceptably high
. Future electricity demand could be comparable or only

slightly higher than today with conservation
The standard of living can be maintained with a lower
rate of energy consumption
There is little need for SPS; future demand can be met
easily by existing technologies and conservation
By investing in SPS development, we are guaranteeing
high energy consumption, because the costs of
development would be so great
.
Arguments mainly focus on the SPS reference system.
Advocates, on the other hand, view SPS as a

potentially viable and preferable technology. so
They argue that an R&D program is the only
means of evaluating SPS vis-a-vis other energy
technologies. Moreover, if the Nation can afford to spend up to $1 billion per year on a
high-risk technology like fusion, it could certainly afford SPS
research that would be much
51
less expensive. proponents maintain that SPS
research will yield many spinoffs to other
technologies and research programs whether
or not SPS is ever deployed. 52 53 They also re-
P. Glaser, Solar Power From Satellites, Physics Today, February 1977,

Summary, Feb. 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment
52
P Glaser, Development of the Satellite Solar Power Station, in So/ar Power from Sate//ites, hearings before the Subcommittee on Aerospace Technology and National Needs, U S
Senate, Jan 19,21,1976, pp 8-35
IT A Heppenheimer, Co/onies in S p a c e (City, State: stackpole Books, 1977)
spond to claims of bureaucratic inertia by

citing several cases in which large projects,
such as the SST and the Safeguard ABM system, were halted in spite of the large investment. 54 They argue that at the funding levels
currently discussed for R&D, the risk of program runaway is very low.
COST
Economic issues have played center stage in
the SPS debate. Almost every journal account
of SPS (particularly those critical of the
satellite) has highlighted its cost. 55 56 57 T h e

summary, Feb. 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment.
J Marinelli, The Edsel of The Solar Age, Environrnenta/Action, July/August 1979,
R Brownstein, A $1,000,000,000 Energy Boondoggle; Science Fiction Buffs Will Love It, Critica/ Mass )ourna/, June 1980.
L Torrey, A Trap to Harness the Sun, New scientist, J UIY
10, 1980
252
predominant questions revolve around R&D

priorities and capital and opportunity costs. In
addition, the calculation of costs themselves
and cost comparisons between technologies
could be subject to extensive scrutiny and
debate.
Proponents argue that the only cost open for
public discussion is the cost of RD&D to the
taxpayer. 5859 The bulk of the SPS investment
would be carried on by the private sector in
competition with other inexhaustible energy
alternatives. Furthermore, much of the RD&D
cost could be returned from other space programs such as nonterrestrial mining and industrialization that build upon the SPS technological base. Advocates also contend that an
SPS program would produce economic spinoffs by providing domestic employment and
by stimulating technological . innovation for
terrestrial industry. 6 1 Some proponents also
argue that as an international system, SPS
could lead to the expansion of world energy
and space markets. 62 63 In addition, in a global
scenario, the United States would bear a smaller portion of the development costs. Finally,
advocates believe that in spite of the large investment costs, SPS would be economically
with
competitive
other
energy
technologies. 64 65
cantly increase as SPS is developed. Furthermore, the U.S. taxpayers would be required to
support this increase and to maintain an ongoing commitment to SPS above and beyond the
RD&D costs, just as they have for the nuclear
industry. The National Taxpayers Union, in
particular, sees SPS as a giant boondoggle
that will allow the aerospace industry to feed
its voracious appetite from the federal
trough. 6 8 Opponents argue that SPS would
n o t a l l e v i a t e u n e m p l o y m e n t substantially
because it provides unsustainable jobs to the
aerospace sector alone. 69 Most opponents also
do not believe that SPS will be cost competitive and argue that the amount of energy
produced by SPS would not justify its large investment cost. 70
The most critical issue for opponents is the
question of opportunity cost, i.e., the cost of
not allocating resources for other uses. 71 They
argue that a commitment to SPS R&D would
jeopardize rather than stimulate the development of other energy technologies. Opponents
also argue that SPS might foreclose opportunities for alternate land use, Federal nonenergy R&D funding, allocation of radio frequencies and orbital slots, resource uses and
jobs.
ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY
Opponents argue that the present cost estimates are unrealistically Iow. 66 T h e y e x p e c t
that like other aerospace projects and the
Alaskan pipeline, the cost of SPS would signifi5Solar Power Sate//ite: Pub/ic Opinion /ssues Workshop, A
Summary, Feb. 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment.
K Heiss, testimony in So/ar Power Sate//ite, hearings before
the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, U S
House of Representatives, Mar 28-30, 1979, pp 132-158
G. Driggers, letter and statement submitted for the record In
So/ar Power Sate//ite, hearings before the Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications, U S House of Representatives,
pp 407-416
Glaser, Solar Power Satellite D e v e l o p m e n t T h e N e x t
Steps, op clt
2 So/ar Power Sate//ite: Pub/ic Opinion Issues Workshop, A
Summary, Feb. 21-22, 1980, Office of Technology Assessment
Heppenheimer, op. cit
P. Glaser, The Earth Benefits of Solar Power Satellites,
Space Solar Power Review, VOI 1, No 1 &2, 1980
5R. W Taylor, testimony in So/ar Power From Sate//ites, pp
48-51.
K, Bossong, S, Denman, So/ar P o w e r Sate//ites or How to
Make So/ar Energy Centralized, Expensive and Environmenta//y
Unsound, report No. 40, Citizens Energy Project, June 1979
Opponents contend that the environmental

risks and uncertainties of SPS far exceed those
of the terrestrial solar options. 72 They are most
concerned about the effects of microwaves on
human health, airborne biota and communications systems. Critics of SPS also argue that it
would severely strain U.S. supplies of certain
materials, thereby increasing our reliance on
foreign sources. 73 In addition, opponents ques
Solar Power Sate//ite: Pub/fc Opinion Issues Workshop, A
J Creenbaum, National Taxpayers Union, letter to the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, expressing
views on H R 12505, July 7, 1978
Richard Grossman, Envlronmentallsts for Full Employment,
private communication, July 25, 1979
7Bos\ong and Denman, op clt
7 50/ar Power Sate//ite Pub//c Opinion Issues Workshop, A
7
Citizens Energy Project, op clt
] Hooper, Star Gazers A/ert, update to Pie In the Sky
(newsletter), The Wilderness Society
Ch.. 9institutional Issues
tion putting Earth resources in space where

they cannot be recycled or retrieved. Opponents also cite the large amount of land
needed for receiver siting, high-voltage transmission lines, the effects of launches on air
and noise quality, the potential for unplanned
reentry of LEO satellites (Skylab Syndrome),
reflected sunlight from the satellites and
potential adverse effects on climate and ozone
as serious problems. 75
Advocates, on the other hand, maintain that
compared to other baseload or large-scale
energy technologies, SPS would incur less environmental
risk. 76 77 78 In
particular,
its
climatic effects would be far less severe than
those of fossil fuels and its bioeffects would
probably be much less hazardous than those
of coal and nuclear. Proponents claim that the
principal advantage of SPS as opposed to terrestrial solar and hydroelectric is that it would
ueless land per unit energy. 79 Most advocates
are confident that while electromagnetic interference and some atmospheric effects could
be a problem, acceptable methods can be
found to mitigate most of the environmental
impacts of SPS. Some proponents also argue
that one of the major benefits of SPS is that it
transports to space many of the environmental
impacts typicalIy associated with the generation of power on Earth. 80 M o r e o v e r , a i r a n d
water pollution and resource strains could be
alleviated if the Nation mined the Moon or
asteroids. Some advocates have also stressed
the importance of weighing environmental
concerns against the needs for inexpensive
energy. 81 A few contend that while environmental issues have ranked high in the public
mind, convenience and the cost of energy are
DeLoss, Solar Power Satellite, op clt

75
C laser, Solar Power Satellite D e v e l o p m e n t T h e N e x t
Steps, op clt
zTHeppenhelmer, oP. c t
G. ONelll, The High Frontier: Human Co/onies in Space (New
York William Morrow & Co , Inc , 1977)
7Glaser, The Earth Benefits of Solar Power Satellites, op
cit.
C W Driggers, SPS Significant Promise Seen, The Energy
Consumer, September 1980, pp 39-40
Summary, Feb. 21-22, 1980, Off Ice of Technology Assessment
83-316 0 - 81 - 18
253
becoming more important. Opponents, on the

other hand, contend that environmental concerns will remain predominant and that the
public perception of environmental risks will
uItimately dictate costs.
Historically, public involvement in technological controversies has often been spurred
by concerns about the environmental risks. Environmental issues couId be very important in
future public thinking about SPS as well. 82 It is
also Iikely that SPS would serve to bring controversies over the impacts of other technologies to the forefront, most notably the bioeffects of microwaves and high voltage transmission Iines (60 cycle). While the public might
be concerned about all environmental impacts
(see table 28), those that most immediately affect peoples health and well-being would
dominate discussion. Moreover, environmental issues would be most focused and
amplified at the siting stages of SPS development (see Siting section). Public acceptance
of SPS wilI depend strongly on the state of
knowledge and general understanding of environmental hazards. It will also depend on the
institutional management of the knowledge;
who determines the extent and acceptability
of the public risk may be just as important as
the data itself.
The most critical environmental issue for the
reference system at present is the biological effect of microwaves, not only because the uncertainties are so great, but also because of the
existing controversy over microwave bioeffects in general. As the proliferation of microwave and radio frequency devices has increased dramatically, this issue has received
considerable attention in the public arena. A
great many newspaper and journal articles, 8 3
as well as television segments on 60 minutes
and 20/20, 84 and Paul Brodeurs book, The Zapping of America: Microwaves, Their Deadly
Risk and the Cover-Up85 signal growing public
lbld
S Schlefelbeln, The Invlslble Threat, Saturday Review,
Sept 15, 1979, pp 16-20
84
A Bachrach, Satellite Power System [SPS] Public Acceptance,
October 1978
Paul Brodeur, The Zapping of America (New York W W Norton & Co Inc , 1977)
254
concern over the increase of electronic

smog.
The press has been particularly suspicious of
the motives and conclusions of the apparently
small, closed community of microwave researchers and decisionmakers in the 1950s and
1960s. Suggestions of vested interests, conspiracy, and coverups stem from the confidential classification of microwave research by
radio frequency users such as the military and
the microwave device industry and the lack of
attempts to solicit public input. 86 Whether or
not such motives in fact existed, the public and
press, fearful of the word radiation, have expressed little confidence in official claims
that microwaves are as safe as they are purported to be.
The political edge of the scientific controversy has also been sharpened by several incidents over a 10-year period of microwave irradiation of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. The
peak power of the modulated field was 18
m i c r o w a t t , f a r b e l o w t h e U . S . g u i d e l i n e .8 7
Although neither electronic jamming or surveillance seemed to be the purpose of the
waves, there was concern about attempted
behavior control and health hazards that led
to Project Pandora and other studies. These investigations tended to conclude that the embassy workers did not encounter health hazards traceable to their exposures. 88 Few followup studies have been conducted however, and
suspicions still exist. Public opinion seems to
have been influenced by the extensive publicity these episodes have received. Articles questioning the ethics and motives of the State
Department leave the reader feeling that the
issues were never adequately resolved.
Most recently the proposed American National Standards Institute and National institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) microwave standards have been criticized. The Natural Resources Defense Council
bIbid.
87
Schiefelbein, op. cit.
88A. Lilienfeld, et al , Foreign Service Hea/th Status of Foreign
Service and Other Employees From Selected Eastern European
Posts Fina/ Report, D e p a r t m e n t o f Epldemlology, the John
Hopkins University, July 31,1978
(NRDC) claims that the NIOSH criteria document that will form the basis of the NIOSH
standard, fails to provide a scientifically and
medically sound standard; while it admits the
existence of many low-level effects, it proposes a thermal standard and fails to adequately address low-level non-thermal effects. 89 NRDC argues that the proposed standard was arbitrarily chosen, just like its
predecessor. N R D C r e c o m m e n d s t h a t t h e
criteria document be recommissioned, that a
balanced team of experts work with NIOSH
and another review the document and that a
temporary emergency standard of 1 mW/cm 2
for 10 MHz to 300 GHz, be promulgated.
In spite of the proliferation of microwave
ovens, public resistance to the siting of
technologies that use the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum has been
strong and often effective. Local residents
have opposed the construction of broadcasting towers and radar installations, as well
as high voltage transmission Iines (ELF radiation). (See Siting section.)
SPACE
SPS would represent a giant leap in our present commitment to space. To some, this space
component and its supporting infrastructure
wouId be an unnecessary and expensive comm i t m e n t , 9 0 while others enthusiastically embrace SPS as the first step towards an extraterrestrial future for human kind. 91 Others argue
that a commitment to space is desirable, but
that SPS would be the wrong route to get there.
It is likely that the discussion of the SPS concept would precipitate extensive debate over
national priorities, domestic space policy and
the international and military implications of
space.
Proponents of SPS argue that space is the
optimum place to harvest sunlight 92 and other
resources that are needed for an Earth plagued
by overpopulation, resource limitations, and a
threatened environment. M a n y e n v i s i o n a
L o u I~ Slesln,
l e t t e r t o D r A n t h o n y R o b b i n s , NIOSH,
NRDC, j Uiy 11, 1979

9(
Cltlzens Energy Project, op clt
9Henson, Harlan, Bennett, op clt
92
Brownsteln, op clt
from
Ch. 9Institutional issues . 255
future in which the U.S. mines, industrializes

and colonizes space as a hedge against these
limits to growth.93 94 95 SPS is one step in this vision, for it not only would deliver energy to
Earth but would also spur the development of
hardware, management, expertise and energy
for use by other space activities. In fact, some
proponents have suggested that without SPS,
the space program will atrophy; 96 that SPS
would give NASA a clear context in which to
plan other space projects. Some advocates see
SPS, like Apollo, as a way to restore the frontier spirit by dispelling the gloom associated
with limits to growth. 97 98
Many opponents, on the other hand, call SPS
an aerospace boondoggle. They argue that
SPS, as an energy system, should not be justified on the basis of its applicability to other
space pro jets. Moreover, it is argued that it is
not necessary to go to space in order to generate technological spinoffs; the Nation can encourage technological competence and innovation in more direct and less expensive
ways. 100 Some critics of SPS also argue that
SPS would serve to escalate and accelerate
confrontations in space.
In the future, public opinion about space
and SPS in particular will be influenced by the
relative status of space programs in this and
other countries. 101 For example, the pursuit of
SPS programs in other nations might act as an
impetus for the United States to participate in
or develop its own SPS. In light of the experience with Skylab, it is clear that the success or failure of U.S. space projects such as
the space shuttle will have a marked effect on
public thinking. Grassroots organizations supportive of space, and the popularity of science
fiction and space-oriented entertainment,
could also play a role in determining attitudes
toward the exploitation and exploration of
Glaser, Development of the Satellite Solar Power Station,
op cit
c
t
94tieppenhreimer, oP
95
0 Neill, op. cit

Peter Glaser, private communication
97Glaser, Solar Power Satellite DevelopmentThe
Steps, op. cit
98 Heppenheimer, oP Ct
9
99
Greenbaum, op cit
OOOfflce of Technology Assessment, op cit
101 Ibid
Next
space. A growing public interest in space

utilization or exploration and increased appreciation of the pragmatic benefits of space
could put SPS in a favorable light. 102 Equitable
international agreements about the use of
space could also spur support for SPS. On the
other hand, ambiguous space agreements, international conflicts, or the escalation of
space weaponry couId turn public opinion
a w a y f r o m S P S . Negative public thinking
about space activities and SPS could also stem
from the technical failure of a major space
vehicle or satelIite.
INTERNATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Beyond its immediate implications as a

space system, there are other international
issues associated with SPS. The satelIite system
is seen as a possible focus for either global
cooperation or global conflict by advocates
and opponents alike. 03 However, opponents
are especially skeptical of the feasibility of a
muItinational system; they doubt that international cooperation would occur until most of
the existing conflicts on Earth are resolved.
SPS opponents are most concerned that SPS
would represent U.S. energy imperialism by
dominating the cultural and technical development of lesser developed countries (LDCs). 104
Reliance on the industrial nations would impinge on third world attempts at energy independence. Furthermore they argue that SPS
wouId do Iittle to alleviate the near term
energy needs of LDCs, whereas most terrestrial
solar technologies could. Opponents also fear
that control of SPS by multinational corporations would accelerate the movement of economic and political power away from individuals and communities. 105
The characteristic of SPS that is most attractive to some proponents, on the other
hand, is the potential for multinational
cooperation. 106 107 In fact, a few contend that
l bid
)1 bid
)41 bid
(5 Bossong and Denman, A Critique of Solar Power Satellite
Technology, op cit
lG laser, The Earth Benefits of Solar Power Satellites, op
Clt
7P C laser, The Solar Power Satellite Research, Development and Evaluation Program Act of 1979, testimony In So/ar
Power Satellite, 1979, pp 215-224
this is the only feasible arrangement for SPS; 108

a multinational SPS would alleviate many of
the problems associated with a unilateral SPS,
e.g., military implications and high costs. Proponents also argue that SPS would enhance
the economies and industrial development of
LDCs by meeting their primary energy needs.109
They maintain that electricity from SPS could
be used to produce methanol, transported to
rural areas in labor intensive pipelines for
heating, cooking, and small industries. 110 S P S
might also be used for mariculture to provide
food. SPS advocates maintain that for oil- and
sun-poor Japan and Europe, SPS is one of the
very few energy options available. Some
also argue that the deployment of SPS would
slow the proliferation of nuclear technology in
the third world. 2
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
Military issues are intimately related to
space and international considerations. Proponents stress that SPS microwave and mirror
systems would be ineffective weapons and no
more vulnerable than a terrestrial powerp l a n t . While some believe that a military
presence in space is unavoidable, it is clear
that there are better ways to achieve military
competence than with SPS. A primary concern
for opponents is that SPS would provide a
technological base that would further military
capabilities and serve to escalate military conf l i c t s . 114 Many opponents feel that, like the
shuttle, military involvement with SPS is inevitable and that because of its vulnerability, SPS
would accelerate the need for a military
presence in space. Opponents are also concerned that because of their highly centralized
nature, SPS satellites and receiving stations
would be targets for attack from terrorists and
hostile nations.
[t is likely that the military issue will be of
great concern to the public, although it is not
08 Glaser, private communication, op clt
09 Heppenheimer, op cit
D Criswell, P. Glaser, R Mayur, B OLeary, G ONeill, and
J Vajk, The Role of Space Technology in the Developing Countries, Space So/ar Power Review, VOI 1, No 1 & 2, 1980
1lBachrach, op clt
12Driggers, op cit
Office of Technology Assessment, op clt
1141bld
apparent how the military implications of SPS

would be viewed. For example, a perceived
military potential of SPS and its supporting infrastructure might be seen as a real benefit to a
public concerned about both national security
and energy needs. 5 Many might even expect a
military presence in space. The laser system
would probably engender more concern over
military applications than the microwave or
mirror designs. Clearly, future opinion will be
influenced by the state of space weaponry in
this and other nations, future agreements
about the use of space, and the state of terrestrial weapons as well as arms limitations
and the perceived military stature of the
United States relative to the rest of the world.
CENTRALIZATION AND SCALE
Debate over future energy strategies often
involves questions of general social values
rather than a narrow choice of specific technologies. One of the issues fundamental to this
debate is that of centralization of energy production. The degree of centralization underlies
many of the other issues discussed here including siting, ownership, public participation,
military implications, and the choice between
terrestrial solar and SPS.
Opponents of large-scale technologies object to societys increasing reliance on complex technologies and centralized infrastructures that, they argue, tend to erode the viability of democratic government by concentrating
economic and political power in the hands of a
few, and reducing individual and community
control over local decisions. 116 Critics of SPS
argue that it would augment and necessitate
centralization by requiring a massive financialm a n a g e m e n t p y r a m i d .117 Utility, energy, and
space companies and Federal agencies would
combine into a simple conglomerate, in which
small business would play little or no part.
They reason that decisions about local energy
development, receiver and transmission line
siting and economic and environmental planning would necessarily be made by Federal
1 Ibid
Bossong and Denman, A Critique of Solar Power Satellite
Technology, op cit
Citizens Energy Project, op clt
Ch. 9Institutional Issues 257
and industrial decision makers at a national or

p e r h a p s m u l t i n a t i o n a l I e v e l .118 M a n y o p p o nents argue that decentralized solar technologies are preferable to SPS because they
employ a wider range of skilIs, encourage participation of small firms, are more directly accessible to the individual consumer and
equitably allocate their negative environmental impacts to the same people who receive the
benefits. In addition, unlike SPS that must be
built in large units to be economic, terrestrial
solar technologies can flexibly accommodate
large or small variations in energy demand.
Moreover, unlike SPS, they do not require
large contiguous land areas, a large initial investment, large energy backup units or a national utility grid to ensure adequate reliability. Dispersed energy technologies are also considered more appropriate for lesser developed
nations because they are better matched to
end-use needs, produce relatively small impacts on local culture and environment and
dont require foreign financing, materials,
complex infrastructures or hardware. 120 O p ponents of SPS also view its scale as a severe
detriment from an energy planning perspective
because the incremental risk of investing in an
SPS development program would be unacceptably high; a case of too many eggs in one
b a s k e t .1 2 1
Most proponents of SPS argue that the Nations energy future will be characterized by a
mix of centralized and dispersed energy generating systems, but that only centralized technologies like SPS will be able to meet the
needs of industry, large cities, transportation
and fuel production. 122 In addition, the centralized nature of SPS facilitates its adoption
into the existing electricity infrastructure. 1 2 3
Some organizational centralization may result,
but this will occur in the utility and aerospace
sectors, already strongly centralized, and so it
will not cause a significant new concentration
of power.
DeLoss, testimony in So/ar Power Sate//lte, op clt
Off ice of Technology Assessment, op cit
DeLoss, Solar Power Satellite, op clt
R Stobaugh and D Yergin, Energy Future (New York Ran
dom House, 1979)
In generaI, advocates of large-scale technologies Iike SPS maintain that centralized systems are more reliable and easier to implement
than dispersed technologies. Centralized
powerplants also produce environmental impacts that are localized and hence directly affect fewer people. It is argued that dispersed
power generation does not reduce centralized
decisionmaking; in order to be economic these
systems will require mass production, standardization, and regulation and an extensive
distribution and service network. 124 C e n t r a l ized technologies, at least, are more convenient from the users perspective. Advocates
also contend that centralized technologies and
infrastructures are a better means of ensuring
equity among the Nations citizens. 125 For example, many people, predominantly in the inner cities, wilI continue to rely on centralized
delivery systems because they cannot afford
the capital costs to do otherwise.
While the public might not couch the problem in terms of centralization, it is clear that
people will be concerned about technologies
and systems that appear to prevent them from
directly influencing the conditions of their
own Iives. 1 2 6 Public thinking about SPS will
then be determined by the extent of public participation in the planning and decisionmaking
process, experience w i t h c e n t r a l i z e d a n d
dispersed technologies, attitudes towards
energy, space, and utility conglomerates as
well as the perceived influence and benefits
(e g., convenience) of centralized technologies.
FUTURE ELECTRICITY DEMAND
Those in favor of SPS tend to foresee an
energy future characterized by high electricity
consumption and an expanded power grid. 127
Many equate economic well-being to high
e n e r g y g r o w t h r a t e s .128 Even if the United
States is not able to absorb all of an SPS
H Brooks, Critique of the Concept of Appropriate
Technology, In Appropriate Technology and Social Values A
Cr~tlca/ Appraisa/, F Long and A Oleson (eds ) (Cambridge,
M,iss Balllnger Publlshlng C o , 1 9 8 0 )
Offlc P o f T e c h n o l o g y A s s e s s m e n t , o p clt
2)1 bid
170fflc e of Technology Assessment, The Energy Context of

SP} Work ~hop, A Summary, September 1980
Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Solar Power Sate//ite
Public Op/rrlon Issues Workshop, A Summary, Feb 21-22, 1980
258
system, they argue that on a global scale there

will always be high demand. 129 130 P r o p o n e n t s
also argue that if SPS is able to provide
relatively cheap, environmentally benign and
plentiful energy, then it will be consumed and
demand will be high. 3 Some argue that no
matter which demand scenario is finally realized, we need to investigate every possible
electricity option today, so that we have adequate choices in the future.
Most opponents, on the other hand, envision
an energy future dominated by conservation
and solar technologies. 123 Some believe that
electricity should play a minor role in our
energy supply mix because of its thermodynamic inefficiency. 133 Furthermore, most opponents contend that even if electricity demand were to increase somewhat, it could be
satisfied with existing technologies. 134 T h e y
argue that by developing large-scale energy
systems such as SPS, we are guaranteeing high
energy use because the investment in their
development is so great.
Public attitudes about SPS will depend on
the relative cost and availability of energy, the
advancement and proliferation of electrical
end-use technologies, attitudes towards energy
companies and forecasters of electricity demand, and the sense of energy security as
determined by domestic supply v. reliance on
foreign sources. 35
SPS Technical Options

How might future public reaction to alternative SPS systems differ? 136 Table 54 identifies some of the relative benefits and drawbacks of the proposed SPS systems as they
might be perceived by the public.
2ONeill, op cit.
30Glaser, private communication, op clt
J IOffice of Technology Assessment, The Energy Context of
SPS Workshop, Op. clt
I J21bld
A B Lovins, Energy Strategy The Road Not Taken? Foreign Affairs, October 1976
Office of Technology Assessment, The Energy Context of
SPS Workshop, op. clt
sOffIce of Technology Assessment, So/ar Power Sate//ite:
Pub/ic Opinion /ssues Workshop, op clt
Jblbid
Siting
Historically, public debate over the introduction of a technology has been most pronounced at the siting stage. It is during the
siting phase that public opposition to a technology has been most vocal, organized, and effective. Citizens have taken direct action
against the siting of powerplants, airports,
prisons, high-voltage transmission lines and
military facilities by forming local and national groups, publicizing their cause through
the media, taking legal action, demonstrating,
and occasionally resorting to civil disobedience and violence. 1 3 7 In general, siting controversies revolve around issues of environmental effects, health and safety risks, reduced land values and fair compensation, private property rights, opportunity costs, vulnerabiIity to attack, and public participation in
land-use decisions. 138 It is clear that in the
absence of national land-use policies, conflicts
over land-use priorities will escalate as the
population grows, and friction between rural
and urban America and local communities and
regional or national decision makers will increase 9
For SPS, siting is a major issue. * SPS would
be particularly prone to siting difficulties
because of its large contiguous land requirements, its potential military implications,
and its use of nonionizing electromagnetic
radiation (e. g., microwaves or lasers) in power
transmission and distribution. This last factor
is most important because of considerable
uncertainties associated with the environmental and health risks of electromagnetic radiation as well as possible interference with electromagnetic systems. These uncertainties and
-
L ( aldwell, L Hayes, and I MacWhlrtey, Citizem and the
/ nvtronment Case Stucfles in Popu/ar Act/on (Broom lngton, Ind
I ndlana University Press, 1975)
OftIce of Technology Assessment, op clt
lbl(l
*It ts assumed that SPS receivers would be sited on land Offshore locations are also possible and might alleviate many of the
~PS Ian(j-use problems, but are not specifically addressed here
Also not considered here are possible multiple land uses If it can
he shown that land can safely and economically be used for
iltlng 5 PS receivers and other uses (e g , agriculture, pasture
land) simultaneously, then siting on private land might not be a
problem However, In the absence of detailed assessments on the
( osts and environmental Impacts of multiple uses, it IS assumed
I n th IS section that I and IS dedicated to SPS receivers alone
259
Table 54.Potential Benefits and Drawbacks of SPS Technical Options

Disadvantages
Advantages
Laser system
. Does not use microwaves
. Of SPS systems, requires less land area per site and
can deliver smaller units of energy
Mirror system
Most environmentally benign of SPS systems
Least weapons potential of all SPS systems
Least
complex to demonstrate, most immediately
reliable system
Possibly
least expensive system
Solid state
. Can deliver smaller units of power than mirror or
reference system
Land
per site is smaller than mirror or reference
system
. Satellites in GEO (in vulnerable to unplanned reentry)
and can be placed over the ocean
Less
weapons potential than lasers
. Fairly well-developed technology
Reference system
Satellites
in GEO (invulnerable to unplanned reentry)
and can be placed over the ocean
Less
weapons potential than lasers
Fairly
well-developed technology
Possible weapon
Health and safety impact of beam wanders
Weather
modification
Largest land requirements per site

Illumination of night sky
Weather
modification
. May fall out of low-Earth orbit
Microwave bioeffects
Electromagnetic interference
. Microwave bioeffects
Electromagnetic interference
their institutional management have been

responsible in part for controversies over the
siting of a great many other technologies that
utilize the radiowave spectrum. Community resistance to the siting of radar installations,
broadcasting towers, and high-voltage transmission lines, for example, has been particularly strong and unexpectedly effective.
Citizens groups have actively opposed transmission lines in a number of States including
Oregon, New Hampshire, lowa, and Mont a n a . 140 As a result of public action in New
York, the State Public Service Commission has
expanded the minimum right-of-way for new
lines and established an Administrative Research Council to study and assess health
risks. The legislatures of a few New York
counties have adopted resolutions opposing
the construction of 765 KV lines. 42 In Minnesota, farmers battled with the public utilities
140
The New Opposition to High-Voltage Lines, Business
Week, November 1977
41A. Marino and R Becker, H Igh Voltage Lines. Hazard at a
Distance, Environment, VOI 20, No 9, p 6-15
K Davis, Health and High Voltage, Sierra C/Ub 6u//etin,
JulV 1, August 1978
over the construction of a powerline through

8,000 acres of prime farm land. 43 After attending public hearings and installing solar and
wind devices in their homes to reduce their dependence on the utilities, some became frustrated with what they perceived as the unresponsiveness and dishonesty of the utilities
and finalIy resorted to demonstrations, destroying utiIity towers and equipment.
The siting controversies most relevant to the
SPS microwave systems are the disputes over
the Navys Project SEAFARER (Surface ELF*
Antenna for Addressing Remotely-Deployed
Receivers), a 25,600-mi 2 u n d e r g r o u n d r a d i o
antenna for communication with nuclear submarines; and the Air Forces PAVE PAWS (Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased Array
Warning System), a radar system. When the
Navy attempted to locate SEAFARER at different times in Wisconsin, Texas, New Mexico,
Nevada, and Michigan, it encountered vehe14H Nuwer, Minnesota Peasants Revolt, Nation, VOI 227,
Dec 9, 1978
* E 1 F (extremely low frequency) radio waves
44P Flrodeur, The Zapping of America, Their Deadly Risk and
Cover-[/p (New York W W Norton & Co , 1977)
260
ment local opposition. Residents in these communities were concerned about the health hazards of ELF radiation. Ranchers in Texas were
also worried about the effects on livestock.
Opponents raised other issues including vulnerability to nuclear attack, private property
rights, and decreased land values. 45 Referenda
defeated SEAFARERs construction in several
counties in Michigan, and in an unprecedented
action, the Governor of Michigan rejected the
military program. 146 The Governor of Wisconsin also accused the Navy of suppressing environmental impact studies that reported
possible environmental and health hazards. 147
Although the ELF program is still being funded,
it has yet to find a new site.
Legal action has also been taken against the
Air Forces plans to build PAVE PAWS in Cape
Code, Mass., and Yuba City, Calif. 148 Fear of
adverse microwave bioeffects, especialIy longterm, low-level effects, sit at the heart of the
controversy. While the Air Force stressed that
health risks were negligible and emphasized
the need for national security, local groups
argued that the data did not support the claim
that PAVE PAWS will not jeopardize their
h e a l t h . 149
Several key observations can be made from
these disputes. First, farmers, ranchers, and
rural Americans are becoming an increasingly
active social force working against the intrusion of urban America on their rural quality of
life. As one OTA workshop participant familiar
with powerline siting controversies remarked,
Developers say that high voltage transmission
lines wouldnt make any more noise than a
highway would and the reaction of people is
What do you mean? Thats why were out
here. We dont want to be near the highways . . , . (Rural Americans) are sacrificing
the kind of life they are out therefor, for the
energy excesses of urban America. 150 In many
c Ellis, Sanguine/SEAFARE R, Sierra C/ub Bu//etin, VOI 61,
No 4, April 1976
Brodeur, op clt
1 4 7
S Schiefelbein, The Invisible Threat, Saturday Review,
Sept 5,1979, pp 16-20
40
Brodeur, op cit
4S. Kaufer, The Air Pollutlon You Cant See, New Times,
Mar 6,1978
cases, communities would prefer to leave a

site overgrown than consent to any kind of
development. For SPS as well as other powerplants, dumps, mines, and military installations, siting in remote areas could be a difficult task, especially in parts of the country
where
residents have already mobilized
against other large-scale projects. 151 According
to another workshop participant, one farmer,
when asked about the SPS proposal, responded, Ive had enough. Im ready to get
my gun out. 152
Another factor that emerges from siting controversies is that while concerns over the environmental and health risks of a technology
are very important to nearby residents, this
issue may mask related concerns such as unsightliness and devaluation of local property
vaIues 153 that may be more important to the
Iocal community. For example, in the Minnesota powerline dispute, the fundamental
issue for many of the farmers was the question
of land-use, i.e., farmland v. right-of -way. 54
However, this issue was channeled into environmental and health concerns that had
greater political leverage in the courts and to
which the utilities and the general public were
more responsive. While the health effects of
ELF radiation were the most frequently articulated concern of communities opposing
SEAFARER, it is clear that to some residents,
economics really lay at the heart of the controversy 155 These people were primarily concerned that Iand values might decrease if
potential buyers worried about the health effects, and might not have opposed the siting if
they had been justly compensated. Other residents were most concerned that the presence
of SEAFARER would make their land more
vulnerable to military attack; this would
threaten their safety and could also reduce the
vaIue of their land. 156
I blci
)lbld
5
1 bld
1 bld
$joseph Thlel, T e x a s
State
Department
of
Health,
private
cc]mmunlcatlon, Nov 28, 1979

P
Boffey,
A( ademy s
121 )-1 21 -i
Project
S E A F A R E R Critics
Attack
National
Review Group, Science, VOI 192, June 18, 1976, pp
This second observation also points to the

complex interrelationship between environmental and health risks, costs, land and air use,
private property rights, esthetics, and public
control over local decisions. For SPS, it is clear
that the choice of transmission frequency and
power distribution as well as public radiation
standards could have a great bearing on the
area of land that would be required as a buffer
zone, the number of people potentially affected, compensated, and/or relocated, and
hence the cost of developing SPS. In addition,
the size of each SPS unit and its location could
determine the extent, number and therefore
cost of transmission lines that would have to
be sited. The cost of a proposed energy facility
such as SPS can also be increased if developers
do not solicit public participation and disputes
and court battIes delay construction. Siting
should therefore be considered as early as
possible in the development process; public input is an essential element in the development
and design strategy.
Finally, it is clear that many of the siting
disputes might have been resolved earlier and
more easily if the channels of communication
between developers and the local community
261
had been more open. Public participation

should be solicited whenever and wherever
possible, ideally even before the siting stage.
Too often, residents become frustrated and resentful towards developers and officials who
make inadequate and occasionally dishonest
attempts to involve the public in meaningful
decisionmaking. This practice has led the public to seek other forums to voice complaints,
thereby delaying decisions and driving up
costs. SPS developers must be well-informed
about the environmental, economic, and military implications of SPS and shouId arrange for
open dissemination and discussion of that information. In addition, no matter what objective research findings are, public perceptions
of potential hazards are largely influenced by
public confidence (or lack thereof) in official interpretation of that data (see Environment, Health, and Safety). Whether justified or
not, the public is considerably more cautious
and fearful of the biological effects of
microwaves and other electromagnetic radiation than are many representatives of Government and industry. But until the uncertainties
are resolved to the publics satisfaction, the
past cases strongly suggest that local resistance to SPS receivers could be substantial.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A
ALTERNATIVES TO THE
REFERENCE SYSTEM SUBSYSTEMS
Solar-Thermal Power Conversion
The basic operational principle involved in solarthermal-electric power systems is identical to that
of virtually al I conventional ground-based powerplants, with a solar furnace replacing the fuel-fired
furnace or nuclear reactor normally used to heat
the power-cycle working fluid. The 10-MW demonstration plant at Barstow, Calif., is such a solarpowered thermal cycle. Virtually all components
of such power systems have been extensively used
and/or tested on Earth, and hence solar-thermal
systems for potential space applications in the SPS
time frame would enjoy the availability of a large
body of applicable technology, hardware, and experience. Significant problems are foreseen, however, in reducing the mass and complexity of spacebased powerplants to levels that make them competitive with the reference system photovoltaic
power source.
The basic rationale for considering thermal
power cycles is their inherently high energy conversion efficiency. High-performance thermal cycle
power generators on Earth routinely attain overall
efficiencies of more than 40 percent, as compared
with the 17-percent projected efficiency for the reference-system photovoltaics, and it is quite probable that material and component developments
during the next decade or two could extend overall
operational thermal-cycle efficiencies for terrestrial units to over 50 percent. Unfortunately,
however, the space environment is such that these
efficiency levels, even with advanced-technology
power-conversion hardware, are extremely difficult
to achieve. The fundamental problem is that of
heat rejection; that is, in accordance with the dictates of the Second Law of thermodynamics, it is
necessary that any heat engine reject to its environment some of the energy it receives (the ubiquitous
thermal pollution of Earth-based powerplants).
On Earth, effective heat rejection at the low temperatures needed for high thermal efficiency is
readily accomplished by using vast quantities of
cool water or air. In space, on the other hand, all
heat rejection must be accomplished solely by
radiation, a process that depends on the fourth
power of the radiators temperature. Hence efficient heat rejection in space can be accomplished
only at high temperatures, which b y t h e S e c o n d
Law results in reduced thermal efficiency. The radi-
ators of the space-based thermal powerplant

therefore become the key limitation on performance, and counteract the beneficial effect of
potentially high-cycle efficiency. The most effective space-based thermal power cycle, then, is generalIy the one that minimizes the radiator mass.
The Brayton and Rankine Cycles

The two simple solar-thermal cycles considered for SPS are the Brayton and Rankine
cyclesthe cycles used on Earth for gas turbines
and steam turbines, respectively. In the Brayton cycle, a compressor compresses a gaseous working
fluid, that is then heated by solar energy concentrated into an absorber by large, diaphanous
thin-film solar mirrors having a concentration ratio
of perhaps 2,000-to-l, then discharges its waste
heat to a radiator. It then returns to the compressor
and repeats the cycle.
The Rankine cycle utilizes the same basic energy
source as the Brayton cycle typically, a 2,000-to-l

solar concentrator mirror focused on an absorber
but employs a condensable liquid, or, frequently,
ordinary steam. The solar energy impinging on the
absorber boils and superheats the steam, which
then drives a turbine. The steam then condenses in
the radiator at constant temperature. The condensed water is then pumped back up to high pressure
and forced into the boiler (absorber) to complete
the cycle.
The Brayton and Rankine cycle options were rejected for the reference system, despite their
relatively high efficiencies, because of the high
radiator mass, the lower projected reliability of
rotating machinery, and relative complexity of orbital assembly operations as compared with the
photovoltaic options. However, recent developments in high-temperature heat exchangers and turbines, 1 and particularly innovative designs of heatpipe and other radiators2 3 now make Brayton-cycle
turbines more attractive.
Review Study of a 13rayton Power System for a Nuclear Electr!c
Jpace( raft, j PL contract 955W08, Garrett-AlResearch report No 311288A ()( t 9, 1979
Yale C F astman, A Study of the Appl Icatlon of Advanced Heat Pipe
Technology to Radiators for Nuclear Spacecraft, Thermacore, Inc , Lanc a~ter Pa E)ec 1, 1975, a I so see Ya Ie C E astm an, Advanced Heat P I pes
[n Aero$pace Power System s, A IAA paper No 77-501, St I. OUIS, Mo , Mar
I -1, 1977
)ohn Hedgepeth and K Knapp, Preliminary Investlgatlon of a Dust
Radiator tor Space Power System s, Astro Research Corp report No ARCrN 1014 Mar 1 9 7 8
265
266
Other Thermal Cycles

Other thermal cycles have also been considered, 4 5 to be used independently or in conjunction with the Brayton or Rankine cycles in
a combination. The most Iikely prospects are
the thermionic6 7 and the magnetohydrodynamic
( M H D )8 c y c l e s or the wave-energy exchanger. 9 10 11 12 13
None of these seems particularly well adapted
for use in an independent mode in space, although
any one of them may have potential when used in
combination with either the Rankine or Brayton cycle. The primary consideration for these cycles is
the tradeoff between high efficiency and high

radiator mass. Principal areas requiring research
and/or additional development are in the hightemperature solar collection and absorption portions of all systems and high-performance heatrejection devices, as well as extensive testing and
pilot operations to establish the required levels of
reliability and reductions in cost uncertainties.
Photovoltaic
Alternatives
Alternative Materials
Alternative photocell materials considered before selecting the reference system options of
single-crystal silicon and galIium aluminure-arsenide were amorphous silicon, polycrystalline silicon, cadreium suIfide, copper iridium selenide, and
polycrystalline gallium arsenide. Although all these
Daniel L Gregory, Alternative Approaches to Space-Based Power
Generation, /ourrra/ of Energy 1, March-April 1977, pp 85-92
Wllllam P C Ilbreath and Kenneth W Billman, A Search for Space
Energy Alternatives, In Radlatlon Energy Conversion In Space, Progres~ In Astronaut/c$ & A e r o n a u t i c s , vo/ 61, Al AA, N Y , ] uly 1978, pp
107-125
G O , Fitzpatrick and E j Brltt, Thermlonlcs and Its Appllcatlon to
the SPS, Ibid, pp 211-221
(For example), W Phllllps and J Mondt, Thermlonlc Energy Conversion Technology Development Program, Progress report No 630-36 (for
June-September 1978), Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Callf , Nov
15, 1978
C V Lau and R Decher, MHD Conversion of Solar Energy, In
Radlatlon Energy Conversion In Space, K W Blllman (ed ), Progress In
Astronautics & Aeronautics, vo/ 61, Al AA, N Y , July 1978, pp 186-200
Robert T Tausslg, Peter H Rose, John F Zumdleck a n d A b r a h a m
Hertz berg, Energy Exchanger Technology Applied to Laser Heated
Engines, Ibid, pp 465-478
1(
W E Smith and R C Weatherston, Studies of a Prototype Wave
Superheater Faclllty for Hypersonic Research report No HF-1056-A-I,
contract AFOSR-TR-58-I 58, AD207244, Cornel I Aeronautical Laboratory,
Buffalo, N Y , December 1958
Abraham Hertzberg and Chan-Veng Lau, A High-Temperature
Ranklne Binary Cycle for Ground and Space Solar Appllcatlons, In
Radiation Energy Conversion in Space, K W Blllman (ed ), Progress In
Astronautics & Aeronautics, vo/ 61, Al AA, N Y , July 1978, pp 172-185
Arthur T Mattlck, Absorption of Solar Radlatlon by Alkali Vapors,
Ibid, pp 159-171
A jay Palmer, Radlatlvely
Sustained (eslum Plasmas for Solar E lectrlc Conversion, Ibid, pp 201-210
materials cost less than either of the two selected

materials, their efficiencies are low and there is little experience in their production. Other factors
considered by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration before selecting the two reference
system options were total system mass, materials
availability, susceptibility to radiation damage,
development status, manufacturing processes, and
energy payback. Other potential photovoltaic
materials that were rejected due to obvious problems with one or more of the above factors include selenium and various selenides, cadmium
telluride, copper sulfide, gallium phosphide, iridium phosphide, and a number of higher order inorganic compounds.
Concentration
Another important parameter is the concentration ratio (CR). The selection of CR = 2 for the
reference-system gallium arsenide option was
strongly Influenced by cell temperature considerations. 14 Should cell technology develop that would
retain high efficiency at elevated temperatures,
higher concentrations might prove cost effective,
since both the mass and the cost of reflector
materials are considerably less than those of
photocelIs.
There is good experimental evidence that the
gallium aluminum-arsenide/gal lium-arsenide cells
selected for the SPS could utilize much higher concentration ratios to gain higher overall efficiency.
There has been considerable development in concentrating photovoltaic subsystems for terrestrial
use during the past 2 years, and it is possible that
passive rather than active cooling may be possible.
Multicolor Photocell Systems

Photocells respond to only a part of the available solar spectrum that impinges on them. It is
possible to achieve more efficient utilization of the
solar spectrum by: 1 ) manufacturing a single photocell from various materials, each responding to a
different wavelength band; 15 or 2) using separate
celIs, each optimized for a different spectral region
and using an optical system to split the incident
light into the corresponding spectral ranges.
1
W Iame$,
a n d R L M o o n , CaAs Concentrator Solar Cells,
cee(lIrtw 01 /he I T th Photovo/talc Specfa/lsts
Conference,
Pro-
1975,
pp
40,? 408
Richard j Stlrn, Overview of Novel Photovoltaic
Conversion Techniq~i IPS at H Igh I ntenslty Level s, In Radlatlon Energy Conversion In
K W Blllman (ed ), Progress In Astronautics & Aeronautics, VOI
~pal e
fl / I Uly 1978 pp 136-151
I aan, ] url~~on, Multlcolar Solar Cel I Power System for Space, r Ibid,
pp 1 5/! 158
Appendix AAlternatives to the Reference System Subsystems
Although the technology for both approaches is

known, it is far from having been proved practical,
and will require considerable research and development effort before being considered for future
operational systems. The second approach appears
to be the most promising in principle. However, it
suffers from a lack of basic data on the photovoltaic materials that might be used for it. Despite
their attractiveness from the standpoint of efficiency, both systems also require either higher
mass or concentrator systems, which may require
active cooling. Again, vastly more research is
needed to determine the overall effectiveness of
these concepts.
Alternative Microwave
Power Converters
I n addition to the klystron, several other devices
may be capable of converting satellite electric
power to microwaves and transmitting them to
Earth. The solid-state amplifier, based on semiconductor technology, could result in a significant and
beneficial change of the entire system. The latter
serves as one of the four systems considered in this
assessment.
Crossed-Field Amplitier. Thls device in the t e r m
of an amplitron, was originally suggested for

the reference system in place of the klystron
(linear beam amplifier). Another form of this device, the magnetron, appears to have considerable merit, * particularly in reducing the spurious
noise
and harmonics generation of the
microwave antenna. I n smaller form (1 kW), this
is the familiar unit that powers microwave ovens.
The latter devices are reliable and cheap.
Whether working devices of the 70-kW capacity
needed for the reference system antenna will
prove to be cost effective and possess the required signal characteristics must await design
and testing, individually and in a phased array.
So/id-State Devices. The principal motivation for
considering solid-state devices is their extremely
high reliability; 17 18 projected failure rates are
100 times lower than those of the reference-system vacuum-tube klystrons or amplitrons. 19 A
secondary advantage of solid-state devices is
their potential for lower mass per unit area than
*W C Brown, Microwave Beamed Power Technology Improvement
PT-5613 J PL contract 955-104, May 1980
G M Hanley et al , Satelllte Power Systems (SPS) Concept Deflnltion Study, First Performance Review, Rockwell International report No
SSD79-0163, NASA MSFC contract NAS8- 12475, Oct 10, 1979
n
Gordon R Woodcock, SolId-State Microwave Power Transmitter Re
view, Boeing Aerospace Co DOE SPS Program Review, June 7, 1979
Vlbid
267
the vacuum-tube devices. Further, their small

size and potentially low unit cost facilitate convenient research and development activities.
The basic problem with solid-state devices is
their low-temperature capability, which implies
low power, coupled with their low-voltage output. Additional potential problem areas are uncertain efficiency, current high cost for high-performance units, and a host of as yet unresolved
transmission, control, and power distribution
complexities. 20 However, these devices are still
in the early stages of being evaluated for the SPS
application, and it is Iikely that studies of the extent devoted to vacuum-tube devices during the
past few years can reduce the present uncertainties associated with sol id-state power conversion
and transmission.
A major area for concern with the solid-state
devices is the paucity of data and experience on
phase control. Although the same generic type of
retrodirective control is projected as for the
reference system, much research, analysis, and
technology advancement will be needed to
define its phase control capabilities to the
necessary level of confidence.
Photoklystrons
The photoklystron combines the principles of a
conventional klystron transmitting tube and the
photoemitter in a single device. Sunlight falling on
a photoemissive surface generates a current of
electrons oscillating in such a way as to emit radio
frequency electromagnetic waves. If used on the
SPS, the resultant microwaves could be beamed to
Earth by using a resonator waveguide.
Potential advantages of the photoklystron over
the photovoltaic array/klystron are that it could increase the useful portion of the photoelectric
energy spectrum as compared with photovoltaics
(it may reach efficiencies as high as 50 percent21 as
compared with 15 to 20 percent for conventional
photovoltaics), and that it would greatly simplify
22
the entire space segment of the SPS as compared
with the reference system, by (a) eliminating the
solar celI arrays altogether, (b) eliminating the need
for on board power distribution, (c) eliminating the
rotary joint and sliprings, (d) reducing the individual klystron power and heat dissipation requirements (there would now be many more klystrons
(lbld
C Ibraeth and Blllman, op c[t
}ohn W F r e e m a n , Wllllam B Colson and Sedgwick Slmons, N e w
Method\ for the Conversion of Solar Energy to R F and Laser Power, In
Space danufacturlng 1 I l, Jerry Grey and Chrlstlne Krop (eds ) Al AA,
New York November 1979
268
distributed over a much larger area), thereby increasing the lifetime of individual klystrons, (e)
reducing individual klystron cost, and (f) reducing
rectenna area requirements, since the transmitting
antenna is much larger than that of the reference
system.
One suggested system (fig. 10) consists of a large
elliptical array of photoklystrons, constituting the
collector and antenna. A large mirror (that could
also be a concentrator) would reflect sunlight to
the photoklystrons. Note that even though the mirror and antenna must rotate with respect to each
other to maintain proper Sun-facing and Earthfacing attitudes, as in the SPS reference system,
there is no need for a mechanical connection between them; in fact, their relative alinement is not
at all critical.
Small working models of photoklystrons exist,
but have not yet demonstrated any of the system
characteristics needed for a practical and cost- effective SPS. Hence the concept still remains just
that: a highly interesting and promising prospect
for further intensive study.
ated baseload electricity may prove extremely difficult, it has been suggested that rectennas be
located in shallow offshore waters. * The costs of
such siting would certainly be higher for a given
area than for comparable land-based sites, but the
system costs might be cheaper overall because of
cost reductions in rectenna size. The considerable
body of relevant experience that was developed for
offshore airports would be useful for studying this
possibility. The land areas that have been considered for offshore airports are comparable to the
needs of SPS rectennas (e. g., 50 to 20 km z).
It may be possible to reduce the necessary area
of an offshore rectenna by eliminating most of the
buffer zone and flattening the power distribution
of the beam across the rectenna. Though potentially costly, the option may be taken very seriously by
the European community for whom rectenna siting
on land would prove most difficult. It may also find
uses along the shores of densely populated areas in
the United States.
Offshore Rectennas
Because siting a rectenna near the coastal population centers that will have most of SPS-gener-
Rice Unlverslty, Solar Power Satelllte

CR 1348, November 1980
Offshore Rectenna
Study NASA
Appendix B
DECENTRALIZED PHOTOVOLTAIC MODEL

Estimating the busbar costs for a house or industrial plant power station, whether connected to
the grid or stand-alone, may involve somewhat different assumptions than for a central power station. For one thing, the homeowners access to capital is different than that of the utility. In addition,
the tax liabilities are different and arise from a different conceptual framework.
In order to compare most directly the busbar
costs of a decentralized photovoltaic technology
with the centralized terrestrial case and with the
solar power satellite, OTA has adopted the case of
decentralized systems leased by a utility to an individual owner. The choice to calculate the costs
this way represents neither a preference nor a prediction on the part of OTA for the way in which dispersed photovoltaic systems will be marketed in
the future. The costs so calculated are the costs to
the utility and do not reflect the price to the consumer. They therefore are directly comparable to
the busbar costs of electricity from the solar power
satelIite.
For homeowners who would prefer not to continue to rely on a central structure for their power,
leasing equipment from a utility may not be an acceptable arrangement. Many, however, will not
wish to accept the relatively high capital investment and subsequent maintenance which an in
stallation requires and wilI prefer leasing to purchase.
Household and Industrial Photo voltaics:
costs and efficiencies
System assumptions:
Array efficiency18 percent*
Degradation 5 percent first year, stable thereafter
Systems life 30 years*
Inverterefficiency90 percent
Battery efficiency 75 percent round trip
Array cost $35 m2*
Additional installation costs assuming roof replacement $0.0
Additional installation costs assuming array flat on
roof $1 3/m 2
Additional installation costs assuming array on ground
$80/m 2
Operation and maintenance1 percent of initial costs
per year
Lightning protection:
Household $500
Industry $0
Inversion and power conditioning$82/kW
Assumptions of SPS reference system
Battery lifetime (deep cycles) 2,000

Battery initial costs ($/kWh capacity)$49/kWh
Battery O&M cost (/kWh discharged) O.038/kWh
Battery total cost (/kWh discharged): 4.3/kWh
Battery housing and related costs ($/kWh capacity)
$6.4/kWh
Backup generator, residential $306/kW
Industrial cogenerator steam turbine$1,446/kW
Percent backup in system with storage60 percent
Sample
Calculation
The following equations apply, assuming there

are no variable O&M costs and no fuel costs.
Busbar costs (/KWh) = Ievelized capital cost/levelized
output + Ievelized fixed O&M/levelized output
cost = FCR X initial capital cost
Levelized capital
($/100m 2) x 100 /$
FCR (fixed charge rate)= CRF (i/N) + T
CRF (i/N) = capital recovery factor = 1
1-(1 + i) N
where:
= weighted cost of capital
I
= economic life = book life
N
= Ievelized income taxes =(t/(l-t))(CRF( i/N) -1)
T
x P (TD 1/N)
TD = tax alIowance for accelerated tax
depreciation**
CRF (i/N) x ((2 x (M (1/CRF(i/M)))/(M X
(M+ 1)X i))
M
= tax life
Levelized output = kWh/year/100m2 array
Levelized fixed O&M= O&M($/100m2/yr)X1000/$ X
AF(e,i,N)
AF(e,i,N) = CRF(i/N) X (1 ((1 + e)/(1 + i))N)/(i e)) X
(1 + e)
where e = apparent escalation rate (inflation rate)
Financial assumptions:
I
0 . 1 0
0.30
= 0.06
= 30 years for array

= 6 years for batteries
M
= 20 years
Example
A household 100m 2 array mounted on the roof in
Boston generates 22,017 kWh/yr:
Cost
of
array
.$3,500
Lightning
protection
$
500
Power
conditioning
.,
...
$
650
Structural
support
.,
..
$1,300
Total
* *A~sume\
...
.,
.$5,950
sum-of-the-years dlglt~ depredation method
269
83-316 0 - 81 - 19
O&M costs/year = 1 percent capital costs = $59.56

FCR = 0.12504
Levelized capital cost= 0.125 X 5,956 X 100
= 74,450 /l00m2 /year
2
Levelized fixed O&M = 9,705 /100m /year
Busbar costs (/kWh) =

74,450
+ 1 1 , 2 3 3
22,017
22,017
= 3.9/kWh
Appendix C
GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND FORECASTS

1. IIASAs predictions were influenced by several factors: 1 ) most of the analysis was done prior to
the 1979 rise in oil prices; 2) there was an optimistic view of the growth of nuclear capacity (to
some 50 to 60 percent of global generating capacity by 2030); 3) participation in the study by
the Soviet Union and other centrally planned economies, who for political reasons projected
very high economic and energy-use growth rates; 4) low expectations for conservation and
alternative energy sources.
2. Predictions of future energy demand are based on estimates of underlying economic and
demographic factors, and of the relation between overall economic and population growth and
energy demand. IIASAs population and GDP growth rate projections are as follows:
Population projections by region, high and low scenarios (10 people) (Finite World, p. 429)
Population base
Projection 2000
year 1975
Region
2030
237
363
560
319
284
436
680
575
315
480
767
797
1,422
133
2,528
247
3,550
353
912
3,946
World
.
NOTES: 1975 data are mldyear estlmates from Unlted Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics Januar~ 1978
1,330
6,080
1,714
7,976
I
II
Ill
Iv
v
VI
Vll
(NA)-North America
(SU/EE)-Soviet Union/East Europe ........,
(WE/JANZ)-West Europe/Japan, Australia
(LA)- Latin America
(AF/SEA)-Southern Africa& Asia ..........

(ME/NAF)-Middle East/North Africa
(C/CPA)-China/Central Planned Asia
Historical and projected growth rates of GDP, by region, high and low scenarios (percent/yr)
High scenario
Historical
Region
I
( N A )
II
( S U / E E ) .
Ill
(WE/JANZ)
Iv
(
L
A
)
v
( A F / S E A ) .
( M E / N A f )
VI
(C/CPA)
Vll
World
I + Ill (OECD).
IV + V(Developing)
1950-60
3.3
10.4
50
5.0
39
70
8.0
5.0
4.2
47
1960-75
34
65
52
61
55
98
61
50
44
6.5
Scenario projection
1975-85
43
5.0
43
62
58
72
50
47
4.3
6.3
1985-2000
33
40
34
49
4.8
5.9
4.0
38
34
51
2ooo-15
24
35
25
37
38
42
35
30
2.5
39
2075-30
20
35
20
33
3.4
38
30
27
20
35
Low scenario
Scenario projection
Historical
1950-60
Region
I
( N A )
II
Ill
Iv
v
VI
Vll
(SU/EE).
(WE/JANZ).
(
L
A
(AFI/EA)
(ME/NAf)
(C/CPA)
World
I + Ill (OECD)
IV + V + VI (Developing)
3.3
10.4
50
5.0
39
70
8.0
50
42
47
SOURCE Energy In a F/n/te World, A Global $ystems Ana/ys/s,

Mass Balllnger Publlshlng Co , 1981) p 431
1960-75
34
65
52
6.1
55
9.8
61
50
44
65
1975-85
31
45
32
47
48
56
33
3.6
3.1
5.0
1 985-2000
20
3.5
2.1
3.6
36
4.6
3,0
27
21
38
2000-15
11
2.5
1.5
30
28
27
25
19
13
29
Energy Systems program croup lnt~matlonal In$tltute for Applied svstems Analvsls
2015-30
1.0
20
1.2
30
24
21
20
17
11
26
(Cambridge,
271
272
3. In general, the IIASA study places great emphasis on the development of nuclear power, and
especially on an explosive growth in fast breeders after 2000. Although a number of countries,
including France, Japan, and the Soviet Union, have announced aggressive plans to install
breeders over the next several decades, it should be remembered that questions still remain as
to breeder reactor safety, reliability and operating costs. (See ch. 6 for a comparison of
breeders and other baseload power sources.) IIASAs high expectations for breeder development are by no means universalIy shared.
Percent of global secondary electrical demand met by nuclear powerllASA
1975
Conventional reactors
Breeders
Total
2000
20
0.0
20
2030
Low
High
Low
High
271
044
275
294
067
303
19,2
40,6
498
22.9
38,2
611
SOURCE Energy in a Finlte World, p 580
4. These higher estimates for the amount of coal used for synfuels depend on a number of
assumptions, including the greatly increased use of nuclear power to replace coal in electricity
generation.
5. The following CONAES study estimates for the U.S. should be compared with the IIASA
estimates for North America (see No. 1, p. 271 for population and economic figures; assume
Canadian population is approximately 10 percent of total),
Population in 2070279 million (Bureau of Census Series I I projection, with no allowance for illegal immigration).
Average growth in GNP, 1980-20102 percent per year ]
Primary energy demand (Quads)

CO AfAES4 [United States on/y - 2010)
Low [A]
High (C)
Medium [B]
70
90
130
IIASA 5 (North America-Canada approximately 10 percent of total)
2000
2030
Low
H
99
120
131
180
Direct comparisons are difficult because of the different time frames and geographical areas
examined. The CONAES A projection, no growth in energy demand over the next 30 years, has
no parallel in the IIASA study. The IIASA low scenario is slightly higher than the CONAES series
B projections; the high scenario is approximately equal to CONAES C. Population estimates are
compatible; however, CONAES 2 percent per year average GNP growth rate is much lower
than IIASAs high scenario. It is approximately equal to the low scenario forecast.
Insofar as the two studies are comparable, CONAES estimates are somewhat lower than
IIASAs, with the more radical CONAES A projection much lower. The difficulty lies in determining what this might mean on a global scale. Lower estimates for the United States may hold
true for other Western industrialized areas, but cannot be extended to developed centrally
planned economies or to the developing world, where growth rates are expected to be higher
than in the OECD. The CONAES report itself states that: Even if energy conservation in the
United States accomplishes a great deal domestically, it will be more than offset by demand
growth in countries at the takeoff stage of development Global energy consumption in 2010
is estimated to be probably three to four times what it is now, with electrical consumption
rising at even faster rates. b
6. The Case Western Reserve and World Energy Conference estimates for future energy and electricity use are as follows:
Energy In Transltlon, 1985-2010 (Washington, D C , National Academy of S, Iences, 1979), p 626
z I bid , p 643
Ibid , p 645
1 bid , p 668
Energy In a Ftnfte VVor/d A G/oba/ Systems Ana/ysls, Energy Systems Progr~m Group, I nternatlona I I nstltute for Appl led Systems Analysis
(Cambridge, Mass Ballinger Publishing Co , 1981), p 44o
Energy In Transition, p 626 )
Appendix CGlobal Energy Demand Forecasts
Energy demand (Quads
1975
2000
2025/2020
CWRU
WEC
C WRU
WEC
OECD
.
.
.
.
...
SU/EE . . . . . . . . . . . .
146.8
55.0
3453
98.3
266.2
126,1
618,8
205.7
395.1
235.0
Developing,
....,...
Global. . . . . . . . .
37.7
239.5
103.0
5466
174.0
566.3
296,8
1,121.3
434.2
1,064.3
End-use electricity demand (Quads electric) (estimated by Clav. and Dupas from model data)
2000
1975
WEC
CWRU
WEC
55.8
152
102
812
386
216
135
737
106,9
353
40.2
182,4
66.1
353
465
1479
12,5
3.9
1.8
18,2
OECD
.,
SU/EE
:
D e v e l o p i n g
. ,
G l o b a l ,
2025/2020
CWRU
Compare these figures to the lower IIASA estimates in figure C-1. The worldwide distribution
of LEPP in 2025 for the CWR model is:
Figure C-1 .Large Electric Powerplants in 2025

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
340
320 300
280 260
240
220
200
180
20
60
F
E
40
D
c
20
B
A
a
b
20
c
d
40
e
f
60
8 Nb per zone
Preliminary Evaluation of Ground and Space Solar
Market in 2025, 29th IAF Congress, October 1978
273
274
7. The World Bank report on Energy in the DevelopingCountries projects energy use and demand
over the next decade. From 1973-78, growth in electricity consumption in developing countries
averaged 8 percent per year, compared to 3.5 percent in developed countries; the Bank estimates this will continue through the 1980s. The Bank reports that in 1980 Oil-Importing Developing Countries (OIDC) invested $18.5 billion in electric power (70 percent for generation, 20
percent for distribution, 10 percent for transmission) out of a total of $24.6 billion invested in
all forms of energyover 75 percent. This is expected to more than double, to $39.7
bilIion/year, by 1990.
The amount of installed capacity is estimated to be 241 gW in 1980, rising to 523.7 in 1990.
Large increases will be made in gas and nuclear fired generators though absolute levels will remain relatively low; hydro power will remain the largest single source, at approximately 40 percent of the total, with oil generation declining rapidly from 37 to 25 percent.
Energy In the Deve/op/ng Countrle>,
World Bank, August 1980, pp 42-49
Appendix D

DOE Comparative Environmental
Assessment
The Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored
comparative environmental assessments between
the following energy technologies: conventional
coal (CC), coal gasification/combined cycle (CG/
CC), light water reactor (LWR), liquid metal fast
breeder reactor (LMFBR), magnetically confined fusion (MC F), central station terrestrial photovoltaics
(CTPV), and the reference system solar power satellite (SPS). An analysis was performed to quantify
and compare the effects of these technologies on
environmental welfare (i. e., effects that are not
directly related to health and safety such as weather modification, resource depletion and noise),
health and safety and resource requirements. Unquantifiable health impacts were also identified,
but were not ranked (see table D-l). The major conclusions include:1
With respect to effects on the environmental
welfare, all of the energy options except for
coal (because of CO2 climatic alterations and
acid rain) are roughly comparable in magnitude, while different in nature.
As shown in figure D-1, it is apparent that the
quantified public and occupational health
risks of all the technologies except coal are
about the same in magnitude, but different in
cause. The health effects that were not included in this analysis are Iisted in table D-1.
Land use comparisons indicate that the land
area required for SPS would be similar to that
for CTPV. Coal utilizes slightly less total land
area. This is distributed among many mining
sites as opposed to the large contiguous land

space needed for SPS and CTPV. The nuclear
technologies require the least total land area.
While each technology would encounter material constraints, none appear insurmountable. Water requirements are listed in table
D-2.
All technologies considered are not energy
producers when operating fuel requirements
are excluded from the calcuIations. Otherwise,
only the inexhaustible technologies are net
producers.
MicrowavesIonosphere
Interaction
While only a small fraction of the incident

microwave energy is absorbed by the ionosphere,
the resultant heating at microwave frequencies
could significantly alter the thermal budget of the
ionosphere. In the lower ionosphere (D & E regions)
a phenomenon called enhanced electron heating
can occur if the microwave heating overwhelms
the natural cooling mechanisms of the ionosphere.
The resultant heating can then affect electron-ion
recombination rates, changing ionospheric densities, or drive additional interactions. Furthermore,
in the E region it is possible that the microwave
heating could enhance natural density irregularities called sporadic E that can cause scintillations or scattering of radio frequency signals particularly in the very high frequency (VHF) band,
e.g., citizen-band and some television bands. z
New experiments and theories were needed to
understand the effects of an SPS microwave beam
traveling through the ionosphere (an example of
..
Program Assessment Report, Statement of Flndlngs, Satell Ite Power

Systems, Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/E R-0085,
November 1980
W E Gordon and L M Duncan, Reviews of Space ScienceSPS impacts on the Upper Atmosphere, Astronautics arid Aeronautics, july/
August 1980, VOI 18, NoS 7,8, p 46
Table D.1 .Unquantified Health Effects

Solar technologies (CTPV, SPS)
Exposure to cell production emissions and hazardous
materials.
Chronic low-level microwave exposure to the general and
worker populations (SPS).
Exposure to HLLV emissions and possible space vehicle
accidents (SPS).
Worker exposure to space radiation (SPS).
Nuclear technologies (LWR, LMFBR, MCF)

System failure with public radiation exposure (including waste
disposal).
Fuel cycle occupational exposure to chemically toxic materials.
Diversion of fuel or byproduct for military or subversive uses.
Liquid metal fire (LMFBR, MCF only).
atW unquantified health effects were identified for the coal SYStem used.
SOURCE:
Program Assessment Report, Statement of Flnr)vrgs, Satellite Power Systems, Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOEIER-0085, November 1980.
275
LORAN-C), and MF (300 kHz to 3 MHz, AM).3 However, neither Arecibo nor Platteville is equipped to
generate a beam of SPS frequency and power density. Instead the experiments were performed at
lower frequencies and power densities and the
results extrapolated to SPS conditions using the
scaling law:
P
SPS
HF
=
f2
SPS
f2
HF
where Psps and PHF are the power of the SPS beam
(i.e., 23 mW/cm2) and heating facility beam respectively, and f is the frequency of the beam (i. e., f sps
= 2.45 GHz).4 This extrapolation is thought to be
valid only if the primary heating mechanism is
ohmic (i. e., heating by CoIIisions between ions). This
assumption has been verified over a limited range
of frequencies. By increasing the Platteville and
Arecibo power densities and maximum frequency,
confidence in the sealing theory could be improved. Experiments are also needed to test the effects of localized ionosphere heating on telecommunication systems operating at frequencies above
3 MHz.
Table D.2.Water Requirements for
Alternative Energy Technologies
Cubic meters
per gigawatt year
Conventional coal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77x 106
Light water reactor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37x 10
Liquid metal fast breeder reactor . . . . . . . . .
32X 1O6
Coal gasification/combined cycle. . . . . . . . .
14x 106
Magnetically confined fusion . . . . . . . . . . . .
39x 106
Satellite power system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = 1 x 103
Central station terrestrial photovoltaics . . . = 1 x 104
Technology
SOURCE: Program Assessment Report, Statement of Findings, Satellite Power

Systems, Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/
ER-0085. November 1980.
what is called underdense heating) because

almost all of the data generated in the past has
focused on the overdense case, i.e., where the
ionospheric density is great enough to reflect the incident heating frequency.
Two high frequency (HF) ground-based heating
facilities have been used to simulate SPS heating in
the lower ionosphere. At Arecibo, Puerto Rico,
ionospheric physics and heating mechanisms have
been studied. The Platteville facility in Colorado
has tested the effects on specific radio frequency
navigation and broadcasting systems, namely VLF
(3 to 30 kHz, OMEGA), LF (30 to 300 kHz,
In the upper ionosphere (F region), effects on

telecommunications and on the SPS pilot beam
stem primarily from a phenomenon called therm a l s e l f f o c u s i n g which results when an elec-
tromagnetic wave propagating through the ionosphere iS focused and defocused as a resuIt of normal variations in the index of refraction. As the incident wave refracts into regions of lesser density,
the electric field intensity increases. Thermal pressure generated by ohmic heating drives the plasma
from the focused areas, thereby amplifying the initial perturbation. Although the heated volume in
the D and E regions is confined essentially to that
of the beam, the heated particles in the F region
wiII traverse magnetic field Iines so that large-scale
field-alined striations or density irregularities form.
These striations reflect VHF and UHF radiowaves
specularly, causing interference and the abnormal
long-range propagation of the signals.
Less is known about the effects of SPS-type
heating in the F region than the D and E layers. The
power scaling law in the upper ionosphere may differ from that in the lower regions (i.e., the scaling
law for thermal self-focusing instability may follow
a 1/f3 dependence rather than the 1/f2 dependence
valid for ohmic heating). Experimental data is
Fnv/ronmental Assessment for the Satell/te Power System Concept
Development and Eva/uatlon Program Effects of /onospher/c Heat/rig on
Te/ecomm[/n[catlons,
DOE/NASA report, DOE/E R 10003-TI, August 1980
t nv/ronmenta/ Assessment for the Sate//lte Power System C o n c e p t
Det eloprrrenf and Eva/uat/on Program, DOE/E R-0069, August 1980
Appendix DEnvironmentant Health . 277
needed to improve theory and test the effects on

telecommunications.
A single SPS would cause the indicated ionosphere perturbations within a VoIume approximately equal to the power beam dimensions. For muitiple SPS deployments (e.g., the 60 systems defined
in the Reference Design) the cumulative effects of
the perturbed volumes must be determined. One
important question obviously concerns the possibility of coupling between adjacent volumes, and
determining beam separation constraints to eliminate mutual coupling. 5
The Effects of Space Vehicle Effluents

on the Atmosphere
SPS reference system rocket exhaust products
would affect every region of the atmosphere. In
table D-3, the atmospheric effects of most concern
are listed. As part of its assessment, DOE has also
identified possible means of resolving these uncertainties in the event that an SPS program is pursued.
Troposphere 6
SPS launch effluents injected into the troposphere could modify local weather and air quality
on a short-term basis. These changes would be due
primarily to the formation and dispersion of a
launch site ground cloud that consists of exhaust
gases, cooling water, and some sand and dust.
While sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and carbon
monoxide concentrations would not be significant,
nitrogen oxides and water vapor are of concern.
Nitrogen oxides (NO x , especially NO, in the
ground cloud, might under certain conditions, present problems for air quality. The projected ground
cloud concentrations themselves are not thought
to violate the short-term national ambient air quality standards that are expected to be promulgated
in the near future, but if ambient concentrations
are already high, a violation could occur. NOX and
SO X in the ground cloud could contribute to an increase in localized acid rain but this is expected to
be small.
The ground cloud will also contain about 400 to
650 tons of water. While having a negligible impact
on air quality, water vapor, especially in association with launch-generated heat and condensation
E Morrison, National Telecommunlcatlons
and Information AdmlnIstratlon, private communlcatlon,
Feb 17, 1981
Most of this section IS derived from Ertv/ronrnenta/ Assessment for the
Satell/te Power $ystem, Concept Development and tvaluatlon Program,
DO E/ ER-0069, August 1980
nuclei could have a measurable, although shortterm effect on weather. In particular, under certain
meteorological conditions, heat and moisture
could enhance convective activity, and induce
precipitation. While the frequency and degree of
such effects are uncertain, none of the projected
weather effects are thought to be serious. Cloudcondensation and ice-forming nuclei would also be
produced in the ground cloud. The effects of the
latter on weather cannot be reliably estimated at
this time. The high abundance of the former in the
ground cloud is thought to be meteorologically important; cloud-condensation nuclei could change
the frequency and persistence of fog and haziness.
It has been suggested that because of the large size
and frequency of HLLV launches, cumulative effects might occur. More research is needed not
only for SPS, but of weather and climate phenomena in general.
Research needs include:
refine and test ground-cloud formation and
transport predictive models as well as weather
and climate models,
update ground-cloud composition as systems
are developed; conduct appropriate observations of rocket launches,
study effects on local weather of prospective
launch sites including possible cumulative effects, and
consider NO effects and possible ways to
X
reduce levels given a range of Iikely future
standard levels and meteorological conditions; refine and validate theoretical models
for simulating NOx dispersion,
Stratosphere and Mesosphere

The upper atmosphere has received considerable
public attention in the last decade, largely as a
result of a number of studies examining the effects
on the stratospheric ozone layers (which shield the
Earth from biologically harmful ultraviolet radiation) of the supersonic transport, fluorocarbons,
and the biological generation of nitrous oxide
etc. 7 8 There is concern that while the potential effects on climate and terrestrial life of altering the
upper atmosphere couId be serious, our understanding of the physics and chemistry of the region
is Incomplete. For example, it is known that the
chemical composition of the upper atmosphere
plays a key role in maintaining the Earths thermal
budget and is directly linked to the dynamics, cirThe Aero\ol Threat, Newsweek, Oct 7, 1974, pp 74-75
( I Imatl( Impact Committee, NRC, Fnv/ronmenta/ Impact of $tra(o\phorlr I /IRh/ NAS, Washington, D C 1975
278
Solar Power
Satellites
Table D-3.Atmospheric Effects

Known
Launch vehicles will inject large amounts of
water vapor and thermal energy into
localized regions of the planetary boundary
layer. The potential for inadvertent weather
modification under suitable meteorological
conditions exists.
Exhaust emissions and reentry products

from reference system heavy-lift launch
vehicles and personnel orbit transfer
vehicles will modify ion densities at high
altitudes. In particular, injection of H2O and
H 2 in the F-region will cause partial
depletion of the F-region.
Uncertainty
The frequency of occurrence of suitable
meteorological conditions. The extent of
injection of cloud condensation and iceforming nuclei. The duration and scale of
the effects of the nuclei and the thermal
energy inputs. The importance of
anticipated small increases in cloud
population, precipitation, haze, and other
meteorological effects to the environs of
the launch site.
Chemical-electrical interactions in the
ionosphere, the effectiveness of mitigating
strategies, and effects on
telecommunications.
Exact value of NO 2 air quality standard to be

Ground clouds formed by HLLV launches
set. Actual ground-level concentrations of
will contain relatively high concentrations
NO 2 associated with vehicle launches under
of NO X that, in combination with effluents
from sources in the launch site environs,
various ambient meteorological and air
will exacerbate existing air quality problems quality conditions typical of anticipated
under certain conditions,
launch sites.
HLLV flights will deposit a large amount of The quantitative increases. Whether the
water and hydrogen above 80 km. The globally averaged increase in water content
globally averaged water content is likely to will be sufficient to alter thermospheric
be increased by amounts ranging from 8 composition or dynamics in a significant
percent at 80 km to factors of up to 100 or way. Whether the increase will result in a
more above 120 km. The injected water and chronic, global-scale partial depletion of the
hydrogen will increase the natural upward ionosphere of sufficient magnitude to
flux of hydrogen by as much as a factor of degrade telecommunications. Whether the
2.
increased hydrogen flux will significantly
increase exospheric density and/or modify
thermospheric properties.
Injection of water vapor from HLLV The scale and persistence of the clouds,
launches in the altitude range of about 80 especially in view of poorly understood
to 90 km is likely to result in the formation co m p et i n g
h eating
cooling
and
of noctilucent clouds.
mechanisms. Whether cumulative effects
could arise and lead to globally significant
effects such as changes in climate
Reference system personnel and cargo orbit

transfer vehicles would inject substantial
amounts of mass and energy into the
magnetosphere and plasmasphere.
Ultimate fate of effluents. Potential impacts

such as increased radiation hazards to
space
auroral
travelers,
modifications,
telecommunications, and terrestrial utility
interference, enhanced airglow emissions,
and changes in weather and climate.
Resolution
Design and implement appropriate
observational programs associated with
rocket launches and conduct laboratory

experiments to characterize better nuclei
formed in the combustion of rocket
propellant. Refine, test, and validate
theoretical models suitable for simulating
the effects of rocket launches. Examine the
meteorological conditions appropriate to
potential launch sites. Evaluate the
importance of changes in those conditions
to the environs of those sites.
Design and implement experiments aimed at
critical problems. Measure and analyze
interactions through rocket experiments
combined with telecommunications tests.
Apply results to improve theoretical
prediction capabilities. Provide guidance for
system operational mitigating strategies
and alternatives.
Utilize a range or anticipate probable
standard values for NO2 including the
existing standard for California. Refine,
test, and validate existing modeling techniques for simulating formation and
dispersion of NO2 in ground clouds. Utilize
existing and acquire new data related to
rocket launches for this purpose. Prepare a
climatology of expected NO 2 ground-level
concentrations under a range of meteorological and ambient air quality conditions
typical of anticipated launch sites.
Obtain a better understanding of the natural
hydrogen cycle and develop and implement
models to simulate the effects of rocket
propellant exhaust on a global scale.
Design and
implement
observational
programs to obtain data on the occurrence
and characteristics of high-altitude clouds
formed during rocket launches. Improve
knowledge of the natural atmosphere near
the mesopause and develop and implement
models to better simulate the effects of
water and hydrogen injection on cloud
formation.
Design and implement experiments in the
magnetosphere to obtain data for improving
understanding
of
magnetospheric
phenomena of interest and provide system
design guidance where appropriate.
. .
SOURCE: Program Assessment Report, Statement of Firrdmgs, Satellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOEIER-0085, November 1980.
culation and climate of the troposphere, but the

mechanisms that couple the two regions are extremely complex and not well understood. 9 The
SPS assessment relies mostly on theoretical modtncyc/oped/a of ic(ence
HIII Book Co , 1977]
els 10 One dimensional models predicting global

average vertical transport of atmospheric constituents are used most extensively, although less-refined two and three dimensional models are also
and Technology VOI 1 (New york McCraw~u~ra note b
Appendix DEnvironment and Health
available. High-altitude experiments are needed to

improve atmospheric theory and the data base for
the SPS assessment.
The most significant SPS impacts would arise
from the injection of rocket effluents, especially
water vapor and reentry NO X directly into the
stratosphere and mesosphere. SPS vehicles emit
CO, into the upper atmosphere but the amount is
extremely small relative to existing levels and to
the quantities generated by the consumption of
fossil fuels. The effects of any impurities in the
rocket fuel, such as sulfur would be negligible.
Thermal energy is also injected by HLLV and PLV
launches, but the effects are thought to be minor
and transient.
Increases in water vapor would be of concern
because its natural abundance in the upper atmosphere is very low. The most recent estimates indicate that the increase in the globally averaged
concentration of water vapor due to 400 HLLV
flights per year would be about 0.4 percent in the
stratosphere (30 km) and 8 percent in the upper
mesosphere (80 km). 2 Increases near the latitudes
at which the water vapor was emitted could be
higher due to a so-called corridor effect with increases in water content up to 15 percent above 80
km. At 120 km and above, it is estimated that the
global water content could be increased by a factor of 100 or more. 4
The production of nitric oxide from the reentry
of HLLVS is expected to increase significantly the
naturalIy occurring NO X concentration and to exhibit a pronounced long-term corridor effect in the
NO X distribution of the mesosphere. 5 Stratospheric
NO x levels would also be altered due to downward
diffusion from the mesosphere, but would be confined mostly to the lower stratosphere where their
impact wouId be negligible.
In the mesosphere, the injection of water could
induce luminous, thin, or noctilucent clouds of
ice crystals in the vicinity of the rocket exhaust. It
is estimated that the cloud would expand from a
size of 1 to 1,000 km 2 over 24 hours. 16 This finding is
based on theoretical calculations and observations
of other rocket launches that deposited far less
water into the mesosphere than that which is projected for the HLLVS. The clouds are not thought to
Iblcl
Iblcl
Program A~ses\ment Report, Statement oi Finding>, Satelllte Power
Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/NASA
Report, DOE/E R-0085, November 1980
Environmental A$$es$ment for the $ate//tte Power \y$tem Concept

Development and Eva/ua tlon Program A tmo~pherlc E ffect$,
DOE/E R-0090, November 1980
Supra note 9
Supra note 6
279
alter significantly the global climate, but in view of

the poor understanding of the coupling between
the mesosphere and troposphere, this expectation
requires further analysis. A large unknown is the effect of the excess water content on temperature
that may affect the likelihood and persistence of
the clouds. 7
In the stratosphere, detectable depletion or
enhancement of the ozone layer from the emission
of water and nitric oxide would be unlikely. While
water vapor tends to decrease ozone, nitric oxide
tends to increase it. The net effect of SPS reference
system effluents is thought too small (i. e., either a
decrease or increase on the order of 0.01 percent)
relative to the natural fluctuations of the ozone
concentration. 8 This conclusion requires further
verification as it is based on one-dimensional
models.
In addition to the formation of noctilucent
clouds and perturbations of the ozone layer, the
water vapor deposited in the stratosphere and
mesosphere might contribute to a chronic partial
depletion of the ionosphere. However, this is expected to be very small in comparison to the local
depletions caused by rocket emissions directly into
that region. 9 Climatic effects might occur from
changes in the chemical composition of the upper
atmosphere, although at present it is not possible
to assess reliably any potential effects. Research
priorities for SPS upper atmospheric effects incIude
update emissions inventory and estimates of

reentry NOX;
estimate magnitude of corridor effect and
study possible temperature feedback mechanisms;
identify and augment existing experimental
programs to make high-altitude measurements
of water and NOX concentrations, study highaltitude water release data;
assess the possibility and climatic impacts of
noctilucent clouds;
develop scenarios of SPS impacts on a number
of different background conditions including
future increases of C02;
document and verify effects of effluents that
are now thought to have a minor impact on the
upper atmosphere; and
determine
telecommunicate ions e f f e c t o f
chronic, partial depletion of ionosphere (from
water vapor injected in the stratosphere and
mesosphere).
Ibid
$u prc? note 9
5u[)r~ note 6
280
Ionosphere
The ionosphere is used extensively in telecommunication systems to propagate and reflect radio
waves. The injection and diffusion of SPS launch
propellants into the ionosphere could alter the density of the electrons and ions that are responsible
for the unique properties of the ionosphere, thereby degrading the performance of the telecommunications systems. Other effects might also occur,
such as enhanced airglow and increased electron
temperature, but the Iikelihood and consequences
of these impacts are yet to be determined. 20
A reliable assessment of the effects of launch effluents on the D-region of the ionosphere cannot be
made at this time. However, two apparently counteractive effects have been postulated. z The emission of water vapor into the D-region is Iikely to
deplete the ionospheric plasma density. This would
reduce radio wave absorption in the daytime ionosphere and result in propagation anomalies. On the
other hand, NO X , produced by frictional heating
during reentry, could engender the formation of
ions in the D-region. It is believed that enough NO X
would be deposited in the region to compensate for
the reduction of the plasma due to water vapor. A
recent lower ionosphere experiment suggests that
anomalies in the propagation of VLF signals were
due to the effects of rocket effluents. While the
experiment was not conclusive, it is clear that detectable effects might occur that warrant further
study.
As in the D-region, current understanding of the
launch effluent effects on the E-region is not very
advanced. Rocket propellants would be directly injected only into the lower E-region because HLLV
engines would be shut off at 124 km.23 Some effluents would enter the upper E-region by upward
diffusion. Exhaust products emitted above the Eregion in LEO by PLVS, POTVS and HLLV could also
diffuse and settle downwards. The impacts of these
effluents on the E-region, however are very uncertain. It is possible that the deposition of ablation
materials during reentry could augment a radio
signal altering phenomenon called sporadic E in
which regions of greatly enhanced electron concentration are created. In addition, the coupling
between the ionosphere and magnetosphere, the
OSupra note 9
Ibid
C Meltz and J A Darold, VLF OMEGA Observations of the ionospheric Disturbance produced by an Atlas HEAO-C Launch, In Proceedings of the Workshop/Symposium on the Prellmlnary Evaluation of
the Ionospheric Disturbances Associated WIIh the HEAO-C Launch, With
Applfcatlons to the SPS Ertvfronmental Assessment, M Mendlllo and B
Baumgardner (eds ), DOE/NASA report Conf 7911108, August 1980
2Supra note 9
ozone layer, air conductivity, and hence climate

could be affected by the effluents but no reliable
conclusions can be made at this time.
The effects of rocket exhaust products are better
understood in the F-region, but the impact of SPS
effluents is still not certain. This region is
dominated by oxygen atoms that recombine more
slowly with electrons than their molecuIar counterparts in the lower ionosphere. Exhaust products
such as water, hydrogen and C02 emitted in the Fregion become quickly ionized by charge exchange
reactions with the existing atomicions. 24 These
molecular ions rapidly recombine with the ionospheric electrons, thereby causing a region of pronounced depletion known as an ionospheric
hole. It has been estimated that for each POTV
launch (which would occur once or twice a month),
an ionospheric hole with an area two to three times
the size of the continental United States 25 would be
formed and persist for 4 to 16 hours. z Each HLLV
launch (one or two per day) would produce a hole
about one-tenth the size,27 lasting 4 to 12 hours. It
has been suggested that a long-term low-level
depletion on the order of 10 percent would develop
in a ring around the launch latitude as a result of
multiple launches .28 The probable consequence of
this depletion ring is a small perturbation of VLF,

H F, and possibly VHF wave propagation.
These findings were based on a number of theoretical models of the ambient and perturbed Fregion as well as several observations of rocket
effluent-induced ionospheric holes. The models are
fairly well developed and theoretical mechanisms
are well understood, but care should be taken in
scaling up radiowave propagation effects. Further
study is required in order to predict accurately the
location, size, movement, and lifetime of the hole
as well as the cumulative effects of multiple
launches. 29 An observation of ionosphere depletion
inadvertently took place after a 1973 skylab flight
that produced a hole 1,000 km in radius. 30 In 1977,
experiments were conducted to purposefulIy produce an ionospheric hole. 31 The experiments,
named Project LAGOPEDO tended to confirm the
E Bauer, Proceedings of the Workshop on the Mod/ f/cation of the Upper Atmosphere by the Sate///te Power System (SPS) Propu/slon Eff/uents,
DO E/NA$A Report Conf -7906180
Supra note 14
Supra note 6
7
Supra note13
Ulbld
Supra note 9
M Mendlllo, C Hawkins, and J Klobuchar, An Ionospheric Tota/
Electron Content Disturbance Associated With the Launch of NASA

$k ylab, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, July 1974
Pongratz, et al , Lagoped~Two F-Region Ionospheric Dep/etion Experlment~ Los Alamos Scientlflc Laboratory, LA-U R-77-2743
Appendix DEnvironment and Health . 281
theory. Recently, DOE took advantage of the

launch of NASAs High Energy Astrophysical Observatory (HEAO-C) by an Atlas/Centaur rocket in
order to monitor the resultant large-scale (1 million
to 3 million km 2) effIuent-induced ionospheric hole,
which persisted for approximately 3 hours. 32 The
preliminary finding indicates that no severe longterm impacts on HF radio signals occured as a
result, but that VLF transmissions (14 KHz) could
have been affected.33 On the whole, not enough is
known about SPS-induced ionospheric holes to
make conclusions about their impacts on telecommu n i cat ions.
In addition to telecommunication effects, other
potential effects of SPS rocket effluents deposited
in the F-region have been suggested .34 Enhanced
airglow emissions could affect astronomy, remote
sensing, and surveillance systems. Past observations have noted enhancements on the order of 10
kilorayleighs for certain visible and near infrared
emissions. 35 The magnitude and significance of SPS
airglow emissions warrants further study. The injection of water vapor in the F-region might also perturb the thermal budget of that region. This would
increase the ratio of cooling by radiation and
perhaps alter the Van Allen belts and the amount
of ionizing radiation in space. Also, as noted
previously, the number of hydrogen atoms emitted
by HLLV launches in the upper thermosphere and
exosphere could be comparable to the number
naturally present. This could increase satellite
drag, alter the Van Allen belts, and affect radio
communications. The water budget of these
regions is not well understood however, and so the
probability of these effects is not known.
Research should focus on the following areas:
improve understanding of D&E region effects;
refine studies of F-region ionospheric holes in

order to predict location, size, movement, and
lifetime;
test effects on telecommunications systems
using D, E, and F regions; and
assess airglow effects perhaps with the involvement of the remote sensing and astronomy communities. 36
M Mendlllo and B Baumgardner, Proceedings of the Workshop/Sumposlum on the Preliminary Eva/uatlon of the Ionospheric Disturbances
Associated W/th the HEAO-C Launch, W/th Appl{catlons to the SPS Env/ronmenta/ Assessment, DOE/NASA Report Conf 7911108, August 1980
Ibid
Supra note 9
5
Supra note13
blbld
Thermosphere and Exosphere

As discussed above in the Stratosphere and Mesosphere summary, HLLV flights are predicted to
substantially increase the natural water content
above 80 km. One consequence of this excess
could be an increase and, perhaps, doubling of the
upward flux of hydrogen atoms that result from the
breakdown of the molecular water vapor as well as
molecular hydrogen emitted above 56 km by
HLLVS, PLVS and POTVS.37 While it is fairly certain
that an increase in the hydrogen flux would result,
the consequences of a perturbed hydrogen cycle
are quite uncertain. The hydrogen escape rate into
outer space could increase. Accumulation of
hydrogen above 800 km might also occur, thereby
possibly altering thermospheric and exospheric
dynamics and enhancing satellite drag.
Research is needed to:
. improve understanding of the natural hydrogen cycle and dynamic processes of the thermosphere and exosphere; and
design models to quantify hydrogen increases
and simulate SPS effects on a global scale.
Plasmasphere and Magnetosphere

SPS reference system effects on the plasmasphere and magnetosphere result primarily from
the emission of COTV argon ions and POTV hydrogen atoms as the vehicles move between LEO and
GEO. 38 The impacts of these effluents could be
great, because the energies and number of ions and
atoms injected would be substantial relative to the
ambient values. Unfortunately, the magnetosphere
and plasmasphere are poorly understood. While
some potential SPS impacts have been identified as
shown in table D-4, their probability and severity
cannot be assessed since no experimental data relevant to SPS exists for these regions. I n particular,
the consequences and the mechanism of interaction between the argon ions and the ambient
plasma and geomagnetic field must be explored.
In addition to the exhaust products, the satellites
themselves could also have an impact on the magnetosphere by obstructing plasma flow, or producing dust clouds, electromagnetic disturbances,
space debris, visible and infrared radiation, and
high-energy electrons.39 Little emphasis has been
placed on these potential effects, however,
because they are thought to be minor and easily
reinedied.
Supra note 6
Supra note 9
lbld
282
Table D-4.Satellite Power System Magnetospheric Effects

Mechanism
Effect
Cause
1. Dosage enhancement of
trapped relativistic
electrons
O + and Ar + in magnetoThermal heavy ions suppress

ring-current-ion cyclotron
sphere due to exhaust and
turbulence, which keeps
plasmasphere heating
electron dosage in balance
in natural state
Ionospheric electric field
Beam induced Alfven shocks
propagate into ionosphere
induced by argon beam
2. Artificial ionospheric
current
3. Modified auroral response Neutrals and heavy ions in

large quantities
to solar activity
4. Artificial airglow
3.5 keV argon ions
5. Plasma density disturbance Plasma injection

on small spatial scale
SOURCE:
Rapid charge-exchange loss

of ring-current particles
Direct impact on atmosphere
from LEO source
Plasma instabilities
System/activities impacted
Space equipment
Modification of human
space activity
Powerline tripping
Pipeline corrosion (probably
unimportant)
May reduce magnetic storm
interference with Earth and
space-based systems
Interference with optical
Earth sensors
Signal scintillation for
space-based communications
Environmental Assessment for the Satellite Power System, Concept Development and Evaluation
ProgrammAtrnosptrericEffects, DOEIER-0090,
November 1980.
If an SPS program is conducted, it is clear that

the design of transport vehicles for the outer regions of the atmosphere and the environmental assessment of their impacts in these regions will be
closely linked. Possible methods of reducing adverse effects include the use of both chemical and
argon ion engines or an alternative propulsion system in the COTV, and lunar mining.
Near term studies include:
design and implement experiments in the
magnetosphere and the laboratory to test SPS
effects and increase theoretical understanding
of magnetospheric phenomena.
The Electromagnetic Characteristics of

the Alternative SPS SatelIites
Microwave Satellites
The satellite would generate microwave power
at a frequency of 2.45 GHz or some other central
radio frequency, thermal radiation, and reflected
sunlight at all solar wavelengths. In addition, it
would generate some power at multiples of the
central frequency (harmonics), and also spurious
noise on either side of the central frequency.
Because the reference system is the only system for
which an attempt has been made to characterize a
system completely, this report will use its
characteristics as an illustrative model for all
microwave systems.
The space antenna would radiate a total of 6,720
MW of microwave power towards Earth. The reference system design calls for the power distribution
over the face of the satelIite antenna to be gaussian
with a 10-d B taper. The resuIting beam pattern is
shown in figure 40, p. 211. Atmospheric scattering

and attenuation due to absorption, in addition to
losses at the rectenna would reduce the usable
power at the rectenna to 5,000 MW. The following
radiative effects are the most important for the
reference system (fig. D-2):
Out-of-band
radio frequency emissions.
The
reference systems klystrons are estimated to
radiate energy at the following harmonic frequencies: 40
Frequency (C HZ)
245- (central frequency)
490- (second harmonic)
7 35- (third harmonic)
980- (fourth harmonic)
Power level
(times 6,720 MW)
1
-50d B(10-5)
-90d B(10-9)
-lOOd B(10 1O)
Although it is known that the antenna patterns for these frequencies would be rather different from that of the reference system, current antenna theory is inadequate to predict a
detailed spatial pattern.
Spurious sideband noise generation from
the klystrons outside of the central frequency
is estimated to be no greater than 200 d B of
the central frequency at a separation of 8 to 10
MHz from the center frequency. Filtering may
be able to reduce this to levels which would
not cause appreciable interference in most
cases This is one constraint in the separation
necessary between an SPS frequency assignment and the boundaries of the 2.45 GHz International Scientific and Medical band. These
considerations apply after the klystron tubes
have warmed up. Since, on the average the
4
C, L) \rndt and L Leopold, Environmental Conslderatlons for the
MI( rowav(, [learn from a Solar Power Satel I lte, I )th /nter\oclety
Energy
( of)kerslrv) I nglneer~ng ( orrferrwce, San Diego, Callf , August 1978
Figure D-2.Overview of Potential SPS
Electromagnetic=Compatibiiity
283
impacts
noise & harmonics
SOURCE:
Power
(SPS), Concept Development and Evaluation Program
100,000 klystrons in the antenna can be expected to fail at a rate of five per day, out of
band radiation as they fail and as they warm
up after being replaced may be greater than
during their operating period.
The reflected beam at 2.45 GHz, at the harmonics, as welI as at other frequencies generated by the rectenna structure itself, would
result in a complicated power spectrum which
wouId change in time as the rectenna ages.
The radiation patterns are expected to be 100
or broader and partially directive. A capability
to monitor and locate rectenna intermodulation emissions is required to allow timely
structural repair to assure no interference with
sensitive terrestrial and aircraft equipment.
Optical and thermal emissions. The reference
satellites would reflect sunlight in three major
ways41
p. 43,
42
1) diffuse reflections from the solar

arrays, the antenna and the underlying structure; 2) specular mirror-like reflections from
the solar arrays and the antenna; 3) glints or
specular reflections from the underlying structure. Diffuse reflections would cause each
satellite to appear as bright as the planet
Venus at its brightest phase (magnitude 4.3).
Specular reflections would occur near the
equinoxes just at local sunrise or sunset (i. e.,
on the same meridian as the satelIite) and
wouId cause a 330-km wide spot of Iight several times brighter than the full Moon to sweep
4
P A E
and
M Stokes (eds ), Workshop on
Power
Effects on Optical and Radio Astronomy, CON F-7905143
(DOE ],
I
Power
Apparent 1
of Solar Power Satellites,
1980, pp 175190
284
across the affected area in a few minutes.

Glints from components of the satellites
structure are not expected to be as serious as
the diffuse or specular reflections and in any
event, may be significantly reduced or eliminated by proper structural design.
In addition to reflecting sunlight, the satellite would also emit thermal radiation of an
estimated intensity of 6.3 X 10 6 watts p e r
square meter at the Earth. The precise wavelength peak depends on the details of the characteristics of the satellites components (e.g.,
type of cell, type of antireflection coating,
etc. ) but would Iikely fall in the 5 to 10 micron
band. The thermal radiation is expected to exceed SIightly current interference levels.
radiation.
Because an appreciable
amount of the sunlight which is intercepted by
the laser satellite would be absorbed and reemitted as heat, the satellite, whether in CEO
or LEO, would be a diffuse infrared radiator
and would radiate some energy at microwave
frequencies as well.
Laser beam characteristics. The two major present laser alternatives operate near 5 microns
(CO laser) or 10 microns (CO 2 laser) infrared
wavelengths. Because the beams are highly
directive, they would be only slightly observable in the infrared except for receivers placed
very near the laser ground stations. Scattered
light from the beam would be detectable in
the lower part of the atmosphere.
Heat
Laser Satellites
Mirror Satellites
As with the other characteristics of laser systems,

the electromagnetic characteristics of the laser
satellite are ill defined. However, the following
Because the mirrors are designed to reflect

sun Iight only, their emissions wouId be only sIightly
altered from the original solar spectrum (i. e., they
wouIdnt radiate appreciable infrared or microwave radiation). Those emissions would be large,
however, for the ground base into which the sunlight is directly reflected (i.e., the equivalent of one
Sun).
Terrestrial observers away from the ground
site would see moving patches of light about
0.5 min arc across surrounded by an aureole of
scattered Iight. The precise apparent brightness of the mirrors wilI depend on a number of
factors, e.g., the orientation of the mirror with
respect to the observer, the relative position of
the Sun from both the mirror and the observer,
the albedo of the reverse side of the mirrors,
and the atmospheric conditions above the
ground station. Low-intensity scattered sunlight from aerosols and dust high in the atmosphere would be observable at up to 150
km from the ground station.
general radiation effects can be expected. Quantitative data will be available o n l y a f t e r t h e
systems become more highly defined.

In general, laser systems would reflect sunlight
from the laser platform and from the relay mirrors
in LEO and CEO, if any. I n addition, they wouId
radiate thermal energy, most probably in the 5 to
10 micron region of the infrared. They would also
be detectable as a thermal source of microwave
power.
Reflected sunlight. The brightness of Iaser satellites at CEO or LEO would depend on the
mode of power CoIIection and conversion (e. g.,
photovoltaic or direct solar pumped) and the
overalI size of the satellite. OpticalIy, the most
important differences are that the LEO satellite would be brighter and perceived as moving slowly by terrestrial observers.
Because they would be smaller than the reference system satellites, individually they
would also be less bright. However, there will
be more of them. (If laser satellites could be
made to operate with the same efficiency as
the microwave designs, five 1,000-MW or ten
500-MW satellites would be needed to equal
reference system capacity. ) Laser relay mirrors
in LEO and GEO would contribute both stationary and moving sources of light. However,
because of their small size (several meters),
they are not expected to be readily visible
from Earth.
The Interaction Between Biological

Systems and Electromagnetic Waves
Microwave radiation is a form of electromagnetic energy which is used in numerous commercial, industrial, military, and medical devices including microwave ovens, radar, diathermy equipment, and sealing instruments. The microwave
band accounts for frequencies ranging from 300
MHz to 300 GHz,
The extent and consequence of exposure of

biological systems to microwaves depends on the
following characteristics of the incident energy,
the biological organism, and surrounding environment: 43
Frequency of electromagnetic radiation. T h e
frequency of radiation is the number of complete oscillations per second of an electromagnetic wave. The energy of the radiation is
directly proportional to the frequency. Although the frequency of microwaves is high, it
is not high enough for the quanta to ionize,
i.e., to eject an electron from a molecule or
atom; hence microwaves are called nonionizing. The bioeffects of X-rays and other ionizing radiation are known to be more severe
than those resulting from the nonionizing portion of the spectrum.
The frequency also determines the depth of
penetration when an electromagnetic wave is
incident on biological material. I n general, the
lower the frequency, the greater the depth of
penetration. For example, infrared waves penetrate no deeper than human skin, whereas microwaves (which are lower in frequency) penetrate through the skin and fat and into human
muscle. 44 The relationship between frequency
or wavelength (frequency is inversely proportional to wavelength) and the size of the irradiated body is also important. Resonance (i. e.,
most efficient absorption) will occur when the
length of an organism measures approximately
half of a wavelength of the incident electromagnetic field. For example, the resonance
frequency at which the absorption rate is maximized for the male human body is on the
order of 70 to 100 MHz, whereas the maximum
absorption rate for rats occurs at 2.45 GHz.45
Thus, an electromagnetic wave may elicit a
very different response from organisms of two
different sizes (assuming that the amount of
energy absorbed is the dominant determinant
of a biological response).
Understanding of the functional dependence of bioeffects on frequency is not com-
For a more detailed discussion of the biophysics of microwave interactions with blologtcal systems, see S Baranskl and P Czelskl, i310/oglca/
Effects of Microwaves, Dowden, Hutchlnson and Ross, Inc , Pennsylvania,
1976
R D Phllllps, et al , Comp//atlon and A$$e$\ment
of Microwave BIoe f f e c t s A Se/ect/ve Rev/ew of tfre L Iterature on the Blo/og)ca/ L ffectj of
M i c r o w a v e s In Re/at/on to tfre $ate///te Power $y~tem ($P\), final report,
DOE/NASA, May 1978
E Berman, A Review of SPS-Related Microwaves on Reproduction
and Teratology, I n The Flna / Proceedings of the $o/ar Power Sate///te Program Rev/ew, Apr 22-25, 1980, DOE/NASA report Conf -800491, July
1980
83-316 0 - 81 - 20
285
plete. The existence of frequency windows,

i.e., effects observed over one specific range
of frequencies is not well-understood.
Intensity of incident wave. The energy carried by an electromagnetic wave per unit area
and time is called its power density and is
measured in units of milIiwatts per square centimeter (mW/cm2). Heating or thermal effects
are generally thought to occur at power densities greater than 10 mW/cm2. Effects at much
lower power densities have been postulated
but the existence and consequence of nonthermal phenomena remains in dispute. Power density windows have been observed experimentally in which bioeffects are noted
only over a specific range of power densities
and not above or below.
Recently, the microwave community has
adopted the specific absorption rate (SAR) as a
measure of the energy absorbed by a biological organism. The SAR is expressed in units of
milliwatts per gram (mW/gm). It is a function
of the power density and weight of the irradiated organism. While the SAR provides
more information about the bioeffects of
microwaves than it does of the power density
alone, it cannot be used to entirely predict the
effects of exposure to microwaves. The SAR is
averaged over the entire body; it does not consider energy absorbed differentially in specific
body parts. It also does not account for possible nonthermal effects. Furthermore, it does
not measure the biological effectiveness of
a microwave, i.e., its ability to induce an effect
which is dependent on parameters such as the
relation between the frequency and size of
subject or body part.
Duration of exposure. For thermal effects,
the length of exposure may influence the
bodys ability to cool. Heating resulting from
long duration exposure of high-intensity waves
may overwhelm the natural cooling system. At
lower power densities, i.e., nonthermal
levels, the cumulative or long-term effects are
not known.
W a v e f o r m . It is thought that the biological
consequences of exposure to continuous wave
radiation is usually less severe than from that
which is pulsed or modulated, although basic
appreciation of the mechanisms of interaction
is lacking,
Subject characteristics. Bioeffects are species-specific, primarily because the factors
which determine energy absorption such as
size, structure, body, insulation, and heat dis-
286
sipation, and adaptive mechanisms vary with

species. The composition and geometry of biological matter also determine the depth of
penetration and wave characteristics; tissue,
muscle, and fat each exhibit different dielectric and conductive properties. Thus, without
adequate theories of interaction, extrapolations from animal studies to human bioeffects
are extremely difficult. The sex, age, and state
of health of an irradiated subject may also be
an important factor, since size and susceptibility to certain kinds of effects may differ
with respect to these parameters. It also appears that electromagnetic radiation may act
synergistically with drugs. The differential absorption of energy may result in hotspots. This
relatively increased energy deposition in cells,
organs or parts of the body relative to its surroundings could lead to very specific biological effects after exposure.
The orientation of the organism with respect
to the electric field component of the wave is
also important the most energy is absorbed
when the electric field is parallel to the long
axis of the body. In animal experiments, physical restraints or sedation might influence
study results. Measurement devices such as
implanted probes could also alter the field
distribution. The prediction of bioeffects may
also be complicated by movement of the subject in the field which changes the absorbed
energy dosage and may result in modulation
of the field.
The effects of whole body irradiation may
differ from partial body exposure. In addition,
for either whole or partial body irradiation,
smaller body parts could resonate if the frequency used was in resonance with that part
of the body.
Environment. The humidity, temperature,
and air circulation of the surrounding environment will affect the ability of a heated biological entity to cool. Objects near the electromagnetic field could also enhance, reflect,
absorb or distort it. For SPS, the effects of the
space environment on the biological response
to microwaves are not known.
SPS-Related Microwave Bioeffects

Experiments (conducted by DOE, EPA)
In conjunction with the SPS DOE assessment,
three studies were initiated and managed by EPA.46
Exposure of bees to 2.45 GHz at 3, 6, 9, 25 and
50-mW/cm 2. No statistically significant effects
on behavior, development, or navigation have
been observed following short-term exposure.
Long-term exposures are planned and should
clarify this possible effect. It has also been
proposed that tests of effects on bee navigation be carried out in the absence of sunlight
(which may possibly mask microwave induced
effects).
Immunology and hematology studies of small

mammals exposed for short durations to about
20 mW/cm2, 2.45 GHz microwaves. No effects
have been reported so far.
Experiments testing the effects on the behavioral and navigational capability of birds subjected to acute and chronic exposures of 2.45
GHz fields. Some mortality has resulted from
exposure to 130 to 160 mW/cm 2 microwaves
and has suggested that species and body geometry determine tolerance levels. Generally,
no statistically significant effects have been
detected at power densities of 0.1 to 2 5
mW/cm 2. Some birds chronically exposed to
25 mW/cm2 have exhibited an increase of aggressive behavior, although the number of
birds is statistically insignificant.
Laser Bioeffects
Lasers are unique among light sources because
of their capacity to deliver an enormous amount of
energy to a very small area at a great distance.47
The primary biological consequence of this property is heating. However, nonthermal mechanisms
C H Dodge, Rapporteur, Workshop on Mechanisms Underlying Effects of Long-Term, Low-Level, 2450 MHz Radlatlon on People, organized
by the National Research Council Committee on Satelllte Power Systems,
Environmental Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences, ] uly 15-17,
1980
4
E- Kle IrI Hazards of the Laser, Hosplta/ Practice, May 1967, pp
48-5 J
have also been suggested. 48 For example, photochemical reactions are thought to be responsible
for damage of biological organisms exposed to
ultraviolet lasers.49 High laser power densities may
also cause injury from shockwaves or high electric
field gradients. 50 Biological electromagnetic interference effects have also been proposed. 5 1
Clearly, the mechanisms of interaction between
laser light and biological entities are not completely understood. Like microwaves, little is known
about the cumulative or delayed effects of chronic
exposure to low levels of laser light.52 In general,
the higher the power and the shorter the period, the
greater the damage.53 The extent of the effect also
depends markedly on the characteristics of the irradiated biological material. Of primary importance is a tissues absorptivity, reflectivity, water
content, and thermal conductivity.
The organ of the body most sensitive to laser
radiation is the eye. The ocular media of the human
eye transmit light with wavelengths between 400
and 1,400 nm. 54 There are two transmission peaks in
the near infrared at 1,100 and 1,300 nm. Light in the
visible and near infrared spectrum is focused
towards the retina. The refraction of the laser beam
by the ocular media amplifies the light intensity by
several orders of magnitude. 55 As a result, in this
spectral region the retina can be damaged at radiation levels which are far less than those which produce corneal or skin damage.
For lasers that emit wavelengths outside of the
visible and near infrared range, the ocular effects
are quite different. At ultraviolet wavelengths, for
example, light is absorbed primarily by the cornea,
which can be injured by photochemical reactions.
Infrared radiation is not focused on the retina
V T Tomberg, Non-Thermal Blologlcal Effects of Laser Beams,
Nature, VOI 204, Nov 28, 1964, pp 868-870
Department of the Alr Force, Ffea/th ~azdrd~ Contro/ for Laser Radlatlon, AFOSH Standard 161-10, May 30, 1980
[)lbld
M Zaret, Laser Appl Icatlon In the F Ield of Medlclne, ZAMP, VOI 16,
1965, pp 178-79
M L Wolbarsht a n d D H Sllney, N e e d e d M o r e D a t a o n Eye
Damage, Laser Focus, December 1974, pp 11-13
Supra note 47
W T Ham, et al , The Eye Problem In Laser Safety, Arch Env/ronmenta/ Hea/th, VOI 20, February 1970, pp 1 ;6-160
D H Sllney and B C Fresler, Evaluation of Optical Radlatlon
Hazards, App/ied Opt/es, VOI
No 1, j anuar~ 1973, pp 1-24
12,
287
either, but is absorbed by the cornea and lens. Most

of the radiation from the C0 2 laser is absorbed in
the 7 nm tear layer of the cornea. 56 Continuous irradiances of the order of 10 W/cm2 could produce lesions within the blink refIex.57 Corneal damage may
be reversible or repairable but severe damage may
result in permanent scarring, blurred vision, and
opacities. 58 The lens is particularly susceptible to
injury because of its inability to eliminate damaged
celIs. Lenticular damage characterized by cataracts or clouding may occur at irradiance levels
that do not produce corneal injury. For example,
glassblowers cataracts are thought to result from
chronic exposure to 0.08 to 0.4 W/cm 2 infrared
radiation. 59 Proposed thermal limits for pulsed C02
lasers range from 0.2 to 1.0 W/cm 2, 0 but this
recommendation requires further study.
Effects on the skin from absorbed radiation may
vary from mild erythema (sunburn) to blistering
and/or charring. 61 The principal mechanisms of injury by infrared radiation are thermal and are a
function of tissue reflectance, spectral depth of
penetration, and the size of irradiated area. Since
thermal burns are produced at temperatures higher
than that which causes pain, in most present occupational situations the pain can serve as warning.
A definite sensation of warmth is produced from
C 02 lasers at 0.2 W/cm 2 over an irradiated area
only 1-cm diameter, or 0.01 W/cm 2 for full body exposure. 62 Heat stress should not be overlooked.
More research is needed to determine the effects
of chronic or repeated exposures.
As was the case for exposure to microwaves, the
determination of laser thresholds and standards is
exacerbated by problems of detection and measurement, instrument sensitivity, dosimetry, interspecies and interfrequency extrapolation, and lack
of complete knowledge of physiological systems,
mechanisms of interaction, and synergistic effects.
U \ A r m y E n v i r o n m e n t a l Hyglence A g e n c y , Laser and Opt/ca/
Haiard~ Course Manua/, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md , 8th ed , ]anuary
1979
D H Sllney, K W Vorpahl, and D C Wlnburn,
Environmental
Health Hazards From High-Powered Infrared Laser Devices, Arch Env/ronmenta/ Hea/tfr, VOI 30, April 1975, pp 174-179
Supra note 47
9
Supra note 55
Suprd note 49
Ibid
2
Supra note 55
288
Experiments also make clear that the extent of the

superficial or immediate lesion is no gage of total
damage. 3
The exposure limit for continuous wave infrared
lasers as recommended by ANSI is 100 mW/cm2 for
exposures over 10 seconds and for smalI spot sizes
on the skin or eyes.64 A whole body irradiance limit
of 10 mW/cm2 has been suggested .65 It should be
stressed that the protection standards for repetitive
and chronic exposures and for wavelengths outside
the visible band are based on a considerable
amount of extrapolation. Data obtained from nonIaser sources, such as bright, small-source lamps
and high luminance extended sources cannot accurately and wholly represent the effects of laser
radiation in determining injury thresholds for
ultraviolet and infrared lasers directly.
General Health and Safety of

SPS Space Workers*
The human bodys tolerance to acceleration
depends on the duration and magnitude of the
acceleration, the positioning of the body relative to
the accelerating force, the restraint and support
systems of the spacecraft and the time spent in a
weightless state. Research is needed to quantify
effects as a function of these parameters and to
determine the tradeoffs between short duration,
high acceleration and longer duration, lower acceleration effects. Studies should also evaluate the
tolerance in the population that may fly in space
(since variation in individual response levels are
great) and explore possible ways to reduce harmful
effects.
Weightlessness is known to induce a number of
physiological responses such as decreased heart
rate, shifting of fluids to the upper body, decrease
of muscle mass and loss of bone minerals .68 Most
of the observed effects have been temporary; only
bone calcium loss appears to require a long period
b
* Supra note 47
American Natlona/ Standard for the Safe Use of Lasers, ANSI (R)
Z136 1-1979, American National Standard Institute
D H S1 Iney and D L Cono\,er, Nonlonlzlng Radlatlon In /rrdustr/a/
Errv/ronmenta/ Hea//h, L V Cralley and P R Atkins (eds ) ( N e w Y o r k
Academic Press, 1975), pp 157-172
*See text for discussion of Ionlzlng radlatlon effects
6bEnvironmen/a/
Assessment for the Sate///te Power 5 y$tern Concept L)eve/opment and Eva/uatJon Program, DOE/E R-0069, August 1980
lbld
Program Assessment Report, Statement of F/nd/ng~, Satelllte Power
System Concept Development and Evaluation Program, DOE/E R-0085,
November 1980
of recovery following return from space.69 For SPS,

however, the effects of periodic weightlessness
over a long time period need to be investigated.
Moreover, ameliorative measures suitable for a
large number of people with broad physiological
characteristics must be investigated .
Workers would be exposed to electric fields
generated by the collection and transmission of
large amounts of electricity across the solar panel
and antenna, but effects of electric and magnetic
fields on biological systems are not well-understood. 71 Research is needed to determine the bioeffects of magnetic fields generated by satellite
electric currents, as well as to assess the effects of
field absence over extended stays in orbit, as CEO
is largely outside of the Earths magnetic field.
Some space workers could also be exposed to high
levels of microwaves. The effects of microwaves in
a space environment deserves special attention. It
is known, for example, that microwaves can work
synergistically with ionizing radiation to increase
the biological effectiveness of the latter.
Research would be required to determine bioeffects and if possible, to develop suitable
exposure Iimits and protective clothing.
Psychological impacts must also be assessed,
especially since there is little information on large,
mixed gender groups working in close confinement
for prolonged periods. Studies should also consider
the effects on workers families and friends and
possible mitigation measures such as careful worker selection, recreation faciIities, social management, etc.
Space workers could be prone to greater safety
risks than their terrestrial counterparts because of
the possible awkwardness of working without gravity. 73 Risks also stem from the high-voltage equipment and handling of toxic materials. There is a
danger that spacecraft charging could produce
electric shocks great enough to injure or kill
workers, although this might be avoided by a judicious choice of spacecraft material. Catastrophic
CoIIisions with meteoroids or space debris are also
possible, given SPSs large size. Extravehicular
activity may also create hazards.
lbld
(lbld
7 Jupra note 66
Baranskl and P Czerskl, L310/oglca/ Effects of M/crowave~,
Hut, hlnson and Ross, Pennsylvania, 1976
7
\upra note 66
Dowden,
Appendix E
EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Part 1
Intelsat was preceded by the formation of a
domestic company, Comsat. In 1962 the Federal
Government, after extensive debate over the proper degree of Federal involvement, chartered Comsat Corp. to provide a commercial communications
satellite system in conjunction and cooperation
with other countries . . which wilI serve the communication needs of the United States and other
countries, and which wilI contribute to world peace
and understanding. Comsat was not directly
owned or run by the Government; it issued shares
of voting public stock (which were immediately
over-subscribed), with 50 percent of these reserved
for common carriers AT&T, ITT, Western
Union, and others. The Board of Directors consisted of three Presidential appointees, six common
carrier representatives, and six elected at large.
However, although Comsat was not directly financed by the Government, it received and continued to receive the benefit of extensive NASAsponsored development of communication satellites and launch-vehicles, free of chargesome
several billion dollars worth. (NASA research on
communications satellites was cut back under the
Nixon administration but reemphasized in the
Carter administrations October 1978 White House
Fact Sheet, largely as a result of increased competition from Japan and Western Europe.)
Under its charter, Comsat was allowed to enter
directly into negotiations with foreign entities with
the supervision and assistance of the State Department. In 1963, a U.S. negotiating team proposed a
framework for an international telecommunications satellite organization: lntelsat. In a series of
meetings details were agreed on: 1) that Comsat
wouId be the consortium manager 2 and majority
owner, with an initial 61 percent of the shares; 2)
that ownership and utilization charges, as well as
voting, would be in proportion to the use of the
system by each participant, readjusted on an annual basis, and that membership would be open to
alI ITU member nations, with a minimum 15-percent share needed for representation and voting; 3)
there would be two levels of agreement, one directCommunlcatlon> Satellite Act of 19b2, In Space Law, Se/ected Ela$fc
Documents, Senate Committee on (ommerce, Science, and Transport
tlon, Dec 1978, p 523
Joseph N P e l t o n , G/oba/ Comrnunlcatlons Sate//(te Po/Icy lnte/sat,
Po/ItIcs and funct~onallsm (Mt Airy, Md Lomond Books, 1974), p 76
(p 55)
Iy by nations, the other by designated agencies

(signatories), one per nation; 4) that Intelsat
would be restricted to providing services between
countries, not within countries; 5) the interim
agreements would last 5 years, at which point permanent arrangements wouId be agreed on.
One immediate result was the refusal of the
Soviet Union and East Europe to participate. The
Soviets used only a miniscule amount of global
communications traffic, some 1 percent, and
would not join an organization dominated by the
United States and West Europe. They began developing their own domestic system (Molniya), which
later formed the core of their international system,
Intersputnik, covering the Soviet Union, East
Europe, Cuba, and Mongolia.
When the interim agreements were renegotiated,
from 1969 to 1971, the basic structure was retained.
However, a number of changes were made, many
of them designed to reduce U.S. dominance and to
increase the direct role of national governments. 3
Comsat was phased-out as the manager, management being turned over to a Director General,
responsible to a Board of Governors composed (in
1979) of the 27 largest participants or groups of participants, representing a total of 83 signatories. A
new voting structure was established to prevent de
facto U.S. veto power. The minimum participation
was lowered to 0.05 percent. AlI signatories and
states parties were entitled to receive free, technical information generated by Intel sat contracts.
Intel sat was allowed to provide services to domestic and regional satellite groups. Net property in
1980 is valued at $663 mill ion, with $523 million of
that in the space segment proper. Return on investment in 1979 was better than 14 percent.4
Part 2
Like Intelsat, Inmarsat is a commercial, profitmaking venture with a corporate structure and independent legal personality. Comsat is the U.S. signatory, holding the largest original share at 17 percent; Great Britain is second with 12 percent, the
Soviet Union third with 11 percent. Initial capitalization was set at $200 milIion.
Because it could participate on a more equitable
basis, the Soviet Union joined Inmarsat; one conse!R IC hard Col lno, The /rite/sat De flnlt/ve Arrangements (Geneva European Broadcasting Union, 1973), p 11-12
Intel}at Annual Report 1980 Intelsat, Washington, D C , p 21
Operating Agreement on Inmarsat, 1976, In Space Law, p 445
289
290 Solar power Satellites
quence was Soviet insistence that nongovernmental signatories e.g., Comsat and Japans Kokusai
Denshin, Ltd.be guaranteed by their governments. It has been pointed out that the Soviet
Union is disinclined to enter mixed organizations
involving states and private enterprise, preferring
to deal only with other states. G
Part 3
The vast majority of Intelsat signatories were
government communications agencies. Only in a
few instances, such as Comsat for the United
States, and Interspazio for Italy, were the signatories separate corporate entities designed for communication satellite operations. One result was a
conflict of interest within agencies that were involved in other communication systems, especialIy
underwater cables. Differences of opinion also developed between Comsat, which wanted to expand
Intel sat into as many other areas, including domestic communications, as possible; and agencies that
wanted Intelsats scope restricted to international
telephone and television relay.
At the beginning, Comsat, with headquarters in
Washington, D. C., was the managing agency; American launchers were used through NASA; and the
satellites themselves were built by U.S. firms
(Hughes for Intelsat I, II, IV, and IV-A; TRW for lntelsat III; Ford Aerospace for Intel sat V). The initial
agreement was structured in such a way that U.S.
participation could never be less than 50.6 percent. 7
Initially, participation by lesser developed counin numbers, tensions developed between LDCs,
Europeans, and the United States over the distribution of benefits. One issue concerned the relative
investment between satelIites and ground stations.
Since users were responsible for building their own
Earth stations, LDCs and others with fewer resources and lower usage urged Intelsat to increase
the size and complexity of the satellite component
in order to reduce Earth-station costs.
As European aerospace capabilities matured,
members began to lobby for larger shares of Intelsat R&D and procurement contracts. Even when
Stephen Doyle, lnmarsat Origins and Structure, 1976

Pelton, op cit , p 58
European bids were higher than U.S. ones, it was

argued that these were necessary to develop competition for the United States, and that it was unfair
for U.S. firms to reap all the financial benefits.
Over time, U.S. firms began to subcontract extensively abroad in an effort to reduce criticism of U.S.
contract dominance.
In the permanent agreement, procurement policy was established with emphasis on the best
combination of quality, price and most favorable
delivery time. However, in the event of equivalent
bids the contract shall be awarded so as to stimulate in the interests of Intelsat, worldwide competition (art. 13).8 This loophole gave Intelsat the
option of allocating contracts on a geographic
basis as long as it determined that they were
roughly equivalent. In recent years, approximately
15 percent of the dollar value of Intel sat procurement contracts has been spent outside the United
States 9
Part 4
Unlike ESRO, which had its own facilities, ELDO
was entirely a coordinating body for separate national efforts. The initial planning called for a
British first stage, a French second stage, a German
third stage, and so on. Launches were to take place
in Woomera, Australia. The major countries had
widely differing interests. France was interested in
an across-the-board capability to compete with the
superpowers and demonstrate French independence and prestige, an aim directly connected with
French military programs in nuclear submarines
and intermediate range ballistic missiles. France
feared that the United States would not provide
launch services for French military satellites or for
programs that promised to compete commercially
with the United States.
Germany was more interested in private commercial ventures, and was much more willing to
cooperate with the United States. Great Britain,
faced by the mid-1960s with severe financial constraints and enjoying a close relationship with the
United States, preferred less expensive programs in
telecommunications and remote sensing.
Intel sat Organ lzatlon Agreement, 1973, In Space Law, p 214

Conversation with ]ohn Donahue, Intelsat procurement office, Octobel 1980
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS,
AND GLOSSARY
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AF
AlAA
audio frequency
American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics
ANSI
American National Standards Institute
A-sat
antisatellite
Aramco Arabian-American Oil Co.
BBB
blood brain barrier
BRH
Bureau of Radiological Health
British thermal unit
Btu
bui
brain uptake index
CB
citizens band
CEP
Citizens Energy Project
centimeter
CMEA
Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon) (East Europe,
Soviet Union, Cuba)
CNS
central nervous system
CONAES Committee on Nuclear and
Alternative Energy Sources (National
Academy of Sciences)
COPUOS Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (United Nations)
COTV
cargo orbital transfer vehicle
Comsat Communications Satellite Corp.
cpm
counts per minute
CW
continuous wave
decibels
dB
dc
direct current
Department of Defense
DOD
Department of Energy
DOE
DMSO
dimethyl sulfoxide
electric discharge laser
EDL
EEG
electroencephalogram m
EKG
electrocardiogram
ELDO
European Space Vehicle Launcher
Development Organization
extremely low frequency
ELF
EMF
electromagnetic fields
electromagnetic pulse
EMP
EMR
electromagnetic radiation
EOTV
electric orbital transfer vehicle
Environmental Protection Agency
EPA
evoked response
ER
ESA
European Space Agency
European Space Research
ESRO
Organization
Federal Communications Commission
FCC
Food and Drug Administration
FDA
FEL
free electron laser
CDL
gas discharge laser
GNP
Gross National Product
GHz
gigahertz (109 cycles per second)
gigawatt (109 watts)
Gw
geostationary orbit
GEO
HEAO-C High Energy Astronomical
Observatory-C
high-energy laser
HEL
Department of Health, Education and
HEW
Welfare
high frequency
HF
high frequency auditory limit
HFAL
heavy-lift launch vehicle
HLLV
horseradish peroxidase
HRP
high-voltage transmission line
HVTL
hertz: a unit of frequency equal to
Hz
one cycle per second
high-atomic-number, high-energy
HZE
particles
International Astronautical Federation
IAF
intercontinental ballistic missile
ICBM
International Energy Agency
IEA
Institute of Electrical and Electronics
IEEE
Engineers
industrial, scientific, and medical
ISM
International Telecommunication
ITU
Union
kilogram
kg
kilometer
km
kilowatt (103 watts)
kw
light amplification by stimulated
laser
emission of radiation
low-Earth orbit
LEO
LMFBR liquid metal fast breeder reactor
LORAN long-range navigation
Megahertz (106 cycles per second)
MHz
microwave power transmission system
MPTS
megawatt (10 watts)
MW
mW/cm 2 milliwatts per square centimeter
National Academy of Sciences
NAS
National Aeronautics and Space
NASA
Administration
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO
National Bureau of Standards
NBS
nonionizing electromagnetic radiation
NIEMR
National Institute of Occupational
NIOSH
Safety and Health
Natural Resources Defense Council
NRDC
Organization for Economic
OECD
Cooperation and Development
(United States, Canada, Japan, West
Europe)
OMEGA generic name for long-range
navigation
OPEC
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries
293
294 Solar Power SateLLites
OSHA
OTA
PLV
POTV
prf
Q
Qe
R&D
rem
RFP
Occupational Safety and Health

Administration
personnel launch vehicle
personnel orbital transfer vehicle
pulse repetition frequencies
Quad (quadrillion BTUS)
Quad, electric
research and development
Roentgen equivalent man, the
quantity of ionizing radiation whose
biological effect is equal to that
produced by one roentgen of X-rays
radiofrequency radiation
SAM
SAR
SEPS
SPS
SRBC
SSTO
STS
t
TVA
UHF
VER
VHF
WHO
surface to air missile

specific absorption rate
solar electric propulsion system
solar power satellite
sheep red blood cells
single stage to orbit space vehicle
space transportation system
metric ton (tonne); 1,000 kg
ultra high frequency
visually evoked electrocortial
response
very high frequency
World Health Organization
Glossary
Ablateto remove by cutting, erosion, melting,
evaporation, or vaporization.
Aerosola suspension of insoluble particles in a
gas.
Albedothe fraction of incident light or electromagnetic radiation that is reflected by a surface
or body.
Ambientthe natural condition of an environmental factor.
Amplitudethe maximum departure of the value
of an alternating wave from the average value.
Artifact a product of artificial character due to an
extraneous agent.
Attenuation a reduction in amplitude of electromagnetic energy.
Beam widththe angular width of a beam of radiation, measured between the directions in which
the power intensity is a specified fraction, usualIy one-half, of the maximum.
Bias currentthe electric current applied to a
device (e.g., a transistor) to establish a reference
level for operation.
Biotathe plants and animals of a region.
Brayton cycle a method of driving a turbine in
which a gas is compressed and heated. The
most familiar use is for aircraft gas turbine
engines. An alternative to the Rankine cycle.
Bremsstrablung radiation radiation from charged
particles that are decelerated in a magnetic
field.
British thermal unit-quantity of heat needed t o
raise one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit
at or near 39.2 F.
Circadianpertaining to events that occur at approximately 24-hr intervals, such as certain biological rhythms.
Cloud condensation nuclei (CCN)particles on
which water vapor condenses to form water
droplets, that in turn form clouds and fogs.
Convection-circulatory motion that occurs in the
atmosphere due to nonuniformity in temperature and density, and the action of gravity.
Cortical tissuestissue from the outer layer of gray
matter of the brain.
Cosmic rayatomic nuclei of heterogeneous, extremely penetrating character that enter the
Earths atmosphere from outer space at speeds
approaching that of Iight.
Couplingthe mechanism by which electromagnetic energy is delivered to a system or device.
CW lasercontinuous wave laser, as distinguished
from a pulsed laser. A laser emitting for a period in excess of 0.25 second.
Cytogenetics a branch of biology that studies
heredity and variation by the methods of both

cytology and genetics.
Cytology a branch of biology dealing with the
structure, function, multiplication, pathology,
and Iife history of cells.
Decible a unit for expressing the ratio of two
amounts of electric or acoustic signal power
equal to 10 times the common logarithm of this
ratio. A ratio of 10 is 10 dB, a ratio of 100 is 20
dB, a ratio of 1,000 is 30 dB, etc.
Diffuse reflection reflection of a beam incident on
a surface over a wide range of angles.
Dosimeter a device for measuring doses of radioactivity.
Eclipticthe circle formed by the apparent yearly
path of the Sun through the heavens; inclined
by approximately 23.50 to the celestial equator.
Electromagnetic energy energy in the entire range
of wavelengths or frequencies of electromagnetic radiation extending from gamma rays to
the longest radio waves and including visible
light.
Electron a subatomic particle with a negative
electrical charge.
Endocrinology a science dealing with the endocrine glands, which produce secretions that are
distributed in the body by way of the bloodstream.
Energy dose the quantity of electromagnetic
energy (in joules) that is imparted per unit of
mass to a biological body.
Energy dose rate the amount of electromagnetic
energy that is imparted per unit of mass and per
unit of time to a biological body.
Epidemiology-a branch of medical science that
deals with the incidence, distribution, and control of disease in a population.
Extended sourcean extended source of radiation
that can be resolved into a geometrical image
in contrast with a point source of radiation, that
cannot be resolved into a geometrical image; a
source that subtends an angle greater than one
arc min.
Exospherethe outer fringe region of Earths atmosphere.
Field intensity the magnitude of the electric field
in volts per meter or the magnitude of the magnetic field in amperes per meter.
Fluxthe rate of transfer of particles or energy
across a given surface.
Frequencythe number of complete oscillations
per second of an electromagnetic wave, measured in hertz (Hz). One hertz equals one cycle
per second.
295
296
Geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) the equatorial orbit at which a satellite takes 24 hr to circle the
Earth so that it is stationary as viewed from
Earth; altitude approximately 36,000 km.
Geosynchronous Earth orbitthe orbit at which a
satelIite takes 24 hr to circle Earth. (The satelIite
may or may not appear to be stationary above a
point on Earth.)
Harmonic frequency a component frequency of an
electromagnetic wave that is a multiple of the
fundamental frequency.
Heliostat a mirror device arranged to follow the
Sun as it moves through the sky and to reflect
the Suns rays on a stationary collector.
Hematology-a branch of biology that deals with
the blood and blood-forming organs.
Heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV) a proposed launch
vehicle used to transport large masses of material from Earth to low- Earth orbit.
Illuminance irradiance; rate of energy per solid
angle measured at a given point.
Immunology a science that deals with disease resistance and its causes.
Intermodulation the mixing of the components of
a complex wave with each other in a nonlinear
circuit. The result is that waves are produced at
frequencies related to the sums and differences
of the frequencies of the components of the
original waves.
Intrabeam viewing viewing the laser source from
within the beam. The beam may either be direct
or specularly refIected.
Ionan atom or group of atoms that carries a
positive or negative electrical charge as a result
of having lost or gained one or more electrons.
Ionizing radiation radiation capable of producing
ions by adding electrons to, or removing electrons from, an electrically neutral atom, group
of atoms, or molecule.
Ionospherethe part of Earths atmosphere beginning at an altitude of about 5 km extending and
outward 500 km or more, containing free electrically charged particles by means of which
radio waves are reflected great distances
around the Earth.
Irradiance (E) radiant fIux density arriving at given
surface in units of watts-per-square-centimeter
(W/cm 2); illuminance (as measured by a detector).
Joule (J) unit of energy (1 watt-see) under the international system. As a thermal unit, 1 joule
equals 0.239 calories. Since the calorie is defined as the energy required to heat 1 gram of
water from 40 to 50 C, 4.184 joules is the
equivalent of one calorie.
Kapton Iightweight, tough plastic film.

Klystron an electron tube used to generate and
amplify microwave current.
Laser a device for generating coherent light radiation.
Low-Earth orbit (LEO) altitude approximately 500
km.
Luminancebrightness on a light source, equal to
luminous flux per unit solid angle emitted per
unit area of the source.
Magnetron a magneticalIy control led tube used
to generate and amplify microwave radiation;
the power sources for microwave ovens.
Magnetosphere a region of Earths outer atmosphere in which electrically charged particles
are trapped and their behavior dominated by
Earths magnetic field.
Mass driver an apparatus for accelerating material
in an electromagnetic field.
Mesoscaleon or relating to a meteorological phenomenon approximately 1 to 100 km in horizontal extent.
Mesosphere a layer of the atmosphere extending
from the top of the stratosphere to an altitude
of about 80 km.
Microwave a comparatively short electromagnetic wave, especialIy one between 100 cm and
1 cm in wavelength or, equivalently, between
0.3 and 30 GHz in frequency.
Modulationwhen a continuous series of waves of
electromagnetic energy is modified by pulsing,
or by varying its amplitude, frequency, or
phase, the waves are said, respectively, to be
pulse-, amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated. In order to convey information by radiating electromagnetic energy, it must be modulated,
Morphology-a branch of biology that deals with
the form and structure of animals and plants.
Multibiotic having or consisting of many plants
and animals.
Multipath radiation in contrast with a so-called
plane wave, that flows in a straight line through
space, an area or volume where electromagnetic waves arrive from different directions
because of reflection or multiple sources is said
to be the site of multipath radiation.
Neuroendocrine-of, relating to, or being a hormonal substance that influences the activity of
nerves.
Neutral particles molecules, atoms, or subatomic
particles that are not electrically charged.
Neutronan uncharged elementary particle that
has a mass nearly equal to that of the proton
Glossary
and is present in all known atomic nuclei except

the hydrogen nucleus.
Noctilucent cloud a luminous thin cloud seen at
night at a height of about 80 km.
Nonionizing radiation radiation of too low an energy to expel an electron from a molecule or
atom.
Ohmic heating-a heating mechanism in a plasma
or other conducting medium. The free electrons
in the medium are accelerated by an applied
electric field and give up kinetic energy by collision with other particles.
Phasethe measure of the progression of a periodic wave in time or space from a chosen instant or position.
Phased array an array of antennas that is aimed as
a group by adjusting the phase of the signal it
sends or receives.
Photoionization ionization (as in the ionosphere)
resulting from CoIIision of a molecule or atom
with a proton.
Photoklystron a device for directly converting visible light to microwave radiation.
Photon a quantum of radiant energy.
Photoperiod the interval in a 24-hr period during
which a plant is exposed to Iight,
Photovoltaic cell a cell composed of materials
that generate electricity when exposed to light.
Plasmaa collection of charged particles exhibiting some properties of a gas but differing from a
gas by being a good conductor of electricity
and by being affected by a magnetic field.
Polarizationthe electric (E) and magnetic (H) fields
that comprise a propagating electromagnetic
wave may be fixed in relation to Earths horizon, or they may rotate. By convention, the vector of the E field is related to Earths horizon: if
the two are perpendicular, the wave is said to
be vertically polarized; if parallel, horizontally
polarized. When the E and H fields are continuously rotating with respect to the horizon, the
wave is said to be elIipticalIy polarized.
Powerthe quantity of energy per unit of time that
is generated, transferred, or dissipated. The unit
of power, the watt (W), is defined as one joule
per second (j/s).
Power density-the quantity of electromagnetic energy that flows through a given area per unit of
time. Formally, power density is specified in
watts per square meter (W/m2), but by tradition
in biological effects studies it is usually expressed in milliwatts per square centimeter
(mW/cm 2).
297
Propagation the transmission of electromagnetic

wave energy from one point to another.
Proton an elementary particle that is identical
with the nucleus of the hydrogen atom, that
along with neutrons is a constituent of all other
atomic nuclei, that carries a positive charge numericalIy equal to the charge of an electron.
Pulsed laser a laser that delivers its energy in short
pulses, as distinct from a CW laser; a laser
which emits for less than 0.25s.
Radiation pressure all propagating electromagnetic waves exert a very sIight pressure on
an absorbing object.
Rankine cycle a Iiquid gas cycle used often for
steam turbines. A working fluid is heated until it
expands and drives a turbine.
Rectenna a coined term for the SPS reference system receiving antenna that also converts the
microwave power to direct-current electricity.
Rectification-the conversion of an alternating current to direct current.
Refraction a deflection from a straight path undergone by a wave in passing obliquely from one
medium into another in which its velocity is different.
Root-mean-squarefor an alternating voltage, current, or field quantity: the square root of the
mean of the square of the quantity during a
complete cycle.
Scattered power power that is reflected or dispersed as the result of an obstruction in the
path of the primary power flow.
Side lobe refers to power radiated from an antenna in a direction other than the desired direction of transmission.
Slipringa metal ring to conduct current in or out
of a rotating member of a machine.
Solar flare an explosion on the Sun which generates fast elementary particles.
Solar winda stream of particles generated by a
solarfIare.
Solid-state amplifier an amplifier whose operation
depends on a combination of electrical effects
within solids, e.g., a transisterized amplifier for
electromagnetic waves.
Specific absorption rate (SAR)the quantity of electromagnetic energy that is absorbed by a body
per unit of mass during each second of time; expressed formally in watts per kilogram (W/kg);
often, informally as milliwatts or watts per
gram (m W/g or W/g). Specific absorption rate
is being considered by the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements as the
official nomenclature for expressing the dose

rate of radio-frequency electromagnetic radiations. Synonymous with energy dose rate.
Specular or regular reflection a mirror-like reflection.
Spurious power or frequencyelectromagnetic energy produced at frequencies that are not easily
related to a specified operating frequency.
Stratosphere an upper portion of the atmosphere
above approximately 10 km (depending on latitude, season, and weather) and in which temperature changes little with changing attitude
and clouds of water are rare.
Sun-synchronous orbit a near polar orbit which
keeps the satellite in full sunlight all the time
while Earth rotates beneath it.
Susceptibilitythe sensitivity of an electromagnetic
receiver to undesired electromagnetic waves
that may resuIt in interference.
Symptomatology a branch of medical science concerned with symptoms of diseases.

Teratology-the study of malformation or serious
deviations from the normal development of
fetuses.
Thermospherethe part of Earths atmosphere that
begins about 80 km above Earths surface, extends to outer space, and is characterized by
steadily increasing temperature with height.
Troposphere the portion of the atmosphere below
the stratosphere, which extends outward about
15 km from Earths surface, and in which temperature generally decreases rapidly with
altitude.
Van Allen belt a belt of intense ionizing radiation
that surrounds Earth in the outer atmosphere.
Wave guide a device for transmitting and guiding
radio-frequency waves

1981 OTA SolarPowerSatellites

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1981 OTA SolarPowerSatellites

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Solar Power Satellites

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-600129

Solar Power Satellites Advisory Panel

American Institute of Aeronautics

Tennessee Valley Authority

Arthur D. Little, Inc.

Tennessee Valley Authority

Frank von Hippel

Workshop on Technical Options

Abraham Hertz berg

Frank von Hippel

Workshop on SPS Public Opinion Issues

Workshop on Energy Context of Solar Power Satellites

Solar Power Satellites Project Staff

Contractors and Consultants

International Energy Associates, Ltd.

OTA Publishing Staff

Richard Beverly and William Brown, Raytheon

Don Calahan, National Aeronautics and Space

Ernest L. Morrison, National Telecommunications

Fred Osborne, Sunsat Energy Council

Stephen Cheston, Georgetown University

Richard Santopietro, U.S. Department of Energy

and Child, Poland

Richard Setlow, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Anita Harlan, L-5 Society

Richard Marsten, Office of Technology

Gerald Stokes, Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Kosta Tsipas, Massachusetts Institute of

A.R. Valentine, Argonne National Laboratory

John Zinn, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

The International Implications of Solar Power Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Alternatives to the Reference System Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 265

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....293

International and Military Imp ications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Systems and Costs. . . . . . . . . .

Environment and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Characterization of Four Alternative SPS Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Microwave transmission. Solar radiation

Since SPS would be a major future energy

designate an agency to track generic research

4 Solar Power Satellites

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

information at the earliest possible time. It

Concept feasibility stages

SPS capacity (CW]

small increments as needed to meet demand

Trojan nuclear powerplant on the Columbia River

Martin Lake electric generating plant in east Texas

not been achieved. For both SPS and fusion, an

INTERNATIONAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

with the Soviet Union could spur a U.S. commitment to SPS.

SYSTEMS AND COSTS

*See chs 3 and 5 for a description of the reference system

oped to provide a basis for review and analysis

lasers or mirrors to transmit solar energy from

costs for most improvements to the reference

Characterization of Four Alternative SPS Systems

Electricity, onsite generation.

Ionosphere heating might affect telecommunications

If visible light IS used there may be problems

Direct beam ocular and skin damage ocular

GEO gives a good vantage point over hemisphere

Direct weapon: as ABM, antisatellite, aimed at Indirect: night illumination psychological