Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Local Gov Digests
Local Gov Digests
Pimentel v. Aguirre
Facts:
Tan v. COMELEC
Facts:
Ganzon v. CSC
Facts:
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
Facts:
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Dela
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Binay v. Domingo
Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance
program initiated by the mayors office. Under this program,
bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of
unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury.
The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter,
the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for
the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was
referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in
audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the
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and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void
for not having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO
Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council
of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a
settled principle of law that municipal corporations
are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such
are endowed with the police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of their creation.
Its authority emanates from the general welfare
clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the municipality to
enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by
the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where
such warehouses are located at a distance of 200
meters from a block of houses and not the
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since the complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the original
jurisdiction of the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral
case between the parties over the ownership of the same parcel of
land. Tamin denied the MTD and granted the municipality's motion
for a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition to
place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of this case, to
the end that the public construction thereon will not be
jeopardized." According to Tamin, the municipality alleges that M&R
are claiming ownership over the land which was previously rented
to them. This action is, therefore, an accion de reivindicacion, a real
action within the jurisdiction of this court. As the complaint is for
recovery of ownership of the land not to enforce the contract, the
Statute of Fraud does not apply. The land subject of this case is
covered by PD 365, withdrawing this land from sale of settlement
and reserving the same for school site purposes under the
administration of the Director of Public School and public plaza
under the administration of the Municipality of Dumingag, therefore
the Cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land involved in this
case. Tamin justified his granting the motion for a writ of
possession with the ancillary writ of demolition by applying
the rule an eminent domain in analogy in that under this
Rule the complainant is given the right to the writ of
possession in order that public construction and projects
will not be delayed. According to him, the necessity of a writ of
possession is greater in the instant case considering that the parcel
of land is covered by a PP and the on-going construction thereon is
being endangered to be left unfinished on account of the buildings
standing on the parcel of land because the appropriation for the
construction might be reverted back to the national treasury. M&R
filed an omnibus MR with motion to set aside order and to quash
writ of possession and demolition but this was denied. The
municipality implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ
of demolition issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the
dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel of land
and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by
the respondents.
M&Rs answer: The parcel of land has been owned, occupied and
possess by respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought
the subject parcel from a Subanan native; that the other
respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a portion of the
parcel of land; that the respondents were never lessees of the
petitioner municipality; that Proclamation 365 issued on March 15,
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Sangalang v. IAC
Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al, on the feasibility of
opening streets in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion
along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air. Based on the studies, it
was deemed necessary, in the interest of the general public to
open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodia, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit,
and Paseo de Roxas streets. According to Bel-Air they own the
streets and as such, should not be deprived of them without just
compensation.
Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and
Orbit streets. NO.
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resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen
(13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. All
ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval.
Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the
power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested
exclusively in the MMC. Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a
"central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed
legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers
the component cities and municipalities had were all subject
to review and approval by the MMC.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the LGUs became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political
subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to
addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative
power. Its power was merely to provide the LGUs technical
assistance in the preparation of local development plans.
Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments
and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro
Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly."
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became
a "special development and administrative region" and the
MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions
were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected
LGUs." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the
legislative debates enacting its charter.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions.
There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a
LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
Moday v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan del Sur passed R 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor
to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion
of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by
Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities." R 43-89 was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there
are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center." Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain
against petitioner Percival Moday, as well as his parents before the
RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The municipality filed a Motion
to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case
stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer
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Issue: WON the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the
necessity of the expropriation? YES.
It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority
should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular
parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the
courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the
purpose of that legislation. If, upon the other hand, however,
the legislature should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes,
the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under
the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear
proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning
whether or not the lands were private and whether the
purpose was, in fact, public.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right
some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the
courts come to determine the question, they must not only
find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In
the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila : First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public.
The legislative department of the government was rarely
undertakes to designate the precise property which should
be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present
case, merely conferred general authority to take land for
public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that
it can be confidently asserted that, under such statute, the
allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an
issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide.
"It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the
control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent
domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity
to the use of any particular property. For if the use be not
public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature
cannot authorize the taking of private property against the
will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be
required."
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is only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square meters is the
subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case No.
CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City. The commissioners submitted an amended
assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it
at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of
P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just
compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December
1996. Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was
amended to reflect the new valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 59204. Petitioner alleged that
the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the
prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings. CA Affirmed RTC.
Issue: WON just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. It asserts that it should be, which in
this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the
property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in
NPC vs. CA
Dedamos: Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided
the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that
just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners
appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any
serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August
1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1,624-square
meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from
attacking the report on which the decision was based; and
(3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower
than the actual value of the property at the time of the
actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.9 However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation
as consideration therefor. In the case at bar, the applicable
law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which
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apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates
were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in
the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified. To be
sure, the Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets:
the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt but reconstructed
Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke with wet
market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon
was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift,
dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for security, intended
for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along the
sidewalk.
Republic v. CA
Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings covering
contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and
use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines
project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency, took
over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America,
had ceased its operations thereat. The national government failed
to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the
foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later,
respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment
for the expropriated property. In the meantime, President Estrada
issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the
expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the
expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used
exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The
remaining portion was retained by the PIA. The Santos heirs
remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until
petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit
in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just
compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos
subject to such final computation as might be approved by the
court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and
motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation
from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision
to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter
or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the
expropriated property.
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Estanislao v. Costales
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Zamboanga City passed
Ordinance No. 44 which imposes a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks
produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the city. The
Minister of Finance sent a letter to the Sanggunian suspending the
effectivity of the Ordinance on the ground that it contravenes Sec
19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. Zamboanga appealed the suspension
in the RTC.
RTC: the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the
Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but upheld its
validity saying that the Finance Minister did not act on it w/in 120
days from receipt of the petition.
Finance Secretary appealed.
Issue: WON Ordinance 44 is valid. NO.
A city, like Zamboanga, may impose, in lieu of the
graduated fixed tax prescribed under Section 19 of
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Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances
and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of
the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the
aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
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and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the then Ministry (now
Department) of Finance. which reads: Sec. 4. Computation of
Penalties on Delinquent Real Property Taxes. (a) Unless condoned,
wholly or partially, in a duly approved resolution of the Local
Sanggunian, delinquent real property taxes shall be subject to
penalty at the rate of two per cent (2%) for every month of
delinquency, provided that the total penalty for one tax year shall
not exceed twenty-four percent (24%). (b) Failure to pay on time at
least the first quarter installment of the real property tax shall
constitute a waiver on the part of the property owner or
administrator to avail of the privilege granted by law for him to pay
without penalty his annual realty tax obligation in four (4) equal
installment on or before the end of every quarter of the tax year.
Accordingly, if the portion of the real property tax due for the first
quarter of tax year is not paid on or before the thirty-first day of
March of the same year, the penalty shall be reckoned from the
first day of January at the rate of two per cent (2%) for every month
of delinquency on the basis of the total amount due for the entire
year and not only on the amount due for the said first quarter of
the tax year. (c) The penalty of two percent (2%) per month of
delinquency, or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum, as the case
may be, shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the
time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that it is paid for
in full.
Cabaluna filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages on 06
July 1993 before the sala of respondent Judge, assailing Joint
Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations
No. 2-85 which, according to him, flouted Section 66 of P.D. No. 464
which fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment
of real estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax.
RTC: Section 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulation No. 1-85 and Local
Treasury Regulation No. 2-85 null and void. Penalty that should be
imposed for delinquency in the payment of real property taxes
should be two per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax for
each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the delinquent
tax is fully paid but in no case shall the total penalty exceed
twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax as provided for in
Section 66 of P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax
Code.
Issue: WON Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local
Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 are valid. NO.
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Thus wise, the chief revenue source of the government will not be
greatly, if not unnecessarily, eroded since tax exemptions that were
granted on piecemeal basis, and which have lost relevance to
existing programs, are eliminated.
Issues: 1. WON respondent Assessors may validly assess real
property tax on the properties of petitioner considering the
proscription in The Local Tax Code (P.D 231) and the Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. 463) against
imposition of taxes on mines by local governments. YES.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that local
government units are without any authority to levy
realty taxes on mines pursuant to Sec. 52 of P.D.
463, which states: Sec. 52. Power to Levy Taxes on
Mines Mining Operations and Mineral Products. Any
law to the contrary notwithstanding, no province,
city, municipality, barrio or municipal district shall
levy and collect taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or
charges of any kind whatsoever on mines, mining
claims, mineral products, or any operation, process
or activity connected, therewith, and Sec. 5 (m) of
The Local Tax Code, as amended by P.D. 426
(reiterated in Secs. 17 [d] and 22 [c], same Code),
which provides: Sec. 5. Common limitations on the
taxing powers of local governments. The exercise of
the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barrios shall not extend to the imposition of the
following: . . . (m) Taxes on mines, mining
operations; and minerals, mineral products, and
their by-products when sold domestically by the
operator.
The Solicitor General observes that the petitioner is
estopped from raising the question of lack of
authority to issue the challenged assessments
inasmuch as it was never raised before, hence, not
passed upon by, the municipal and provincial
assessors, LBAA and CBAA. This observation is well
taken. The rule that the issue of jurisdiction over
subject matter may be raised anytime, even during
appeal, has been qualified where its application
results in mockery of the tenets of fair play, as in
this case when the issue could have been disposed
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CFI: Cebu to refund the real estate taxes paid by NDC for the parcel
of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 430 of August 10,
1939, and the warehouse erected thereon from and after October
25, 1966
CA: certified the case to SC as one involving pure questions of law,
pursuant to Sec. 17, R.A. 296.
Issue: WON NDC is exempted from payment of the real estate taxes
on the land reserved by the President for warehousing purposes as
well as the warehouse constructed thereon, and in the affirmative,
whether NDC may recover in refund unprotested real estate taxes it
paid from 1948 to 1970.
Section, 3 par. (a), of the Assessment Law, on which
NDC claims real estate tax exemption, provides
Section 3. Property exempt from tax. The
exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Property owned
by the United States of America, the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality at
municipal district . . .
The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in
National Development Co. v. Province of Nueva Ecija
where We held that its properties were not
comprehended in Sec. 3, par (a), of the Assessment
Law. In part, We stated: 1. Commonwealth Act No.
182 which created NDC contains no provision
exempting it from the payment of real estate tax on
properties it may acquire . . . There is justification in
the contention of plaintiff-appellee that . . . [I]t is
undeniable that to any municipality the principal
source of revenue with which it would defray its
operation will came from real property taxes. If the
National Development Company would be exempt
from paying real property taxes over these
properties, the town of Gabaldon will be deprived of
much needed revenues with which it will maintain
itself and finance the compelling needs of its
inhabitants 2. Defendant-appellant NDC does not
come under classification of municipal or public
corporation in the sense that it may sue and be
sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense, it is an entity
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Casio v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog passed Resolution
49 which classified certain areas, including Casios coliseum which
was licensed as a cockpit. The classification led to the cancellation
of Casios license to operate such cockpit.
The ordinance provides that changes in the zoning ordinance as a
result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated
as an amendment provided that such is carried out through a
resolution of three fourths vote of the SP. Said amendments shall
take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC. On
August 13, 1985, Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, Series of
1985, reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus
allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. Nine (9) members of the
said SP, participated, with four (4) members voting for the
amendment, while four (4) voted against, and with one (1)
abstention. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock
by voting for the amendment. When Resolution No. 378 was
transmitted to then City Mayor Miguel Paderanga for approval, he
returned the same to the SP within ten days, without any action,
stating that his approval thereof was not necessary since it did not
involve a disposition of city government funds, as provided by
Section 180 of the LGC and Section 14 of the charter of Gingoog
City. By virtue of said Resolution No. 378, Mayor Lugod, issued to
petitioner the aforestated permit to operate a cockpit dated April 2,
1986, which was renewed by another permit issued on January 5,
1987. Gingoog Gallera protested the operation of Coliseum before
the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The protest was founded on
the fact that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued by
the PGC, although city mayor's permits were issued to petitioner.
On April 11, 1986, the PGC, through OIC Orog sent a telegram to
the Station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend in the
meantime the operation of the cockpit. On April 24, 1986, the PGC
eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight
in the Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC.
Thereafter, an action for prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the RTC against
petitioner, on the ground that Resolution No. 378, purportedly
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LC: struck down the questioned ordinance upon the ground that
the power to "declare a state of emergency ... exclusively pertains
to Congress"; that "there is no longer any state of emergency"
which may justify the regulation of house rentals; that said
ordinance constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on
the use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the
constitutional rights of property owners"; that the power of the City
of Manila to "regulate the business of ... letting or subletting of
lands and buildings" does not include the authority to prohibit what
is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be
deemed sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City
Charter.
Issue: WON the Ordinance is valid. NO.
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate
is essentially police power. Inasmuch as the same
generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the
rights and/or the property of persons, which are
protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution,
the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to
a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by
the regard, the respect and the obedience due to
the prescriptions of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Constitution of
Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the
police power measure must be "reasonable". In
other words, individual rights may be adversely
affected by the exercise of police power to the
extent only and only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. If such demands
are brought about by a state of emergency, the
interference upon individual rights, resulting from
the regulations adopted to meet the situation, must
be, by and large, co-extensive, co-equal or coterminous with the existence thereof. And, since an
emergency is by nature temporary in character, so
must the regulations promulgated therefor be. In
the language of Justice Holmes,"circumstances may
so change in time or differ in space as to clothe with
such an interest what at other times or in other
places would be a matter of purely private concern."
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Morata v. Go
Facts: Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint with the CFI against
Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus
damages. The parties are all residents of Cebu City. The Moratas
filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds the failure of the
complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay
conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence
of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The
motion was opposed. MTD denied. MR denied.
Issue: WON the Katarungang Pambarangay law apply to cases
heard by the Regional Trial Courts. YES.
SECTION 6. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless
there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in
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the law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases,
may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and
(c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is
concerned, she has substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have
exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private
respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary
before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total
unawareness of the LGC of 1991, more specifically on the
provisions on the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing.
He should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful
that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts
are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge
is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. 21 He
should have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay
law under the LGC. Had he done so, this petition would not
have reached us and taken valuable attention and time
which could have been devoted to more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the
first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the
mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati
at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11
May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a),
Section 412 of the LGC, respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He
cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC)
which states that the parties may go directly to court where
the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier
stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code,
the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the
private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
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ALU v. Letrondo-Montejo
Facts: The President of the Philippines declared December 4, 1992
a "special day" for the holding of election for Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) throughout the nation. Employees, pursuant to their
CBA subsequently filed claims for the payment to them of holiday
pay for that day. Private respondent, however, refused their claims
on the ground that December 4, 1992 was not a regular holiday
within the contemplation of the CBA.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Kabataan Election Day considered a
regular holiday for purpose of the CBA.
We hold that it is and that, in denying petitioner's claim,
respondent Voluntary Arbitrator denied members of
petitioner union substantial justice as a result of her
erroneous interpretation of the CBA, thereby justifying
judicial review.
First. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is part of the local
government structure. The LGC (Rep. Act. No. 7160) creates
in every barangay a Sangguniang Kabataan composed of a
chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary and a treasurer. 3
The chairman and the seven members are elected by the
Katipunan ng Kabataan, which is composed of citizens of the
Philippines residing in the barangay for at least six (6)
months, who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and who
are registered as members. The chairman of the SK is an ex
officio member of the Sangguniang Baranggay with the
same powers duties, functions and privileges as the regular
members of the Sangguniang Barangay. 5 The President of
the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan, which is
imposed of the SK chairmen of the sangguniang kabataan of
the barangays in the province, city, or municipality, is an ex
officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang Bayan. Hence,
as the Solicitor General points out, the election for members
of the SK may properly be considered a "local election"
within the meaning of Art. VII, sec 3 of the CBA and the day
on which it is held to be a holiday, thereby entitling
petitioners members at the AMS Farming Corp. to the
payment of holiday on such day.
Second. The Voluntary Arbitrator held, however, that the
election for members of the SK cannot be considered a local
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Garvida v. Sales
Facts: Petitioner applied for membership in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan but was denied such as she was already 21 years and 10
months old. She filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. The court found
her qualified. The Board of Election Tellers appealed, but the RTC
judge inhibited himself by reason of his close relation with her.
Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan. Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios,
per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age.
Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director
Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and
allowed petitioner to run. Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner
informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain
why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Earlier
and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
"Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy"
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age
qualification in her certificate of candidacy. That same day Rios
issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc
issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation
of petitioner in the event she won in the election. Petitioner won. In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc,
the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May
27, 1996. On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was
"without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on
Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner
ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and
was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.
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that the candidate was elected will not make the age
requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility.
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private
respondent, the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared
elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office. Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent
has failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually
knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously
voted for her with the intention of misapplying their
franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of
her rival candidate.
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of
the LGC petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang
Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of
votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435 applies
when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
removed from office, or has been absent without leave for
more than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of
eligibility. Being "eligible" means being "legally qualified;
capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office.
Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section
435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court
deems it necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by
the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple
majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall
assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion
of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and
enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC
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Accordingly, the First Engineering District of the DPWHARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the
same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis
of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back
powers which have been previously devolved under the said
executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of
E.O. 426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise
higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law
reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways
while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and
supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute
specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should
therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in
a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later
legislative will. Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054
states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the
basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was
also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Abbas v. COMELEC
Facts: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in 13
provinces and nine 9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan in
implementation of RA 6734, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the ARMM." These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1)
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. In 1987, a new
Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for
regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides
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6.
7.
hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of
divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made"
national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by
enumerating possible instances of conflict between
provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an
application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's
religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the
duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. In the present case, no
actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are
no conflicting claims involving the application of national
law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom.
This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon
to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
WON RA 6734 grants the President the power to merge
regions.
What is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National
Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes Administrative regions
are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to
merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [see
Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict
between the power of the President to merge administrative
regions with the constitutional provision requiring a
plebiscite in the merger of local government units because
the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to
administrative regions.
WON provisions in the Organic Act which create an
Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the
autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and
properties vested upon the regional government by the
organic Act are unconstitutional because while the
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Fourth
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Ordillo v. COMELEC
Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to RA 6766. The COMELEC
results showed that the creation of the Region was approved only
by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the
provinces and city abovementioned. Sec of Justice: considering the
proviso that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be
included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao, being the only province
which voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. As a result of
this, Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR.
Ordillo et al then filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The president
issued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices created under
EO220 are abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR as the
Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said region be composed
of more than one constituent unit. They pray that the court declare
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4.
5.
officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be refiled anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress.
When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in
2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from
square one again, going through the legislative mill just like
bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the
approval.
The deliberations during the 11th Congress on the
unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved
resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities,
have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic
aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
WON the equal protection clause was violated.
If Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income
requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be
scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection
clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
LGC, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid
classification. However, Section 450 of the LGC, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption.
The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be
prescribed in the LGC as mandated in Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were
written in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009,
such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision
merely states, Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009
The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This
one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th
Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income
requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely
on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
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Reyes dissent:
1. The cityhood laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution.
Sec 10 mandatory. The use of the word "shall" in a
constitutional provision is generally considered as a
mandatory command, though the word "shall" may receive
a permissive interpretation when necessary to carry out the
true intent of the provision where the word is found. Thus, it
is not always the case that the use of the word "shall" is
conclusive. However, a reading of Section 10, Article X
cannot be construed as anything else but mandatory.
The intent of R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of
the LGC, is to exempt respondent municipalities from the
income requirement of P100,000,000.00. Thus, the cityhood
laws, which merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, are
in accordance with the "criteria established in the LGC,"
pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
The cityhood laws contain a uniformly worded exemption
clause, which states: "Exemption from Republic Act No.
9009. The city of [___] shall be exempt from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009."
What Congress had in mind is not at all times accurately
reflected in the language of the statute. Thus, the literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless; and
lead to absurdity, injustice, or contradiction.105 When this
happens, and following the rule that the intent or the spirit
of the law is the law itself, resort should be had to the
principle that the spirit of the law controls its letter. Not to
the letter that killeth, but to the spirit that vivifieth. Hindi
ang letra na pumapatay, kung hindi ang diwa na nagbibigay
buhay.
The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be seen
in the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill
No. 2157. Noteworthy is his statement that the basis for the
2.
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Caasi v. CA
Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao,
Pangasinan. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the
ground that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service which would mean that he his a permanent
resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC
dismissed the petitions on the ground that possession of a green
card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary,
despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in
successive elections in said municipality. Commissioner Badoys
dissent: A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an
immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted
that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be
qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done.
Miguels opponent, Caasi also filed a petition for quo warranto.
Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. CA ordered the
RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo
warranto case on the ground that the COMELEC has already ruled
on his qualifications.
Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of the United States
Consti: Article XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe
the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
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United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even
if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party
to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and
giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public
office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Facts : Rodriguez won against Marquez for the gubernatorial post in
Quezon province. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via
petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed
that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on
November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand
theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is
therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC. The
COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition in a resolution
of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal via petition for
certiorari. In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez
renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same
allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition
for disqualification was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when
Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) from where the April
18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending
before the Court. On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the
MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated
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b.
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Galido v. COMELEC
Facts: Galido and Galeon were candidates during the 18 January
1988 local elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of
Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol. Galido was proclaimed duly-
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2.
3.
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consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor
of Lucena City. On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena
City.
Issue: WON COMELEC Talaga is qualified to run forMayor in Lucena
City for the 2001 elections.
Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified
to run for city mayor by reason of the three-term rule
because the unexpired portion of the term of office he
served after winning a recall election, covering the period
May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He
posits that to interpret otherwise, private respondent would
be serving four (4) consecutive terms of 10 years, in
violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution[4] and
Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the LGC.
Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city
mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a
second re-election in 1998 and between June 30, 1998 to
May 12, 2000, during Tagaraos incumbency, he was a
private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3
consecutive terms.
In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that
private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms having lost his third bid in the May 11, 1998 elections,
said defeat is an interruption in the continuity of service as
city mayor of Lucena.
Borja Case: Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and,
during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct
for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can
he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because
he has served only two full terms successively. To consider C
as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while
the people should be protected from the evils that a
monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Lonzanida Case: Two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
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Mendoza v. COMELEC
Osmea v. COMELEC
Facts: RA 7056 (An Act Providing for the National and Local
Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous
Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor)
was enacted. Suit was instituted by Governor Osmea, Governor
Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governors of the
Philippines, Representatives Garcia, del Mar, Bacaltos, Cainglet,
and Guanzon, by way of a petition for Prohibition, mandamus and
Injunction with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the implementation of said RA and the
consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the Comelec
to immediately and with all deliberate speed set up the machinery
and make the necessary preparation for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of
May, 1992. They pray for this Court to declare Republic Act No.
7056 as unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid and inoperative
because:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for
the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the
second Monday of May 1992.
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3
thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates
Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in
effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be
elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution.
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign
periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections,
violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title
"Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems
mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local
elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May,
1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing
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number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for
President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the President and the
Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same
hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
Term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion.
This common termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years.
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and
local election prior to June 30, 1992 or more specifically as
provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5-on the second Monday of
May, 1992.
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, is fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec. 8,
Art. X). The incumbent local officials were elected in January
1988. Therefore, their term would have expired on February
2, 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of
June 30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well
as those of the Senators, members of the House of
Representatives, President and Vice-President, is the same
to synchronize the national and local elections.
Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandate
of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act 7056 provides for two
(2) separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. 2. Start of
Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of
election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared
there shall be held: (a) An election for President and VicePresident of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and
all elective Members of the House of Representatives on the
second Monday of May, 1992, and (b) An election of all
provincial, city and municipal elective officials on the second
Monday of November, 1992. The purpose of Republic Act
7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading
1.
2.
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3.
De Rama v. CA
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil
Service Commission seeking the recall of the appointments of
fourteen (14) municipal employees. De Rama justified his recall
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Alinsug v. RTC
Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the municipal
government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a
permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality.
On 10 June 1992, she received an order from the newly proclaimed
mayor Ponsica, detailing her to the Office of the Mayor. In
compliance with the order, she reported to said office the following
day. On 19 June 1992, Zonsayda absented herself from work
allegedly to attend to family matters. She had asked permission
from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. On 23 June
1992, Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending
Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992
for "a simple misconduct . . . which can also be categorized as an
act of insubordination." The order also stated that the suspension
"carries with it forfeiture of . . . benefits such as . . . salary and
PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity."
Forthwith, Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition dated 07 July
1992, for "injunction with damages and prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction" against Mayor Ponsica
and the municipal treasurer. The petitioner alleged that since her
family supported Mayor Ponsica's rival in the 11 May 1992
elections, her suspension was an act of "political vendetta". She
further alleged that said respondents' acts were "malicious, illegal,
unwarranted, wrongful and condemnable." Mayor Ponsica and the
municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through private
practitioner Lezama, alleging that the petitioner had not exhausted
administrative remedies and that her suspension was in
accordance with law. The foregoing elicited a motion from the
petitioner, praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged
from the record, and that the respondents be all declared in default
on the ground that since the respondents were sued in their official
capacities, "not including their private capacities," they should
have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the
provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b)
[i] and [3] of the LGC. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 and Art.
177 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes usurpation of public
authority. The respondents opposed the motion. Manifesting that
the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer, they asserted
that both the LGC and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not have
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Municipality of Pililia v. CA
Facts: On March 17, 1989, the RTC of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80,
rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of the
Municipality of Pililla against PPC ordering it to pay business taxes
as well as storage, mayors permit, and sanitary inspection fees.
The SC affirmed with modification (1991 Pililia Case). This judgment
became final and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were
remanded to the trial court for execution. On October 14, 1991, in
connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Mendiola filed
a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality for the examination of
defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and
1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business
imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended. On October 21,
1991, PPC filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18,
1991, Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of
P11M as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the
Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim
documents executed by said mayor. Accordingly, on October 31,
1991 the court below issued an order denying plaintiff
municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment
on the ground that the judgment in question had already been
satisfied. Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order of October
31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation
to plaintiff municipality amounted to P24M , while the amount
involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia
was only P12M; and that the said mayor could not waive the
balance which represents the taxes due under the judgment to the
municipality and over which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola
had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25%
and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when quantified and added,
amount to more than P12 million. MR denied. On February 18,
1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner
municipality, filed a petition for certiorari with us, which petition we
referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On March 2,
1992 PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to
represent petitioner municipality. Consequently, on March 31, 1992
the CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private
counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice
to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through
the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. The Municipality
filed an MR.
Issue: WON Atty. Mendoza has authority to file a petition in behalf
of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. NO.
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private
attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled that private
attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
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October 1994, the President promulgated AO. 153 which meted out
suspensions to the petitioners.
OP Case 5469:
Because of the refusal by the NPC to pay real property taxes
assessed by Albay covering the period from 11 June 1984 up to 10
March 1987 amounting to P214,845,184.76, the Province sold at
public auction the properties of NPC consisting of geothermal
power plants, buildings, machinery and other improvements
located at Tiwi and Daraga, Albay. The Province was the sole and
winning bidder at the auction sale. NPC failed to redeem its
properties. It later filed a petition with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the auction sale conducted by the
Province. NPC claims, inter alia, that its properties are not subject
to real property tax. On 17 May 1989, the Province, through Atty.
Romulo Ricafort, the legal officer of the Province, filed it; comment
on the NPC petition with the Supreme Court. On 2 June 1989, the
Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan adopted Resolution No. 129-89
authorizing respondent Governor to engage the services of a
Manila-based law firm to handle the case against NPC. On 25
August 1989, Atty. Jesus R. Cornago entered his appearance with
the Supreme Court as collaborating counsel for the Province in G.R.
No. 87479. The entry of appearance of Atty. Cornago bore the
conformity of respondent Governor. On 14 November 1989, Atty.
Antonio Jose F. Cortes of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm sent
respondent Governor a letter informing him that Atty. Jesus R.
Cornago, as collaborating counsel for the Province, has filed a
memorandum with the Supreme Court, suggesting that a retainer
agreement be signed between the Province, on the one hand, and
Atty. Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. On 8 January 1990, the
Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90
authorizing respondent Governor to sign and confirm the retainer
contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Salalima signed the
retainer agreement. On 4 June 1990, the Supreme Court issued a
decision dismissing the NPC petition and upholding the validity of
the auction sale conducted by the province to answer for NPC's tax
liabilities. Payments amounting to P7,380,410.31 were made by the
Province to Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago.
Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in
entering into the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said
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Reyes v. COMELEC
Facts: Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on
May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint
was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by
Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted
and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the
Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the
Department of Interior and Local Government were never received
by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of
the same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of
cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the
latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. In its
decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from
office. It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian
had terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to
render judgment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated
without giving him a chance to be heard. A TRO was issued by the
court on February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. But on
March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the temporary restraining
order and without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial
Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's
counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the
decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon
petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the
decision. On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued
an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and
peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But
service of the order upon petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of
candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in
Bongabong. On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de
Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
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his answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed,
this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply
with the order to file answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is
required by public service. The efficiency of officials under
investigation is impaired when a case hangs over their
heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they
are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the
business of government will not be prejudiced.
WON the DILG erred in recommending to the Disciplining
Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation
in view of Josons inexcusable failure to file an answer.
Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the
LGC, viz: (a) Preventive suspension may be imposed: (1) By
the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component
city; (b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time
after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided,
That, any single preventive suspension of local elective
officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided,
further, That in the event that several administrative cases
are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing
and known at the time of the first suspension.
Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining
Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b)
when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the
gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for
the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied
with. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite several
opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his
right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined.
5.
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Evardone v. COMELEC
Facts: Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern
Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. On 14
February 1990, Apelado, Aclan and Nival filed a petition for the
recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat. COMELEC issued a resolution approving the
recommendation to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition
for recall against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said
Municipality. Evardone filed before this Court a petition for
prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. SC issued TRO ordering
the respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the
petition for recall.
Central Office got it on the same day, but field agent got it 3 days
later, a day after the completion of the signing process sought to
be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
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2.
be some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good
a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.
Recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a
local government unit cannot be more representative of the
sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose
members represent the entire electorate in the local
government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just
as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as
are those composing PRAs.
The question here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of
the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year
period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening
of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA
outside this period make it any more representative of the
people, as the petition filed by 25% of the registered voters
is claimed to be?
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000,
more than one year after petitioner assumed office as
mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding
on that date.
WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same
Paragraph (b) of 74 of the LGC includes the Election Period
for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election.
P: date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within
the second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues
that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b)
does not only mean "the day of the regular local election"
which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period
as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days
immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he
contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election
may be held.
This contention is untenable. The law is unambiguous in
providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had
Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign
period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election
Code, it could have expressly said so.
Ps interpretation would severely limit the period during
which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no
recall election may be held until one year after the
assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably
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Osea v. Malaya
Facts: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed a Protest Case with
the Civil Service Commission. She averred that she was appointed
as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the
endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that
despite the recommendation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V.
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words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It is open
to the public (in the sense, it is public service), but upon the
payment only of a certain rental (which makes it
proprietary.) Article 424 of New Civil Code cited by appellant
makes clear distinction. It reads: ART. 424. Property for
public use, in the province, cities, municipalities, consist of
the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, public works
for public service paid for by said provinces, cities
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial
and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws. Thus, the term "public works for
public service" must be interpreted, following the principle
of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding words
"provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters and promenades" which
are used freely by all without distinction. Hence, if the public
works is not such free public service, it is not within the
purview the first paragraph, but of the second paragraph of
Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character.
And, as already held by this Court, a municipal water system
designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is a
corporate function of the municipality
Cases differ as to the public and private character of water
works in some respects, but the weight of authority, in so far
as legislative control is concerned, classes them as private
affairs
The consequential effect of such declaration is foreseeable,
thus: Although the state may regulate the service and rates
of water plants owned and operated by municipalities, such
property is not employed for governmental purposes and in
the ownership operation thereof the municipality acts in its
proprietary capacity, free from legislative interference
The water system of a city not being a property held for
governmental purposes is not subject to legislative control
In the ownership and control of a water system purchased
by the city out of the proceeds of the loan contracted for
that purpose, the city acts in its proprietary character as
distinguished from its government capacity.
Similarly, we cannot uphold appellant's theory that the
transfer of ownership of the Osmea Waterworks System to
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service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate
use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The
playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, and
Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands: capitol site and
the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in
the classification regarding State properties, properties for
public service in the municipalities are not classified as
public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the
chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with
regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
Norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in
question which are devoted to public service are deemed
public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held
and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.
HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS: where the
municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public
purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public
school, the public market, or other necessary municipal
building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
presume a grant from the States in favor of the municipality;
but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked
only as to property which is used distinctly for public
purposes...."
VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO:
municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes
are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the
municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt
from execution and attachment since they were not
patrimonial properties.
MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS: a municipal lot
which had always been devoted to school purposes is one
dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a
municipality.
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amended by Act No. 1112 and Ordinances Nos. 70, 71, 144, 167,
192, 272, 490, 903, 988, 1162, 1244 and 1476, which deal with the
sale and transfer of the franchise of the Compaia de Tranvias de
Filipinas to the plaintiff in April, 1904.
On March 27, 1903, the plaintiff, then known as "Manila Railways
and Light Company", acquired the said franchise from Charles M.
Swift, together with all the rights, privileges and obligations
appurtenant thereto. The plaintiff has since then established
electric car lines along certain streets of the City of Manila and
suburbs, which have now and then been altered with the express
consent either of the City of Manila or of the Philippine Legislature.
As grantee of the franchise, the plaintiff corporation agreed to pay,
and has to date been paying, to the City of Manila, 2 1/2 per cent
"of the fares collected and tickets sold within the limits of the City
of Manila, and the same percentage of fares collected and tickets
sold without the said limits to the proper municipality or
municipalities of the Province of Rizal." In 1927, the plaintiff applied
for and obtained from the Public Service Commission certificates of
public convenience to operate as it did in 1929, an autobus service
along the streets, districts and suburbs of the City of Manila, not
covered by its electric car lines. Alleging that these autobus service
was included in the franchise granted the plaintiff, under Ordinance
No. 44, the defendant and appellee City of Manila collected from
the plaintiff who had to pay under protest a tax of 2 1/2 per
cent of the fares collected and ticket sold in its autobus lines within
the City of Manila from April, 1929 to November, 1932, amounting
to P43,868.06. The present action was instituted to recover this tax.
The plaintiff issues transfer tickets which entitle the holder of
regular fare to transfer from a street car to an autobus and viceversa without extra charge, although this privilege is not extended
to zone fare passengers.
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Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from
demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction,
G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. CA:
dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of
Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable
only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA
with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C)
the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in
Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC of
1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant
permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local
government units concerned.
Issue: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges
is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the
Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the
other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to
grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The
Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect
fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus
fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region.
The LGC of 1991 does not contain any express provision
which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
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year, because the members of this Court could not, within the
unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision
thereon. Although the term of office of petitioner herein expired on
December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of Carmona,
Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot, as regards such
rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto. For this reason,
and, also, because the question of law posed in the pleadings,
concerns a vital feature of the relations between the national
government and the local governments, and the Court has been led
to believe that the parties, specially the executive department, are
earnestly interested in a clear-cut settlement of said question, for
the same will, otherwise, continue to be a constant source of
friction, disputes and litigations to the detriment of the smooth
operation of the Government and of the welfare of the people, the
members of this Court deem it necessary to express their view
thereon, after taking ample time to consider and discuss full every
conceivable aspect thereof.
Issue: WON a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly
by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set
forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the
suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein
referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and
explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to
municipal corporations and none has been cited to us
said procedure is exclusive; that the executive department
of the national government, in the exercise of its general
supervision over local governments, may conduct
investigations with a view to determining whether municipal
officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said sections, as a
means only to ascertain whether the provincial governor
and the provincial board should take such action; that the
Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the
provincial governor and the provincial board to take said
action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so
the provincial governor and the provincial board may not be
deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the
authority conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of
the Revised Administrative Code; that such would be the
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Ganzon v. Kayanan
Facts: On August 25, 1956, Rosales lodged a verified complaint
against Ganzon for taking advantage of his public position. On
September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, designated Kayanan to conduct the investigation of said
complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 64(c) of the RAC
granting Kayanan all the powers given to an investigating officer by
Sections 71 and 580 of the same Code. On September 18, 1956,
respondent served a copy of the complaint on petitioner and set
the investigation of the charges on September 20, 1956. Petitioner,
having filed a motion for postponement, respondent definitely set
the investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On September
24, 1956, Ganzon instituted in the CFI an action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction questioning the authority of the President to
order his investigation and praying that respondent be enjoined to
suspend and desist from proceeding with the investigation and
that, pending decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary
injunction be issued against respondent. On September 26, 1956,
the lower court declined to issue the writ and instead set the case
for hearing on the merits on September 28, 1956. At the hearing,
both parties agreed to admit all the facts set forth in the pleadings
and submitted the case for decision. And on October 2, 1956, the
lower court rendered decision dismissing the petition. His motion
for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present
appeal.
Issues: 1. WON the President of the Philippines has the power and
authority under our Constitution and the laws at present in force in
this jurisdiction to investigate the mayor of a city and, if found
guilty, to take disciplinary action against him as the evidence and
law may warrant.
Iloilo charter does not contain any provision as regards the
procedure by which he may be removed. Nevertheless, as
this Court has once said, "the rights, duties, and privileges
of municipal officers (including city officials) do not have to
be embodied in the charter, but may be regulated by
provisions of general application specially if these are
incorporated in the same code of which the city organic law
forms a part". The code herein referred to is the Revised
Administrative Code. The charter does not say that he shall
hold office at the pleasure of the President unlike similar
provisions appearing in other city charters. The idea is to
give the mayor a definite tenure of office not dependent
upon the pleasure of the President. If this were the case, he
could be separated from the service regardless of the cause
or motive. But when he was given a definite tenure, the
implication is that he can only be removed for cause. An
inferential authority to remove at pleasure can not be
deduced, since the existence of a defined term, ipso facto,
negatives such an inference, and implies a contrary
presumption, i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the
end of his term subject to removal for cause.'
64(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and
to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials.
For disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the
Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the Government of the
(Philippine Islands) Philippines. (c) To order, when in his
opinion the good of the public services requires, an
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Bito-Onon v. Fernandez
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Batangas v. Romulo
Facts: The Province of Batangas, represented by Governor
Mandanas, filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to
declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in
the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year
the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release
thereof.
Issue: WON the provisos in the GAAS of 1999-2001 relating to the
LGSEF, as well as the Oversight Committees Resolutions issued
pursuant thereto are unconstitutional and void
Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted
as a policy that: Section 25. The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the
Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to
one of general supervision. This provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction
between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An
officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act.
If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the
act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
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Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
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of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports,
put the cause of death of all five victims as `asphyxia' caused by
the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal
conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in
hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas,
which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter
inside the septic tank." TC: dismissed. IAC/CA: reversed.
MR:reversed.
Issue: 1. WON Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar.
2. WON such negligence the immediate and proximate cause
of deaths of the victims hereof.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage
to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the
relation between the omission and the damage. He must
drove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the
defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. Proof of such relation of
cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did
not in any way contribute to the negligence of the
defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the
product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a
difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the
proximate cause of the accident.
Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to
clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an
accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the
laborers. They contend that such failure was compounded
by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing
danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to
neutralize or render harmless the effects of the toxic gas.
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Torio v. Fintanilla
Facts: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21,
22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the
"1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn
organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of
P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the "cancionan". The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas
Extravanganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui
employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The
troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and
one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The
program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some
speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela"
then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached,
the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of
the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San
Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the
following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to
recover damages. TC: Executive Committee appointed by the
municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good
father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a
stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that
was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on
entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for
damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was
accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. CA
reversed.
Issue: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the
exercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it
of a private or proprietary character?
Holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of
Malasiqui Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative
Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. A fiesta
may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a
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three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had
more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to
immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private
respondent the amount of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is
hereby required to submit to this Court a report of its
compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible
period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this
resolution.
Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila
Facts: V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David
Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by
the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta. Pursuant to the aforesaid contract,
the respondent-appellee proceeded with the construction of the
new Pasay City Hall building as per duly approved plans and
specifications. The respondent-appellee accomplished under
various stages of construction the amount of work (including
supplies and materials) equivalent to an estimated value of
P1,713,096.00 of the total contract price of P4,914,500.80. The
appellants paid only the total amount of P1,100,000.00 to the
respondent-appellee leaving an amount of P613,096.00
immediately due from the petitioner-appellants to the respondentappellee. Pasay failed to pay. Action for specific performance with
damages against herein petitioners-appellants before the
respondent Court. The parties arrived at a draft of amicable
agreement which was submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay
City for its consideration. Protracted pre-trial hearings and
conferences were held where the respondent Court suggested and
advised that "under the principle of quantum meruit, the plaintiff is
forthwith entitled to at least that which is due to him for defendants
under the contract and that public interest must perforce require
the continuity of construction of a public work project, instead of
delaying its immediate completion by litigating upon technical
grounds which would undoubtedly redound to public detriment".
The Municipal Board of Pasay then enacted Ordinance No. 1012
which approved the Compromise Agreement and also authorized
and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Claudio to represent the
appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final approval of
the respondent Court herein. Court approved the said Compromise
Agreement including a Manifestation and Addendum thereto. On
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