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(Lima & Hirst) Brazil As An Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities
(Lima & Hirst) Brazil As An Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities
Since the early years of the twentieth century Brazils major foreign policy
aspiration has been to achieve international recognition in accordance with its
belief that it should assume its natural role as a big country in world affairs.
Brazils desire to influence international rules and regimes and to be considered
a major player has been understood principally in terms of its soft power: it has
consistently eschewed the development of hard power, and especially of
military power. Rather, its claim to greater influence has been associated with
other classical power attributes, such as territory, population and economic
profile. Its location in a relatively peaceful regional environment, the early
settlement of its territorial demands and border disputes, and its consequent
position as a status quo power within the region also help to account for its
aspiration to what one might call a middle ground international role.
Although the bases for an autonomous foreign policy have become more
restricted in the post-Cold War period, Brazil still seeks to preserve an
independent voice within the international community and a certain level of
independent capacity to determine its actions. In addition, the country has
demonstrated a clear intention of wanting to expand the roles that it plays and
the responsibilities that it assumesin regional politics, in Third World agendas
and in multilateral institutions. Recent indications of this include its initiative
towards the creation of a South America Community; its activist policies and
positions in both hemispheric trade negotiations and global trade fora; its efforts
to deepen relations with major world powers such as as China and Russia; its
desire to build up SouthSouth coalitions, particularly with India and South
Africa; the promotion of its own candidates to head both the WTO and the
Inter-Development Bank; and its campaign to become a permanent member of
an expanded UN Security Council (UNSC). Moreover, as democracy deepens
its roots within the country, Brazil has attempted to link an increasingly activist
stance in world affairs with political support at home for a more active partisan
involvement in foreign policy. In this context, the governments fight against
poverty and unequal income distribution at home and its assertive and activist
foreign policy can be viewed as two sides of the same coin.
For the concept of a foreign policy community, see Amaury de Souza, A agenda internacional do
Brasil: Um estudo sobre a comunidade brasileira de poltica externa, Centre for Brazilian International
Relations (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro, mimeo, 2002. It includes members of the executive, congress and
judiciary, leading social movements and interest groups, non-governmental organizations,
businesspeople, journalists and academics.
22
For the concept of critical junctures, see Ruth Collier and David Collier, Shaping the political arena:
critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991).
3
For distinct explanations of Brazilian foreign policys relative stability and continuity, see Maria Regina
Soares de Lima, Instituies democrticas e poltica exterior, Contexto Internacional 22: 2, JulyDec.
2000, pp. 265303; Marco Antonio Muxagata de Carvalho Vieira, Idias e instituies: uma reflexo
sobre a poltica externa Brasileira do incio da dcada de 90, Contexto Internacional 23: 2, JulyDec.
2001, pp. 24591; Celso Lafer, A identidade internacional do Brasil e a poltica externa Brasileira (So Paulo:
Editora Perspectiva, 2001).
23
Jos Mara Arbilla, Arranjos institucionais e mudana conceitual nas polticas externas argentina e
brasileira, Contexto Internacional 22: 2, JulyDec. 2000, pp. 33785.
For the concept of autonomy through participation, see Gelson Fonseca Jr, Alguns aspectos da poltica
externa Brasileira contempornea, in Gelson Fonseca Jr, A legitimidade e outras questes internacionais.
Poder e tica entre as naes (So Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1996), pp. 35374. For the contrasting desire for
autonomy, see Letcia Pinheiro, Trados pelo desejo: um ensaio sobre a teora e a prtica da poltica
externa Brasileira contempornea, Contexto Internacional 22: 2, JulyDec. 2000, pp. 30535.
24
25
See Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Brazil, the GATT, and the WTO: history and prospects, paper presented
to seminar on The international relations of Brazil: new possibilities and old constraints, Centre for
Brazilian Studies of Oxford University, St Antonys College, Oxford, 1516 March 1999.
11
See Ricardo U. Sennes, Brasil, Mxico e ndia na Rodada Uruguai do GATT e no Conselho de
Segurana da ONU: um estudo sobre os pases intermedirios, doctoral dissertation, University of So
Paulo, Brazil, 2001, p. 157.
26
See Sennes, Brasil, Mxico e ndia na Rodada Uruguai do GATT e no Conselho de Segurana da
ONU, p. 148.
See Abreu, Brazil, the GATT, and the WTO.
27
See Sennes, Brasil, Mxico e ndia na Rodada Uruguai do GATT e no Conselho de Segurana da
ONU, p. 96.
See Celso Amorim, Entre o desequilbrio unipolar e a multipolaridade: o Conselho de Segurana da
ONU no perodo ps-guerra fria, in G. Dupas and T. Vigevani, eds, O Brasil e as novas dimenses da
segurana internacional (So Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1999), pp. 8798.
16
See Lafer, A identidade internacional do Brasil e a poltica externa.
17 See Amorim, Entre o desequilbrio unipolar e a multipolaridade, p. 93.
15
28
See e.g. Lafer, A identidade internacional de Brasil e a poltica externa, Spring 2000; Andrew Hurrell,
An emerging security community in South America?, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds,
Security communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
29
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24
In August 2000, all South Americas heads of state attended the first South American presidential
summit, which took place in Braslia. The agenda set for the meeting included five topics: defence of
democracy; regional trade; regional infrastructure; information, science and technology; and the fight
against drug trafficking.
Special mention should be made of the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru and the 1996 political crisis
in Paraguay. In October 1998 the governments of Ecuador and Peru signed a peace treaty in Braslia,
finally ending hostilities. With regard to Paraguay, Brazil has consistently coordinated diplomatic action
with Argentina to contain backsliding into authoritarianism.
It should be noted that for Brazil the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the Andean countries
is connected to the interstate and intersocietal links in the Amazon area.
The period since 2002 has seen a major reallocation plan within Itamaraty, with the number of
diplomats in South America almost doubled and the number of those in European countries drastically
reduced.
At the Planalto (presidential) palace this function has been assumed by Marco Aurlio Garcia, as chief
adviser to the president on international affairs.
Rubens Ricupero, O atacado e o varejo da diplomacia, Folha de So Paulo, 26 June 2005.
30
In the Buenos Aires declaration, Argentina and Brazil promised to intensify cooperation, strengthen
both democracy and integration processes, improve Mercosurs institutions, generate sustainable growth
and fight against poverty.
31
MINUSTAH involves the participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Canada,
US, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Philippines, Spain and Sri
Lanka.
27
In the early 1950s a rapprochement between Vargas and Pern, and the suspicion that an alliance between
Brazil, Argentina and Chile had been negotiated, generated a vociferous and hostile reaction by
opposition forces which contributed to destabilizing the domestic political situation.
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33
28
In August 2000 President Clinton travelled to Colombia to announce the Colombia Plan, which
involved an aid package worth $1.3 billion dollars, and to reaffirm full support for the Pastrana
government. Eighty per cent of the aid package is for military use, and involves the formation of three
1,000-man anti-drug battalions, with 500 military advisers and 60 helicopters.
34
SouthSouth relations
Since the inauguration of the Lula administration Brazil has laid a very strong
emphasis on the expansion of SouthSouth relations, and this has raised high
expectations. One of the administrations first steps was to underscore the link
29
The Fourth Summit of the Americas took place in Mar del Plata, Argentina, on 45 Nov. 2005.
Immediately afterwards, President Bush visited Brazil for bilateral talks. For evaluation of the visit see
The boys in Brazil, Wall Street Journal, 8 Nov. 2005; Brazil, US look ahead to world trade talks, New
York Times, 7 Nov. 2005.
35
36
International security
Brazils stance on security matters has two strands. On the one side, the country
defends its prerogative to maintain a strong notion of sovereignty which is
reflected in many of the axioms of its defence policy, such as the importance of
protecting territorial integrity and national interests.30 On the other, it has
become clear that a more promising option for the country in global and regional
security matters has been to enhance multilateralism. Brazil has become fully
committed to non-proliferation regimes and acknowledges the importance of
multilateral institutions in world and regional security. As has been underlined,
Brazil has been among the most vocal of intermediate states and emerging
30
On 30 July 2005, the National Defence Policy launched a new decree (5.484) approved and signed by
President Lula. This decree represents the official statement of Brazils vision of national defence and
regional/international security. According to this document, the main strategic priorities for Brazil are:
(1) Amazonia (impact of war in Colombia, drug traffic, guerrilla groups, etc.); and (2) the South Atlantic
(for its role in trade, and its gas and petroleum resources). It argues that, in a world characterized by
growing interdependence and globalization, it is important to develop an appropriate national defence
sector because, in the future, the countrys natural resources may need to be protected from external
ambitions. This sector must have appropriate human and economic resources, adequate technology and
weapons. The document also recognizes the growing presence of non-traditional threats such as
terrorism and organized illicit activities, and gives priority to (3) the creation of a rapid deployment
force and (4) a growing role for Brazil in peacekeeping operations.
37
Social inequality
Brazil can be defined as a regional power by any economic yardstick, given
that its economy constitutes half of the total economic size of the region. In
fact, almost half of the regions GNP is of Brazilian origin and its exports
represent more than 40 per cent of the total exports of the region. In addition,
Brazils trade pattern is more diversified than that of its neighbours: only
around 25 per cent of Brazilian exports are destined for the region. In recent
years the region has been identified as an area for the diversification of investments in non-traditional areas and as a strategic location for Brazilian multinationals, especially in the energy and engineering sectors.
Politically, Brazillike Argentina, Chile and Uruguayhas experienced a
relatively recent transition from an authoritarian regime to representative democracy, and can now be considered politically stable. Despite the fact that Lulas
government is going through a difficult political situationas a consequence of
accusations of corruption in the PT and in the parties of the government
38
According to a study of political instability in South America, from 1990 to 2004 instability was higher
in the Andean countries, than in the Southern Cone, where only Paraguay showed a similar number of
crisis events. In an index composed of the number of semesters (six months) in which events such as
coups dtat, civil wars, states of siege, presidential impeachments or social revolts had happened,
Colombia (96%), Venezuela (58%), Bolivia (55%), Paraguay (51%), Ecuador (48%) and Peru (48%)
registered, in that period, the highest incidence of such events, above the South American mean of
around 40%. See Marcelo Coutinho, Crises institucionais e mudana poltica na Amrica do Sul,
doctoral dissertation, IUPERJ/University Candido Mendes, Rio de Janeiro. See http://
observatorio.iuperj.br. Jan. 2005. See also http://observatorio.iuperj.br.
32
The more closely the value of the GINI index approaches 0, the less unequal is the country. For
example, the GINI value of Namibia, the most unequal country, is 0.707; the Brazilian GINI is 0.593.
Worse than Brazil in terms of inequality are six African countries and Guatemala.
33
See Human Development Report 2005 (Geneva: United Nations Development Programme, 2005). HDI
values of 0.800 or above are classified as high human development; of 0.5000.799, as medium human
development; and of less than 0.500 as low human development.
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