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The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to
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ISBN: 978-1-929667-16-1
Second Edition, January 2012
ARCHANGEL:
CIAs SUPERSONIC A-12
RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
DAVID ROBARGE
CIA CHIEF HISTORIAN
FOREWORD
This history of the A-12 reconnaissance aircraft was occasioned by CIAs acquisition
on loan from the Air Force of the eighth A-12 in the production series of 15 in
September 2007. Known as Article 128, the aircraft is on display at the Agencys
Headquarters compound in Langley, Virginia. This history is intended to provide an
accessible overview of the A12s development and use as an intelligence collector.
Writing this story was a fascinating challenge because I am not an aviation historian
and have never flown any kind of aircraft. Accordingly, I have tried to make the
narrative informative to lay readers like myself, while retaining enough technical detail
to satisfy those more knowledgeable about aeronautics and engineering. I have drawn
on the sources listed in the bibliography and the extensive files on the A-12 program
in CIA Archives. Hundreds of those documents were declassified and released to the
public in conjunction with the dedication of Article 128 in September 2007 as part of
the Agencys 60th anniversary commemoration. I have limited citations to specific
documentary references and direct quotes from published works. When discrepancies
arose among the sources regarding dates and other details, I have relied on the
official records.
For their contributions to the substance and production of this work and to the
documentary release, I would like to thank my colleagues on the CIA History Staff
and at the Center for the Study of Intelligence, the information review officers in the
Directorate of Science and Technology, designers and cartographers in the Directorate
of Intelligence, and publication personnel at Imaging and Publishing Support. I also
am grateful for historical material provided by the Lockheed Martin Corporation and
the A-12 program veterans, the Roadrunners.
David Robarge
CIA Chief Historian
January 2012
iii
CONTENTS
From Drawing Board to Factory Floor
11
21
27
Finding a Mission
31
41
References
47
A-12 Schematic
Inventory of A-12s
Bibliography
A depiction of the A-12 on its first operational flight in May 1967. Entitled
designs in
met all the
range, and
decided not
F r o m D r a w i n g B o a r d t o F a c t o ry Floor
A-1, 23 April 19
A-1, 26 June
1958
Clarence Leonard Kelly Johnson was a pathbreaking aeronautical engineer who worked for
Lockheed Aircraft for over four decades. Born in Ishpeming, Michigan, on 27 February 1910,
he graduated from the University of Michigan with an M.S. in aeronautical engineering in 1933
and joined Lockheed that same year.
Johnson was creative, dynamic, ambitious, and unafraid to question others expertise and
ideas. Soon after arriving at Lockheed, he told his employers that the design of a new aircraft
they were working on was flawed and would make the plane dangerously unstable. Instead of
firing him, Lockheed asked him to work on the problem. He developed the double vertical tail
configuration that became one of the trademark features of the companys aircraft, including
the A-12.
From there, Johnson rose quickly and became Lockheeds chief research engineer in 1938.
In 1952 he was appointed chief engineer of the firms Burbank, California, plant and then vice
president of research and development in 1956, and vice president for advanced development
projects in 1958. Johnson became a member of Lockheeds Board of Directors in 1964 and
senior vice president of the corporation in 1969. He retired in 1975, but he served on as a
consultant at the Skunk Works until 1980. He died at the age of 80 on 21 December 1990.
Johnsons contributions to advanced aircraft design were extraordinary. He designed or
contributed significantly to the development of 40 well-known and important military and
civilian aircraft. In addition to the U-2, the A-12, and the SR-71, they included the P-38
Lightning, the Constellation, the PV-2 Neptune, the F-80 Shooting Star, the F-94 Starfire, the
F-104 Starfighter, the B-37 Ventura, the C-130 Hercules, the C-140 Jetstar, and the AH-56
Cheyenne attack helicopter. His accomplishments were founded on a hard-charging but
informal management style and an openness to experimentation that brought out the best in
his coworkers. Among his numerous awards and honors from industry, professional societies,
and the Air Force, are two Collier Trophies (1959 and 1964), the National Medal of Science
(1966), the nations highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1967), the CIA
Distinguished Intelligence Medal (1975), and the National Security Medal (1983). He was
elected to the Aviation Hall of Fame in 1974.
F r o m D r a w i n g B o a r d t o F a c t o ry Floor
The Finalists
F r o m D r a w i n g B o a r d t o F a c t o ry Floor
Patches made for OXCART crew members. CYGNUS was the name given the A-12 in
testing. The 1129th SAS was the unit designation of the A-12 team assigned to Kadena
Air Base in Okinawa.
The A-12 practically spawned its own industrial base and the 2,400 or so machinists,
mechanics, and fabricators could do their own milling and forging. The sign at the top, Stamp
out F.O.D. was an exhortation to Stamp Out Foreign-object Damage, a problem of engine
failure sometimes caused by small objects inadvertently dropped and left in nacelles during
fabrication.
10
1Bissell, 133.
2McIninch, 10.
B r e a k i n g T h r o u g h T e c h n o l o g i c a l Barriers
11
Dealing with the extreme temperatures of Mach 3+ flight was the most formidable
challenge.
12
The Engines
The J58 turbojet engines that would enable the
A12 to fly so high and fast were the most persistent
problem. Designed in 1956 for a Navy aviation project
that was canceled, the engines had to undergo major
modifications to turn them into the most powerful airbreathing propulsion devices ever made. Just one
J58 had to produce as much power as all four of the
The J58 jet engine during a static test. A modified version of an engine designed for
another program four years earlier, the jet generated as much power as the turbines
of the ocean liner the Queen Mary.
5Helms, 266.
6 Brown, 17.
B r e a k i n g T h r o u g h T e c h n o l o g i c a l Barriers
13
In this photo, one of the first of the A-12 released by CIA, the adjustable inlet cones in front of the engines
are clearly visible. Called spikes, the devices regulated the incoming air flow to maximize thrust and
prevent interruptions in fuel combustion at high speeds.
14
9 Ibid., 216.
B r e a k i n g T h r o u g h T e c h n o l o g i c a l Barriers
15
Defenses
Finally, although it was intended to fly too high and
too fast to be detected or shot down, the A-12 was
equipped with several electronic countermeasures
(ECMs) to foil hostile air defenses. The ECMs would
warn the pilot his aircraft had been painted by a
16
B r e a k i n g T h r o u g h T e c h n o l o g i c a l Barriers
17
Throughout testing, flight procedures evolved; in effect, pilots were testing and training simultaneously.
Here, the only A-12 trainer builtthe Titanium Gooseis about to refuel, a process that took the A-12
close to stall speed when it was filled up.
20
from then on all A-12s but the trainer were fitted with
the required propulsion system.
Other performance benchmarks were reached
slowly because of continued difficulty sustaining
Mach 3 speeds. The first flight to fly briefly at Mach
3 was in July 1963, and the first sustained flight at
operational conditionsMach 3.2 at 83,000 feet for
10 minutesdid not take place until February 1964.
A year later, the A-12 fleet had made 1,234 flights
totaling almost 1,745 hours, but only 80 of them had
been at Mach 3 or faster (one reached Mach 3.27)
and for a total of only just over 13 hours.3
Progress came more quickly during the
rest of 1965 and into 1966. Following a one-hourandfortyminute, 3,000-mile flight mostly above
Mach 3.1 in January 1965, an operationally outfitted
A-12 (Article 128, not a test aircraft) first attained
Mach 3 in March. Peak speed and altitudeMach
3.29 (over 2,200 mph) at 90,000 feetwere
reached by separate aircraft in May and August;
289 flights above Mach 3 lasting over 84 hours were
made by October; a maximum stress flight of nearly
sixand-a-half hours was completed in November,
with portions at peak speed and altitude; and as of
mid-March 1966, over 146 out of nearly 2,750 hours
flown were above Mach 3.4
Not surprisingly, people living around the test site
and along the flightpaths filed many complaints
about sonic booms, especially after the public
announcement about the OXCART project in
February 1964. Another consequence of all this
flight activity was an increase in UFO reports. As with
the U-2 in the 1950s, there is a strong correlation
between the A-12 flight schedule and alien aircraft
sightings submitted in the early and mid-1960s.5
Many other hurdles besides the engines had to be
surmounted, turning OXCART into a regular fouralarm fire that undermined CIAs reputation for
doing things on the cheap [and] quickly, according
to Bud Wheelon.6 In April 1963, after assessing the
capabilities of the Soviet Unions new computer-
3 Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: OXCART Status Report, 26 February 1965.
4[OSA,] Project OXCART and Operation BLACK SHIELD Briefing Notes, 20 October 1965; Memorandum from CIA Acting
Director of Special Activities to CIA Assistant to the Director of Reconnaissance, OXCART Status Report, 18March 1966; [OSA,]
OXCART Development Summary and Progress (1 October 196631 December 1966), 31 December 1966; OSA, Report
OXCART A-12 Aircraft Experience Data and Systems Reliability, 15 January 1968.
F u l l S t r e s s Testing
21
A rare photo of an airborne A-12 with landing gear visible, here on its second flight ever.
equipped TALL KING radar, CIA directed Lockheed
to rebuild the chines to change the A-12s RCSan
expensive and, it turned out, undesirable change.7
Costs soared as a result of other miscalculations,
delays, and difficulties. By late November 1963,
McCone reported to President Johnson that $400
million had been spent, and $300 million more would
be needed, to produce the 15 OXCART aircraft CIA
and the Air Force had ordered.8
Some of the problems encountered were mundane,
but serious nonetheless. One was foreign object
damage, which by July 1963 had resulted in 18 engine
removals and extensive nacelle modifications.9
During the aircrafts assembly at Burbank, small
items such as bolts, nuts, screws, pens, and metal
shavings would fall into the nacelles. When the
engines were started at the test site, these objects
were pulled into the power plant and damaged its
internal parts. Taking X-rays, shaking the nacelles,
installing screens over air inlets, and even having
workers wear coveralls without breast pockets
largely controlled the problem.
Another issue was debris on the taxiways and
runway. Like huge vacuum cleaners, the giant
J58 engines would suck up anything loose on the
pavementfasteners, clamps, rocks, chunks of
Crashes
During the first three years of pre-operational
testing, three A-12s crashedtwo from mechanical
malfunctions, one because of ground crew error. All
pilots ejected safely. The first loss, of Article 123,
occurred on 24 May 1963 during a low-altitude,
5Haines, 73.
6 Richelson, 98.
29November 1963.
9Chief/OSA Aircraft Systems Division memorandum for the record, Factors Affecting A-12 Flight Test and Mach Number Extension,
22
21 July 1963.
F u l l S t r e s s Testing
23
YF-12A
26
1Scoville to Joseph Charyk (Undersecretary of the Air Force), Interdepartmental Cover Support for Project OXCART, 29 May 1962.
2McCone untitled memorandum to DDCI Marshall Carter, 10 February 1964; Briefing Note for the Deputy Director of Central
3Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 1:322-23.
4 Johnson, History of the OXCART Program, 15-16.
H i d i n g O X C A R T i n P l ain Sight
27
5Jack C. Ledford (Assistant Director, OSA) memorandum to Wheelon, Effect on OXCART Program if Aircraft S/N 121 is Used
for Speed Record Attempt, 19 August 1964; Ledford memorandum to McCone, Effect of Using OXCART 121 for Speed
Record Attempt, 20 August 1964; Carter letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, 24 August 1964; Cunningham
memorandum to McCone, Establishment of World Record of Aircraft Speed by the A-11, 28 April 1964.
28
FINDING A MISSION
30
1McCone memorandum for the record, Discussion at NSC Meeting5 May 1964, 5 May 1964.
2Carter memorandum to Wheelon, SKYLARK, 22 August 1964.
3 [DS&T,] Vulnerability of the OXCART Vehicle to the Cuban Air Defense System, 15 September 1964; NRO Acting Director
memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs et al., OXCART Reconnaissance of Cuba, 6 September 1966;
Peter Jessup (NSC) memorandum, Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 September 1966, 16 September 1966;
Wheelon to McCone, Considerations bearing on OXCART use over Cuba, 7 September 1966; CIA Board of National Estimates to
Helms, Probable Communist Reactions to Use of the OXCART for Reconnaissance over Cuba, 6 September 1966; Pedlow and
Welzenbach, 44.
F i n d i n g a Mission
31
6Board of National Estimates, Political Problems Involved in Operating OXCART Missions from Okinawa over Communist China and
32
7Peter Jessup (NSC) memorandum for the President, Proposed Deployment and Use of A-12 Aircraft, 11 April 1966; Raborn
memorandum to the President, OXCART Deployment Proposal, 29 April 1966; Raborn memorandum to the 303 Committee,
OXCART Deployment, 15 June 1966; Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-2-66, Reactions to a Possible US Course of
Action, 17 March 1966; OXCART Development Summary and Progress (1 October 1966-31 December 1966).
8 [OSA,] Briefing Note for the Director of Central IntelligenceOXCART Status Report, 15 February 1967
9 Helms memorandum to the 303 Committee, OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam, with attachment, 15 May 1967.
F i n d i n g a Mission
33
OXCARTs first
mission over
Southeast Asia,
31 May 1967. With
pilot Vojvodich in the
cockpit, Article 131
refueled three times
during its
3 hour 39 minute
flight.
This image of
Hanoi area was
taken during the
fourth mission, on
30 June 1967.
34
10[OSA,] Critique for OXCART Mission BSX001, 6 June 1967; DS&T, BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 31 May-15
August 1967, 22 September 1967, 3-4; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), BLACK SHIELD Mission X-001, 31
May 1967, NPIC/R-112/67, June 1967; [OSA,] Critique for OXCART Mission Number BX6705, 26 June 1967, and Critique for
OXCART Mission Number BX6732, 3 November 1967.
F i n d i n g a Mission
35
11OSA mission critiques, 16 June 1967-15 May 1968; DS&T, BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December
1967, 31 January 1968, and BLACKSHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968.
to DDS&T, Analysis of Surface to Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and BX6734, 27 November 1967.
36
14DDS&T Carl Duckett memorandum to DCI Richard Helms, OXCART Operations on 27, 28, 29 October (local time); DS&T,
BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967, 31 January 1968, 25-35; D/OSA memorandum
to DDS&T, Analysis of Surface to Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and BX6734, 27 November 1967;
Cable OPCEN 2898, 30 October 1967; Cable from Kadena, IN 91487, 1 November 1967; Donald Smith (EA/DDCI) untitled
memorandum to Duckett, 6 November 1967.
15DS&T, BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967, 36-39; DS&T, BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance
Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968, 30 April 1968, 3-8, 10-11, 13-14.
F i n d i n g a Mission
37
States, XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 474, 475, 494; Helms memorandum to Walt W. Rostow et al., OXCART Reconnaissance of North
Korea, 24 January 1968.
18NPIC, North Korea Mission BX 6847, 26 January 1968, Highlights, NPIC/R-17/68, January 1968; DS&T, BLACK SHIELD
Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968, 30 April 1968, 8-10.
19 Quoted in Rich and Janos, 245.
20Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA) memorandum to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Requirement for a Second BLACK SHIELD
Mission Over North Korea, 29 January 1968; Report on Meeting of the [Pueblo] Advisory Group and Notes of the Presidents
Luncheon Meeting with Senior American Advisors, both 29 January 1968, FRUS, XXIX, Part 1, 557, 565; DS&T, BLACK SHIELD
Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968, 30 April 1968, 11, and BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1 April-9
June 1968, 7 August 1968, 2-3; CIA Intelligence Information Cable, Implications of Reported Relocation of USS Pueblo, 12
February 1968, Declassified Documents Reference System, doc. no. CK3100137943.
38
With the OXCART program cancelled, the A-12s flew back to the United States and were placed
in storage.
40
1Ledford, Briefing Note for the Director of Central IntelligenceBureau of the Budget Recommendations for the OXCART Program,
16 November 1965.
2C. William Fischer (BOB), Herbert D. Benington (DOD), and John Parangosky (CIA), Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft Study,
November 1966.
3Parangosky memorandum for the record, 12 December 1966 Meeting with Mr. Helms re OXCART/SR-71, 15 December 1966;
DDCI Rufus Taylor memorandum to Helms, Reduction of A-12/SR-71 Fleets, 29 December 1966.
4[OSA,] Briefing Note for the Director of Central IntelligenceOXCART Status Report, 15 February 1967; Helms memorandum to
Rusk, OXCART, 28 July 1967; Vance memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., SR-71 Plans, 9 May 1967.
A F u t i l e F i g h t f o r Survival
41
5Helms letter to McNamara, 13 September 1967; [National Reconnaissance Office,] NRP Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting
Held September 29, 1967, Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, 29 September 1967.
6 Duckett memorandum to Helms, OXCART/SR-71 Information for EXCOM Meeting, 19 December 1967.
7Helms memorandum to Paul Nitze (DOD) and Hornig, Considerations Affecting OXCART Program Phaseout, 18 April 1968.
8OSA memorandum to Lockheed, A-12 Accident ReportAircraft 129, 21 June 1968.
42
A F u t i l e F i g h t f o r Survival
43
44
REFERENCES
A-12 Schematic
R e ferences
47
26 April
First test flight
30 April
First official flight
29 August
4 May
Joint CIA/
Air Force
panel selects
Lockheeds
A-12 design
1957
1958
1959
21 April
Lockheed begins
design studies for
Mach 3 aircraft
First supersonic
flight
6 November
First flight at
Mach 2
1960
11 February
CIA and
Lockheed sign
contract for 12
A-12s
1962
1963
15 January
First flight using
two J58 engines
20 July
First flight at
Mach 3
7 August
First flight of
YF-12A variant
48
3 February
First sustained flight
at design conditions
(Mach 3.2 at 83,000
feet for 10 minutes)
President Johnson publicly
announces existence of
OXCART program
25 March
Last A-12 completed at
Skunk Works
28 December
President Johnson
decides to end
A-12 program by
January 1968 (later
extended to July)
29 October
First SR-71 arrives at
test site
22 December
First flights of SR-71 and
M-21 carrying D-21 drone
1965
26 January
30 July
D-21 collides with
M-21 just after launch,
causing death of one
crewman and leading
to termination of
program
29 February
1964
5 January
Air Force cancels
YF-12A program
5 March
First launch of
D-21 drone from
M-21
1966
27 January
A-12 flies for one hour
and 40 minutes above
Mach 3.1 for distance
of 3,000 miles
12 November
CIA declares A-12
operationally ready
1967
First overflight
of North Korea;
Pueblo located
5 February
Air Force directs
Lockheed to destroy
tooling for all
OXCART aircraft
21 March
First SR-71 mission,
over North Vietnam
6 May
Last (29th) A-12
mission, over North
Korea
21 May
President Johnson
reaffirms earlier
decision to end A-12
program
4 June
Pilot Jack Weeks dies
when A-12 crashes in
checkout flight
21 June
Last A-12 flight, from
test site to storage
facility in California
26 June
CIA Intelligence Star
awarded to BLACK
SHIELD pilots
1971
1968
5 January
Pilot Walter Ray is
killed after ejecting
from A-12
15 July
TAGBOARD
program
discontinued
23 May
First A-12 flight across
Pacific
31 May
20 November
Maximum speed and
altitude reached by
one A-12 (Mach 3.29
at 90,000 feet)
R e ferences
49
Inventory of A-12s
Aircraft
Number
121
Serial
Number
Configuration
Number of
Flights
Number of
Hours Flown
Disposition
60-6924
Flight testing
332
418.2
60-6925
122
177.9
60-6926
Operations
79
135.3
60-6927
Training
614
1076.4
125
60-6928
Operations
202
334.9
126
60-6929
Operations
105
169.2
60-6930
Operations
258
499.2
128
60-6931
Operations
232
453.0
129
60-6932
Operations
268
409.9
60-6933
Operations
217
406.3
60-6937*
Operations
177
345.8
60-6938
Operations
197
369.9
133
60-6939
Operations
10
8.3
134
60-6940
Drone operations
80
123.9
135
60-6941
Drone operations
95
152.7
122
123
124
127
130
131
132
*Numbers 6934 to 6936 were used for the Air Forces YF-12A fighter-interceptor
version.
50
G00503
Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area
CP 5N 122E
Scale 30.5M
RUSSIA
Sea of
Okhotsk
KAZAKHSTAN
MONGOLIA
NORTH
KOREA
SOUTH
KOREA
CHINA
JAPAN
NEPAL
BHU.
INDIA
BANGL.
Taiwan
BURMA
Number
Pilot
Aircraft
Date
BX6847
Weeks
131
26 January 1968
BX6853
Murray
127
19 February 1968
BX6858
Layton
127
6O
May
N
R T1968
H
PACIFIC
OCEAN
P hi l i p p i n e
Sea
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
South
VIETNAM China
Sea
Guam
Target: North Vietnam
PHILIPPINES
Pilot
Aircraft
Date
BSX001
Vojvodich
131
31 May 1967
BSX003
Weeks
131
10 June 1967
BX6705
Layton
129
20 June 1967
BX6706
Weeks
129
30 June 1967
BX6708
Collins
127
13 July 1967
8 December 1967
BX6709
Sullivan
131
19 July 1967
Celebes1967
10 December
BX6710
Ceram
Collins
129
20 July 1967
MALAYSIA
Target:
Cambodia and Laos
MALAYSIA
Number
Pilot SINGAPORE
Aircraft
BX6737
Vojvodich
131
Layton
131
Sumatra
Date
Celebes
Sea
Borneo
I N D O N E S I BX6716
A
Java Sea
Java
Vojvodich
131 PAPUA
21 August 1967
BandaBX6718
Sea
Layton
127 GUINEA
31 August 1967
BX6722
Weeks
Arfura
129
16 September 1967
Sea
Collins
131
17 September 1967
Sea
BX6725
Collins
127
4 October 1967
BX6727
Murray
131
6SOUTH
October 1967
BX6728
Collins
131
PACIFIC
15
October 1967
BX6729
Murray
129
18 October 1967
BX6732
Sullivan
131
28 October 1967
BX6733
Murray
127
29 October 1967
BX6734
Sullivan
129
30 October 1967
BX6740
Layton
131
16 December 1967
BX6842
Layton
127
4 January 1968
BX6843
Weeks
131
5 January1968
BX6851
Collins
127
16 February 1968
127
8 March 1968
EAST
BX6723
Timor
TIMOR
INDIAN OCEAN
(U.S.)
Number
BRUNEI
BX6738
Northern
Mariana
Islands
(U.S.)
Luzon
New Guinea
NEW
Gulf of
Carpentaria
A BX6739
U S T RVojvodich
A L I A 127
Great Australian
BX6856
Vojvodich
Bight
OCEAN
15 December 1967
Tasman
Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
R e ferences
51
52
SR-71 Blackbird
The best known version of the A-12 (above right) is the SR71 Blackbird (above left), whose nickname
has become eponymous with the entire set of OXCART variants. In December 1962, the Air Force
ordered six reconnaissance/strike aircraft for high-speed, high-altitude flights over hostile territory
after a nuclear attackhence its original designator RS. Compared to the A-12, the SR-71 was about
six feet longer, weighed 15,000 pounds more fully loaded, had more prominent nose and body chines
and a two-seat cockpit, and carried additional optical and radar imagery systems and ELINT sensors in
interchangeable noses.
With the added weight, the aircraft flew slower and lower than the A-12 or the YF-12A, but it carried more
fuel and had a longer range. After an initial contract for six RS-71s, the Air Force ordered 25 more in August
1963. When President Johnson disclosed the aircrafts existence in July 1964, he mistakenly transposed
the designator letters. Air Force officials let the error stand and came up with the Strategic Reconnaissance
(SR) category instead. The fleet, based in the United Kingdom, Okinawa, and California, flew over
3,500 sorties from March 1968 until November 1989, when it was deactivated. In September 1994 Congress
allocated funds to reactivate three SR-71s. Two aircraft and crews became operational during 1995 and
1996. In October 1997, President Bill Clinton vetoed further funding, and in June 1999 the SR71 program
was shut down again.
R e ferences
53
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Published Sources
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. Reflections of a Cold
Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
Brown, William H. J58/SR-71 Propulsion Integration, Studies in Intelligence 26:2 (Summer
1982), 15-23.
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Web Sites
http://blackbirds.net
http://roadrunnerinternationale.com
http://www.habu.org
http://www.lockheedmartin.com
R e ferences
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