Abellana v.

Marave
G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974)
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The criminal
case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner
appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed
with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and
independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on
the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent
Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioners literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123.
Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive
right in accordance to Art. 33 of the Civil Code. 2 As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973
Constitution, the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a
statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at
bar, literal construction of the law is not favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its
function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a
procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of
vindicating an alleged right.

Maniago v. CA
G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of
the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing
Authority. In 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by
private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya.
A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency
of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case)
separately had been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioners motion on the
ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action
for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
HELD:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule
111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must
be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be
deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which
arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule,
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or
omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is
reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been
reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not
bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to
bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. 26 The
ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with
regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be
separated but follows that of his employee" is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from

crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against
the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery
requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought
against the employee or against his employer.
In Dulay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted
before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer
constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately.

Gan vs. Reyes

G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002
Bellosilo, J.
Facts:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send her 3-year old daughter Francheska Joy S.
Pontevida, to school, Bernadette S. Pontevida demanded from petitioner support for their love child to
which the petitioner denied paternity. In exasperation, Bernadette in a complaint instituted in behalf of her
daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitioner
contends that there was no cause of action for the support since Francheskas birth certificate indicated
her father as Unknown which was eventually denied by the court. Having denied his motion, petitioner
failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more
than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent
moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. Hence, the court received the
evidence of private respondent ex parte. The claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, thus,
the trial court ordered petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his
illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each
month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the
accumulated arrears ofP20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15
May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private
respondent.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that
the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement.
Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an
exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of
default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious
defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice
to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2)
weeks after its scheduled hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court acted in grave abuse of discretion for ordering the immediate execution of the
judgment without due notice and hearing to petitioner.
Held:
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was
likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly,
petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was
disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence."10

Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in
actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to
the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that
advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision
preemptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between
those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument
that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and
explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further
explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner
attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the
provision subject of the petition.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be
instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support
until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the
early case of De Leon v. Soriano16 is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently
and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime
have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of
funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that
if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil
and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and
education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the
years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take
up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to nonpayment of the funds when needed.

Sps. Quisumbing vs MERALCO

GR No. 142943 April 3, 2002
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon
City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business
name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs.
Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club,
Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. On March 3, 1995,
MERALCOs inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot
inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of
asking permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed
the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO 's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the
meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and
there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the
inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. The spouses were advised by
MERALCO's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for
verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, MERALCO
had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the spouses unless they pay the amount
of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina
informed the spouses that they were just following their standard operating procedure. An action for
damages by the spouses alleging that MERALCO acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and
malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without
due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.

ISSUE:
Whether MERALCO observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electric supply of the
spouses?

HELD:
Under the law, MERALCO may immediately disconnect any electric services on the ground of meter
tampering. However, they may do only in the presence of an officer of law or by a duly authorized
representative of the energy regulatory board where they can personally witnessed and attested the
discovery of the tampering. If theres no government representative, the prima facie authority to
disconnect granted to MERALCO by RA 7832 cant apply. The presence of government agents who may
authorize immediate disconnection goes into the essence of due process. MERALCO cant be prosecutor
and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. MERALCO cant rely
on the contractual right to disconnect if there is non-payment of bills. An adjusted bill shall be prepared

and only upon failure to pay the company disconnect or discontinue service. This is also true in regard
with the provision of the revised order no. 1 of the former public service commission which requires a 46
hour written notice before the disconnection may be justified. Hence, this case is partially granted wherein
both of the parties are to pay each other.