ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)

G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy
that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential
election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an
ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting
that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be
vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its
announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In
its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the
public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,
not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance
with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in
this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case
and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the
JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or
that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight
appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re
Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here
as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article
VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.

3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief
Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this
case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the
petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth
an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the
selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to
the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet
vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant
to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit
the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because
the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation
of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional
experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely
settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC
from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are
reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by
the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest

their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen,

Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16
of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a
judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the
following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear
legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant
to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant
unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the
act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.