DE CASTRO V.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)

FACTS
This case revolves around the contentious situation that arose from the impending
mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, just a week after the
presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex
officio member of the JBC, sent a letter to the JBC, urging the commencement of the
nomination process for the office of the Chief Justice without delay.

During its January 18, 2010, en banc meeting, the JBC passed a resolution
unanimously agreeing to initiate the process of filling the soon-to-be-vacated position of
Chief Justice, effective May 17, 2010, with the impending retirement of the incumbent
Chief Justice. Consequently, the JBC publicly announced the opening of the Chief
Justice position for applications or recommendations, publishing this announcement in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its February 8, 2010 meeting, the JBC decided to move forward with the next step by
releasing the names of specific candidates and inviting the public to submit their sworn
complaints, written reports, or opposition, no later than February 22, 2010. Despite
initiating the process in accordance with its rules, the JBC has not yet determined when
to present the list of nominees for the position to the President, pending the resolution of
the present controversy.

Several cases preceding this one and the petitions from intervenors have requested
either the prohibition of the JBC from finalizing the shortlist, a mandamus instructing the
JBC to finalize the shortlist, or have contended that the act of appointing the next Chief
Justice by GMA constitutes a midnight appointment.

A frequently cited precedent in this case is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998, concerning Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of
the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City, and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively,
which is abbreviated here as the Valenzuela case. In this precedent, the Court ruled that
Section 15, Article VII prohibits the President from exercising the power to appoint
individuals to judicial positions during the specified period.
ISSUE
 W/N the petitioners have legal standing?
 W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?
 W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?
 W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist
of nominees by the JBC?

HELD
 The petitioners possess legal standing as the Court had waived the requirement
for this particular case. Legal standing is a unique concept in constitutional law,
as some lawsuits are not filed by individuals who have personally suffered from
the enforcement of a law or any other government action, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in the interest of the public. Even if, strictly
speaking, the petitioners "do not fall within the definition," it remains well within
the broad discretion of the Court to waive the requirement, thus eliminating the
obstacle to address and resolve the significant constitutional issues raised.

 There is a justiciable issue at hand. The petitions present a real and concrete
case or controversy that is ready for judicial determination. The fact is that the
JBC has already initiated the proceedings for the selection of nominees who will
be part of a shortlist submitted to the President for consideration in appointing the
next Chief Justice, who will succeed Chief Justice Puno. Although the position
has not yet become vacant, the mere fact that the JBC has commenced the
nomination process according to its established rules and practices, even though
it has not decided whether to present the list of nominees to the current outgoing
President or the next President, renders the situation ripe for judicial resolution.
This is because the subsequent steps involve the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the shortlist, and the possible consultation with
constitutional experts. Resolving this controversy will definitively address the
lingering questions that have hindered the JBC from proceeding with the process
it has already initiated or that have given it reason to pause.
  Prohibition under section 15, article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the supreme court or to other appointments to judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

The Supreme Court justifies its position with several key arguments. The meticulous
drafting and arrangement of the Constitution by the framers suggest a purposeful
reflection of their intentions and vision for the Constitution. The Constitution's 18
Articles, specifically the allocation of powers among the three branches of government,
underscore the principle of the separation of powers. Article VII focuses on the
Executive Department, outlining the powers vested in the President, including the power
of appointment detailed in Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the Article.

The Court emphasizes that if the framers had intended to extend the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, they could have
explicitly done so. They could have easily incorporated this prohibition into Article VIII,
likely in Section 4(1). While the Valenzuela ruling established that the prohibition
covered judicial appointments, it was not based on a solid foundation rooted in the
Constitutional Commission's deliberations.

Furthermore, the Court emphasizes the use of the word "shall" in Section 4(1), Article
VIII, as an imperative that imposes a duty enforceable by law. Consequently, Section
4(1) imposes on the President the obligatory task of appointing a Supreme Court
Justice within 90 days of a vacancy. Failing to do so would constitute a clear violation of
the Constitution.
The Court contends that the 90-day limit set in Section 4(1), Article VIII was established
as a specific provision to create a definitive mandate for the President as the appointing
authority. This provision should not be undermined by a mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela, which suggested that Section 15, Article VII held greater authority because
of its more stringent language.

Section 15, Article VII does not apply to all other appointments within the Judiciary. The
provision's primary purpose was to prevent outgoing Chief Executives from making
midnight appointments. The framers of the Constitution established this prohibition with
a clear rationale, but it was intended to be specific to appointments made in the
Executive Department. The Constitutional Commission did not extend this prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary because they had already devised a comprehensive
solution. This solution involved the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and
the implementation of a meticulous and unhurried process for nominating and screening
candidates for judicial positions. This approach aimed to eliminate the need for midnight
appointments within the Judiciary. In essence, the establishment of the JBC was a
deliberate move to depoliticize the Judiciary by removing the Commission on
Appointments' intervention and ensuring that judicial appointments were based on merit,
competence, and a rigorous selection process.

As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the
Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself
when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the
“constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming
presidential elections. He assured that “on the basis of the (Constitutional)
Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court
of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the
President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of
Appeals.

Within Article VII, which comprises 23 sections, three sections (Section 14, Section 15,
and Section 16) pertain to the President's appointing authority. It is evident that Sections
14 and 16 exclusively address appointments within the Executive Department.
Consequently, this implies that Section 15 should be interpreted in the same context,
limited only to the Executive Department as well. This interpretation aligns with the
principle that each part of a statute should be understood in relation to the entire
context. In other words, each segment must be considered alongside the others and
remain subordinate to the overall intent of the entire law.
The decision of the Court in Valenzuela to extend the coverage of Section 15 to include
appointments in the Judiciary not only undermines the Constitution's intent but also
threatens the goal of ensuring the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive and
Legislative branches. Such an interpretation would essentially subject the Judiciary and
the Supreme Court to the political fortunes or misfortunes of individuals competing for
the presidency during a presidential election.

Moreover, allowing Section 15 to apply to appointments in the Judiciary would raise

doubts about the wisdom of having the incoming President, rather than the incumbent,
appoint the next Chief Justice. This process could potentially compromise the
independence of the judiciary as the appointee may become beholden to the appointing
authority. On the other hand, allowing the incumbent President to make the appointment
does not pose the same risk of jeopardizing judicial independence, particularly because
the incumbent President's term will conclude by June 30, 2010.

The argument presented suggests that the incumbent President would have ample time
to appoint a successor to Chief Justice Puno during the remaining 45 days of the 90-
day period stipulated in Section 4(1), Article VIII, even with the prohibition in place.
However, this argument overlooks the broader application of Section 4(1) to every
instance of a vacancy in the Supreme Court, not just the immediate vacancy caused by
Chief Justice Puno's retirement on May 17, 2010.

Furthermore, Section 4(3), Article VII stipulates that regular elections must take place on
the second Monday of May. As a result, the elections could occur as early as May 8 or
as late as May 14. Consequently, if the regular presidential elections were held on May
8, the prohibition period would be 115 days, while if the elections were on May 14, the
prohibition period would be 109 days. In either scenario, the prohibition period would
exceed the mandatory 90-day period for filling a vacancy in the Supreme Court. This
realization leads to the understanding that there could be at least 19 instances where
the outgoing President would be unable to fulfill the constitutional duty of appointing a
Supreme Court Justice. It is inconceivable that the framers of the Constitution intended
such an impractical outcome.

In certain extreme circumstances, there arises a question as to whether a Judicial and

Bar Council (JBC) list is a prerequisite for any President to appoint a Chief Justice,
particularly if the appointee is selected from the current justices within the Supreme
Court. This hypothetical situation suggests that the President, in this scenario, may
have the prerogative to directly appoint a Chief Justice without the need for a formal
recommendation from the JBC.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
The Members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.

The provision is evidently aimed at candidates seeking entry into the Supreme Court
from external sources, meaning individuals who are not current members of the Court
but aspire to become one. It pertains to candidates for the Supreme Court, rather than
individuals who are already part of or serving as justices within the Court. These sitting
justices have previously undergone the vetting process by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).

 Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC

The issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully fails to fulfill an act that the law specifically requires
as a duty arising from an office, trust, or position. Mandamus is a suitable remedy when
the act in question is within the discretion of the tribunal or officer. However, it cannot be
used to dictate how judgment or discretion should be exercised in a particular manner.

For mandamus to be granted, the following conditions must be met: (a) the plaintiff must
have a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the defendant's duty to
perform the act because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant must be unlawfully
neglecting the performance of the duty prescribed by law; (d) the act to be performed
must be ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there should be no alternative appeal or
other readily available, swift, and sufficient remedy in the ordinary course of law.