2. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
Ong
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the
action of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a
Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato
Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that,
"vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof,"
from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for
every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into
consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President
from making appointments within two (2) months immediately
before the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were
five (5) candidates for the position from the most senior of the
Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato
C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for
the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do
not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution
intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should
have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the
Judiciary.
RULING:
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII,
mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from
the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day
period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should
start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution
for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will
be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby
effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time
granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the
appointment. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before
the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is
ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in
the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of
the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only
refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for
every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful
neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that
duty.
7. Topacio v.
FACTS:
Topacio implored the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate
post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Judge Ong. He points
out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for
appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has
failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong, on the other hand,
avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him as
a natural-born citizen. The decision having become final, he caused
the corresponding annotation thereof in his Certificate of Birth. The
OSG informed Topacio that it cannot favorably act on request for the
filing of a quo warranto petition until the RTC case shall have been
terminated with finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is a proper party in a quo warranto
position.
RULING:
The Court held this case dismissible even if the treated as one for quo
warranto.
Quo warranto is brought against the person who is alleged to have
usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public
office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
For a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing
must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a
mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum
of legal ground to proceed with the action.
Petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of
an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
12. People v. Cuaresma
FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal of Dumaguete City filed an information on the basis of
sworn affidavits with the City Court Judge charging Cuaresma with
criminal case of oral defamation. Cuaresma moved to quash the case
contending that the case had been commenced by an information by
the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party as required by
Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The Judge denied the motion
and required the fiscal to file the verified complaint within ten days.
The fiscal complied with the order by filing the needed document on
the same day.
Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months later alleging
that the offense had prescribed since the filing of the original
information on August 2, 1978 did not interrupt the running of the
period of prescription of the crime (two months from discovery) and
that said prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the submission
of the corrective complaint on august 4, 1980. Judge granted her the
motion stating that “it was the filing of the verified that conferred
jurisdiction upon the Court and this was on August 4, 1980”.
The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube 26, 1981
which was denied for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time. Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as filed
by the Second Assistant City Fiscal three years after the dismissal of
the motion to reconsider.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the writ for certiorari is proper?
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary
judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No, the Court held that it is improper in the following counts:
1. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor General instead
of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and was dismissible on this account.
PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated, but it is, as intended by the framers of the Constitution,
an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.

2. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer

exercising judicial functions or of any judge which are claimed to be
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. In the case at bar, the correct procedure is the filing of an
appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in law and not grave
abuse of discretion.

3. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs (e.g.

certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is not exclusive and granted to lower
courts.

There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative

of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy.

17. Macalintal v. PET

FACTS:
Atty. Macalintal, in questioning the constitutionality of PET,
highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Buac vs.
COMELEC which declared that contests involving the President and
the Vice-President fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
PET in the exercise of quasi-judicial power. On this point, petitioner
reiterated that the constitution of PET, with the designation of the
Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof,
contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of
other Courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court, in acting as PET, exercise quasi-
judicial power in violation of Section 12, Article VII?

RULING:
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what
is essentially a judicial power. The present Constitution has allocated
to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial