ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

A Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court that directed the
Judicial and Bar Council to resume proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. A shortlist of nominees
was submitted to the incumbent President. Strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J.
Puno’s successor arose. Petitioners argued that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec.
15, and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended a ban on presidential two-month midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, contending that the principle of stare decisis
is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
This view, however, seemingly conflicts with Sec 4(1), Art VIII, which provides that any vacancy
in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Sec 9, Art VIII,
which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from
submission by the JBC of the list of nominees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court is bound and controlled by precedents.

RULING:

The Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court is not obliged to follow a particular decision blindly that it determines,
after re-examination, to call for a rectification. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision
may be observed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are
relevant. The Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. The Constitutional Commission confined
the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. Section 4(1) and Section 9,
Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90days from
the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of
the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, the JBC must submit to the President the
list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court to enable the President to appoint one of
them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to
submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs because that shortens the 90-day period
allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will
be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the
President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.