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Aytona vs. Castillo

Red herring

President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the

Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath. The following day,
President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office and he issued Administrative Order No. 2
recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia.
President Macapagal then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central
Bank. ​Aytona instituted a quo warranto, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the
powers of Governor of the Central Bank. He claimed that he was validly appointed and
the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because the position
was then occupied by him. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been
revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real issue is whether
the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim
appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already
qualified.

Issue: Whether the appointment made by President Garcia is valid.

Ruling:
NO. Section 10, paragraph 4, article VII, of the Constitution which provides that the President
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress. There seems to be no doubt that the President may
make the appointment, and if approved by the Commission on Appointments, it would
unquestionably be lawful, valid and effective, but if disapproved or not acted upon by the
Commission on Appointments then the appointment becomes ineffectual and the appointee
ceases and can no longer perform the duties of the office to which he had been appointed. Ad
interim appointments that the President may make during the recess of the Congress are those
made during a period of time from the adjournment of the Congress to the opening session,
regular or special, of the same Congress. In other words, if the President had convened in a
special session the fourth Congress whose term was to expire on the 30th of December 1961
and during such session the ad interim appointments had been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments there would be little doubt that the appointments would be lawful and valid.

Therefore, the appointment made by President Garcia is not valid since the Commission on
Appointment did not approve such.

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In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido

Vallarta
Argumentum ad verecundiam

The Resolution of the Court En Banc are the appointments signed by the President which states
the appointment of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court. The said appointment was made 2 months before the next presidential
elections which was imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, that two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Issue: ​Whether or not the appointment made by the President to fill vacancies in the
judiciary in view of Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII during the period of the ban in the
interest of public service is valid​.

Ruling:
NO. Section 4(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that ​the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. During the period stated in Section
15. Article VII of the Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end his term” — the President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that
the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every six years. Section 15, Article VI is directed
against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for
partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses
in the Omnibus Election Code. Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not
only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their making — but also appointments of the Presidential election.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making of ​temporary
appointments to ​executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.​ Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the
President during the period of the ban. Considering the respective reasons for the time frames
for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President’s power of appointments, it

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is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for
avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. ​Temporary
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out,
comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower
courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are
long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making
is considered an election offense. To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative
need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the
Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it
will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question requiring
expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section
15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.

Therefore, the appointment made by the President to fill vacancies in the judiciary in view of
Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII during the period of the ban in the interest of public service is
unconstitutional.

Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Post hoc

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from
the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of
the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to
invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to
the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being
unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the
shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.

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A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to
here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII
prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.

Issue: Whether or not the principle of stare decisis is controlling, hence, the Court has erred in
disobeying or abandoning the decision in Valenzuela case.

Ruling:
NO. ​Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisiset non quietamovere,​ i.e.,
to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a
principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the
decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless
and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the
decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably
not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. Judicial decisions assume the same
authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those
called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. ​In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts,
but the courts of coordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not
bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court,
as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. ​Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision
that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. ​A judicial pronouncement in
an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is
for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not
to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the
Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently
forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify
or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.

Therefore, the principle of stare decisis is not controlling, because of the innate authority of the
Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division.

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Grande vs. Antonio

Vicious Abstraction

Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children were not expressly
recognized by Antonio as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
Grande left for the United States with her two children. Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court. ​The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Antonio, "the
evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted
if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]”.

Issue: Whether or not ​father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.

Ruling:
NO. Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children ​may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before
the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. In the case at bar, respondent filed
a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for
the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is
enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken
to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname,
therefore, has no legal basis.

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On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children.

Therefore, the father has no right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.

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